UNITED STATES - REPUBLIC OF KOREA SECURITY RELATIONS: POLICY/STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

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**Abstract:**

US domestic budget difficulties, and growing East Asian economic might now require the US to change its security relationship with South Korea. The ROK's growing global stature, its economic vitality, and military strength indicate it is ready to take a more pronounced role in its own self-defense. US-ROK relations must become more reciprocal, giving the ROK more decision-sharing opportunities. The Nunn-Warner report does not go far enough in prescribing a US strategy toward East Asia in the next century. US must take a more active role in diplomatic initiatives aimed at reducing tensions in East Asia, specifically the Korean peninsula. The US and the ROK should be developing combined strategies to deal with an eventual Korean unification. These two allies should also begin developing arms control strategies for the Korean peninsula. US should facilitate better ROK-Japan security relations. US should maintain diligence in Korea until North Korea opens.

**Supplementary Notation:**


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<thead>
<tr>
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**DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT:**

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Executive Summary of
U.S.-R.O.K. SECURITY RELATIONS:
POLICY/STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

The Cold War is over. After more than forty years of competition and confrontation throughout the world, the United States and the Soviet Union are now involved in substantive dialogue.

The interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China intersect Northeast Asia, especially the Korean peninsula. The peninsula's volatility commands these nations' military attention, its prosperity attracts their economic interests, and its political transformations beckons their diplomatic overtures.

In the US, much has been written about the need to focus on internal problems and shift external security burdens to others. The US's security relationship with the ROK must take on a new perspective as the ROK experiences dramatic economic growth, continues to post trade surpluses with the US, becomes a more prominent international player, and the North Korean threat takes on a different regional perspective.

Given the the rapidly changing international security environment, and the forecasted domestic budget constraints, what should be the United States' national security policy toward South Korea into the next century?

US interests in the ROK clearly comprise a large portion of US regional interests. Through the US-ROK Mutual Defense
Treaty and the basing of troops in South Korea, Washington projects its commitment to protect the ROK and US forces from attack by the DPRK. This presence has been exceptionally effective, having prevented another conflict on the Korean peninsula for the past thirty seven years.

Our national security strategy should call for establishing more balanced security partnerships with our allies. By looking to our economic well-being as the foundation of our long term strength, it is appropriate to expect our regional allies with thriving economies to assume a larger portion of their defense costs, particularly those associated with US force presence.

The primary threats to US interests in East Asia generally take on military or economic forms. The future global environment is likely to be more heavily influenced by economic rather than military issues. Despite this expectation, the present sizes of standing armies around the world, especially those of the East Asian nations, pose threatening contingencies for US policy makers. The Gross National Products (GNP) of the US, Japan, and the ROK combined constitute 40% of the world's GNP. This figure is forecasted to constitute greater than half the world's GNP by the year 2010. From purely a US economic perspective, the region's stability is imperative to US security.

An important facet of our future national security policy toward the ROK is our ally's forecasted ability to provide for
its own defense. US forward deployed forces in South Korea have provided the deterrence and operational leadership required to prevent another Korean War over the past forty years. During this timespan the ROK armed forces, much like South Korean development in general, have grown to a sizeable and credible entity. Despite the recent weapons modernizations by both Koreas, and the anticipated growth of future ROK and DPRK defense outlays, the ROK will soon surpass the DPRK in terms of military expenditures and capabilities.

Perhaps one of the most delicate issues facing the US as it reassesses security policies in Northeast Asia is the relationship between the Republic of Korea and Japan. While the two nations are the region's most prosperous, there are some very peculiar interdependencies which undergird their economic, political and security relations.

There is no reason to believe American interests in the region will vanish overnight, so it is probably safe to envision the present relationships remaining as they are for the foreseeable future.

The US's relationships with Japan and Korea have been strained over the past few years over growing concern regarding the trade deficits between the US and its Northeast Asian allies. Three separate but related issues serve to underscore problems with US-ROK trade-security linkages: (1) ROK economic growth and the corresponding trade imbalances with the US, (2) a rise in ROK nationalism and recent anti-Americanism brought
about by ROK economic growth and confidence, (3) reduced East-West military tensions and a popular US misperception that these reduced tensions have carried over to the Korean peninsula.

Recently there has been substantive progress toward the eventual reunification of the peninsula. At the center of the action, the two Koreas have exchanged proposals which would encourage eventual unification.

This study reaches the following conclusions:

The changing world order poses unique but manageable problems for the US. As a result of this changing world order, US worldwide security commitments must change.

As Seoul approaches normalized diplomatic relations with Moscow, Pyongyang's plight will be exacerbated. This situation should assist Seoul in developing relations with Pyongyang.

The US must maintain its focus on its interests in Northeast Asia. The Pacific Rim, particularly Northeast Asia, will become increasingly important to the economic well-being of the United States. Strategically, US posture toward Northeast Asia should not change.

Recommendations for future US-ROK security relations include:

Seoul's changing global stature requires the US to adopt a relationship of more equal footing with the ROK. Seoul-Washington relations should be more candid, forthright and reciprocal.
Speaking in terms of US forces in Korea, US policy makers must realize that changes in Eastern Europe did not occur because the US reduced its presence in Europe. The same patience and diligence which kept the peace and eventually contributed to the collapse of communism in Europe must be exhibited in Korea, with the same conviction.

Rather than restructuring on a calendar timetable, it should be done according to changes in North Korean behavior. Our force restructuring should avoid precipitating a regional arms race to fill any void created by a hasty US withdrawal.

As the ROK decides to contribute more to combined defense, it should also be given a greater share of the decisionmaking toward combined defense.

The US and the ROK should begin to formulate strategies to deal with the eventual unification of the Korean peninsula. Arms control strategies should be developed and possible diplomatic initiatives explored.

The US should undertake diplomatic initiatives to interest the PRC, USSR, the ROK, and DPRK in substantive talks to lower the overall level of tensions in the region.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Question</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope and Limitations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-East Asian Interests</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Interests in the ROK</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing US Regional Interests</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in the Military Component</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in the Economic Order</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>REGIONAL POWERS AND THEIR INTERESTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet Union</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>THREATS TO US INTERESTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Threats</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Threats</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>PROSPECTS FOR ROK SELF-DEFENSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Assessment</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK-DPRK Military Capabilities</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Political Factors</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK-DPRK Intentions</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Military Trends</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Shortcomings</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Arms Issues</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>ROK-JAPANESE REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ongoing Cooperative Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limits to ROK-GOJ Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>ECONOMICS AND SECURITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROK-US Trade Security Linkages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>KOREAN UNIFICATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US, Soviet, and Chinese Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nunn-Warner Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II-1</td>
<td>US Interests in East Asia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-1</td>
<td>Soviet Forces in Asia</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-2</td>
<td>Chinese Regional Forces</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-1</td>
<td>North Korean-South Korean Military Comparison - January 1990</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII-1</td>
<td>US-ROK Trade Balance 1986-90</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII-2</td>
<td>Defense Expenditures as a Share of Gross National Product, 1982-87</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The Cold War is over. After more than forty years of competition and toe-to-toe military confrontation throughout the world, punctuated by small "hot wars" in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, the United States and the Soviet Union are now involved in substantive dialogue and the majority of Soviet satellite nations have rejected the Soviet Union's communist ideology. Tensions have been greatly reduced, strategic nuclear and conventional force reduction talks are ongoing, and it appears a superpower peace is attainable.

As the superpowers begin to adjust to changing roles in a changing world order, two staunch US Asian allies, Japan and Korea are slowing down from a decade of tremendous growth. This growth has catapulted these two nations into the forefront of global affairs. The interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China intersect Northeast Asia, especially Korean peninsula. The peninsula's volatility commands these nations' military attention, its prosperity attracts their economic interests, and the its political transformations beckon their diplomatic overtures.
The US has had a particular affinity for the region for over 100 years. Since the end of the Second World War, the US has committed military, economic, and diplomatic energies to Northeast Asia. Playing a primary role in the disarmament of the Japanese Imperial Army, which ultimately led to the unintentional division of the Korean peninsula, the US supervised the reformation of Japan. Five years later the US spent blood and treasure in the defense of the Republic of Korea. The US’s active participation in these two significant events served to inextricably link US economic, military, and diplomatic interests to the region.

As the Cold War continued, and the US maintained its diligent efforts to contain Soviet Communism around the world, our Korean and Japanese allies developed economically into the industrial powerhouses they are today. In both cases, the US provided their security and allowed them to concentrate their efforts on economic growth and development.

As the US and the Soviet Union take stock of their Cold War experiences, the two now stand economically strained facing a world which now places greater emphasis on economic strength. In the US, much has been written about the need to focus on internal problems and shift external security burdens to others. A US with a "budget deficit that limits available resources, monstrous trade imbalances which undermine American alliances, and a number of simmering crises that threaten peace," has been forced to reexamine its foreign policy.
This study is intended to contribute to this reexamination. The specific focus here is on the restructuring of the US's national security policy toward the Republic of Korea (ROK). The US's security relationship with the ROK must take on a new perspective as the ROK experiences dramatic economic growth, continues to post trade surpluses with the US, becomes a more prominent international player, and the North Korean threat takes on a different regional perspective.

THE QUESTION
Given the parameters previously mentioned, the rapidly changing international security environment, and the forecasted domestic budget constraints, what should be the United States' national security policy toward the South Korea into the next century?

PURPOSE
This purpose of this study is to examine the most prominent issues facing US-ROK security relationship, and as a working "think piece," assist in the development of new guidelines for the conduct of US-ROK security relations. Policy recommendations will be presented which may be of use to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in the formulation and execution of US national security policy.

APPROACH
This study will follow a specific path in examining
important issues bearing on US-ROK security relations. This path will use these steps:

1. US national interests in Northeast Asia generally and in South Korea specifically will be defined. The changing nature of regional economic and military components of US interests will also be examined.

2. Regional geostrategic players and their interests in the region will be addressed. Their interests will be compared with US interests.

3. Identify those threats which directly impact on US interests. Specific Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean military threats are identified, as well as regional economic threats.

4. ROK self-defense capabilities will be examined through a net assessment addressing ROK-DPRK military capabilities, economic and political factors, ROK-DPRK intentions, future military trends, ROK military shortcomings, and nuclear issues.

5. ROK-Government of Japan (GOJ) regional cooperation will be examined, with emphasis on ongoing cooperative arrangements and limits to ROK-GOJ cooperation.

6. The relationship between economics and security is especially important to this study. In the case of US-ROK security relations the trade-security linkages will be brought out, with emphasis on the burden sharing issue.

7. Prospects for Korean unification will play an important role in future ROK-US relations, as Northeast Asian security issues take on new perspectives.
North-South dialogue and US, Soviet, and Chinese positions will be examined.

8. Conclusions will be drawn from the different areas of the paper. The Nunn-Warner report will be briefly explained and its strengths and weaknesses discussed. From the conclusions and the shortcomings of the Nunn-Warner report, policy recommendations for the future will be suggested.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

US-ROK security relations to date, their strengths and weaknesses, and the challenges which lie ahead will be reviewed. Examination of these issues will encompass diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power and their impact on this unique issue.

Statistical evidence to support some of the arguments will be presented. However, due to the wealth of documented information which applies to this topic, this study will not reiterate information already cited in documented source materials.

While intended to provide recommendations for the improvement and maturation of US-ROK security relations, a specific policy will not be mapped out. Rather, changes or alterations to present policy which reflect the present day issues bearing on this policy will be recommended. The study is intended to be more prescient than the Nunn-Warner report.

ASSUMPTIONS

The primary assumption here is that present US security
policy toward South Korea requires comprehensive restructuring. This effort must take into consideration:

1. The changing global military threat to the US and its allies, specifically the threats in Northeast Asia. Prospects for normalization of Soviet-ROK relations, and their impact on possible Korean unification should be analyzed.

2. US budget deficits and their associated drain on available financial resources will continue to constrain US security spending.

3. Growing ROK nationalism, domestic racial problems, and ROK economic strength will encourage the restructuring or reduction of our presence in Northeast Asia/Korea.

4. The changing regional security environment involves these developments:
   - The Soviet threat is diminishing; improved Sino-Soviet relations and stated Soviet intentions bear this out.
   - Continuing assessments of the North Korean threat indicate that the ROK may soon be able to provide for its own defense.
   - Closer North Korea-China alignment, a result of changes in Eastern Europe, complicates regional issues.

5. South Korea's growing economy and desire for a greater responsibility for its own defense suggest that it merits a larger burdensharing role.
ORGANIZATION

This study is organized into nine chapters, each addressing specific issues. This chapter serves as the roadmap for the rest of the study. It provides a brief background to the question and the framework under which the research will progress.

Drew and Snow are drawn upon to define US national interests in Chapter 2. Three categories of interests are used to assess US interests in Northeast Asia and Korea specifically. Changes in the military and economic elements of US interests are also addressed.

The regional powers and their respective interests are identified in Chapter 3. Soviet, Chinese and Japanese interests and their impact on ROK-US relations are specified.

Threats to US interests are examined in Chapter IV. Specific Soviet, Chinese and DPRK military capabilities and a few economic threat scenarios and their impact on US interests are outlined.

The prospects for ROK self-defense are discussed in the fifth chapter. By way of a ROK-DPRK net assessment, a prognosis for eventual ROK self-defense is provided. Future military trends and personal observations by visitors to North Korea are used to assess DPRK intentions.

The prospects for ROK-GOJ regional cooperation are assessed in Chapter 6. Ongoing cooperative arrangements and present limitations to increased sharing of regional security
responsibilities are depicted.

ROK-US economic and security relationships are addressed in Chapter 7. The prominence of trade-security linkages are examined, and their impact on future ROK-US security policy is explained. This is an area of increased importance in US-ROK security affairs.

The prospects for unification of the Korean peninsula are examined in Chapter 8. Inter-Korean dialogue, as well as Soviet, US and Chinese perspectives are addressed. The roles of the regional powers in this important process are also outlined.

The final chapter presents conclusions drawn from the study's discussions and arguments. These conclusions are applied to the present state of US-ROK relations, the direction they should take, and the roles each ally will play in the future. In the course of drawing these conclusions, a brief analysis of the Nunn-Warner report will be provided. The chapter will also offer policy recommendations which applicable into the next century.
CHAPTER I NOTES


CHAPTER II

DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS

In assessing the purpose for the US presence in Northeast Asia, and South Korea specifically, US interests in the region must be identified. Drew and Snow refer to national interests as the ends of grand strategy. They divide national interests into survival, vital, major, and peripheral interests. Donald Nuechterlein, cited by Drew and Snow, defines these categories of interests in the following fashion:

**Survival Interest:** That which exists when the physical existence of a country is in jeopardy due to attack or threat of attack.

**Vital Interest:** Circumstances when serious harm to the nation would result unless strong measures, including the use of force, are employed to protect the interest.

**Major Interest:** Situations where a country's political, economic, or social well-being may be adversely affected but where the use of armed force is not deemed necessary to avoid adverse outcomes.

For the purposes of this study, only the categories of survival, vital, and major will be examined, as these are the variants which the authors apply specifically to Northeast Asia.

US-EAST ASIAN INTERESTS

President Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney have
recently published two pivotal documents which clearly identify US interests in the region. The President's National Security Strategy of The United States, published in March of this year, specifies broad national interests and attaches objectives to insure the maintenance of these interests. By comparing the President's National Strategy with Secretary Cheney's recently published A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century, national interests in Northeast Asia were derived and are shown in Table II-1.

**TABLE II-1**

**US INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA**

* Protect the US From Attack.
* Support Our Global Deterrence Policy.
* Preserving Our Political and Economic Access.
* Maintaining the Balance of Power to Prevent the Rise of any Regional Hegemony.
* Strengthening the Western Orientation of the Asian Nations.
* Fostering the Growth of Democracy and Human Rights.
* Deterring Nuclear Proliferation.
* Ensuring Freedom of Navigation.
Secretary Cheney's document, also known as the Nunn-Warner Report, was directed by the fiscal year 1990 Defense Department authorization bill and required the President to articulate the administration's five year strategy for US military presence in East Asia. Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner were chief sponsors of the provision.³

Regional interests which can be categorized as survival would be protecting the US from attack, supporting its global deterrence policy, and maintaining the balance of power to prevent the rise of any regional hegemony. More specifically, the US must protect itself from an attack by another nation. By the forward deployment of US forces in Japan and the ROK, the US is clearly demonstrating its commitment to global deterrence. By maintaining strong alliances with Japan and the ROK, essentially ensuring their regional strength, the US is maintaining a pronounced regional balance of power which prevents any regional hegemony. The US presence in the region and its alliances with South Korea and Japan preclude any military hegemonic threat from Japan as well.

Vital regional interests are the deterrence of nuclear proliferation and ensuring freedom of navigation. By protecting Japan and South Korea from attack by any regional adversary, the US is demonstrating a vital interest. The US is legally bound to this interest by its mutual defense treaties with Japan and the ROK. Through the US possessing a nuclear capability, and maintaining a presence in the region, its
allies fall under the US nuclear umbrella. Just as important, the US naval presence in the region insures its navigational freedom, as well as that of its allies, Japan and Korea. This interest continues to be vividly demonstrated by the US presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. This presence secured the uninterrupted flow of oil from the gulf to its Northeast Asian allies, who remain critically dependent on this source for their oil imports.

Major regional interests are the preservation of our political and economic access to the region, strengthening the Western orientation of the Asian nations, and fostering the growth of democracy and human rights. As economic strength is becoming a more critical element of global power, the US's ability to maintain both economic and political access to Northeast Asia is imperative. While its security alliances with the ROK and Japan serve to maintain the political access, being the largest trading partner of these countries insures its economic access. As democratization in the ROK in 1988 and the democratic movement in Beijing in 1989 demonstrate, the US continues to support the western orientation of the Asian nations. This is particularly important as relations between the Soviets and the ROK grow. US support of these political developments in the ROK and the PRC clearly shows US commitment to democratic values and human rights.

These US regional interests are shaped by economic interests in the region, primarily its strong trade
relationships, and its time-tested series of bilateral security agreements with several nations in East Asia. The US is committed to security treaties with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia (under the provisions of the ANZUS, where the US has suspended its security obligation to New Zealand). These commitments, formed in the early years of the Cold War, were developed principally to support the US strategy of containment of Soviet expansionism. This strategy is comprised of a network of security relationships which recognizes the disparate cultures, political systems, and levels of economic development of our allies. With the exception of Vietnam, the strategy has been tremendously successful in fulfilling its intended objectives: containing the Soviet Union and deterring another war in Korea. Our presence has also contributed to regional peace, stability, and prosperity by serving as the regional "balancer". 

US interests have taken on different complexions within the past year, due largely to the recent unexpected changes in Eastern Europe, the dramatic growth over the last decade of East Asian newly industrialized countries (NIC's), and our heightened awareness of the nation's domestic fiscal difficulties.

US INTERESTS IN THE ROK

projects its commitment to protect the ROK and US forces from attack by the DPRK. With its forces manning the security of the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom, and occupying defensive positions which straddle the main North Korean avenues of approach, the US also signals its resolve to demonstrate its global deterrence policy. This presence has been exceptionally effective, having prevented another conflict on the Korean peninsula for the past thirty seven years.

The preservation of US economic and political access is extremely critical as Northeast Asia, and Korea particularly, continue to grow in economic stature. As Secretary Cheney's strategic framework explicitly mentions, the US is not in the ROK purely by altruism. The US presence on the peninsula sets the stage for its economic involvement in the region.6

Vitally important and a serious complication, the supposed development of nuclear weapons by the DPRK provides the US rationale for its resolve to deter nuclear proliferation on the peninsula. Despite the DPRK signing of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement, they have failed to faithfully implement the agreement by denying the International Atomic Energy Commission opportunities to verify their compliance. This contradicts their stated policies of nonproliferation and seeking a nuclear free zone on the peninsula.

Equally important is US naval presence and its contribution by insuring the freedom of navigation not only for US merchant shipping, but that of Korean merchant shipping also.

15
CHANGING US REGIONAL INTERESTS

The US is now facing a period in which its economic and military effectiveness is being questioned. Economically, the US can no longer support growing budgets with increased deficits. At the same time, the costs of US national security are becoming exponentially more expensive. With the recent events in Eastern Europe and the economic ills of the Soviet Union, these costs may not prove as imperative as in earlier years. These same rising security costs are at the root of our fiscal ills, and must be remedied.

Our allies in East Asia, as well as NATO, are experiencing great economic prosperity, yet continue to rely heavily on US-furnished security. Professor Paul Kennedy argues that the US is now facing a challenge which has historically confronted "governing bodies of the world". That threefold challenge is the ability to "simultaneously provide military security for its national interests, satisfy the socioeconomic needs of its citizenry, and to ensure sustained growth." Professor Edward A. Olsen, a noted East Asian scholar, has also noted this US position in several of his writings on US-ROK relations. He is most vocal in noting that this change in global economic order requires a change in US interests, placing economics before military and political interests. There are counter arguments to Kennedy's theory, the most noteworthy being Joseph Nye's "The Misleading Metaphor of Decline," published in the March 1990 The Atlantic Monthly.
Mr. Nye's position is that the US is not in decline and can afford both social and international security. As Chapter VII will discuss, US-ROK trade-security linkages should be revisited as the US faces a period of limited economic resources from which to fund social and national security programs.

CHANGES IN THE MILITARY ORDER

The regional military environment has changed very little over the past decade. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) still poses the most volatile threat to US interests in the region. As are other socialist economies, the DPRK is close to insolvency and relies on foreign military sales to generate the cash needed to do business on the global market. A vivid example of Pyongyang's economic difficulty is its failure to repay its debts to its largest creditor, Japan. After facing a severe economic crisis in 1976, the DPRK renegotiated its debt payments to Japan in 1979 and 1983. After each renegotiation, they failed to service the debt. This crisis has prevented them from obtaining desperately needed technology to modernize their industry. Pyongyang's fiscal problems will restrict its ability to keep pace with Seoul's military modernization efforts over the next decade. DPRK relations with Moscow are strained, due to the political liberalization taking place in the USSR and the successful trade relations Moscow enjoys with Seoul. Having benefitted from Soviet-supplied weapons modernization prior to
the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the DPRK will not enjoy such privileges over the next decade as a result of strained USSR-DPRK relations. As a result, Pyongyang has more closely aligned itself with Beijing in the past year.\footnote{11} Moscow has replaced its military adventurism with economic "gladhanding" in the region. Albeit there has not been an observable decline in Soviet forces in the Soviet Far East Military District which fronts Japan, there have been unilateral force reductions on the USSR-PRC border. What may be more important are little known Soviet efforts toward brokering North-South dialogue.\footnote{12} In June 1989 Kim Young Sam, then leader of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and now leader of the new Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), made a trip to Moscow at the invitation of academic Yevgeni Primakov. During the visit, Moscow orchestrated meetings between Kim and North Korean Ambassador to Moscow as well as the Chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland. The outcome of these closely coordinated meetings were a series of proposed meetings between functionaries of both countries as well as a summit meeting between Roh Tae Woo and Kim Il Sung. What perhaps was even more important was that Kim's meetings with the North Koreans were not revealed until he arrived in the United States after leaving Moscow. The appearance of Moscow mediating between Seoul and Pyongyang seemed very substantial.

At the same time, the PRC has been involved in a protracted
retrenchment since the repression of political liberalizations last June. This orientation toward domestic affairs has caused China to develop isolationist policies of "self-reliance," not unlike those of North Korea's Juche. The PRC will remain in a state of transition until Deng Xiaoping passes from control. In the interim, although it would appear Beijing welcomes the DPRK as an ideological ally, it cannot support Pyongyang militarily or economically.

While the prospects for lessening of military tensions in other parts of the world seem verifiable, the hostilities between North and South Korea and their impact on US interests will continue to play out as the most prominent military issue for the US in the region.

CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC ORDER

The economic and trade elements of our national interests are no less important. US policy makers and academics alike are now realizing that our security policy toward East Asia over the past twenty years has enabled our closest allies to devote vast amounts of energy and treasure to their economic development without having the corresponding responsibility of national defense. This policy, together with other trade issues has contributed to our allies gaining trade advantages over the US.

Our national security strategy should call for establishing more balanced partnerships with our allies. By looking to our economic well-being as the foundation of our long term
strength, it is appropriate to expect our regional allies with thriving economies to assume a larger portion of their defense costs, particularly those associated with US force presence. This could serve to lessen the burden on any one country and allow for increased responsibilities on the part of our allies. To date our philanthropic provision of military security in the region, as well as trade imbalances, has contributed to our recent regional alliance strains and fiscal difficulties.¹³

Noted scholars support this idea. As Dr. Olsen argued, our present relationships with Japan and Korea must be reprioritized, placing economics first, ¹⁴ Professor Chalmers Johnson of the University of California, Berkeley, a noted East Asian-Japanese scholar, cites the Japanese as being "...not exceptionally clever, only exceptionally lucky in that the Americans are still paying for their defense and buying more of their products than anyone else. With such a rich uncle taking care of them, the Japanese have never had to grow up."¹⁵ Dr. Johnson has adopted a descriptive characterization of the US role in Japanese security - that of "Japan's Ghurka," referring of course to Japan's ability to concentrate its economic wherewithal to global trade and economic development while the US shoulders its security burdens.¹⁶ This relationship is changing rapidly, toward a more balanced sharing of security responsibilities. DOD's recently published Strategic Framework For The Asian Pacific Rim addresses these changing
relationships based upon the changing economic order within the region over the next decade. This changing economic order also involves the other geostrategic players in the region, the PRC and the USSR, although their positions within this order are less pronounced. These other regional interests will be addressed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER II NOTES


2Drew and Snow, pp. 29-30.


4International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington D.C., April 1990), pp. 77,80,139.


6A Strategic Framework, p. 8.


22
CHAPTER II NOTES

10See A. Mashin, "North Korea: Legend and Reality," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Moscow Argumenty i Fakty, No. 13, 31 March-6 April 1990, pp. 4, 5. and "Soviet Media Introduces DPRK Elections, People's Life," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Moscow International Service in Korean, 10 April 1990, 0900 GMT. Both translations are extremely critical of Kim Il-Sung, the DPRK economy, and the quality of life in the DPRK.


14Olsen, p. xi.


16The term "Japan's Ghurka" was mentioned by Dr. Edward Olsen in an interview at the Naval Postgraduate School, 26 April 1990. Dr. Johnson had used the term recently at a conference held in Monterey sponsored by the Chief of Staff of the Army. The focus of the conference was the exchange of ideas between senior Army leaders in the Pacific and leading East Asian scholars.
CHAPTER III

REGIONAL POWERS AND THEIR INTERESTS

Northeast Asia is the sole location on the globe where the interests of all the major powers converge. Today, as in the past, Northeast Asia and especially the Korean Peninsula, is of major importance to the global superpowers. The peninsula has key meaning not only for the US, but Japan, China (PRC) and the Soviet Union as well. In absolute terms, the geostrategic interests of each of these major powers center on the Korean peninsula. This region has military and economic significance for each of these major powers. As the USSR slowly progresses through Perestroika and Glasnost, its need to develop capital markets is imperative. Mikhail L. Titarenko mentioned this overwhelming need in his article "Asian and Korean Security and Stability," in the Summer 1989 edition of Korea and World Affairs. The East Asian countries, Japan and Korea especially, offer the Soviet Union the needed capital and developmental opportunties. As such, Moscow is fervently developing economic/trade relations with the East Asian nations, with the ROK in particular. At the same time, the lessening of military tensions in Eastern Europe has had an effect on military relations between the PRC and the USSR, as recent events indicate.1

24
The PRC, after indications of several years of remarkable reform and self-improvement, dramatically and abruptly reversed course in June of 1989. The resulting trade restraints imposed on the PRC by the US and other western nations after the events at Tienanmen Square have hampered their economic growth. Coupled with the Chinese government's austerity program, imposed in the fall of 1988, these sanctions have contributed to the flat industrial output of the Chinese economy over the past year. Another example of the effect of foreign sanctions and domestic austerity is the severe drop in the tourism trade and its effect on the financing of private and sovereign debt, currently valued at $41.3 billion. Social requirements continue to mount, as unemployment mounts, brought on by the austerity program's effect on production. Their close ties to the DPRK, having grown even more close since the collapse of Eastern Europe, burdens them with another basket case they can ill-afford to support.

Japan also is not without its difficulties. Quite aware of the ramifications that developments on the Korean peninsula present to their government, the Government of Japan (GOJ) watches the two Koreas very closely. Economically, Japan is the largest creditor in the world, as well as the leader in developmental assistance. But at the same time, the GOJ is facing problems at home. The Nikkei stock market average has suffered a 30% loss, the yen is weakening, their work force is
aging faster than any on earth, and their housing market woes are stimulating domestic discontent. 6 Couple this situation with the US's demands that the GOJ contribute a larger share for its defense and Japan's growing anticipation of Gorbachev's planned visit to Tokyo in the Spring of 1991, their concerns are very complex.

ROK and DPRK interests are quite obvious, but will only be mentioned briefly in this chapter. Detailed descriptions of their interests, capabilities, and a net assessment will be provided in later chapters of this paper. In short, both nations desire unification, but the means by which to accomplish this goal and the resulting government are quite divergent. By examining the interests of the major powers, perhaps we can better understand their impact on the interests of the two Koreas.

THE SOVIET UNION

Soviet policy toward the Far East was pronounced most articulately by General Secretary Gorbachev in his July 1986 Vladivostok and September 1988 Krasnoyarsk speeches. In both addresses he emphasized that Moscow's political, economic, and military interests increasingly will be tied to the Far East and the Pacific. 7

As indicated in Gorbachev's speeches, The Soviet Union will make serious attempts at reducing its troop strength in the region, advancing numerous arms control and confidence-building
proposals, and seeking to improve its relations with China. In addition, Moscow will suggest political solutions to regional conflicts and seek to develop new contacts with a wider range of regional nations. Of greatest importance economically, the Soviets will actively promote greater Soviet participation in the Asian-Pacific economy. Events of the past four years has demonstrated the Soviet resolve to pursue these goals, sometimes at the risk of alienating previously friendly nations (e.g., North Korea in the instance of Seoul-Moscow relations).

The USSR continues to have vital interest in the defense of its borders, as demonstrated by its resistance to decrease the force levels in the Far East Military District over the past decade. The troop withdrawals on the Chinese border, despite their significance to Sino-Soviet relations, actually do not have a significant impact on East Asian relations per se, as these forces were not oriented toward East Asia. The effect of these troop reductions on confidence-building in the region cannot be downplayed, however.

As many analysts of Soviet-East Asian Affairs have noted, the Soviet economic crisis is fundamentally responsible for Moscow's newly developed interest in the region and the Soviet's improved relations with all powers in the area. Closer ties to Japan, Korea and other newly industrialized countries (NIC's) in the region provide a better opportunity to penetrate capital markets and gain cash, technology, and development of new industries in the Soviet Union. This fact
must be kept in mind when attempting to understand the Soviet "New Thinking." 9

In addition to Moscow's economic woes, they continue to be concerned with the balance of power in the region. Sharing the other superpowers' interest of insuring that no country in the region develop a power advantage over the others, General Secretary Gorbachev pledged in the May 1988 summit with President Reagan to continue discussions to assist both Koreas to find peaceful solutions for their independence, freedom, and security. 10 Another aspect of this concern, and one which may alleviate many fears in East Asia, is the Soviet-Japanese claim to the Northwest Territories. Gorbachev's visit to Japan, scheduled for the Spring of 1991, carries with it a great deal of expectation for the return of these islands to Japanese control. Such a maneuver by the Soviet leader would contribute significantly to galvanizing Soviet-Japanese economic ties.

In terms of the Korean peninsula, Soviet influence upon the DPRK is waning. As Moscow-Seoul relations improve and the two countries move closer to full diplomatic relations, Soviet influence in the DPRK will quickly dissipate. Once key to the modernization of North Korean military weaponry, Moscow is viewed with increasing suspicion. As Foreign Broadcast Information Reports cited in Chapter II demonstrated, USSR-DPRK relations are at a nadir. This situation is due to the Perestroika and Glasnost occurring in the Soviet
Union. Such policies are considered unthinkable in the DPRK, as their present economic and political situations suggest. Due to this rift between the former close allies, Moscow can no longer be expected to furnish military hardware or economic support as they once did.

On the southern side of the DMZ, Moscow is enjoying unprecedented friendliness. First demonstrated at the 1988 Olympics, the South Korean love affair with the Soviet seems to know no bounds. ROK President Roh Tae Woo has eagerly supported Gorbachev's requests for direct investments, joint ventures, and trade. Such are Seoul-Moscow relations that permanent trade missions have been exchanged. These missions also are conducting operations normally reserved for full diplomatic missions, with the exception of flying national flags or conducting signal communications. In light of these developments, Moscow is cultivating a position with regard to the Koreas which could previously only be claimed by the United States - the one country in the region which could impartially represent the interests on the peninsula. We tend to call it being uniquely qualified to be the "honest broker." To date, our unwillingness to initiate pragmatic diplomatic initiatives with Pyongyang precludes us from truly making such a claim.

JAPAN

Japan has greatly benefitted from the US's forward deployed strategy. Economically and militarily, Japan has continually
spoken of its "comprehensive security," a strategy that includes economic assistance, defense forces and diplomacy. This concept of security, mentioned in Paul Kennedy's thesis, is timely and should maintain the Japanese in good posture well into the 21st century.

Japan's present defense policy, which is fiscally constrained by their constitution, focuses on the immediate threats to its export-based economy. Always wary of the Chinese to the West, and the Soviets immediately to their northern borders, Japan relies quite heavily on the US presence on their islands, and the US military capability in the region, especially its staunch posturing on the Korean peninsula.

Although Japan has committed itself to defend its sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles, any further development of a power projection capability is not in the best interests of the other regional nations. China, Korea, and the Philippines have clear memories of the World War II experience, and do not want any replication of past military experiences at the hands of the Japanese. The bilateral relations the GOJ shares with the US clearly augments the capabilities of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Certainly closer military relations with other regional nations such as the ROK would strengthen the regional might of the East Asian nations. But so far, cooperation of this sort has not been successful. The study will go into further detail on this aspect in Chapter VI.
Japan's interests in the region, in sum, are to maintain a military balance of power such as exists today. They seek to maintain access to markets throughout the world, with a concerted interest in the US market. On the Korean peninsula, Japan seeks to ease the hostilities between the two Koreas. Japan seeks to improve its dialogue with the USSR, in an attempt to permanently solve the Northern Territories dispute. At the same time, an improvement of relations with the PRC would expand trade opportunities and ease tensions simultaneously. Japan, which serves as the "engine" of the Asian-Pacific economic machine, is also at the hub of superpower regional interests. This is due largely to the GOJ's unique relations with each of the major players. This position will strengthen as Japan enters into more extensive economic relations with China and the Soviet Union.

CHINA

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Chinese interests are rooted in its four modernizations: agriculture, industry, science, and defense in this order. The challenges set forth by these modernizations are predicated by the Chinese' desire to propel themselves into the grouping of developed countries. This course will hopefully begin to develop non-military growth enterprises which will stimulate the economy and make it a competitor on the world market.
Approximately ten years ago, the Soviet and Chinese economies were at the same juncture in their development. Both economies teetering close to stagnation, both equally caught in the world recession. The leadership that Deng Xiaoping brought to China is largely credited with redirecting the country's revitalization. By instituting cultural liberalization and experimentation with Western ideas, including the conclusion of trade pacts with the US, the country began to grow and trade vigorously on a global scale. The events in Beijing last June ended that development, and the growth of their economy has faded. The rejuvenation of their economy, placing it in the framework of other superpower's economies, is the single most important interest within China today. The regional variables which impact upon this interest are many.

The People's Republic of China has no desire for military actions to recur on the Korean peninsula. Although aligned with the DPRK, the PRC does not consider their relations exceptionally strong. China is in favor of tension reduction on the peninsula, and played a significant role in using its good offices to foster tripartite talks between the US, ROK and DPRK in 1983. The Rangoon bombing ended all possibilities of those talks taking place.

The PRC is also a strong advocate of maintaining a balance of power in the region so that no nation is the dominant power in the region. During a recent visit to the US by the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, members of the
visiting delegation voiced their support of the US being an objective balancer in the region, especially with respect to the Korean peninsula. In the same context, they indicated their apprehensions regarding a Japanese military buildup.

However, they seemed very focused on the nature of the new world order. They appeared cognizant that this order was going to be less controlled by military than by economic forces. They readily acknowledged that those nations which could produce, market and control the transfer of technologies were going to be those which would have the leg up. Indicative of their understanding of their own shortcomings, the Chinese realize that those nations which utilized centrally controlled economies were going to be systemically handicapped in the global marketplace. Despite this claimed realization, the Chinese government has returned to a very centralized form of government and market control, brought on by last summer's events in Beijing.

In sum, Beijing's interests in the regions are very similar to the other major players in the region. With the notable exception of Japan, who would like to dramatically expand its economic dominance of the region, the major powers share much the same interests in the region. Balance of power, tension reduction on the Korean peninsula, and access to capital markets and technology are all interests of equal importance to these major players.
CHAPTER III NOTES

"Premier Li Visits Moscow for Talks with Gorbachev," The Korea Herald, 24 April 1990, pp. 1,5.


DOD, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, p. 4.


CHAPTER III NOTES


15 Roundtable Discussion Between The Beijing Institute For International Strategic Studies and The U. S. Naval War College Faculty and Students, Newport, RI, 12 May 1990.


35
CHAPTER IV

THREATS TO US INTERESTS

The primary threats to US interests in East Asia generally take on military or economic forms. Although ideological and political differences exist in the region, only those threats which appear to be the most serious will be addressed here. As mentioned previously, the global scene is likely to be more heavily influenced by economic issues rather than military. Despite this expectation, the present sizes of standing armies about the world, especially those of the East Asian nations, pose threatening contingencies for US policy makers.

This chapter will address the perceived economic and military threats facing US interests in East Asia, with emphasis on the Korean peninsula.

MILITARY THREATS

The Korean peninsula, occupying the geostrategic position it does, is exceptionally vulnerable to military hostilities. Ancient and recent history have proven this fact. As discussed in the last chapter, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the United States all possess interests which converge on the Korean peninsula. The Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, occupiers of the peninsula and beneficiaries of alliances with the major powers,
are the focus of these interests.

Seven of the ten largest armies in the world can focus their might on or within Asia.¹ Of these, the USSR, PRC, US, ROK, and DPRK have forces which are located in or are oriented towards Northeast Asia. Although not as large as the armed forces of these other powers, Japan's Self Defense Forces are formidable, well-equipped and capable of influencing military operations in the region. Japan's global economic strength and strong alliance with the US qualifies it as a major power.

Another indicator of the region's importance to the superpowers is the existing network of mutual defense treaties. The US shares mutual defense responsibilities with the ROK and Japan, while the DPRK shares similar alliances with the USSR and the PRC. While the US and its NATO allies have experienced a lessening of tensions with their Communist block adversaries in Europe, the same cannot be said of the tensions between the East and West camps in Northeast Asia. This and the DPRK's hostile posture has forced the US to give considerable attention to the military threats in Northeast Asia.

SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union poses the most demonstrable threat to US interests in the region. Despite its claims to have reduced forces in Asia, the capabilities contained in the Far East Military District appear to far exceed those needed for defense
(Table IV-1). Although Soviet attention is currently focused

TABLE IV-1

SOVIET FORCES IN ASIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUND FORCES</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver Divisions</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PACIFIC FLEET</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Ships, Vessel and Craft</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB/BN</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Subs</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Combatants</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support/Misc Craft</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft/Helicopters</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR FORCES</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters/Attack Aircraft</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Fighters</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


on internal economic and political priorities, weapons modernization programs continue. These programs, principally air and naval, will ensure a continued threat to our interests, allies, and forces in Northeast Asia. Although not poised to immediately influence operations on the Korean peninsula, these
Soviet forces can effectively launch offensive operations from the Northern Territories or from the Soviet mainland to the Japanese Islands. Likewise, Soviet air and naval forces have the capability to strike the Korean land mass. Although unlikely, these remain credible capabilities.

While the Soviet Union poses the most capable military threat in the region, its intentions also warrant scrutiny. Clearly, the Soviets have nothing to gain by supporting a DPRK-led invasion of South Korea, nor would it be consistent with present US-USSR relations. Recent Soviet resistance to the Conventional Force Reductions in Europe (CFE) negotiations, may give the US indications as to the Soviet's inclinations in Northeast Asia. The Soviet resistance to conventional force reductions in Europe may carry over to similar overtures for force reductions in Northeast Asia.

Premier Ryzhkov's tour of East Asia in February of this year gave clear proof of Soviet interest in this region. General Secretary Gorbachev's proposed Spring 1991 visit to Japan carries heightened expectations for a resolution to the Northern Territories issue and subsequent improved Soviet-Japanese relations. If this were to occur, tensions in the region would be drastically reduced.

CHINA

As China returned to more isolationist policies of "self-reliance," orthodox ideologies have become once again more dominant in Chinese decision making circles. This
tendency, which follows the gruesome events in Tiananmen Square last June, dovetails with Chinese policy to retreat from reforms achieved over the past decade to focus on maintaining internal control. As events in Beijing last June demonstrated, emphasis was placed on the solution of problems through the use of the armed forces. The confidence placed in the military could have only increased its stature in the eyes of Beijing's leadership. Comments offered by members of the Beijing Institute For International Strategic Studies, during their 12 May 1990 visit to the Naval War College, indicated that the measures taken by the military at Tiananmen Square were heroic and patriotic. Such views, if conveyed to the military, would only bolster their confidence as well. It also indicates Chinese willingness to use military force in precarious situations. While the Chinese have displayed caution in the use of their armed forces toward an external threat, their conflict with Vietnam was an example of their willingness to use their armed forces. These facts may give cause to speculate about the Chinese military threat to the region (Table IV-2).

Recent ideological strengthening of Chinese-North Korean relations lends itself to question a possible Chinese role in possible future hostilities on the Korean peninsula. Although the Chinese armed forces are not as sophisticated as their Soviet counterparts, their sheer size and discipline makes them dangerous adversaries. Analogies can be made to the readiness of Chinese forces prior to the Korean war and their resulting
effectiveness against United Nations Command forces. Although

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IV-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHINESE REGIONAL FORCES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHENYANG REGION GROUND FORCES</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Armies</td>
<td>5 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Aircraft</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORTH SEA FLEET</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal Surface Combatants</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol and Coastal Combatants</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare Combatants</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibs</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Aviation</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A Group Army is equivalent to a Western Corps


Chinese Peoples Volunteers forces were poorly armed, their initial successes against United Nations Command forces were significant, driving the UNC back to the southern portion of the Korean peninsula.

Chinese intentions and past behavior must also be factored into an assessment of the possible threat these forces pose to US interests. Beijing's current strategy calls for a "peaceful international environment," one which advocates trade with market-oriented countries like Japan and the ROK. Prior to the events in June 1989, ROK-PRC trade amounted to over $3
billion annually.² Along the same lines, it would seem doubtful that the Chinese would be willing to engage in external hostilities when it is so encumbered with domestic issues.

Other less threatening issues which impact on US interests are Chinese arms exports and their possible effect on regions outside Northeast Asia, such as the Middle East. This is already the case with Chinese sales of CSS-2 ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia.³ Chinese intentions to become a supplier of 300-600 km range missiles is a troubling issue in other regions of the world. As China embarks on weapons modernization programs, the importation of technology from South Korea or Japan would improve their weaponry, making their weapons exports more attractive on the world market.

NORTH KOREA

North Korean military capabilities and their corresponding threat to US and ROK interests will be discussed in detail in Chapter V. However one recent issue which has the potential to completely destabilize the region is the report that the DPRK is in the process of developing a nuclear device. The DPRK has already been reported to have reverse-engineered Soviet SCUD technology. This fact, associated with a possible fissionable device, is a tremendous threat to all nations in the region, given the DPRK's past behavior pattern. Chinese members of the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies claimed to have no knowledge of such a development.
This issue has been widely reported lately, and is inconsistent with DPRK requests for a nuclear free zone in Northeast Asia. Any further confirmation of this development would necessitate diplomatic or military measures from all powers in the region.

**ECONOMIC THREATS**

As mentioned earlier in Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* and other works, the future global environment is likely to be shaped more by economic events than by military power. This is certainly true in Northeast Asia. The Gross National Products (GNP) of the US, Japan, and the ROK combined constitute 40% of the world's GNP. This figure is forecasted to constitute greater than half the world's GNP by the year 2010. From purely a US economic perspective, the region's stability is imperative to US security. Japan and the ROK are two of the US's largest trading partners, and a great deal of that trade translates directly to defense requirements. To place the importance of US ties to Asia in more vivid terms, consider Arthur Schlesinger's article, "Our Problem is not Japan or Germany," from the 22 December 1990 *Wall Street Journal*. In speaking to the US's debtor status, Mr. Schlesinger considers the implications for our national security if Japan stopped selling the US silicon chips for semiconductors or, even worse, stopped selling to the US and began selling to the Soviets. Another eye-opener would be if our creditors registered their disapproval of our governmental
policies by dumping Treasury securities and other holdings. These two not altogether implausible scenarios demonstrate how our national security interests are closely linked to US-Asian economic relations. Three other economic scenarios exist which would surely threaten US vital interests.

First, the possible failure of Perestroika and Glasnost could predicate a change in Soviet leadership, giving rise to renewed Soviet militarism. Reassertion of perceived Soviet military interests on the Soviet periphery could bring about increased Soviet presence in Northeast Asia, and possible direct military support to the DPRK if ideological change occurred in Moscow as well. Such a circumstance would invalidate present forecasted strategies in Northeast Asia, which spell out continued hostility by the DPRK, but a reduced threat by China and a possible reduced threat by Soviet Far East Military District forces. Our economic ties to the region would be directly threatened by an increased Soviet presence in the region.

The second scenario involves the Japanese, Soviets, and possibly the DPRK. In exchange for a commitment of capital expenditures to Soviet Siberia or to North Korea, Moscow returns the Northern Territories to Japan. This situation is possible, and could occur within the next year, coinciding with Gorbachev's proposed visit to Japan. If events which occurred in Seoul during the '88 Olympics can be used as a benchmark, this exchange of capital for territory could lead to a
Japanese-Soviet "love affair" of sorts. During the Olympics, the South Koreans could not get enough of the Soviets, and supported them second only to their own athletes. The South Koreans often took up the Russian athletic cause against their US opponents. If such behavior could be translated to the Japanese-Soviet relationship, it might even be possible to witness a Japanese shift from close US-Japanese relations to warmer Soviet-Japanese relations. As economic development in the Soviet Union begins to take shape, the relationship could further blossom. This example would have serious ramifications on US-Japanese relations, if not our presence in the region.

The third example involves a shift of the world technological lead from the US to Japan. Should this occur, and some data suggest it will, the US could lose its lead in the technologically-rich markets. Recent journal and periodical articles demonstrate Japan is plowing enormous sums of capital into technologically dependent markets off-shore. In the technology realm, the Japanese strategy has been to give up just enough to appease while increasing their advantage. The spinoff possibilities from this impending technological shift could be devastating, reaching from manufacturing technologies to weapons development to space exploitation.

As these examples have shown, the US is becoming more vulnerable in the economic sense. The US must continue to maintain and improve its economic and political access to
Northeast Asia, particularly Korea. As mentioned in the last chapter, this is a vital as well as major interest, as the economies of the ROK and the US would be jeopardized in any of these scenarios. It is not the purpose of this study to conduct a detailed analysis of the vulnerability of US economic interests, nor to examine every possible economic threat scenario. However the brief examination of selected scenarios is helpful in order to understand the hazards facing US economic interests.
CHAPTER IV NOTES


CHAPTER V

PROSPECTS FOR ROK SELF-DEFENSE

An important facet of our future national security policy toward the ROK is our ally’s forecasted ability to provide for its own defense. US forward deployed forces in South Korea have provided the deterrence and operational leadership required to prevent another Korean War over the past forty years. During this timespan the ROK armed forces, much like South Korean development in general, have grown to a sizeable and credible entity. Analogous to the economic partnership we share with the ROK, our combined defense of South Korea is well-trained, technologically advanced, and doctrinally well postured. Just as we are seeking to adjust our respective strategic roles in this combined defense effort, so too must the roles be examined from the operational perspective.

This reexamination requires an accurate prognosis of the ROK’s ability to provide for its own self defense, with US forces utilized in a supporting role. This chapter will analyze the ROK’s forecasted ability to provide for its own self defense. By assessing the capabilities of ROK-DPRK military forces, briefly interpreting economic and political factors bearing on the military balance, and attempting to accurately depict DPRK intentions, a net assessment will be
presented. Through this assessment, future military trends on the peninsula can be forecasted. ROK strategic force shortcomings will also be identified. Finally, this chapter will briefly address nuclear arms issues as they pertain to the Korean peninsula and their role in future relations. This analysis will hopefully depict the current and future military environment on the peninsula as well as accurately present the ROK's ability to provide for its own defense.

NET ASSESSMENT

ROK-DPRK MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The armed forces of the ROK and the DPRK are the tenth and seventh largest in the world respectively. The preponderance of these two sizeable armies, over 1.5 million soldiers combined, are arrayed within 30 kilometers of the 151 mile long Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This vividly portrays the volatility of the military environment in Korea and amplifies the capabilities of the two forces.

Both armed forces are well equipped and well trained. Motivated largely by the experiences of the Korean War, the two armies are capable of inflicting great damage to each other. Compounding this high state of readiness on both sides is the access both nations have to state of the art weaponry.

The DPRK has modernized its forces during the past three years through the acquisition of MIG-23 Floggers, MIG-29
Fulcrums, Su-25 Frogfoots, ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense systems, and SA-3/5 surface to air missiles. These improvements, delivered by the Soviet Union just prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics, were viewed as barter for Soviet landing rights at DPRK airfields and overflight privileges.

At the same time, the ROK armed forces have also modernized. ROK additions to its armed forces have been indigenous as well as through import, mainly from the US. US sales of F-16 fighters have greatly enhanced the ROK air forces. The recent agreement to purchase/co-produce F/A-18 aircraft is also a tremendous addition to the ROK air force. The ROK has taken delivery of 12 CH-47D Chinook helicopters to date, and will acquire another 6 by 1992. These heavy lift helicopters will add a greater degree of mobility and logistical sustainability to their ground forces. Korean production of the K-88 Tank is a vast technological improvement to their armor forces and adds a reliable indigenous weapon system to their anti-armor forces. This fiscal year alone, the ROK earmarked $1.45 billion for purchases of US military equipment. This slice is but a part of the $24.3 billion allotted between 1990-95 for the ROK Force Improvement Program (FIP).

Despite the recent weapons modernizations on both sides, and the anticipated growth of future ROK and DPRK defense outlays, the ROK will soon surpass the DPRK in terms of
TABLE V-1

NORTH KOREAN-SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY COMPARISON - JANUARY 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>930,000</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Inf Brigades</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Mobile Divs/Brigades</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>2/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Brigades</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Inf Divisions</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium &amp; Light Tanks</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>1,940</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery (Tubes)</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS Missile Launchers</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft Artillery</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Sites/Missiles</td>
<td>54/800</td>
<td>34/210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Air Force                      |             |             |
| Personnel                      | 70,000      | 40,000      |
| Jet Fighters                   | 750         | 480         |
| Bombers                        | 80          | 0           |
| Transports                     | 275         | 34          |
| Helicopters (Including Army)   | 280         | 280         |

| Navy                           |             |             |
| Personnel                      | 40,000      | 60,000      |
| Attack Submarines              | 23          | 0           |
| Destroyers                     | 0           | 11          |
| Frigates                       | 2           | 17          |
| Corvettes                      | 4           | 0           |
| Missile Attack Boats           | 29          | 11          |
| Torpedo Craft                  | 173         | 0           |
| Coastal Patrol                 | 157         | 79          |
| Mine Warfare                   | 40          | 9           |
| Amphibious Craft               | 126         | 52          |

Total Personnel: 1,040,000 (North Korea) 650,000 (South Korea)

military expenditures and capabilities. As stated in his testimony before the Senate Arms Services Committee on 8 February 1990 and reiterated in a personal interview on 16 April 1990, General Louis Menetrey, CINC United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/US Forces Korea, the balance of power on the peninsula is shifting to the ROK. As Table V-1 demonstrates, the DPRK has a marked advantage in ground forces over the ROK/US forces. In terms of ratios, the DPRK enjoys a 1.5:1 advantage in manpower, a 2.2:1 advantage in tanks, and a 2.5:1 advantage in artillery. However in relation to naval and air forces, where ratios cannot accurately depict the qualitative advantages the US 7th Air Force and 7th Fleet provide to the ROK/US forces, these US/ROK enjoy the military advantage, according to General Menetrey's analysis.

ROK forces do possess the capability to defend themselves, despite the numerical advantage of the DPRK forces. The geography of the Korean peninsula and the elaborate system of obstacles is often neglected when comparing the capabilities of these two forces. The predominant north-south orientation of the mountain ranges on the peninsula would naturally channelize any form of DPRK attack. And because the DPRK forces employ a derivative of Soviet doctrine in their offensive tactics, the ROK's chances for halting an attack are enhanced. With three primary avenues of approach from North Korea: the Kaeson-Munsan, the Yonchon-Uijongbu, and the Kumhwa-Pochon, South Korea's extensive barrier network is designed to take
advantage of these corridors. Present disposition of ROK forces are heavily oriented toward these avenues of approach and would employ the barrier system in conjunction with the massing of artillery and airmobility to methodically defeat a DPRK attack. The orientation of the terrain mentioned earlier denies a wide front to advancing DPRK forces.\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS}

Present economic and political conditions also favor the ROK's chances for self defense. Economically, Seoul is striving to improve its trade ties with both China and the Soviet Union. For this reason alone, it is not in either country's interest to support or encourage a conflict on the Korean peninsula. As will be examined in detail in Chapter VII, the economic facet of South Korea's relationships with Beijing and Moscow is an important factor in influencing North-South relations.

Politically, Seoul has been nurturing diplomatic relations with North Korea's two most important allies. Recent South Korean political leaders' trips to Moscow and the exchange of trade offices is an indication of the seriousness and direction of Seoul-Moscow relations. Although described in an apolitical sense by pessimistic ROK lawmakers, these relations are important to both countries.\textsuperscript{6}

Seoul's relations with China, based largely on their trade, is equally important. Seoul-Beijing trade has risen from 1985
estimates that ranged from $300 million to $800 million to 1988 estimates of $3 billion which is six times the amount conducted between Beijing and Pyongyang. This relationship has contributed significantly to improved Northeast Asian interdependency, through expanded trade contacts. At the same time, this trade facilitates ongoing discussions between Beijing and Seoul, albeit primarily economic. It certainly serves as another means by which the two countries can communicate, serving to improve bilateral relations.

The ultimate goal of improved Seoul-Moscow and Seoul-Beijing relations is the ROK's northern diplomacy. President Roh's 7 July 1988 statement on national unification outlined Seoul's systematic plan for improved relations with Pyongyang. It is the ROK's hope that improved relations with Moscow and Beijing will nurture better relations with the DPRK. If better relations evolve, it would obviously improve Seoul's ability to keep peace on the peninsula.

ROK-DPRK INTENTIONS

The closed DPRK society and its often radical behavior makes it very difficult to assess its intentions. However we can draw from North Korean responses to South Korean initiatives and also cite the experiences of recent visitors to North Korea.

When President Roh addressed the United Nations General Assembly in October 1988, he proposed that a consultative conference among the United States, Soviet Union, China, Japan,
and the two Koreas should convene to resolve issues on the Korean peninsula. In the same speech, he resolved "never to use force first against the North." He was also agreeable to a North Korean proposal for a nonaggression pact and to converting the Armistice Agreement into a permanent peace treaty.

These comments elicited a North Korean response a month later. The response contained four principles: an orientation toward reunification, withdrawal of foreign troops, arms reduction between the two Koreas, and negotiation among parties directly involved.

This response by Pyongyang is echoed by Dr. Robert A. Scalapino, Director of the University of California at Berkeley's Institute of East Asian Studies. In an interview on 3 April 1990, he spoke of his visit to the DPRK in August 1989. It was during this visit that he felt that the risk of a DPRK attack, circa 1950, was very low. He also stated that the North Korean leaders he met indicated they have no desire to risk destruction of their country. They realize that we have the air power to conduct severely destructive raids on North Korean targets in the event of another conflict on the peninsula.

For these reasons, it does not appear that the DPRK intends to begin another conflict. To the contrary, it may appear that based upon the return of US servicemen's remains from North Korea this Memorial Day, the DPRK may be interested in
conducting substantive relations with the US. At the same time, Moscow-Pyongyang relations are at their worst in history, clearly indicating Pyongyang has played that card for the last time. Prospects for the future normalization of Seoul-Moscow relations complicate the DPRK situation.

FUTURE MILITARY TRENDS

By virtue of the vitality of the ROK economy and the unhealthy state of the DPRK economy, it appears certain ROK military growth will surpass that of the DPRK within the next decade. Despite its 7% growth, some critics are quick to classify the ROK economy as "cool." In contrast to its growth in the previous three years, it indeed has cooled down. But in comparison to other Asian nations, it shares the highest GNP growth rate with Hong Kong and Taiwan. In fact, as a study recently completed by Dr. Chung-in Moon demonstrated, despite decreasing defense spending as a share of the ROK GNP, it continues to demonstrate annual increases in terms of actual expenditures. Dr. Moon does conclude however, that changes in regional and international security environments will favor reduced military spending. A recent defense policy paper, termed "The White Paper," published in December 1988 contends that the gap in ROK-DPRK military power will be closed within the decade.

ROK SHORTCOMINGS

One area which the ROK military must make substantial gains is in strategic forces. Specifically, the ROK is reliant upon
the US to provide the ground, air, and naval command, control and communications (C³) necessary to conduct combined operations on the peninsula. The US also provides the Indications and Warnings (I&W) functions for the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Finally, the ROK is totally reliant upon the US for logistical sustainment of forces. Ranging from fuels to ammunition, US forces provide the logistical support for the CFC in Korea. In addition to modernizing their forces the ROK must also develop a logistical network capable of sustaining its forces in the mid-intensity conflict.¹⁴

NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUES

The possibility of Pyongyang pursuing a nuclear weapons capability is indeed extremely destabilizing. Recent reports have indicated that this type of research is ongoing in the DPRK at the Yongbyon experimental reactor facility. The reports have been supported by infrared photographs taken by a French satellite.¹⁵

The US policy is to neither confirm nor deny the presence or use of nuclear weapons in the Pacific theater. It is well known that the Soviets, Chinese and Americans possess nuclear capability for use in the region. If the North Koreans are in fact developing a nuclear device, it would be in the entire region's best interests if the DPRK's allies attempted to persuade them to discontinue this process. The development of this weaponry has the ability to affect the regional balance of power, and hence have an undesirable impact on US survival
interests in Korea. While it is not the purpose of this chapter to pursue arms control recommendations, such measures must be immediately undertaken if North Korea is pursuing nuclear arms development.
CHAPTER V NOTES


8Kim, p. 345.

9Kim, p. 346.

10Kim, p. 346.


Perhaps one of the most delicate issues facing the US as it reassesses security policies in Northeast Asia is the relationship between the Republic of Korea and Japan. While the two nations are the region's most prosperous, there are some very peculiar interdependencies which undergird their economic, political and security relations.

Together these two nations account for just over 10% of the world's GNP. Aside from the US and Europe, they are each other's largest trading partners. Despite this close economic interdependence, these two neighbors are just beginning to break ground in developing sound regional security cooperation.

There are several issues which lie at the heart of this odd situation. One would think that these two strongly anticommmunist nations would work well together in the pursuit of regional security. This has not happened. History has demonstrated the animosity these two nations have shared toward each other over the past several hundred years. Dating back to 1592, when Shogun Toyotomi Hideyoshi attacked Korea only to be repulsed by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, there is a long history of Japanese attempts to conquer or annex Korea. Japan's first prime minister, Itoh Hirobumi, was assassinated just prior to
the 1910 annexation by a Korean revolutionary, Ahn, in Manchuria. Japan's annexation of Korea eventually occurred in 1910, and lasted until the end of the World War II.\(^1\) After the Korean liberation by allied forces in 1945, there were no formal Japanese-ROK relations until 1965. In fact, in 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone was the first Japanese head of state to visit Korea. A year later, Korean President Chun Doo Hwan made the first visit to Japan by a Korean head of state. During the visit, Japanese Emperor Hirohito apologized ambiguously, by describing the period of Japanese colonial rule as "unfortunate."\(^2\) It was not until President Roh Tae Woo's visit to Japan in May 1990, that Emperor Akihito and Prime Minister Kaifu formally apologized for the atrocities committed by the Japanese during their occupation of Korea.\(^3\)

Because of this ongoing issue, security relations between the two countries have been conducted through their mutual security partner, the US. Having a Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea and a Security Pact with Japan, the US has been the convenient go between for security issues since the two formalized relations in 1965.

**ONGOING COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS**

Inasmuch as Japan and Korea both have vital interests in the security of the ROK, one would expect a more cooperative atmosphere. Despite the historical impediments, the two nations have made considerable progress in studying the
possibilities for more pronounced cooperation. The ROK's principal threat is, and since the Korean War has been, the DPRK. Because of this, the ROK focus has been on continental defense. The breakout of the ROK armed forces depicted in the last chapter (Table V-1) demonstrates the overwhelming focus on land-based defense. The ROK has spent very little time planning for air or seaborne invasions by the DPRK. Conversely Japan, as an island nation, has focused a large part of its defense budget on the development of Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF).

With export-based economies in both countries, the continental focus of the ROK has shifted a bit lately toward consideration of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) defense. Dr. Edward Olsen of the Naval Postgraduate School, goes to great length to describe the "new thinking" which is taking place among Korean strategic planners. Despite the suspicion in Korea about Japan, much thought is being given to increased cooperation between the ROK and GOJ toward the protection of the Northeast Asian SLOCs, particularly the Korean or Tsushima Strait. The two navies have expanded their participation in exercises with the US and of necessity, conduct "pass-ex" (passing exercises) regularly. The ROK's participation in this year's RIMPAC '90 exercise is of particular importance. This exercise, which has historically involved many of the US's strongest regional allies (Britain,
Canada, Australia, and Japan) since 1971, is designed to
exercise SLOC protection in the Pacific Rim region. This is
the first time the ROK has participated in the exercise.⁵

Aside from the naval aspect of military cooperation that
takes place between the ROK and GOJ, a great deal of other
regional cooperation occurs. Japan, under the provisions of
the Far East Clause of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, provides
basing to US forces specifically for the upkeep of the
armistice, the defense of Korea, and international peace.⁶
Additionally, the ROK and GOJ share strategic intelligence and
provide logistical support for one another during exercises.
The nature of their military cooperation has been reaffirmed
repeatedly, most recently during the Chun-Nakasone summits in
1983 and 1984, where the two leaders termed their security
links to be inseparable.⁷

Despite the overt reluctance on the part of the ROK and GOJ
to enter into a formal cooperative security relationship, they
share similar interests in the region and are quite willing to
work together toward these common interests as long as the US
is there to join with them. ROK-GOJ participation in the 1990
RIMPAC exercise and the Japanese commitment to protect the
SLOC's out to 1000 nautical miles are two prominent examples
where these two neighbors currently display their military
cooperation.

LIMITS TO ROK-GOJ SECURITY COOPERATION

Ameliorating as the recent Japanese apology may seem,
limitations to ROK-GOJ security cooperation will continue. These limits, as outlined earlier, are deeply rooted in the historical and cultural differences of these the two Asian nations. It will take an incredibly long time for these prejudices to fade away.

Realistically, the two countries have a strong, facilitating ally who has proven willing to accommodate this relationship over the past forty years. There is no reason to believe American interests in the region will vanish overnight, so it is probably safe to envision the present relationships remaining as they are for the foreseeable future. Because of this arrangement, the author does not expect to witness any substantial change in ROK-GOJ security cooperation in the near future. As our new Pacific strategy indicates, there will undoubtedly be slight modifications to this strategy as it applies to our Korean and Japanese allies in the years to come. As the two obtain greater global stature, and develop increased confidence in their international positions, we may see changes in their relationship.
CHAPTER VI NOTES


5Olsen, pp. 21-2. see also "We Regret Participation in the '90 RIMPAC Exercise," Choson Ilbo, 25 March 1990. This article describes ROK-GOJ participation in this annual naval exercise.

6Article 6 (Far East Clause) of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (1960) says: "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of the facilities and areas in Japan."

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMICS AND SECURITY

During the past decade, our Northeast Asian allies experienced unparalleled economic growth. The US contributed significantly to that growth, economically and with demonstrated security commitments. The economic relationships the US shares with Korea and Japan have become inextricably linked with our security commitments. As the Nunn-Warner report indicates, the US has "invested heavily in the region since the Second World War in political, military, and economic terms, assisting in the development of democratic, market-oriented governments." The report later adds that the US assumes the role of carrying out its national interests in Northeast Asia because its military presence sets the stage for its economic involvement in the region.

The US's relationships with Japan and Korea have been strained over the past few years over growing concern regarding the trade deficits between the US and its Northeast Asian allies. The growing trade frictions have fostered protectionist attitudes in the US. Coupled with the growing domestic budget deficit and political and military changes in Europe, the US is being encouraged by political leaders to reexamine its military commitments to Northeast Asia.
Recently Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas and Representative Carl Levin of Michigan both called for significant force withdrawals from Northeast Asia to counteract this trend of trade imbalances. Their rationale: if Korea and Japan can run trade surpluses with the US, they can obviously afford to pay for more of their defense. Why should we subsidize their economic success with free security? Several academics also support this argument, and use it to explain why the two countries have been able to prosper. Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, questions how the US can expect to remain competitive when it affords so many allies an artificial advantage by allowing them to concentrate their resources on civilian investment and to commit the majority of their research and development budgets to nonmilitary use.² Professors Paul Kennedy, Edward Olsen, and Chalmers Johnson all share in this view, with Kennedy and Johnson more outspoken on the Japanese side of the trade-security issue.³

This chapter will highlight these trade-security linkages from the US perspective, addressing the predominant US-ROK issues.

**ROK-US TRADE-SECURITY LINKAGES**

Three separate but related issues serve to underscore problems with US-ROK trade-security linkages: (1) ROK economic growth and the corresponding trade imbalances with the US, (2) a rise in ROK nationalism and recent anti-Americanism brought
about by ROK economic growth and confidence, (3) reduced
East-West military tensions and a popular US misperception that
these reduced tensions have carried over to the Korean
peninsula. Two of these issues are certainly related.
Phenomenal ROK economic growth has spawned a high degree of
pride, confidence and global competitiveness. This
development, coupled with the emergence of democratic
governmental change, has brought on the recent surge of
nationalism. This surge differs from those witnessed in the
eyear 1980's mainly because the present anti-US sentiment has
its roots in US-ROK strained economic relations. Specifically,
US efforts to open Korean markets is viewed with animosity,
particularly by those domestic producers whose livelihoods will
be most heavily effected by US efforts.

Conversely, US domestic fiscal troubles have increased
trade imbalances specifically, the ROK has posted trade
surpluses over each of the last five years. Although the ROK
has attempted to eradicate these trade imbalances, Seoul still
maintains a surplus. The Roh administration has taken active
measures to reduce the surplus, specifically increasing imports
of US goods rather than Japanese, and liberalize the ROK
economy. US-ROK trade figures are shown in Table VII-1.

These US efforts to encourage Seoul toward a more balanced
and equitable trade relationship are one of the reasons for the
increase in anti-Americanism. A portion of the South Korean population feels these US efforts are a form of economic imperialism, misunderstanding the closed nature of Korean markets and the relative freedom of US markets. Many Koreans refuse to admit the advantages their products enjoy in the US, being sold at reduced tariffs to the largest consumer market in the world.  

TABLE VII-1
US-ROK TRADE BALANCE 1986-90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Trade Surplus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>$7.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>9.6 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>8.6 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990*</td>
<td>.5 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* estimate


Where the trade-security linkage is most pronounced, and the US should closely reexamine, is the price the US has paid for regional and global deterrence and Korean defense. This expenditure over the past thirty seven years has permitted Korea to develop economically without having to singularly bear the burden of its own defense. During this same period, the
ROK has grown to enjoy the benefits of military offsets and the derived coproduction ventures the US has provided. However, as the South Korean economy matures and becomes more globally robust, the relationship it shares with the US must also take a more realistic perspective. This perspective is one which first recognizes the true character of the alliance, and how this relationship must take on a more reciprocal nature. This nature is reflected in recent US security policy changes. These changes call for increased defense spending and cost sharing by the ROK to compensate for US force reductions, increase the ROK's contribution to the cost of the remaining US in-country presence, and to ease the US burden for mutual defense. As the Nunn-Warner report indicated, the US is in Korea to set the stage for its economic involvement. This aspect of the US involvement in Korea is a recent development however. Since the Korean War, the US has maintained forces in the ROK to carry out several missions, not just to satisfy our economic interests. US forces have economically and militarily overseen the Armistice. The US has also chosen to forward deploy forces to Korea, demonstrating its commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty, although not specifically required. And the US presence at Panmunjom and along the main avenues of approach have served to deter the DPRK from attack. These commitments to ROK security have been steadfastly adhered to for thirty seven years. During this time, the US also
contributed significantly to the economic and military development of South Korea with substantial aid. Between 1959 and 1984, the ROK attracted approximately $12 billion in loans and $662 million in direct investment from the US. The American share of Korea's total loans during the period was 26% and its share of direct investment was 31%. The US has been Korea's largest supplier of foreign capital. As Korea became more prosperous, it no longer required US military or economic assistance. And since this time, Seoul has shared in the cost of US forces in Korea.

Seoul currently funds $300 million in actual won expenditures for US defenses in South Korea. DOD calculates that current costs to maintain forces in Korea amount to $2.4 billion. The figure Seoul claims it contributes is $2.2 billion, but this amount includes $1.9 billion of imputed land costs, or rent-free basing. In addition to this $300 million, Washington would like the ROK to pick up indigenous labor costs and their associated expenses as well as increase military construction funding. Inherent in this request is for Seoul to absorb a more equitable portion of the costs of US presence, along the same lines as Japan, which pays for close to 45% of the costs to base US forces in Japan.

Another aspect of US-ROK burden sharing contention is the percentage of GNP the ROK has contributed to their defense (See Table VII-2). As mentioned in Dr. Moon's study, although the
TABLE VII-2
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1982-87

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>82</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>84</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>86</th>
<th>87</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ROK has increased its actual won expenditures each year, defense expenditures, as a percentage of GNP, have declined. This trend is particularly troublesome to American policy makers, as the ROK was the only nation in the region to show a decrease in percent of GNP defense expenditures during this period, while at the same time accruing trade surpluses with the US. The decrease was not a function of affordability. According to reliable sources and classified Korean studies, the ROK could have afforded up to 11% of GNP without severely impacting on social programs. The "bottom line" to this aspect of the study is that the US and the ROK must agree upon a defense appropriations strategy which is acceptable to both allies' interests and fits the needs of the threat.
CHAPTER VII NOTES


6US indigenous labor costs include not only the wages and salaries of Korcan Civil Service workers and other employees, but these employee's health care and family education expenses also. Part of antiquated labor contracts negotiated many years ago, Washington would like to get out from under these growing entitlements.


8This figure was mentioned by Dr. Edward A. Olsen during an interview 26 April 1990 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. He cited studies which were presumably conducted at the Korean Institute of Defense Analysis, although he had not personally had access to the reports.

74
This July, thirty-seven years will have passed since the signing of the Armistice Agreement ending the Korean War. This agreement was not a peace settlement, but merely a document intended to facilitate a final peaceful settlement at a later date. Obviously this never occurred. During this period, hostilities have taken place periodically, never, however returning to the fratricidal type of conflict which produced this result.

Since the signing of the Armistice, American and South Korean forces have been postured along the demarcation line dividing The DPRK and the ROK, insuring the Armistice's compliance. And during the course of these thirty seven years, people throughout the world have questioned when the two Koreas would ever reunify.

Without rehashing the entire history of the original division of the peninsula, which took place at the conclusion of World War II, it must be reemphasized that the division was never intended to permanently divide this nation. Korea had been annexed by Japan in 1910, and was occupied by the Imperial Army until its defeat in 1945. An arbitrary line was drawn at the thirty eighth parallel to facilitate US and Soviet disarmament of the Japanese. As a result of this procedure, we
still find the communist DPRK to the north and the fervently anti-communist ROK to the south.

Recently there has been substantive progress toward the eventual reunification of the peninsula. At the center of the action, the two Koreas have exchanged proposals which would encourage eventual unification. On the periphery, the regional powers of Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States have taken sides on the issue, predominantly aligning themselves with their respective Korean allies.

In this chapter the proposals made by the two Koreas will be discussed and the positions and perspectives of the major regional powers will be outlined.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Prior to the recent democratization of the ROK, there had been only one substantial overture toward the process of developing relations which would lead to eventual reunification. The Carter-Park proposal of 1979, which called for tripartite negotiations (US-ROK-DPRK) toward a final peace agreement between the two Koreas, was privately agreed to by Washington and Beijing in the Summer of 1983. In August 1983, Deng Xiaoping and Kim Il-sung met privately and discussed the prospects of these talks. A month later in September Deng indicated to US Secretary of Defense Weinberger that the North Koreans would show some willingness to address the unification issue, and that China would be willing to aid the effort. Ten days after that meeting, China notified the US Embassy in
Beijing that the DPRK was prepared to begin talks. The next day the Rangoon bombing occurred, where President Chun narrowly missed assassination by a North Korean placed bomb. Although subsequent attempts have been made to resume this promising process, formal productive discussions have yet to demonstrate progress.

On 7 July 1988, President Roh Tae Woo initiated his "northern policy," in an attempt to resolve the reunification issue. His proposal contained six points:

* Actively promote exchanges of visits between businessmen, journalists, religious and cultural leaders, academics and students;

* Exchange of information about the 10 million divided families and their visits across the DMZ;

* Actively promote trade between North and South, to be regarded as 'internal trade within the national community';

* Encourage Seoul's allies - Japan and the United States - to trade nonmilitary goods with Pyongyang;

* End wasteful, confrontational diplomacy toward the North but initiate cooperation with Pyongyang in international community;

* Urge Tokyo and Washington to improve relations with Pyongyang as Seoul seeks to enhance its relations with Beijing and Moscow.

One major impediment to Roh's initiative has been the ROK anti-Communist law, prohibiting contacts with the North. Seoul has been able to manage this small problem, but has been tested on occasion. Most notable were the secret March 1989 trip to Pyongyang by Reverend Mun Ik-hwan, the 1988 visit of opposition
party member Suh Kyong-won, and the secret June 1989 trip of student leader Im Su-gyong. Suh was later found to have been a DPRK spy and was sentenced to 15 years in prison, considered a light sentence. Reverend Mun and Im were each sentenced to 10 years in prison for their visits, violations of the National Security Law. 

Authorized ROK-DPRK contacts were accomplished when the Soviets arranged a meeting between opposition leader Kim Young Sam and Ho Dam, the DPRK Politburo member in charge of unification. Another visit, perhaps the height of North-South contacts, occurred when Chung Ju Young, Hyundai's North Korean born Chairman, met with Choe Su-Gil, President of the DPRK's Taesung Bank, to co-develop a resort in the scenic Mount Kungang region of North Korea. Both of these visits drew the interest of Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo and Washington, and are largely credited with initiating the rapidly developing economic relations between Seoul, Moscow and Beijing. To date however, productive Seoul-Pyongyang discussions have yet to take place.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Roh's proposed policy was received by Pyongyang as a an attempt to anger and embarrass it by dramatically improving Seoul's relations with the DPRK's close allies: China, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. The ROK has persistently asked for Soviet assistance in improving relations with Pyongyang. Roh even proposed a summit with Kim Il-sung on 15 August 1988.
Kim responded favorably one month later, and invited Roh to Pyongyang provided the ROK would be willing to adopt a nonaggression declaration and to discuss establishing a confederal government of a united state, maintaining the autonomy of the two systems of government. When Roh addressed the UN General Assembly in October 1988, he agreed to Kim's proposal and even suggested converting the Armistice into a permanent peace treaty. Roh also pledged never to use force first against the DPRK, and reiterated his hope to visit Pyongyang as soon as possible.

Pyongyang's counter to Roh's General Assembly address called for four principles and two major proposals in welcoming Roh's comments one month earlier. The principles contained in the Pyongyang communique were:

* Orientation toward reunification;
* Withdrawal of foreign troops;
* Arms reduction between the two Koreas;
* Negotiation among parties directly involved.

The two major proposals were:

* Phased withdrawal of US forces and gradual arms reductions between the two Koreas by the end of 1991 to be administered by tripartite talks between the US and the two Koreas;
* Easing the existing political and military confrontation between the two Koreas by terminating overt and covert slander of each other, initiating a variety of joint developments and exchanges, and initiating high-level political talks between the two Koreas.
Pyongyang's communique certainly indicates a willingness to begin formal contacts with the ROK. As in the past, however, Pyongyang failed to initiate any activity. In fact, due to the events in Eastern Europe and Hungary and Poland establishing formal diplomatic ties with Seoul, the DPRK withdrew into what appeared to be closer relations with China.

US, SOVIET, AND CHINESE POSITIONS

Although the US was initially cool to Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk formula for resolving tensions on the Korean peninsula, it is now solidly behind Roh's proposal for a consultative conference among the US, China, the USSR, Japan, and the two Koreas to reach a solution to Korean tensions. Washington is firm, however, that the two Koreas should take the lead in the resolution of tensions on the peninsula.

Interviews with key military and diplomatic personnel in Seoul indicate there are military, diplomatic, economic, and social changes which must come from ROK-DPRK dialogue to indicate substantive and progressive change from the DPRK. A brief list follows:

Military:
* Reciprocal notification and observation of large scale exercises.
* Acceptance of Joint inspection teams.
* Military hotlines.
* Reciprocal visits by military personnel.
* Arms control negotiations.

Diplomatic:
* Reciprocal acceptance of political legitimacy.
* Acceptance of UN membership for both Koreas.
* North-South summit meeting.
* Exchange of resident diplomatic missions.
Economic:
* DPRK acceptance of increased trade between ROK and USSR/PRC.
* Substantial ROK-DPRK trade.
* Trans DMZ economic relations: loans, joint ventures.

Social:
* End to hostile psywar broadcasts, leaflets, other propaganda.
* Mail exchange.
* Telephone links.
* Free passage through the DMZ.

Moscow's position, indicated above, clearly demonstrates Gorbachev's commitment to assist in the solution of tensions. His particular emphasis was to "lower military confrontations in areas where the coastlines of the USSR, PRC, Japan, DPRK, and South Korea meet." His commitment clearly indicated Moscow's willingness to take the lead on this issue, a position the US should support with its participation as well.

China also seeks to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, however it has not been as vocal in its support for or rejection of any of the mentioned proposals. During the visit of the Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies, it was indicated that reunification was inevitable and would remove a hotspot from the region, but no one predominant form of resolution was favored. It is difficult to obtain official Chinese views on the Korean unification issue, although it is widely accepted that they remain ideological allies with the DPRK, and would be expected to support Pyongyang's position on inter-Korean issues.
An event that may indicate the prospects for a process of resolution rather soon is the unexpected meeting of ROK President Roh Tae Woo and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev during the latter’s trip to the US in June 1990. Following the Roh-Gorbachev meeting Roh will meet with President Bush in Washington. Regardless of the process to date, all nations mentioned in this chapter must begin to proceed toward more productive diplomacy in the pursuit of an eventual unification of the Korean peninsula. If a unification were to occur, the benefits from the reduced tensions would accrue to all nations whose interests intersect on the peninsula. Energies could be diverted to the pursuit of economic growth rather than military preparedness.
CHAPTER VIII NOTES


4 Kim, p. 347.

5 Kim, p. 346.

6 Kim, p. 346.

7 Kim, p. 346.


9 Kim, p. 346.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Today the international community is undergoing changes brought about by the conclusion of the Cold War. Economic strength becoming increasingly more important than military might, it indeed poses unique but manageable problems for the US. As a result of this changing world order, US worldwide security commitments must change. The US's domestic fiscal difficulties require it pay more attention to managing the budget deficits, as failure to do so will quickly squander economic assets through debt servicing. Essentially, the US must focus attention on its economic instruments of power lest it further decline.

By focusing more of its attention on domestic affairs, the US will need to back off somewhat from its global security commitments. One of these, containment of the Soviet Union, is no longer necessary. Recent events have demonstrated this quite well. US-ROK security relations will also require adjustment. South Korea is a prospering nation. Despite the government-labor difficulties it is experiencing, South Korea's economy continues to be the most vibrant in Northeast Asia. Because of Seoul's economic well-being, the US should strive to achieve a greater share of cost sharing from its ally. This can be accompanied by sharing combined defense decisions with
the ROK government.

The North Korean threat may begin to dissipate. The Soviet economic assistance it relied upon for close to four decades has begun to dwindle. It no longer enjoys the convenient relationship it once shared with Moscow. Its relationship with Beijing is purely ideological (however there may be some economic assistance provided by Beijing). The remainder of Pyongyang's allies are rapidly rejecting communist ideologies. As this continues, Pyongyang will become increasingly isolated.

As Seoul approaches normalized diplomatic relations with Moscow, Pyongyang's plight will be exacerbated. This situation should assist Seoul in developing relations with Pyongyang if for no other reason than the DPRK's dwindling number of ideological allies. Obviously, any contact between Seoul and Pyongyang, supported by conciliatory behavior, would reduce the threat.

However as these events unfold, the US must maintain its focus on its interests in Northeast Asia. The Pacific Rim, particularly Northeast Asia, will become increasingly important to the economic well-being of the United States. The majority of US trade has its origins in the Pacific, and Asian Pacific investment in the US is growing rapidly. Strategically, the US posture toward Northeast Asia should not change. The US must remain committed to deterring attacks against itself or its allies. The US political and economic access to Asia must
be maintained. The maintenance of the present balance of power will also remain critical into the 21st century. These interests will remain vital to the US.

**NUNN-WARNER REPORT**

The Nunn-Warner report discusses specific ways US Asian allies can increase their participation in regional stability and how the US can reduce and restructure its military presence in East Asia. As the report applies to Northeast Asia, it recommends that the US should continue to urge its Korean and Japanese allies to increase their contributions toward the costs incurred in basing US forces in Korea and Japan. The report also specifies a time table for the restructuring and reduction of forces in both countries. While this process is beneficial and will ultimately lead to the redistribution of US economic resources back to domestic requirements, the report does not address US-ROK-GOJ security relations in a comprehensive manner.

The report does not recommend diplomatic or political courses of action which could lead to reduced tensions on the Korean peninsula and more defense savings. If the report were a comprehensive strategic framework, it would include diplomatic/political recommendations also. The prescription the report provides only looks forward ten years, and is calendar driven, calling for reassessments every three to five years. It does not address contingency strategies, which reflect initiatives based upon the occurrence of actual events, and planning accordingly. The report does not address the
more prominent issues facing the US in the next ten to fifteen years. One of these important issues is the prospect of China's development and its place in the regional order, if not the world order. The recent announcement of impending diplomatic relations between the ROK and the Soviets is sure to have an effect on other Pacific Rim nations, and will serve to provide Moscow with the influence it sought in the region without the use of force.

With respect to Korea, the report should have addressed the changing nature of US-ROK relations. As recent events demonstrate, Seoul is a bonafide international player, capable of considerable influence. In ten short years it has become an economic powerhouse, and over the past two years it has developed a polished diplomatic reputation. The US must respect that image, and must adjust its relations with Seoul accordingly.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

This change in Seoul's stature requires the US to adopt a relationship of more equal footing with Seoul. This change will expect more from Seoul in terms of leadership and responsibility for the direction of the alliance and mutual defense arrangements. Seoul-Washington relations should be more candid, forthright and reciprocal.

Speaking in terms of US forces in Korea, US policy makers must realize that changes in Eastern Europe did not occur because the US reduced its presence in Europe. The same
patience and diligence which kept the peace and eventually contributed to the collapse of communism in Europe must be applied to our interests in Korea with the same conviction.

The same analogy can be applied to the 2nd Infantry Division. In no more of a precarious position that that of the Berlin Brigade in Europe, its deterrence capability over the past 37 years is matched only by that of the Berlin Brigade. The division's mission must continue as is, with minor restructuring. Contrary to some critics suggestions, the 2nd Infantry Division should not be relocated to a rear area, but should remain in their present position until noticeable positive changes in North Korean behavior take place.

As the US adjusts its strategy in Korea to more accurately reflect the changing threat and domestic economic difficulties, it should not do so haphazardly. Rather than predicking further reductions or restructuring on a calendar timetable, it should be done according to changes in North Korean behavior. Furthermore our force restructuring should avoid precipitating a regional arms race to fill any void created by a hasty US withdrawal.

The burdensharing issue should be handled in a different fashion than it has been. Essentially the US should tie burdensharing to decision sharing. As the ROK decides to contribute more to combined defense, specifically the cost of maintaining US forces in the ROK, it should also be given a greater share of the decisionmaking toward combined defense.
The US should actively encourage this by including more substantive ROK input toward the size, makeup and disposition of US forces in the ROK.

As part of more open and candid relations, the US and the ROK should begin to formulate strategies to deal with the eventual unification of the Korean peninsula. The two allies should avoid the gaffes committed by the NATO allies when addressing the German unification issue. By developing combined courses of action now, the decisions and corresponding responses to unification overtures would be better planned and easier to execute. Since the process will probably take on a process similar to Germany’s 4 plus 2 (outlined by ROK President Roh in his address to the UN General Assembly in October 1988), other alternatives with other regional nations should be addressed.

Along the same lines, arms control strategies can be developed and possible diplomatic initiatives explored. Arms reductions will eventually occur, as both Korean leaders have publicly announced their support for such efforts. It is prudent to discuss alternatives now. It is not the purpose of this study to propose specific arms control strategies. However, the US must keep in mind the significance of the Philippines and Okinawa to the defense of the Korean peninsula, and perhaps plan for the loss of these bases.

These diplomatic initiatives should be started before arms
control becomes a hot issue in the region. The US should take diplomatic initiatives to interest the PRC, USSR, the ROK, and DPRK in substantive talks in order to lower the overall level of land forces in the region.

Most important, the US must take the lead. It must demonstrate the leadership and foresight which has allowed it to maintain such a preeminence in the region for the past forty years. This effort may be difficult, given the present US administration's preference to low-key diplomatic efforts, but it is imperative.
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91
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93
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100