POSTWAR NAVAL FORCE REDUCTIONS 1945-1950:
IMPACT ON THE NEXT WAR

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**Title**: Postwar Naval Force Reductions 1945-1950: Impact on the Next War (Unclassified)

**Abstract**: The force structure of the U.S. Navy was reduced dramatically during the five years following the conclusion of the Second World War. Planning efforts were complicated by the lack of a clear threat, inter-service rivalries and uncertainty in the national military strategy. Support for naval forces dwindled steadily until the Navy was unable to respond effectively to the crisis presented by the Korean War in 1950. The reactivation of ships and personnel for that conflict was beset with problems. Lessons applicable to any postwar period of reduction may be drawn from this experience.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Navy experienced dramatic reductions in its force structure in the five years following the conclusion of the Second World War. The drawdown of forces after the demobilization was influenced by inter-service rivalries, the lack of a clear naval threat, and difficulties in developing a national military strategy.

Extensive planning efforts resulted in a proposed postwar force which had a similar ratio of ship types to the VJ Day Navy. The primary factor in the continuing reduction of the size of the force was inadequate funding. This was caused by a general reluctance to accept the possibility of future conflicts and the resulting inattention to defense requirements. The issue was further complicated by disputes over the role of the Navy in an age of nuclear weapons.

The Korean War provided an opportunity to evaluate the effect of these reductions. Serious problems were encountered with the reactivation of ships, aircraft and personnel in response to that conflict. While naval operations were successful, the lack of serious opposition did not provide a complete test. Based on the Korean experience, the U.S. Navy could not have responded effectively to a general war at that time.

Lessons applicable to any similar period may be drawn from post-World War II drawdown. Among these is the need to build a force structure based on valid mission requirements which support the national military strategy. Logical planning is required, but
ultimately cost will become the primary factor. A scaled-down version of existing forces becomes the most acceptable, although not necessarily the optimum solution in a period of reduced funding.
PREFACE

This examination of the post-World War II reduction in naval forces is being undertaken at this time due to the widespread perception, supported in statements by both the Soviet and American political leadership, that the Cold War is over. With the slackening of tensions between the super-powers in the last years of the 1980's, the need to maintain a large active armed force by the United States has been questioned. Without addressing the merits of the arguments for a demobilization of much of the current military force structure, I will examine the last period in American history where the military threat was viewed as no longer existing.

I will concentrate solely on the issue as it affected the United States Navy. The role and status of the United States Marine Corps was heavily debated during this period and is an appropriate topic for a separate study.
POSTWAR NAVAL FORCE REDUCTIONS 1945-1950:

IMPACT ON THE NEXT WAR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States Navy experienced dramatic reductions in force levels following each of its major wars. Although each period was unique, the condition common to all postwar eras was the reluctance of the general populace to accept the possibility of future conflicts, and their unwillingness to support the cost of being sufficiently prepared. This phenomenon was most apparent following World War II, the conflict which produced the greatest level of mobilization in American history.

By late 1943 the tide had turned in favor of the allies and initial plans were formulated for the inevitable reversion to peacetime force levels. In the Navy, which had swollen to nearly 12,000 vessels of all types manned by nearly 3.5 million men, the transition would be abrupt and stressful.

The key elements in force structure planning—consideration of the military threat, national interests, national strategies, existing forces and resource constraints, all had an impact on the planning. However, due to the rapidly changing world order, and a rate of technological advancement almost beyond comprehension, the difficulties inherent in the planning process were exacerbated.
Additional problems evolving from disputes over defense unification, Universal Military Training, inter and intra-service rivalries, as well as new strategic options resulting from the advent of the atomic bomb, made the issue even more complex.

The force planning process works best during periods of expansion, not reduction. Every period of constriction has been painful. Decisions have often been made which produced tragic results during the next war. The period 1945-1950 is appropriate for study since it includes a large drawdown of forces, an attempt at a logical planning process in a period of uncertainty, and increasing reluctance to adequately fund requirements. These events were followed by a test, represented in the Korean War, of how well that planning effort served the needs of the national defense. Some of the issues are unique to that period and may have limited relevance to existing conditions. However, many of the arguments, proposals, problems and solutions may be applied to any period of force reduction.

This paper will examine the process of reducing U.S. Navy forces after the Second World War and the planning efforts which took place from 1943 until the commencement of hostilities on the Korean peninsula in 1950. No force planning process may be considered in isolation. Therefore, the study will begin with a summary of the political environment in which the senior Navy leadership was operating, and the key issues, foreign and domestic, extant in that period. This will be followed by an outline of initial postwar plans, and an examination of the demobilization
program. Also to be addressed are the attempts to compensate for a reduced force structure through reliance on a reserve fleet, and finally the impact of these actions on the Navy's ability to respond during the Korean War.
CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION OF FORMAL POSTWAR PLANNING

*Environment.* Before embarking upon an examination of the force planning process, adequate consideration must be given to the environment in which the deliberations took place. By 1944 it became apparent that the Second World War would bring about a major restructuring of the world order. The remnants of the old power structure, the dominance of France and Germany on the continent, and the British Empire across the globe, had been in decline since the Great War, and were about to dissolve. The upstart nation of Japan, including its dreams of hegemony in a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, was facing a seemingly inevitable defeat.

Into this vacuum were to step the newly emerging superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The USSR, as did its precursor, the Russian Empire, relied on its vast land army. The Soviets were relentlessly advancing toward Berlin and the eventual domination of eastern Europe. The June 1944 Normandy invasion had placed a large American army on the European continent for the second time in the century. Few envisioned that it would remain long beyond the defeat of Nazi Germany. The Battle of the Atlantic against the German submarine menace had been effectively won. The awesome naval power of the United States had made the defeat of the Japanese Empire a certainty.
On the domestic front, the "Former Naval Person," Roosevelt would be dead by war's end, to be replaced with the ex-artillery captain, Harry S. Truman. The dynamic James V. Forrestal had succeeded Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy in 1944. The Congress, through its Naval Affairs Committees, was very supportive of spending requests from the Navy.

Visualizing total victory on all fronts, the Navy now became concerned with planning for its role in the postwar national defense and the requirements for its own force structure. This planning process was to be complicated by the changes the war was bringing about—decolonization, altered alliances, national and ethnic movements, and a new balance of power. The dominant question was to be the role of the United States in this greatly altered world order and its relationship with any world government which might emerge.

Origins of the Plan. The earliest evidence of formal concern at the highest levels for the composition of the postwar Navy was in August 1943. Retired Admiral H. E. Yarnell was appointed head of the Special Planning Section of the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).1 In March of 1942 the offices of the CNO, a large administratively oriented staff, and the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), a smaller, all military, operations staff, were combined with Admiral Ernest J. King wearing both hats. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne, effectively ran the office of CNO while King devoted the majority of his time attending to the demands presented by a multi-ocean
war. While not addressing specific strategic issues, Horne's guidance to Yarnell supported a large fleet. He advocated keeping as many ships in commission as possible, or as Vincent Davis described it, "an argument for a somewhat undernourished giant rather that a perfectly fit midget...."²

Yarnell quickly waded into the task and produced his recommendations. The key difficulty he faced was the inability to define clearly a postwar threat. Brought up in the tradition of Alfred Thayer Mahan that navies existed to fight other navies, he could not honestly identify a valid threat to the U. S. fleet. Yarnell's planning activities were conducted in nearly total isolation from agencies outside the Navy. The major omission was in the factor which was to become predominant in the equation—that of cost—as only the vaguest estimates of a postwar naval budget were made. These computations were made without any consultation with the Bureau of the Budget or Congress.

Upon receipt of Yarnell's recommendations, Horne personally assumed major responsibility for postwar planning. He sought limited inputs from the Washington based staffs, and conducted only minimal liaison with the Army, whose planning efforts had significantly exceeded those of the Navy. Operational commanders were expected to provide inputs upon their return from the theaters of war.

Horne forwarded Yarnell's plan to the Secretary of the Navy on 22 May 1944 as "Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No. 1," with only minimal changes, most notably the designation of Russia as a
probable enemy because "they would almost certainly build a fleet."³

Plan No. 1 was to be replaced almost immediately with another revision, designated "Demobilization Plan No. 2," on June 9th. The latter plan, while similar, was less pessimistic about the role of allies in the postwar world. Plan No. 2 based its structure on the premise of the traditional American defense of the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific, leaving Europe and the eastern Atlantic to the Royal Navy. This proposal, calling for a Navy of 500,000 men, 50,000 officers, and an annual budget of $3 billion, was to represent the dominant view of the postwar Navy.⁴

The previously circulated "Demobilization Plan No. 2" emerged as "Navy Basic Post-War Plan No. 1," in April 1945. The tentative nature of the planning process at this stage is illustrated by the direction given in the document: "It is understood that many of the policies, estimates, allocation of ships and aircraft, designation of bases and features of shore activities are tentative and subject to change or supplementation."⁵ The plan outlined specific numbers of vessels to be assigned to the three major branches of the Navy. The fleet was divided into: the active fleet, which would be manned at 70% of its wartime complement; a ready reserve, manned at 20-30% and used to train midshipmen and reservists; and finally an inactive reserve (or laid-up fleet) consisting of ships wholly out of commission with only caretaker crews on board (see Appendix 1 for specific totals).
Expecting a drawn out battle against the fanatical Japanese for their homeland, postwar planning justifiably took a lower priority than the accomplishment of the wartime mission at hand. Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee early in May 1945, Admiral King in response to queries about the Navy's plans replied:

The study of the post-war Navy has proceeded a little bit further than you might gather. We have it pretty well blocked out, but it is not in its final form and it is not going to be in final form until we know what the national policy is to be for the defense of the United States...⁶

No further plans were proposed until hostilities had ceased.

The End of the War. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic weapons and the resultant unconditional surrender of Japan ended the war before the Navy was totally prepared. Justifiably reluctant to discuss demobilization plans openly while ships were under attack in the Pacific, the Navy was abruptly forced into the transition phase.

The demobilization plans had less to do with the specific requirements of demobilization than with the hopes for a postwar force structure. Nevertheless, steps were almost immediately undertaken to complete the enormous and complex demobilization process. On 30 June 1945, the Navy's personnel strength was 3,380,817.⁷ Of these only 15.2% of the officers and 10.7% of enlisted personnel were in the regular Navy, the remainder being reservists and inductees.⁸ Almost instantaneously, the focus of the nation shifted to rapid demobilization and the immediate return
of family members to civilian life. Under these conditions the Navy pressed on with its force structure plans.

**Debate Over Fleet Composition.** From its initial draft the plan was subject to criticisms, mainly along parochial lines. Admiral J. S. McCain, speaking for the aviators as DCNO for Air, was concerned about the number of carriers. "Gunboat admirals," even those such as Horne who accepted the emergence of naval air as predominant, thought the share of the budget devoted to aviation (42%) was too large.⁹

Within the Navy, disagreement existed as to the appropriateness of the force levels assigned by Plan No. 1. An original intent was for inputs from the senior officers returning from the Pacific. In the original correspondence presenting the comments King stated that:

> It is necessary to keep in mind that the present tentative active fleet is what it is proposed to have ready for instant action upon completion of demobilization next fall. . . . The assumption upon which the Basic Post War Plan is based (until the end of 1947) are as follows:
> (a) There is no prospective enemy in possession of a large fleet.
> (b) There is no prospective enemy that is largely dependent upon imports, as was the case with Japan. Consequently, the field for submarine action will be more limited than it was in the last war.
> (c) Enemy action on the sea (if war comes before the end of 1947) will consist largely of operations by submarines, land based aviation, and possibly cruiser raids.
> (d) Possible action, if necessary, would consist of air attacks upon enemy production centers and lines of communication; [and] conduct and support of amphibious operations.¹⁰

In the recommendations from three admirals selected, their background and interests are not difficult to ascertain. The
widest distinction was between Rear Admiral W. P. Blandy (a "gunboat admiral") and Rear Admiral A. W. Radford (the new DCNO for Air). While both supported an increase in the number of carriers (Blandy two more, Radford 10), the major difference lay in their perceptions of Navy of the future. Radford clearly wanted air as predominant, while Blandy and Vice Admiral H. W. Hill, the third officer asked to comment, supported a "balanced force." This was in reality a scaled down version of the World War II structure with a similar ratio of cruisers and battleships to carriers.

Admiral Nimitz, the wartime Commander in Chief Pacific, was also asked to provide an input. He too saw an increased role for the carrier; he supported an additional 10-15 CV's and the elimination of three cruisers, while not recommending any changes to the battleship inventory. This concept of a "balanced fleet" was to recur often. As one study of the period concluded:

...balance meant that some of each type of ship and weapon that had proved useful during the war would be kept on active duty....The ratio of carriers to surface combatants to be kept on active duty would be determined by the relative number used during the war."

Admiral King recommended the retention of two additional carriers to be compensated for by the deactivation of two large cruisers and numerous patrol craft. He overruled the recommendations for reductions in amphibious lift and the number of patrol aviation squadrons. Anticipating the battles to come, Radford advocated "for psychological reasons in dealing with the army I am inclined to believe that a reduction in the number of squadrons is preferable, although from an operational point of view
Consolidating these recommendations, the plan was modified and issued as "Post-War Plan 1A." Consolidating these recommendations, the plan was modified and issued as "Post-War Plan 1A." The dominance of carrier based aviation in the Pacific and the emergence of the submarine as an instrument of war had reduced the influence of the old guard of the battleship Navy. The death of Navy Secretary Knox on April 28, 1944, and his replacement by the World War I naval aviator James Forrestal further strengthened the aviation proponents. Except for of shore bombardment in preparation for amphibious assault, the battleship had played a relatively minor role in the war. The successes of the carrier groups in the Pacific would lead to dynamic aviators rapidly rising to predominance. By 1945 aviators represented 23.2% of all Navy unrestricted line officers and 27% of all flag officers; the submariner share of flag billets was 20%. Forrestal appeared to be squarely behind the aviators. In his Annual Report for FY 1945 he stated, "Air power has the main emphasis in the postwar Navy....The carrier is the spearhead of the modern fleet just as the battleship was 25 years ago."

While the United States at war's end had not developed a clear concept of national objectives, the Navy had loosely defined its role in the peacetime world. Forrestal described the mission of the armed forces of the United States during the immediate postwar period as:

a. Enforcing the terms of peace with our enemies.
b. Fulfilling our national commitments under the United Nations Organization.
c. Collaborating in preserving the integrity of the Western Hemisphere.

d. Providing for the security of the United States.\textsuperscript{16}

In this report, Forrestal presented his views on the nature of the postwar fleet (as per Post-War Plan 1A, see Appendix 1) but stressed uncertainty as a key element.

This plan is advanced at a time due to the evolution of new weapons of warfare, a long term composition of the branches of the armed forces is particularly uncertain.... While the Navy's long term planning must cover the potentialities of new weapons, the composition of the active fleet now [emphasis his] must be such as to meet the problems of the immediate next two or three years with the instruments available.\textsuperscript{17}

Fiscal Considerations. Throughout the initial planning deliberations the issue of cost was only lightly touched upon. The figures used by Yarnell of between $7 and $10 billion per year were arrived at without any substantive analysis of what the force might cost.\textsuperscript{18} The issue of funding was clearly brought out by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard who wrote to the VCNO,

The Preliminary Navy Basic Demobilization Plan is in the opinion of this office well-conceived.... No such plan, however will be worth the paper it is written on unless adequate funds are available to permit its execution. It behooves the Navy Department to make every effort to gain the support of the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress so that adequate appropriations may be forthcoming.\textsuperscript{19}.

The Chief of the Bureau of Personnel (and later CNO) Vice Admiral Louis E. Denfield was prophetic in his analysis. He saw the problem worsening over the postwar years, and predicted, "during a stabilization period of about 5 years after the end of the war, decreased appropriations might create situations similar to that of 1933" [the year viewed as the nadir of support for the Navy].\textsuperscript{20}
In March 1944 Congress had become involved in the planning when the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, better known as the Woodrum Committee, convened. While not firmly establishing the policies expected from its title, it is notable in some respects as it represented the initial foray of serving naval officers into the political arena. It also evaded decision on the unification issue, which was viewed as a victory for the Navy. This unification battle, however, was to be rejoined later, and had a major impact on the development of the postwar Navy.

During the war the Navy received a great deal of support and not much questioning from the Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, Carl Vinson. By war's end the Congress desired to reassert its role in providing for the national defense and Vinson chose the venue of a Concurrent Resolution. While not legally binding, the results of the deliberations would provide "the sense of the Congress" and the Navy leadership had agreed to abide by its guidelines. The statement of purpose of the Hearings affirmed this:

This concurrent resolution is a reaffirmance of congressional authority and responsibility in the matter and will be considered as binding by the Navy.... The size of the Navy is determined by two factors: (1) The necessity for security; and (2) The economic ability and justification for the maintenance and operation of the determined size of the Navy.²¹

The Navy's role in national policy and its traditional mission of defense of the Western Hemisphere were confirmed. However, a new obligation emerged, that of "The commitment of the United States to participate in the maintenance of world peace."²² The first two
missions represent the traditional prewar notion of the function of the U.S. Navy; the third is a vague and undefined concept, committing the Navy to world wide operations. Here the tie between national policy and force structure is made; however, the tasks to be derived from that policy are sufficiently broad to be of little value to planners faced with force reductions. In this instance a further complex mission for the Navy had been added without much apparent thought or debate.

The force totals presented by the resolution and supported by the Navy in testimony did not much alter Postwar Plan 1A. After two years of discussion of the plan, it did not differ greatly from the original Yarnell proposal. The changes were to occur once the cost factor was applied.

In March 1946, hearings were conducted on proposed cuts to the funding needed to support the agreed upon force levels. The Navy had asked for $6.325 billion to implement Plan 1A. The Bureau of the Budget on 20 February offered $3.960 billion. After Navy protests, a figure of $4.224 billion was submitted to Congress, the cuts coming primarily from construction and public works. The result of these cuts was a new plan, "Basic Post-War Plan No.2," which replaced the previous versions in March. The major impact of these budget cuts was a decrease of combatant ships from 1079 to 965, and the loss of four carrier air groups, 14 large surface combatants and eleven land based operational aviation squadrons. The future impact of these cuts was prophetically addressed: "...it will reduce the purchases we can make of new equipment in
plans for the future. The effect will be felt to a greater extent in the years that follow 1947, the fiscal years 1948 and 1949.\textsuperscript{26}

This process resulted in the adoption of Post-War Plan No. 2 as the basis for the future of the Navy. Despite extensive planning, no substantive changes were made until funds were altered by the administration. Within the period of a few weeks the plan had to be changed to accommodate those reductions.

The force planning process in the initial postwar period was complicated by debate within the Navy concerning the relative emphasis to be given aviation, submarines and surface forces. Uncertain of the long term role or objectives of the Navy, and desiring to avoid internal struggles over the merits of each branch, the leadership opted for a postwar structure based on the ratios which had emerged from the war. Past contributions were as important as potential for future employment in planning the postwar force structure, while cost was given relatively minor consideration. Despite the effort, a variety of external factors combined to alter the force structure which emerged from the planning process.
CHAPTER III

THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

Personnel: Bringing Johnny Home. Expecting a protracted and costly final battle for the Japanese homeland, the Navy was shipping vast quantities of stores, ammunition and personnel west across the Pacific. When the war suddenly ended in August 1945, those supplies became surplus and the ships and personnel redundant. Plans were immediately put into effect for the return to civilian life of over 3 million service members.

The Navy's goal was to constrict to the 558,000 officers and men programmed in Post-War Plan 1A. As expected, the political pressure to return the "former civilians" to their homes was tremendous. However, the demobilization process itself required that naval forces be utilized, not only to return naval personnel stateside, but also to return the hundreds of thousands of American soldiers and airmen scattered throughout the world.

A key lesson learned during the post World War I experience was that demobilization by unit, while more efficient, was not politically acceptable. A process of discharge based on individual merit was required. As with any personnel issue, great difficulty was encountered in matching the needs of the fleet with the desires of the individual. The solution was a point system where factors such as age, length of service, total overseas duty, and dependency
status were considered. Elements not included were unit operation
or engagement awards, or credit for having more than one dependent.
The system was essentially simple. Every month a point total would
be published setting the minimum required for discharge. Those
with the requisite points would then commence the separation
process.

As expected the selection of criteria and its relative
weighing was wildly unpopular with those with low point totals.
The files of the Bureau of Personnel are filled with correspondence
expressing displeasure with the system, ranging in tone from polite
questioning to violent indignation. Special consideration for
select groups, such as students, firemen, teachers, engineering
students, farm workers and even university professors, was demanded
based on their professed absolute necessity to the functioning of
society and the economy. Many commanding officers were severely
hampered in completing their assignments, or in some cases even
getting underway, by this system of individual release. In such
cases, they were authorized to delay discharges up to 120 days
based on "military necessity".

Even in the initial demobilization plans the Navy made
allowance for special skills. Specifically exempted from automatic
discharge were shore patrol personnel, storekeepers, and accounting
machine and key punch operators in the enlisted ratings, as well
as officers with skills in oriental languages or those engaged in
military administration. The end of the war put severe demands on
certain specialists within the Navy. Especially affected were
those engaged in the logistics problem of getting troops home and disposing of surplus equipment before it was destroyed by the harsh tropical environment. Also in critical need were those capable of administering and governing the newly acquired or recently liberated territories in the Pacific. These demands forced periodic revisions of the discharge policy.

Anticipating the requirements of demobilization and recognizing a lack of experienced personnel in this area, on 1 August 1945 the Bureau of Personnel requested Captain and Commander volunteer applicants for duty with demobilization activities. These officers were to administer the Personnel Demobilization Program. The plan called for 18 overseas "staging centers" where travel to the U.S. would begin. From there the service member would be shipped to the "receiving station" (21 were operating) nearest to his home of record. The final stop was at a "separation station" where final discharge would occur normally within 72 hours after arrival. By early 1944 preparations were made for this process with the establishment of two experimental demobilization centers. These facilities were used to test the system and to make adjustments prior to its full scale implementation.

Although the vast majority of the service members processed through the system were very eager to return to civilian life, the Navy took steps to ease the transition. Congress had authorized a mustering out payment to a maximum of $300, the initial payment to be made at separation. As part of the Civil Readjustment
Program, an interview was conducted concerning GI Bill benefits and job prospects. Representatives of organizations such as the Veterans Administration, Red Cross, U.S. Employment Service, and Civil Service Commission were made available to provide assistance. The culmination was a separation ceremony "of dignity and character to indicate the gratitude of the Nation for his service." The process did not end here. District Civil Readjustment Officers contacted the veteran approximately 30 days after discharge to see if further help was needed.

The personnel demobilization process may be viewed as a halfway house on a monumental scale. Although hampered by the vast numbers involved, the Navy assumed responsibility for rendering every possible assistance in the readjustment to civilian life. The goal was to prepare its veterans for the return to their communities.

While one branch was working furiously to get men out of the Navy expeditiously, others were concerned with the adequate manning of whatever fleet remained. Even under the greatly reduced force structure, an acute shortage of experienced officers and critical skills in the enlisted ratings were anticipated. In an open letter to reserve officers, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal urged them to consider a career in the regular Navy: "We know that the Navy will need after the war more USN officers than it has—perhaps 30,000 more...."

The demobilization program dealt mainly with raw numbers which would only be appropriate if the postwar fleet were merely a down-
sized version of its wartime structure. While this is not a totally inaccurate description of the consequent force, the personnel needs were substantially different, and personnel instability existed through much of the postwar period.

**Materiel Reductions.** On August 31, 1945 the U. S. Navy possessed over 51,000 vessels, 1,166 of these being combatants and over 44,000 classified as landing craft. While no one seriously expected that this enormous fleet would be maintained. Naval officers were determined to hold on to as many ships as possible, especially the major combatants, i.e., battleships, cruisers and carriers. Demobilization of personnel was relatively quick and easy compared with the monumental task of reducing the number of ships to the planned levels.

The Navy decided what to keep and what to scrap using relatively simple criteria. Desiring to keep the most modern vessels, 1940 was used as a guideline for the last year of construction for ships that would be retained. Obviously the enormous collection of amphibious craft which had been amassed for the invasion of Japan would no longer be needed, and most would be declared surplus. Equipment already contracted for but no longer needed, had to be canceled. "As of 1 November 1946 the Navy had terminated a total of 63,338 prime contracts involving commitments of 16 billion dollars.".

Ships currently under construction were a particularly difficult issue due to the sunken costs. On VJ Day 202 ships were under construction. Almost immediately 56 of these were cut back,
but by October the War Mobilization and Reconversion Office had asked for further reductions. Through negotiations with the Bureau of the Budget rough guidelines were agreed upon. Ships over 90% complete would be finished; those between 50% and 90% would be laid-up "as is"; and those below 50% complete would be scrapped. Exceptions were made for prototype or new design vessels. This guidance was considered to be flexible and the Navy was able to negotiate for funds to complete 58 of the 73 ships under construction on March 1, 1946. Justifying this change, Forrestal had testified:

Generally speaking the ships which we desire to complete are of the most modern design and embody the latest approved developments for their respective types. They will unquestionably be more economical to maintain and to operate than the older vessels they would replace.

The ships retained would be divided into the active fleet, ready reserve and inactive (also popularly known as "mothballed" or "laid-up") reserve. The conflict between the commitments to demobilization and the requirements of the immediate postwar fleet caused severe manning problems in the active force. In the desire to speed the return of servicemen the Navy converted several combatants, including carriers, to transports to participate in the aptly named "Operation Magic Carpet". The extent of the requirements for the occupation of Japan was an unknown during the immediate postwar months. As the unexpectedly smooth process went on, more ships could be released for other roles. Ship deactivation was further delayed by the requirements for Operation
CROSSROADS, the Bikini atomic tests which involved 89 ships. While ambitious, the plans for inactivation of ships were attainable. The schedule was delayed by a combination of shortfalls in personnel, berthing space and funds.

The materiel condition of ships brought out of mothballs from World War I was considered unsatisfactory. Most of the blame was attributed to their condition when decommissioned and the state of the art of ship preservation in 1918. The failure to fund the program adequately and the lack of a scheduled inspection program were additional causes of unacceptable delays in getting these ships back on line.

Determined not to repeat those mistakes, a concerted effort was made to adequately prepare ships of the Second World War fleet for their undetermined period of hibernation. The optimistic goal was to be able to reactivate a mothballed ship within ten days and have it ready for action after a twenty day shakedown cruise. Preparations were made during tests at the Philadelphia Navy Yard's Industrial Test Laboratory and special courses in ship preservation were given at San Diego and Philadelphia.

Upon arrival at the preservation site the steps included removing all perishables, ensuring an ample supply of spare parts was aboard, and making each compartment watertight. A wax-like compound was utilized to prevent oxidation on all corrodible metal surfaces, and all removable topside equipment was stowed below. A final step was the application of a hot plastic paint to the ship's hull. This coating was expected to protect the hulls of
inactive ships for about 5 years in salt water and for more than 15 years in fresh water. The key to the process was dehumidification, using both drying agents and moisture removing machinery. The preservation program was expected to take approximately four months for a cruiser and six months for a battleship.¹⁴

Administratively the ships of the inactive fleet were transferred to the newly created 16th Fleet on the east coast and the 19th on the west. These ships would be manned with a skeleton crew whose main mission was to provide security and monitor the dehumidification equipment. Although berthing sites were dispersed throughout the country, concern was voiced over the concentration of so many ships in a few areas and their vulnerability to a Pearl Harbor type of surprise attack.

The demobilization process was successful, especially when the scope of the project is considered. Although not without its problems, the personnel demobilization went essentially according to plan and most milestones and goals were reached. The process of inactivating much of the huge fleet amassed during the war was made more difficult because the requirements for personnel releases conflicted with those of properly preserving the Reserve Fleet ships. By October 1946 when the personnel cutbacks were completed, the U.S. Navy was not capable of reacting to even a limited crisis; fortunately for the nation, none arose.¹⁵ With only a small portion of its wartime strength remaining the Navy prepared to face the problems the postwar era would provide.
CHAPTER IV

EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE PLANNING

No force planning issue may be productively studied without considering outside factors which influence the process. Therefore an examination of the key issues facing the Navy and the other armed services in the 1946-1950 period is necessary. Among those issues were service unification, Universal Military Training, advances in technology, and an emerging military threat to American security. These factors have been researched individually; however, a summary of each will serve to provide a better understanding of the domestic political environment of the period.

**Unification.** Political controversies regarding the organizational structure of the armed forces of the United States in the post-World War II period made the task of planning naval forces especially demanding. Unification of the armed forces was not a new idea. In 1903 the Joint Board of the Army and the Navy was created, but it remained essentially powerless. Its charter did little more than to guarantee that each branch would not encroach on the domain of the other. Consequently, the board had little impact on the ability of the services to cooperate. During the Second World War a marriage of convenience evolved with the leadership of the Army and Navy working together to accomplish the operational requirements of defeating the Axis Powers. A joint
committee, headed by Vice Admiral J. O. Richardson, was formed by the JCS in 1944 to study and report on the matter of defense unification. The committee, with the notable dissent of its chairman, recommended a "single department of the armed services headed by a civilian secretary and under him, a commander of the Armed Forces who would act as Chief of Staff to the President." As the end of the war approached, realization that inter-service cooperation was not as effective as it could have been, reawakened the slumbering movement to unite the services.

With the end of hostilities, the blank check for defense expenditures was to disappear. The branches of the service would be in direct competition for increasingly scarce funding. Much has been written on the unification of the services and the establishment of the Defense Department by the National Security Act of 1947. As illustrated by the Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols), debate over the issue continues 40 years later. The 1947 legislation and the debate surrounding it had a major impact on force planning in the U.S. Navy during that period. Specific examples will aid in the discussion.

Naval officers saw few benefits to be accrued from unification of the services. Accustomed to going their own way in strategy, tactics and force structure selection, they believed that only those experienced with the unique requirements of war at sea were qualified to make decisions affecting the Navy. The potential loss of the Marine Corps and control of naval aviation were the major
fears of the Navy leadership. The Navy viewed these changes as a threat to their battle tested and proven task force concept of operations. They saw unification as an unwarranted abandonment of an organizational structure which, from its perspective, had won the war in the Pacific.

The Army Air Corps in many regards, became a de facto separate branch during the war. The including of Army Air Force General H. H. "Hap" Arnold as a functional equivalent to the service chiefs was a prelude to the eventual establishment of a separate Air Force. Hence, the Navy was also concerned about being continually outvoted in JCS deliberations by the Army and its offspring the Air Force. Compromises ensued after lengthy battles. The Navy retained its Marines and carrier based aviation assets. However, it still viewed itself as always being a minority and a target for relegation to a minor role in the national defense.

The awesome power displayed by the atomic bomb had convinced many that all other forms of weaponry were now obsolete. Aware of this perception, the Navy began to seek a nuclear role for itself. As Vincent Davis, the foremost scholar of the period, wrote, "aviation forces with a nuclear capability were the only kind of military force that the postwar Congress was inclined to support with enthusiasm."

As early as 1945 Congress was informed that the Navy intended to adapt the atomic bomb to carrier aircraft. In November 1947 a program emerged to modify aircraft carriers to be capable of operating the new AD aircraft. This single-engine, propeller-
driven aircraft had the ability to deliver a 10,000 pound atomic bomb. This development was followed by demonstrations of a modified P-2V patrol aircraft conducting long range flight profiles after launch from a carrier deck. The message sent by the Navy was clear—the Air Force should not necessarily have a monopoly on nuclear operations.

Except for strikes near the end of the war, naval aviation had not been used as a weapon against Japanese "strategic" targets. Sensing that the very survival of naval aviation might depend on achieving a capacity in this role, aircraft and carrier development shifted toward the heavy strike at long range. The Navy was unwilling to enter the realm of "strategic bombing" of enemy cities. Instead they viewed its mission as "strategic air warfare," defined as precision bombing of enemy military installations. As a consequence funds were deflected from traditional roles such as antisubmarine warfare and amphibious assault. This was not viewed, by the Navy at least, as a total alteration of the traditional naval sea control mission. A precision attack against submarine bases was in fact, they argued, antisubmarine warfare.

Some naval officers contended that only carrier based aircraft at present were capable of reaching targets deep within the Soviet Union. The lack of significant naval power in the hands of any potential enemy made the shift to this type of warfare more appealing to those concerned with the survival of the Navy as a viable participant in the national defense.
The Navy recognized that funding would be more readily attainable for the modern systems which had captured the imagination of the public and Congress. They also feared the loss of their traditional role as the nation's first line of defense and Air Force dominance in the postwar era. Navy force planners shifted emphasis away from more traditional roles, and turned toward guaranteeing a mission for its aviation forces. The flexibility of the aircraft carrier gave it a mission even if there was at present no enemy fleet to fight.

Compromise was achieved, but many controversies continued after the signing of the National Security Act in 1947. JCS conferences were held in Key West and Newport in 1948. The ensuing agreements relegated strategic air warfare to the Air Force with the Navy retaining responsibility for air operations, including land based antisubmarine warfare, which were a part of a naval campaign. With only minor changes this delineation of responsibility remains in effect.

This was not to be the end of all controversy and debate, as many outside the Navy still believed that the Navy had never accepted unification. In the 1949 Congressional debate, JCS Chairman, General Omar Bradley stated: "Despite protestations to the contrary, I believe that the Navy has opposed unification from the beginning, and that they have not in spirit as well as deed accepted it completely to date." 6

This perceived reluctance to work with the other services and to accept a defense organizational structure supported by the
Congress and the Administration was to hurt the Navy's planning efforts. "The Navy leaders were branded as obstructionists by much of the public press and by their Army colleagues." Proposals for modernization were cynically viewed as efforts on the part of the Navy to resist the mandated policy. Valid concern over national defense policy was constantly surrounded by doubts about the motivation behind the Navy positions.

Technology. During periods of uncertainty in the direction of national policy or defense strategy, an option available to force planners is an emphasis on the development of technology. In theory, when these key variable factors do become more clearly defined, the nation will have a basis for timely production of effective and modern weapon systems.

The technology of warfare advanced at a rapid pace between 1939 and 1945. During that period the world witnessed cavalry charges and V-2 rockets, biplanes and jet propelled fighters, crude artillery explosives and the atomic bomb. Fighter aircraft were viewed as becoming obsolescent in six months; ships produced prior to 1940 were considered to be almost worthless as first line combatants. Under these conditions the Navy was forced to plan for an uncertain future.

While previous technological advances reached fruition during the war, most of the hard research and theoretical groundwork was done in the prewar period. As Captain R. D. Conrad, Director of the Planning Division of the Office of Naval Research and Inventions, stated in a lecture to Naval War College students in
July 1946: "There was little time for research during this war and there will probably be none during the next; during war there is only time to apply the fruits of research, and precious little of that." 8

Recognizing the importance of technological research, the Office of Research and Inventions was created by executive order on 19 May 1945. The office would engage in research on varied topics such as nuclear physics, medicine, chemistry, electronics and mathematics. The Naval Research Laboratory, previously part of the Bureau of Engineering, was a part of this new office, the chief of which reported directly to the Secretary of the Navy. Among its key roles were to coordinate and assume overall control of projects where the subject is of major interest to more than one bureau, and to conduct research in its own laboratories for fundamental work not unique to any single bureau. Another was to act as an information and filing center for all projects being undertaken by the Navy Department. 9 Funds would also be made available to contract research with educational institutions and industrial laboratories. The importance of initiating and maintaining ties with universities and other civilian research agencies was emphasized. By 1949 over 700 projects, involving 150 institutions and expenditure of $15 million would be ongoing. 10

Admiral King in congressional testimony in March 1946 commented:

One of the vital duties of the postwar Navy will be to maintain continuous active research and development of new devices, weapons and techniques in order that the
United States may be ready for future emergencies, and that we may keep ahead of future developments abroad.  

The Office grew very slowly initially, its combined personnel total increasing only from 4,071 on VJ Day to 4,610 on 1 July 1946. Expenditures for fiscal 1946 totalled $24.6 million. Support would continue through fiscal 1948 when $34.3 million was expended, now under the new title of the Office of Naval Research. During that year the Navy conducted 896 projects at 223 institutions. In his Fiscal 1948 Report, the Secretary of the Navy referenced investigation of the possibilities of the use of nuclear power for propulsion of naval vessels. The launching of Nautilus six years later was to be one notable result of the funds expended for research in the postwar period.  

Through the investment of limited resources into research and development during these years, the Navy was able to better prepare for an uncertain future. Appreciating that American exploitation of pure research done in the inter-war period had resulted in successful and decisive weapons in the Second World War, Navy planners wisely devised an organizational framework to exploit the rapidly advancing technology of the era.  

The Military Threat. No force planning evolution may be adequately undertaken without considering the threat which the force is designed to attack or counter. The U.S. Navy emerged from the Second World War with total dominance over every other Navy; indeed, it was probably stronger than the combined total of the remaining forces in the world. The Soviet Navy played a very minor
role in the war, but emerged from it in an excellent position for expansion. It is estimated that at least 10 German Type XXI submarines had been captured. Even more important was the Soviet seizure of the blueprints for the Type XXVI submarine, a Walther-engine-powered true submersible.\textsuperscript{1} German shipyards, although damaged, were to provide a basis for Soviet naval ship construction, and Stalin's prewar dream of a Soviet high seas navy now seemed possible.

During the early postwar period the Soviet Navy was dismissed as primarily a coastal defense force capable only of sporadic raids against merchants and minor naval actions. In November 1948, testimony before the General Board of the Navy revealed, "The Soviets have succeeded in building a sizeable submarine force and maintaining it in a high state of readiness."\textsuperscript{15}

Official estimates for 15 November 1948 credited the Soviet Navy with a confirmed 229 submarines of all types. U.S. Naval Intelligence speculated that they were also currently engaged in construction of coastal defense submarines and patrol craft. The Soviets were also believed to be completing heavy cruisers and destroyers begun before or during the war, and preparing for the mass production of destroyers, destroyer escorts and minesweepers.\textsuperscript{16} Projecting into the next 10 years, U.S. Navy analysts testified prophetically that:

As a conclusion, aircraft development and employment trends of the Soviets indicate that ships will be attacked with guided missiles carried by aircraft of great range and speed.... Missiles will probably be launched from well outside conventional gun range.\textsuperscript{17}
Although the capability for submerged missile launch was many years away, the Soviets had captured German V-2 rockets and had displayed interest in adapting a missile to submarines.

This threat caused recommendations to be offered to protect surface ships against attack. Among these were dispersion of tonnage among smaller single purpose units, provision of extra armor to vessels lacking it, de-emphasis of conventional guns and concentration on surface to air missiles.\textsuperscript{18}

Most new USN ship construction was designed to counter the submarine threat, either directly with attacks against individual boats or through naval air attacks against their bases. This latter strategy obviously would require modern carriers equipped with fast survivable aircraft. The limited ship construction during this period emphasized countering this submarine threat. Along with the push for large carriers to destroy submarine bases, three new antisubmarine warfare ships were being built. Upgrades in electronic equipment and increased training were inaugurated. However, at this time when Soviet naval forces were growing, fiscal constraints were shrinking the American Navy.

Fleet dispositions reflected this focus on the Soviet threat to western Europe. Continued Soviet interest in the Turkish straits along with the inherent political instability in the region caused a postwar shift of USN forces to the Mediterranean.

Once the majority of the troops had been brought home from Europe, naval forces were all but eliminated from the area, and by January 1946 only one light cruiser and two destroyers remained,
although the force was to grow to 14 ships by the end of that year. These ships were forced to operate without an adequate support system. Funding for shore activities took a low priority and the degree of permanent commitment to the region was in doubt. All postwar plans had relegated the Mediterranean to the British and other European allies. When it became apparent that they would not maintain this role a continuous American naval presence developed. By 1948 the USN averaged 21.8 ships including 1.4 carriers in the Mediterranean.

By 1949 the Soviet Union had emerged as the principal threat in terms of both capability and intent. General Bradley testifying on American goals and objectives stated: "...the only force opposing such objectives in the world today is communism and the only nation whose postwar actions have indicated an opposition to the tranquility we seek are the Soviet Union and her satellites." The Soviet Navy did not yet represent a large fleet with which to do battle in accordance with Mahanian principles. By 1948 it did, however, provide a valid threat to the U.S. Navy, and force planning efforts to counter this threat could now proceed.

Universal Military Training. The newly accepted American responsibility for world security meant the end of the prewar period of isolation and small active military forces. A much debated solution to the postwar manpower dilemma was Universal Military Training (UMT). Many of the Navy's plans were deferred until resolution of the question. In July 1945 the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy recommended the establishment
of UMT, which as proposed by General Marshall, would support a "...small professional army of volunteers, backed by a large reservoir of trained men, who would be called into active service only in an emergency." Under the concept, Navy enlisted men would undergo one year of active service divided into four phases: recruit, elementary schooling, pre-commissioning training and shipboard training.

The proposal shared the support of the public and the Truman Administration, and especially the Army, whose manpower needs were the greatest and who had the most to gain. The Navy officially voiced support, as Vice Admiral Horne testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee in May 1945, "we feel very strongly that we need universal military training to maintain the size of the Navy we are going to need." The undetermined status of UMT affected the planning process heavily since the Ready Reserve was conceived for dedicated training of personnel. Addressing the issue King as CNO stated:

"In case Congress does not provide for Universal (or Other) Military Training in which to utilize the vessels of the reserve, review the status of those ships with the idea of deactivating some of them and using the personnel thus released to place in full commission such additional medium carriers (together with other combatant types) as may be practicable."

Both the Air Force and the Navy, being more technically intensive than the Army shared concern over the training burden these short term sailors and airmen would present.
There were beneficial side effects to UMT. Among these were development of a sense of service and discipline, national unity, exposure to regional and cultural differences and the encouragement of democracy. "The training would emphasize 'morale welfare' and 'character guidance'; deferments or exceptions were to be kept to the lowest level possible, and the compulsory training of women would also be considered at a later date."\(^{25}\)

Despite support from the services and the Administration, the issue became embroiled in budget disputes. UMT was eventually determined not to provide the anticipated benefits in relation to cost, which Secretary Forrestal estimated as $800 million for the first year and $2 billion per year once the program was underway. The legislation was defeated in 1948. The funds planned for UMT went to pay for the 70 groups requested by the Air Force. Congress opted for the less expensive option of the draft by passing the Selective Service Act of 1948.

These controversies combined to complicate force planning in the post-World War II era. Unquestionably, conditions have changed since that time, and many of the old arguments have been resolved. Nevertheless the basic problems of manpower, technology, and service roles and missions continue to affect the planning process.
CHAPTER V

REDUCTIONS AFTER DEMOBILIZATION

The postwar plans were repeatedly described as interim measures to be used in the transition period between war and peace; until the world order and the role of the United States Navy became better defined. Since no firm duration of this transition period had been agreed upon, the force levels delineated in Plan No. 2 became the basis for the postwar Navy. In the immediate years following the war the Navy was engaged in a variety of projects. These included Magic Carpet evolutions to bring home the remaining American forces, the Bikini and Kwajalein atomic tests, experimental operations in the arctic and antarctic, and limited training evolutions. This period of relative calm was not to last.

Geopolitical Changes. Not long after the defeat of the Axis powers, events abroad caused the political and military leadership of the United States to question the endurance of the newly attained world stability. In March 1947, Soviet pressure on Greece was the primary rationale for the enactment of the Truman Doctrine and the granting of $400 million in aid to that Balkan nation. The notion of collective security, where nations of the non-communist world would be interdependent for security needs evolved. The United States, possessing by far the greatest military and economic assets, became the major participant in this policy. The Rio
Treaty of 1947, and the North Atlantic Treaty were formal examples of the movement toward collective security.

The February 1948 fall of Czechoslovakia to a Soviet inspired coup d'etat and the subsequent detonation of its own atomic weapon in September 1949 cemented the belief that the Soviet Union, once our staunch ally against Nazi Germany, now represented the key threat to world peace. Beset with serious economic problems, the nations of western Europe, victor and vanquished alike, were in no position to resist determined Soviet intimidation or expansionism. The United States reacted with the implementation of the Marshall Plan for European economic recovery and a review of the adequacy of its military force structure.

**Force Level Debate.** On July 1, 1946, 33 combatants were under construction; thirteen of these remained so during the following year in which no new ships were authorized. By October 1947 the Navy's demobilization process was essentially completed. While the deactivation of ships had not been accomplished as scheduled, the personnel demobilization, although at times chaotic, had reached the planned manning levels. All branches of the newly unified armed forces believed that the Soviet Union was rapidly developing a military force that could not go unchallenged. Concurrently there existed wide disagreement on how best to counter this threat.

In the eyes of the newly independent Air Force, the atomic bomb and long range aircraft had become the ultimate weapon. Their interpretation of the results of the Strategic Bombing Survey
conducted at the end of the war reinforced the belief that air power had been the decisive weapon in the final victory. In a period of adequate defense funding this concept could coexist with the sea control and force projection strategy of the Navy, but as competition over defense dollars increased, it appeared that one strategy could survive only through the demise of all others. This battle for funding resulted in overt attacks by Navy and Air Force personnel on the strategic thinking and weapon systems of the other. The first years of the newly unified armed services were filled with public displays of controversy and animosity.

The Air Force advocated the B-36 heavy bomber which in theory could reach any Soviet target due to its 40,000 feet ceiling and 5,000 mile range. While the Navy had agreed to the Air Force having predominance in strategic bombing, a role for naval aviation for ground attack in conjunction with naval operations remained. Additionally, the Navy leadership questioned the wisdom of over-reliance on a single platform.

When the previously approved super-carrier, U.S.S. United States, was abruptly canceled by Forrestal's successor as Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, all reluctance to fight for the survival of naval aviation disappeared. This cancellation, which provoked the resignation of Navy Secretary John L. Sullivan, as well as a continuing erosion of fiscal support for Navy programs by the Truman Administration, caused alarm among senior naval officers. From the Navy perspective, the Air Force and Army having failed to
absorb naval aviation in the unification debates were now embarking on a campaign to strangle the force by removing its funding.

The JCS seemed to be unable to contend with these inter-service battles. As Paolo Coletta wrote,

In part because they lacked a precept for national policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to provide sound answers to the questions of how much of the nation's resources should be allocated to the services, what service should get what weapons and which of alternative strategies should be followed.¹

The Navy, seeing itself as being constantly outvoted and outmaneuvered in the Defense Department, and unable to fund its planned force structure, appealed to Congress for relief.

The Battle of the Budget. The budget debates of 1948-1951 are well documented and analyzed and only a brief summary is relevant to this examination.² By June 1948 the Navy had been reduced from the goals presented in Postwar Plan No. 2. The shortfall consisted mainly of 1 fleet carrier, 3 escort carriers, 2 battleships and 31 destroyer escorts. Total funds expended in fiscal 1948 ($4.9 billion) were $1.7 billion less than the previous year.³ These figures are misleading since the Navy had been living off its wartime surplus during these years. The proportion of total spending that was attributed to the use of wartime inventory was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Total expend.</th>
<th>Wartime inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>$6.6 B</td>
<td>$1.5 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>$4.9 B</td>
<td>$0.8 B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>$5.6 B</td>
<td>$1.0 B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By using these previously purchased stocks, and by digging into the wartime reserve, "In 1947 a 6.5 billion dollar Navy had been
operated on a $4.5 billion cash budget." Obviously these stocks could not last indefinitely, and the fiscal condition of the Navy was far worse than an examination of allocations would indicate.

In the fiscal 1949 budget the major shares went to: personnel, 30%; maintenance and operations, 26%; and procurement, 26%. Personnel levels had dropped below the anticipated 500,000 enlisted and 50,000 officers outlined in the postwar plans to 363,255 enlisted and 46,657 officers as of June 30, 1949. Reduced funding necessitated a personnel reduction in force during calendar 1949. The Navy elected to complete this through attrition, arguing, "From the standpoint of morale it is desirable to reduce the number of personnel on hand to the planned figure by normal attrition without replacement, rather than by immediate discharge of the surplus." If 1949 was a bad year, 1950 was to be worse. Addressing the cutbacks, Carl Vinson argued that the fiscal 1950 budget would reduce carrier strength from 11 to 8, reduce aircraft procurement from 1,123 to 843, deactivate nine naval air stations, and allow "Navy aviation to wither on the vine by failing to give enough aircraft...." Responding to why the cuts must come from aircraft procurement Admiral Denfield, the CNO, stated:

the only area susceptible for reduction of the magnitude imposed was that in contractual obligations for procurement. Of the major items of procurement, shipbuilding had already been reduced 60 percent; procurement of electronics equipment for antisubmarine warfare had been reduced 40 percent. The sole remaining major item was aviation procurement.
Although it was clear that naval aviation was being cut, were these reductions unique to the Navy or were the others services also being equally affected?

The Army and Air Force were also experiencing funding shortfalls. Associating excessive defense spending with uncontrollable inflation, and possessing a personal belief that the military leadership was wasteful, President Truman was determined to monitor defense funding closely. In 1948 the newly established Defense Department was given $11.25 billion and subsequently received a $3.5 billion supplemental allocation. For the next year, the Bureau of the Budget granted $14.5 billion to Defense, but retracted $1 billion of the previous year's supplemental funding. For 1950, although the services asked for $23 billion, Truman would not be moved from his figure of $15 billion. He went as far as directing that the Air Force not spend, until he approved, the $822 million Congress had provided for their 70 group program.9 The share of the defense budget in these years appears to show a relatively even apportionment of one-third to each service. General Bradley, addressed this apparent equal apportionment of the funding and declared it to be, "only a coincidence, and may not necessarily hold."10
While the Navy bemoaned the loss of the carriers, the Air Force fell well short of its goal of 70 groups, with funding provided for only 58. However, faced with what they viewed as a dedicated effort to emasculate the Navy through removal of its air arm the senior uniformed leadership resorted to unprecedented steps to preclude the perceived impending disaster.

**Personnel Reductions in Force.** The demobilization of the initial postwar year was swift and relatively simple. In the post-1946 period the reductions were gradual, and unlike the previous experience, these cutbacks were to force out some individuals who desired to remain on active duty. Many of the cuts in ships and squadrons were caused by the lack of funding for personnel. Several methods were utilized to reduce personnel costs.

One of the more common techniques was to make horizontal cuts, i.e., reduce the basic personnel allowance of commands throughout the Navy. Acknowledging problems caused by this approach, the CNO agreed to consider special requests for interim allowances. Such
increases would not be easily obtained. In a letter to "All Ships and Stations," the Chief of Naval Personnel announced, "In view of the critical situation which will obtain [sic] throughout Fiscal 1948, these requests will be granted only in the most exceptional cases."¹¹

Delaying promotions was another cost saving measure. Block promotions to lieutenant and lieutenant (junior grade) based solely on longevity were discontinued. There would be no promotion of chief warrant officers to grades W-3 and W-4 in fiscal 1951. Letters were sent to Congressmen, announcing that appointments to the Naval Academy would be reduced from five per member, to four.¹²

An excess of senior enlisted personnel existed in the early postwar years. A proposal to alleviate this situation was to allow transfer to the Fleet Reserve (nominal retirement) after 16 years of active service. This top heavy force was unwieldy but provided some advantages. The senior petty officers could provide a superb nucleus for rapid mobilization in an emergency.

By 1949 further cuts were required. Recruiting had been cut to the absolute minimum and a system of early discharges was initiated. Commanding Officers were directed to utilize this option, "to the maximum extent possible."¹³ Although the enlisted manning of the Navy by now numbered 371,700, a further reduction of 21,700 was announced for June 1949,¹⁴ Reductions continued, and by 30 June 1950 (five days after the North Korean invasion) 336,897 enlisted personnel were on active duty.
FIGURE 2.

NAVY PERSONNEL STRENGTH
(as of 30 June)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>141,161</td>
<td>842,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>52,434</td>
<td>446,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>45,416</td>
<td>373,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>47,975</td>
<td>401,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>44,641</td>
<td>336,897</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The increase in 1949 was attributed to the political situation in the previous year, e.g. Berlin and Czechoslovakia. A further reduction of 1,590 officer was programmed for FY 1951. This would be accomplished primarily through the release of reserve officers from active duty.

The cost savings required could not be accomplished entirely from horizontal cuts. More drastic measures were required. In November 1949 the Navy announced the decommissioning of 28 aviation squadrons and reductions at five overseas air stations.

Morale is a measure of military strength that is difficult to quantify. Senior naval officers, in Congressional testimony and elsewhere, voiced their concern over the debilitating effects of these decreases. The size of the cuts were such that they could not be compensated for with mere adjustments to personnel assignment policies. While the term "hollow force" has not yet
come into use, it does provide an apt appraisal of the Navy of 1950.

**Revolt of the Admirals.** Working within the system and showing a reluctance to air disputes outside the service had been a tradition among naval officers. By late 1949 the situation appeared so critical that this tradition was violated. Naval officers resorted to going around their civilian secretary, directly to Congress, and in at least one case, to leaking data to the press. These events, along with direct attacks upon the Air Force strategy in congressional testimony have become popularly known as the "Revolt of the Admirals."

Sullivan had been replaced as Secretary by Francis D. Matthews, who was known as the "rowboat secretary" after having admitted to commanding nothing larger than a rowboat. One naval aviator with experience in Washington, Captain John G. Crommelin, saw the problem as more than an inter-service dispute over funding. He released a statement to the press calling, "...the cancellation of the big carrier and the B-36 controversy only 'superficial manifestations' of the problem."\(^{16}\) The critical issue was having forced on the Navy a general staff concept, a structure that had resulted in ruin to the German armed forces twice in this century. Support for this view by senior naval officers, including the CNO, was leaked to the press by Crommelin, and Matthews became convinced that he had a mutiny on his hands. Matthews subsequently fired Denfield, and several senior officers were forced to retire.
Some argue that the revolt failed since, "There were no discernable changes in the military budget in terms of total amount or distribution." However, the main intent of the revolt was not merely to increase the Navy's share of the defense budget, but to preserve its aviation component. In this regard the aims were achieved. Unable to ensure the survival of adequate forces to conduct their assigned missions, senior naval officers used a public forum to express their extreme dissatisfaction with the civilian leadership. This process was not without its undesirable side effects. In the eyes of many, this episode was one more example of Navy intransigence and resistance to change.

FIGURE 3
POPULAR VIEW OF THE NAVY AND UNIFICATION

"UNIFICATION AT LAST!"

CHAPTER VI

EFFECT ON NAVY CAPABILITIES

The continuing reduction in funding for the Navy after 1947 was coincident with the increasing realization of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. While the size of the Navy in personnel and active ships did not decrease dramatically, those numbers should not be viewed as the sole indicators of combat readiness. During that period attempts were made to produce an accurate assessment of Navy's ability to perform its missions.

State of the Reserve Fleet. The procedures for preserving ships after the Second World War were implemented due to wide dissatisfaction with the condition of ships preserved after the previous conflict. Among those discrepancies were:

(1) the lack of appreciation of the importance of maintaining readiness of these ships;
(2) the inactivating of such ships without thorough overhaul;
(3) the lack of adequate funds for upkeep;
(4) and the inadequacy and infrequency of necessary inspections, with the resultant ignorance of true conditions by the Navy Department.¹

Although Navy Regulations were drafted specifically to remedy these shortcomings, many of the complaints voiced in 1950 over the condition of mothballed ships were similar to those voiced in 1940.
One of the initial problems was the wide disparity in the quality of the preparations made for deactivation by ships' crews. The demands of the personnel demobilization had made it impossible in many instances to complete the required preparations despite the best of intentions. By 1947 the program of overhauls had to be abandoned. In its place emerged a plan for a five year inspection cycle, during which 20% of the reserve fleet would undergo an overhaul each year. Due to budget restraints even this program was determined not to be affordable, and it too was discontinued in 1949. Cutbacks in manpower and in the amount of assistance provided by civilian yards further exacerbated the problem. A system of concentration on "high priority ships" never became operable due to debate over which ships should fall into this category.

So despite the advanced planning, and determination not to repeat the errors of the last postwar period, economic factors were about to bring about a recurrence of those problems. These shortfalls were not unknown to the senior Navy leadership as the record of hearings conducted in 1948 and 1949 indicate.

Established in 1900 primarily to advise the Secretary on war plans and ship construction, the General Board of the Navy had lost much of its former status during World War II. An attempt was made in 1947 to restore its previous authority and prestige through the appointment of dynamic war-experienced officers to its membership. One of these was Captain Arleigh Burke who would later rise to further prominence as CNO. The record of the deliberations
provides a means to examine the Board's appraisal of the readiness of the Navy for that period.

Testimony was heard on the effects of fiscal cutbacks on the ability of the Navy to conduct its mission. Concern over specific types of ships was voiced: "The readiness of the DD's and DE's, for instance, for anti-submarine work, is far below what the operating forces would like to have."

Among of the other deficiencies addressed in testimony was the deterioration of amphibious ships at Green Cove Springs, Florida. Citing the unsatisfactory condition of these vessels, Rear Admiral F. A. Braisted of the CNO's logistics staff predicted that they only had two or three years left unless something was done. The cause of this deterioration was the lack of financial support for the reserve fleet. Rear Admiral M. E. Curtis, representing the CNO, assured the board that he was aware of the problems, but estimated, "what we need is over two billion dollars more than we were allowed to go to Congress and ask for." The only place remaining to get funds to support the reserve fleet properly was to take it from the active forces, and there was no perceived surplus there. Personnel manning was also a problem.

The 2,100 inactive reserve ships were manned with 18,000 enlisted, or only 8-10 per ship. The merits of using civilians to man the reserve fleet were discussed. The currently utilized military personnel had responsibility for training of reserve crews upon ship activation. This requirement, along with the perceived
need for additional supervision of civilian workers, were believed to outweigh any possible monetary savings.⁵

The shortage of replacement parts for these ships was also a recognized deficiency. The Bureau of Ships was not purchasing additional spare parts and the minimum procurement time ran 12-15 months on some items. It was estimated that it would take two to three years to fill the 400,000 outstanding requisitions, even if funds were available.⁶

The Board also heard testimony on future aircraft inventories. There was a need to replace older aircraft since 80% of the inventory in 1949 was purchased prior to 1945. Normal attrition combined with reductions in aircraft procurement would produce a serious shortfall in reserve aircraft. Witnesses before the Board predicted, "In the event of war in 1952, there will not be any planes in the reserve stock to draw from."⁷

The relationship between funding and readiness was clearly made during these deliberations. "The cost of retaining ships of the Reserve Fleet is directly related to the doctrine of readiness current at anytime."⁸ This state of readiness was not unknown to the Navy, Congress or Administration—it represented the readiness for which the nation was willing to pay. The efficiency of this economy measure is debatable. It was estimated that the costs of maintaining the Reserve Fleet amounted to "less than two-tenths of one per cent of the present replacement value of these ships."⁹
Action was taken on some of the recommendations. It was hoped to convert 18 Reserve Fleet destroyers to fast antisubmarine escorts with improved electronic detection equipment.10

The poor condition of the war stocks was revealed by the DCNO for Logistics who reported, "The status of the Navy War Reserves, as of May 1948 is as follows:

<table>
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The Board served its purpose in identifying areas of deficiency. Unfortunately the prevailing climate of reduced defense spending made action to correct these problems unlikely.

War Plans. In the post-demobilization period the Navy was confronted with the complex problem of coordinating force structure with strategic war planning. Although in an ideal situation strategy would drive the force plan, this was not always to be the case. Although only a remnant of the VJ Day fleet, The USN was the most powerful in the world. However, as the continuing debate over roles and mission would indicate, it was perceived as being a force in search of a strategy. In a lecture at the Naval War College Vice Admiral Carney observed, "The character and geography of any possible opponents of the future are such as to make it most unlikely that an exact duplicate of our 1945 forces would again be required."12 Accepting this, the key question becomes, "were U.S. naval forces of 1947-1950 designed to best implement the current
war plans, or were they simply a scaled down version of the 1945 Navy in search of a mission?"

One of the initial attempts at formulating war plans in the postwar Navy were a series of 11 studies codenamed "Pincher." This concept, first produced in June 1946, for war against the USSR, emphasized a western European offensive. It also projected an extensive role for carrier based aviation in the Far East and Mediterranean. Notably, no mention made of naval use of nuclear weapons.\(^{13}\)

These studies did not represent the only viewpoint in the Navy. Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery, Chief of the Guided Missile Division on the CNO staff, evoked comment and controversy with his public advocacy of a strategic nuclear role for naval aviation. He argued that current land based aircraft, due to their limited range and the lack of suitable forward bases, would be unable to reach targets within the Soviet Union, Gallery concluded that only carrier aircraft could successfully deliver the "Sunday Punch" of the atomic bomb.\(^{14}\)

The General Board also looked at the problem and provided its own recommendations without addressing specific force level requirements. Its relative order of priorities differed from the "Pincher" studies by listing antisubmarine warfare first, and the Navy contribution to the air offensive, last:

At present, the greatest single threat to the United States military effectiveness overseas is the possibility of an efficient enemy submarine force using submarines equal to or better than the German Type 21.... This makes it imperative that every effort be made to deny
enemy submarines access to the open seas immediately upon
the outbreak of war.15

The senior Navy leadership was aware of the severity of the
problem and was concerned over their inability to respond
effectively. Vice Admiral Carney argued that the present level of
funding was not adequate to meet the requirements of current war
plans, and:

...it may be necessary to bring the requirements and
phasing of the Mobilization Plan more in line with the
possibilities of our domestic economy. If such re-
estimated requirements and phasing indicates that the
Navy cannot accomplish the tasks or missions now
prescribed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have to be
advised accordingly.16

Faced with widely differing views of its future role and hence
its desired force structure, the Navy did little to make major
alterations to its Second World War model. Because of the rapidly
developing technology of jet propulsion, progress was made in the
design and production of new aircraft. The size and range of these
were to suggest, in the Air Force view, that the Navy wanted a
strategic strike role for itself. The ensuing battles over the
limits of each service and the competition for decreasing defense
funding were to affect Navy force planning as much as the need to
develop forces to support the war plans.
CHAPTER VII

EVALUATION: KOREAN WAR LESSONS

An opportunity to judge the quality of the decisions made by Navy planners in the postwar years was dramatically presented on June 25, 1950 when North Korean troops attacked across the 38th parallel.

Although American naval forces were spread thinly in the Far East, they were stronger there than in any other region of the world. At the time hostilities commenced, the forces available to Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East, totalled one light cruiser, four destroyers, four amphibious warfare ships and four auxiliary minesweepers. The U.S. Seventh Fleet's Carrier Division 3, consisting primarily of the carrier U.S.S. Valley Forge, a cruiser and eight destroyers was ordered west from Subic Bay in the Philippines. They steered initially toward Okinawa, not Sasebo, Japan, due to uncertainty over Soviet intentions.

This meager force was augmented with British, Australian and New Zealand vessels and the first air strikes were conducted by Valley Forge aircraft on July 3rd. These operations were followed by the unopposed insertion of elements of the First Cavalry Division with amphibious ships at Pohang on July 15th.1 Even with these limited initial objectives it became obvious that present levels were inadequate. Additional naval forces would be required
if the United States were to become committed to combat on the Korean Peninsula.

**Manpower Augment.** Full mobilization never occurred during the Korean War. In its place was an ambiguous state between war and peace (the conflict then being officially described as a police action). The issue was made more complex due to commitments throughout the world and the uncertainty of the intentions of the Soviet Union in Europe. Mobilization plans were based on the outbreak of general war, and not even a "national emergency" had yet been declared. By mid-July, however, it became apparent that the active forces would be unable to cope with the current situation. On the 19th President Truman authorized the Secretary of Defense to activate reserve forces. This was followed by the decision to extend enlistments involuntarily for 12 months.²

The use of reserve assets is commonly viewed as a less expensive alternative to maintaining a totally active force structure. By the late 1940's, economy had taken precedent in nearly every decision. As its manning levels were decreased, the active fleet had grown increasingly dependent upon the reserves. The organization of the Naval Reserve had not changed greatly since 1938. It was comprised primarily of four branches:

1) Organized Reserve who conducted weekend drills and did 14 days of active service for training annually.

2) Volunteer Reserve, normally not paid and not required to perform regular training, although pay for active duty for training might be authorized if funds were available.
(3) Merchant Marine Reserve of experienced seagoing officers.
(4) Fleet Reserve comprised of nominally retired officers and enlisted personnel who had left active duty, but had not completed 30 years of active service.

At the end of 1949 there were 299,920 officers and 782,427 enlisted personnel in the Naval Reserve.³

To fill the urgent need for augmentation of Far East ships and staffs, the shore establishment was initially tasked with providing personnel. Calls went out for reservists willing to volunteer for active service. This call was later canceled except for special categories after involuntary activation was authorized. This initial order, announced on July 22nd, would affect 7,212 officers and 49,160 enlisted personnel.⁴

The priority for recall was first Organized Reserve, then Volunteer Reservists who had drawn pay, and finally, unpaid Volunteer Reservists. Since shortages in many specialties existed in the fleet, some unpaid Volunteer Reservists were recalled while Organized Reservists remained at home, continuing their routine of paid drills. Eventually, approximately 39,000 of the 68,000 petty officers in the Organized Reserve would be called to active duty.⁵

Since a general mobilization had not been declared, the decision remained of how to use the recalled reservists. Except for aviation squadrons, which deployed mostly intact, reservists were used on an individual basis to augment active fleet units. En route training would be required, but this exacerbated the shortage of instructors, many of whom had been transferred to sea duty.
Proposals were made to utilize officers and men of the Fleet Reserve in this role, and ultimately over 2000 Fleet Reservists were recalled to active duty as instructors.

The reliance on the reserves experienced in the early months of the war did not last long. Recognizing the inequity of Second World War veterans being recalled to active duty while many men too young for the 1941-1945 war remained at home, the nation turned toward selective service for manpower. Reserve participation peaked in FY 1951 with 174,610 total reservists activated, comprising almost 25% of the fleet. A decline ensued until only 14,157 reservists were on active duty by the last year of the Korean War.6

The reserve augmentation was most successful within naval aviation. A total of 42 squadrons were activated with 21 reporting to the Pacific Fleet for duty by October 1950. The augmentation included carrier based tactical air and land based maritime patrol squadrons. The experience of Attack Squadron 702 (VA-702) was typical.

In July activation notices went out to squadron members at their base at Naval Air Station Dallas. After a week of hectic preparation, the squadron departed for San Diego where they underwent several months of additional training. This was necessitated by the transition to the modern AD Skyraider aircraft. By March of 1951 VA-702 was part of an all-reserve air group conducting combat missions off the carrier U.S.S. Boxer.7
Several problems were experienced with the reserve augmentation. One of the key issues, and the most controversial, was that of deferments. Records on reserve personnel were poor and little accurate data was available on which to base deferment decisions. As a result most had to be considered on a case by case basis, initially without much firm guidance. The issue had become so politically volatile that on October 17th, the Secretary of Defense defined the following as valid criteria for deferment from recall:

1. individuals enrolled in educational institutions,
2. elected government officials, and
3. persons requesting delay for humanitarian reasons. \(^8\)

The most common criticism of the process was the inadequacy of the training provided for the activated reservists prior to reporting to their commands. This shortfall required that the active fleet ships devote extensive manhours to on-the-job training before these personnel would be effective members of the crew.

**Reactivating the Reserve Fleet.** As a result of the needs of the Korean War, activation of ships was commenced almost immediately. The Reserve Fleets were required to provide ships in the condition in which they were laid up, as rapidly as feasible. The active fleet commander would be responsible for crew training and scheduling of any modernization required. The activation process was completed primarily by reserve crews but the problems produced by the lack of a full mobilization made this process difficult.
Reactivation crews found a wide range of materiel condition of the mothballed ships. Battleships, carriers, destroyers and submarines were generally in good condition; however, "...the first priority, for the situation we have been supporting now at Korea, included the very ships [amphibious] that were the lowest order of importance and were designated for deterioration." Once the ship was turned over to the active fleet commander, the monumental task of getting the crew prepared for operations commenced.

Activation teams were comprised of trained reservists, and many of these had been sent to the Far East in the early days of the war. Consequently, training the newly arrived augment crews was a serious challenge. Personnel in many cases were not experienced in their assignment or so far removed from the Navy that whatever knowledge they had was forgotten. Morale problems caused by the perceived inequity of the activation process also needed to be overcome.

The most critical problem was the lack of an adequate supply of critical spare parts. It was not uncommon for many orders to be backlogged for months and improper documentation and inexperienced personnel made the problem nearly unsolvable. "The part's on order" became the common retort to any question.¹⁰

Despite these obstacles, the reactivation progressed. Responding to orders received in July, 54 ships, mostly amphibious types, were reactivated by September. A total of 564 ships of all types had been transferred to the active fleet by the following March. Among these was the battleship U.S.S. New Jersey.
In response to the need for additional shore bombardment capability in Korea, work commenced aboard New Jersey on 26 September 1950. By October the crew, mostly recalled reservists, began to arrive, and on 21 November the ship was recommissioned. A period in dry dock followed. There it was discovered that although the dehumidification program had done its job in reducing corrosion, a side effect was dried up gaskets and electrical insulation. Workups were completed in April, and New Jersey arrived in the Far East on May 12th ready for action.11

The pattern was similar for most ships. Problems caused by funding cutbacks for the reserve fleet complicated and delayed the reactivation process. The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, Vice Admiral Badger, observed: "If we had not discontinued the quinquennial overhauls for economy reasons about two or three years ago, we wouldn't have had to care so much about these ships that were laid up improperly at the time of deactivation."12 Fortunately, in this conflict the Navy had time to correct the deficiencies and respond to the crisis.

Evaluation. The ultimate measure of any decision process will come from a case where the planned results may be compared with those actually achieved. No world war or general mobilization emerged from this postwar period. No foreign fleet sortied to meet the U.S. Navy, and the Korean War was limited in objectives. Nevertheless, the conflict can provide some limited gauge by which the decisions of the previous years may be tested. Despite the limitations of the comparison, the conflict does provide an
opportunity the judge the level of personnel and materiel readiness
posessed by the Navy five years after demobilization commenced.

One of the documents available to evaluate Navy performance in Korea is the series of Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) Interim Evaluation Reports. Written as the war progressed, they provide an operators' and commanders' view of the events.

Among the observations made regarding the adequacy of forces: "In the first seven months of the Korean War, however, air power enjoying almost complete freedom of the skies, was unable to prevent military reverses to our ground forces." Despite the debate over modern strategic weapons and who should employ them, the key to the conflict was getting ground troops ashore and supporting them once they got there. This required two of the capabilities which had been relegated by many as obsolete--the amphibious assault and shore bombardment from large naval guns.

Senior commanders complained about shortages of ships. Commander Seventh Fleet stated that, "the shortage of destroyers has been a continuing problem." and "the problem of providing antisubmarine security for units of the Seventh Fleet is aggravated by the shortage of escorts and screening vessels." Shortfalls in aircraft were also addressed:

The current critical shortage of carrier type aircraft in the Western Pacific is becoming more acute due to the increase in losses during January and February, largely caused by ground antiaircraft fire."
Concern was also voiced over problems presented with coordination of basing activities at airfields under Air Force control.

The most often cited shortfall was in adequately trained personnel:

The basic allowances of the staffs, ships, squadrons and shore establishments in commission at the outbreak of hostilities were inadequate to carry out sustained combat operations...the basic allowances are unrealistic and inadequate for meeting emergencies.¹⁶

Also addressed was the slowness of the augmentation and the lack of sufficient training among both officers and enlisted personnel. This training problem was attributed to "budgetary limitations and high personnel turnover". The report goes on to state "all fast carriers, escort carriers and tenders performed satisfactorily." The lack of a sufficient basic allowance, and the need to augment ships' companies would "make the existence of a satisfactory degree of readiness for general war doubtful in the majority of ships at the time of their deployment."¹⁷

Personnel shortfall problems recur throughout the report. The need to conduct "on the job training" in a combat zone is one of the chief complaints. Acknowledging that ships were for the most part manned to their basic allowance, the report also emphasized that the basic allowance level was insufficient to sustain combat operations. Jet fighter squadrons were reporting 59% operational readiness while their attack and patrol counterparts reported 63% and 92% respectively.¹⁸ Although unit readiness figures can be
misleading, these figures were evaluated as generally accurate by the CINCPACFLT staff based on their observations.

From the perspective of naval aviation, the war was far from a "police action." In Korea naval aviators flew 275,912 sorties, only 7,000 less than conducted by the Navy in all of World War II.\textsuperscript{19} The evaluation of Navy aircraft vis à vis its Soviet built adversaries is startling:

Air combat experience in Korea has indicated that present carrier fighters are inadequate; fighters reasonably capable of combat against contemporary developments of the MIG must be provided at high priority.\textsuperscript{20} and,

Jet aircraft provided are inferior to the MIG in speed. Attack aircraft are barely satisfactory for the present time, and would be wholly inadequate in the event of a general emergency.\textsuperscript{21}

Among the more revealing final conclusions: "Strength of the Pacific Fleet is not adequate to meet an expanded emergency.", and "Readiness of many ships when deployed was not adequate for naval combat."\textsuperscript{22}

Most narratives of the Korean War agree that U.S. naval forces performed well against their adversaries. Notwithstanding, significant doubt exists as to its preparedness if a sizable subsurface or air threat to its carriers and amphibious vessels could have been mounted. As it was, considerable difficulty was encountered with the limited mine warfare capability of the North Koreans. It was observed, "the excellent minesweeper force of World War II had literally dissolved."\textsuperscript{23} Fortunately the U.S. Navy was not given a complete test, and some speculation must remain over the merit of the decisions made in the late 1940's.
Admiral Arthur D. Radford, the Commander in Chief Pacific during the war, observed:

...the apparent failure of the communists to read American newspapers of June 1950. There they would have found that in another year or less, all U.S. forces would have been greatly reduced—to a point, I am certain, where they could not have intervened successfully in Korea."\(^{24}\)

It has been argued that is was only the Korean War which stopped the precipitous decline of the U.S. Navy. If this is true, then the war occurred just in time.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND APPLICATIONS

Between 1945 and 1950 United States Navy force levels were reduced dramatically; first by a rational process to demobilize the immense World War II fleet, followed by a gradual erosion of strength, caused primarily by inadequate funding. The planning in the initial phases was hampered by debate within the Navy concerning the size and role of the major branches--air, surface and submarine. The latter drawdown took place in a complex political environment, highlighted by reorganization of the nation's defense structure. Throughout both phases, the changing world order and controversy over the best means to confront the growing Soviet military threat exacerbated the problem of reaching consensus on a national military strategy. Hence, the development of an effective naval force structure was without firm guidance and became stagnant. The basic elements of these phenomena are not necessarily unique to this period, and it is possible to derive some general observations about postwar naval force reductions.

Caution must be exercised in the inappropriate application of lessons learned from the historical analysis of one period; the precise conditions will never exist again. However, the following conclusions do have relevance to any reduction of forces in a postwar period.

1. On a relative basis, during demobilization reducing personnel levels is easy; reducing materiel assets is hard. In
mobilization the converse is true, personnel hard and assets easy. The personnel reductions after World War II, although not without its problems, were accomplished essentially as planned. The proper preservation and induction of ships into the reserve fleet was dependent upon facilities, trained personnel, and funding, and as a result was more complex to plan and execute. In the early stages of the Korean War, although the poor state of preservation delayed the activation of some ships, the limited nature of the conflict allowed time to get these vessels to the scene of operations. Providing trained personnel to man these ships was vastly more difficult. Five years after the greatest war in American history, there were severe shortages of personnel on active duty and no adequate system for augmenting these forces in a national emergency. Cost saving methods such as reduction of ship and squadron basic manpower allowances and excessive reliance on reserve forces, came very close to making the United States militarily impotent in 1950.

2. If national foreign policy is not clearly defined, military force planning will become muddled.

3. Periods of uncertainty in international relationships and military strategy will push the process toward the less controversial "balanced forces," i.e., a scaled down version of existing assets. This does not necessarily exclude this approach from the available options, but it may not provide the optimum solution. "Most acceptable" should not be chosen over "most effective."
4. Ideally, the planning of naval forces should be accomplished from the top down. This requires constructing forces which support the national military strategy, which in turn serves the national interests. In practice, however, domestic politics, and most importantly, competition for reduced funding, became the primary inputs to the planning system. In the 1947-1950 reductions, cost was ultimately the overriding factor.

5. Continued defense spending will be difficult to justify in a postwar period. The euphoria of peace, and the anticipation of defense appropriations being transferred to domestic programs, or being reduced to produce fiscal stability, will combine to drive defense spending downward.

6. The "cheap fix" will always be attractive. The reliance on reserves has clear advantages in terms of cost and efficiency. Excessive reliance on reserves may not be able to provide adequate forces for emergency situations short of general mobilization.

7. Special consideration is warranted for those who fought the war and who are now no longer needed on active service. The Navy's Demobilization Program provides an example of steps taken to ease the transition to civilian life. This becomes even more important in situations where personnel are forced out by reductions in force.

8. Reduction of active forces solves short term manpower problems, such as recruiting with a changing demographic base which provides less available manpower. The larger problem of
establishing a system such as UMT, to provide trained personnel in
an emergency or general mobilization remains unresolved.

9. Through the use of materiel purchased during the conflict
it is possible to support postwar operations temporarily. This
results in a dangerous drawdown of war reserve stocks and presents
an inaccurate evaluation of the adequacy of allocations.

10. Force reductions which immediately follow a conflict may
be only the initial phase of a larger drawdown which will commence
three to five years after war termination.

11. If one service is viewed as being unreasonably
intransigent on one issue, e.g., the Navy on unification, it
becomes isolated. Future substantive debate on national military
strategy may become clouded by association with that previous
controversy.

12. Periods of reduced tension provide a window of
opportunity for force modernization. Reallocation of funds toward
research and development may provide future dividends.

13. Postwar reductions are inevitable. Without corresponding
reductions on the part of potential adversaries, these drawdowns
become a form of unilateral arms reduction. It is acknowledged
that no recent precedent for successful naval arms control
agreements exists. Nevertheless, intelligently applied, mutual
arms reductions are an option available to force planners in
periods of reduced funding.

In the application of these lessons the key consideration is
to determine which factors have changed and which have not.
Although present Soviet intentions are uncertain, their military capability remains immense. This was not the case in 1945-1950. The Korean War erupted unexpectedly. Will the next crisis requiring U.S. armed intervention do likewise? The political volatility in many parts of the world could provide similar situations. The post-Cold War era presents many challenges to Navy force planners. The events which took place 45 years earlier provide lessons which will better enable the Navy to respond to the tests of the future.
APPENDIX 1

PLANS 1, 1A, 2 AND CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 80

COMBATANT SHIP ALLOWANCE BY TYPE

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</table>

^SPECIAL DUTY SHIPS LISTED IN PLAN 2 INCLUDED IN ACTIVE FLEET

SOURCES: PLAN 1: CNO (OP-S00) SER 004850-D DTD 7 MAY 1945
PLANS 1A/2: U.S. CONG., HOUSE, COMM. ON NAVAL AFFAIRS, HEARINGS ON EFFECT ON NAVY OF DEMOBILIZATION AND PROPOSED BUDGET CUT HEARINGS (WASH: USGPO, 1946), P. 2754
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 80: U.S. CONG., HOUSE, COMM. ON NAVAL AFFAIRS, COMPOSITION OF THE POSTWAR NAVY, REPORT (WASH: USGPO, 1945), P. 7
NOTES

Chapter II

1. Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policies and the United States Navy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1962), p. 3. In this detailed and comprehensive study Professor Davis provides the major source document for the 1944-1946 period. In 1943 Admiral Bloch, who had been sent back from the Pacific did some informal estimates of postwar requirements but the Yarnell study was to become the basis for all subsequent plans.


4. Ibid., p. 94.

5. Identified by its designation as OP-50B, Serial 004850-D, Subj: Basic Post-War Plan No. 1, dtd 7 May 1945, located Naval Historical Center (hereafter NHC) Postwar Plans File.


9. Davis, p. 35.


12. CNO to SECNAV, Memorandum, Subj: Basic Post War Plan No. 1., Memoranda from Hill is dtd 29 OCT 1945; Blandy, dtd 18 OCT 1945; Nimitz, dtd 8 OCT 1945; and Radford, dtd 29 OCT 1945. NHC, Postwar Plans File.


14. Davis, pp. 126, 133. In 1941 12% of unrestricted line flag officers were aviators; 13%, submariners.


17. Ibid., p. 4.

18. Davis, pp. 34-35.

19. Ibid., p. 28.

20. Ibid., p. 74.


22. Ibid.


26. Ibid.

Chapter III

1. NAVPERS 15637. "The Navy's Demobilization Program" (Washington: Sept. 15, 1945), pp. 1-2. Copy located in Navy Library, Washington Navy Yard. The point values for each basic element were: (a) one-half point for each year of age; (b) one-half point for each full month of active service since Sept. 1, 1939; (c) one-quarter point for each full month of duty outside the U.S. since Sept. 1, 1939; and, (d) ten points for all dependents (regardless of number). Special credit was given to recipients of individual combat awards and limited duty personnel.

2. Ibid. p. 2. The demobilization schedule called for the release of approximately 25,000 officers and 257,000 enlisted per month until September 1946 when the goal of 57,800 officers and 500,000 enlisted would be attained.


4. BUPERS (PERS 23A-MM) Message to ALSTACON dated 1 August 1945, NHC, ALNAV Message File for August 1945.


6. NAVPERS 15637, p. 8. This mustering out payment was made to "all men and women of the regular and reserve components who were released under honorable conditions". $300 went to those with 60 days or more of overseas service, $200 to those with 60 days or more of service regardless of duty station, and $100 to all others. This payment was not taxable.

7. Ibid., p. 9.
8. *All Hands*, August 1945, p. 67. As of November 22, 1946 more than 41,000 applied. Of these 12,000 were offered commissions and 8,000 were accepted.


12. Ibid., Forrestal letter to John W. Snyder, Director, Bureau of the Budget, read by Vice Admiral E. L. Cochrane during above Hearings, p. 2768.


14. Harley Cope, "Fighting Ships on the Leash," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 1947, pp. 161-165. At the time Captain Cope was the Commander Philadelphia Group, 16th Fleet, charged with inactivating 3 battleships, 22 cruisers, and 7 carriers. The description of the process is summarized from his writing.

15. Chester W. Nimitz, "Statement and Discussion" in Hearings above, p. 2757. Responding to a question as to when the USN would again be ready to fight, Nimitz responded, "If the nature of the emergency was such that demobilization were stopped and that we again mobilized, I would estimate a minimum period of 6 months from the present date."

Chapter IV


5. Donnelly, p. 22.


17. Ibid., p.7 [742]. The Soviets were believed to have 3,100 aircraft assigned to the Navy for coastal defense, operation with naval units and protection of naval installations.

18. Ibid., p.8 [743].


20. Ibid., p. 11.


22. Donnelly, p. 25.


CHAPTER V


2. See the record of the Hearings before the House Committee on Armed Services, *The National Defense Program -- Unification and Strategy*, for 1949, provide a good source of the official views of the services. Coletta in *The United States and Defense Unification 1947-1953* and Kennedy and Rosenberg in their contributions to *History of the Strategic Arms Competition 1945-1951*, provide excellent analyses of the controversies surrounding the development of naval strategies and force structure during this period.


4. Ibid., p. 51. Figures are taken from unlabeled graphic presented between pages 50 and 51.


6. Ibid., p. 216.


10. Omar N. Bradley, "Statement" in Hearings above, p. 520. The ratios for 1950 were: Air Force, 34%; Army, 33.6%; and Navy, 32.4%.


12. "Navy Forced to Cut USNA Appointments," Army Navy Air Force Journal, 10 June 1950, p. 1093. The rationale was that the unexpanded facilities at Annapolis could provide for only 2,750 midshipmen and 3400 were currently on board.


CHAPTER VI

1. Clinton H. Sigel, "The Reserve Fleet," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1951, p. 682. The author was at the time serving as Operations and Plans Officer on the staff of the Commander Atlantic Reserve Fleet.

3. Ibid., p. 9, [154].

4. Ibid., p. 20, [165].

5. Ibid., p. 22, [167].

6. Ibid., Record of testimony on March 31, 1948, Serial 316, p. 6, [180].

7. Ibid., p. 19, [371]. The 1948 authorized procurement of 868 aircraft was 850 less than requested.

8. Ibid., Record of testimony on May 27, 1949, p. 12, [393].

9. Sigel, p. 685. The total cost estimate of $58.6 million includes both material and personnel costs. While this allocation did not provide adequate care for those ships, which comprised 70% of the fleet, the cost of this "insurance policy" in relation to the replacement value of the ships is noteworthy.

10. Chief of Naval Operations OP-30B, Memorandum dtd 18 May 1948, Serial 00105P30 (SC) A4-1, Subj: "Improvements in the Readiness of the Fleet." NHC, Strategic Series XVI 1948 File, Box 242. The spare parts issue was also addressed. "Procurement of spare parts and important equipage for all reserve fleet vessels should be accelerated so that their gear is brought up to date as soon as practicable beginning with appropriations budgeted for fiscal 1950. Priority in this procurement should be given to A/S [antisubmarine] types."


16. CNO OP-41 Memorandum, p. 3.

CHAPTER VII

1. Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1957), pp. 31-39. This is the primary source of the narrative of the initial days of the war.


3. Ibid., p 73. Of these, 24,976 officers and 152,560 enlisted were in the Organized Reserve or the Volunteer Reserve in drill pay status. In mid-June 1950, 6,330 Reserve officers and 12,739 enlisted were on active duty.

4. Ibid., p. 75-76.


7. W. H. Vernor, Jr., "Standby Squadron," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1952, pp. 728-739. The author, who was the squadron Intelligence Officer, presents an entertaining insight into some of the Korean War combat experiences of VA-702 pilots along with an examination of the civilian backgrounds of squadron members.

8. Mobilization in the Korean Conflict, p. 82.

9. O. C. Badger, "Capabilities of the Reserve Fleet," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 27 March 1951. Vice Admiral Badger was at the time, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier. Among his responsibilities was the Atlantic Reserve Fleet.


15. Ibid.


22. Ibid., p. 1-17.

23. Cagle and Manson, p. 125.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


"BuPers Action Reduces Number of Promotions of Active Duty Officers." All Hands, April 1946, p. 73.


**UNPUBLISHED SOURCES**


