The Sociology of Army Reserves: A Comparative Assessment

Charles C. Moskos
Northwestern University

Contracting Officer's Representative
Michael Drillings

Basic Research
Michael Kaplan, Director

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The Sociology of Army Reserves: A Comparative Assessment

Moskos, Charles

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(2) no other reserve system relies on reservists for basic full-time support;
(3) no other reserve system has a well developed career path (with a corresponding professional military education system) leading to senior command and staff positions; and (4) in no other reserve system do reservists have such limited real vacation time.
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19. ABSTRACT (Continued)

The effect of these conditions is that the American reserves, in comparison with those in other Western countries, are characterized by greater conflict between reserve duties and family obligations and, most especially, between reserve duties and civilian employment responsibilities. Long-term policy changes to improve reserve force must take this into account.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Heretofore the sociology of the military has been, in effect, the sociology of active-duty forces. This report outlines the ways in which conventional military sociology is inappropriate for an understanding of reserve components. The referent is the Selected Reserves of the U.S. Army—the Army Reserves and Army National Guard.

The core characteristics of the American reserve system are highlighted by a comparative analysis of reserve forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, and Israel. The comparative analysis adopts a case-based rather than variable-based approach. Qualitative binary methodology is used instead of quantitative multivariate statistics.

The following are identified as the core and unique elements of the social organization of American reserve components: (1) No other reserve system requires as much training time for its members; (2) no other reserve system relies on reservists for basic full-time support; (3) no other reserve system has a well-developed career path (with a corresponding professional military education system) leading to senior command and staff positions; and (4) in no other reserve system do reservists have such limited real vacation time.

The sum effect of these conditions is that the American reserves, in comparison with those in other Western countries, are characterized by greater conflict between reserve duties and family obligations and, most especially, between reserve duties and civilian employment responsibilities. Long-term policy changes aimed to improve reserve force must take this elemental fact into account.

In brief, the sociology of the reserves is a subject that should be approached on its own terms.
THE SOCIOLOGY OF ARMY RESERVES:
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

What is termed the sociology of the military is, in effect, the sociology of active-duty forces. Reserve forces have rarely been the object of theoretical analysis and, until very recently, of not much more empirical research. <1> The underlying assumption of this research project is that the sociology of the reserves is worthy of attention in its own right for both social scientific and policy reasons. The research goal is to determine the conditions defining the sociology of the reserves that separate it from the sociology of the active force.

This report breaks new ground by offering a conceptual overview of American reserve components by the use of the comparative method. The focus is on the organizational features of the Selected Reserves of the U.S. Army -- the drilling units of the Army Reserves and the Army National Guard. When referring to the Reserves and Guard collectively, they will be termed, following conventional usage, as reserve components or reserve forces (in lower case letters).

The plan of this report is threefold. First, I present an explication of an innovative comparative methodology. The methodology is holistic in nature and differs in important respects from the conventional statistical approaches. Second, a framework is constructed for specification of organizational
variables that enhance our understanding of American reserve forces. This is done by examining characteristics of the social organization of three reserve systems in Western countries. Third, the core and unique elements of the social organization of American Army reserve components are given. In this manner basic research is shown to advance the development of military sociology and informs policy decisions.

Field research in 1986 was carried out in the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom. The research methodology was based on site visits to reserve units, interviews with reservists, perusal of official documents, and discussions with local social scientists who had studied reserves in their home countries. This report does not address itself to the substantial number of the more obvious differences between foreign and US reserves forces. Rather it seeks through a focused comparative methodology to highlight salient organizational dimensions of the American case.

The Methodology of Qualitative Comparisons

Social scientists have long been confronted with a dilemma in undertaking comparative research. Does one use a quantitative approach, with large data bases, to reach broad conclusions, but often at the expense of the varied contexts from which the data was drawn? Or does one use a qualitative approach that compares a number of cases in a strategic fashion, but is limited in its
conclusion by the small number of cases that can be reasonable studied? This dilemma has been especially true in comparative sociology generally, and even more so in comparative analyses of military systems.

In essence, I am proposing a new way to think about and to do comparisons of military systems. The methodological approach followed here has its own unique aspects, but it also follows the leads of contemporary methodologists engaged in similar explorations of determining better ways to establish a meaningful dialogue between measurement and substantive findings of importance. <3> This report, while constructing a comparative case analysis of military reserve systems, is viewed as basic research in organizational analyses. The underlying methodological issue is what Charles Ragin has described as the contrast between "variable-based" approaches and "case-based" approaches. <4>

The dominant paradigm in the methodology of the social sciences has clearly been variable-oriented approaches. The variable-oriented method is built upon the language of hypotheses testing. Researchers are required to develop theories that specify relationships among variables. Relevant data are then collected to determine the extent to which the relationship holds for a given population. The corresponding methodology deals primarily with measurement questions, determining the reliability and validity of the data, and with statistical manipulation. The
entire enterprise drives toward the rejection or acceptance of
the hypothesis being tested. The basic discourse focuses upon
variables and their interrelations.

The quantitative tools of mainstream social science equate
with multivariate statistical analysis and the variable-oriented
approach. The problem is that in the course of satisfying the
demands of statistical techniques, the connection between the
research, on the one hand, and the substantive concerns that
motivated the research in the first place, on the other, tends to
be strained. Quantitative cross-national studies often have an
unreal quality to them because the data examined have little
meaningful connection to actual empirical processes. Another
problem with the variable-oriented approach is that, by typically
starting out with a hypothesis-testing model, it can overlook
significant factors from the inception of the investigation.

The core assumption in this report is that comparative
analysis does not have a logical affinity with the variable-based
approach. Comparative analysis is best aligned with
case-oriented methodology. The case-oriented approach means that
cases are dealt with not only in terms of the internal complexity
of their parts, but also in terms of heterogeneity across cases.
Whereas statistical analysis requires many simplifying
assumptions, as well as basic uniformity of units within a
population, case analysis assumes that causal relations are
intricate and embedded in particular social contexts.
In a nutshell, variable-based analysis starts simply with one independent variable, then adds more independent variables, usually one by one, to reduce the "variance" in explaining a dependent variable. Case-based analysis starts out complicated and then begins to discard extraneous dependent variables that do not affect the independent variable. Multivariate statistical analysis tends to break cases into parts -- variables -- that are difficult to reassemble into wholes; qualitative comparisons allow examination of constellations, configurations, and conjunctures. Multivariate statistical techniques start with simplifying assumptions about causes and their interrelation as variables. The method of qualitative comparison, by contrast, starts by assuming maximum causal complexity and then seeks to disaggregate that complexity.

Case-oriented studies are sensitive to organizational complexity and historical specificity. They are well suited for addressing empirically defined organizational outcomes, and they are useful to generate new conceptual schemes as well. Researchers who are oriented toward specific organizations (such as sociologists of the military) do not find it difficult to maintain a meaningful connection to societal issues (civil-military relations broadly defined) because they are concerned with actual human agencies and process. It is difficult, however, to sustain attention to complexity across a large number of cases. Furthermore, case-oriented researchers
are always open to the charge that their findings are not specific to the few cases they examine. Even when they do make broad comparisons and generalize, case investigators often are accused of letting their favorite cases shape their generalizations.

While the case-oriented approach is limited in this way, it has many special features that are well worth preserving. First, case-oriented methods are holistic in that they treat cases as whole entities and not as collections of parts (or as collections of scores on variables). Thus, the relations between the parts of a whole are understood within the context of the whole, not within the context of general patterns of covariation between variables. Second, causation is understood conjuncturally, that is, outcomes are analyzed in terms of intersections of conditions and the timing of these intersections. This feature of case-oriented methods makes it possible for investigators to specify trends in organizations as well to make statements about the origins and directions of important qualitative changes in specific settings.

Hitherto, most comparative analysis based on case studies, although often reaching interesting conclusions, have not attempted to specify the exact nature of the comparisons. What is needed is a kind of algebraic methodology in which variables can be used for logical analysis. Ragin proposes a comparative methodology, based upon Boolean algebra, that is rigorous while not
being quantitative in the conventional sense. Boolean algebra does not rest upon the manipulation of numbers. Instead, it uses binary data -- true or false, more or less, present or absence of a variable. Boolean algebra in comparative analysis allows for assumption of diversity of conditions within and between cases and offers techniques for sorting data by various "cancelling" procedures.

Four examples drawn from military sociology may help make clear the logic of case-oriented analysis in comparative research. These deal in turn with studies of combat performance, military cohesion, military leadership, and the military as an institution. Though none were specifically informed by the methodology described above, each in its own way illustrates the value of the case-oriented approach and the use of binary procedures in comparative analysis.

Martin van Creveld compared the combat performance of the World War II armies of Germany and the United States. Each of the two armies became case studies allowing for point by point comparisons on such factors as the operation of the replacement system, the selection of officers and noncoms, the distribution of promotions, leave policies, the military justice system, and the like. The conclusion was that the reason the German Army outfought its Western opponents could be reduced to one fundamental factor: the Wehrmacht consistently recognized and rewarded combat soldiers more than its opponents.
W. Darryl Henderson examined the factors affecting group cohesion in the armies of the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Israel, and the United States. He basically used binary descriptions of constituent variables found in broader constructs such as unit ability to provide for soldier's needs, surveillance, modes of leaving the unit, commonality of values, cultural characteristics, nationalism, unit motivation and control, unit stability, leadership, and so forth. Those factors and only those factors that related to high cohesion were specified. Henderson concluded with a series of policy recommendations for the American Army based on comparative analysis of cohesion. The root recommendation was to initiate procedures to allow the small-unit leader the authority to become the dominant influence in the day-to-day life of the soldier.

A third example is Jon W. Blades' examination of leadership in military units. The key premise was that leadership traits (e.g. level of ability, directive versus non-directive, enforcement of standards), and qualities of the unit (e.g. member motivation and ability) interact differentially depending on their presence or absence in the group situation. Based on 49 groups of American enlisted men, Blades used statistical analysis to support his findings and, strictly speaking, did not use a case-oriented methodology. But the noteworthy feature is that Blades' final list of "ten rules" are implicitly couched in binary terms: for example, high member ability combined with
non-directive leadership and high member motivation produces good unit performance; or high leader motivation combined with high leader ability and high leader establishment of standards (i.e. among members with low ability and motivation) produces good unit performance.

The fourth illustration is my own prior work that looked at the military systems of eight Western countries and placed them on a spectrum of more or less "institutional" versus more or less "occupational." The investigation aimed to peel away extraneous layers of organizational cosmetics to reach the core of institutionalism. We found that all institutional armies, regardless of size, type of recruitment, level of technology, met three basic conditions: (1) those in charge are wholly involved in the military, (2) the separate parts relate to the core, and (3) members are primarily value driven. On the basis of examination of highly institutional armies, we concluded -- in the face of conventional wisdom -- that military members living on post or military wives being heavily engaged in the military community work were not essential to an institutional orientation.

We must be careful not to overstate what case-based methods can do or to understate what multivariate statistics can do. Both methodologies have their place, but case-oriented methods seem to advance comparative research better than does statistical manipulation. What follows is an example of comparative research
of military reserve systems utilizing case-based analysis. Again, I stress that the research object is not to present a series of detailed studies of foreign reserve systems, but rather to identify factors that help us better understand the American reserve system.

Army Reserves in Comparative Perspective

Three foreign reserve systems were selected for comparative analysis to highlight the distinctive organizational features of the American system. These were the reserve systems of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Israel. Each system, of course, reflects its own country's history, military traditions, and defense requirements. Despite differing military structures and needs, however, all three countries, like the United States, represent civil-military systems operating within a strong democratic framework.

The German reserve system is based on a conscription system not unlike that of the United States in the pre-Vietnam era. A noteworthy feature of the German system is that upon release from active duty, the draftee is not placed into a drill unit for two years; if called-up he is to return to his old active-duty unit. After the two-year inactive reserve period, the reservist is typically assigned to a unit in the locally-based "territorial" army. The German reserve system is based essentially on skeleton units, permanently manned by an active-duty cadre, to be filled
out by reservists in the event of mobilization.

The United Kingdom has a reserve system based on a voluntary system for all its military personnel. The British all-volunteer framework is similar to that of the contemporary United States. A unique feature of the British system, however, is that the basic training of recruits is carried out by the local reserve unit. British reserve units in the "territorial" army are closely aligned with the regimental and corps system of the active army. Reserve recruitment is handled by local reserve units.

The Israeli military is based on a conscription system encompassing both a standing army and a reserve obligation that is long-term and demanding. A distinguishing feature of the Israeli reserve system is that there are no non-drilling reservists. Also unique, non-career active-duty soldiers can be assigned to duties within reserve units. The citizen-soldier model is the essence of the Israeli armed forces. In an important sense the reserves are the Israeli Defense Force.

The reserve components of the United States for historical reasons are divided into the federal U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and the state-based Army National Guard (ANG). Under the Total Force, the USAR and ANG have become more and more integrated into the training standards and deployment plans of the active force. In 1987, for the first time in modern American history, the number of drilling reservist exceeded the number of soldiers in
the active force. Current trends indicate that reserve forces will come to take on an increasingly important mission in the American force structure -- both for budgetary and manpower reasons.

The salient features of each country's reserve system along with those of the United States are indicated in tables 1-5. These comparative tables deal with: (1) reserve organizational features, (2) active-force interface, (3) retention and career progression, (4) military occupational specialties, and (5) societal interface. The tables are not intended to be inclusive of all reserve features in the four countries, but rather, as described in the comparative methodology given earlier, to be a mechanism by which complex materials can be reduced to its core elements. This in turn sets the context for a specification and analysis of the distinctive qualities of the reserve forces of the United States.

[Tables 1 Through 5 About Here]

Table 1 on organizational features shows that American reservists commit more time to training than do those of any of the examined countries. Indeed, it appears that the time American reservists devote to training exceeds that of any other country in the world. Minimum training is 39 days in the United States (two weeks of which is usually done in annual training);
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Federal Republic of Germany</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Training Time of Lower Ranks</td>
<td>12 days every two years</td>
<td>27 days per year</td>
<td>30 days per year</td>
<td>39 days per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Duty Time for Mid-Level Officers</td>
<td>30-40 days per year</td>
<td>40-50 days per year</td>
<td>50-60 days per year</td>
<td>60-70 days per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Prior Service Entrants</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Cohesion</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. ACTIVE-FORCE INTERFACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Federal Republic of Germany</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Commanders Above Battalion</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active-Duty Force Contact with Reserves</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low to Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-Time Reservists in Unit</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active-Duty Cadre in Unit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation a Key Factor in Retention</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion to Senior Rank Possible</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Military Education for Promotion</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement Pension for Career Reservist</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS Mismatch Problem</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Units Over-strength in Technicians</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Reserve Units of Technicians</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Vacation Time of Reservist</td>
<td>4-5 weeks</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
<td>4 weeks</td>
<td>1 week or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Conflict</td>
<td>Low to Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium to High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer Conflict</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Status of Reserve Officer</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
27 days in the United Kingdom (also with two weeks of annual training); and only 12 days every two years in Germany (usually completed in one stint). In Israel, 30 days annually is required for reserve duty (most often taken in one or two blocks of time).

In all countries training time for officers, especially those above company grade, greatly exceeds the time of the rank and file. Typically extra reserve duty for officers is done in evenings and on weekends. In all countries, much of this extra time is uncompensated, though the United States allows for some special compensation for additional training. Estimates are not firm, but it appears that American officer reservists devote the most time to reserve duty, followed by Israel, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

About half of those newly entering the American reserves are non-prior service, a situation also found in the United Kingdom, another country with a volunteer military. Even in the draft era, however, the United States allowed entrance into the reserves without a prior term in the active force. Unit cohesion in American reserve components occupies a midposition between the low cohesion of German units (mainly a function of their rarely coming together as an integral group) and the extraordinarily high cohesion of British and Israeli units.

Table 2 deals with the interface between the active and reserve components. The hallmark of the American reserve system is that reserve officers occupy the command and staff positions
throughout the reserve hierarchy. Senior reserve commanders are found only in the American army. In turn, and again in contrast to other armies, the exposure of active-duty personnel to the reserve system is low in the American case. In Germany, and to a lesser degree in the United Kingdom, many active-duty officers are assigned to the territorial army. In Israel active-duty officers command reserve units at higher levels (not to mention that all reserve officers have had extensive active-duty service).

Another significant feature of the American system is the widespread use of full-time reservists in reserve training. These include both Active/Guard Reserves or AGRs (full-time reservists on active duty), and military technicians (federal civilian employees who are also reservists). Thus even the full-timers as well as the part-time cadre are themselves reservists. In other armies, the training of reservists is either a responsibility of active-duty personnel (as in Germany and Israel) or is conducted with the strong input of active-duty cadre (as in the United Kingdom). In brief, where full-time staff in American reserve forces consists mainly of reservists, in other countries the full-timers are principally active-duty personnel.

Table 3 shows crucial differences in retention and career progression between the America reserve forces and those of other countries. Only in the United Kingdom and the United States is
compensation for reserve duty a supplement to one's civilian salary. In Germany and in Israel (as in most European countries), compensation for reserve duty is computed by formulas to make remuneration approximately equal to one's civilian earnings. That a career reservist receives a retirement pension is yet another singularity of the United States.

Another significant differentiating trait of the American military is that only in the United States can reserve officers be promoted to senior positions solely through participation in the reserve structure. Correspondingly, only the American system has developed a comprehensive (and quasi-mandatory) system of professional military education for promotion of the reserve officer corps. No other country has a serious career development program for reserve officers, much less a program of professional military education.

Table 4 on military occupational specialties shows that all four countries confront problems matching the military occupational specialty (MOS) a soldier acquired on active duty with his assignment in the reserves. This state of affairs is particularly acute with regard to technical skills. To help overcome this problem Israel routinely carries overstrength technicians in reserve units, while the United Kingdom has "sponsored " units designated for a particular grouping of technicians. Germany has no special arrangements to deal with MOS mismatch, but its reserve MOS problem is largely one of
combat arms shortages rather than technicians. MOS mismatch is aggravated in the American case by frequent geographical movements of reservists and, more recently, by the changing missions of reserve units.

Table 5 offers an assessment of the interface between the reserves and the larger society. Each of the four examined countries has some amount of conflict between family and reserve obligations, though this appears to be somewhat higher in the United States. Employer conflict is a definite problem across the board, but seems to be much more acute in the United States. The reasons for the severity of employer conflict in the American reserves are complex. To some degree such conflict inheres in the higher training demands of the American reserves, especially for the career reservist, than is found in most other countries. To another degree, conflict derives from the relative lack of employer support for reserve training in the United States. This lack of employer support also reflects itself in the social standing of reserve officers in American society (and in Germany society), a standing not commensurate with the prestige the reserve officer enjoys either in the voluntary system of the United Kingdom or in the citizen-soldier tradition of Israel.

Perhaps the paramount factor contributing to family and employer conflict in the United States reserves is one that is rarely mentioned -- the American vacation system. The average worker in Germany enjoys a five to six week vacation (as is true...
throughout much of Northern Europe); this coupled with relatively low training requirements means the German reservist can reasonably expect to enjoy four to five weeks of real vacation each year. In the United Kingdom, the typical worker's vacation is four weeks; the tacit understanding being that an employer will absorb one week of a soldier's annual training and the reservist will use one week of his own vacation time. Even in Israel, the reservist's normal 30-day vacation is in addition to his annual 30-day reserve requirement. In sum, the reservist in other countries can expect to have a vacation period three to five times greater than his American counterpart.

Conclusion

This report has sought to demonstrate the analytical validity of the comparative analysis of reserve forces. The ideal methodological strategy should integrate the best features of the case-oriented approach with the best features of the variable-oriented approach. This integration allows investigators to address questions relevant to many cases in a way that does not contradict either the complexity of the social causation or the variety of empirical social phenomenon. The key to a proper synthetic strategy is the idea of qualitative comparative analysis -- the notion of comparing configurations of parts. This is the intersection between complexity and generality.

The comparative analysis presented here was explicitly not a
full treatment of foreign reserve systems. Rather, the analytical value of the research is to specify salient features of the social organization in the American case. The following are identified as the core and unique elements of the social organization of American Army reserve components.

One. No other reserve system requires as much training time for its members, whether at officer or enlisted levels.

Two. No other reserve system relies on reservists for basic full-time support.

Three. No other reserve system has such a well developed career path, with a corresponding professional military education system, leading to senior command and staff positions within the reserve structure.

Four. In no other reserve system do reservists have such limited real vacation time.

The sum effect of these conditions is that the American reserves, in comparison with those in other Western countries, are characterized by greater conflict between reserve duties and family obligations and, most especially, between reserve duties and civilian employment responsibilities. The severity of this conflict is an important and distinguishing feature of the American reserve system. Any long-term policy changes aimed to improve reserve forces must take this elemental fact into consideration.

This report represents the third of a three-part
investigation of Army reserve forces. The first report presented demographic, social background, and attitudinal differences between members of reserve forces and active-duty forces. \(9\)
The second report gave an organizational analysis based on in-depth interviews with reservists and extended observations of reserve units in the United States. \(10\) This report highlighted organizational features in the American reserve system through a comparative analysis of reserve forces in other Western countries. The underlying assumption is that the sociology of the reserves is not coterminous with the sociology of the active force and is a subject that should be approached on its own terms.

The basic research reported here promises not so much solutions to specific problems, but some useful ways to think about them. The purpose of basic research in the social sciences is not to provide policy prescriptions, but to furnish information that can be used to evaluate the adequacy of current military manpower policies and, where needed, undertaking new policy initiatives.
NOTES


Though not framed in comparative terms, the separate country studies of allied armies prepared by the U.S. Army Training Board, Fort Monroe, Virginia, is a vital aid for comparative analysis. For access to these reports I thank Colonel Benjamin W. Covington III. All studies of the Israeli Defense Force are perforce studies of Israel's reserve system. See, especially, Reuven Gal A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press, 1986). The reserve system of the Federal

The United Kingdom has yet to find its scholar of the British reserve system.

2. My debts are boundless to Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, University of Hull, England; Ekkehard Lippert, Bundeswehr Social Science Research Institute, Federal Republic of Germany; and Reuven Gal, Israel Institute of Military Studies.


Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).


