WAR TERMINATION: THE MARITIME COMPONENT

BY

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MAY 1990

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Prepared for:
Director
Defense Nuclear Agency
HQ DNA/NASF
6801 Telegraph Road
Alexandria, VA 22310-5000
The research reported here was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency.

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS

2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT

4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
NPS-56-90-009

5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
Department of National Security Affairs

6b OFFICE SYMBOL
Code NS

6c ADDRESS (City, State and Zip Code)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100

6d OFFICE SYMBOL

6e NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Defense Nuclear Agency

7b ADDRESS (City, State, and Zip Code)

8a NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION
Defense Nuclear Agency

8b OFFICE SYMBOL
DNA/NASF

8c ADDRESS (City, State, and Zip Code)
HQ DNA/NASF
6801 Telegraph Road
Alexandria, VA 22310-5000

9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
MIPR 88-674, 90-581

10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS

11 TITLE (Include Security Classification)
WAR TERMINATION: The Maritime Component

12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
JAMES J. TRITTEN

13a TYPE OF REPORT
FINAL

13b TIME COVERED
From Oct 89 to May 90

14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)
90 MAY 30

15 PAGE COUNT
68

16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
Presented at War Termination Conference sponsored by BI-COLLEGE PEACE STUDIES Program of Haverford and Bryn MAWR Colleges, Haverford, PA (April 1990) and to be included in forthcoming conference proceedings book.

17 COSATI CODES

18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
War Termination
Semiotics
Russia

Victory
Political Culture

Military Thought
Strategic Culture

19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Analysis of new Soviet defense military doctrine and strategy with emphasis on strategic role of Navy and war termination. Author concludes despite Soviet words, the USSR has not and cannot repudiate all wars, including nuclear war, since the defense of the homeland remains a necessary and objective mission of all armed forces. Author argues against separation of war into nuclear and non-nuclear components. New strategic missions for Soviet armed forces analyzed along with special considerations for military operations in maritime theaters. Author concludes that nations can allow greater amount of uncertainty in war termination decisions than is normally thought and that war termination discussions need to be separated into those supporting programming, pre-war planning, and during a war.

20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED

21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
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22c OFFICE SYMBOL
NS/Tr

DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR

63 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

WAR TERMINATION: The Maritime Component

James J. Tritten

Since we have all heard from the media that the cold war is over and there will be peace dividends, why should there even be any discussion of war let alone the termination of war and its maritime component? A very polished current President, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mikhail Gorbachev, has given the world a plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth by the year 2000. He told his party a report that nuclear was is totally unacceptable and cannot be won, that the preparation for nuclear war cannot bring political advantage to anyone.

For those in the West who did not get the message through translations, Gorbachev provided his explicit message in English; going so far as to repudiate Clausewitz.1 If this is not enough, the CPSU and government leadership has repudiated "peaceful coexistence" as simply another form of the class struggle.2

Has the Soviet threat to the U.S. and NATO gone away? Is the danger of a superpower war so remote today that we should shift our strategic planning focus to third world and
non-military threats? Do we have an opportunity to terminate the cold war that the Bolsheviks first started waging in 1917? Perhaps it would be better to terminate this cold war and assist the former Soviet Union in its transition to another political state rather than to continue to see the Soviet threat is former terms and risk needing to plan for termination of a future hot war.

On the other hand, do events in Eastern Europe cause alarm in the West and raise the specter of a fragmented Soviet empire with multiple nuclear actors or a central core that lashes out from its deathbed? Will events get so out of hand in the USSR that the West will consider once again intervening to safeguard war materials, this time strategic nuclear weapons, so that they will not be used? Once the breakup of the Soviet empire is complete, will a new strong central government take its place and will this one be just as great a threat to the West as the past one?

These questions cause us to first consider the category of war termination as a legitimate area for research. The danger of war still exists, although the type of war that we have all considered the old main line possible future war scenario is probably not nearly as of much interest today as it was even a few months ago. This paper will first attempt to look at the types and nature of war itself first before
attempting to define its maritime components and the role that the sea services play in war termination.

THE NATURE OF WAR

Since the focus of this research is war termination between the United States and the Soviet Union, and since there is a general lack of standardization of military terms in the West, it seems appropriate to use the well thought out and standardized Soviet terms for the purposes of making explicit any discussion of what types of wars are being discussed. This effort will also aid us in identifying differences in strategic culture.

The nature of a future war can be ascertained by the study of the high level political-military aspects of governmental policy. This area of knowledge is termed the military doctrine of a nation. The military doctrine of a nation can be separated into two basic components: first the sociopolitical aspects which are basically the theory of war encompassing methodological, economic, social and legal principles. These first sociopolitical aspects are relatively constant over an extended period of time. Recently, the sociopolitical aspects of a revised "defensive" Warsaw Pact military doctrine have been published and widely discussed in the Soviet literature.4
Under the sociopolitical aspects of Soviet military doctrine, we find official pronouncements that the USSR and the Warsaw Pact have renounced the use of war to settle any political, economic and ideological differences. The Warsaw Pact nations "... have committed themselves to not begin military operations (voyennyye deystviya) against any state..." except in response to an attack. The Soviets have also renounced first nuclear strikes and made claims that generally, nuclear war or even the use of a single nuclear weapon cannot achieve any political gains.

The second of the two basic components of military doctrine are the military-technical aspects or the practice of war, encompassing organizational development, technical equipment, training, and determinations of the forms and mode of the conduct of operations and war. "This aspect of doctrine defines the ways, means and methods of accomplishing tasks pertaining to reliable defense of the socialist homeland, tasks assigned to the Armed Forces by this country's political leaders." The military-technical aspects of doctrine deals primarily with the character of the threat, the preparation of the nation for specific types of wars, the types of armed forces required, and the types of armed conflict (missions) which the armed forces must be prepared to conduct.
Having published the new sociopolitical tenets of its military doctrine, the Soviet Union is currently undergoing a thorough discussion of its military-technical aspects. Unlike debates over doctrine in the past, the present discussion is occurring, in part, in the open. The discussion will effect the reformulation of Soviet military art, strategy, operational art, and tactics. In order to understand these aspects and the follow-on questions of war termination and its maritime aspects, we first must consider the nature of war as it is understood by the Soviets.

Perhaps the most important distinction made in the USSR over the use of the term "war" is that the Soviet military does not limit their analysis of war to merely the armed conflict portion. There is a recognition that war consists of the economic struggle, diplomatic activities, ideological efforts, intelligence undertakings, competition in the scientific and technical areas, as well as the armed conflict conducted by armed forces. These distinctions, however, are often ignored by spokesmen outside of the military who often use the word "war" with the same meanings as it has in the West.

Just as the Soviets have categorized all aspects of military doctrine, they have also describe the varying characteristics and classes of wars itself. According to
the Soviets, wars also may be characterized by a number of sociopolitical and military-technical features. The sociopolitical aspects of war include a number of economic and sociopolitical issues with the primary characterization of wars as either just or unjust. Just wars are "waged in the name freedom and progress, in defense of national independence, against aggression." Unjust wars are "waged for purposes of plunder, conquest, enslavement, and defense of reactionary regimes."

In order to understand what character and classes of war the current President/General Secretary of the CPSU and the Soviet military have now stated they are against or have renounced (in order to study termination), we need to consider these sociopolitical characterizations and classes of war.

The first sociopolitical characteristic or class of war is a war in defense of the homeland. For the socialist states, there is an additional and special subcategory termed wars in defense of the socialist homeland. Wars in defense of national independence are always just wars. Wars in defense of the socialist homeland are enshrined in the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR. Such wars are central to an understanding of the character and classes of wars that have been and have not been renounced by the
current leadership of the CPSU and Soviet government. There has been a steady stream of comments in the literature reinforcing this type of war.10

In the final analysis, preparation for wars in defense of the homeland are the objective raison d'etre for all national armed forces. Even if the CPSU ceases to be the guiding force in the USSR, or even if the USSR breaks up into multiple political actors, there will always be a requirement for the defense of the homeland. There will always be agencies in any Soviet or Russian government that warn of an impending attack by external forces or warn of a resurgent Germany. As such there remains a need to study how wars in defense of the homeland are terminated and the role of maritime sector in such efforts.

The second sociopolitical characteristic or class of war is a revolutionary or civil war fought against oppression and for the purposes of liberation from exploitation. Revolutionary or civil wars are always just wars if fought against the forces of reaction. The third sociopolitical characteristic or classification of war is wars of national liberation. Such wars if conducted against reactionary or imperialistic forces are always just wars. Wars of national liberation advance the cause of freedom and social progress.
In the past, it was clear that officially according to ideological dogma, peace was impossible until the source of war, imperialism, had been eliminated and society had been transformed. With the realization that Marx and Engels are either no longer speaking to Mikhail Gorbachev or if they are, it no longer matters what they say, the internationalist mission of the Soviet Armed Forces is changing. This will have a significant impact on the force structure and probably the character of the Soviet Navy.

In the early 1970s, some in the West went so far as to suggest that the Soviet Navy was being built specifically to support its internationalist mission.\textsuperscript{11} If there was ever any truth to this argument, with the death of evangelical international socialism, the structure of the Soviet Navy and other maritime assets will change (presumably reduction in capability), hence effecting the Navy's ability to support war termination of major wars between the superpowers.

The subject of termination of wars of national liberation or civil wars remains a legitimate area for research, although outside the major area of concern in this effort other than their possible effect on the ability to fight and terminate a war in defense of the homeland. The decline in interest in such foreign wars by the CPSU
leadership will have a direct impact on the size and capability of Soviet maritime forces which will have an impact on the termination of wars in defense of the homeland.

The fourth major sociopolitical characteristic or classification for wars is "wars of imperialism." Such wars are rarely just wars according to the Soviets. These types of wars would include suppression of just struggles for liberation, the capture of foreign territory, enslaving/plundering other peoples, defense by reactionary regimes, any war against socialist states, and most wars between capitalist nations. The only just war in this class would be those aimed at protecting the state sovereignty of a capitalist country from imperialist aggression. Hence, even if the most heretofore unlikely events occur in the Soviet empire, i.e. socialist states become capitalist states, a war fought in defense of state sovereignty by this new nation would be a just war fought in defense of the homeland.

Despite the rhetoric against war that has been emanating from Moscow, there has certainly not been any renouncing of wars in defense of the socialist homeland. Since the Soviets still feel that there is a danger of war, a discussion of future possible wars between the superpowers
fought under the rubric of a war in defense of the homeland, even if not a socialist homeland, and even certain other types of just wars, and therefore a discussion of war termination is therefore still warranted after consideration of the sociopolitical characteristics or classes of wars.

In addition to the above four major sociopolitical characteristics and classes of war, there are also a five military-technical characteristics and classes of war. The first military-technical characteristic or classification of war is its scope and scale. Wars are either local or worldwide. The Soviet military feels that any future war with the United States would automatically be a global war.\(^\text{12}\)

In the West and within the Soviet academic literature, there are differences in opinion over this issue with some advocating the confinement of war to the theater of origin while others argue over the inability to do this. In the maritime sector it is very difficult to image that armed conflict could be raging in one theater while in another, the belligerents render honors when passing each other on the high sea. There are questions also over the desirability of horizontal escalation from theaters where one is currently at a disadvantage to theaters where one has an advantage.
The scope and scale of a war have obvious implications for the termination of a war. Questions arise over whether or not combat can be limited to a single theater, whether or not certain categories of weapons, such as nuclear, will be used (first or last) at sea or whether their use is tied to use ashore, of whether or not victory at sea is necessary at all to either superpower?

The second major military-technical characteristic or classification of war is by the makeup of the belligerents, i.e. the war is either between coalitions or simply between two belligerents. Despite the events in Eastern Europe today, it is likely that any war planning that is going on in either the Kremlin or the Pentagon still assumes that for the opposing side, NATO and the Warsaw Pact might function at least to some degree. The Soviet literature has traditionally assumed that a future war with the U.S. would be a war between coalitions.

Those of us interested in war termination should also consider, however, future wars only between the two superpowers with other nations (including nuclear powers) having a significant interest but no direct military role. Indeed, perhaps the termination of a major war by the two superpowers alone should have been a planning option all along. For example, although such a war would require a
surviving strategic nuclear reserve for use the other superpower, there will also be a requirement for residual reserve forces to balance the offensive and defensive forces of the other nuclear and nonnuclear powers that might pose a threat at the end of the war.

A third major military-technical characterization or class of war is based upon the military hardware employed. The Soviet theoretical differentiation in this area is that wars either make use of conventional forces or employ weapons of mass destruction including a nuclear and nuclear missile war. Although at the outset, it would seem that these distinctions are fairly neat, the division of war into these two classes is actually quite complicated.

Despite the pronouncements of the CPSU and military leadership that nuclear war can serve no political purpose, war, and nuclear war are still possible, there have been numerous discussions in the literature over the dangers that still exist, accidental nuclear wars, or escalation out of a crisis.

The recent Soviet repudiation of nuclear war by the Soviet political leadership does not exactly fit into the traditional classes of war as outlined by the Soviet military. It appears what the Soviet political leadership has actually renounced is nuclear-rocket war on a scale that
would equate to a world war. Although senior military spokesmen have also renounced world nuclear-rocket war, there is also a clear recognition by all Soviet spokesmen that as long as nuclear weapons exist, they serve a politically useful purpose in the deterrence of war (all types but especially a nuclear-rocket war) and to prevent political coercion against the USSR and socialist nations of the world.

In 1987, three Soviet academics wrote that nuclear armed conflict itself does have direct political utility. There also have been statements by senior military strategists, both before and after the current President/General Secretary of the CPSU came out against nuclear war, that a nuclear war can in fact still serve political purposes. In a 1988 article released in English, two academics first make reference to the Gorbachev party line against the political utility of nuclear war and then argue against banishing nuclear war from politics.

If nuclear war does not serve any political purpose, this argument must be taken to its logical extreme that even a just war in defense of the socialist homeland does not warrant the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, there have even been some suggestions of this in the Soviet press. A long-standing theme in the Soviet military literature...
is that any nuclear war, however initiated or limited, could not be kept within bounds and would inevitably escalate either vertically or horizontally. There has been no argument over this assumption by the civilian academics or military. The assumption will therefore be that from the Soviet perspective, their planning assumption is that any nuclear use will precipitate additional nuclear use. This planning assumption, however, does not mean that at the time of the execution of plans, cooler heads might not prevail.

The maritime aspects of this issue of an expanding nuclear war have been an area for much discussion. Clearly the Soviets and other countries have the capability to fight a nuclear war in the maritime theaters. The United States position on this issue was made explicitly clear by the Secretary of Defense when he stated that it is "... our policy objective of denying the Soviets the ability to limit a nuclear war to the sea." In other words, although the U.S. might not like to fight a nuclear war at sea, if the Soviets were to initiate one there, it is American declaratory strategy to not allow such operations to be limited to the sea. This has obvious implications for war termination.
Although a war might not actually employ the actual use of nuclear weapons, any war between the superpowers must be planned with the possibility of their use. In other words, a military commander developing strategy or plans should assume that all wars between the superpowers are nuclear wars, just that it some of them the weapons might not yet have been used. There have been a number of statements in the Soviet literature from both the military and civilian academics to support such a view.\(^\text{20}\)

The artificial separation at the policy level of war into nuclear war (less acceptable) and nonnuclear war (more acceptable) is a subject that I have addressed elsewhere.\(^\text{21}\) From a maritime perspective, the tactical interrelationship of these two classes of war can be illustrated by the advantages to submarines making conventional weapons strikes against naval surface forces which have been forced to disperse in the face of an imminent strike from nuclear weapons.\(^\text{22}\)

Once nuclear weapons have been used, the war does not necessarily terminate, nor might the conventional armed conflict end. It is very likely that conventional combat actions will occur simultaneously with nuclear strikes and continue on after nuclear actions are over. This is especially true at sea where a coordinated attack on
maritime units might take on the character of an initial nuclear strike and then mopping up operations using conventional ordnance. Issues for termination, therefore, include how to ensure that second nuclear use will not come easier during these subsequent conventional combat actions than did the first nuclear use? Indeed, especially at sea, we need to think how to arrange nuclear cease fires while the war and armed conflict go on. In other words, deterrence of the nuclear portion of an armed conflict may need to occur before the war, during the initial conventional phase of a war, and even after terminating initial nuclear use.

Similarly, there is a requirement to deter the escalation to nuclear war (even accidental or limited nuclear war) during the period of rising tensions in a crisis. Both superpowers have used their fleets, including submarines, for coercive naval diplomacy and it is assumed that some of these units are nuclear capable. Although it is difficult to fully create scenarios in which accidental nuclear strikes might occur on the high seas, attention should be given to just such a possibility in order that the termination phase of the crisis will receive appropriate attention. In late 1989, a suggestion was made by a Soviet
general officer to hold joint games with the West to explore the process of de-escalation.24

Whether one chooses prevention, minimal deterrence, mutual assured destruction, or a combination of the two as the preferred theory of deterrence, there is general agreement by all nuclear powers that a nation must have a survivable/secure nuclear reserve force capable of striking back, even if subjected to a coordinated, surprise first strike or actions taken by conventional forces against nuclear weapons or their delivery systems. This reserve retaliatory force must be perceived by other nations as having the credible capability of a retaliatory strike, generally even after worst case enemy actions. The Soviet Union accepts, in deed, the deterrence of nuclear war by having the capability to prevent strikes against its own homeland and punish an aggressor with a strategic nuclear reserve (some of it at sea) if such military operations are unsuccessful.

The neat distinction of war into nuclear and conventional is an artificial creation. A more realistic planning assumption is that at a minimum, the maneuver or actual use of nuclear missiles/weapons of mass destruction will be contemplated by at least one superpower in any future crisis, armed conflict or war between them. This
means that the military strategist should assume and plan that any future superpower crisis, armed conflict, or war can involve nuclear or nuclear-rocket weapons. One should also assume that accidental nuclear strikes are possible either in the period of rising tensions of a crisis or during the initial conventional stage of an armed conflict or war.

Therefore the subject of the termination of nuclear war remains an area that requires research despite public pronouncements from the highest levels of leadership in both the U.S. and USSR that a nuclear war must never be fought. Although war termination generally focuses on nuclear war termination, there is a clear need to discuss termination of superpower crises, limited armed conflicts, and wars that have not yet seen the use of nuclear weapons (but perhaps their maneuver) and have remained at the conventional-only level.

We ought to also consider the termination of nuclear crises, armed conflicts, and wars that have reverted to the use of conventional weapons and the requirements for renewed nuclear deterrence under the conditions where nuclear weapons have already been used at least once. If all superpower crises, armed conflicts, or wars are automatically potentially nuclear wars, perhaps one of the
more interesting questions to research is whether or not a crises, armed conflicts, or wars occurring under the threat of or with actual nuclear use can actually be terminated prior to the expending of all of the nuclear "bullets?"

Research into the termination of nuclear wars must also continue as a hedge against the possibility that current Soviet arms control efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000 will be unsuccessful.

The fourth major military-technical characteristic and classification used to describe wars is pace. Whether a war is fast moving or prolonged is somewhat related to the other three previous characteristics. It is usual for the Soviets to break a war into periods (termed the "periodization" of a war) no matter what length there is to the war itself. In historical analysis of past wars, great emphasis is placed upon the initial period of a war, indeed this term rates an extremely lengthy entry in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia.  

A cursory review of recent Soviet military journals reveals a great deal of interest in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, when the Soviet Armed Forces struggled on the strategic defensive. In the periodization of a war, there always appears to be a turning point or breakthrough period in which the initial defensive
operations were replaced by the counteroffensive and finally the strategic offensive. What is conspicuously absent is any Soviet analysis of the retaining of strategic-level reserve military force used for coercion in the negotiations at the war's termination; a frequent assumption of the role of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{26}

Instead, strategic reserves are generally discussed from the perspective of formations, units, troops, or stockpiles of material directly subordinate to the Supreme High Command that are used at the strategic level of armed combat (either defensive or offensive) to crush or rout the enemy, i.e. impact the armed conflict portion of the war and not its political or diplomatic efforts.

War termination has been thought, by some, to automatically follow the initial use of nuclear weapons. It has been only recently that extended research has gone on regarding extended nuclear war. Despite the obvious unpopularity in certain circles over even a discussion of an extended nuclear war, we must break free of the mentality that pictures such a war as merely a mindless\textsuperscript{27} "spasm" and recognizes that armed conflict with nuclear weapons would have the character of other military campaigns, operations, or strikes.
Nuclear weapons delivery vehicles have obvious reload capabilities. It would seem obvious that nations would and should take actions, not necessarily nuclear combat actions, to preclude reconstitution of a nuclear striking force once its initial ordnance is expended. Operations in the maritime sector will have special requirements and opportunities in this regard.

It would also seem that more research is needed in the extended nature of war (not merely armed conflict), since we appear to finally now be able to fully terminate World War II, some forty-five years after the end of the armed and economic conflict portion of the war. We must recognize that the armed conflict portion of war is but one of many tools available to governments in the settling of their disputes and the conduct of war. Perhaps this reconsideration of all of the aspects of war will aid in a recognition of the importance of war's time element.

The fifth major military-technical characteristic or classification of wars is whether or not they are wars of position or wars of maneuver. To a large degree, this characteristic results from the previous four. Although one might assume that wars of position have become passe, the effect of strategic defenses on military campaigns (lack of
extended deterrence) might just be to render wars of mobility less attractive.

Maritime war is automatically a war of mobility. The extended mobility of fleets enables them to temporarily mass otherwise widely dispersed assets in order to concentrate fire for a successful combat strike or battle. Mobility also allows fleets to change rapidly from defensive to offensive formations. On the other hand, natural geographic features can strongly suggest positional behavior by fleets, such as barriers between islands or the mainland and islands.28

With so much of the earth covered by water, maritime warfare is pursued in an environment where the surface provides few opportunities for concealment; hence deception is more difficult to achieve. With better knowledge of the ocean's floors, we may find that the naval operational planner will study the terrain of his battlefield much like his land-oriented counterpart. This may give rise to reconsideration of certain aspects of subsurface warfare being more warfare of position than mobility.
Figure 1 attempts to graphically display the varying military-technical characteristics or classifications of war. These characteristics or classes are in addition to the sociopolitical aspects outlined previously.
Having considered the varying military-technical characteristics or classes of wars, it is apparent that war and therefore war termination remains an area that warrants research despite the pronouncements of political leaders against fighting either a nuclear and conventional armed conflict.

With the acceptance that wars are still possible (at a minimum, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to fight a war in defense of the homeland), we now must turn to the possibility that such wars would be fought to by the military from the perspective of winning, losing, or stalemate. Despite repeated pronouncements by the highest political leadership of the U.S. and USSR that a nuclear war should not be fought and cannot be won, if a war in defense of the socialist (or nonsocialist) homeland were to occur, the Soviet military is certainly going to consider its options and recommend to its political masters whatever is possible (including total and partial victory).

One of those options, and one that we can safely predict that any military would investigate and recommend, if it is possible, is to win the war (or at least not lose it) at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. If the potential is there for an offensive (even if there were sincere prewar doctrinal statements that the war would be
conducted from strictly a defensive perspective) then we should expect consideration of this option during the war. Despite what any political leadership says before a war, once they are in it, they must and will consider all known options. Indeed, the Soviets recognize that once a war breaks out, the essential sociopolitical aspects of war (currently defensive) may change.29

The Soviet literature evidence of discussions over the possibility of winning a nuclear war may have simply been a requirement for military analysts to investigate whether or not such a goal were attainable rather than a specified goal in actual war plans. Victory has at least been contemplated and judged as attainable (or not) in the different and specific sociopolitical and military-technical classes of war and also at varying levels (strategic, operational, or tactical) of warfare and armed conflict. The Soviets appear to be ruling out, for planning purposes, victory in a nuclear-rocket world war.30

Victory may not be possible in an overall war effort, but victory at the tactical or even the operational level of the armed conflict may be a necessity if the nuclear-rocket world war is to be prevented. Therefore victory at the lower level may be necessary to ensure that a crisis or the conventional phase of armed conflict does not escalate.
In June 1988, one of the more interesting recent Soviet political-military articles examined how the new defensive military doctrine would transform the military-technical side of doctrine at each of these levels of warfare and armed conflict. The authors of this article outlined the general nature of combat actions to be taken at each of these three levels of war and armed conflict for four possible variants or scenarios of defense of the homeland.

The third variant requires the defender allow the attacker to wear himself out until such time as the defender can mobilize his forces for the counteroffensive. The defender, however, will only have the combat potential for a counteroffensive that will stop at the borders. In such a situation, "the concept of victory is also allowed only at the operational and tactical levels, but is excluded at the strategic level." Historical antecedents include the Soviet offensive operation lead by then-General Grigori K. Zhukov against the Japanese on the Khalkhin Gol (River) in August 1939 and the fourth stage (July 10, 1951 - July 27 1953) of the war in Korea when both sides exercised restraint even though they might have gone on the offensive and crossed the armistice line.

Andrei Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada and one of the authors of this article,
mentioned later "there is now a real possibility that the USSR will adopt the third model as its goal." Additional discussions of future security scenarios have been advanced by an outspoken academic from the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Alexi G. Arbatov. In a widely discussed article, Arbatov stated "We declare officially that a protracted large-scale conventional war with NATO in Europe is impossible and unacceptable" and that "it is very hard to imagine" a "conventional war between the Soviet Union and the United States." Further more, for planning purposes, the Soviet military should conduct only defensive operations, and should not assume a simultaneous two front war.

WAR TERMINATION DECLARATORY STATEMENTS

The debate over the future security environment expected is not quite completed. Political guidance to military doctrine in the USSR has changed from previous years. Which side wins in this debate can be immaterial to a discussion of the problems of current war termination, except to give us guidance an current thinking. If a war were to be fought today, however, it is likely that the military leadership
would retain their "old thinking" from the days that they were first socialized into the Army.

The Soviet military and civilian academics who have entered the debate appear to be wrestling with how to implement their new planning guidance and have given us some clues on their perception of the requirements for war termination with a clear bias towards early termination -- prior to escalation of any type. Andrei Kokoshin, one of the authors of the four variants article, told a Western audience in late 1989 that the basic mission for the Soviet Armed Forces should be to restore the status quo without violating the territory of the other side and without counterattacking beyond the operational and operational/tactical level.

A Soviet general officer wrote in late 1989 about the possible ways that armed conflict can be ended; laying out four potential scenarios and suggesting that war and crisis termination be the subject for additional research (the attacker surrenders as a result of counterattacks, the attackers achieves his objective and sues for peace, the attacker temporarily stops while regrouping for a new attack, and the attacker stops without giving the defender any indication of his intentions).
In a November 1989 interview, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev, military advisor to the current Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, stated some very specific views on crises or war termination implying that the role of the defensive, during the initial period of a future war, was to allow the political leadership the opportunity to terminate it. Failing that, the military would be unleashed to perform their normal function of crushing and decisively routing the enemy.\(^{37}\)

It appears that the traditional strategic missions of the Soviet Armed Forces and the criteria for successful completion of those missions has undergone significant revision. In the past, total defeat was required of the enemy's armed forces in armed conflict as the military's contribution to overall war termination. Under the new defensive doctrine, the revised military requirement is to defeat the invading force and to prevent vertical and horizontal escalation or the escalation of the conflict over time. If necessary, the military might have to respond with additional options that might not be foreseen prior to the war. The political/ideological goal of traditional Soviet war termination strategy was to ensure that the aggressor would not be in a position to once again threaten the USSR and that progress was made toward eventual peace ("mir") and
a world socialist order. It appears that the political goals for war termination are now to prevent nuclear holocaust and simultaneously ensure the survival of the homeland (socialist or other).

**STRATEGIC MISSIONS IN WAR**

In analyzing what drives Soviet military doctrine, or indeed the military doctrine of any state, we find that in the USSR it is the military policy of the CPSU (or in other states it is simply military policy). According to Soviet authors, the words used to describe the defensive capability of a state is determined by the same words (termed factors of war) used in issues considered by military policy. These are the military or combat potential of a state, its economic potential (military-economic potential is a subset), scientific potential (again military-scientific potential is a subset), social potential, and finally moral-political potential. Further investigation reveals that these same words are used to describe what decides the course and outcome of war and what is necessary for victory at the strategic level.

During the armed conflict portion of a war, the Soviet Armed Forces would have the opportunity to undermine with new means, the military/combat, military-economic, social,
and moral-political potential of their enemy, thus having a
great influence on the course and outcome of war and the
attainment of victory at the strategic level.

During the pre-armed conflict portion of war or during
the war itself, the government of a state has the
opportunity to build up one's own potentials in each of
these areas and to undermine those of the enemy using
legitimate or illegitimate economic, diplomatic,
ideological, intelligence, or scientific and tools.

These factors of war are clearly identified in the
appropriate Soviet scientific reference publications and are
used widely in military-political writings. It is important
to recognize that these factors offer us the possibility of
bridging the gap from a discussion of war and its goals into
specific military (strategic level) and combat (operational
and, tactical levels) operations/actions that must be
undertaken to undermine an enemy's overall potential and
therefore attain victory at each level. It is possible to
identify the level of warfare or armed conflict which would
be effected by tying the military or combat (including
naval) operations/actions to the goal to be attained. In
the Soviet literature, one can clearly see not only the use
of these terms in setting the requirements for a healthy
defense of the USSR but in also identifying targets for
strikes against enemies in time of war.\textsuperscript{38}

The major strategic goals and strategic missions of the
Soviet Armed Forces in an armed conflict have been openly
discussed in the Soviet military literature for numerous
years. Figure 2 attempts to illustrate the traditional
military operations at the strategic level of armed conflict
and the assigned role of maritime forces.

There is some Soviet Navy literature evidence, however,
that these traditional strategic missions have been revised
in accordance with the new defensive military doctrine of
the socialist community and the USSR.\textsuperscript{39} Figure 3 attempts
to formulate these new missions and place the Soviet Navy
within them.

Analysis of either Figure 2 or 3 is a useful starting
place to move from politically determined goals in a war or
armed conflict to major military missions in order to
understand how each Soviet armed service will be used. Both
Figures 2 and 3 show the connection from military
operations/actions at the strategic level of armed conflict
to the combat operations/actions at the operational and
tactical levels. Original Russian words are contained in
parentheses where appropriate to ensure that the reader can
correctly place key phrases in this diagram.\textsuperscript{40}
WAR - Achieves Political Goals by Using

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Military Operations/Actions - Strategic Scale
(Voyennyye Deystviya)

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- Strikes (Udar)
  - Forces & Resources
    - Nuclear Missile
      - Single/Group/Massive
    - Character/Time & Sequence
      - Offensive/Defensive/Counter-offensive
      - Simultaneous/Successive
  - Military Operations (Voyennyye Deystviya) in a Land Theater
    - Forces & Resources
      - Combined Arms/Fleet
      - Groups of Fronts
    - Character
      - Offensive/Defensive/Counter-offensive
      - Time & Sequence of Execution
        - Initial/Subsequent
        - Simultaneous/Successive
  - Defense of Nation from Enemy Strikes
    - Forces & Resources
      - Combined Arms/Fleets
  - Military Operations in a Naval Theater
    - Forces & Resources
      - Combined Arms/Fleets
    - Character
      - Destruction of naval forces
      - Destruction of land targets
      - SLOC Interdiction
      - SLOC Defense

- Combat Operations/Actions - Operational&Tactical Scale

Figure 2

TRADITIONAL SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIC MISSIONS

33
WAR - Achieves Political Goals by Using

Armed Forces Econ Means | Dipl Means | Ideolog Means

Armed Conflict | Intell Means | Sci/Tech Means

Military Operations/Actions - Strategic Scale (Voyennyye Deystviya)

Strategic Operations | Campaigns | Battles (Strategicheskaya Operatsiya) (Bitva)

- Repelling Enemy Aerospace Attack
  - Forces & Resources
    - PVO/Navy
    - Character
      - Destroy missiles
      - Destroy aircraft
      - Combat naval platforms
        - Anti-SSBN
        - ASW/Anti-surface
  - Suppression of Enemy Mil-Econ Potential
    - Forces & Resources
      - Nuclear Missile
        - Strikes (Udar) SRF/Navy
        - Single/Group/Massive
      - Strategic Aviation
      - Space
      - Navy (Anti-SLOC)
    - Character/Time & Sequence
      - Offensive/Defensive/Counter-offensive
      - Initial/Subsequent
      - Simultaneous/Successive

Destruct of Grouping of Enemy Armed Forces

Forces & Resources

- Combined Arms/Fleet
  - Groups of Fronts

Character

- Offensive/Defensive/Counter-offensive
- Time & Sequence of Execution
  - Initial/Subsequent
  - Simultaneous/Successive

Combat Operations/Actions - Operational&Tactical Scale

Figure 3

POSSIBLE NEW SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIC MISSIONS

34
The Soviet Navy's strategic role in a modern war between the superpowers, where operations were assumed to be global, relatively brief, and perhaps nuclear, had been thought to be generally limited to threatening nuclear missile strikes from protected bastions. Protecting the bastions would take up a major portion of the Soviet surface and subsurface fleet operating in an active defensive role. Another important strategic mission for the Soviet Navy has traditionally been to assist the Soviet Ground forces in the conduct of the theater strategic operation ashore.

Recently the Soviet Navy was given an increased role in defense of the nation from enemy strikes from the sea, a role that they share with the Soviet Air Defense Troops. As to distant water military operations on the high seas, this has been a long-term and basically unfunded goal due to a lack of appreciation for navies by the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces and CPSU.

One can therefore view the Navy's discussion of these new strategic missions as their attempt to revise the general lack of appreciation for the maritime sector by the marshals and generals and to once again explain how maritime forces can be used to achieve political goals during an armed conflict. This obviously has an impact on the use of
maritime forces at the strategic level of armed conflict and therefore in war termination.

Instead of using historical and Western surrogates as did the late Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov when he served as Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy in his many writings, we now see explicit examples how a strong Soviet Navy can meet the new requirements for a defensive doctrine. What is not clear, however, is whether or not the Navy's position has been accepted by the marshals and generals.

Under the new defensive doctrine, the Soviet Navy argues that it has an even more important role than it did in the past. Most of the world's navies argue this point and most analysts of the Soviet Navy do the same. What is important is to look for evidence that the role of the fleet has increased at the expense of some other service. Generally such evidence is lacking.

We see the major mission of defense of the homeland includes strategic antisubmarine and surface warfare naval operations. Both are designed to eliminate the source of missiles and aircraft that could be used to strike the USSR. These operations as well as direct defense of the homeland are not new and have always existed under this category.
They are obvious missions to be fought in a war in defense of the homeland.

If initial defensive military operations of several weeks were not successful and the political leadership could not contain the conflict, the USSR would then "develop their armed forces in accordance with their plans for wartime." Under such a scenario, we would expect to see the Soviet Navy play a strategic role in the suppression of the enemy's military-economic potential and the destruction of groupings of enemy armed forces.

The suppression of the enemy's military economic potential is still undertaken by strikes including those from Soviet naval ballistic missile submarines. What is new under the Navy's publication of possible new strategic missions for the Soviet Armed Forces, however, is the shifting of attacks against the enemy sea lines of communication from a separate category (which had always been criticized as being unable to have an effect on the outcome of war) to being an integral part of the major strategic mission of undermining the enemy military-economic potential. This implies that the sea lines of communication mission may have more importance in the Soviet mind than is generally conceded in the West.
If the Soviet Ground Forces are going to be limited to a defensive capability as prescribed in variant 3, then it is entirely possible that a very offensive and aggressive Soviet Navy will be required to ensure that any land invaders cannot be reinforced or resupplied by sea in a long war. We should recall the military-technical characteristics of war include its pace; hence there will be a requirement for the conducting of both short and long wars, although there may be funding shortfalls for the more expensive long war.

If we see the Soviets failing to make unilateral cutbacks in naval forces as they have done in their Ground Forces, one should not use this as proof of a "real" offensive Soviet military doctrine. It is instructive to consider the real offensive capabilities of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force which are nested within a real defensive doctrine in which U.S. and NATO ground forces are already in conformance with variant 3, i.e. they do not have the capability to repel an invasion and then invade the USSR at the level of a theater strategic offensive operation.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MARITIME THEATERS

Naval leaders like to argue that naval warfare is either unique or at least so fundamentally different that navies should not be commanded by officers who have not
spent their military careers at sea. Although we see this argument made often, that does not necessarily mean that naval warfare is unique and that the general principles and laws of war and armed conflict do not apply. Indeed, this paper has consciously attempted to use the terms generally applied to land warfare to describe war at sea. There are, however, many special considerations for military operations in maritime sectors that should be understood by the vast majority of people who have their primary experience in land theaters.44

The Soviet Union may choose to deploy its strategic missile-carrying submarines in restricted waters, so for geographic, military, political, and legal reasons, other nations would find it more difficult to conduct offensive antisubmarine warfare operations including those in support of war termination. For example, internal waters of a nation are the legal equivalent of land and an attack by a belligerent in such waters would be a definite escalatory step just as would an attack on the land portion of the homeland. Attack on the Pacific Fleet in internal waters of the U.S. by the Japanese in 1941 had a more dramatic effect than if the attack occurred while the fleet was forward deployed.
A recent Master's Thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School argues that the Soviet's will move toward "close aboard bastions" within their 12 n.m. territorial sea.\textsuperscript{45} Territorial waters are not the same thing as internal waters and not the legal equivalent of land. Attacks on ships in another nations territorial sea (underway but probably within sight of land), however, would be more escalatory than an attack on that same ship on the high seas and less escalatory than if the attack took place in port (in internal waters). Another theory suggested is that the USSR intends to hide these units in the territorial -- and perhaps internal -- waters of other nations.\textsuperscript{46} Deploying submarines in restricted waters close to shore offers the Soviet Union opportunities to hide submarines, atone for deficiencies in submarine and antisubmarine warfare technology, and concurrently keep all regional targets covered.

The recently publicized reductions in older Soviet fleet assets (obsolete ships and "harbor queens") results in a leaner but meaner navy force structure.\textsuperscript{47} If theories about deployments of ballistic missile submarines closer in to the USSR are correct, the area of responsibility for sea control by the Soviet Navy decreases. Decreasing the areas to be controlled coupled with a more efficient force
structure can result in an increase in the combat potential of the Soviet Union, albeit in a reduced area. When increased combat potential is viewed in relation to Soviet attempts to reduce the threat from the sea with naval arms control, we can see that the overall correlation of forces would improve in favor of the USSR and thereby security would be enhanced.⁴⁸

Nations routinely anchor their warships in the territorial sea (and even in internal waters -- ports) of other nations with full permission. Attacks against naval forces overtly or covertly deployed in the territorial sea or internal waters of another nation would certainly present unique challenges.

There are additional political and legal implications regarding naval deployments that we can also predict would certainly affect both Soviet and Western decision-making during a war. For example, should nations conduct offensive naval operations in or near enemy/other nation's home waters during the initial conventional phase of war when the political leadership of a nation is attempting to terminate the war without escalation? Should operations be conducted in an enemy's home waters, in a different theater of operations during a limited or general war, when actions thus far were confined to another distant theater? ⁴¹
These questions become even more interesting if we consider that some of these Soviet home waters are viewed by the U.S. as subject to high seas rights of navigation, yet are now or in the past have been considered in some cases by Soviet writers, and in a few instances officially, as closed seas, historic, regional, or territorial bays or seas, or internal waters. For example, the Sea of Okhotsk has been referred to by Soviet writers as a "closed sea." Similarly, some writers have described the Sea of Japan as a "regional sea" to which access would be unrestricted only in peacetime.49 Both seas are acknowledged as areas for Soviet ballistic missile submarine deployments.

Whether or not the Sea of Okhotsk is a "closed sea," or the Sea of Japan is a "regional sea," or the legal significance of such statements, it is clear that all nations attach more importance to areas of the ocean close to its shores than they do to the high seas. We know that nations react when other nations sail their warships within "territorial waters," despite the internationally recognized right of innocent passage. Nations will very likely react to attacks within its internal or territorial waters, closed, historic, regional, or territorial bays or seas in a different manner than to attack forward-deployed units on the high seas.
Nations will similarly react differently if other state's maritime forces remain in these waters for extended periods of time or conduct combat therein during wartime. The abilities of navies to remain in waters close to another nations shores over extended periods of time during a crisis, or during the termination phase of war is a special advantage that again demonstrates that the escalation of war has a horizontal and time component which can have significant utility.

These geographic, military, political, and legal ramifications illustrate the ratchet effect possible through horizontal escalation at sea. Unique escalatory steps can be taken at sea to send clear political signals to other nations during war termination without resorting (or again resorting) to vertical escalation and nuclear war. Horizontal escalation has a number of maritime "rungs" that must be thoroughly investigated by naval and political leaders and planners, and understood by those who otherwise criticize such plans.

There are obvious command and control issues that need to be thought out by each superpower. If, for example, strikes against the U.S. homeland are the province of the highest levels of the CPSU, government, and military, then the theater and tactical commanders must understand where
the line is, i.e. where does the United States start at sea and therefore where do restrictions start to apply. Such questions take on additional complexity in coalition wars.

Another issue that may involve special considerations in the maritime sector is that of efforts to demonstrate positive control over nuclear forces when establishing a nuclear cease fire. Sea based nuclear forces offer the leadership of a nation the opportunity to demonstrate command and control over a force by having it fire a nuclear weapon at a part of the earth using a trajectory that does not threaten the other party and where the warhead will explode harmlessly. The possibility of degraded communications between the political leadership and units at sea (usually assumed to be a more demanding measure) will test and demonstrate the surviving command and control infrastructure.

Rules of engagement at sea are a bit more difficult to handle then ashore and the consequences of poor judgment can often be more dramatic. There are types of ships at sea that will simply not know they are actually under attack until such time as the first weapon explodes and the ship is on her way to the bottom. Plausible danger facing the commander of a naval ship results in the "STARK" or "VINCENNES" models with all of the political and military ramifications that
follows.

Escalation should not be viewed as having only a vertical component leading automatically to global nuclear war. There are significant military actions including those taken by navies, that can escalate warfare by expanding the confrontation to new geographic areas or by extending the conflict over time. Both, construed as actions taken to "prevent" enemy victory, or at least to "punish" aggression, fit well into normal deterrence theory and actions which could be taken during the termination phase of a war.

CONCLUSIONS

War termination remains a legitimate area for research, even in these exciting days of a changing threat. The Soviet Union, or whatever nation-state takes the place of the USSR, will have no choice but to fight a war in defense of its independence. The current political and some of the military leadership have repudiated the direct threat of invasion to the Soviet Union but they do not think that the danger of war has been eliminated. An unexpected war (including a nuclear war) may grow out of a crisis or be the result of a mistake or accident.

We also should consider terminating with parts of the Soviet empire as well as the possibility that multiple
nuclear capable political actors may emerge from current and future events in the Eastern bloc. This implies that the West must maintain extremely flexible targeting capabilities so as to rapidly respond to the changing political climate in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{51}

Given the objective necessity to fight a war in defense of sovereignty, there will always be a political requirement to consider fighting such wars to a successful conclusion. Hence victory at the strategic level is an alternative that must be investigated if only to understand if it is or is not possible with the military forces at hand. Armed conflict must also be studied at the operational and tactical levels and it is not inconsistent to have aggressive actions at the tactical (or even operational) level nested within a defensive doctrine. We must continue to monitor current Soviet debates over possible new variants for the conducting of armed conflict other than the traditional active defense of the past.

The Soviets have not openly said very much about war termination, but what they say indicates a desire to not fight a war with the West, but if one were to come, to terminate it quickly with a combination of initial defensive military and offensive political actions with a residual capability to go on the offensive if necessary and then
fight that war to a decisive rout of the aggressors invading force. The Soviets view of the class nature of warfare may end in the near future which would transform their consideration of war termination from being a sociopolitical event to a more military-technical problem (as it is viewed in the West). Soviet war termination goals under the new defensive doctrine approximate those currently assumed for NATO, i.e. status quo ante bellum.

War termination must consciously address more than the armed conflict portion of the war effort. If we expect our intelligence assets to verify compliance with any termination agreement, we must end the non-armed conflict portion of the war as well. In doing so, however, if we anticipate a shift to a long-term but non-violent competition with the adversary, then we should terminate the economic, diplomatic, and other aspects of the war on as favorable terms as possible.

To understand the strategic missions assigned to the Soviet Armed Forces in war, and thus the goals they are attempting to reach prior to war termination, we need to understand the Soviet factors of war. Undermining the enemy's military/combat, economic (and military-economic), and moral-political potentials can be the direct result of military operations/actions taken at the strategic level.
during armed conflict. Undermining the scientific and social potential of one's enemy are goals which can be worked on during the non-military (period of rising tensions) portions of a war.

The Soviet military has three basic strategic missions in an armed conflict: the repelling of enemy aerospace attack, the suppression of the enemy's military-economic potential, and the destruction of groupings of enemy armed forces. The Soviet Navy contributes to the day to day repelling of nuclear strikes against the homeland by its fielding of ballistic and cruise missile submarines that are capable of conducting nuclear missile strikes. This deterrence mission will continue as long as there are nuclear weapons and would be a requirement during the period of rising tensions of a crisis and the conventional phase of an actual war.

The nature of nuclear war must be taken seriously and investigated as best we can given the limitations of the social and hard sciences to predict. The start of nuclear operations in an armed conflict will not be the end of politics. The political aim may simply becomes to terminate the war at any cost. Someone, and this is the responsibility of both the military and political leadership of a nation, has to think through what combination of
nuclear and nonnuclear actions would be undertaken to make this offer credible and to successfully execute it.

Maintaining a strong conventional war fighting capability at sea is a good idea because it allows you to have nonnuclear options and the capability to use military force after first nuclear use, signaling a willingness to deescalate but still make a political statement and simultaneously return the conflict to a lower level.

Allowing a conventional campaign against strategic forces is adding a major rung in the escalation "ladder" (as perceived in the West) and, therefore, raises the nuclear threshold and does not necessarily upset strategic stability. It is doubtful that the West could ever procure sufficient capable forces to mount such a successful strategic antisubmarine warfare campaign against Soviet strategic submarines that their wholesale destruction, no matter how long the war, would be an issue.

In a long war, the strategic mission to battle the enemy's sea lines of communication takes on a special importance. Success at sea in such operations would allow either superpower to be in a better position to terminate the war on more favorable terms. The destruction of groupings of enemy naval forces would generally take on the character of support to the Ground Forces in a combined
arms/fleet strategic operation in a land theater rather than a massive strategic level naval operation. The capability for significant offensive operations on the high seas is consistent with an overall defensive military doctrine.

Any discussion of military operations/actions taken in the maritime theaters should also take into consideration those special circumstances or factors that would be involved with war at sea. It is not impossible for those oriented in land warfare to understand such considerations and it is the responsibility of the navies to ensure that generals and political leaders can make intelligent decisions about the strategic employment of the fleet. This will be especially true in the area of attacks on each others maritime component of the homeland and termination of the war at sea.

The maritime sector may be the most difficult to communicate with and therefore command naval forces. In a war, we should expect major degradation of command and control making the issuance of new rules of engagement, say from wartime to peacetime, extraordinarily difficult. Planning should therefore assume that war termination might be more ragged in the maritime sector and a clean switch to more restrictive rules of engagement might be impossible.
It is clear that Soviet military force structure and doctrine have changed and military strategy and operational art are being changed even today. Alarm bells should be ringing in Washington and in the capitals of Europe against attempting to negotiate any naval arms control in an era of such uncertainty over these issues.

War planning, therefore war termination planning, is different when one is discussing plans for programming and force acquisition, planning for forces on hand today, and planning conducted at the time of execution of plans. This is generally overlooked by civilian academics in both the U.S. and the USSR who otherwise use programming documents (posture statements and legislative testimony) as a faulty surrogate for war planning guidance that is based upon forces actually in hand.

Generally for programming we hold strategies constant and manipulate force structure, generally proving that the forces to be procured -- according to contractor specifications -- are necessary to implement the strategy. The threat is somewhat vague with the programmed force generally argued as being able to meet all possible contingencies under the prescribed strategy.

For war planning done by the functional or theater commanders, the emphasis is on forces on hand with
manipulation done with strategy. Possible goals are identified and the forces assigned estimated as being able to or not accomplish those goals with perhaps some dilution of expected force capability reflecting actual capabilities demonstrated in fleet exercises. The enemy threat is generally specified so as to allow planning to be completed.

Finally, at the time of the execution of plans, we have to account for actual force capability, as demonstrated in real combat, (not contractor specifications or exercises) that survives the first strikes, and the possible strategies and goals that might be attainable with that capability. Usually a vastly different threat is now reality and the reliability of information about that enemy is much less certain. Planning for programming, war plans, or execution is therefore very different thus necessitating different discussions of termination strategies.

It is important when considering war termination to understand, whether one is reading documents or talking with experts, from which of these perspectives war termination is being addressed. Before a war, we successfully deal with a great deal of uncertainty about the potential behavior of foreign nations. For planning purposes, we attempt to be a bit more precise. When war comes and it is time to be
terminated, perhaps we can accept greater amounts of uncertainty than we think.
NOTES


(3) Robert B. Bathurst, "Some Problems in Soviet-American War Termination: Cross/Cultural Asymmetries," NPS-56-88-028,
Monterey, CA, September 30, 1988, p. 69.


(13) Mikhail Gorbachev Report to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on June 28, 1988, carried in Moscow Pravda in

(14) Boris Kanevsky and Pyoty Shabardin, "The Correlation of Politics, War and a Nuclear Catastrophe," Moscow International Affairs in English, No. 2, February 1988, p. 96 (the original Russian version of this article appeared in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn in October 1987).


(17) Boris Kanevsky and Pyoty Shabardin, "The Correlation of Politics, War and a Nuclear Catastrophe," Moscow International Affairs in English, No. 2, February 1988, p. 98 (the original Russian version of this article appeared in Mezhdun-


(26) There have been statements made in Soviet military writings in the past that can be construed by the reader as supporting the use of nuclear weapons for coercion, but such statements are extremely old and can be interpreted as having no reference to nuclear coercion. See for example the oft-cited passage from General-Major Vasiliy I. Zemskov, "Wars of the Modern Era," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl' in Russian, No. 5, May 1969, p. 61 (Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 45).

(27) A recent Soviet article suggested that a nuclear war "may even begin or end without the taking of political decisions." Such a statement is extraordinary but reflects the Kremlin's concern over accidental nuclear strikes during a crisis or the conventional phase of the armed conflict. See Yu. Zhilin, "The Factor of Time in the Nuclear Age," Moscow Kommunist in Russian, No. 11, July 1986, p. 120 (translation by Ray Garthoff).

(28) For an excellent graphic depiction of such concepts


(33) Alexi Arbatov, "How Much Defense is Sufficient?" Moscow *International Affairs* in English, No. 4, April 1989, pp. 35, 39, 40 (this article appeared in *Mezhdunarodnaya*...
Zhizn in March 1989).


(40) The abbreviations SLOC refers to the sea lines of communication; PVO refers to the Soviet Air Defense Troops; and SSBN means strategic nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine. Anti-SSBN operations are often referred to as strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW).


(43) This of course was one of my major conclusions in a previous work - James J. Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, pp. 189-
192, 226.


(47) For an interesting commentary by the Soviet Minister of Defense on the types of forces that the USSR is dismantling, see "Ostankino Radio Studio on the Line," phone-in program with Dmitriy T. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense with commentator Boris Kondratov - broadcast live on Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1100 GMT, February 17, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-036, February 22, 1990, p. 107 (emphasis added):

"As for the reductions and scrapping of military hardware, yes indeed some of the hardware that
has seen out its prescribed service life is being destroyed, sent for melting down. But what tanks are these? The T-34, T-54, old models of the T-55, T-10. But all the new hardware will remain. Moreover, any hardware that is still serviceable is not being withdrawn from the Armed Forces. As you recommend, it is being mothballed and, should the need arise, will be used.

Perhaps the most significant official claim is to Peter the Great Bay, off Vladivostok, as historic and thus internal waters, enclosed by a baseline of 106.3 nautical miles! I use the term significant since all nations acknowledge the legal restrictions on sailing in another nation's internal waters during peacetime but no nation accepts such a lengthy baseline. The 106 nautical mile line which the Soviets claim closes off Peter the Great Bay is, at one point, more than twenty miles from any land.


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