Reserve Component Round-Out
Of Light Infantry Divisions

A Monograph
by
Major Donald A. Osterberg
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
First Term AY 89/90

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This monograph discusses the Army's decision to round-out light infantry divisions with reserve component personnel. The unique 'spectrum of conflict' requirements upon which the light infantry division force design and operational concept were based are reviewed. This review serves as the basis for an analysis of the capabilities of active component and reserve component mixed forces and the viability of the round-out concept to support the diverse missions assigned to light infantry divisions.

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component forces cannot achieve the light infantry division criterion of rapid deployment (6 days), strategic mobility (500 C141B sorties), and tactical flexibility (fight anywhere, anytime, against any enemy).

In this study, I analyze the requirements for light infantry support in both low intensity and mid-high intensity conflict and recommend mission realignment and force structure modifications to facilitate a meaningful light infantry capability across the entire spectrum of conflict.
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MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Donald A. Osterberg

Title of Monograph: Reserve Component Round-Out of Light Infantry Divisions

Approved by:

[Signature]
Monograph Director

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Purvis, MPA, MMAS

[Signature]
Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Colonel William H. Janes, MA, MMAS

[Signature]
Director, Graduate Degree Program

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Accepted this 26th day of March 1990
ABSTRACT

RESERVE COMPONENT ROUND-OUT OF LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS
by Major Donald A. Osterberg, USA, 46 pages.

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I. Introduction

The United States has recognized for many years that its principle security threat is the Soviet Union. In spite of the recent initiatives of Glastnost and Perestroika, Warsaw Pact forces still possess the capability to challenge world peace. With improved power projection capabilities brought about through a leaner, modernized force, the Soviet Union can extend the threat of conflict throughout the world. Through Soviet use of third world surrogates, the threat has become increasingly diverse and complex.\(^1\)

Following World War II, the U.S. Army force structure progressively became heavier as part of a mechanization process. Since the Vietnam War, the U.S. military has focused on preparing for major conventional and nuclear war, since it serves as the greatest threat to national security.\(^2\) As a result of this focus, U.S. forward deployed heavy forces appear adequate to counter opposing forces in a mid to high intensity conflict. However, heavy forces are difficult to deploy quickly to lower intensity trouble spots, thus limiting their effectiveness at the low intensity end of the conflict spectrum.
The nature of actual conflict since World War II has been of low to mid intensity. This emerging strategic reality drove the policy of flexible response which required lighter forces with greater flexibility to increase the range of options available to the National Command Authority. Consistent with the policy of deterrence, many believed that the presence of a credible ground force during pre-hostilities would deter escalation. In the event deterrence failed, a force with the capability to support a low intensity conflict and to serve as the base force upon which to build a higher intensity capability if required, was desirable to facilitate flexibility. Under the umbrella of rough nuclear parity between East and West, deployable conventional forces are key to preventing the escalation of low intensity conflicts into superpower confrontations. To protect U.S. security interests and objectives worldwide, a better balance of heavy and light forces to counter potential threats across the entire spectrum of conflict was required.²

In early 1980, following the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. military planners realized that the rapid deployment of ground forces to the Persian Gulf and other potential areas of crisis was nearly impossible. The need for increased strategic flexibility prompted President Carter to order the development of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in 1980. This requirement for a Rapid Deployment Force ultimately inspired the Army's light
infantry concept. In fiscal year (FY) 1983 the Army began to reexamine its force structure with the goal of improving flexibility and the deterrent capabilities of conventional forces, thus making the Army a more relevant force in the strategic environment.\textsuperscript{4} The concept was developed for a light infantry division consisting of approximately 10,000 soldiers, which could be deployed in 500 C-141B sorties in about six days time. Light divisions were to be tactically flexible, rapidly deployable, strategically mobile, globally oriented, and combat ready. The force was designed to fight primarily in a low intensity conflict, while possessing the capability to fight effectively in mid to high intensity conflict if augmented by heavier forces.\textsuperscript{5} The actual organization and structure of the light division was developed consistent with these requirements. The creation of smaller light divisions would both help retain force structure and make power projection easier.\textsuperscript{6}

The 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, California became the Army's first light infantry division and served as the test unit to validate the force design and operational concept of the division. The certification test was conducted in 1985 and 1986. Following a number of changes in organization and equipment, the operational concept and force design of the light infantry division were validated and certified. Concurrent with the certification test, the Army decided to field a total of five light infantry
divisions. Two divisions were to be manned with all active component (AC) soldiers (7th, and 25th). Two additional divisions would be organized with approximately 75% active component and 25% reserve component (RC) personnel (6th and 10th), and one division would consist of all reserve component personnel (29th).

In this monograph, I will review the unique "spectrum of conflict" requirements upon which the light infantry force design was based. Since the Army established the criteria that light infantry divisions must be light, rapidly deployable, strategically mobile, and tactically flexible, I will assess the capabilities of AC/RC mixed forces focused in these areas. I will begin by reviewing the mobilization process to determine if AC/RC mixed forces can be expected to mobilize and deploy within six days, utilizing 500 C141B sorties. I will also analyze the personnel positions which were decremented from the active component force structure, and the positions which were added by a Table of Distribution and Allowances to support round-out forces. Through this review, I will determine if the total force meets the authorized end strength of 10,778, and more importantly, if the round-out forces have sufficient command and control personnel to facilitate peacetime training and preparation. I will proceed to assess the capability and mission readiness of reserve component light infantry round-out forces by reviewing the mission essential task lists (METL) and battle
tasks of the 6th Infantry Division (Light) and their round-out brigade, to determine if reserve component units are training for a sufficient range of combat missions to ensure tactical flexibility in support of the light infantry operational concept.

The effectiveness of the current light infantry division force structure to provide a meaningful "spectrum of conflict" capability has been questioned since its infancy. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the force structure to determine its capabilities. I will briefly discuss the opinion of many military experts that a requirement exists for light infantry to fight both in low intensity conflict and in Europe (mid to high intensity).

I have accepted for the purpose of this study that the light infantry division force structure, without reserve component round-out augmentation, is capable of executing the missions for which it was designed. Additionally, in support of our Concept Based Requirements System, I have not questioned whether a threat exists to justify the need for five light infantry divisions.

Based upon the heavy reliance of light infantry divisions on reserve component augmentation, a review of the Army's round-out concept is required to determine if mixed active and reserve component forces are appropriate to support "spectrum of conflict" missions.
RESERVE COMPONENT ROUND-OUT

The U.S. military developed the "round-out" concept as a cost effective means of bringing understructured active component units up to designated organizational structure by augmenting them with reserve component units. The goal of the round-out concept is to maintain post-mobilization capabilities consistent with tactical requirements. The round-out concept appears sound for units designed to fight in a mid to high intensity conflict which would likely be preceded by the declaration of mobilization. However, the decision to round-out light infantry divisions with reserve component forces is questionable in view of the light infantry division's prescribed focus on low intensity conflict. The limited ability of reserve component forces to deploy rapidly, given the inherent limitations of the mobilization process, seems inconsistent with the operational concept upon which the light infantry force design was based.

The round-out forces for the 6th Infantry Division (Light) are extensive and much different from those of the 10th Infantry Division (Light). Figure 1 represents the round-out forces assigned to the 6th Infantry Division (Light). In addition to one infantry brigade, round-out forces include: an artillery battalion, including the division's 155MM howitzer battery; the division's attack helicopter battalion with aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) company, and its ground cavalry troop; one of the
Figure 1 - 6th Infantry Division Round-Out Forces.
division's three engineer companies; and a support battalion, including support, supply/transport, maintenance, medical, and arctic support companies. In addition to those Army Reserve forces listed, the 2d Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Light) is rounded-out with an additional infantry battalion from the Alaska National Guard.

The 10th Infantry Division (Light) is rounded-out with one light infantry brigade from the National Guard. Since all of its combat support and combat service support units are in the active component, the 10th Division is less dependent upon reserve component augmentation than the 6th. Therefore, for the balance of this paper, I will use the 6th Infantry Division (Light) to illustrate specific round-out issues since it offers the clearest examples.
II. Light Infantry Division Requirements

In August 1983, General John A. Wickham Jr. (Army Chief of Staff) instructed the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop proposals for a "light, division-sized force, designed to rapidly deploy and represent a credible fighting force on the future's most likely battlefields." General Wickham's directive focused on improving the Army's ability to adequately perform in low to mid intensity conflicts in all types of geographical environments. The force was to be "fighter-heavy" and easily deployable to any area of conflict utilizing minimum transportation resources.

TRADOC developed the concept for a new light infantry division which was approved by General Wickham in October 1983. The major elements of the light infantry division's operational design were:

1) consist of approximately 10,000 soldiers, of which 50% were to be in infantry units, and contain nine infantry battalions.

2) be deployable in 500 C141B sorties.

3) be designed for engaging light enemy forces in low to mid intensity conflicts, while maintaining the capability for fighting heavier forces in mid to high intensity conflicts when augmented by supporting units,
weapons, and equipment.

4) be suitable for use in a NATO conflict.\textsuperscript{11}

From 1983 to 1985, the Army analyzed, studied, field tested, and refined the light infantry force design and operational concept. From the summer of 1985 to the fall of 1986, the Army conducted a formal certification test of the force design and operational concept utilizing the 7th Infantry Division (Light). The test concluded that:

- a light division is able to mobilize, depart from its home station, and arrive at its final destination in about six days; conduct operations for about 48 hours without external support; conduct air assault operations; participate in amphibious operations; conduct military operations in villages and cities; and is capable of defeating light enemy forces, including insurgents and counterinsurgents. Moreover, when assisted by corps and other non-divisional units, it is capable of defeating heavy enemy in a favorable environment, such as wooded terrain.\textsuperscript{12}

The Army's certification process did not consider or test the deployment capabilities of divisions consisting of AC/RC mixed forces. Consequently, a General Accounting Office (GAO) audit of the certification process concluded that:

- in view of the importance of reserve units to the organizational structure of three of the five light infantry divisions, and the uncertainty about their deployment capability, an evaluation of the capability of these units to rapidly mobilize and deploy appears to be crucial to the certification of the light division concept. Therefore, although the Army has concluded that the light infantry divisions design and concept are sound, some key questions remain unanswered.\textsuperscript{13}
The GAO study concluded in an April 1988 report that the Army's certification test of the light division concept was incomplete because it failed to address the constraints associated with mobilizing reserve component forces and the resultant degradation of capabilities inherent in AC/RC mixed units. In response to the GAO audit, Army officials acknowledged that "although their deployment capability had not been tested during certification, reservists probably could not meet the Army's six day deployment criterion for light divisions." Army officials further indicated that they were not ignoring the potential problems with reserve unit deployment, and that the Army planned to conduct a formal review of the requirements and capabilities of reserve units assigned to support light infantry divisions. However, based upon conversations with officials from both the National Guard Bureau and the Chief of Army Reserve, no such study has been ordered or conducted since the GAO completed their audit in April 1988.

Again in response to the GAO audit, Army officials indicated that two options have been discussed for deploying AC/RC mixed forces. One option is to deploy only the active component elements of the 6th and 10th Infantry Divisions, with their reserve component round-out forces being ordered to mobilize and deploy when ready. A second option is to deploy the 7th and 25th Divisions as required, while mobilizing the other light divisions on a contingency
basis.\textsuperscript{16} Since both options require mobilization, I will summarize the mobilization and deployment processes before continuing to analyze the capabilities of round-out light infantry divisions.
III. AC/RC Mixed Force Capabilities

MOBILIZATION

Mobilization planning stems from national policy and strategy. Joint strategic military planning develops the forces to overcome or neutralize the military threats to national security. Mobilization is the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources.

There are four separate levels of military mobilization which may be declared.

(1) Partial Mobilization may be declared by Congress or the President to mobilize reserve component units to meet requirements for a particular contingency.

(2) Selective Mobilization is executed by the authority of Congress or the President to respond to an emergency with a force tailored to meet the specific requirement. Selective mobilization differs from partial mobilization in that it would not normally be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security.

(3) Full Mobilization results from actions by Congress and the President to mobilize all units in the existing approved force structure.

(4) Total Mobilization, as well, requires actions by
Congress and the President to generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure.\textsuperscript{22}

In addition to the mobilization options discussed above, the President has the authority to exercise a 100,000 man call-up to augment active forces with units from the selective reserve. The presidential call-up option can commit forces for a period not to exceed 90 days and is designed to meet the requirements for an operational or contingency mission.\textsuperscript{23}

As discussed above, the authority to order mobilization resides with the President and/or Congress. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), recommends to the President and Congress the level of mobilization required to support a given contingency (CONPLAN) or operations plan (OPLAN). Once the decision is made, the SECDEF directs mobilization of reserve component units through the military departments.\textsuperscript{24}

The mobilization process is a matter of preparing and then executing plans for mobilization. The magnitude and type of emergency governs the level of mobilization and the available time.\textsuperscript{25} Figure 2 depicts the various options for mobilization which may be implemented over time. Normally, mobilization will be executed in a sequential manner, proceeding from 100,000 through PARTIAL and FULL, to TOTAL mobilization. However, it's important to note that in the case of a low intensity conflict scenario, or a show of force
Figure 3 - Mobilization Options (Over time)
contingency, the sequence may be changed.27

Army mobilization commences with receipt of an order to mobilize and issuance of an alert notification order through command channels. FORSCOM units mobilize in five phases: I-Preparation, II-Alert, III-Mobilization at Home Station, IV-Movement to Mobilization Station, and V-Operational Readiness Improvement.28

(1) Phase I - Preparatory. This phase concerns reserve component units at home station during peacetime. During this phase, units plan, train, and prepare to accomplish assigned mobilization missions. Unit complete as many administrative and processing actions as possible before being ordered to Federal active duty. Therefore, plans for the following phases must be completed, which include movement planning.29

(2) Phase II - Alert. This phase begins when the unit receives notice of a pending order to active duty and ends when the unit enters active Federal service.30

(3) Phase III - Mobilization at Home Stations. This phase begins with the unit's entry on active Federal duty and ends when the unit departs for its mobilization station, or port of embarkation (POE).31

(4) Phase IV - Movement to Mobilization Stations. This phase begins with the unit's departure from home station and ends when the unit closes at its mobilization station. Movement from home station to the mobilization station will
be by the most expeditious and practical means available. Organic wheeled vehicles will normally be used when the mobilization station is within a one-day road march. Personnel and equipment in excess of organic capability, or which cannot sustain a motor march operation, will be moved by nonorganic or commercial transportation.\(^{32}\)

(5) Phase V - Operational Readiness Improvement. This phase begins when the mobilized unit closes at its mobilization station and ends when the unit is evaluated as operationally ready for deployment. The goal of the unit during this phase is to attain operational readiness in the shortest possible time, consistent with its planned deployment or operational mission.\(^{33}\)

The nature of low intensity conflict or show of force contingency operations require a rapid deployment force which can best be facilitated under the framework of a 100,000 Presidential call-up. Considering the realities of partisan politics, Vietnam paranoia, and the inherent confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of government over foreign policy roles, it is clear that the President would avoid being constrained by the 90 day limitation imposed upon the call-up option, and would therefore, likely opt for an all active component response. Although the War Powers Resolution (public law 93-14B) has similar requirements for congressional involvement when U.S. military forces are committed, it does not carry the same threat of
foreign policy restriction as does the congressional declaration of national emergency required to progress to partial or full mobilization. It follows that it may be politically acceptable to activate the round-out brigades of the 6th and 10th Infantry Divisions for mid to high intensity conflicts; however, given the political reaction to the request for reserve component units during the Vietnam War, it would seem unlikely that they would be activated for a low intensity conflict. Our recent experiences in Grenada, Iran, Libya, Honduras, and the Persian Gulf further suggest that the most likely response to a low intensity conflict or show of force contingency will be an all active component package.

DEPLOYMENT

The deployment process is designed to coordinate deployments in support of military objectives. The Joint Deployment System (JDS) establishes a means to plan, coordinate, and monitor movements, based upon OPLANS and CONPLANS submitted by the unified and specified commands. or during JCS directed contingencies for which plans have not been developed. The Army component commander participates in the development of time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD), which identifies and prioritizes forces required to deploy in support of anticipated operations.

The deployment of AC/RC mixed forces is complicated by
The geographic dispersion of units, which requires deployment from multiple points of embarkation (POE). For example, in the case of the 6th Infantry Division (Light), active component units are located at both Fort Richardson and Fort Wainwright, Alaska, and their round-out forces are located in 23 different cities, spread over the States of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa.\(^3\) If required to direct deploy (which is not currently the plan), 6th Infantry Division round-out forces would deploy from Minneapolis and Camp Ripley, Minnesota, Sioux City and Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and Madison, Wisconsin.\(^3\) Equipment for these units is dispersed between local reserve centers, and equipment concentration sites at both Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, Camp Ripley, Minnesota, and Fort Richardson, Alaska.

Under current mobilization plans, the round-out forces for the 6th Infantry Division (Light) are required to travel up to 500 miles via organic and commercial contracted transportation from home station to their mobilization station at Camp Ripley, Minnesota.\(^3\) The movement of reserve component personnel and equipment (which requires civilian contracted assets) and the subsequent link-up with active component elements and preparation for combat operations would be difficult in six days time, if not totally impractical.
PERSONNEL

The authorized personnel strength of a light infantry division is 10,778. In most AC/RC mixed organizations, entire units are decremented from the active component force structure and designated as reserve component round-out; thereby, bringing the division up to authorized strength without increasing the overall end strength. However, in the case of light infantry divisions, the criticality of their mission and the requirement for rapid deployment mandate additional positions to facilitate operational readiness objectives.

Military technicians and Federal civil service employees occupy positions in reserve component units and are assigned as members of the reserve unit as a condition of employment. The full-time manning program provides active component and active guard and reserve (AGR) personnel to enhance readiness through improved training, administration, personnel, maintenance, supply, and operational activities. Additionally, readiness groups (RG) consisting of active component personnel are established to provide advice and assistance to reserve component units in all major functional areas. Although it’s true that the personnel discussed above are provided to all reserve component units regardless of round-out designation, round-out units optimally consist of on average fifteen percent full-time personnel, compared to seven percent for normal reserve component units.
In addition to the support discussed above, the 6th Infantry Division (Light) developed (and Forces Command (FORSCOM) approved) the concept for a 172 man Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organization to augment their round-out forces and facilitate operational readiness. The TDA organization is designated as the 6th Infantry Division (Light) (Round-out) and is headquartered at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. The TDA headquarters consists of 25 officers, 8 warrant officers, and 139 enlisted personnel and is commanded by a Brigadier General (RC).

It's important to note that the positions for the TDA headquarters were not decremented from the active component force structure and are authorized for peacetime only. The TDA headquarters has added an additional level of command to an already convoluted chain of command. Reserve component round-out forces receive war time missions and annual training support from the 6th Infantry Division (Light). Peacetime missions, financial support (budget), and training supervision are provided by the 4th U.S. Army Headquarters (CONUSA), through the 88th U.S. Army Reserve Command (MUSARC) to the reserve component units. Readiness Group Snelling (which provides training supervision to reserve component units) is assigned to 4th U.S. Army, and has no linkage with the 88th U.S. ARCOM (MUSARC) or the 6th Infantry Division. Reserve component units receive training guidance from the CONUSA, the MUSARC, and 6th Infantry
Division. Unit status reports are submitted through reserve component channels (with a copy furnished to the 6th division), whereas training and readiness briefings are conducted for both the CONUSA and the parent active component division. These briefings typically require different information, in different formats, thus contributing to the problem of limited training time available in reserve component units. The result is often confusion and a duplication of effort. With the augmentation headquarters providing support to the round-out forces in all staff functional areas, the 6th Infantry Division (Light) has created an ad hoc or nonstandard organization which forces round-out units to plan and train differently than they will fight.

TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY/TRAINING

The light infantry division operational concept requires a force capable of executing tactical missions across the entire spectrum of conflict. As discussed earlier, tactical missions for light forces include: air assault operations; amphibious operations; military operations in villages and cities; offensive/defensive operations against light enemy forces; insurgency / counterinsurgency support; and conventional operations against heavy forces (when augmented). This level of tactical competence is extremely difficult
to achieve in a reserve component training environment. The average training year for a reserve component soldier consists of 24 days of inactive duty training (IDT) and 15 days of annual training (AT) for a total of 39 training days per year.\(^4\) In response to limited training time, and in consonance with the spirit of "do less better" (FM 25-100, Training the Force), reserve component forces are required to narrow their battle focus to only the most vital mission essential tasks.\(^4\) The concept of battle focus is unquestionably a good concept, albeit extremely difficult for light infantry divisions to implement given their requirement to respond to planned and unplanned contingencies across the entire spectrum of conflict. To narrow the focus of forces earmarked to fight anywhere in the world, in all types of terrain, against enemy forces ranging from insurgent guerrillas to a massive Warsaw Pact armored attack, is contradictory and ill-advised. A comparison of the mission essential task lists (METLs) for the 6th Infantry Division (Light) and their reserve component round-out brigade illustrates the battle focus process and highlights the limited tactical flexibility of reserve component forces.

The mission of the 6th Infantry Division (Light) is to:

- be prepared to deploy rapidly worldwide in support of United States national interests and objectives. Defend Alaska, including the initial defense of the Aleutian Islands.\(^5\)

The mission essential task list for the 6th Infantry Division (Light) is to:
- rapidly deploy by air to secure a lodgement area in another theater.

- conduct, and command and control tactical operations against light enemy forces in any terrain and against heavy forces in close terrain.

- sustain tactical operations while deployed to another theater, including autonomous sustainment for the first 48 hours after deployment.

- maintain capability to rapidly accept and integrate augmenting forces.

- deploy forces to and secure key facility locations in Alaska, and the Aleutian Islands.

- conduct, command and control, and sustain tactical operations at widespread locations in an arctic environment.

- conduct rear area operations so that command and control, combat support, and combat service support operations are not disrupted by enemy activity.\(^5\)

The mission for the 205th Infantry Brigade (Light) is to:

be prepared to mobilize and deploy rapidly worldwide as part of the 6th Infantry Division (Light) in support of United States interests and objectives. Additionally, defend Alaska.\(^5\)

The mission essential task list for the 205th Infantry Brigade (Light) is to:

- conduct mobilization training and operations.

- conduct strategic deployment.

- conduct tactical deployment by air, ground, and rail.

- conduct offensive operations.

- conduct defensive operations.
- provide command and control to attached and OPCON units.
- plan and coordinate logistical support.
- operate in an arctic environment.\textsuperscript{53}

The battle tasks which support the 205th Infantry Brigade's METL are as follows:

- Assault
- Raid
- Anti-armor ambush
- Point ambush
- Defend
- Occupy assembly area
- Move tactically
- Cross danger area
- Tactical road march
- Passage of lines
- Occupy objective rally point
- Occupy patrol base
- Area ambush
- Link up operations
- Employ fire support
- Reconnoiter zone
- Reconnoiter route
- Occupy observation post
- Breach obstacle
- Helicopter movement
- Prepare for chemical attack
- Construct obstacles
- Defend against air attack
- Maintain operational security (OPSEC)
- Aerial resupply
- Sustain
- Prepare for combat
- Consolidate/reorganize\textsuperscript{54}

Although extensive, and undoubtedly challenging to accomplish in 39 training days per year, the METL and battle tasks represent only limited tactical flexibility which is inconsistent with the light infantry operational concept. Missions such as amphibious operations, military operations in villages and cities, and insurgency / counter-insurgency
operations are not listed. Note that the primary mission for both the 6th Infantry Division and their round-out forces is to "deploy rapidly worldwide" with a secondary mission to defend Alaska.

The mission to fight anytime, anywhere, against any opposition requires the highest degree of tactical excellence. Especially critical in a reserve component training environment is the process of conducting a realistic assessment of what standard of proficiency is acceptable when compared with the expenditure of available resources to achieve that capability. Major General John L. Matthews of the Utah National Guard suggests that it is unreasonable to expect reserve component units to maintain sufficient tactical flexibility to be "all things to all people." General Matthews suggests that the brightest and most effective civilian leaders are also the reserve components brightest and most effective commanders. He feels that the current philosophy of "one Army, one standard", often results in unrealistic and unnecessary training demands (and time) which tend to produce excessive losses of the very people the we most need to retain. He goes on to suggest that:

we have the right to expect our Total Force to give us the highest level of security this nation can afford. We have made a conscious decision to transfer a significant part of that force to the Guard and Reserve. We may well transfer more. We can be successful in that endeavor if we are willing to be statesmanlike in our approach. We are
current placing artificial roadblocks in the way of our citizen soldier force, attempting to turn them into low-budget active force look-a-likes. This is forcing it into a mold that emphasizes its weaknesses and nullifies its strength.57

Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins, Jr. stated it best when he said that:

reserve component training suffers from the Army’s failure to make realistic assessments of what can be expected from reserve components in an emergency, and from the reserve components’ promise of more than they can deliver. Statements that reserve component units should be as ready to fight as active units is self-serving, and self-defeating.58

Some mobilization experts point to the demonstrated effectiveness of reserve component combat service support units to direct deploy to Europe, for example, as a reasonable standard for all reserve component forces. General Collins agrees that support units may be ready to deploy much earlier than units expected to fight upon arrival in the combat theater. He warns however, that the "lives of soldiers will be endangered if reserve component units are expected to fight even a month after call-up, no matter what their claimed state of readiness is."59

The requirement for tactical flexibility mandated by the light infantry division operational concept is an example of unrealistic demand being thrust upon reserve component forces. The expectation that reserve component light infantry forces can achieve the required level of competence is a "dubious proposition at best."60 In light of the
mobilization and training limitations already discussed, a post-mobilization, mid to high intensity conflict mission, must be developed for reserve component light forces to facilitate a realistic battle focus consistent with institutional capabilities.

THE NEED FOR TWO LIGHT INFANTRIES

As discussed earlier, General Wickham envisioned the primary mission for light infantry divisions to be at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. It appears the Army never really understood the concept of low intensity conflict operations and developed a force ostensibly focused on low intensity conflict (but viewed through a mid to high intensity paradigm). Current institutional attitudes are changing from low intensity conflict toward a focus on "heavy/light" mixed forces to fight in a more conventional, high intensity role. The attention being generated by the concept of heavy/light operations is evidenced by the increased percentage of heavy/light and light/heavy rotations at the National Training Center and by the volumes being written on the subject in military related publications. Major Peter N. Kafkalas posits that the Army's decision to round-out the 6th and 10th Infantry Divisions with reserve component brigades has fueled a refocusing from low intensity conflict. The decision to round-out light divisions sent a signal to the Army that the focus for light
divisions was, by design, not on low intensity conflict, since low intensity conflict operations are normally considered pre-mobilization activities. Major Kafkalas suggests that the inescapable conclusion is that the 6th and 10th Infantry Divisions could only be committed to a low intensity conflict scenario with their two active component brigades, which would clearly limit their effectiveness. Therefore, it's fair to conclude that "light divisions are not LIC-oriented, but are force augmentees for a higher intensity conflict." Whether by a misunderstanding about the round-out of light divisions or by a number of other likely factors (including our desire to "do what we know"), it appears the Army has either consciously or subconsciously redirected the doctrinal and functional focus of light divisions toward mid to high intensity conflict.

I would argue that the impetus for the development of a rapid deployment force, focused on low intensity conflict, has not changed from 1983 to the present. Therefore, if a redirection is occurring, it is important that we don't lose sight of the political and military significance of low intensity conflict operations. I would suggest that there is a requirement for light infantry forces in both low intensity conflict and in Europe, and that we have not maximized the potential of our light forces to respond effectively to either type of conflict. A solution exists, I believe, to refine this capability without radically changing the current
force design or fielding plan.

The requirement for light infantry forces in a low intensity conflict environment has been succinctly stated by General Wickham, and was developed in the introduction to this paper. I will now focus briefly on the requirement for light infantry forces in mid to high intensity conflict, i.e. Europe. Colonel Huba Wass de Czege in a recently published NATO Interim Report: Employment Concepts for Light Infantry in Europe, argues that the Army needs three different types of light infantry. One is required for low intensity conflict, and both a "classical" and "regular" light infantry capability is required in Europe. He explains that:

classical light infantry is appropriate to denying large tracts of forested, compartmented terrain to the enemy, either in the main battle area of a corps defense, or as part of a covering or screening force operation. Classical light infantry tactics also include attacks by infiltration or air assault operations to support attacks by larger heavy forces. A modified "regular" light infantry force is required in open, hilly, and partially forested or urbanized terrain, where archipelago, and reverse slope defenses are most appropriate.

The "regular" light infantry forces require the capability to work closely with tanks, to provide security, to ensure their rapid advance, and to fight from or assault strong points. Colonel Wass de Czege concludes that "we need to seriously address the lack of an infantry force which is optimized for a regular infantry mission" in mid to high intensity conflict.
Michael Mazarr in his article, *The Light-Heavy Debate Rears Its Head Again*, concurs with Colonel Wass de Czege that there is a requirement for light infantry in low intensity and in mid to high intensity conflicts. He suggests that "the only role for which current division-size light infantry units are fully suited is low intensity conflict" and that "the missions for which light infantry divisions are best suited do not call for five divisions." Mazarr recommends that three light infantry divisions should be directed to train and focus on low intensity conflict, while retaining secondary missions for mid to high intensity conflict in Europe. Colonel Wass de Czege contends that two or three light infantry brigades per heavy corps would be adequate in Europe. Therefore, two (or more) divisions should be reorganized, equipped, and trained primarily for mid to high intensity conflict, thus giving the U.S. a meaningful light infantry capability across the entire spectrum of conflict.

I agree with both Colonel Wass de Czege, and Mr. Mazarr that there is a requirement for at least two different types of light infantry units. However, my conclusion (which will be developed in greater detail later), is that the desired "spectrum of conflict" capability can be achieved by converting either the 10th or the 6th Infantry Division to an all active component force. This division, along with the 7th and 25th Infantry Divisions (already all AC), would
provide a total of three active component divisions capable of rapid deployment, focused on low intensity conflict, with secondary missions in the mode of Colonel Wass de Czege's "classical" light infantry in Europe. A reserve component division, utilizing one of the current round-out brigades as its base unit, could be organized to provide a capability to fight as "regular" light infantry in Europe. This reserve component division, along with the 29th Infantry Division (Light), would provide the Army two divisions primarily focused on fighting in a mid to high intensity environment. In the Army's 1984 Program Objective Memoranda (POM), the requirement for five light infantry divisions was justified based upon a detailed threat assessment. As mentioned earlier, for the purpose of this study I have elected not to challenge this assessment. Therefore, my recommendations would not require an increase in the number of light infantry divisions, but would rather reprioritize missions consistent with institutional capabilities.
IV. Conclusions

The light infantry division operational concept mandates that light forces possess the capability to "deploy anywhere in the world in six days or less." This is a standard which round-out divisions cannot meet due to the inherent limitations of the mobilization process. Based upon a thorough review of the mobilization and deployment processes, I have concluded that although complicated and difficult to manage, they are functionally organized and are as efficient as can be reasonably expected.

Since neither of the round-out brigades for the 6th or 10th Infantry Divisions are "direct deploying" units, the following generic (unclassified) timeline would be representative of their deployment capability:

1. Preparation: Ongoing
2. Alert/mobilization at home station 72 Hours
3. Movement to mobilization station 24-48 Hours
4. Operational readiness improvement 10-45 Days
5. Deployment to theater of war 2-4 Days

TOTAL: 16-54 Days

Light infantry divisions were designed to be strategically mobile, requiring between 514-520 C141B equivalent sorties for deployment. Current aircraft
requirement estimates for the 6th Infantry Division (Light), which would be required to deploy from seven or more points of embarkation (POE), is between 600-620 C141B sorties.

The light infantry division Table of Organization and Equipment authorizes a personnel strength of 10,778 which round-out divisions do not meet. In the case of the 6th Infantry Division's round-out forces, a Table of Distribution and Allowances headquarters (172 personnel), a training cadre (21 personnel), and full-time civilian employees (6 personnel) have been added to provide peacetime command, control, and training supervision. The end result is a force which exceeds authorized strengths and is non-standard in design, while adding an additional command echelon to an already diffused chain of command. Additionally, the notion of a round-out headquarters, which is authorized for peacetime only, is inconsistent with the Army's "train as you're going to fight" philosophy.

In addition to the personnel issues associated with round-out divisions, geographic dispersion detracts from their rapid deployability. Again using the 6th Infantry Division (Light) as an example, the distance between the division headquarters (Fort Richardson, Alaska) and their round-out brigade headquarters (Fort Snelling, Minnesota) is over 3000 miles. This distance, in conjunction with the fact that the division's round-out forces are spread over a three State area of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa, complicates the
training supervision being provided by the "go to war" headquarters.

Light infantry divisions were designed to fight effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict. The specialized training required to facilitate this level of tactical flexibility is beyond the capability of reserve component units to achieve in 39 training days per year. The concept of battle focus and the reality of the reserve component training environment argue against the expectation that reserve component forces can achieve and sustain the required standards of proficiency. Extensive post mobilization training will be required (14-30 days) for light infantry round-out forces prior to deployment, whereas active component light forces are organized and equipped at Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) One and are expected to maintain the corresponding level of training and operational readiness.

The delta between the requirements for light infantry forces and the capabilities of round-out divisions is significant. The Army has fielded three light infantry divisions (6th, 10th, and 29th) which are not deployable within six days, require more than 520 C141B sorties to deploy (in most cases), and are incapable of executing the wide range of tactical missions (spectrum of conflict) upon which the light infantry operational concept is based.

It is important that I clarify that the reasons for
reserve component unit's inability to achieve the required level of operational readiness are not due to a lack of quality personnel or exhaustive effort. (In my two years of providing full-time support to an Army Reserve brigade, I observed superbly talented, dedicated, hard-working, motivated, and well-trained professionals serving in the reserve component.) The reason for the delta between the requirements for light infantry forces, and the capabilities of round-out divisions is that the Army has simply asked its reserve component forces to achieve an unrealistic standard of deployability and tactical flexibility. The decision to round-out light divisions is an example of fiscal limitations requiring force design modifications for which the negative impact on readiness has not been adequately considered or tested. The fact that reserve component round-out units are incapable of countering the threats for which light divisions were designed raises questions about the mission alignment and resource allocations within the Total Army force structure.

The recent end of the Cold War and the dramatic changes in the Warsaw Pact seem to indicate the probability of a major conflict in Europe is diminishing; however, the threat cannot be underestimated or ignored. Tensions in Latin America, the Middle East, the Philippines and elsewhere, increase the probability that U.S. forces may be required to support low to mid intensity contingencies, thus validating the need for
forces capable of fighting effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict.
IV. Recommendations

As mentioned earlier, I believe our existing mobilization and deployment systems are functional and require no modification. Additionally, based upon my personal observations, I have concluded that reserve component training (in most cases) is being planned and executed as well as can be expected. Therefore, to reduce the delta between the requirements for a rapidly deployable, strategically mobile force, capable of fighting effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict, and the capabilities of AC/RC mixed light divisions, the Army must: 1) alter the requirements through a realignment of missions, and/or 2) increase current capabilities through force structure changes. I would recommend both. First, the Army must recognize that the round-out concept is inconsistent with operational requirements for light infantry divisions. Consequently, the Army’s light divisions should be manned with either all active component, or all reserve component personnel. The active component divisions should focus on low intensity conflict, while retaining the secondary mission to reinforce forward deployed forces with "classical" light infantry support in mid to high intensity conflict. The remaining reserve component light infantry divisions should focus on providing "regular" light infantry support to
forward deployed forces in mid to high intensity conflict (which may require personnel and equipment modifications).

With these proposed changes, the U.S. Army would have a meaningful light infantry capability across the entire spectrum of conflict, thus increasing its strategic relevance. Low intensity conflict operations would receive additional training in three active component light infantry divisions, while a conventional capability (two divisions) would exist for post mobilization support of NATO operations in Europe or worldwide. Mission requirements would be more realistically aligned, while achieving the spectrum of conflict capabilities envisioned by the original designers of the light infantry operational concept.
Endnotes


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12. Ibid., p. 11.

13. Ibid., p. 5.


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19. FORMDEPS, Volume I, p. 3-1.

20. Ibid., p. 3-1.

21. Ibid., p. 3-2.

22. Ibid., p. 3-2.

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25. FORMDEPS, Volume I, p. 3-1.


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29. Ibid., p. 3-5.

30. Ibid., p. 3-5.

31. Ibid., p. 3-5.

32. Ibid., p. 3-5.

33. Ibid., p. 3-5.


35. FORMDEPS, Volume I., p. 4-1.

36. Ibid., p. 4-1.


39. Interview with MAJ James A. Lundell (205th Infantry Brigade), 7 July 1989, Fort Snelling, Minnesota.
40. GAO/NSIAD-88-115, P. 15.

41. Combined Arms And Services Staff School, Reserve Components/Mobilization, p. 10.

42. Ibid., p. 10.

43. Ibid., p. 33.

44. Lundell interview, 7 July 1989.

45. Department of the Army, "Permanent Orders # 56-1," Table of Distribution And Allowances, 6th Infantry Division (Round-Out), (TDA 4RWF998, EDate, 900916), (12 July 1989), p. 1.

46. Ibid., p. 1.

47. GAO/NSIAD-88-115, p. 11.


51. Ibid., p. 2.


53. Ibid., p. 3-1.

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63. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

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