Rear Operations During the Offense: How Capable is the Corps of Conducting Rear Security Operations During the Attack?

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This study examines current U.S. Army rear operations doctrine as it applies to the tactical level of war. Specifically, it analyzes the ability of a heavy U.S. Corps conducting offensive operations to conduct successful rear operations against a Level III Soviet threat. This paper briefly reviews two cases of rear operations. First, the German army on the Eastern Front in World War II is examined. Next, the experiences of the US Army in Korea are examined. These case studies provide significant lessons learned which may apply to the modern battlefield.

Soviet doctrine for attacking an enemy rear area is studied next. Our current doctrine for conducting rear operations is reviewed in the next chapter. The analysis compares our current capabilities against the probable threat. Using the lessons learned from the two historical examples, this paper then analyzes the ability of the Corps to protect its rear area. This study concludes that our current doctrine does not adequately identify the size and nature of the threat. (Continued on back of page)
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ABSTRACT


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I. INTRODUCTION

AirLand Battle doctrine describes the Army's approach to generating and applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels. It is based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to accomplish the mission. (1)

Army doctrine, as outlined in FM 100-5, Operations, lays the foundation necessary for future victories; it is primarily through this "aggressive exercise of the initiative" that commanders on the AirLand Battlefield are expected to fight and win. According to doctrine, the AirLand Battlefield is composed of three integrated and synchronized components: deep, close, and rear operations. Close operations are recognized as bearing the "ultimate burden of victory or defeat", with "the measure of success of deep and rear operations (being) their eventual impact on close operations." (2)

This doctrine for success is intended to apply to both offensive and defensive operations, and is contained in manuals describing operations at each of the tactical echelons of command from battalion through corps. The strategic requirements of maintaining forward deployed forces in Europe have, however, given US doctrine a distinctively defensive emphasis. AirLand Battle doctrine, emphasizing aggressive action within the context of that defense, continues to be refined and developed. Specifically, rear operations doctrine continues to develop.

This emphasis on the strategic defensive in Europe has
neglected other possible missions for US forces. The possibility of a threat to our rear area as we conduct corps level offensive operations is rarely discussed. Doctrine for such operations may need revision. Although significant amounts of work, such as articles in professional journals and monographs, exist describing rear operations, most are set in a defensive scenario. Very little work has been completed dealing with the rear threat during the offense. If doctrine anticipates tactical offensive operations, and holds successful rear operations to be necessary for the success of close and deep operations, then that doctrine must be applicable to offensive as well as defensive operations.

The subject of this monograph is rear operations during corps offensive operations. It attempts to determine if U.S. Army doctrine for rear operations provides the guidance necessary for success during corps level offensive operations. Specifically, the subject of the tactical combat force (TCF) and its capability to defeat appropriate enemy forces in the corps rear area is examined. The specific context of this paper will be limited to a US heavy corps conducting offensive operations against a Soviet or Soviet trained enemy while NATO conducts a strategic or operational defense.

The fast-paced, non-linear nature that future battlefields are expected to have will place enormous stress on the sustainment structure of the Army. The number of possible scenarios in which Army forces could be found conducting AirLand operations is extensive. The lethality of the weapons and austerity of assets
available leave little room for error on the battlefield. If doctrine is not yet fully developed, history may provide some solutions to the problems of modern warfare.

By studying historical examples of rear operations and using them as a basis for comparison, this paper examines our current doctrine for employment of tactical combat forces. By analyzing our TCF concepts and capabilities in contrast to Soviet doctrine for deep operations and operations of stay-behind and bypassed forces, it attempts to determine if current doctrine has adequately addressed mission requirements.

In order to evaluate historical examples as well as current doctrine, certain criteria have been established. First, does doctrine identify the nature of this threat, its size, composition, and the tactics and objectives to be expected of it? Next, does doctrine provide adequate combat forces to defeat the probable rear area threat that the corps could encounter during offensive operations? Also, does doctrine provide clear guidance on how to identify, select, organize and employ the TCF? Is the formation of a TCF from within the corps feasible given our current force structure? Finally does doctrine apply the lessons available from United States and European history regarding rear operations?

To adequately study the historical implications of rear operations, this study examines two cases where armies on the offensive conducted security operations in their rear areas. During Operation BARBAROSSA, the German army had considerable
trouble with pockets of bypassed Russian forces, as well as partisan organizations, both of whom threatened the German lines of communications.

Similarly, the U.S. X Corps found its rear area and logistics threatened during the early months of the U.N. counteroffensives of 1950. AirLand Battle, with its emphasis on initiative and offensive action, could place U.S. Army forces in similar circumstances, against Soviet or Soviet-trained enemies. By looking at history, we may find insights into future war.
II. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

The German experience in Russia provides significant insight into rear operations as they might one day again occur on European soil against a Soviet enemy. The extended, often non-linear nature of the battlefield of the Eastern Front may resemble future Airland Battlefields.

As the German army rebuilt itself during the prewar years, the General Staff paid close attention to Germany's European neighbors. It did not escape their attention that during wargames and maneuvers conducted in the 1930's, the Soviets had conducted experiments in partisan raids and other operations in the enemy rear. Consequently, German plans for operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of Russia in 1941, had taken the threat to their rear areas into account.

Special security units, (sicherungs, or line of contact) divisions, regiments, and battalions were formed to mop up bypassed enemy forces, secure lines of communication, and guard supply depots, railway stations or important bridges. Usually formed from the Landsturm - reservists over 35 years of age unfit for combat duty - the Sicherungstruppen were organized, trained, and equipped with primary emphasis given to security of the extensive lines of communication the German High Command knew would exist in the east.

The initial concept called for security regiments and battalions to establish a string of supply depots behind the
advancing Germany forces, maintain lines of communication, safeguard supplies, and most importantly, relieve front-line units from such responsibility. As civilian administration was set up in these rear areas, the security forces would then be released to continue moving farther east.

The concept for employment was for three security divisions to follow each advancing army group, one on each flank and one in the rear.(5) The flank divisions would provide lateral security for lines of communications and protect the flanks. The trailing division secured supply routes, bridges, railroads, and the headquarters. Being responsible for areas often in excess of five thousand square miles of territory, security forces were primarily used to fortify supply depots and guard supply trains and convoys.

When the first security divisions were formed in May of 1941, they were manned by breaking apart three regular infantry divisions which had returned from other combat duties. Each security division would consist of one regular infantry regiment, one reserve (Landsturm) regiment, one artillery regiment, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion and (sometimes) anti-tank or reconnaissance units.(6)

During the initial months of the attack on Russia, the Russian threat in the German rear was much as the General Staff had predicted. The majority of enemy forces in the German army rear consisted of the pockets of passed Russian soldiers which had not yet been reduced or captured by combat forces. Few partisans were as yet active in the German rear, since the
inhabitants of the Baltic States were welcoming the Germans as liberators.

The major threat in the German rear areas came from Russian soldiers and units fighting their way back through the Germans. Tactical doctrine required security companies and battalions to secure the rear areas of advancing units so that combat units would not be required to divert attention to areas behind them. (7) Their specific mission was protection of supply lines to the forward divisions and protection of the roads and rail lines in use.

During operations, the armored divisions spearheading the German advance were supported by heavy truck units carrying their supplies, up to a distance of three hundred miles from the supply base. In order to ensure that the supply system was also responsive to the needs of the slower moving infantry divisions, a system of secure outposts was established. Every fifty to seventy-five miles, a security battalion would establish a supply depot to the immediate rear of the advancing units. (8) A security force would then stay with the logistics units to safeguard the supplies, as well as secure and patrol the supply routes. Supply units would then spread out laterally, establishing smaller, secure sites and provide support for the advancing infantry divisions. Eventually, the Russian rail lines were used and supplies begin to move by rail.

The security of these rail lines and railheads placed an additional requirement on the security units. This task fell to the security divisions, and to front line units which sometimes
had to be pulled from the front for such duties. Often replacement units on their way to the front were used. Trains were assigned security detachments, fields of fire were cleared along the line, and anti-aircraft guns were mounted on flatcars as part of the active security measures taken to protect them. Guard posts and security unit patrols were used to protect the rail lines from sabotage, which was the main type of Russian activity directed against rail LOC's.

As the German march continued east and approached Moscow, the threat in the rear increased substantially. Partisan activities increased in scope and frequency and were increasingly coming under centralized control from Moscow. Their operations became more widespread and were often conducted in consonance with those of the Red Army. This caused the battle in the rear to require diversion of combat units from the front. By early 1942 in order to prevent the security units from being overwhelmed by enemy activity, infantry divisions began conducting rear operations.

These operations of the security units provide an excellent example for contemporary study of such forces in the corps rear during offensive operations. First, the Germans recognized that "anyone charged with responsibility for planning and conducting military operations must take into account the size, danger, and proper significance of the front behind the front." The German High Command clearly recognized that a threat to the rear was a threat to the overall operation and took action to minimize that threat. The organization of security divisions, regiments, and
battalions was not only intended to reduce the threat to the rear, but also to remove responsibility for rear security from the commanders of forward combat divisions.

The tactics and missions assigned the security troops were well within their capabilities. "Mopping-up" pockets of bypassed forces, guarding supply depots, and securing supply routes and trains were tasks they were organized to perform. In terms of the criteria for evaluating a TCF (Section I), the German security forces were a doctrinal solution to the rear threat during offensive operations. The German doctrine for security unit organization, missions, and equipment was the same as a regular infantry division therefore clearly understood. (11)

Did the Germans correctly identify the threat to their rear, the tactics they would use, and determine what their possible objectives might be? The General Staff recognized the greatest risk in the rear would be to the vast length of their lines of communication. Their studies of Russian training during the 1930's provided insight into the nature of the rear area threat. Security units were specifically intended to secure LOC's and installations against bypassed units of the Red Army or partisan bands. As previously stated, the Russians had practiced such operations during wargames and would be expected to conduct them against the German Army. Once they had identified the threat, it was possible for the Germans to organize forces to counter that enemy. However, was the formation of security units feasible within the force structure of the German Army?
The German Army in 1940-41 was capable of providing the manpower for such forces, by breaking up existing infantry divisions. It is interesting to note that the Army High Command thought rear area security was so important that it approved the breakup of three experienced combat divisions to form the first security divisions. The operations of these units provide some interesting lessons learned for us to apply to rear operations on the AirLand Battlefield.\(^{(12)}\)

These lessons begin with the requirement to select high quality personnel and equipment for security forces. The organization, planning, and employment of these forces must be driven by the size, capabilities, and intentions (objectives) of the enemy. Regardless of the enemy objective, the security force must always be aware of the enemy capability to attack the rear area and thus disrupt sustainment of forward combat operations.

Other lessons from Operation BARBAROSSA are that the fight in the rear is just as intense as fighting at the front, and the rear fight must be treated with real concern. Further, this fight must be active and aggressive, requiring trained combat troops. The Germans conducted such an aggressive fight by continuous reconnaissance and combat operations in the rear area. Finally, the rear security operation must be under unified command, preferably under an experienced combat commander.

The U.S. Army in Korea

The experiences of X Corps and the 3d Infantry Division
during November 1950 illustrate how U.S. forces could conduct rear security operations during a corps level attack. The Corps' landing at Wonsan, North Korea on 25 October 1950 was to begin the final assaults that would complete the destruction of the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) and bring a rapid end to the war. (13)

Initially consisting of two U.S. Divisions (the 7th Infantry and 1st Marine) and two Republic of Korea Divisions (the 3rd and Capital Divisions), X Corps' mission was to continue to advance north to the Manchurian Border. (14) The two ROK Divisions were ordered to attack up the coast with the U.S. divisions attacking north from Wonsan towards the Chosin Reservoir and Yalu River (see Map A).

While the X Corps advance continued, groups of bypassed soldiers of the NKPA were often formed into guerrilla bands of 200 to 1,500 under Chinese or Russian leadership. (15) As many as 30,000 bypassed North Korean soldiers were located within the X Corps area of operations, posing a serious threat to the Corps' rear supply base and lines of communication to the advancing divisions.

MG Edward M. Almond, commanding X Corps, and his staff recognized the serious threat the bands of bypassed Communist soldiers represented. Tactical doctrine of the day was contained in FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations - Operations*, dated August 1949. Within it, protection of lines of communications and rear areas was the responsibility of the subordinate units, (16) unless
MAP A (NORTH KOREA) Source: Appleman, South to the Naktong North to the Yalu, p. 730.

X CORPS ADVANCES TO THE YALU RIVER
25 Oct-26 Nov 1950

- 12 -
furnished by the higher commander:

When contact is imminent, security measures are increased. However, security forces should be only of sufficient strength to preserve the commander's freedom of actions. In their composition, consideration is given to preserving tactical unity. It is advisable that they possess mobility equal to that of the forces they are expected to oppose.\(^{\text{(17)}}\)

The North Korean forces operating in the X Corps area were lightly armed (small arms and mortars) and the mission of securing the corps rear and LOC's initially fell to the 1st US Marine Division. The 1st Marine Division's assigned tasks were: route reconnaissance, security of the corps landing base at Wonsan, and attack in zone to the North Korean/Chinese border.\(^{\text{(18)}}\)

Between October 26 and November 10, the 1st Marine Division continued to secure Wonsan, patrol the Corps MSR's and advance in zone (one regiment) towards the Chosin Reservoir. In the corps rear, engaging units from platoon to battalion size in strength, the Marines found their task more difficult. The North Koreans began to organize and coordinate their activities, and the LOC's grew longer as the units of X Corps advanced northward.

On November 5, the 3d Infantry Division was attached to X Corps, with missions as follows: relieve 1st Marine Division, secure Wonsan, destroy enemy in zone, establish blocking positions to secure corps left flank, and prepare for offensive action to the west in the vicinity of Hamhung.\(^{\text{(19)}}\)

Between November 5 and November 29, the North Koreans operating in and around the X Corps rear area conducted dozens of
raids, ambushes, and attacks on corps supply convoys, trains and support units. The 3d Infantry Division conducted continuous security operations and patrols to safeguard movement along the divisions' main supply routes, and even provided guard forces for supply trains using the single rail line in the area.

The most significant action occurred on November 29, when the division's 7th Regiment was heavily attacked near Koto-Ri, along the main corps MSR. The successful defense of the MSR against an enemy force estimated at two divisions in size maintained the supply lines to the 1st Marine Division as it advanced to the Chosin Reservoir, and kept open the escape route US forces would shortly be using as they retreated in the face of Chinese armies newly entered into the war during December. (20)

Using the criteria described in Section I, the rear security operations conducted by X Corps were evaluated. An overall assessment is that the X Corps was successful in maintaining open lines of communications and safeguarding rear area installations and units, thus ensuring continuous sustainment of forward combat units. The forces allocated for rear security (one division) were adequate based on the initial G-2 estimate of enemy forces in the corps area (3,000 to 5,000). (21)

Doctrinally, there were shortcomings which forced the X Corps to improvise rather than implement standard doctrine or procedures. FM 100-5 (August 1949) did not describe possible threats to the rear area during offensive operations, nor did it provide guidance on the size, composition, or employment
considerations of combat forces fighting the battle in the rear; yet, it strongly suggests that combat forces are necessary to do so.

The actual formation of a "TCF", in this case an entire infantry division, was feasible within the force structure of the time. The security of the rear was considered part of the overall combat operation, and it was not uncommon to use combat units in such a manner.

Finally, the lessons of history were applied in determining how to conduct rear security operations. The lessons used were from the European Theater of World War II and required modifications as the war progressed. Specifically, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins used his experiences as a corps commander during World War II in developing a common doctrine for rear security of US Army forces in Korea.(22) This development of a rear operations doctrine under combat conditions provides us with some important lessons learned.(23)

The foremost of these lessons from Korea is that rear security operations are a normal and integral part of any combat operation. Specialized units and personnel are not required for such operations; they can be conducted by regular combat units. However, the responsibilities, and associated areas, should be clearly delineated and divided among subordinate units.

The fluid nature of offensive operations is going to leave large numbers of enemy soldiers in the rear creating the need for significant forces dedicated to rear security. Consequently,
convoy movement must be treated as a combat operation, coordinated at all levels to provide continuous security and fire support. The supply routes must then be the object of continuous reconnaissance, and require additional engineer support in order to be maintained.

Bearing in mind these experiences as well as those of the Germans on the Eastern Front, let us now examine the rear area threat a US corps might face on the European Battlefield.
III. THE THREAT

The development of Soviet military thought is deeply rooted in their experiences during World War II - their "Great Patriotic War." It is difficult to pick up a work on Soviet military matters and not find multiple references to their victory over Nazi Germany. According to V.G. Reznichenko, "in the first decade following the Great Patriotic War tactics developed on the basis of the highly rich experience accumulated during the war."(24)

The Soviets consider the offensive to be the decisive form of combat, but recognize that the modern battlefield will be non-linear in nature, with simultaneous offensive and defensive actions. Soviet forces can be expected to carry out operations "at high momentum and at great depth".(25) Thus, U.S. forces can expect strikes throughout the depths of offensive formations, strikes conducted by Soviet forces trained, equipped, and possessing a historical tradition of aggressive independent action on the battlefield. In order to answer the question this paper poses regarding the capability of the corps to conduct rear operations during the offense, we must examine how a Soviet adversary might respond to that attack.

The initial rear area threat would probably come from bypassed pockets of resistance and remnants of units. As the German Army discovered in 1941-42, these groups can divert significant combat power from front line operations. Pockets of
enemy soldiers from platoon to company size should be expected immediately after the destruction of the parent regiment or division. The danger from such forces will grow as they organize into larger bands under centralized control, as was the case in both Russia and Korea.

In order to achieve decisive results, Soviet defensive doctrine stresses the need to counterattack an advancing enemy at the earliest opportunity. By deploying forces in multiple echelons and depths, with significant forces in uncommitted echelons, they seek to maintain maximum freedom to maneuver. A U.S. force conducting offensive operations should expect a significant threat of counterattack designed to strike "against weak spots in his battle formation, especially on the flanks and in the rear."(26)

During counterstrikes or counterattacks, the ground maneuver threat is extremely high.(27) In preparation for division or army operations, tank-heavy forward detachments are normally assigned objectives fifty to eighty kilometers into the depth of the enemy formation in order to disrupt maneuver of reserves or facilitate the maneuver of larger Soviet forces counterattacking even deeper objectives.(28) A division's forward detachment normally consists of a tank or motorized rifle battalion, reinforced with engineer, artillery, air defense and reconnaissance support.(29) Tailored to meet mission requirements, forward detachments are equipped and supplied to conduct extended, independent, and deep operations.

Soviet methods of conducting deep operations were well-
tested in World War II, or in the case of helicorne operations, represent application of modern technology to those methods. The specific types of Level III threat we may encounter from a Soviet or Soviet-type enemy are: bypassed conventional units, ground maneuver units acting as a forward detachment and/or Operational Maneuver Group (OMG), aviation, airborne, and helicorne units. (30) Depending on whether these are division or army assets, their size would vary accordingly. Each represents a significant threat to our rear area and Soviet doctrine calls for their simultaneous and coordinated use against an attacking enemy. (31)

Desant forces are another possible Level III threat in our rear area. This category includes both parachute and air assault (helicopter) soldiers who can be rapidly inserted up to fifty kilometers behind our lines at tactical depth, and up to two hundred kilometers if conducted at operational depth. (32) Of particular note is their ability to operate in consonance with forward detachments in seizing objectives in the enemy (our) rear, even as we continue our advance.

Soviet airborne and air assault forces also contain various antitank and air defense weapons. "The exceptional mobility and firepower of Soviet units make them a formidable threat to an enemy's rear." (33) The BMD Airborne Combat Vehicle provides this mobility and firepower. Mounting a 73mm main gun, anti-tank guided missiles, and three machine guns, the BMD is capable of carrying an airborne squad. It is this tactical mobility after
being inserted that makes these such a formidable rear threat. At army level, there is an air assault battalion capable of conducting one battalion size or three company size tactical desant operations. These units normally strike vulnerable high value targets such as nuclear capable artillery, command posts or helicopter bases of an attacking corps or division. Additionally, divisional motor rifle troops could be used in heliborne operations as long as the operation remained within range (twenty kilometers) of Soviet artillery. 

(34) According to recent studies by the U.S. Army Soviet Army Studies Office, current organic aviation assets in a divisional aviation squadron could lift one desant battalion with BMD's. 

(35) According to recent studies, "The deep strike has remained an enduring expression of the impact of space and time on the Russian art of war." 

(36) This combination of stay-behind or bypassed forces, ground maneuver forward detachments, airborne or heliborne forces (equipped with mechanized vehicles), assault and attack helicopters provides the Soviet army or division commander a significant capability to attack our rear areas. Do we possess the organization and doctrine to defeat such a threat?
IV. CURRENT DOCTRINE

According to FM 100-5, Operations:

Operations in the rear area contribute to the unified battle plan by preserving the commander's freedom of actions and assuring uninterrupted support of the battle. They are, in effect, the defense against the enemy's deep operations.(37)

Doctrine describes rear operations as "activities rearward of elements in contact designed to assure freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations, including continuity of sustainment and command and control."(38) Rear operations are further divided into four functional areas: terrain management, security, sustainment, and movements.(39)

Rear operations are an integral part of every successful operation, offensive as well as defensive. Rear operations during the offense have not been studied in the same detail as defensive operations. Yet FM 100-5 and FM 100-15 both include rear operations within the offensive framework of the AirLand Battlefield.(40) FM 100-5 states:

Corps, divisions, and maneuver brigades can perform any type of tactical offensive operation. Divisions, brigades, and battalions may also be employed as security forces, as elements of main or supporting attacks, as reserves, or, in some cases, as elements of deep or rear operations.(41)

We can see that according to the Army's keystone warfighting manual, the AirLand Battlefield may assign forces of any
tactical echelon, from battalion through corps, the mission of conducting rear operations during the offense.(42)

Although the need to protect sustainment facilities, supplies, command posts and communications networks is recognized as critical to ultimate victory, FM 100-5 states that "every effort is made to minimize the diversion of combat forces to rear security operations."(43) The preponderance of rear operations is the responsibility of units located in the corps rear area - the combat service support, combat support, and headquarters units.

In addition to rear security operations, these units conduct Area Damage Control (ADC), which includes "measures taken before, during, and after hostile action....to reduce the probability of damage and to minimize its effects".(44) Specifically, the objectives of rear operations and ADC are to:

. Secure the rear areas and facilities.
. Prevent or minimize enemy interference with command, control, and communications.
. Prevent or minimize disruption of combat support and combat service support forward.
. Provide unimpeded movement of friendly units throughout the rear area.
. Find, fix, and destroy enemy incursions in the rear area.
. Provide area damage control (ADC) after an attack or incident.(45)

We can see that rear operations consist of a myriad of activities besides security operations and each of these activities requires commitment of forces regardless of the enemy situation. Security operations allow continuous and uninterrupted
operations through a system of graduated response designed to effectively counter the threat to the rear. The size and nature of the threat will determine the scope and type of security operation response. According to FM 90-14, three levels of threat are used: Level I, II, and III.(46)

The level I threat consists of enemy controlled agent activity, sabotage by enemy sympathizers and acts of terrorism. Enemy agent activity is only one aspect of Soviet unconventional warfare operations. Agents may be inserted into a theater of operations after initiation of hostilities, they may be left behind as enemy forces retreat, or they may be "sleeper" agents inserted long before commencement of hostilities. In all cases, their missions are focused on espionage and subversion.(47)

The level II threat consists of diversionary and sabotage operations conducted by enemy unconventional forces. It also includes raids, ambushes, and reconnaissance operations conducted by small combat units, as well as special or unconventional warfare missions. The first, unconventional warfare operations are typified by Soviet Spetznaz Forces. With missions similar to our own special operations forces, they will be inserted behind our lines to disrupt or destroy key civilian and military targets in the rear.

Raids, ambushes, and reconnaissance operations will be conducted by combat units smaller than battalion size.(48) Although reconnaissance would certainly be their primary mission, raids and ambushes of limited scale would be conducted for specific purposes
such as capturing prisoners or documents.

Special missions or unconventional warfare operations include parachute or helicopter assaults of company-sized or smaller forces. They may be assigned intelligence collection missions, or combat missions targeted against command and control, logistics, or nuclear delivery systems and/or facilities.

The level III threat consists of forces of battalion size or larger. (49) They are normally combat units conducting any or all of the following: heliborne operations, airborne, amphibious, infiltration operations, or ground force deliberate (combat) operations. These operations may consist of armor heavy Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG), airborne battalions or regiments, heliborne infantry assaults of battalion size, or infiltrations of units of battalion size and larger. (50)

It is important to remember that the enemy activities represented by these levels of threat are not going to be sequential and escalatory in nature. According to FM 90-14:

> These threat activities will not occur in a specific order nor is there a necessary interrelationship between threat levels. The rear area may face one or all actions at one time, and in some cases, Level I or Level II activity would be conducted in support of a Level III incursion or a major attack occurring in the close-in battle. Additionally, some activities may take place well ahead of general hostilities including terrorist attacks against key personnel and activities. (51)

Since rear security operations are essentially an economy of force, the minimum force necessary is always used when countering these levels of threat. The graduated responses of rear
operations are intended to counter the threat with the minimum force necessary. This process of response begins with base and base cluster self-defense.

Using intelligence preparation of the battlefield,(52) as well as current intelligence estimates, and his own mission analysis, each base(53) and base cluster(54) commander develops a plan to conduct the defense of his area of operations. Normally consisting of a combination of active and passive defense measures, base and base cluster defense holds each rear area unit responsible for its own defense against Level I threats. Since combat support and combat service support units are not normally trained or equipped to counter Level II or III threats, they are grouped together in bases or base clusters, consistent with the requirements for tactical dispersion.(55)

In the event that bases or base clusters come under attack by Level II threat, the operations cell of the corps rear area operations center must plan for the next level of response - response force operations.(56) Response forces are normally military police, augmented, if possible, with field artillery and/or army aviation assets. Their mission is to defeat attacks beyond the capabilities of base defense forces, and to prevent premature commitment of the tactical combat force.

However, the primary purpose of response force operations is to facilitate continuous sustainment operations by allowing base or base cluster units to return to sustainment activities as rapidly as possible. Using artillery and air support, response forces
disrupt an attack in our rear area, then destroy the enemy using fire support and close combat.

In the event that the enemy force exceeds the capabilities of response forces, the highest level of response becomes necessary - the tactical combat force (TCF). Since the TCF is intended to defeat enemy ground combat, airborne or air assault forces of battalion size or larger, the corps TCF is normally a combined arms brigade-sized organization composed of ground maneuver, attack helicopter and field artillery units under the command of the overall ground maneuver headquarters. (57)

The TCF may be a specific unit with a dedicated mission (and area of operations) in the rear area, or it may be one of a variety of units with an on-order rear operations mission, employment being dependent on METT-T factors. Regardless, once the TCF is committed, it comes under the command and control of the corps rear area operations center. Since commitment of the TCF is a decision made by the corps commander, and the TCF is normally the sole unit conducting operations against Level III threats, the decision to commit it is not made until the rear threat is beyond the capabilities of the base/base cluster and/or response forces. The rear threat must be such that commitment of the TCF is a necessity. (58) Further, if the situation dictates, the G-3 may allocate additional combat power to the TCF.

During offensive operations, rear security operations stress maintaining open lines of communication. Other responsibilities are constant: units are responsible for base defense, M.P.'s
conduct response force operations, and the TCF is prepared to meet the threat exceeding Levels I and II. Doctrine seems to insinuate that TCF operations will be of an on-call nature:

An implied task in offensive operations is to ensure the indirect pressure of the maneuver force is so bold and aggressive as to prevent the threat from executing Level III incursions into our rear area.(59)

The requirements of rear operations are directly related to the type of offensive operations being conducted. During a deep attack, support assets will either accompany maneuver forces or remain behind friendly lines. However, during an exploitation extended lines of communication can result and more extensive rear operations planning will be required:

Sustained offensive maneuvers over long lines of communication may require a tactical combat force be assigned to the rear battle to ensure the momentum of the offensive is maintained.(60)

Remember, however, as we act, the enemy reacts. The most likely enemy deep objectives are expected to be command and control headquarters, sustainment facilities, and targets which could disrupt or interdict our LOC's. Base/base cluster and response force operations are again assigned responsibility for Level I and II threat. The corps M.P. brigade is expected to carry most of the burden of responsibility for Level I and II threats, and the TCF (committed or on-call) is responsible for defeating Level III threats.

Since the most likely threat to the corps rear would be a
regiment or brigade-sized force assigned a mission of disrupting corps C2 or CSS to maneuver units, the TCF must be an appropriate force to counter such a threat. Additionally, the TCF must be prepared to respond to the possibility of a counterattack into the corps rear through the flank of an adjacent enemy not in the corps area of operations. This force can be expected to be of regiment or division size. Should this occur, a brigade size TCF would only be expected to delay or block the enemy. In order to defeat or destroy such a force, units might be diverted from forces fighting the close battle, or a TCF could be provided from echelons above corps.

A typical corps level TCF could be the corps armored cavalry regiment, along with all its organic ground maneuver, army aviation, and field artillery assets. A composite TCF could be formed around the nucleus of an armor or mechanized ground maneuver brigade, supported by corps field artillery and attack helicopter units. If the TCF is formed around a light infantry brigade, it requires assault helicopter or wheeled vehicle transportation augmentation to give it the necessary battlefield mobility, in addition to fire support and attack helicopter support. In all cases, close air support is integrated into TCF operations if available.

A common approach to the problem of rear operations during the corps offensive is to use the corps aviation brigade as the TCF, possibly augmented by light infantry or mechanized ground forces. Furthermore, chapter seven of FM 17-95, *Cavalry*
Operations, provides excellent guidance on the use and employment of cavalry forces for rear operations. (64)

Regardless of the type of unit assigned the TCF mission, it must be capable of defeating the threat to our rear area. This paper next examines how well our doctrine has identified the rear area threat and provided the forces necessary to maintain the security of the rear area against that threat.
V. ANALYSIS

This analysis uses the criteria presented earlier for an evaluation of current rear operations doctrine in answering the following question: How capable is the heavy corps of conducting rear security operations during offensive operations? The emphasis is on the capability of the corps to provide a tactical combat force (TCF) capable of defeating a Level III threat. Other aspects of rear operations will be discussed in light of their impact on TCF operations.

At first glance, it would appear that doctrine is adequate. The threat, its nature, tactics, and organization are discussed. The doctrine for security operations and response levels is reasonable and provides forces to counter the various threats. Guidance exists on the selection, employment, and organization of the TCF. Formation of the TCF as defined doctrinally is feasible from within the corps, and historical lessons from Burma and the Eastern Front are included in FM 90-14. A more in-depth analysis of our doctrine within these parameters and tempered by lessons learned from the two historical examples suggests that our current doctrine may not provide the necessary guidance to conduct successful rear operations during a corps level offense.

This paper will evaluate current doctrine first by determining applicable lessons learned from the two historical examples, then analyzing doctrine according to the criteria established in Section I. This study assumes the threat as discussed earlier
will conduct operations in a manner similar to the Soviets in 1941-42, or the Koreans in 1950, and that the lessons learned from those examples remain valid today.

The first lesson from history was the realization that rear operations were a regular combat mission, integral and concurrent fights within the context of the larger battle. Every soldier within the command was, and could be, expected to fight in the rear area. The enemy units operating in the rear area contained multiple types of forces, and could strike anywhere within the corps rear area, with their operations carefully planned, executed, and synchronized. Rear operations were economy of force operations, but history has shown that a substantial effort was still required to win that battle.

Even though rear operations were a part of the overall fight, they required dedicated, trained combat units to conduct. In both historical cases examined, the requirement to conduct operations in the rear developed due to large number of enemy soldiers in the rear - they simply overwhelmed initial security and response measures.

The emphasis of rear operations was maintaining open lines of communication as friendly forces advanced. Combat actions in the rear were a significant aspect of LOC security. This security required both active security measures such as combat reconnaissance and patrolling, and passive measures such as moving convoys at night.

The conduct of rear operations was neither easier nor less
significant during the offense. Attacking forces found large numbers of bypassed enemy soldiers in their rear area, in addition to other, more deliberate enemy activities. In the case of a Soviet or Soviet trained foe, these forces were eventually organized and employed under centralized command and control.

Units conducting rear security operations were combined arms and task-organized to meet the threat as it developed. The battle in the rear required the same combat and combat support systems as did the battle at the front. Both the Germans and our army in Korea learned the need for mechanized mobility, anti-aircraft, artillery, aviation, and engineer support in the rear. Additionally, the combat sustainment of these forces was required. The end result was to meet the rear threat with a force as capable, well-trained and supported as it was.

These general lessons learned from history have revealed some strengths and weaknesses of our current doctrine. Each of the criteria for evaluation will now be used to evaluate that doctrine, incorporating these general lessons learned as well as those specific lessons previously mentioned.

Does doctrine identify the threat in terms of size, composition, tactics, and objectives? A comparison of U.S. and Soviet doctrine reveals it does not. The graduated levels of threat in FM 90-14 may lead one to draw the mistaken conclusion that enemy actions in our rear will be escalatory in nature, beginning with acts of sabotage (Level I) and ending with battalion size air assaults (Level III). Both Soviet and US
doctrine agree on what the probable enemy objectives and intentions would be - disruption of command and control, logistics, and destruction of headquarters and nuclear delivery systems. (65)

Soviet doctrine, however, states that the entire spectrum of possible activities will be conducted in the enemy rear. (66) These actions will be synchronized and simultaneous, in addition to the threat which will exist from bypassed forces. Based on a review of Soviet doctrine and historical precedent, it is easy to imagine our corps rear area containing hundreds or thousands of bypassed enemy soldiers, rapidly exceeding the capabilities of base, base cluster, and response forces defenses.

As the battle develops, and our lines of communication become longer, Soviet attempts to attack our rear could include a reinforced tank battalion (forward detachment) operating in consonance with an airborne or heliborne assault of battalion or regimental size. Once on the ground, these forces possess armored mobility and firepower in the form of the BMD Airborne Combat Vehicle, and are supported by divisional or army assault and attack helicopters.

This analysis reveals that the threat as depicted in our doctrine is significantly different from that in the two historical case studies and most importantly, from that which the Soviets themselves intend to insert into our rear area. Instead of a singular airborne or air assault light infantry battalion attacking to seize a bridge or airfield (a common scenario in FM
90-14) we should expect an armored or mechanized forward detachment and a mechanized desant battalion supported by artillery, air defense, engineers, and aviation. This will be in addition to the bypassed units still there. Clearly doctrine has been overly optimistic in describing the threat in terms of size and composition.

Does doctrine provide a force adequate to counter the rear threat? According to FM 100-15, the TCF may be either dedicated or on-call.(67) Clearly the rapid pace and non-linear nature of the modern battlefield preclude the TCF being an on-call force. Both historical examples distinctly mandate that rear operations forces must be dedicated to that mission on a full-time basis. To do less means surrendering the initiative in the rear in terms of flexibility and ability to react.

We must next evaluate how well doctrine provides guidance on the selection, organization, and employment of the TCF. Once again, doctrine comes up short. History tells us that the primary concern should be the threat to be encountered. Our doctrine emphasizes economy of force, using units not readily available for or capable of conducting mechanized offensive operations. These units are usually light infantry (augmented with transportation) or an aviation brigade. The probable armored characteristics of the threat should lead us to selecting and organizing a TCF which possesses like capabilities.

Employment should be based on a desire to conduct aggressive rear operations designed to prevent the enemy from achieving his
stated objectives. Employment criteria currently is purely reactive in nature, in harmony with neither the aggressive spirit of AirLand Battle doctrine nor battlefield realities of a fast-paced, mechanized battle containing multiple engagements.

Employment criteria should be proactive in nature—providing a TCF capable of conducting aggressive rear operations and possessing the ability to defeat the most probable threat. That threat is a regimental sized (or equivalent) combined arms force possessing armored mobility and protection. The TCF must be employed with similar capabilities.

The need to maintain secure of lines of communication, combined with the need to rapidly mass combat power to defeat a brigade or regiment requires that the TCF be organized under certain conditions. First and foremost it must possess the ability to command and control multiple elements of combined arms—aviation, artillery, and ground maneuver. It must possess adequate combat power (force size) to defeat a like-size threat, and finally, it must possess the necessary battlefield maneuverability and mobility to defeat an armored or mechanized threat.

These organizational requirements represent basic lessons learned from history, and provide further guidance as to the structure and organization of the TCF. They are within the capabilities of any maneuver brigade in the army, and if augmented, within the capabilities of combat aviation and light infantry brigades. Doctrine for rear operations, however, does
not describe organization of the TCF in sufficient detail.

Is formation of the TCF feasible from within the corps given this current force structure? The answer is, and must be, yes. The nature, size, and employment capabilities of the TCF have been discussed, and forces capable of meeting those requirements exist within the corps. Ground maneuver and combat aviation brigades, and the armored cavalry regiment possess the required capabilities. They already possess the organization, C2 structure, and operations doctrine to conduct combat or security operations in the rear. The question remains whether it is feasible to assign one of these units to rear operations, thus precluding it from conducting close or deep operations.

Assuming the corps has an ACR, three heavy divisions (three ground and one air brigade each), and one corps aviation brigade (with two attack helicopter groups), the corps would have fifteen brigade size units available for offensive operations. Doctrinal requirements are normally a three-to-one correlation of forces to conduct an attack; normally a corps attacks an enemy division (four regiments). Committing one brigade of the fifteen in the corps to rear operations will reduce combat power available for close operations, but the ratio of forces would still be three-to-one (fourteen brigade equivalents versus four regiments).(68) Compared with the option of an on-call TCF, this will significantly increase the combat power available in the rear (from nothing to one brigade).

Although this represents a risk for the maneuver commander,
it represents a calculated, acceptable risk. Most importantly, the formation of the appropriate TCF is feasible from within assets assigned to the corps, since it still leaves a force ratio greater than three-to-one available for close operations. Thus, the rear threat can be countered without risking the decisive close battle.

The use of combat units to conduct rear operations has a basis in history, and the final criteria this paper uses to evaluate our doctrine is how well doctrine incorporated those historical lessons. The basic rear operations manual, FM 90-14, begins with a brief discussion of American rear battle experiences in Burma and German experiences against the Russians. The German experience against Russia and our own in Korea provide important models for our use in preparing to meet the Soviet threat or their surrogates. Our doctrine requires further refinement in order to fully incorporate those lessons. In some instances, such as whether rear security operations is a full-time combat mission or a part-time 'mopping-up' operation, our doctrine directly rejects the lessons of history. Further developments of our rear operations doctrine must include these examples from history if we are to win the battle in the rear.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The rear area threat as represented in our doctrinal publications is misleading and vague. We are led to believe the enemy activity against our rear area will be a methodical, escalatory series of steps ending with, at Level III, a battalion of light infantry attacking specified targets. The actual threat is more probably a regimental size combined arms force capable of simultaneous, coordinated action against multiple targets.

This force will operate in conjunction with the numerous stay-behind and bypassed forces, special operations forces, and desant units the enemy intends to insert into our rear area.

To counter this threat, the tactical combat force must be a brigade or regimental size combined arms unit assigned the singular full-time mission of rear security operations. This force must be capable of rapid ground and air mobility, possess armor protection and firepower, and be supported by artillery, air defense, engineer and aviation assets.

The lessons of history are clear- the TCF must conduct an aggressive rear operation. Reconnaissance and patrolling of MSR's will not be possible with a part time or on-call TCF. Intelligence preparation of the rear battlefield will not be conducted, and we ultimately surrender the initiative to the enemy. Only by active combat action in their rear area did the German army in Russia and our army in Korea maintain open supply routes and provide
continuous support to their front lines.

My conclusions reflect a synthesis of historical precedent, Soviet doctrine for defensive and deep operations and our rear operations doctrine. The US heavy corps, not having been provided a clearly defined threat and the doctrine to combat that threat, is not capable of conducting successful Level III rear security operations in a mid-to-high intensity environment. My recommendations suggest the necessary additions to our doctrine.

First, update and refine the threat as it is described in current manuals such as FM 90-14 and 100-15 to reflect the continuing development of Soviet doctrine. Emphasize the armored capabilities of Soviet deep attacks: attacks which his doctrine states will be conducted in conjunction with airborne or air assault forces. Emphasize the Soviet intention of conducting such attacks even within a defensive operation.

Second, incorporate more fully the harsh lessons from World War II and Korea into doctrine. This can only be accomplished by requiring that the TCF be a combat unit assigned a full time mission of rear security. Treat the unit assigned the TCF role as any similar combat force, include it as a normal and standardized part of the operations order, and address it so in all planning.

The threat to our rear area is real, and it's significant. As Clausewitz said:

"A threat to the rear can, therefore make a defeat more probable, as well as more decisive." (69)
ENDNOTES


4. Security Troops. This term refers to soldiers assigned to designated security units. It also applies, according to War Department records, to a broad range of military administrative and tactical units and staffs conducting security operations in the communications zone extending from Germany into the interior of all occupied countries.


8. Ibid., p. 7.

9. Ibid., p. 10.

10. DA Pamphlet 20-240, op. cit, p. 34.


17. Ibid., p. 48.


20. Ibid., p. 23.


25. Ibid., p. 34.

26. Ibid., p. 64.

27. Covington. op. cit., p. 149. According to Covington a counterstrike is conducted to destroy an enemy force which has lost momentum and is unable to penetrate the Soviet first defensive echelon. A counterattack is conducted after the first defensive echelon has been penetrated. Second echelon and reserve forces than attack "to restore the integrity of the overall defense."


34. Holcomb and Turbiville, op. cit., p. 10.

35. Ibid., p. 11.


38. FM 100-5, op cit., p. 20.


40. FM 100-5, op. cit., p. 107.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. i.

43. Ibid., p. 21.


45. Ibid.


47. Ibid., p. 1-3.


50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.


53. FM 90-14 Defines a base as a geographically small, defendable area with a defined perimeter and established access controls. (p.4-2).

54. FM 90-14 Defines a base cluster as several bases that are grouped together to enhance their security as well as to facilitate their support of combat forces. A base cluster will not normally have a defined perimeter or established access point. (p. 4-3).


57. Ibid., p. D-3.


60. Ibid., p. C-2.


62. Ibid.


68. Fifteen brigade equivalents may at first glance seem to prohibit committing forces to rear operations. In order to maintain a 3 to 1 force ratio, twelve brigades would be required for close operations. Of the three remaining, two could be used for deep operations, and one for rear operations. This
drastically reduces risk in the rear, yet maintains an acceptable force to fight the decisive close battle.

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