FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE!

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROGER W. SCEARCE, FC

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

29 APRIL 1990

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
As a global power, being prepared to project and sustain a credible force ready to fight throughout the world across the continuum of conflict is a necessary, but expensive undertaking. Army leadership has recognized that, at least for the foreseeable future, the Army is more likely to become involved in a low intensity conflict (LIC) than any other type of combat operation. Consequently, how to plan for, how to sustain, and even how to fight during a low intensity conflict are new, emerging elements of important Army and joint operations.
20. ABSTRACT—continued.

service doctrine. In this regard, much of today's contingency planning is also centered around possible LIC scenarios.

This study focuses on finance and resource management service and support issues associated with the larger challenge of sustaining LIC or contingency operations. In the author's view, certain aspects of present Army financial management doctrine and procedures should be changed, thereby enhancing our ability to sustain a LIC or contingency operation. Each chapter explores numerous critical Army finance and accounting and resource management issues associated with sustaining the installation, the deployed unit/task force, and the individual soldier, respectively. From this discussion and analysis, conclusions and recommendations are developed with a goal of improving finance and accounting and resource management support, and in turn, overall sustainability of future LIC operations.

For example, Chapter 3 deals with sustaining the deployed unit/task force. LIC planners (especially those concerned with so-called Third World countries in Central/South America and Southwest Asia) are finding that sustaining the deployed force is perhaps the most critical and worrisome issue facing some of our Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Planning for the deployment of US forces to areas where there is little to no infra-structure or local logistical support creates unique sustainability problems. Moreover, in a "bare based" LIC situation, sustainment requirements become more critical during the initial phases of an operation, vice later. However, the "logistical tail" is normally not present during the early phases. In Chapter 3, the author shows that because of this potential for initially degraded logistical support, a Finance Support Team (FST) and Contracting/Ordering Officer(s) become large "logistical force multipliers" in a LIC environment. When deployed during the outset of a LIC operation, these small support elements provide the means for local procurement of supplies, indigenous labor, transportation, equipment, and support services.
FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:

PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE!

An Individual Study Project

by

Lieutenant Colonel Roger W. Searce, FC

Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Player
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
29 April 1990

UNCLASSIFIED
ABSTRACT

As a global power, being prepared to project and sustain a credible force ready to fight throughout the world across the continuum of conflict is a necessary, but expensive undertaking. Army leadership has recognized that, at least for the foreseeable future, the Army is more likely to become involved in a low intensity conflict (LIC) than any other type of combat operation. Consequently, how to plan for, how to sustain, and even how to fight during a low intensity conflict are new, emerging elements of important Army and joint service doctrine. In this regard, much of today’s contingency planning is also centered around possible LIC scenarios.

This study focuses on finance and resource management service and support issues associated with the larger challenge of sustaining LIC or contingency operations. In the author’s view, certain aspects of present Army financial management doctrine and procedures should be changed, thereby enhancing our ability to sustain a LIC or contingency operation. Each chapter explores numerous critical Army finance and accounting and resource management issues associated with sustaining the installation, the deployed unit/task force, and the individual soldier, respectively. From this discussion and analysis, conclusions and recommendations are developed with a goal of improving finance and accounting and resource management support, and in turn, overall sustainability of future LIC operations.

For example, Chapter 3 deals with sustaining the deployed unit/task force. LIC planners (especially those concerned with so-called Third World countries in Central/South America and Southwest Asia) are finding that sustaining the deployed force is perhaps the most critical and worrisome issue facing some of our Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Planning for the deployment of US forces to areas where there is little to no infra-structure or local logistical support creates unique sustainability problems. Moreover, in a "bare based" LIC situation, sustainment requirements become more critical during the initial phases of an operation, vice later. However, the "logistical tail" is normally not present during the early phases. In Chapter 3 the author shows that because of this potential for initially degraded logistical support, a Finance Support Team (FST) and Contracting/Ordering Officer(s) become large "logistical force multipliers" in a LIC environment. When deployed during the outset of a LIC operation, these small support elements provide the means for local procurement of supplies, indigenous labor, transportation, equipment, and support services.
The genesis of this study was a short essay I authored at Command and General Staff College in 1985 which dealt with finance support and resource management during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. As fate would have it, Operation Just Cause occurred during my USAWC year and rekindled my interest in finance support during low intensity conflict (LIC). As I developed the research issues, the LIC "sustainability" thesis soon became apparent. And, I also realized that nothing could substitute for real world LIC experience. Thus, in support of this undertaking, I was fortunate enough to spend some time on-site at FT Bragg talking with soldiers and civilians of the 18th Corps Finance Group who participated in supporting Operations Just Cause, Hawkeye, and Urgent Fury. I would indeed be remiss if I did not openly express my deep personal and professional gratitude to the many finance soldiers and civilian employees I interviewed while researching this topic.

Of special mention is the unselfish support and encouragement I received from COL Barry S. Baer, Commander, 18th Corps Finance Group. Throughout this study, his assistance, constructive comments, suggestions, and recommendations were provided willingly and with the goal of making this project the best it could be. In short, this study would not have been possible without his comprehensive personal interest, involvement and many extra efforts - for which I will always be grateful.

I also owe a special thanks and salute to a number of other professionals at FT Bragg for taking an inordinate amount of their time to answer my many questions concerning finance support during Operations Just Cause, Urgent Fury, and Hawkeye: MAJ Tom Mulyca, 5-3, 18th CFG; MAJ Tim Wansbury, Cdr, 107th FSU; CPT Jeff Kovach, XO, 107th FSU; MAJ H.Q. Thigpen, Cdr, 82d FSU; and, MAJ(P) Hank Peoples and Mrs Peggy Smith, F&AO, 18th CFG. Had their help and collective experience not been available, this paper would have definitely been incomplete. (And, a personal "thanks" to SFC Lorenzo Juarez for coordinating my visit to FT Bragg.)

At the HQDA level, the insights and recommendations provided by COL Tully Anderson, ASA(FM) and LTC Jeff Roche, ODCSOPS were also extremely beneficial in providing an Army strategic-level perspective concerning finance force structure and future support of LIC.

Finally, I need to publicly thank my project advisor, LTC(P) Harvey L. Player, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, USAWC, for being so patient and supportive throughout the development and preparation of this study. His professional knowledge, advice, and assistance were invaluable.
**FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:**

**PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE!**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Abstract........................................................................................................................................Page ii
Preface...............................................................................................................................................Page iii
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................Page 1

Chapter 1 Low Intensity Conflict: A Primer ........................................Page 5
Chapter 2 Sustaining the Installation During LIC Operations.........Page 12
Chapter 3 Sustaining the Unit/Task Force During LIC Operations.....Page 22
Chapter 4 Sustaining the Soldier During LIC Operations...............Page 33
Chapter 5 Finance Support for Tomorrow's LIC: Are We Ready?....Page 44
Chapter 6 Conclusion .......................................................................................Page 55

Bibliography...............................................................................................................................Page 59
FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:
PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE:

INTRODUCTION

"We are going to do something terrible to you -- we are going to deprive you of an enemy."[1]

General Georgi Arbatov
Director, Institute of the USA and Canada
USSR Academy of Sciences

General Arbatov may be right! Given recent historic events, most would agree that the Soviet threat is diminishing, along with the probability of a high intensity/conventional war in Europe. Along these lines, there are those who believe United States policy must now concentrate on what one might call the 'stability mission.' In addition to the remaining Soviet challenge (which will be formidable), and various Third World threats, the reality is that we will remain a global power with interests throughout the world.[2] Accordingly, the 'strategic vision' of General Carl E. Vuono, US Army Chief of Staff, is one in which our future Army is not only smaller, but also versatile, deployable, and lethal. What this translates to is a smaller, leaner Army still... "able to fight and win in joint and combined operations across the continuum of conflict, throughout the world."[3] As noted recently by General Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: "We must not allow ourselves to be confused about our security. In that respect, the future has not changed. We must have conventional forces that remain strong, ready, and proud - even if they are smaller due to conventional force agreements or constrained dollars. We need an Army with forward-deployed units in critical regions and home-based, strategically deployable
units ready for any contingency that threatens our interests."

Along these lines, a major point that has been driven home consistently this past year at the Army War College by high level speakers and course readings alike is that, at least for the foreseeable future, the US Army is more likely to become involved in a low intensity conflict (LIC) than any other type of combat operation. Clearly, our recent military history proves this to be true: Panama is being called a peacetime contingency operation by some, by others a LIC; Grenada was a LIC; and some still claim that our involvement in Vietnam began as a LIC. While the implications of the dynamic changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the USSR still warrant our attention and readiness, it is common knowledge that much of the contingency planning being done today is centered around possible LIC scenarios. As a global power, being prepared to project and sustain a credible force ready to fight throughout the world across the continuum of conflict is a necessary, but expensive undertaking.

With this in mind, LIC planners (especially those concerned with so-called Third World countries in Central/South America and Southwest Asia) are finding that sustaining the deployed force is perhaps the most critical and worrisome issue facing some of our Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). It can be argued that it makes absolutely no sense to deploy a LIC/contingency force if the logistical effort to sustain the force will take more than deploying the force itself. As was discovered during both Grenada and the Hurricane Hugo relief effort in St. Croix, Virgin Islands (Operation Hawk Eye), deploying US forces to areas where there is little infra-structure or local logistical support creates unique sustainability problems that are different than those considered when planning for mid to high intensity conflict operations. Further, it makes sense that force sustainability is even more imperative during the initial phases of a LIC operation than later. However, it is during these early phases that the
"logistical tail" is not present. This is because there is normally only enough airlift available to project essential combat forces, weapons, and equipment to the combat area. For example, simply transporting one so-called light division requires about 400 sorties of the C-141 aircraft. Thus, it is likely that there will be very little airlift dedicated initially to transporting organic vehicles, extra equipment, administrative items, and/or bulk supplies. It is precisely because of the absence of these critical sustainability items that a Finance Support Team (FST) and a Contracting/Ordering Officer must be deployed during the preliminary phase of any LIC operation. These elements place immediate logistical and sustainment capability in the battle area by providing the means for local procurement of supplies, transportation, equipment, and services. As will be shown in this paper, when used properly these small support elements are large logistical multipliers to the LIC task force commander.

Sustaining the deployed unit/task force during a LIC or contingency operation is but one part of the overall sustainability challenge. In most cases, the parent installation de-facto becomes the support "umbilical cord" for the deployed force, but must also continue to sustain itself while its units are deployed. Lastly, the individual soldier and his/her family have important sustainment matters that must be taken care of as well during the LIC or contingency operation.

Unfortunately, certain aspects of present Army financial management doctrine and procedures do little to enhance installation, deployed unit/task force, or individual soldier sustainability during a LIC operation. While many specific examples could be used to support this thesis, the purpose of this paper is to focus on finance and accounting and resource management service and support to sustain the installation, deployed unit/task force, and individual soldier, as a part of the larger challenge of sustaining LIC/contingency operations. Thus, this paper will be organized such that
each chapter focuses on sustaining the installation, the deployed unit/task force, and the individual soldier, respectively. From this discussion and analysis, conclusions and recommendations will be developed with a goal of improving finance and accounting and resource management support, and, in turn, overall sustainability during future LIC/contingency operations.
FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:

PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE!

INTRODUCTION

ENDNOTES


There are probably as many definitions or interpretations of the term "low intensity conflict" (LIC) as there are people discussing it. In an effort to facilitate understanding of the issues raised throughout this paper, it would be useful if everyone "is singing from the same LIC sheet of music," so to speak. The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a very brief overview of low intensity conflict and highlight a few of the more important elements and tenets associated with LIC. It is not intended to make the reader an expert, nor is all there is to learn about LIC contained in this chapter.

General Carl E. Vuono, US Army Chief of Staff, had this to say about low intensity conflict in his recent white paper on the US Army in the 1990's and beyond:

"A growing challenge to US interests and national security strategy is so-called low-intensity conflict. International drug trafficking, terrorism, insurgency, and subversion of legitimate democratic regimes pose serious threats. Low-intensity conflict can undermine important allies and other friendly nations, impede the development of democratic institutions, and hamper essential US economic and military ties. Nor are these problems limited to the developing world; as Americans know well, terrorism and drug trafficking can plague even a super-power. Clearly, low-intensity conflict is the security challenge most likely to demand a US military response with little or no warning.

We must not forget, however, that the causes of low-intensity conflict generally are political and economic rather than military. Although the military aspects may be crucial, the solutions to low-intensity conflict go far beyond the military dimension. Military action can only be a shield against violent opponents and a source of assistance to the civil authorities responsible for political, economic, and social development. Recent history demonstrates that military might cannot substitute for effective nation building and legitimate political institutions that meet citizen's needs."
JCS Pub 3-07 and FM 100-20 define LIC as follows:

"Low intensity conflict is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above to routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications." [2]

Figure 1 has been included to illustrate the point that there is virtually a myriad of LIC definitions or concepts:
Figure 2 shows the Operational Continuum and where LIC fits in. Important here are the numerous dynamics depicted within the 'LIC Environment' portion of the continuum. Each one could be viewed as a mission for US forces, along with its inherent logistical or sustainability challenges, depending on the country or geographical location of the conflict.

![Operational Continuum and LIC](image)

**Figure 2(4)**

There have been 60+ insurgencies (all LICs) since the end of World War II. History also tells us that there is a high probability (75% chance or greater) that a LIC will include such military actions or activities as: internal turmoil/riots/demonstrations; terrorism; organized subversion; guerrilla war; and protracted guerrilla war. Usually, the LIC "threat" environment involves more than routine competition; targets US, friends, or allies; may be country-specific, regional, or international; and, can certainly involve force or the threat of force.[5]
The threat to US interests from low intensity conflict is cumulative and could affect such interests as: isolation of US, allies, and friends from selected Third World countries or regions; loss of access to strategic resources and possibly basing, transit, and access rights; flouting law and human rights; and, refugee problems. US National Strategy for LIC has four components: support of Third World governments; support of selected resistance movements; stopping narcotic trafficking; and combatting terrorism.[6]

At this juncture, it may be helpful to contrast Airland Battle (ALB) with Low Intensity Conflict. In terms of "dynamics of power," ALB is primarily 'combat power' oriented with particular emphasis on maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. However, LIC is mainly 'influence' oriented with emphasis towards understanding, coordination, discriminate engagement, and measured response. Basic tenets of ALB are initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. Similarly, the basic tenets of LIC are understanding, initiative, resourcefulness, agility, and integration.[7]

A review of differences in the 'doctrinal focus' of ALB vs LIC also provides insight. ALB holds to a USSR/Warsaw Pact threat, emphasizes warfighting and direct application of military force, is measurable with clear military objectives, and imputes a well known chain of command. Conversely, LIC holds to more of a 'global threat' where non-military aspects dominate military operations. The LIC environment is subjective with indirect, discriminate applications of military force to preclude conventional war. Further, LIC is also known not only for ambiguous political and political-military objectives, but also as an area where there are numerous, simultaneous US interdepartmental and combined efforts in which the military does not normally have the lead.[8]

As a final note concerning US military action in a LIC situation, the challenge is for the United States ... "to be a positive catalyst to the growth and spread of
democracies and to accelerate the social and economic benefits to the people [of the Third World]. To accomplish this, the United States has outlined six basic propositions to guide military action in the Third World:

- US forces will not, in general, be combatants. A combat role for US forces, as executed in Panama, is viewed as an exceptional event. The principal military role will be to augment security assistance teams.

- The United States should actively support anticommunist insurgencies.

- Security assistance requires new legislation and more resources.

- The United States needs to work with its Third World allies at developing "cooperative forces."

- In the Third World, no less than in developed countries, US strategy should seek to maximize its technological advantage.

- The United States must develop alternatives to overseas bases."

Again, this discussion of LIC is provided not to confuse, but rather to create a common frame of reference, and perhaps stimulate further interest for study. Clearly, LIC is not the "Fulda Gap" battle nor does it consist only of providing "security assistance" to some poor, Third World country. LIC is, however, a dynamic area of US involvement worldwide which embraces all aspects of national power. There is also a strong argument that LIC is "tomorrow's battlefield" for the US Army, with a host of sustainability issues yet to be discovered. Thus, with the preceding backdrop in mind, for the purposes of the remainder of this paper, the term LIC will be used in the context of the military element of power, and assumes an active US military operation of limited size, scope, and duration, most likely somewhere in the Third World. The finance and accounting and resource management support issues that will be developed and discussed in this paper, however, are as applicable to sustaining a small security assistance team or foreign internal development mission as they are to a sizeable LIC military operation.
Chapter 1

ENDNOTES


FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:
PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE!

Chapter 2 - Sustaining the Installation During LIC Operations.

Essentially, sustaining the installation during a LIC operation translates into ensuring sufficient financial resources are provided so that the LIC mission and deployment can be supported without undermining the execution of the installation's current year program and budget. In this regard, there are three resource management (R/M) areas critical to sustaining the installation during any LIC operation: Funding; Accounting; and, Resource Management Policy and Command Awareness.

I. Funding the LIC Operation.

Currently, there are no provisions in our planning, programming, and budgeting system that permit the programming of resources for possible military emergencies. We are not permitted to create or budget for a "contingency fund" at any level of command which could be used to pay for an emergency military operation, such as Operation Just Cause in Panama. The Headquarters, Department of the Army Financial Management Plan for Emergency Conditions (HQDA FMPEC) reinforces this by mandating that during low intensity conflict operations "normal peacetime budgeting procedures will continue... ."[1] The FMPEC goes on to state that:
"MACOMs affected by the emergency will develop initial emergency cost estimates by appropriation... as prescribed by HQDA. Emergency costs will be separately identified by appropriation and used in developing cost estimates for operating budget submissions and emergency reports, as required by HQDA(COA). The operating budget will contain separate identification of normal requirements and offset costs, i.e., normal programs which have been reduced, deferred, or cancelled as a result of the emergency."[2]

Obviously, with this kind of policy guidance in effect, there is no General Open Allotment or appropriation at the HQDA level against which the costs of deploying for a LIC emergency combat operation can be charged. Current regulatory guidance calls for initial funding of military contingencies from the Operation & Maintenance-Army (OMA) appropriation.[3] These policies have found their way into resource management doctrine as well. FM 14-6, Comptroller/Finance Services in Theaters of Operations, also states that it is Army policy to continue normal peacetime budgeting procedures during low intensity operations. Further, FM 14-6 mandates that the "Theater Army" will finance emergency requirements with the available funding program until "additional funds can be obtained by HQDA" (most likely via a time-consuming supplemental budget request to the Congress).

Consequently, responding to a LIC with CONUS based troops infers that the "Theater Army" is, in reality, the parent MACOM or home installation of the deploying force. Implicitly, this means that the initial stages of a LIC could (and probably will) be financed from the deployed unit's installation OMA operating budget. This unexpected, unprogrammed "requirement" could wreak havoc on an installation's current year resource program and be extremely detrimental to the installation's ability to pay its contracts and sustain itself. Contributing to the problem is that the same scenario is occurring at the MACOM level as well. Normally, it is MACOM standard financial management policy that all resources received from HQDA for the current fiscal year be
distributed to their subordinate installations. However, during an emergency (LIC?), the FMPEC charges the MACON to:

"Manage the (MACON) O&M budget so that funds are made available immediately to support tactical operations of the emergency. Inform higher headquarters (HQDA) immediately of the need for reprogramming authority or additional fund requirements if the constraints of the Annual Operating Budget (AOB) would be exceeded. Request such additional policies and/or authority for emergency action as necessary for execution of the emergency budget."[4]

What this means is that not only will the deploying installation be decremented financially to support a LIC operation, but so may other installations within that MACON. Moreover, other MACON’s are also affected adversely. For example, additional FY 90 ONA costs in support of Operation Just Cause by US Army Information Systems Command amounted to $1.3 Million.[5] Interestingly, the FMPEC imputes that an "emergency budget" will be developed and executed in tandem with the installation budget. Hopefully, enough time and manpower are available to accomplish this extra work. Of greater concern, though, is the thought that if the LIC occurs in the third or fourth quarter of a fiscal year (FY), every installation in the supporting MACON(s) could lose resources. The bottom line is that there is no "emergency funding/contingency withhold" at the MACON level; thus, the installation initially foots the bill to get our forces deployed, and (in theory) is reimbursed later.

As two current examples, XVIII Airborne Corps and FT Bragg absorbed much of the initial costs during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada and Operation Just Cause in Panama. In both cases, paying for these operations conceivably caused a number of their current installation sustainability and quality of life programs to be deferred or moved to the ‘unresourced requirements’ list. This is not right; our soldiers and their families suffer because of these policies. There should be some financial mechanism to preclude the installation or MACON from having to justify yet more resources to simply "recover"
from the LIC operation. Any proposal to rectify this situation would require new legislation. An easier solution would be to establish a "General Open Allotment" at the OSD level which could be charged only in a military emergency, and only when specifically approved by the SECDEF. Installation OMA or mission funding offsets, if any, could later be determined and withdrawn by HQDA or the parent MACOM. Another means might be to appropriate and program an initial amount, based on analysis of costs associated with Grenada, Panama, Honduras, and St. Croix. This special funding could be maintained at the OSD level, and allocated to the military services in the event of a military emergency. If it is not used in any given year, nothing has been lost. Conceptually, this would be similar to JCS Exercise Funds or the new CinC Initiatives Fund. (Note: the CinC Initiatives Fund is currently maintained by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for allocation to the Unified Commands, based on review and approval of proposed projects.)

II. Accounting for LIC Costs.

Unfortunately, once the shooting has stopped, the first questions from the Congressional and civilian leadership are usually: "How much did it cost? Did we spend the taxpayers' dollars wisely?" Given that the LIC more than likely does not affect our "survival as a nation," and that peacetime resource management procedures are in effect, then the Standard Army Financial System (STANFINS) in use at every installation across the Army must be responsive enough to provide the financial answers. The accounting problems that are encountered, however, are not with STANFINS, but rather with the program managers and commanders supporting the LIC. Frequently overheard during the LIC are such comments as, "What's the fund cite?" and, "I'm not paying for it out of my budget!" Trying to prescribe and capture costs which are legitimately
chargeable to the military operation versus determining what is a "normal" installation operating cost also consumes much of the R/M staff's time and energy. As was observed during Operation Just Cause by the 18th Corps Finance Group Commander:

"Accounting (as a minimum, the bookkeeping function) is dependent upon the initial input of correct data. Failure to do so at the source, simply leads to bad output (reports, etc.) that are crucial to decision making. In an era of reduced or scarce resources, correctly identified resource costs for a particular operation, exercise, or project dictates that correct data input up front is required. Even during Operation Just Cause there was management attention to costs and who was being charged for what ("not my budget" was the lament). Thus, I spent a significant amount of time working the correct accounting classification structure for the JTF-BO in Panama. ...We may not do the number "crunching" or bookkeeping in the AO; however, we are responsible for the initial input description of the cost to the system for all the transactions that do take place... "[6]

Admittedly, accounting for the LIC costs is not a glamorous undertaking, but is something that everyone (including Army leadership) becomes very concerned with, either sooner or later. For example, when no special Accounting Processing Codes (APC) are loaded into the installation STANFINS before a deployment, then attempting to restructure the costs and properly charge them to the operation later results in an almost herculean task. What HQDA doesn't want to hear is "I don't know what the costs were; we didn't have STANFINS loaded with special APC's." Further, not having special APCs in the system could feasibly result in degraded support to our soldiers. Assume the task force commander wants to lease a building for billets, but no one has or knows the fund cite, then there is no way to pay for the lease because the finance support team (FST) cannot legitimately disburse public funds without an approved fund cite. And, in a LIC environment, the vendors want cash now, not a check in the mail later. As the on-site FST chief noted during Operation Just Cause:
"Whether it is an exercise, disaster relief, or an operation, supporting units need to know the accounting classification (APC/fund cite) to be used. This continues to be an issue in this environment. The bureaucracy is too entrenched to make "mid-course" corrections without "pushing." The local APC master file has to be updated as well as the proper DODDAC, if applicable, and MD&F established in a responsive manner."

Notionally, the "peacetime rules in effect" contributes to this potential problem of LIC cost accounting. When the troops are deployed overnight, in a combat role, and the installation staff is performing "theater rear" functions and also playing R/M catch-up, it becomes extremely tenuous as the comptroller or finance officer try and keep the records straight. Until the "fog of war" lifts somewhat, no one at the installation wants to stop and estimate the costs of how much has been used and/or might be required to support the LIC. Nonetheless, the emergency budget must be formed, and costs reported to higher. If the time is not taken to do it right and capture the costs properly, there may be no reimbursement at all. This could be devastating, for instance, when facing a Military Airlift Command (MAC) bill amounting to millions of dollars for transporting troops and supplies to the combat zone. To make the point, now assume the installation couldn't show that it is not responsible for the entire amount because of accounting shortfalls.

These accounting/funding issues are resolved easily if prior financial contingency planning has occurred. The problem is we don't do that very well either, as our financial military history has shown. Another factor hindering better accounting readiness is that resource management or finance personnel are excluded from operational planning. Consequently, once the operation is public, we play R/M catch-up again. In deference to operational security requirements, however, a generic finance annex suitable for most LIC contingency operations should be developed locally and integrated into the G-3 planning process. This annex should contain general military pay, travel, and other
financial policy instructions, standard APC's, deploying force(s) funding guidance, etc.

Establishment of appropriate APC's and an OPLAN annex prior to Operations Just Cause and Urgent Fury would have permitted immediate collection of cost data and facilitated cost accumulation during the operations.[9] Accounting for LIC costs is just too important an area in terms of installation sustainability to ignore/neglect until the C-141's are airborne.

III. Resource Management Policy and Command Awareness,

History tells us that in any military operation short of all out war, financial and resource management policy questions and issues always arise. For example, during Operation Just Cause, the following policy issues were addressed on-site, during the operation:

- "Accounting procedures (discussed above).
- Contracting/Procurement/Commercial Vendor Services.
- Currency/Central Funding.
- Fund Authorization/Control.
- Use of SECARHY Contingency/Limitation Funds
- Entitlements (Jump Pay; Hostile Fire Pay; BAS; etc.).
- Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Payments and Records.
- Supporting Joint Operations and SOF/Intel Activities.
- Confiscated Cash; Weapons for Cash; Other Special Command Programs.
- Engineer Projects - funding.
- Supplies - Billing; Use of Proper DODDAC, etc."[10]

Furthermore, during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, numerous examples were recorded that indicated commanders were not familiar with how appropriated funds can be used and what could be purchased. There were some examples of personnel entering into improper contractual agreements during Urgent Fury that may have been avoided if commanders were more familiar with Army/DOD financial policies and installation level resource management in general.[11]
Clearly, neither the LIC commander on the ground nor the installation can afford the many extra efforts associated with correcting/investigating irregular procurements, improper/illegal expenditures of public funds, errors with soldier entitlements, or erroneous EPW/indigenous labor payments, to name but a few. However, the probability of any of these occurring increases significantly during a LIC operation. To research, verify, or restructure any questionable action that should have been handled in accordance with a well known and understood "policy" impacts adversely on the installation's mission and sustainability. Without question, both the "quick-fix" and long term solution is leader education. In fact, a new course was recommended after Grenada. The following was incorporated into the Operation Urgent Fury 1984 after action report:

"A financial management course should be developed for all Commanders of battalion units or equivalent. This course should stress the use of funds during a hostile operation. Additionally, more emphasis should be given to this subject during Command and General Staff College, Battalion and Brigade Commanders Course, and at our Senior War Colleges."[12]

Given the Panama experience and financial lessons learned, the course is still needed. The resource management and finance communities can also do much more to educate the commanders they support. A proactive approach at the installation level is the method that will reap the most benefits in terms of leader awareness of financial and resource management issues in a LIC. The opportunities locally are certainly there: Officer Professional Development (OPD) classes; NCOPD; readiness briefings; unit liaison visits; pre-exercise planning sessions; post-exercise critique sessions; after-action reviews; "hotwashes;" Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) meetings; staff meetings; etc. The only limitations are time and imagination, both of which can be overcome with an aggressive, meaningful approach to "getting the word out."
Installation sustainment is as important as any other sustainment issue during LIC. There are indeed complex issues facing all involved, but none that are insurmountable. If certain innovations are made and appropriate, continuing attention is given to these important installation sustainment and resource management areas, then the installation will be that much more prepared when the time comes to deploy and sustain assigned units in support of a LIC or contingency operation.
FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:

PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE:

Chapter 2

ENDNOTES


2. Ibid, para 2-2b(1) and (2), p. 3

3. Ibid, para 2f, p. 4.

4. Ibid, para 2l, p. 5.

5. Msg, CDRUSAISC//ASRM-PB-B//, DTG 112230Z Jan 90, sj: Financial Impact of JUST CAUSE.


8. Msg, HQ FORSCOM//FCJ8//, DTG 121900Z Jan 90, sj: Financial Impact of JUST CAUSE.


12. Ibid.
FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:
PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE!

Chapter 3 – Sustaining the Unit/Task Force During LIC Operations.

Once a military unit is deployed in response to a LIC, it must be sustained. If recent history is any indicator, the LIC/contingency task force will be deployed initially without much of its logistical tail. Making the deployment even more challenging is the high probability that the unit will be placed into what may be called a "bare based" environment. Obviously, a paradox is apparent between supporting the LIC task force logistically versus US airlift capability to get required supplies/equipment there simultaneously. Further,

"...the barer the base (isolated, far regions with harsh climates), the greater the logistic shortfalls, thus the greater need for local procurement and labor. But a bare base also means that fewer goods and services are available from the local economy. [However,] regardless of how indigent an economy may seem, goods and services have a way of always turning up when the price is right."[1]

To enhance mission success, the Finance Corps (via Finance Support Team(s)) brings certain capabilities to the battlefield not found in other organizations. In essence, these capabilities represent doctrinal Finance wartime missions/functions and serve as "logistical multipliers" so that initial (and longer term) sustainment of the deployed unit/task force is maximized.

LIC/contingency planners could well be viewed as remiss if they forget to include Finance Corps personnel/units in the planning process. To illustrate, the following critical functions would surely become major battlefield sustainment issues to the task
force commander if a Finance Support Team(s) (FST) and a Finance Command and Control/Operations cell (from a Corps Finance Group headquarters) were not deployed during the initial phases of the LIC/contingency operation:

+ Local procurement support for goods and services;
+ Payment of indigenous (local) labor;
+ Currency support (to include captured currency control and disposition);
  - Control and disposition of MIA/KIA (US and enemy) currency;
  - Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Detainee labor accounting/payrolls;
  - Claims/solatium payments in support of Staff Judge Advocate (SJA);
  - Special Operations/Counter-intelligence funding and/or payrolls;
  - NEO operations support/payments;
  - Civil Affairs support;
  - LIC/contingency cost accounting;
  - Military and civilian pay support to US personnel;
  - Resource Management and Finance policy determinations and implementation.[2]

These Finance wartime missions are comprehensive, but are by no means all inclusive. In every recent LIC/contingency operation, numerous financial management/pay problems have developed that were resolved by the FST on-site. The payoffs of tough, demanding training in wartime finance functions are significant, but flexibility, initiative, improvisation, and anticipation are also as paramount in providing the task force necessary finance support during a LIC. In my opinion, the areas highlighted above with an asterisk (*) represent the most critical/important in terms of initially sustaining the LIC unit/task force. The following paragraphs discuss some issues and recommendations associated with each of these important areas that the task
force commander and supporting FST need to consider in order to maximize sustainment operations.

I. Local Procurement Support.

The source of much of what it takes to sustain the task force (i.e., food, fuel, facilities, local labor, etc.) during the early stages of a LIC will probably need to be procured locally. As noted earlier, the most likely LIC scenarios will probably occur in a ‘bare based’ environment. The size of the finance element/organization deployed to support the task force will depend on the mission, anticipated duration, location, availability of local resources, economic impact, as well as what is required from the local economy (i.e., food, fuel, supplies, transportation, labor, etc.). Clearly, local procurement during LIC is very critical to unit/task force sustainment. An FST should be included early-on in the operation to provide on-site sustainment, regardless of how many or what types of goods or services are anticipated to be procured locally for the task force.[3] Providing this critical support, however, still remains a very complex undertaking because of a host of finance and procurement regulatory requirements.

An appropriate illustration of these shortfalls is our experience in Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury. LTC B.E. Braswell, Finance & Accounting Officer, XVIII Airborne Corps and FT Bragg, had the mission of providing financial support during Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada). He had this to say concerning wartime procurement and contracting:

"The Army must change its contracting procedures during wartime operations. The procedures we now have for peacetime cannot work during wartime (low intensity conflict) because of the speed and quick reaction time required to support the combat commander and troops."[4]
LTC Braswell went on to strongly recommend that:

"More flexible procurement/contracting rules and procedures must be developed for wartime LIC operations. Peacetime procedures are too cumbersome and inflexible. ...Contracting Officers supporting military operations should be empowered to enact retroactive contracts in support of mission essential requirements...."

What drove LTC Braswell to these conclusions and recommendations were the numerous problems encountered in sustaining Urgent Fury units, most of which stemmed from current financial management and procurement procedures. For example, G-4 personnel had little to no knowledge of how to execute a local procurement in Grenada. Why? Because the Director of Logistics is usually responsible for local procurements at the installation and the "combat troops" don't normally practice it during an Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) or Field Training Exercise (FTX). Most units had no Class A Agents or Procurement/Ordering Officers on orders nor did they know what they were to do nor how to do it with respect to procuring items locally. Further, the few Contracting Officers that finally got to Grenada were hamstrung because they were not empowered to negotiate retroactive contracts. Consequently, a number of irregular real estate procurements resulted because several private facilities and homes had been occupied by US forces without benefit of a negotiated contract. This point is so important that US personnel are even cautioned in the TJAG Operational Law Handbook (1989 DRAFT) that no legal "contract authority" exists for commanders to seize or requisition property. Actions to acquire most property are viewed as "unauthorized commitments" and must later be "ratified" by a warranted US contracting officer with proper funds. The handbook reminds commanders that seizure and requisition are not a panacea for effective logistical support. In fact, these types of
'acquisitions' (i.e., seizure and requisition) may even work to alienate the local populace in a low intensity conflict (LIC) environment. In short, if items are simply "taken" from the local population by the task force, then it should come as no surprise that goods and services later become hoarded and protected, instead of available for sale and use by the task force.

Lastly, the Defense Fuels Supply Center (DFSC) had to be contacted to negotiate a fuel contract with Shell Oil Co. of Antilles, Ltd. to provide fuel to our forces in Grenada. Sufficient lift assets did not exist to transport sufficient fuel quickly enough to sustain the operation over the initial phase. Unfortunately, based on current procurement regulations, the local contracting officer on the ground did not have "authority" to contract for fuel. Had DFSC not been able to react quickly enough, the mission could have been jeopardized.

In summary, most of these procurement shortcomings could have been anticipated during the LIC/contingency operation planning process, and resolved beforehand. Rehearsing not only the combat operations, but also required support operations is critical to successful mission accomplishment. This was even apparent during World War II:

"When the North African invasion - the first major land operation against hostile territory - was being planned in 1942, logisticians anticipated that many needs of American forces could be supplied from the North African economy. If the invading forces could make local procurements, it would save valuable shipping space."[8] Thus, Finance commanders, Contracting Officers, and SJA's, just as logisticians, must be included in all LIC/contingency operation planning and rehearsing processes. They are the experts; it's their job to determine support requirements, and then provide them to the deployed unit/task force. Further, it is also apparent that Army leadership needs
to closely examine peacetime procurement and contracting rules and regulations to be
sure they are written in such a way as to maximize flexibility and support to the LIC
task force commander, while at the same time maintaining requisite internal controls to
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

II. Payment of Indigenous (Local) Labor.

It is in this area that the FST becomes a very important 'force multiplier' as well
as logistical multiplier to the LIC task force commander. It makes no sense to use US
troops for tasks that local nationals will normally perform for reasonable wages. As
noted during Operation Just Cause in Panama, "payments made by [the FSTs via Class A
Agents] to local nationals for casual labor leveraged the capability of the [Joint Task
Force] commander by freeing up combat soldiers to perform their wartime mission."[9]
Again, historical precedent for utilization of local labor can be drawn from World War II:

"In the Pacific, Asia, and the Middle East,... the Army used natives for a
variety of tasks: construction work, rescue of downed fliers, driving trucks, and
running railroads, among others. Usually, it was much cheaper and quicker to
employ native labor for such work than for the Army to do it. ... [Further,] in the
most underdeveloped regions where the Army operated, native workers, still
accustomed to bartering, had little concept of money [currency]. Such was the
case in the northern forward base sections of Australia. There, the Army paid for
[labor] services in beads, mirrors, colorful cloth, and cosmetics. Bedouins in
Morocco also frequently preferred and received payment in cloth."[10]

The lessons learned from World War II are equally as appropriate today. In terms
of sustaining the task force commander, the ability to expand the supporting manpower
pool via hiring local labor provides a tremendous opportunity to conserve soldier
strength and maximize combat power/resources. Along this line, the supporting FST
must also be ready to "accommodate" the wage requirements of the local populace.
Flexibility and innovation are key. Normally, US dollars are readily usable and acceptable worldwide. However, the task force commander and the FST must keep in mind that,

"...hiring LN [local national] laborers from a hostile country presents three challenges: (1) Ensuring that the laborers pose no threat; (2) Finding a currency they will accept for payment; and, (3) Preventing US spending from disrupting the local economy."[11]

Current Army policies, procedures, and regulations are adequate with respect to this area of LIC sustainment and support, but constant coordination with the on-site SJA concerning employment of local labor is mandatory. Finance units must train constantly in this area during peacetime/garrison to develop requisite proficiency to support the LIC commander. Because of its "force multiplier" impact, this area is so valuable to the task force commander that finance unit training time to practice indigenous (local national) labor payroll procedures must be devoted beforehand, not after the task force and FST deploys.

III. Currency Support.

There is an old maxim that says "Money Talks." This old maxim holds as true in wartime as it does in peacetime. Currency has always been required in war, and always will. Contrary to what some would argue, currency/cash is not another class of supply. What currency (or some appropriate medium of exchange) is is an extremely critical resource to the task force commander. Some of the more common/expected currency uses during a LIC include: buying supplies, goods and services; paying vendors, claimants, and local laborers; funding special missions and intelligence requirements; paying "bounties" for enemy weapons, equipment, or information; paying US personnel; and, paying EPW payrolls in accordance with the Geneva-Hague Regulations. If the
finance mission in support of the task force is to be accomplished, then the acquisition and control of sufficient amounts of currency is paramount.

In many cases, use of the host nation currency is preferred in order to support host country economic initiatives and currency viability, mitigate against "inflating" the local economy with US dollars, as well as preventing or impairing "black market" activities. If the decision is made that local currency will be used in support of the LIC operation, then arrangements must be made in advance to procure that currency, establish appropriate exchange rates, and ensure necessary physical security, storage, and internal controls are in place prior to deployment. Depending on the lead time provided, this could be quite a challenge, especially if the currency is in short supply in the US or on the 'embargoed' currency list maintained by the Treasury Department. As an example, one of the first requirements of Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada was to locate and buy $150,000 worth of East Caribbean Currency (ECC) to support initial phases of the operation. The following summary of actions necessary to acquire the ECC provides an idea of just how difficult it can be to locate, acquire, and provide the currency to the supported task force:

"The Federal Reserve in New York was contacted and tasked to find East Caribbean currency [ECC]. . . . The Federal Reserve called and informed us [FT Bragg Finance] that only $500 (US) of ECC was available, as it was an embargo[ed] currency in the US. . . . The disbursing section of the Treasury Department was contacted to locate ECC in the amount required. [We were later informed that Treasury had located] $150,000 of this currency on the island of Antigua. . . . [A Finance Disbursing Officer was then dispatched] to pick up the ECC, unencumbered, in Antigua. [The Disbursing Officer] departed FT Bragg, NC, at approximately 1300 hours, October 25, 1983, en route to Antigua and returned on October 26, 1983, with $150,000 of ECC. His arrival coincided with the departure of the Class A Agent for Grenada the evening of October 26, 1983. The funds were used to purchase supply items and to pay for contract services. . . . Within 48 hours of initial deployment, the first East Caribbean dollars departed Fort Bragg for Grenada for use by American Forces." [12]
Thankfully, the arrival of the ECC 48 hours later than the assault troops did not adversely affect the sustainment mission. Again, a simple way to ensure necessary currency is available for the mission is to mandate that finance personnel be included early in the initial planning stages of the LIC operation. Further, due to OPSEC considerations, finance elements in support of a Contingency Corps must have blanket authority to procure embargoed currencies without approval from DoD or Treasury. This will require regulatory changes at the departmental level of the Executive Branch.

The other side of currency support embraces the control and accountability of all currency and cash found or captured during military operations. In addition to ensuring funds removed from US and enemy KIA/WIA personnel receive proper accounting and disposition, the supporting FST(s) are also responsible for accounting for and safeguarding all confiscated/captured cash and currency. The most recent example of this very sensitive mission is Operation Just Cause in Panama. 18th Corps Finance Group deployed personnel found themselves developing policy and procedures "as they went" concerning the counting, turn-in, safeguarding, storage, accounting, record keeping, audit trail, and disposition of millions of dollars of confiscated cash (mostly US dollars believed to be drug related).[13] Attention to detail in this area is a must; accounting for and safeguarding captured/found cash works to ensure the integrity and credibility of the LIC task force and operation in the eyes of the public. What the task force commander does not need is the unexplained loss/disappearance of any found, confiscated, or captured cash or currency. This point is illustrated by 18th Corps Finance Group based on experiences during Operation Just Cause in Panama:

"UP chapter 7, FM 14-7, Finance Operations, soldiers who capture currency must turn it in to the nearest finance support element for control and safekeeping. Since a portion of the currency in the Republic of Panama was tainted by the illicit drug trade and money laundering operations, cash captured in Panama had to go through CID prior to being turned into [finance]. A reconciliation of captured
cash reported on J2/J3 logs with cash actually accounted for by [finance] revealed that not all funds reported could be accounted for. In some cases, soldiers released captured cash to U.S. governmental agencies other than Department of the Army. In other cases, reported cash (if it actually existed) could not be tracked due to inadequate detail in the J2/J3 logs. [Implicitly,] emphasis needs to be placed on accurate and complete reporting and disposition procedures for captured/found currency. [The recommendation was that] commanders reinforce the importance of correct reporting and disposition of captured cash. This will ensure control and safekeeping of all funds. Also, recommend CID strengthen controls over captured cash. Noting the location and time of capture, the unit making the capture, and a unit point of contact on each Evidence/Property Custody Document (DA Form 4137) will provide increased control over captured currency.\[14\]

As shown in the above example, the potential exists for "temptation" to creep in and overwhelm any soldier, especially when there is so much money involved. The Army certainly doesn't need the adverse publicity associated with a major loss, theft, or removal of captured funds. Since LIC operational/contingency plans are likely to include most of the drug producing countries worldwide, there is a high probability that there will be similarly significant amounts of captured currency to deal with. It is for these very reasons that finance soldiers, who are charged by doctrine with the wartime functions of controlling captured currency/cash, are deployed to fulfill them. The benefits in terms of sustaining and supporting the task force are great, and the FST manpower costs minimal.
FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:
PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE!

Chapter 8

ENDNOTES

3. Parrish, p. 64.
10. Rundell, p. 159.
11. Parrish, p. 66.
**Finance Support During Low Intensity Conflict:**
**Providing the Sustainment Edge!**

Chapter 4 - Sustaining the Soldier During LIC Operations.

The normal peacetime mind-set of most officers and soldiers when referring to "Finance" is to think of travel pay, fund cites, allotments, cashiers, military pay, LBS's, etc. These are all appropriate, in that those images are reflective of finance's day-to-day peacetime service mission to both the soldier and the installation. An illustrative example of this perception is contained in a fictional excerpt from a recent article in Military Review:

"The Task Force Commander, [LTC] Grant, strains to read his watch in the faint, red blackout lights. It is 0247, enough time for one final check before takeoff. Working his way down the narrow [a]isle, he reassures and inspires the tightly packed troops as he squeezes by. Grant is impressed with his combined arms team. They are America's finest; take that lieutenant on the end, for example. Determination and confidence radiate from his intense eyes and clenched jaw. And that diamond on his collar says that ... what, a finance officer? "Lieutenant," Grant shouts over the resonant hum of the engines, ["what are you doing on this operation -- we were just paid three days ago!"] [1]

Obviously, the Task Force Commander in this illustration does not have an appreciation of Finance Corps wartime capabilities or what the Finance Corps can bring to the battle. Many officers and soldiers still tend to think of Finance in only peacetime, "support to the individual" terms. This mind-set needs to change because it can adversely affect the soldier (and possibly the soldier's family), and even the LIC mission.

At this juncture, a brief discussion of the Finance Corps doctrinal mission may aid understanding. FM 14-7 states:
"The mission of the Finance Corps during conflict is --
To sustain Army, joint, and combined operations by providing timely commercial vendor and contractual payments, various pay and disbursing services, and limited accounting on an area basis. Additionally, finance units have the implied mission to protect and defend themselves to continue sustainment of the force and maintain battle freedom for combat units to engage enemy forces."[2]

FM 14-7 goes on to stress that:

"Finance missions can be divided into two general areas: service provided to organizations and service provided to individuals. Individual support deals with personal [pay] entitlements of the soldiers. ...Organizational support encompasses local procurement of supplies and services, payment of legal claims, and control[/payment] of enemy prisoners of war."[3]

Thus, during transition to war and during combat (LIC or otherwise), Finance doctrine dictates that finance support "shift" from peacetime functions (i.e., those directed primarily towards individual soldier military pay and performing installation level disbursing and accounting missions) to providing wartime finance support to units on an area basis. This is not to say that individual soldier support is any less important; it has always and still remains a high priority to the supporting finance unit. In fact, in World War II, prompt payment of the troops was so important that in August 1943, it warranted comment by General George C. Marshall when he notified all Theater Commanders of his concerns that:

"...large numbers of enlisted men who were returning to the United States from foreign theaters had not been paid for months. Their accounts could not be settled upon arrival because they did not have the necessary records with them. ...all Theater Commanders [were urged] to give special attention to correcting pay deficiencies."[4]

Clearly, providing our soldiers rapid and accurate personal finance service will "have a significant impact on the ability of the force to support itself and the morale and enthusiasm with which soldiers approach their battlefield missions."[5] If our soldiers are confident that their finances and other personal affairs are correct and in order, and
that their families have been taken care of, then they can concentrate more readily on accomplishing the mission and killing the enemy.

But, in deference to the mission, and finance wartime doctrine, other sustainment requirements rightfully carry a higher finance battlefield priority during LIC operations. Consequently, it is precisely because of this shift in wartime finance support emphasis that individual soldier "personal financial readiness" is so critical to the soldier’s sustainment. The soldier's personal financial readiness becomes even more important during a LIC operation because of the probable "Third World" location and unknown duration. The challenges to ensure our soldiers are ready financially for deployment fall into three areas (all of which are very interrelated): support prior to deployment; supporting the deployed soldier; and, supporting the soldier's family while the soldier is deployed.

I. Soldier Support Prior to Deployment.

A primary aspect of sustaining the individual soldier during a LIC operation is to ensure that his/her personal affairs are in order before departing for the battle zone. If this is not done, then the soldier (and perhaps his/her family) becomes a "problem" during the operation. "Financial Readiness Reviews" are as important as Family Care Plans; all of which must be integrated into and examined during ERE's, FTX's, and all other types of training or readiness exercises. It is common knowledge that our soldiers were not informed in advance that they were deploying "for real" into Panama, Grenada, or Honduras because of OPSEC necessity. This practice can be expected to continue, given the very sensitive, highly classified nature of quick deployment LIC contingencies or engagements. Consequently, it is unlikely that there will be a POR process, or pre-deployment "administrative shakedown." Thus, it is
imperative that leaders make habitual, monthly checks of their soldiers to ensure pay options, allotments, powers of attorney, medical status, and wills are correct and current. The supporting finance unit must also make this review a special item during liaison and support visits to unit PAC’s when in garrison. A common checklist for this review of critical items/areas is easily developed and should be standard from unit to unit.

Another major area where the soldier can be taken care of prior to deployment is for the command to be prepared for the inevitable myriad of travel/military pay policy questions that always arise. For example, during Operation Just Cause in Panama, the following "finance and pay policy" issues required research and, in most cases, coordination with higher headquarters or HQDA for resolution, implementation, and payment guidance or instructions:

- TDY/Per Diem issues.
- BAS/Separate Rations.
- Flight Crew Member Pay entitlements.
- Billeting costs/reimbursements.
- Jump Pay—questions concerning starts, stops, combat zone jumps.
- Hostile Fire Pay vs Imminent Danger Pay (Mil and Civ) — payment procedures.
- Foreign Language Proficiency Pay.
- Foreign Duty Pay.
- Family Separation Allowance.
- BAQ.
- Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay (HDIP) for flying duty.
- Transportation of Family Members (to visit WIA soldiers).
- Transportation Entitlements for Convalescent Leave."[6]

The above issues are not new. Similar questions on almost every issue came up during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada and Operation Golden Pheasant in Honduras. Part of the "policy problem" is that these issues are only superficially considered in the FMPEC. Moreover, the financial regulations that implement these policy issues are derivative from public law, the Joint Federal Travel Regulations (JFTR), and the DoD
Pay Manual (DODPM). As such, the Army regulations are complicated, are written from a "CONUS garrison" perspective, and, therefore, create doubt when decisions must be reached quickly in a "hostile" environment. These shortcomings have been identified in most LIC after action reports; they should now be worked, resolved, and appropriate policy manuals and regulations updated by USAFAC and ASA(FM).

Nonetheless, most of these issues can be anticipated, planned for, and addressed at the local level via a "generic" finance annex to most contingency/OPLANs and a carefully monitored "financial policy review." This review should be conducted by ASA(FM) after each LIC operation, and should be structured based on cumulative LIC financial lessons learned to date. In this manner, the 'questions' can be discussed and resolved beforehand; there are certainly enough recent LIC experiences to capture most of the main policy issues and the attendant decisions. The result will be a reference of "policy precedents" which could then be distributed/shared, and available for use and implementation prior to the next LIC/combat operation. Ultimately, our soldiers benefit in that their authorized entitlements are paid on time, and not retroactively.

II. Supporting the Deployed Soldier.

Colonel George R. Gretser, finance officer for the 8th Armored Division during World War II, related that a typical comment from 8th AD soldiers was, "What the hell do I want with money in a foxhole?" He went on to say that the only pay they wanted was a little pocket change to buy items from the post exchange truck; the remainder they wished to send home in various allotments.[7] This is noted simply to underscore the fact that soldiers expect to be paid (and rightfully so), even in a combat situation.

Financial support to the deployed soldier falls into the normal, routine set of pay related tasks. Answering pay inquiries, transmitting pay changes, allotments, cashing
checkst converting currency, etc. would continue in the LIC area of operations. However, this type of support would be accomplished in conjunction with unit rest/refit/refuel operations and/or when unit logistical/local procurement support was being provided by finance elements. Indirect support to the deployed soldier is also facilitated by finance support to any APO and AAFES activities in the LIC area of operations (i.e., currency replenishment, change funds, exchanging Treasury checks for cash, etc.).

Along these lines, however, in a deployed situation in response to a LIC, the Army's liberal military pay option policy may do more to create problems than anything else. Today, our soldiers not only can get paid once or twice a month, but also can have their pay accrued, sent to the unit, sent to an address, or sent to a financial institution (SURE-PAY). For the most part, these pay options remain essentially the same during a low intensity operation. However, normal peacetime payday procedures will not remain in effect for soldiers deployed during a contingency. Doctrinally, the Task Force Commander can suspend normal paydays and require "combat payments" of not more than a specific amount be implemented.[8] This set amount for combat payments is equally applicable to personal checks cashed. The single soldier can easily accommodate these changes, but an altogether different dilemma occurs for the married soldier. The following example concerning military pay in Grenada makes the point:

"A potential problem developed as soldiers [deployed in Grenada] realized they were unprepared to support their families and/or pay bills. Many soldiers asked about forwarding their paychecks so they [their families] could buy postal money orders. This problem was alleviated as units were quickly redeployed to home stations; however, the potential for problems during a longer deployment exists."[9]

It should be mentioned that the great majority of soldiers do participate in the SURE-PAY program. But, making the SURE-PAY option mandatory would essentially resolve the problem described above, presuming the soldier had a joint bank account with
the spouse. Unfortunately, even our current move to the Joint Service Software (JSS) pay system (USAF model) will do little to help resolve the pay option dilemma. Under JSS, soldiers can still have their pay (in the form of a Treasury check) sent to a "check to address" location. In the final analysis, it is not the soldier who suffers, but rather the soldier’s family. While the soldier is deployed, they may receive his check in the mail, but can only cash it with a valid power of attorney – a cumbersome and legalistic process. Making SURE-PAY mandatory and ensuring a support allotment to the family exists before deployment will preclude most home station family support problems. Moreover, the support allotment is even preferable in that should the soldier be listed as Missing In Action (MIA), the allotment continues, whereas his net monthly pay is, by regulation, automatically accrued. (Again, the logic/reason for this policy/law is also suspect and should be re-examined – it makes no sense to continue an "allotment of pay," but stop the "net pay" itself when the soldier is listed as MIA.)

Soldiers on SURE-PAY are expected to have in their possession a sufficient supply of personal checks to cash, even during combat. Finance units are charged doctrinally to ensure they are prepared to cash personal checks for soldiers during LIC operations. It is also reasonable to expect that a number of soldiers will not have their personal checks with them when they deploy, especially when OPSEC considerations dictate they not be informed as to what is happening until they are enroute to the LIC combat zone. Accordingly, the supporting finance element/FST must be prepared to issue a "combat payment" if and when authorized and requested. The combat payment is, in reality, nothing more than a "casual pay," taken immediately from the soldier’s pay account, usually on the next payday. For instance, during Operation Just Cause, the FST from 7th Finance Support Unit, FT Ord, California, reported that:
"...we paid many CP's [casual pays] to soldiers with "savings" accounts instead of checking accounts. Quite a few were armed with ATM cards, but were left out in the cold. We paid 6300 casual pays (to all units and all [armed] services), but cashed only 650 personal checks. That might be some indication of what we might do in the future, despite SURE-PAY and direct deposit."[11]

Given that commanders and finance officers will always experience at least some soldiers who require a combat payment, then it seems to make sense that this should be the standard method of payment for all deployed soldiers, especially in a LIC environment. An examination of cumulative payments during Operation Just Cause supports this idea:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finance Support Task</th>
<th># Trans</th>
<th>$ Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casual pays-Army</td>
<td>7,584</td>
<td>$319,620.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checks cashed</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>24,089.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar disparities between the number of checks cashed and combat (casual) payments were experienced during US military operations in Grenada, Honduras, and in support of Hurricane Hugo relief efforts in St Croix, Virgin Islands, as well.

In sum, to adopt this proposal would not only eliminate the need for soldiers to carry personal checks into combat, but also eliminate the finance officer's burden of accounting for, transporting, securing, and depositing the checks - which could prove to be somewhat difficult, depending on the LIC location. Moreover, internal controls would be strengthened with respect to complying with the LIC Task Force Commander's guidance limiting the amount of pay in the area of operations - whether it be by casual payment or by cashing a check. In other words, it is unlikely more than the authorized number of combat payments would be paid to a given soldier; however, creating a system to ensure only a certain number or amount of checks were cashed by that soldier could be unwieldy and unreliable.
III. Supporting the Deployed Soldier’s Family.

Several issues concerning support to the soldier’s family have already been discussed in preceding sections. These include ensuring that “personal financial readiness” is included (and checked) during individual and unit training, as well as ensuring pay allotments and/or SURE-PAY have been initiated. But what happens after the soldiers have deployed, and the families have been informed of the deployment after the fact? The soldier needs to be sure that his family is being cared for. This is where the unit/installation “family support network” gets energized - and home station finance units must play an integral role in this area. As discovered at Ft Bragg during Operation Just Cause, the family support groups in each unit were a significant source of pay information, concerns, and problem resolution:

"Finance participation in Family Support Groups is a must while the soldiers are gone! Many, many pay issues were surfaced during these meetings. The spouses know very little; it’s a great way to disseminate lots of [LES and pay related] information (both orally and in writing) to many family members, to hear about lots of problems, and answer many questions. We’ve got to be innovative; the SJA must also be a player for powers of attorney, etc. Families need money, and our job must be to get it to them. If that takes the deployed FST to find a soldier in the combat area, get his approval, and then relay that it’s OK for the spouse to receive the cash from a casual pay from his pay account, then so be it -- we’ve got to make that happen. And, you use whatever commo that is available from home station to the combat zone - FAX, COAHOST, electronic message, JTEL, phone, courier, whatever it takes - to support the family."

It should also be kept in mind that when soldiers are deployed, the workload at the supporting home station finance unit increases dramatically. A brief scan of the "financial and pay policy" areas mentioned in Section I above provide but a sample of the types of new pay inputs required because of a deployment. These numerous and sometimes complicated changes will be reflected on the next LES, and must be explained to the soldier by the unit PSNCO. Unfortunately, the PSNCO is not at home station to
explain these unfamiliar changes to the spouse; therefore, the explanation becomes the responsibility of home station finance personnel. This endeavor must be handled as a "labor of love;" for if it is handled impersonally or improperly, more problems will be created than averted.

The ultimate beneficiary of a soldier's personal financial readiness is, of course, the soldier's family. Thus, we must do everything feasible to ensure our soldier's have made provisions for family support prior to deployment. Once deployed, we then must make every effort to keep the information flowing and resolve family financial and support problems as soon as they occur. Home station finance elements can do much towards this end - indeed, our proactive, caring efforts with respect to his family are a major part of sustaining the deployed soldier during LIC operations.
FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:

PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE!

Chapter 4

ENDNOTES


7. Rundell, p. 140.

8. FM 14-7, p. 6-4.


10. FM 14-7, p. 6-4.


The title to this chapter poses a very valid question: Is the Finance Corps truly ready to support and sustain the next LIC? The short answer is — Yes; and the outstanding finance support provided during recent military operations in Grenada, Honduras, St Croix, and Panama stands as testimony. Indeed, there were many Finance Corps success stories; but a review of the results from each of these military operations also indicate that there were areas which "could have been done better."

While some of the primary sustainment areas where improvements could be made have already been explored elsewhere in this study, the purpose of this chapter is to highlight a number of remaining critical areas and issues and at the same time share a few thoughts, ideas, and recommendations which could do much to improve finance support of tomorrow's LIC. These areas include: Doctrine and Force Structure; Training; Planning; and, Policy and Procedures.

1. Doctrine and Force Structure.

Most of our doctrinal publications have been and still are written with a mid to high intensity conflict in mind. A quick scan of FM 100-5, Operations; FM 100-16, Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps; FM 14-6, Comptroller/Finance Services in Theaters of Operations; and, FM 14-7, Finance Operations supports this assertion.

While finance wartime missions and functions are easily adapted to support Air-Land
Battle "sustainment imperatives" of Anticipation, Integration, Continuity, Responsiveness, and Improvisation found in FM 100-5, the implementing "how to" details contained in FM's 100-16, FM 14-6, and even FM 14-7 (to a degree), are sorely out of date. This is especially apparent when the focus shifts to low intensity conflict (LIC). The Finance School, Soldier Support Center, USAFAC, ASA(FM), and the Logistics Center should form a group to revise and update these important doctrinal manuals so that they all are in consonance, address LIC in greater detail, and include the many likely and unique LIC sustainment requirements that will be encountered in a "joint task force" environment.

FM 14-7 (Finance Operations) is built around a mid to high intensity scenario, and stresses an "area support" concept of finance wartime operations. The purpose of Chapter 6, FM 14-7, is to discuss finance support during low intensity conflict. The chapter is four pages long. While Chapter 6 does address LIC in very general terms of finance support to be provided, it should be rewritten to cover adequately those unique issues and requirements that a LIC operation will place on supporting finance elements - issues such as command and control, communications, transportation, increased emphasis on "battlefield cost accounting," continued finance operations at home station, and task organizing deployed finance elements.[1]

A representative of the DA DCSOPS recently stated before a Congressional committee that "...the most likely conflict to occur is one of low intensity, probably originating in the Third World."[2] If this is true, then it appears that FM 14-7 should explore and discuss the "how to's" of supporting a LIC in greater detail. For example, the finance unit(s) doctrinal organization for combat (to include command and control) as currently depicted in FM 14-7 is not appropriate to sustain a LIC operation. As was discovered during Operation Just Cause in Panama:
"The actual organization of the finance task force which was created to support the JUST CAUSE Task Force did not represent finance doctrine as described in FM 14-7, Finance Operations. ...The actual finance task force which supported Operation JUST CAUSE consisted of the 18th Corps Finance Group establishing a command and control cell which directed the activities of Finance Support Teams from three different CONUS finance support units (FSU) plus the 180th FSU [in] Panama. Finance Doctrine does not address the building of finance task forces from a number of FSUs. Nor does the doctrine address the concept of a command and control cell to coordinate all financial support in the AO of a low intensity contingency operation. The doctrine states the [entire] finance group, finance support unit, or finance support team will be deployed from one unit. If this happened, finance support operations at the home stations would be severely hampered, jeopardizing financial support to the installation and to non-deploying personnel [left behind at the home stations]."[3]

This is an important point. Doctrinally, the Finance Group Commander must have the flexibility to task organize any and all finance elements to best accomplish the LIC contingency mission as well as sustain parent/home installation(s) and personnel. This needs to be documented in FM 14-7, using the concept employed by 18th Corps Finance Group in support of Operation Just Cause as the model.

From a finance force structure perspective, the Finance Support Team (FST) is an ideal element to form on an ad-hoc basis and deploy in order to sustain a LIC operation. Experience has shown that a deployed FST of between 5 - 7 finance soldiers can normally support up to a brigade sized task force of deployed soldiers. An FST can usually be organized and deployed from any MTOE Finance Support Unit (FSU) without jeopardizing parent installation main finance office operations. However, the FST is not self contained; and accordingly, is dependent on the supported unit for its own sustainment. Thus, it is questionable as to whether any non self sustaining element should be deployed into a LIC environment.

Perhaps a review of the emerging Finance Detachment (FD) as an alternative force structure for finance task organizing is in order. As our Army decreases in size over the next few years, rather than operating under an "area support" doctrine, it may prove
to be more feasible to "habitually associate" an FD with each active brigade sized element in the force, and position the parent FSU (soon to be renamed Finance Support Command (FSC)) geographically to best control all FD operations. With an augmentation of seven to ten personnel (including a detachment clerk/driver, armorer, and supply sergeant) to the proposed TAA 93 FD strength of 19, the FD could almost become self sustaining. In addition to the obvious "unit identification and cohesion" benefits of an FD supporting known combat units in both peace and war (to include LIC), this idea offers potentially significant resource savings in the long run, depending on required numbers and locations of parent FSCs and Finance Groups as a function of the ultimate size of our future, smaller Army.[4]

Whether or not the finance force structure stays the same, at a minimum, all TOE finance units in direct support of a contingency corps must be at ALO 1 and their TOE equipment must all be coded with Equipment Readiness Code A (ERC A). Additionally, there must be a concerted effort by the contingency corps leadership to ensure the supporting finance unit possesses sufficient communications equipment and priority to not only communicate in the LIC/contingency area, but with home station as well. In terms of both logistics and soldier support/morale, too much is riding on the finance support/sustainment mission to relegate it to a lower priority.

Lastly, another doctrinal issue appropriate to a LIC operation but absent in FM 14-7 is the integration of the missions of both the supporting LIC finance element and the supporting Civil Affairs (CA) Command, if deployed. For example, a Theater Civil Affairs Command has a Public Finance Division, with a strength of six personnel, headed by a Finance Corps Colonel. Another staff section in the CA command with potential interface with the supporting LIC finance element is the Economic and Commerce Division, also headed by a Colonel.[5] These CA elements could prove to be sources of
additional missions for the LIC finance element, or valuable sources of information/assistance. FM 14-7 should be revised with a detailed discussion concerning finance and CA interaction and mutual considerations/requirements during LIC operations.

II. Training

Finance Corps soldiers today must be both technically and tactically proficient. The SQT and other finance technical training requirements are arduous enough. Couple with them the host of individual and unit wartime requirements, and it quickly becomes evident that preparing a finance unit training plan and schedule is a balancing act. But does it need to be the same in every unit? Probably not, as shown in the following excerpt of a contingency corps Finance Support Unit (FSU) commander's comments:

"Most FSUs use the ARTEP Mission Training Plan #14-403-30-MTP to identify the specific tasks necessary to perform missions in accordance with FM 14-7. It also serves as the basis for developing the yearly ARTEP for many FSUs. Like FM 14-7, the Mission Training Plan is based on a mid- to - high intensity environment. Units such as [this FSU] spend valuable training time preparing for an ARTEP that does not reflect the more likely scenarios they will find. FM 25-100 [Training the Force] states that it's impossible for units to be prepared to perform all possible missions. The concept of Battle Focus requires commanders to evaluate their wartime missions and develop a training program that will allow them to successfully accomplish the unit's critical wartime missions. It's unlikely that a unit should expect to be proficient in missions at all levels of conflict. A [contingency corps FSU] must be prepared to operate successfully in a low-intensity conflict. [The unit's] training must reflect that fact. [Thus,] based upon the scenarios [this unit] will likely participate in, the unit will operate by deploying FSTs capable of operating independently, performing a wide range of finance support missions. The [entire] unit will not deploy... [Therefore,] requiring the unit during an ARTEP to [deploy as an FSU and] establish a field site, conduct perimeter defensive operations, [etc.]... does not reflect the unit's "go to war" missions."[6]

The bottom line is that finance unit commanders at all levels must be both pragmatic and innovative when it comes to designing individual and unit training programs for those
finance units in direct support of combat units with potential response missions to LIC/contingency operations. The training must be flexible and allow for a LIC focus; a high intensity, all out conventional war is not probable. (Even if an all out conventional war did appear to be likely, current national intelligence agencies estimate that there will be sufficient warning time to allow for appropriate adjustments to train and prepare for supporting a high intensity conflict.) The finance ARTEP/MTP as well as FM 14-7 should be changed to incorporate "battle drills" at all unit organizational levels, as envisioned in FM 25-100.

As was discovered in Panama, Grenada, and St Croix, finance soldiers and NCOs operated "on their own" with minimal supervision or guidance when it came to getting the finance support mission accomplished. This independent nature of operating in a LIC reinforces the need to continue teaching the 'finance basics' in the TRADOC schools and practicing them in the units - basics such as commercial accounts, accounting, funds control, civilian pay, BPW payrolls, and disbursing. Moreover, the Finance School should look closely at initiating Operations (S-3) training in its officer and NCO courses.

Lastly, with the many lessons learned from recent LIC/contingency deployments, the Finance Corps now possesses sufficient wartime experience to be a "player" in the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). Further, Finance Corps leadership should begin now to develop a way to rotate finance units to the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to practice and refine their critical battlefield sustainment missions, as does the rest of the Army. A recent Military Review article by LTG Lewi, CG, 21st TAACOM, USAREUR, makes the point:

"It has been said that CSS [Combat Service Support] units have little problem training to their METL [Mission Essential Tasks List] requirements because they perform most of their METL tasks routinely in their day-to-day support missions. However, this is only partially true, since many CSS units, such as finance and medical units, often use markedly different procedures and techniques in peacetime..."
than those they would use, on similar tasks, in a combat environment.
Additionally, CSS units, in the accomplishment of their daily technical tasks, do
not usually work under the stressful conditions one would expect to see in combat.
...CSS training must be realistic and simulate the modern battlefield in terms of
equipment and parts availability, system supportability, risk, planning for future
operations, unit movement and other practical support conditions."[7]

What better way to achieve the realism stressed by LTG Lewi than to rotate an FST or
FD to the NTC and/or JRTC and provide wartime finance support to participating units?

III. Planning.

When in a crisis situation (such as a LIC/contingency deployment), it has been said
that "the situation, procedures, and issues don't change; the timeline to get them done
does!"[8] Well documented and established procedures which cover routine actions
allow those in a crisis situation to concentrate their efforts on unusual conditions,
which often prove to be the decisive factors.[9] The critical importance of having a
"financial contingency or OPLAN" to support most LIC contingencies cannot be
overstated. It is, however, a historical fact that Army financial contingency plans have
either been absent, not current or ignored. The "fix" is relatively easy - finance
commanders must be proactive with G-3 contingency planners, convince them that
selected finance personnel have a need to know and are reliable OPSEC risks, and ensure
finance plans and policies are included in all OPLANS. These generic finance annexes to
OPLANS must be based on experience, integrate fully Contracting and SJA requirements,
and updated at least semi-annually. Finance Group commanders should also prepare and
distribute Finance Support SOPs to the units they serve outlining finance missions,
functions, and general support procedures that will most likely be used during a
LIC.[10]
Internally, finance planning at a minimum should focus on maintaining a Readiness SOP, a Field SOP, and Standard Finance OPLANs. The Readiness SOP covers the "how to's" of pre-deployment preparations and deployment. The Field SOP outlines how the finance element, no matter what size, operates in a field environment. The Standard Finance OPLAN could serve as a basis for how finance expects to execute generic missions in a LIC/contingency environment, while being flexible enough to be modified quickly based on specific mission dictates.[11]

IV. Policy and Procedures.

As noted earlier in this paper, every deployment of US soldiers has resulted in a myriad of finance, funding, military pay, and travel/TDY policy questions and issues. Generally speaking, Army finance policy is either lacking or inconsistent to the point that it creates uncertainty in the minds of local finance personnel attempting to resolve the issue, usually for a deployed soldier or the task force commander or staff. Notionally, it should not be this way; yet every LIC after action report is filled with comments and recommendations to improve Army or DoD finance policies. A true joint group should be formed to examine these recurring issues and questions with a view of streamlining and modifying applicable regulations or the DoD Pay Manual (DODPM).

Perhaps a team of resource management/finance personnel enrolled at the all-service Professional Military Comptroller Course at Maxwell AFB or a team of Army Comptrollership Program students at Syracuse University could take on this mission in satisfaction of their research requirement.

With respect to improving finance mission capability during a LIC, a "joint" finance policy and doctrinal manual may prove to be worthwhile. During Operation Just Cause, Marine, Air Force, and Navy personnel were served by Army finance elements. While no
major problems occurred per se, FST personnel indicated that it would have been helpful in a few cases to produce a "regulation" or SOP which governed that particular armed service. A joint manual would provide this reference. Further, with common procedures addressing most finance issues contained in a joint manual, much of the perceived unfairness would be ameliorated (i.e., USAF personnel in LIC area of operations on full per diem while Army personnel were presumed to be under 'field conditions,' etc.).

Another area where finance mission enhancements could be realized concerns the appointment of deputy finance officers. Deputies act in the name of the accountable finance officer, and generally can perform any of the acts or functions that the accountable finance officer could perform if present personally. Given a number of Grenada and Panama experiences, recommend that AR 37-103 be changed to permit the accountable finance officer to appoint deputies in the grade of SSG and above, and that the finance officer's next higher commander be the sole approving authority of the appointment. In reality, the long, laborious deputy approval process contained in AR 37-103 hinders mission accomplishment. The accountable finance officer knows subordinate finance personnel best, and is ultimately pecuniarily liable for the deputies' actions anyway. So, it should be the finance officer's judgement as to who is appointed a deputy; not the MACOM or USAFAC.[12] Moreover, using deputies during LIC deployments puts less of a drain on deployed combat units for Class A Agents (who should be leading their units, not performing finance functions), and, in the long run, permits the FST more support flexibility and capability.

Finally, the "weapons for cash" program implemented during Operation Just Cause in Panama probably saved US lives and provided needed intelligence information to proper authorities. The funding and procedural aspects of this innovative program need
to be worked and documented uniformly in a regulation or FM for future use. Along this line, this initiative also placed an unexpected demand for currency on the finance support elements in Panama. The same situation can be expected during future LIC operations. Thus, a contingency cash holding authority should be developed and approved for those finance units in direct support of contingency corps units. This would provide needed flexibility to acquire large amounts of cash on short notice in support of future LIC operations.

V. Summary.

This chapter began with a question: Are we ready to provide finance support for tomorrow's LIC? The answer is still Yes - but as shown herein, certain changes and improvements in such areas as finance Doctrine, Training, Planning, and Policy/Procedures could do much to enhance further our capability to support and sustain the next LIC/contingency operation. The soldiers and units we serve deserve nothing less.
FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:

PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE:

Chapter 5

ENDNOTES


2. Lehowicz, Larry G., BG, Director of Training, DA DCSOPS, in a statement before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, 4 April 1990.

3. Personal notes received during interview with COL Barry S. Baer, Commander, 18th Corps Finance Group, 8 February, 1990, at FT Bragg, NC, sj: Finance Support During Operation Just Cause.


5. Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 41012H20004 100, Theater Civil Affairs Command, EDATE 680917, Paras 115 and 133.


10. Ibid. p. 2.

11. Ibid. p. 2.

There are many military and political leaders who will argue that, at least for the foreseeable future, the United States is more likely to become engaged in a low intensity conflict/contingency operation than any other military action. Consequently, how to plan for, how to respond to, and even how to fight during a low intensity conflict (LIC) are new, emerging elements of important Army and joint service doctrine. During a LIC, or any combat operation for that matter, sustainment is a primary determinant of success or failure in battle. The critical nature of the sustainment challenge is appropriately summarized in the following quote from FM 100-5, Operations:

"Sustainment is a central, potentially decisive aspect of operations, not an adjunct to them. It is as important to success as any other part of the commander’s operational plan. To meet the sustainment challenge, commanders must grasp both the operational and logistical possibilities and limitations of their situations. The most successful commanders have been those who pressed their operations to the very limit of their sustaining power – but not one step further." [1]

Simply stated, no matter where we find ourselves engaged along the continuum of conflict, sustainment is critical to winning. In a LIC situation, sustainment takes on special importance because of the probable lack of host country infra-structure or available on-site US logistical support. A primary purpose of this study was to provide some insight into what the Finance Corps can bring to the LIC battle, especially in terms
of initial sustainment capability. A major conclusion of this research is that the Finance Corps is an integral part of sustaining the deployed task force in a LIC environment. Finance elements performing their wartime doctrinal missions provide unique sustainment capabilities for the deployed task force which actually serve as "logistical force multipliers." To be sure, recent LIC experience has validated (in general terms) Finance Corps wartime doctrine. As stated by the Commander, 18th Corps Finance Group (CFG) after Operation Just Cause:

"The mission and functions we have performed from the individual, FST, FSU, and (Finance) Group level validates without question our finance battlefield doctrine. In addition, during JUST CAUSE we validated 8 of our 10 18th CFG METL [Mission Essential Task List] tasks. So we know we are moving in the right direction and there is an absolute need for a TOE Finance Corps in the LIC area of operations."[2]

But, as discussed throughout this paper, the LIC sustainment challenge is more complex than solely sustaining US forces dispatched to the LIC area of operations. Finance, accounting, and resource management sustainment issues must be resolved not only for the deployed task force, but also for the parent installation, our soldiers and their families. Further, there are other finance doctrinal, training, planning, and policy areas which also impact significantly on sustaining a LIC operation. Most of these important finance related issues and areas have been examined closely in this study, and appropriate recommendations provided to improve overall installation, deployed force, and soldier sustainability during LIC/contingency operations. If we are to respond quickly to our worldwide commitments and at the same time sustain our forces properly, then we need to begin now by changing and improving portions of certain finance and accounting and resource management doctrine, regulations, policies, and procedures to enhance overall LIC sustainability.
As our Army is refined and restructured in the coming years, each Combat Service Support branch must be introspective enough to ensure its future potential will be maximized so that our soldiers and units continue to receive the best support possible. The Finance Corps is no exception. The sustainment challenge is too critical and dynamic to LIC/contingency mission success to warrant anything less than an honest, hard look at how we do our business. The issues, concepts, and recommendations developed in this study are a first step towards this end.

And remember, the next time we respond to a LIC or contingency operation, don’t forget the "US Army Finance Corps: You can’t afford to go to war without us!"
FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:

PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE:

Chapter 6

ENDNOTES


FINANCE SUPPORT DURING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:

PROVIDING THE SUSTAINMENT EDGE:

BIBLIOGRAPHY


2. Baer, Barry S., Memorandum, sj: Battlefield Accounting, dtd 8 January 1990.


18. Lehowicz, Larry O., BG, Director of Training, DA DCSOPS, in a statement before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, 4 April 1990.


22. Msg, CDRUSAISC//ASRM-PB-B//, DTO 112230Z Jan 90, sj: Financial Impact of JUST CAUSE.

23. Msg, HQ FORSCOM//FCJS//, DTO 121900Z Jan 90, sj: Financial Impact of JUST CAUSE.


27. Personal interview with COL Tully Anderson, Executive to the Director of the Army Budget, ASA(FM), HQDA, 8 March 1990, sj: Funding, Budget, and Resource Management Issues Associated with LIC Operations.

29. Personal interviews with the following individuals, 7-9 February, 1990, at FT Bragg, NC, sj: Finance Support During Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and HawkEye:
- COL Barry S. Baer, Cdr, 18th Corps Finance Group
- MAJ Thomas Mulyca, S-3, 18th Corps Finance Group
- MAJ Timothy Wansbury, Cdr, 107th Finance Support Unit
- MAJ H. Gordon Thigpen, Cdr, 82d Finance Support Unit (Abn)
- MAJ Henry Peoples, F&AO, 18th Corps Finance Group
- CPT Jeffrey Kovach, XO, 107th Finance Support Unit
- Mrs Peggy Smith, Deputy F&AO, 18th Corps Finance Group


34. Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 41012H20004 100, Theater Civil Affairs Command, EDATE 880917.


42. __________________, "We Shall Again Astonish You in the West," US News and World Report, 1 June 1987.
