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NATIONAL SERVICE: CAN IT RAISE A QUALITY ARMY?

BY

COLONEL LARRY TURNAGE, AV

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5 APRIL 1990

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
The concept of national service that would include military service has been proposed in and out of government on a near continuous basis since the turn of the century. The perceived need for some form of national service is the topic of much discussion in the Congress. The current debate and the possible affect of such an act on the armed forces and society is a topical issue of concern. Except for a short period just prior to World War II, our peacetime ranks have been filled with volunteers. Will society allow that to change? If not, what will it agree to? What are the implications for the future of (continued on back)
today's Army of quality soldiers in a period of declining manpower and other factors impacting the all-recruited force? This study explores the feasibility of a National Service Act and its acceptance or rejection as an alternative for manning the Army through discussion of the historical and contemporary methods America has used to raise its armed forces in peace and war. The degree of acceptance of those methods by today's society is directly tied to our historical societal values towards the military. The influence of those values will determine the degree of consensus for a National Service Act.
NATIONAL SERVICE: CAN IT RAISE A QUALITY ARMY?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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NATIONAL SERVICE: CAN IT RAISE A QUALITY ARMY?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The perceived need for some form of a corps of national volunteers is the topic of much discussion in the Congress and elsewhere. Powerful politicians led by Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, have introduced various forms of proposed legislation calling for national service. Much of the pending legislation including S.3, The "Citizenship and National Service Act of 1989" (Appendix 1) includes service in the Armed Forces as one of several national service options. There are others who call for mandatory national service and some who see a need to return to compulsory military service. The continuing debate and the possible impact of the provisions of legislated national service on the U.S. Army's capability "to provide for the common defense" and "secure the blessings of liberty" is a topical issue of significant importance to the Nation and the Army.

BACKGROUND

The concept of national service is not new to America nor is it without merit provided it does not degrade the Nation's ability to maintain an adequate level of military
readiness. The degree to which legislated national service would be accepted by the American public and its affect on the recruiting and retention of an appropriate size force of a quality equivalent to today's is uncertain. There are certainly more questions than answers concerning any form of national service and more than can be adequately addressed in this study. A historical review of the methods America has used to provide manpower for its defense throughout its history and society's acceptance or rejection of those methods is necessary to gain an understanding as well as an appreciation of the problems associated with manning an army in this country. Such a review may go far towards answering some of the crucial questions facing the Congress and the Army's senior leadership concerning national service as an alternative to past methods of providing for the common defense.

The Militia

Long before America became a nation the need for providing for the common defense was acknowledged by the colonies. From the onset each of them with the exception of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, established a militia in which service was mandatory for all able-bodied freemen. Several of the colonies were headed by professional military officers and, in fact, Georgia was founded as a military colony. The militia was the only feasible form of collective defense for
many reasons among them geography, small populations, and lack of a mobility infrastructure. The concept of the militia as the first line of defense was to last into this century. Its successor, the National Guard, continues the tradition of the citizen-soldier prepared to defend his "colony". The usefulness of the militia as the only source of raising an army was always questioned by professional soldiers beginning with George Washington. However, it was the only method acceptable to the public for over 150 years.

Conscription

Americans were comfortable with the militia for many reasons. It had always been successful (with a great deal of good fortune on occasion) and it provided for a means of defending the nation without a large standing army. The latter reason was ingrained in American thought from the beginning. Another reason was the lack of nationalistic pride on the part of the individual until the Civil War. The American colonists' experiences with the British army coupled with their fervent protection of individual rights has passed to succeeding generations. The fear of a large standing army has never waned and conscription has never been accepted in peacetime. The only peacetime use of conscription was from 1940 to 1973, a period covering involvement in three "hot" wars and one cold one. The rapid demobilization after our
wars reflects the will of the American people over many generations.

The Present

Since 1973, America has depended on volunteers to fill the ranks of its forces to protect it. From a dubious beginning until now the All Volunteer Force (AVF) has been accepted by the public as a viable method of providing manpower for national defense. Congress has acknowledged this by providing the means necessary to ensure the continued success of what has become a remarkable societal experiment and a validation of the law of supply and demand where the quest for labor is concerned.

The Future

The concept of national service in some form or another has existed at least since the early part of this century. The current debate concerning national service could well mean that it is an idea whose time has come. If so, the Army must prepare to enter a fourth era in the evolution of providing manpower to "provide for the common defense" and "secure the blessings of liberty" for the citizenry.

Crucial to this preparation is an understanding of why Americans volunteer and who can be expected to volunteer from the target population if given competing alternatives of similar value. A review of society's historical behavior
as a whole towards active military service and the attitude of today's youth towards such service is critical to the formulation of strategies that will ensure the Total Army continues to obtain and retain the number of quality men and women required to man the force.
CHAPTER II
NATIONAL SERVICE AND VOLUNTARISM

The social philosopher and psychologist William James is credited with issuing the first major call for a national service in his "The Moral Equivalent of War" speech presented at Stanford University in 1906. The following excerpt from that speech may be more timely now than at the beginning of the century:

Men now are proud of belonging to a conquering nation, and without a murmur they lay down their persons and their wealth, if by so doing they may fight off subjugation. But who can be sure that other aspects of one's country may not, with time and education and suggestion enough, come to be regarded with similarly effective feelings of pride and shame? Why should men not someday feel that it is worth a blood-tax to belong to a collectivity superior in any ideal respect? Why should they not blush with indignant shame if the community that owns them is vile in any way whatsoever?

Individuals, daily more numerous, now feel this civic passion. It is only a question of blowing on the spark till the whole population gets incandescent, and on the ruins of the old morals of military honor, until a stable system of morals of civic honor builds itself up. What the whole community comes to believe in grasps the individual as in a vise. The war function has grasped us so far; but constructive interests may someday seem no less imperative, and impose on the individual a hardly lighter burden.

If now ... there were, instead of military conscription, a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against Nature, the injustice would tend to be evened out, and numerous other goods to the commonwealth would follow.... Such a conscription, with the state of public opinion that would have required it, and the
many moral fruits it would bear, would preserve in the midst of a pacific civilization the manly virtues which the military party is so afraid of seeing disappear in peace.2

BACKGROUND

Since James' call for national service in 1906, there have been many other such proposals. While his proposition required conscription for implementation and was proposed in a much different time than exists today, current thinking on the subject of national service and the requirements for such service are not totally dissimilar. It may be argued that national service as a concept predates James and some sort of service was required to one's "nation" prior to independence. While the average person probably did not necessarily think nationally until the Civil War forged true nationalism, the foundation of American societal values concerning voluntarism was formed long before then. Those values, although severely tested during turbulent periods in our history have remained essentially unchanged.

An individual's service to the nation may be mandatory or voluntary. It may be incumbent on a particular gender or age group. It may require active or reserve service or both in a certain branch of the armed forces or it could be service in an organization such as the Peace Corps on in one's local community. In short, it may take on many forms. The acceptance or rejection of national service by the
majority of society depends on many factors. Generally, Americans have supported volunteer organizations for most purposes but have opposed compulsory military service.

**VOLUNTARISM**

The early settlers were volunteers of the first order. They had to be in order to survive. The harshness of their new environment dictated their actions. It was "all for one and one for all" or all could perish. From then to Ben Franklins' volunteer fire department in Philadelphia, to the present there has always been a commitment to voluntary civic service in this country. As with the early settlers it is understood that volunteering one's services is in the best interest of all and is a responsibility of citizenship.

**Why Volunteer?**

Not only is volunteering one's civic duty, in the final analysis the volunteer expects to receive some type of reward also. That reward may be tangible or intangible such as the volunteer fireman's house being saved from fire or a military veteran receiving the thanks of a grateful citizenry and financing a home with government assistance. The reward for volunteering may be nothing more than self satisfaction or it may be significantly more depending upon the need for a certain service or the level at which it is performed. In
any case with few, if any, exceptions there has to be an incentive for the volunteer. Nowhere is this more true than in the incentives offered today to entice young men and women to enlist in the military. While there have been and are now many volunteer organizations sponsored at the national level for different purposes none can compete with today's all volunteer military.

The attitude towards volunteering ebbs and flows depending upon the national mood driven by the economy, external threat or other factors. On balance, it has remained positive over the long term and has survived many challenges to include the "me generation" and the materialistic Yuppie.

Whenever challenged such as by President Kennedy to "ask what you can do for your country" or by President Bush's call for a "Thousand Points of Light", Americans have volunteered in great numbers. The bulwark of voluntarism has always been the citizens reaction whenever the nation has been threatened. The word "volunteer" is nearly synonymous with the word "soldier" when spoken in the context of American history. Americans have proven through their deeds that they will readily volunteer for a cause they believe to be worthy. On the other hand they have been quick to rebel when forced to perform a duty against their will.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
CHAPTER III
THE MILITIA LEGACY

While Americans have always been inclined to volunteer for causes in which they believe, they rebel at being forced to perform a service with which they do not agree and which offers no apparent incentive for doing so. Society has historically resisted efforts by the government to force the individual to give up his freedom to act on his choices. This has been especially true where compulsory military service is concerned. Although today's Congress must continue to grapple with how best to raise an army its task is relative minor compared to that experienced by the leaders of the colonies and later the Continental Congress in dealing with the militias.

The history of the militia originated in England with King Henry II's Assize of Arms:

Moreover, let each and every {freeman} ... swear that ... he will possess these arms and will bear allegiance to the lord king Henry ... and that he will bear these arms in his service according to his order and in allegiance to the lord king and his realm. And let none of those who hold these arms sell them or pledge them or offer them, or in any other way alienate them; neither let a lord in any way deprive his men of them either by forfeiture or gift, or as surety or in any other manner.1

The colonial militia of seventeenth century America came ashore with the earliest settlers. Indeed, several of the
colonies, Virginia and Massachusetts among them, were led by military professionals and Georgia was established as a military colony from its beginning. The militia was soon institutionalized in the colonies with requirements similar to those of the English militia before its demise in seventeenth century Europe. The English concept of every freeman having an obligation to perform military service carried over to every colony except Pennsylvania where the Quakers objected to military service. It is interesting to note that women and slaves (or indentured servants) were not subject to military service. Conjecture as to why might lead one to believe that only freemen were citizens and only citizens were required to perform the obligations of citizenship or that the women and servants were needed to maintain the households and farms. Subsequent history would indicate it was the former and not the latter. The abolishment of slavery and the enfranchisement of all Americans settled the question of citizenship. However, it left unanswered the question of an equal obligation (or right) of citizenship for all citizens regardless of gender. It passed on the contentious issue of unrestricted military service for women to be settled by future Americans. The need for an organized defense was apparent to the colonists. All colonies were threatened by Indians, the French, the Spanish or each other. The formation of a militia was the only feasible
solution to a creditable defense for a colony due to its poor economics and in most cases a sparse and widely spread population. As early as 1619, the Virginia assembly declared a general military obligation and in 1623, passed a statute requiring all citizens to bear arms. When in 1627, Richard Bickley refused to do so he was sentenced to be "laid neck and heels for the space of twelve hours" and fined a hundred pounds of tobacco.2

All able-bodied freemen from as early an age as sixteen to as old as sixty were required to serve in the militia -- a period covering over forty years of one's life. A stark comparison with today's Military Service Obligation of eight years which ironically is mandatory only for those citizens that enlist voluntarily (and aliens allowed to enlist). This period of service essentially amounted to service from age sixteen until disability or death given the life expectancy of the period.

In 1636, the Massachusetts Bay colony organized the first three regiments of militia; the North, East, and Boston Regiments. The North and East Regiments would become the 182nd Infantry and the 101st Engineer Battalion, the two oldest units in today's Army.3 Thus the heritage and lineage of a professional army began but it would be a long time before the requirement for a creditable standing army would be accepted and it, and not the militia would be
established as America's first line of defense.

The colonists' disdain for the British army grew out of the Quartering Act of 1765 and their fear of a standing professional regular army. That fear is reflected in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution:

No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

One can imagine the public outcry today if the government were to dictate private homes be used to house soldiers in peacetime!

The Constitution clearly reflects early America's intention to "provide for the common defense" through the concept of the citizen soldier. Although it provides for raising an army and maintaining a navy it is much more clear in the provisions outlining the organizing and employment of the militia as required by the Congress.

Each colony had a militia. It was made up of able-bodied men of the colony who attended monthly militia musters. They served without pay and were required to furnish their own equipment. Militia officers were elected by those they led. Membership in the militia was not an option. It was an obligation of citizenship in the colony and a matter of civic pride. As one governor of the Massachusetts colony stated every male should consider "it
his truest honor to be a soldier-citizen."

The militia was the embodiment of the citizen soldier. It was cost effective, was not threatening, and when needed could be ready for action on short notice. It was the militia who fought and somehow won the nation's independence. From Saratoga to Yorktown the merit of the citizen soldier army was cemented in the minds of the colonists. That blind faith ignored the fact that the militia fought poorly more often than not and lost more battles than it had won. For the most part it was poorly trained, paid, equipped, disciplined, and led. The Continental Congress held no real power over the colonies and was incapable of raising an army. It did issue quotas for men to each colony which by and large were ignored. Out of a total of 76,000 quotas issued the fighting strength of the Continental Army never exceeded 20,000.

Nevertheless, one didn't argue with success, ergo the idea that a professional military was not required was confirmed. It was to remain so for the next century and a half. It would be 1945 before the nation would recognize and accept the need for a sizable and professional standing armed force in peacetime. In the interim the focus would continue to be on the militia. The states would see to that. The inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights insuring "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." was necessary before the required number of states would ratify the Constitution.

The Constitution placed strict constraints on the ability of Congress to raise a national army by limiting its funding to no more than two years. There were no similar restrictions regarding a navy. These safeguards against a large army derived from the warnings of Hamilton and Madison in the Federalist papers. They echoed the population's fears of military force gone astray. The nation needed a navy to counter threats from abroad. The militia was sufficient to maintain internal security. Congress resorted to the Militia Act of 1792, a stop gap measure at best, to provide national policy for governing the state militias. Congress would continue to wrestle with the states over its authority to "raise and support Armies" well into the future.

The authority of Congress and its predecessors to raise an army has been challenged throughout American history. The challenge has ranged from discussion to open resistance and bloodshed. It continues to be a topic of great national concern and interest and most likely will remain one given the citizens' vehement protection of their individual liberties. The ongoing Supreme Court case initiated by five states over the federal government's directed training of their militia clearly demonstrates the continuing struggle.
over state's rights. The most controversial issue Congress has had to deal with in raising an army has been that of compulsory military service. The lessons learned during past periods of conscription must be applied in the consideration and formulation of any national service program if it is to be accepted by the American public.

ENDNOTES

1. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 3.

2. Ibid., p. 5.

3. Ibid., p. 7.


CHAPTER IV

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE

As discussed in Chapter Two, Americans detest being forced to do something they don't agree with or fail to see the need for, especially when that act requires them to forfeit some of their personal liberty or in the case of a state some of its rights. Few acts of government have been more controversial than that of conscription.

It was clear to many even before the War of Independence that the use of militia to fight large scale wars was wholly unsatisfactory. While the militia served a useful purpose and performed well when defending its local area its reputation and dependability when called upon to fight away from that area or outside its colony left much to be desired. As a result of his experience with the militia system in the French and Indian War, George Washington wrote:

Militia, you will find Sir, will never answer your expectations, no dependence is to be placed upon them; They are obstinate and perverse, they are often egged on by the Officers, who lead them to acts of disobedience, and when they are ordered to certain posts for the security of stores, or the protection of the Inhabitants, will, on a sudden, resolve to leave them, and the united vigilance of their officers can not prevent them.1

The militia system and the impotence of the Continental Congress in its power to conscript haunted Washington throughout the Revolution. "... if every nerve is not
strain'd to recruit the New Army with all possible expedition, I think the game is pretty near up"2 he wrote shortly before the enlistment of his army was to expire. He repeatedly found himself short of soldiers and having to recruit an army before a major battle or when enlistments were up. He was among the first to call for compulsory military service:

Voluntary enlistments seem to be entirely out of the question {he wrote as early as 1778}, all the allurements of the most exorbitant bounties and every other inducement that could be thought of, have been tried in vain, and seem to have had little other effect than to increase the rapacity and raise the demands of those to whom they were held out. We may fairly infer, that the country has been already pretty well drained of that class of Men whose tempers, attachments and circumstances disposed them to enter permanently, or for a length of time, into the army....3

and:

I most firmly believe {wrote Washington in October, 1780} that the Independence of the United States never will be established till there is an Army on foot for the War; that if we are to rely on occasional or annual Levies we must sink under the expense; and ruin must follow.4

The colonies and later the states would remain firmly in control of anything military. The idea of a central government with the power to raise a large army ran counter to the citizen's fears and they ensured that that power would come under the realm of state's rights. The War of 1812
found President Madison incapable of calling the states' militia into federal service, although his Congress unlike the Continental Congress, was empowered "To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." The states refusal to mobilize their militias to serve under the federal government led Madison to call for a draft but his request died in Congress. Presidents still find themselves doing battle with states rights issues over the peacetime employment of their modern day militia, the National Guard. President Lincoln would request the next draft nearly a half century after Madison's request failed.

If George Washington gave birth to the idea of conscription, it was Abraham Lincoln who made it a reality. The Regular Army strength of 1860, was slightly more than 16,000 officers and men. Two days after Fort Sumter surrendered in April 1861, Lincoln called for 75,000 militia. The initial reaction in the North swelled the ranks of the Union Army to 187,000 by the end of the year. But unlike previous wars the Civil War would take advantage of the locomotive. Armies could, for the first time, be moved rapidly. The train would allow commanders to mass large armies for battle and with new weapons technology sustain large numbers of casualties. Large numbers of troops would be needed. However, the myth of the militia would not die.
The citizen soldier had won all the nation's previous wars and it could win this one also.

The public's continuing fear of the federal government and its army coupled with fanatical states rights advocates, resisted all attempts by Lincoln to impose conscription or even to directly enlist volunteers into the Regular Army. The southern states which seceded over states rights imposed conscription early and were able to raise an army of over 900,000 from an available population of five and a half million. The Enrollment Act of 1863, although full of flaws, was the first attempt to conscript for military service. Riots protesting the draft were common with the most serious turning into a race riot in New York City in July 1863, where an estimated 500 people died.5

When conscription was next called for the lessons learned from Civil War conscription were applied. Whereas only about six percent of Union soldiers were bona fide draftees, the Selective Service Act of 1917 provided sixtyseven percent of the World War I servicemembers.6 Thus, the power of the federal government to conscript as empowered by the Constitution was at last firmly established.

The United States became a world power after the Spanish American War. The American public accepted their new responsibility and finally realized the need for a creditable active army. This acceptance did not necessarily soothe
their objections to a large armed force and it certainly did not change their thoughts concerning conscription especially when they fail to see a need for it.

America's first peacetime compulsory military service law, the Selective Service and Training Act, was signed by President Roosevelt on September 16, 1940. Thus ended a tradition that had served the nation for 150 years - that of manning the nation's peacetime armed forces with volunteers.

The events leading up to this historical departure from tradition somewhat replicate today's events in reverse. War was breaking out everywhere and public and Congressional sentiment was changing. America had at long last accepted its inevitable involvement in a second world war. Less than a year before Germany invaded Poland a Gallup poll showed over two-thirds of those polled thought the country's participation in World War I had been wrong. In February, 1940, thirtytwo percent felt America would enter World War II. Three months later sixtytwo percent thought so.7 The fall of France in June, 1940, ended any doubt. Adolf Hitler had caused what many in America had wanted since the birth of the nation - peacetime conscription.

The Army reflected two decades of neglect. With wooden rifles, mock cannons, trucks with "tank" painted on them and an active strength of 189,893 (twentyfive percent of it was overseas) in 1939,8 it was ill prepared for war. General
George C. Marshall was appointed Chief of Staff the month Hitler invaded Poland. His pleadings to the Congress for proper funding and manpower had been unsuccessful until now. With the fall of France, Congress, like the public, provided more than was asked. Its provision of peacetime conscription set a precedence that would last until 1973. However the calls for some form of national service would continue.

ENDNOTES

2. Ibid., p. 39.
3. Ibid., p. 41.
4. Ibid., p. 42.
8. Weigley, p. 569.
CHAPTER V
AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH NATIONAL SERVICE

William James' proposal for conscripted national service early in the century was to have been a panacea for the youth of the day. Every young man would be trained in a skill to be able to seek meaningful employment and while being trained he would be taught the discipline needed to be a responsible citizen. Since James first declared the need for national service there have been many other proposals and several programs designed primarily to assist young men make the transition from youth to adulthood. Unlike James' proposed program none of the implemented programs have been mandatory.

Probably the most successful of the numerous national service programs that have been implemented over the years was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and even it had its critics. When FDR was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, former Army Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood with former President Teddy Roosevelt established the Citizens Military Camps. The concept was to train young men to provide a pool of officers for mobilization. The first camp, established at Plattsburg, New York in 1915, gave the program its name of the "Plattsburg movement." FDR liked the idea so much he established "Naval Plattsburgs." The concept was unique to most national service programs in that it targeted college students and
affluent young professionals who paid for the privilege of attending. The Plattsburg movement saw ninety percent of its graduates in military service in World War I and several in high civilian and government positions later in life. FDR remembered the success of the Citizens Military Camps. They undoubtedly were an influence in his formulation of several of his New Deal programs but, most certainly the CCC. What possibly could have been wrong with a national service program that advertised "Give your vacation to your country and still have the best vacation you ever had?"2

The Plattsburg experiment although successful, was overcome by World War I. No doubt, the 1916 legislation requiring military training for all male students attending land grant colleges was influenced by the Plattsburg movement. The establishment of the Reserve Officer Training Corps(ROTC) was the only national service concept that survived World War I and it was not popular. The horror of World War I and the belief that it was indeed the "war to end all wars" coupled with the disarmament of Germany left little cause or need for anything military. Nowhere is this belief reflected better in American society than in the readiness of the Army in the two decades following the war. If the Army of the 1970's was a "hollow army" the Army between the World Wars was barely existent.

The concept of national service was kept at the
forefront of public issues by James and others at the turn of the century and no one was a stronger proponent or more vocal than General Wood even while he served as Army Chief of Staff. Various forms of national service programs were proposed or adopted for different purposes in virtually every administration in this century. Many, such as the CCC of the New Deal era, the Peace Corps, Job Corps, and VISTA were successful. No adopted program to include the CCC required, or substituted for, military service. The proposed Universal Military Training (UMT) program of the Truman Administration was the closest America came to adopting a mandatory program of military service for all eligible males. Despite the Army's strong support and active participation in lobbying activities, UMT was not enacted as proposed. With its demise the support for a compulsory national program of military service waned. Now there is a strong resurgence of support for national service. But the Army wants no part of any type of national service program notwithstanding the fact that many of the proposals have included military service as an option.

There have been many bills introduced in recent years which propose some form of national service. The type of service varies with the bill but it ranges from compulsory military service to strictly volunteer service. A bipartisan bill co-sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy, D-Massachusetts,
and Senator Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, and recently passed in the Senate provides greater benefits for youths who volunteer for civilian service than those currently provided for military service. A discussion of the large number of varying types of national service proposals exceeds the scope of this study. One proposal co-sponsored by Senator Sam Nunn, D-Georgia, and Representative Dave McCurdy, D-Oklahoma in the 101st Congress will be discussed.

ENDNOTES

1. Moskos, p. 20.
2. Ibid., p. 21.
CHAPTER VI

THE CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL SERVICE ACT OF 1989

{This} legislation should be put to the Darman "duck" test: if it looks like a draft and smells like a draft, it must be a draft!

Elliot J. Feldman
Congressional Hearing
23 February 1989

BACKGROUND

Several bills have been introduced in the Congress with various strategies designed to implement some form of national service. The proposed bill, designed to raise a national corps of volunteers of all ages, which elicited Mr. Feldman's comment is the "Citizenship and National Service Act of 1989" co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and Representative McCurdy and 25 other members of Congress (Six senators and 19 representatives). Of the 27 co-sponsors all are Democrats except one, seven serve on their Armed Services committee, and only 10 have performed any type of military service.

The Nunn-McCurdy Bill

The purpose of the Nunn-McCurdy bill is to establish a Citizens Corps which would provide three options for voluntary national service:

1. Civilian service.

2. Service in the armed forces.
3. Senior service.

Appendix 1 is a synopsis of the entire bill (S.3 and H.R. 660 are identical, therefore only S.3 is provided).

**IMPACT OF NUNN-MCCURDY ON THE ARMY**

If enacted the Nunn-McCurdy proposal (or any similar legislation) would have the potential to impact the current force, and the Army's manning and training systems.

**THE CURRENT FORCE**

The degree of impact of the Nunn-McCurdy bill on the current force is impossible to determine, however, such provisions as no authorized allowances and two-thirds the pay of a "regular" volunteer of equivalent grade and time in service could create an environment that would deter cohesion and breed confusion as to benefits and resentment towards the Army on the part of the Citizens Corps (CC) volunteer. On the other hand the "regular" soldier is likely to feel the benefits the CC volunteer would receive and the options they provide (to include using them to buy a house) are better than the more restrictive benefits he will receive. It is certain that two soldiers of the same rank and performing the same duty while entitled to different pay, allowances and benefits could cause the perception of there being two classes of soldiers akin to the "US and "RA" distinctions prior to 1974.
The management of citizen-soldiers to ensure fairness in overseas tours, equal consideration for promotions and schooling, COHORT packages, etc. would require additional resources and changes to the current system. The administration of a CC would require a large bureaucracy with the Department of Defense likely assuming the lead. Should DOD be required to pay the bill the greatest impact would be in reduced dollars for other defense programs.

MANNING

The ability to continue to recruit and retain quality soldiers would be severely disrupted. With the declining population of 18 to 25 year old males the services are already experiencing difficulty in meeting recruiting quotas. The Nunn-McCurdy bill would further hinder the recruitment of I-IIIA Test Score Category (TSC) applicants. The legislation would essentially negate the Army's competitive recruiting edge the Congress has provided with the two year enlistment and the Army College Fund. A potential applicant's propensity to enlist would be reduced considering he (or she) could continue to live at home and earn nearly the same benefits as a soldier while working fewer hours performing volunteer services in the local community.

To continue to attract and retain professional soldiers would require a significant increase in incentives for the Total Army. The current enlistment benefits would be
noncompetitive with the civilian volunteer benefits if Nunn-McCurdy were enacted as proposed.

TRAINING

When fully mobilized all the services combined can train approximately one million recruits a year. Currently the Army's maximum number of two year enlistments is 15,000. Nunn-McCurdy would increase the Army's two year enlistments and require the other services to establish a two year program. The bill does not cap the total number of two year contracts nor does it require a floor on the number of recruits by TSC. Experience has proven the lower the TSC the less trainable the recruit. In some skills the CC soldier would not attain proficiency. The increased training requirements would stretch the training base and unit trainers to the limit. The objectives of Nunn-McCurdy may not be at all attainable without significant resources added for a surge in the training base. Even if the Training and Doctrine Command were provided the necessary resources the question of unit trainers being able to handled the increased training requirements would remain.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The fundamental values of early Americans determined their attitudes towards the military and a professional army. The British army instilled a fear in the colonists that has stood the test of time. A fear of standing armed forces and violent protection of individual freedoms are as much a part of today's society as any previous. Americans have and will continue to do what is necessary to protect treasured freedoms. However, they will continue to reserve the right of deciding when the time to act has come.

From the days of the early militia until now the way the nation is protected has depended upon the consensus of the public. It is a way of doing business that is not likely to change. The pattern has been consistent. In every instant of national crisis we have been late to mobilize and quick to demobilize. It can be argued that the Civil War was the greatest threat the Nation has experienced. Yet, neither side was quick to conscript. It was over a year after Fort Sumter was fired on before the Confederacy enacted conscription and it was not until 1863 that the Union passed conscription laws. Even so, that war for the most part was fought with militia. The history of rapid demobilizations has been just as consistent. While Americans are quick to volunteer for a worthwhile cause as determined by them, they
are just as quick to rebel at being forced to perform a service or duty with which they disagree. The thirteenth amendment to the Constitution ratified soon after the end of the Civil War outlaws slavery, but it also outlaws involuntary servitude -- a reaction to conscription.

Given these deep-rooted beliefs, honed over time, national service as a method of raising an army in peacetime seems unlikely. What is likely based on the growing Democratic support for programs to help our youth make the transition to adulthood and accept their responsibilities of citizenship is some type of national service program which will have some undetermined affect on an all recruited force.

The Army (and DOD) leadership must prepare for what seems to be an idea whose time has come.
BRIEF TITLE: Citizenship and National Service Act of 1989

SPONSOR: Nunn

DATE INTRODUCED: January 25, 1989

SENATE COMMITTEE: Labor and Human Resources

OFFICIAL TITLE: A bill to establish a corporation to administer a program of voluntary national service, and for other purposes.

CO-SPONSORS: 6 CURRENT COSPONSORS

Jan 25, 89 Referred to Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

Jan 31, 89 Committee on Labor and Human Resources requested executive comment from Office of Management and Budget, General Accounting Office, Department of Education, Department of Defense, and Veterans Administration.

Mar 9, 89 Committee Hearings Held.

Mar 14, 89 Committee Hearings Held.

Mar 20, 89 Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Hearings held at Dorchester, Mass.

Apr 21, 89 Committee Hearings Held.

CO-SPONSORS: 6 CURRENT COSPONSORS

AS INTRODUCED: Robb, Glenn, Breaux, Sasser.

Jan 31, 89 Matsunaga, Boren.


Establishes the Citizens Corps, which shall provide the following national service options: (1) Civilian Service; (2) Service in the armed forces; and (3) Senior Service.

Allows individuals to serve in the Civilian Service who: (1) are age 17 or over; (2) have received a high school diploma or its equivalent; and (3) are U.S. citizens or permanent residents.

Allows individuals to be eligible to enlist for service in the armed forces as Citizen Corps members (subject to existing personnel requirements of the armed forces) who: (1) have received a high school diploma or its equivalent; (2) satisfy applicable enlistment requirements; and (3) satisfy other eligibility criteria established by the Secretary of Defense.

Allows individuals to serve in the Senior Service who: (1) are age 65 or over; and (2) meet eligibility criteria established by the Corporation for National Service.

Makes such Civilian Service one year of full-time national service, with the option of requesting an additional year. Makes such Armed Forces Service either: (1) two years of active duty in the armed forces, two years in the Selected Reserve of a reserve component, and four years in the Individual Ready Reserve; or (2) eight years in the Selected Reserve of a reserve component. Makes the Senior Service for such time period as the Corporation for National Service allows and either full- or part-time.

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Provides that Civilian Service or Senior Service members may perform national service to meet the unmet needs of a State, local government, or other community. Allows such service to include the following types: (1) educational service (such as literacy and numeracy programs, Head Start, tutoring, and service in schools, libraries, and adult education centers); (2) human service (such as service in hospitals, hospices, clinics, community health centers, homes for the elderly, and child-care centers, and in programs assisting the elderly, poor, and homeless, including improving their housing); (3) conservation service (such as conservation of urban and rural natural resources, community betterment); (4) public safety service in support of the criminal justice system (including police, courts, prisons, and border patrol); and (5) service in existing national programs (such as the Peace Corps and VISTA).

Directs the Secretary of Defense to designate appropriate national service positions for Citizens Corps members serving in the armed forces.

Sets forth application requirements for Civilian Service and Senior Service. Directs the Secretary of Defense to establish a system to enlist individuals for service in the armed forces as Citizens Corps members.

Title I: Administration of the Citizens Corps - Subtitle A: Administration of the Civilian Service and Senior Service - Makes the Corporation for National Service (CNS) responsible for administering the Civilian Service and Senior Service of the Citizens Corps.

Establishes the Corporation for National Service as a nonprofit corporation which shall not be considered an agency or establishment of the U.S. Government. Makes the CNS subject to this Act and, if consistent with this Act, the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act.

Directs CNS to establish: (1) types and amounts of allowances and support for Civilian and Senior Service members; (2) appropriate types of national service activities for such members; (3) procedures to monitor provision of financial assistance under title III of this Act to assure that Citizens Corps members and graduates faithfully perform and complete their service; (4) procedures to examine the effect of such national service on the availability and terms of employment in an area; and (5) rates of pay, eligibility criteria, and terms of service for Senior Service members.

Directs CNS to make general grants, pursuant to a specified allocation formula, to assist States in: (1) paying civilian and senior service member stipends and wages; (2) providing and administering national service opportunities for such members; and (3) making grants to national service councils in each State.

Authorizes CNS to make supplemental grants during a fiscal year to: (1) States which have an unusual increase in Civilian and Senior Service members (excluding those serving with Federal agencies) in such fiscal year; and (2) Federal agencies to assist them in placing Civilian and Senior Service members for such fiscal
Directs CNS also to: (1) serve as a clearinghouse for national service opportunities information; (2) assist States in placing applicants in out-of-State positions, if they are unable to place them in within-State positions; (3) assist Federal agencies in acquiring national service participants; (4) investigate claims of abuses in placement or administration; and (5) issue rules for administering and monitoring service performance and provision of service opportunities.

Subtitle B: Provision of National Service Positions for Members of the Civilian Service and Senior Service

Directs each State Governor to: (1) prepare a national service plan for the State, specifying priorities; and (2) designate volunteer service areas in the State.

Requires each volunteer service area to have a national service council.

Requires such councils to: (1) recruit and place volunteers; (2) prepare and implement a plan for such purposes; (3) provide oversight; and (4) perform other duties.

Conditions provision of funds to a national service council upon its being certified and its volunteer recruitment and placement plan being approved.

Requires councils to consider agency effectiveness and community-basing in selecting service sponsors, i.e. the public agencies or public or nonprofit organizations with which the Civilian or Senior Service members are placed.

Requires the Council to take measures to prevent worker displacement. Requires each State to establish grievance procedures for resolving complaints of regular employees or their representatives that placement of Service members violates such prohibitions of worker displacement. Provides for appeal of State decisions under such procedures to CNS.

Authorizes CNS to require private nonprofit corporations to pay to CNS up to $1,000 per Service member placed in a position with such organization. Provides for reduction of such payment to reflect part-time or less than full-year service.

Subtitle C: Administration of the Citizens Corps with regard to Service in the armed forces

Makes the Secretary of Defense responsible for administering the Citizens Corps with regard to service by Citizens Corps members in the armed forces, and to issue rules for such purpose within 60 days.

Title III: Benefits for Participating in the Citizens Corps

Requires States and Federal agencies to provide $100 per week stipends to Civilian Service members. Requires CNS to provide such members with health insurance. Authorizes CNS to provide other appropriate support assistance.

Requires States and Federal agencies to pay an hourly wage determined by CNS to Senior Service members. Authorizes CNS to provide other appropriate support assistance.

Requires that Citizens Corps members serving in the armed forces receive 66 percent of the rate applicable to other armed forces members of the same pay grade and years of service, for
their basic pay and basic allowances for subsistence and quarters. Makes such Citizens Corps members and graduates ineligible for specified benefits for other members and veterans of the armed forces.

Establishes certain educational and housing benefits for those who complete Citizens Corps service in the Civil Service or in the armed forces. Provides that such financial benefits shall be to assist such individuals to: (1) pursue a program of education or training at an educational institution or training establishment; or (2) purchase or construct a dwelling to be owned and occupied by such individuals as their primary residence. Excludes such assistance from gross income for income tax purposes.

Sets the amount of such education and housing benefits for Civilian Service at not to exceed $10,000 for each year of the term of service completed. Allows CNS to provide portions of such assistance to individuals who are released from such service for just cause.

Sets the amount of such education and housing benefits for Citizens Corps service in the armed forces at: (1) not to exceed $24,000 for completion of two years honorable service on active duty, if the member agrees to complete the honorable service obligation selected; and (2) not to exceed $12,000 for each year of satisfactory participation in training in the Selective Reserve, if the member agrees to complete the honorable service obligation selected. Allows the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide portions of such assistance to Citizens Corps members released with an honorable discharge from completing a service obligation in the armed forces.

Limits the use of such assistance to the ten-year period after completion of service, unless it is determined that an individual was unavoidably prevented from using such assistance during such time period.

**Title IV: Miscellaneous Provisions** - Entitles individuals who successfully complete terms of service in the Peace Corps or VISTA to educational and housing benefits. Provides that entitlement to benefits shall be in the same manner as for a member of the Civilian Service, even though such individuals are not members of such Service; but reduces such benefits to reflect the amount of compensation received by such volunteers over and above the amount of the stipend for Civil Service members.

Conditions individual eligibility for Federal higher educational assistance under student loan or loan guarantee programs on current membership or successful completion of a term of service in the Citizen Corps. Makes such condition effective on October 1, 1995 (five years after the effective date of this Act). Sets forth the following exceptions to such condition, if such individuals are otherwise eligible for such assistance: (1) individuals enrolled in an educational institution before the end of such five-year period; (2) individuals age 26 or over; (3) individuals who served honorably in the armed forces; (4) individuals determined by CNS to be ineligible for national service because of physical or mental handicap, compelling personal
circumstances, or unavailability of a national service position after a reasonable period; (5) individuals receiving assistance provided by the Department of Defense to members of the armed forces (or the Department of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard) if further military service is a condition of the assistance; (6) individuals receiving assistance provided by the Directors of the Peace Corps or the ACTION Agency, the head of a Federal agency, or a State, if the condition of such assistance is Peace Corps or ACTION service or national or community service which CNS determines is comparable to Citizens Corps service; and (7) individuals who served in Peace Corps, ACTION, or such Federal or State programs of comparable national or community service.

Sets forth similar conditions for parental loan program eligibility.

Directs CNS to identify by rule compelling personal circumstances, such as age, family status or size, and income, that may render an individual: (1) ineligible for national service under this Act; but (2) eligible, as an exception, for Federal student loans.

Provides for a phase-out of the following Federal higher education student grant programs: (1) Pell Grants; (2) Student Educational Opportunity Grants; and (3) State Student Incentive Grants.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


