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A CONCEPT FOR SENIOR LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORWEGIAN ARMY

BY

COLONEL BJORN FREDRIKSEN
Norwegian Army

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2 APRIL 1990

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
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**COL BJORN FREDRIKSEN**

**U.S. Army War College**
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A CONCEPT FOR SENIOR LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORWEGIAN ARMY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Bjorn Fredriksen, Norwegian Army
Colonel Alfred G. Snelgrove, Jr., U.S. Army
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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INTRODUCTION

There are several reasons why it is relevant to address senior leadership in the Norwegian Army now. First, the Norwegian Army has not experienced war since World War II. All officers with experience from that war have been retired long ago. The closest Norwegian Army officers have been to experiencing war during the last four decades is participation in United Nations' peacekeeping operations. In many respects these operations provide a selected few officers with valuable experience, which benefits the professional level of the army. However, these operations cannot in any way be compared to war. Second, the main component of the Norwegian Army is the mobilization component, which is eight times the size of the peacetime strength.1 Clearly a mobilization army with only three weeks refreshment training every three years, after a one-year initial training, is crucially dependent on a professionally competent leadership.2 According to FM 100-5, Operations, the most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership.3 This observation has even greater significance for a mobilization army. Third, in 1985 the Norwegian Army experienced a rather heated debate concerning the competencies and qualities of its senior leadership.4 Nothing very constructive resulted from this debate. Some named generals, who were criticized, particularly by reserve officers, for their leadership style during a refreshment training exercise, resorted to defending their actions rather than trying to grasp the essence of the issue.
Fourth, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense in 1988 initiated a three-year study project to be performed at the University of Bergen concerning leadership within the armed forces. This initiative was partly a result of some conclusions in the final report of the Commission that investigated the causes for the accident in 1986, in which sixteen soldiers were killed in an avalanche during a field training exercise.

For these reasons the leadership debate in the Norwegian Army is likely to continue, and some new doctrinal initiatives ought to result from it. Being a student at the U.S. Army War College puts me in a unique position to study the doctrinal and educational part of senior leadership development in the United States Army. Using this opportunity it is my hope to draw some conclusion which may be useful to the future senior leadership development in the Norwegian Army.

For the purpose of this study I define senior leaders as colonels and higher ranks.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to determine if there are any flaws or shortfalls in how the Norwegian Army conceptually approaches senior leadership development, and if shortfalls are identified, to recommend corrective measures. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to propose detailed actions. I am particularly concerned about which instruments can be applied in peacetime to prepare army officers for the awesome responsibilities and challenges they are likely to face in war.

It is the thesis of this paper that the Norwegian Army lacks a sufficiently detailed doctrine on senior leadership. The result is that
certain skills, competencies and attributes of senior leaders are not being adequately addressed in education, training and execution of leadership.

My approach to this study is to examine what writers of military history and the art of war can teach us about senior leadership. I will also examine U.S. Army doctrine on this subject and compare it with the present state of matters in the Norwegian Army. To what degree this is a relevant comparison will be discussed in Chapter IV.

ENDNOTES


6. Ibid.
CHAPTER II

REQUIREMENTS OF SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS

GENERAL

If one wishes to develop a conceptual framework for senior leadership development it is necessary to first examine what is required of senior leaders. Senior leadership is not necessarily synonymous with generalship or command of combat formations at high level. However, for the purpose of this discussion I will make no distinction between them. More important perhaps, is the distinction between command at high level on the battlefield and serving in a high level executive leadership position in peacetime. I will touch upon both but focus on what is required in war. However, we are talking of the same leaders. Therefore, the challenge is how to prepare for war while executing peacetime responsibilities.

MILITARY HISTORY

Sun Tzu in his essays on "The Art of War" 2,500 years ago recognized that the moral strength and the intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war. He further pointed to five matters which are essential in assessing the relative strength of opposing forces. These five matters were morale, generalship, terrain, weather and doctrine. From these observations we can deduce that the importance of leadership on the outcome on the battlefield is not a new thought.

Clausewitz, in his classical volumes "On War", has an extensive discussion on military genius. Although Clausewitz reserves the term military genius for those who have excelled in the highest positions as commanders-in-chief, he also points out that appropriate talent

4
is required at all levels if distinguished service is to be performed.\textsuperscript{4}

Even if very few military leaders will have the opportunity to fit into Clausewitz's definition of military genius, it may still be of relevance to examine which attributes of military leaders he considered a precondition for distinguished service. It is obvious that if there is no potential for genius to be found at lower levels of command, there is nobody to rise to the level of genius.

In his discussion on military genius Clausewitz identifies ten qualities or attributes which all play an indispensable role in a military mind aspiring for genius.\textsuperscript{5} They are:

- Courage.
- Strength of body and soul.
- Powers of intellect.
- Coup d'oeil.
- Determination.
- Presence of mind.
- Energy.
- Endurance.
- Character.
- Imagination.

In Clausewitz's opinion each of these attributes are in themselves important contributors to success on the battlefield, but it is the harmonious combination of all that is essential for the military genius.\textsuperscript{6}

Clausewitz seems to think that the potential for creation of military genius coincides with the degree of civilization of the society; that the quality of military genius is a result of intellectual development in society.\textsuperscript{7} From this view one can clearly draw the conclusion that one can
develop military officers with a potential for distinguished service, by exposing them to experience provided they possess the required mental capacity. I would also maintain that the experience need not be gained on the battlefield alone, but can to a great degree be acquired through books. Bismarck once said that only idiots learn through their own experience. He preferred to learn through others' experience. This of course is not to say that officers can be trained and developed only through study of war in books. In an army which cannot draw on benefits from war, realistic field training exercises is an indispensable tool in order to test theories on the conduct of battle.

Because war is the realm of chance and uncertainty, the French term coup d'oeil plays an important part in Clausewitz's discussion. Coup d'oeil refers to the ability to quickly grasp the true nature of the situation, which the mind would otherwise need time to analyze and reflect on. Combined with determination, coup d'oeil serves to limit the agonies of doubt and hesitation which arise from the omnipresent quest for certainty on the battlefield.

Martin Van Crewald points out in "Command in War" that the quest for certainty is never to be resolved, no matter how sophisticated the command systems we develop. Ultimately the commander therefore must rely partly on his intuition in the decision-making process, and not let the fog of war distract him from what has to be done. In the lack of extensive war experience this capability can only be acquired through a combination of the study of war and practice on the training field in exercises.

It is interesting to see how Clausewitz's views coincide with views of others with more recent experience on the battlefield. General, Sir Archibald Wavell, in a series of lectures on generals and generalship at Trinity
College, Cambridge in 1939, discussed many of the same attributes as did Clausewitz. Although he sometimes used different words, and added some skills and the need for a common sense, Sir Archibald seemed to be very much in agreement with Clausewitz on the prerequisite attributes for successful generals. Wavell, of course, based his lectures on personal experience and the study of successful generals who had reached their fame on the battlefield long after Clausewitz's days.

Similarly, Barbara W. Tuchman, drawing from her study of military history, in a lecture on generalship at the U.S. Army War College in 1972, reiterated many of the same qualities to be found in generals.

Thus we can draw the conclusion that there are certain basic attributes required in senior leaders, already discussed by Clausewitz, which have stood the test of time irrespective of the technological development of the battlefield. They therefore seem to be universal in scope in the sense that they have to do with the human factor in battle.

U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE

A more recent and complete discussion on senior leadership requirement is to be found in U.S. Army Senior Leadership Doctrine. FM 22-103 provides a doctrinal framework for leadership and command at senior levels.

In the preface three purposes for the manual are stated. First, it is meant to serve as guidelines for professional development of leaders aspiring to lead and command at senior levels. Second, it is a ready source of guidelines for officers actually holding senior positions. Third, FM 22-103 shall serve as a frame of reference for other initiatives related to senior leadership. In my view the first purpose is the most important one. In this manual junior leaders will find a whole range of useful ideas to seek
self-improvement in order to prepare themselves for more senior positions. As such, a manual dealing particularly with senior leadership and its distinction from leadership at lower levels is indispensable.

Chapter One FM 22-103 defines leadership and command at senior levels as "the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired results." In Chapter Five this definition is developed further in an extensive discussion of the four processes of command and leadership.

Command is a process to communicate interest and provide direction to achieve results. Control is a process designed to establish limits and provide structure. Management is a conceptual process which facilitates planning and efficiency. Leadership is a personal influence process that provides purpose and motivation.

The definition of leadership and the discussion of the four related processes represent an essential framework to reflect on senior leadership. The first important aspect to note is the distinction between direct and indirect influence. While senior leaders exert both, contrary to leadership at lower levels, senior leaders must be astutely aware that indirect influence plays a paramount role at their level.

This observation leads directly to the next aspect of the definition of senior leadership. Indirect influence is obtained through use of the organization. Senior leaders, therefore, must possess the skill to create an organizational climate which makes subordinate commanders and staffs responsive to the senior's influence efforts.

Finally, and the most important aspect of the definition, is that command and leadership is a results oriented activity. The quality of the
result is a general measure of the effectiveness of leadership. The best results are obtained if the organization acts willingly through motivation created by the senior leader.

FM 22-103 is a conceptual treatment of command and leadership at senior levels. Since leadership involves using influence to obtain results, it is natural that the treatment starts with a thorough discussion of leadership vision. Vision is described as a senior leader's source of strength, and perspective of the desired results. In this discussion we can clearly see the influence of Clausewitz, in that vision is likened to his discussion of coup d'oeil. This is the intuitive ability to quickly realize what has to be done. To formulate his vision a senior leader must draw on certain perspectives on history, operations and the organization. To implement his vision effectively he needs to possess attributes such as being a standard-bearer, developer and integrator and finally make use of leadership imperatives such as creating purpose, direction and motivation. Thus FM 22-103 establishes the foundation for what senior leaders must be, know, and do to be successful.

The manual goes on to discuss the ethical framework and necessary skills to be able to achieve desired results. Of particular importance is Chapter Six which discusses the organization. To effectively implement their vision senior leaders must establish cohesive, adaptive and resilient organizations and understand the intimate relationship between the organization itself, its leaders and their followers.

The final chapter examines several historical examples of successful senior leaders during World War II, which in an excellent way illustrate the concept of leadership discussed in the previous chapters. This chapter also illustrates the value of reading military history, memoirs, and biographies in
order to gain experience on senior leadership on the battlefield. In Appendix A of FM 22-103 are reiterated the eleven time-tested principles of leadership which are also treated in FM 22-100, Military Leadership, aimed at company and battalion level leaders.

The United States Army also has another important publication on senior leadership. DA Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership, is new and complementary to existing doctrinal leadership publications. This publication addresses more specifically leadership in executive positions at the highest levels in peacetime. Essentially it introduces the concept of a third level of leadership—the strategic.

CONCLUSIONS

Together FM 22-103 and DA Pamphlet 600-80 provide an excellent foundation for senior leadership development for peace and war. As I will discuss further in Chapter IV of this paper it is inconceivable to acquire the leadership modern armies need without such basic documents on what constitutes successful senior leadership. The Norwegian Army does not have a publication today that covers this urgent need. The strength and value of such publications is that they establish agreed upon doctrinal statements of what senior leaders must be, know, and do to be successful in large military organizations and on the battlefield. They establish the philosophical frame of reference for leader action.

It is also obvious that FM 22-103 is heavily influenced by Clausewitz and successful commanders in previous wars. Many quotations from "On War" and other historical sources is used to support the discussion of attributes,
skills and competencies required of senior leaders. This observation serves to underline the importance of the study of the evolution of warfare by reading military history in order to understand what is required by leaders on the battlefield.

ENDNOTES

2. Ibid., p. 40.
4. Ibid., p. 111.
6. Ibid., p. 100.
7. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 3.
17. Ibid., p. 47.
18. Ibid., p. 5.
20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 16.

22. Ibid., p. 66.

23. Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership, p. iii (Preface).

24. Ibid., pp. 5-8.

25. FM 22-103, pp. 7, 8, 11, 12, 17, 26-28, 30, 32, 38, 48, 57, 59, 60, 67-79.
CHAPTER III
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

U.S. ARMY - PROFESSIONAL VALUES

The United States Army considers the men and women in service to belong to a profession of arms as opposed to a vocation.\(^1\) The profession is constituted by shared institutional values such as, loyalty, duty, selfless service, integrity, and individual values such as commitment, competence, candor and courage.\(^2\) "No peacetime duty is more important for leaders than studying their profession and preparing for war."\(^3\) These are the fundamental guidelines that govern U.S. Army leadership development.

Detailed discussion on leadership requirements are contained in doctrinal publications already discussed in Chapter II of this paper. FM 22-103 points out that development as a military professional is a continual and career-long process.\(^4\) DA Pamphlet 600-80 describes the leadership development process as consisting of two components; the structured component and the unstructured component. The first one consists of the traditional formal training, schooling, and experience through duty assignments. The unstructured component consists of individual leader development, including coaching, guiding, and mentoring.\(^5\)

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

These structures and processes are tied together in a total description of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) in DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization.\(^6\) The purpose of the OPMS is to enhance effectiveness and professionalism in the United States Army Officer Corps. The OPMS encompasses all policies and
procedures regarding procurement, training, development, assignment, evaluation, promotion and separation from active duty of army officers.\textsuperscript{7}

The OPMS consists of three major subsystems and numerous supporting processes. The three subsystems are: Strength management, professional development, and evaluation. These systems are interactive in that they merge in a centralized process for selection for promotion, command and other assignments.\textsuperscript{8} Although they are all important parts in an officer's career, for the purpose of this study, I will concentrate my discussion on the professional development system.

**PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

According to DA Pamphlet 600-3 the process of professional development consists of five basic elements:\textsuperscript{9}

- Development in designated career field(s).
- Officer professional education, to include resident and nonresident instruction, on-the-job training, individual study and civilian education when appropriate.
- Individual professional development.
- Planned and progressive rotation of duties to different assignments.
- Professional development counseling by commanders.

I find it of particular interest that these elements include such things as nonresident instruction, individual study, and individual professional development as supplements to the more traditional resident instruction and assignment rotation. FM 22-103 in Appendix B elaborates on the obligation that leaders have to continue their personal professional development.\textsuperscript{10} In
this regard the following elements are considered important:

- To maintain technical and tactical competence.
- To develop a historical perspective, through reading military history, in order to ascertain lessons learned and to understand the nature of war.
- To participate in a professional reading program to stay abreast in history and current affairs, which will stimulate creative and analytical thinking, and understanding of the impact of change in society and the world.
- To maintain a thorough understanding of doctrine as it develops and changes. This is crucial to successful leadership on the modern battlefield.
- Finally senior leaders as well as all soldiers have an obligation to keep physically fit in order to endure the stress and hardships of the battlefield.

It is interesting to note that the United States Army has instituted a professional reading program. Army Regulation No. 28-86 states the purpose to be to stimulate constructive thinking concerning prevailing and future military problems and to encourage Army personnel to engage in a systematic improvement of their professional competence. The reading program is updated annually in a Contemporary Military Reading List published in a DA Circular. The current list is published in DA Cir. 25-89-3. Although this is a voluntary program, I consider it an important incentive to stimulate professional self-development.

THE MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM

In considering senior leadership development in a peacetime environment the structure and curriculum of the Army schooling system is of particular
importance, especially in the schools attended during the senior years. DA Pamphlet 600-3 describes five phases in professional development: the lieutenant phase, the captain phase, the major phase, the lieutenant colonel phase and the colonel phase. All phases consists of a combination of assignment rotation and schooling aimed at qualifying the officers for progressively more demanding positions and responsibilities. During these phases officers will attend a basic course, advanced course and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3). Later a selected percentage of officers will attend the resident Command and Staff College and the Army War College. Some officers not selected for resident education will have an opportunity to take the Nonresident Correspondence Course equivalent to the resident courses.

It is interesting to note that CAS3 has a correspondence phase which must be completed before entering the resident phase. Similarly interesting is it that the Staff and War Colleges are extended to a large number of officers through a correspondence alternative to resident education. This fact serves to underline the importance placed on formal education as part of professional development. Another important aspect of the Staff and War College level of education is the interservice relationships manifested in the fact that all services as well as international students and senior level civilians are represented at these schools. This serves to broaden student perspectives on joint operations as a key part of their professional development.

The aim of the Command and Staff College is to prepare graduates to think, decide, communicate, and act as general staff officers and field grade commanders, and, among other aspects, to apply lessons of military history to contemporary military problems. A number of staff college graduates will
be allowed to continue a 49-week Advanced Military Studies Program to prepare the officers to serve as division and corps principal staff officers.  

The senior service colleges are at the apex of the professional military training system. They include the Army War College, its equivalents in the other services, as well as the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Some officers are also selected to attend foreign equivalents of a United States senior service college. Senior service colleges prepare officers for senior command and staff positions with the Army and Department of Defense.  

The U.S. Army War College plays a central role in the Army's senior leadership development. The basic senior leader development mission of the War College is to provide the Army and the Nation with senior leaders who:

- Understand the role of the military in a democratic society;
- Can advise the national command authorities on the use of military forces to achieve national objectives; and
- Are adept in the use of military forces to achieve national objectives.

This mission is achieved through a curriculum consisting of four core courses, advanced courses, which may be tailored to individual student's interests and needs, and finally a national security seminar week. The core courses include The Senior Leader, War, National Policy and Strategy, Implementing National Military Strategy, and Global and Theater Strategy Application. The curriculum also includes a Military Study Project, which is an individual or group research effort on a selected topic relevant to the mission of the war college and which results in a research paper. Another important part of the curriculum is the Advanced Warfighting Program, which
allows participating students an in-depth study of strategy and operations through extensive reading of military history and case studies of campaigns and operations.\textsuperscript{20}

Finally, an overview of the educational system is not complete without mentioning the numerous opportunities for civilian education. The objective of the Army Civil Schooling Program is to meet Army requirements for advanced education and to provide selected officers an opportunity to satisfy their own educational aspiration.\textsuperscript{21} This program includes such studies as: Advanced Degree Program; Technological Enrichment Program; Legal Education Program; and Advanced Management Program; and other programs.\textsuperscript{22}

CONCLUSIONS

Based on this extensive overview and discussion of the United States Army leadership development system some general important conclusions can be drawn:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The military as a profession is emphasized.
  \item The relationship between military and political institutions and the Constitution is emphasized.
  \item At every level of rank up to colonel there is an educational opportunity.
  \item The study of the nature of war through military history programs and case studies plays an indispensable part in education and professional development.
  \item Individual efforts through study and reading outside the schoolhouse is considered important and strongly encouraged.
  \item The educational institutions foster high academic standards.
\end{itemize}
Correspondence studies is offered as an alternative to, and sometimes as integral part of, resident education.

Senior leadership and the development of senior leaders is based on a well-defined doctrine on the subject.

**THE NORWEGIAN ARMY PROFESSIONAL VALUES**

It is extremely difficult to find a Norwegian Army publication which in general terms discuss the Army's role, its values, and its linkage to constitutional values. However, UD 3-1, Military Leadership, contains an overview of the tasks of the Army and the Defense forces. The Royal Decree of 10 June 1949, which describes the obligation of all Norwegian officers to defend the country with every means available, serves the function of an officer's oath, which Norwegian officers are not required to take. There are also certain traditions and unwritten standards of behavior which serve to instill some sense of common values. However, I would question whether the majority of the officer corps shares a feeling of belonging to a profession. In fact the introduction in the late 1960s of regulations of workhours and compensation for overtime may serve to gradually erode any sense of professionalism. Norwegian officers have to negotiate wage increases through unions like any other vocational group in society. I believe that this state of affairs in the armed forces has a detrimental effect on how many officers look upon their obligation to pursue individual self-development, and whether they view themselves as belonging to a profession.

**PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

The Norwegian Army Personnel Management System underwent a major restructuring in 1985. The new system generally dictates that the Personnel
Management Branch is responsible for professional development through the
captain phase. Promotion to major is obtained in competition with other
captains against a vacant position. Having reached the rank of major,
each individual officer is responsible for seeking the education and
assignment rotation which will qualify him for the next higher rank within his
branch. If he so wishes, the officer can also pursue a track which will
qualify him for more general positions irrespective of branch. A large number
of colonel and higher positions are branch independent.

The Army Personnel Management Branch issues regulations, which describe
the minimum requirements for education and job experience in order to qualify
for lieutenant colonel positions. Each single position at this level is
described separately. This system puts the responsibility for career
development on the individual officer. However, one can also opt out of the
competition and in all likelihood remain a captain or major until retirement
at the age of 60, in which case one can have a more stable family life without
the frequent reassignments and moves that goes with a competitive military
career.

This system obviously has advantages and disadvantages. It leaves it to
the individual officer to define his career ambition and the kind of Army life
he wants to lead. Presumably the best motivated officers will pursue the more
competitive career track. This is not, however, to indicate that those who
opt out of the competition for promotion are less motivated in their job. It
only means that they have other personal values. The weakest part of the
system in my opinion, is that there are no general written guidelines, other
than the minimum requirement to qualify for promotion to lieutenant colonel,
for those who sincerely aspire to senior command and leadership. It is
necessary to start early in the career to prepare oneself to acquire the
perspective to meet the challenges of senior leadership. The question the young ambitious officer is probably struggling with is, what do I concentrate on to get where I want to go?

THE MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM

The Chief of Defense guidelines for Personnel Management state that the goal of the Personnel Management System is to acquire and train the necessary number of competent and motivated personnel fit to perform their numerous tasks in peace and war. Leadership development shall be a primary concern in all education and training. Every commander is responsible for the guidance and development of leadership abilities in subordinates. The publication further states that the goal of all leadership training is to develop competent leaders at all levels who are able to perform their duties in peace and war. Finally it states that leadership performance will be in accordance with "Chief of Defense leadership guidelines."

The obligatory education during the junior years are very similar to the United States Army system described in this chapter. Although the various courses and schools may vary in length from U.S. equivalents, during the lieutenant, captain and major phases the officers attend a platoon commander's course, a company commander's course, and the lower level of the staff college, which is a three-month course equivalent to CAS3.

With regard to senior leadership development it is more important to look at the voluntary education that comes later in the career. The Norwegian Army Staff College has basically the same educational objective as the United States Army equivalent. However, those officers who seek command at battalion level must complete a two-month battalion commander's course. Prospective battalion commanders must also attend a precommand course immediately before
taking command, as must U.S. battalion commanders. There is also an
equivalent to the staff college which focuses on logistics and administration.

I believe that the curriculum of the staff college is extensive and well-
suited to fill its purpose. However, I note that there is no specific course
included that addresses senior command and leadership, although obviously a
large number of map exercises and staff rides serve to develop skills related
to senior leadership.\textsuperscript{31} There is also no military history program in the
curriculum and very few, if any, examples of the use of battle case studies to
illustrate tactical teaching points.\textsuperscript{32}

The Norwegian equivalent to the senior service colleges in the United
States is the National Defense College. This is a seven-month education to
prepare selected officers and senior civil servants for senior positions in
the Total Defense Organization, which includes the Military Defense.\textsuperscript{33} The
composition of the student body is approximately 40 percent civilians and 60
percent military officers of the ranks of lieutenant colonels and colonels
from all services.

The curriculum is divided into four courses which study the international
environment, the security policy situation in Europe, the Norwegian political
and economical environment, and the Total Defense concept and its capabilities
and limitations respectively.\textsuperscript{34} Notably absent from the curriculum are any
subjects related to senior leadership, operations and campaign planning, and
military history. The method of instruction is very similar to the one used
at the U.S. Army War College.\textsuperscript{35}

The Norwegian Army also educates a great number of its officers at allied
training and educational institutions. About six officers each year attend
staff colleges in various NATO countries and Sweden. Two Army colonels each
year attend the NATO Defense College, and one each year attends the U.S.
Army War College. These educational opportunities represent indispensable additions to the professional development of the Norwegian Army and the defense establishment through the experience and knowledge these officers bring home about allied professional methods and thinking.

ENDNOTES

1. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-1, The Army, p. 21.

2. Ibid., pp. 22-23.


4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, p. 84.

5. Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-80, Executive Leadership, p. 50.

6. Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, Commissioned Officers Professional Development and Utilization, p. 5.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp. 5, 102.

9. Ibid., p. 6.

10. FM 22-103, p. 84.

11. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation No. 28-86, p. 1.

12. DA PAM 600-3, p. 8.

13. Ibid., p. 11.

14. Ibid., pp. 8, 11.

15. Ibid., p. 11.

16. Ibid.


18. Ibid., pp. 4-7.

20. Ibid., p. 12.
22. Ibid., p. 13.
23. Forsvarets Overkommando/Harstaben, Militart Lederskap, p. 11.
24. Ibid., p. 25.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 4.
29. Ibid., p. 7.
30. Ibid., p. 11.
31. Harens Stabsskole, Program for Kurs II/7 - 1989-1990, pp. 5-10.
32. Ibid.
34. Ibid., pp. 17-19.
35. Ibid., p. 8.
CHAPTER IV

SENIOR LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN
THE U.S. AND NORWEGIAN ARMY

COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION

The first question is whether it is at all relevant to compare senior leadership development in our two armies. Clearly there are numerous differences that would suggest the irrelevance of such a comparison. First the role of the armies are very different. The Norwegian Army is primarily tasked with defending and fighting on Norwegian territory. Second, it is a conscript army totally dependent on mobilization to fight a war. Third, many would rightfully maintain that the Norwegian Army by no means has the relative resources of the United States Army to invest in equipment, training, or leadership development.

On the other hand there are also some fundamentally similar challenges facing our nations. We are both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose major adversary is still considered to be the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. Although the military threat seems to be diminishing at the moment, the rationale for an Army will still be its capability to blunt our common adversary on the modern battlefield. The United States Army is also decisively dependent on mobilization of the reserve components in case of a major conflict in Europe. Finally it is not to farfetched to suggest that U.S. formations may be put under a NATO command in Norway lead by a Norwegian Commander-in-Chief. Both U.S. and Norwegian officers therefore face the same challenges in case of war. Norwegian and U.S. generals face the same challenges on the battlefield in Europe. In fact the combined aspects of a future war demand that senior leaders have a common
understanding of the nature of war, a common understanding of each others capabilities and limitations, and a shared view on the basic requirements to be successful on that battlefield. Essentially they require a shared frame of reference across a broad spectrum of issues.

Is the Norwegian Army system of leadership development adequate to foster the kind of senior leaders we need on the future battlefield? That is to be hoped but neither the leadership nor the system, which was created after World War II, has since been put to a real test. In general I believe it is justified to say that Norwegian Army commanders do well in combined exercises, but that is not the ultimate test.

In peacetime it is an obvious obligation for any army to do the best it can to prepare itself for war. In comparing with the United States Army I would like to point out some areas within the subject of leadership development where improvements can be made.

First there is the question of doctrine. The Norwegian Army has two publications that deal with leadership, both of which I have referred to earlier. UD 3-1 is an educational manual on leadership primarily aimed at direct leadership functions at company level and below. This manual has been a great success since its introduction in 1974. It prescribes a situationally flexible leadership which advocates participation when appropriate. Most elements of this leadership formula are also relevant for senior leaders. However, aiming at the direct leadership level, it does not address the challenges of indirect leadership at senior levels, and it does not discuss the kinds of challenges Clausewitz saw facing the general on the battlefield.
A recent study of leadership in the Norwegian Army indicated that while it can still serve its purpose for some years it may be time for a review of UD 3-1 in the near future.¹

The second publication is the "Chief of Defense Basic View on Leadership in the Armed Forces." This publication was issued in revised form in 1988. As the title indicates it contains the Chief of Defense's guidelines on the purpose and goals of leadership. It is a very brief pamphlet that primarily focuses on the institutional values to be observed in the execution of leadership at all levels.² While it is a very important publication, it does not address the kind of senior leadership that is treated in the United States Army FM 21-103 and DA PAM 600-80.

There exists also a third publication, which is not very widely known in the Army, that deals with part of the leadership problem on the battlefield. UD 12-7-11 discusses how to cope with stress and battle fatigue. This publication is aimed at leadership instruction at officer candidate schools.³

I must conclude that the Norwegian Army has no doctrinal publication on senior leadership that treats this as an important military subject of study on its own merits. I believe that it is reasonable to ask if this may partly explain why the leadership debate erupted in the Norwegian Army in 1985 (Chapter I).

Then there is the question of the study of the nature of war by reading military history. I have shown to what extent military history is used as a vehicle for learning in U.S. Army educational institutions. In the same vein one can view the contemporary military reading program. I have also documented that military history has no place in the curriculum either at the Norwegian Army Staff College or at the National Defense College. Neither is
the subject of leadership study per se any part of the curricula. I firmly believe that both institutions should include such studies in the curriculum.

Professor of Military History at the Norwegian Military Academy, Karl Rommetveit, in an article in a military magazine in 1989 discussed the lack of understanding of the importance of military history in the education of military officers. He documented that Norwegian officers are not being acquainted with interpreters of military history such as Clausewitz, Liddel-Hart, and Fuller during their education in Norwegian military schools. He also presented a convincing argument for the study of military history as an integral part of the professional development of military officers.

Commanding General 6. Division, Major General Torkel Hovland, in a speech at the Norwegian Army Staff College in June 1988 said that officers and men in the Norwegian Army are unprepared for the psychological effects of battle and other crises. He based this statement on the observations of the effects on unit cohesion and leadership performances of the avalanche in 1986 which killed 16 soldiers during an exercise. He maintained that the unpreparedness was primarily a result of the technical, tactical, and procedural training in the Army, and that very little attention is paid to preparing for the tremendous psychological effects encountered in the transition from peace to war. This will be a particularly difficult transition for a mobilization army. In order to implement training programs to prepare for these effects one must understand the nature of war and the resulting effects on soldiers. In peacetime this can only be acquired through professional study.

Thus, what to read and to include in educational programs becomes the question. Karl Rommetveit in his previously cited article provides many useful suggestions of military history from Clausewitz, Liddel-Hart and Fuller
to the study of the battles of Hastings, Agincourt, Jena, Waterloo, Gettysburg
and the more recent famous battles of World War II. Colonel(Retired) Roger
H. Nye's excellent book "The Challenge of Command" is devoted to exploring
what officers should read at every stage of command and professional
development. In his discussion of command and leadership he makes reference
to some 250 works of biographers, historians, professional soldiers,
scientists, and philosophers. He also quotes General of the Army, Omar
Bradley:

We studied everything we could get our hands on. You
start working hard right from the start. You can't say
later on in life I will start studying. You have got to
start in the beginning.

This is the best guide to professional military reading I can recommend.

ENDNOTES


2. Forsvarets Overkommando/Presse og informasjonsavdelingen,
Forsvarsstifens grunnsyn på ledelse i Forsvaret, pp. 4-18.

3. Forsvarets Sanitet, UD 12-7-11, Mestring av Stridsreaksioner, p. i
(Preface).

4. Karl Rommetveit, "Hvilken verdi har krigshistorie for Offiseren?"

5. Ibid., p. 5.


7. Major General Torkel Hovland, Foredrag for Brigadesjefskurs ved HSTS,
1986, pp. 4-5.

8. Rommetveit, p. 15.


10. Ibid., p. 153.
Based on the previous discussion I recommend five initiatives to be considered by the Norwegian Army Inspector General for further action.

First, the Norwegian Army should establish and publish a doctrine on senior leadership for peace and war. I have shown that senior leadership is in nature very different from junior leadership, although there are similarities. I believe that the nature of senior leadership needs to be addressed in an Army publication in order to provide a basis for teaching and practicing senior leadership, and as a basis for developing senior leaders. The U.S. Army publications FM 22-103 and DA PAM 600-80 may serve as models for such a publication, although the content must reflect the particular Norwegian Army environment.

Second, I recommend that a course on senior leadership be included in the curricula at the Army Staff College and the National Defense College. These courses should be based on the senior leadership doctrine, and the study of successful senior leaders through case studies. This will require some trade-offs with respect to other subjects, but I believe that for example a two week course addressing senior leadership is a worthwhile investment in the Army's future leadership. Also I think that the civilian students at the National Defense College would benefit tremendously from discussing senior leadership with their military colleagues and vice versa.

Third, the Norwegian Army needs to rediscover the value of studying military history, and should include this subject in the Staff College curriculum. Military history case studies are excellent tools by which to
supplement other methods of teaching tactics and military operations. I also think that historical case studies would be a worthwhile supplement to other teaching methods at the Defense College.

Fourth, the Army should establish guidelines and incentives to encourage officers to pursue individual professional development outside the schoolhouse. This could be accomplished in many ways, such as the use of correspondance studies, reading programs, requirements to take a test before admittance to the Staff College, and other ways that need to be further examined. This might also be a way to instill in the officer some sense of belonging to a profession, and should be accompanied by some prospect of career rewards.

Fifth, the Army should establish a professional contemporary reading program. Although this would have to be a voluntary program, it would encourage officers to keep updated on military history, contemporary military subjects and issues in strategy and national security policy, and other subjects relevant to senior military leaders.


