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FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE 1990S AND BEYOND

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS F. METZ, IN

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2 APRIL 1990

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
The fundamental and unprecedented changes of late 1989 and early 1990—both home and abroad—thrust the Army into a complex, volatile, and unpredictable period similar to that of having just won a war. Almost everywhere democracy movements met success while the perceived threat from the USSR was reduced daily. With the submission of the FY 91 budget, the effect of these changes began to take their toll. Of the four pillars of defense, the Army decided to maintain readiness and take risks in modernization and sustainment, leaving structure somewhat variable but critical to maintaining (cont'd on back).
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FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE 1990S AND BEYOND

An Individual Study Project

by

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Colonel(Ret) Michael J. Morin
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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ABSTRACT

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FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE 1990s AND BEYOND

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the Army was oriented by the senior leadership in the right direction with the doctrinal improvements to AirLand Battle (ALB) and the Army 21 study. These efforts, linked by AirLand Battle Future (ALBF), will guide the Army into the 21st Century. The domestic and international events of 1989 have thrust the Army into the 1990s facing unprecedented change. How the Army manages this change will directly affect its capabilities and the will to use them for many years to come.

The United States can be proud of its post World War II successes. With a major clash between the superpowers avoided, the enormous prosperity of the free world, democracy breaking out around the world, and the Cold War seemingly won, the United States can look to its strategy of containment and flexible response with great pride. "Past successes, however, do not guarantee future peace."

Success has created a paradox: we have won a war without fighting it. Upon concluding past wars, the Army has undergone significant turmoil in its force structure. As history predicts, today's Army feels tremendous pressure for
restructuring. This restructuring will be through subtraction via the individual and combined efforts of the budget, perceived and actual threat reductions, the explosion of technology, and the increased influence of information. This paper will offer not only ways to reduce the turmoil but also a vision on which the Army can focus while protecting the nation and its vital interests.

In America, we have a notorious record "for summing up our military adventures and misadventures by preparing to do the whole thing over again, only better." What has been successful in the latter half of this century may not bring success in the next. Thus, to glean insights into how we should structure for the future, this paper will briefly review how we have built out force since World War II. Although this look will be critical, the successes manifested in 1989 were a result of strength, not weakness.

Important to note here is what this paper is not. It is not "pie in the sky." To wipe the slate clean and design an ideal force for the 21st century is unproductive. To show how a salami slice of the force via the Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS) should take place is of little value. It does not explain how to ensure planning precedes programming to support ALBF. This paper does not articulate
how to avoid the arcane adherence to structure by flags. This paper is not how to manage the design of limited spaces, a debate of one here and two there. Finally, it is not a debate of ships or planes or tanks or infantry or active or reserve.

This paper is about the basic organizational form for the Army in the 1990s and beyond. This form will complement Army doctrine and be consistent with joint doctrine. It will focus on the corps, division, and brigade across the mixes of heavy, light, active, reserve, combat, combat support, and combat service support. This paper stresses that our force structure must be consistent with our expressed commitments across the operational continuum and that friend and foe alike must realize the Army is prepared to carry out its warfighting mission.

Above all, this paper is realistic. It outlines a vision and a common sense approach to achieve that vision. The reduction of turmoil and creation of the correct structure for the 1990s and beyond is "doable." Nevertheless, astride the path to the future stand several "sacred cows." The same fortitude and wisdom that brought our Army back from the Vietnam conflict must be called upon to remove these obstacles. The major stepping stones of this path, ALB-ALBF-Army 21, are on the correct azimuth and "the changes of 1989."


should not alter this direction.

Nevertheless, this paper presents the "giant steps" our force structure should take as a result of "the changes of 1989." By reviewing the history of post World War II structure and outlining current structure challenges, this paper lays a foundation that the future trends' impact on structure will be better understood. Although focusing on Army corps ar. below, this paper's conclusions support Army and Joint doctrine. The purpose of this paper is to present a vision of the organizational form the Army should take in the 1990s and beyond.
ENDNOTES

1. Carl E. Vuono, A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond, p. 5.

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

General Starry, in his Military Review article, "A Perspective on American Military Thought," opined that the purpose of history is "to inform our judgments of the future; to constitute an informed vision; guide our idea of where we want to go; how best to get from where we are (and have been) to where we believe we must be." With these thoughts in mind, a broad review of our post World War II structure is helpful to the study of the force structure for the 1990s and beyond.

A review of organizational history is not as easy as one would first think. In most cases, military historians write about personalities or events. One can easily review the documents, the tables of organizations and equipment, but learning why a leader organized as he did is a much more difficult task. This chapter does not seek to define the "American way of organizing forces." Its purpose is to review key milestones since World War II that have had an affect on the way we are organized today.

FUNDAMENTAL THOUGHT

General Starry presents the argument that "American military thought reflects no more than perhaps three
fundamental influences: Napoleon, the industrial revolution and modern technology."² These influences reflect a degree of irony as they relate to organization. Many of the generals of the Civil War were educated at West Point "where Jomini on Napoleon was the standard historical treatise on the military art."³ They were schooled in what Napoleon did but not how in some cases and why in many others. For example, the value of massing artillery was known by Civil War generals, but how to organize to cause the event to happen was not always known.

Napoleon was known for his massive capacity for work and administrative detail wherein lies the irony. He organized his armies, top to bottom, to the finest detail; however, seldom did he record why he organized the way he did. When he did, historians have failed, thus far, to elaborate the theories. Although we have been influenced by Napoleon, his organizational hows and whys are seldom included.

The industrial revolution also ironically lead military leaders away from the importance of organization. Regardless of your military theory persuasion, the dominance of mass, maneuver, or a combination of both, the abundance of equipment and munitions directs your attention to moving them and the soldiers to the enemy and not how they are organized once they arrive. By the time the influence of technology arrived, an
influence which should have had a greater effect on our organizational thinking, the Army was locked in an arcane adherence to structure by flags.

FROM DILEMMA TO FAULTY LOGIC

The years following World War II created a dilemma for the Army. World War II ended with the offense as the dominant form of combat. After we fought the Korean conflict to a stalemate, the Soviet threat grew until we could not out mass and/or maneuver their forces. The Army was left with a vexing dilemma.

Part of the solution to this dilemma was to build force structure on the following three rationales: the pivotal role of nuclear weapons, short war scenarios derived from nuclear dependence, and forward basing of units, which validated guarantees that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons to turn back Soviet aggression. The strategy of massive nuclear retaliation left the Army uncertain of its place. The short war scenario rationale caused the U.S. to support a larger, war-ready military force in peacetime, supplied by a permanent defense industry nurtured and sustained by the Pentagon. Industry naturally championed the "bigger and better than last time" philosophy.

The forward basing of units under the threat of nuclear
battle caused a brief excursion into the innovative world. The Pentomic Division was to be lean, powerful, versatile, and readily adaptable to the requirements of the nuclear battlefield. This nuclear battlefield variation was the only major structure change for twenty years.

With the logic of massive retaliation failing the test of reality, President Kennedy endorsed a policy of flexible response which ushered in an era that would see changes in force structure. Flexible response strategy required the Army to fight across what is known today as the operational continuum.

ROAD CONCEPT

The force structure solutions to support the flexible response strategy were divisions designed around different styles of combat with each having a common base. This concept was known as the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD). The ROAD concept would transform an army, which during World War II organized eight million soldiers around Infantry, Armor, and Airborne divisions, to one that organized three quarters of a million soldiers around Airborne, Air Assault, Light, Motorized, Mechanized and Armor divisions.

During World War II, maneuver combat power was concentrated under the corps, a fighting headquarters vice
logistics. Divisions supported by the field army above the corps could rapidly concentrate and maneuver under a corps.\textsuperscript{11} With some additional tailoring, today's ROAD divisions and corps are essentially equivalent to World War II's corps and field armies, respectively. The burdens to maneuver and support a corps and the redundancy between the corps and division seem to call for changes in this concept. However, the ROAD concept has not been seriously challenged in any force design effort since 1962.\textsuperscript{12}

Initially, the ROAD concept served the Army well. At the height of the Vietnam conflict the "Army was able to move almost a million soldiers a year in and out of Vietnam, feed them, clothe them, house them, supply them with arms and ammunition, and generally sustain them better than any Army had ever been sustained in the field . . . On the battlefield itself, the Army was unbeatable."\textsuperscript{13} In contrast, the Army, like the nation, was demoralized with and caught up in whatever went wrong in Southeast Asia.

REBUILD AN ARMY

After the Vietnam conflict, the Army would again focus on the NATO high intensity battlefield. Force designers, challenged by this demanding scenario, would perceive three
catalysts for change: the capture of the Vietnam helicopter expertise, the employment of the lessons learned from the 1973 Middle East War and the exploitation of a new generation of equipment. Tests in the early 1970s to fuse armor, airmobile infantry, and air cavalry, called Triple Capability (TRICAP) failed but planted the seed for a fourth maneuver-aviation brigade that would appear in future designs.

The lessons from the Middle East War were sobering. The presence of large numbers of modern weapons, densely packed at critical points on the battlefield offered massive destruction in very short periods of time. The imperative to fight modern battles with combined arms forces was carved in the third tablet. Time for mobilization seemed non-existent.

Another influence was the effort by the Chief of Staff, General Abrams, to create The Total Army. Although manpower and budget considerations were helpful in securing the approval of The Total Army concept, its real thesis was to ensure that the Army could not be committed to sustained combat without the approval of the America people. The Total Army would invite politicians to become more involved with the force structuring process.

In 1973, as a result of the Echelons Above Division (EAD) study, the field army was eliminated from the force with the
exception of 3d USA. Field army functions were assigned to corps which joined the division and battalion as a "unit of maneuver." The battle tested formula of alternating ("skip") echelons tasked to provide a range of combat, combat support, and combat service support ("unit of maneuver") with intervening levels oriented to the concentration of maneuver elements ("units of concentration") was lost. Although the brigade remained a unit of concentration, "the capability to rapidly concentrate maneuver combat power under a purely operational echelon died at that point and must be reestablished." 16

Army reform thought gave birth to the Active Defense doctrine which sought to increase the defender's range and kill ratios with the use of the technically superior anti-tank guided missile using mobility and "battle" positions in depth. 17 With a Total Army, tested by REFORGERs, U.S. conventional defense of Europe became more credible but not independent of the nuclear option.

On the up side, the rebuilding efforts were successful in giving the Army superb leadership, discipline, morale, weapons, and doctrine. 18 On the down side, the Army became less deployable, less flexible, and more difficult to sustain. These changes and those on the international scene resulted
in a mismatch between capabilities and commitments.

DYNAMIC 80s

The dynamic 80s began with a restructuring study called Div 88, which maintained the basic ROAD concept. Brigades would be task organized with battalions from which combined arms task forces would be formed. The concept of combined arms battalions was rejected. ALB doctrine, developed throughout the decade, sought "to moderate the force ratios at the FLOT by merging active defense and deep attack of follow-on echelons into one battle. It embraces the need to seize and hold the initiative through maneuver of forces and fires." In addition, it requires in depth operations, mental and physical agility, and the ability for all echelons of command to rapidly concentrate combat power through maneuver. The requirements of ALB are not supported by the outdated ROAD structure and the notion of ad hoc task organization at the brigade and battalion. Rotation after rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) proved that only with finest training and leadership can the Army’s design support ALB in the field.

The doctrinal and design changes of the 80s were challenged by three major influences. First, force designers
added up the total manpower bill to field 16 (Div 86) active component divisions and realized a 150,000 spaces shortfall. All the good ideas developed a 20,000 soldier division that the corps commander could not effectively fight. Doctrine, structure, and end strength did not match. Second, the Chief of Staff, General Wickham, was convinced the Infantry needed a shot in the arm, a renewed sense of purpose and training. Third, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered President Carter to call for a Rapid Deployment Force.

With the pressure of these three influences, some part of structure had to change. The program that directed this change was called Army of Excellence (AOE). By moving and consolidating functions at the corps, AOE reconciled the Div 86 goals with fiscal realities and, in theory, better supported ALB. AOE was also helpful in solving the infantry and rapid deployment challenges by identifying the spaces need to build Light Infantry Divisions (LID).

LIDs could not only dissipate the pressures already mentioned but also improve the Army’s stature in other areas. LIDs would offer more flexibility for an era in which large scale conflict in Europe was stepping aside for lower intensity conflict elsewhere. They would make the Army more...
relevant to the strategic environment in which power projection seemed to be the domain of the Navy and the Marines. Shortfalls in strategic lift could be camouflaged by creating smaller, lighter divisions. With Div 86 too expensive, the LID offered more force structure at an acceptable price.26

Although LIDs have achieved many of the goals sought by the senior leaders who created them, they are not risk free. Due to their design and the proliferation of heavy Soviet equipment around the world, their insertion along the operational continuum above peacetime competition is a very risky endeavor.27 Because of the superb leadership, soldiers, equipment, and training of our LIDs, a Korea-Task Force Smith tragedy will not be repeated; however, we must never ask more of a LID than it is designed, equipped, and trained to perform.

Hindsight is 20-20; nevertheless, many feel the Army should have sought a design and structure somewhat different than the LID's. A greater utility could have been achieved with a unit that is hard hitting, mobile, unrestricted by complex supply base, and capable of securing a bridgehead or landing zone, launching a punitive raid, or fighting a delaying action against superior forces.28 This design may
have looked more like the motorized units studied at Fort Lewis during the late '70s and early '80s than the LID of today. The slow death of the motorized concept is almost complete. This death should not pass without highlighting the differences between the capabilities of the LID and the realities of modern battlefield - differences that cannot be forgotten by those who employ these elite forces.

The score sheet for the '80s is still being tallied. ALB doctrine, quality soldiers and equipment, improved joint warfighting capability, and an all time high in readiness of active and reserve forces merit high marks. Nevertheless, questions abound. Can a corps support three, four, or five different types of divisions in one theater? Did the Army go far enough with Div 86 and/or AOE? Could we have let go of the complex, cumbersome divisional structure? Should we have gone to the center of the doctrinal issues instead of cosmetic changes around the edges? Will the 1980s represent the penultimate attempt to preserve the Army that won two World Wars and kept the peace after 1945?

CONCLUSION

This review of post World War II structural history sets the stage for developing a force for the 1990s and beyond.
Although our history is short, we have shown little attention to how and why we organize the way we do. In our post World War II relationship with the USSR, we quickly became dependent on nuclear weapons. As their conventional forces continued to grow in quantity and quality, we became troubled in many arenas not the least of which was structure. Not once during this dynamic time for our Army, have we challenged the ROAD concept.

Two of the reasons the Army maintained the status quo are clear. First, we rebuilt from the Vietnam conflict focused on a threat that seemed to support the bigger and better philosophy. Second, when structural changes called loudly, we had the money to maintain the status quo. Even our strongest enemy has experimented with corps of mixed brigades, testing formations suited for the conduct of operational maneuver. The Soviets believe smaller units will be required to operate with greater autonomy and combined arms balance must be captured in the peacetime organizations of tactical units.29

Our most recent history will record an Army of the finest quality, but maybe an Army that could have met the future better prepared if different structural changes had been made in the 1980s. With the stage set, the next chapter,
"Challenges to Future Structure," will develop the scene for later chapters to act out their role in the development of a vision of the structure for the 1990s and beyond.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 4.


5. Ibid., p. 35.


10. Bahnsee, p. 79.

11. Ibid., p. 84.

12. Stack, p. 29.


14. Bahnsee, p. 82.


16. Bahnsee, p. 84.


22. Bahnsen, p. 82.

23. . . .id Segal, "Army Light Infantry Divisions: Are They Fit to Fight?" *Armed Forces Journal International*, Oct. 1989, p. 82.


25. Bahnsen, p. 82.


27. Bahnsen, p. 80.


CHAPTER III
CHALLENGES TO FUTURE STRUCTURE

During late 1989 and early 1990, changes that challenge the Army occurred faster than the ink used to report them could dry. At times, the writing of a "where we are today" chapter seemed futile. Nevertheless, President Bush's FY 91 budget represents a baseline against which the vision of the force for the 1990s and beyond can begin. Although not without challenges, the FY 91 budget offers insight into how the military will balance structure, readiness, sustainment, and modernization, the pillars of defense. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the major challenges that impede restructuring correctly for the 1990s and beyond.

STRATEGY FIRST, THEN THE BUDGET

Change has been the greatest in Europe which houses vital U.S. interests and the most challenging military scenario. The democracy movements in Eastern Europe and the internal problems in the Soviet Union, have significantly reduced the perception of threats to U.S. interests. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union remains a formidable foe which spends on defense three times as much of its GNP as the U.S. spends. "Since Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985, the Soviets have
fielded more tanks and artillery pieces than currently exist in the combined armies of Britain, France and West Germany. This continued growth is masked by the Soviet’s recent declaration of a new defense doctrine, a further catalyst to reducing the perception of the threat. Whether by unilateral or multilateral efforts, the future NATO may be better in numbers but be much weaker because of the force-to-space ratios seriously affecting the national military strategy in this vital region of the world.

The Army’s challenges go beyond Europe and the war portion of the operational continuum. Battles against drug lords, terrorists, and insurgents range from minor excursions to major wars. With new democracies developing around the world, our peacetime competition efforts are vital to the promotion of the values so important to our way of life. Leadership in peacetime competition will be critical to the reduction of future requirements elsewhere on the continuum. Thus, strategy must take into account our long term interests and how we affect them as the Army operates at this state of the continuum.

The two extremes of the continuum meet where the fastest growing challenges are developing - conflict with regional powers which have ever growing arsenals of modern weapons.
For many years, the Army looked at the spectrum of conflict and labeled the low intensity end "high probability, low risk" and the high intensity end "low probability, high risk." Assuming that the planned force for the high end of the spectrum could handle the needs of the mid intensity wars, our strategy paid little attention to this part of the spectrum. U.S. military strategy must take into account that in the 1990s and beyond we will face conflicts that are both highly probable and highly risky at the conflict state of the operational continuum.

Before many of these changes became obvious, the Bush administration came to Washington knowing that it would not get President Reagan's weapons and maintain the force at the same size and readiness. With the announcement of the FY 91 budget, the administration has chosen to maintain readiness with quality, reduce structure and take a risk in modernization and sustainment.

The recent changes around the world and the budget constraints seem to cry for revamping U.S. national military strategy. However, the Secretary of Defense seems to be taking the path of least resistance, leaving it up to the services to squeeze and trim within existing plans. "As far as I can see, it's one third, one third, one third," says Adm.
Crowe referring to how the cuts will be apportioned among the Army, Air Force, and Navy. "There ain't gonna be any strategic rationale." The Secretary of Defense said it best, "Given an ideal world, we'd have a nice, neat, orderly process. We'd do the strategy and then we'd come around and do the budget. This city doesn't work that way."

Since the Soviets know this fact better than many Americans, the following logic seems to hold: "the budget crisis looks like a vortex out of which America will emerge weaker than it was before Ronald Reagan brought it back." Strategy and budget alignment must be correctly orchestrated to ensure that structure decisions support the decisions concerning readiness, sustainment and modernization.

COMMUNICATING WITH CONGRESS

One of the foremost challenges to the vision of the structure for the 1990s and beyond is the system designed to build the force, The Planning, Programming, Budget System (PPBS). "While the constitution establishes a system of defense to protect the nation and its vital interests, it does not define that system." The PPBS defines the system and communicates with Congress. Although Congress is constitutionally mandated to fund the Armed Forces, it lacks
accountability and finality; everyone "wants to soak in the defense hottub."³

Six congressional committees are responsible for the defense budget; however, in 1989, 14 committees and 43 subcommittees and panels held hearings while 1500 congressional staffers devote nearly all their time on defense matters.⁹ The parochial self-interest of competing states and districts accounts for the micro-management of line items at an unmanageable rate in recent years.

The PPBS is out of balance; the planning P is silent. The dominant staff officers who labor in this arena are not planners but programmers. "Although this system provides structure and discipline for completing force planning tasks in the short term, it does not provide complete insight into alternative approaches or focuses which force planners use over the longer term to help them determine the level and mix of required forces."¹⁰

One example of this system's failure is the inability to rapidly project land power. Although land power was projected in Grenada and Panama, these scenarios were not the scale of the Korean conflict or what will be required in the future. Planners and programmers should keep Fehrenbach's This Kind of War turned to the Proud Legion chapter where it says, "you
may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life - but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud."

The Army acknowledges its dependence on the sister services for deployment. Even the best structured, most ready, and best modernized force cannot be employed or sustained without adequate strategic lift. "The United States cannot afford to risk the effectiveness and credibility of its overall defense strategy by failing to develop and field adequate worldwide lift assets. The airlift and sealift assets that are currently available or approved for acquisition are inadequate." With the 1987 Commission of Merchant Marine and Defense report, no doubts exist to the "growing danger to the national security in the deteriorating condition of America's maritime industries."

Strategic lift is a major, but only one, example of how the failures of the system seriously affect a coherent national military strategy. The Army must improve its use of the PPBS and communication with Congress to achieve the vision for the 1990s and beyond. The vision presented in the
following chapters will assist in this effort.

THE SPACES GAME

Problems with the PPBS do not stop with the communication with Congress. In the 1980s as the Army maintained a constant end strength, the pressure to find "spaces" developed specialists throughout the MACOMs. These specialists learned not only to hold to what they had but also to lobby for more. With reduced end strength, this competition will become even more intense and a greater challenge to a vision.

While the DA staff fights an inter-service battle, it will referee inter-branch, MACOM, and unit (division and corps) disputes. In many cases, the referee will make decisions based on rules produced by the players. In theory, Army structure evolves from the Concept Based Requirement System (CBRS). (Although beyond the scope of this paper, many would argue that the actual system is a Constraint Based Requirement System.) Sometimes in concert with CBRS and sometimes not, structure and design are heavily dependent on allocation rules.

These rules are constrained by the Army Force Planning Data and Assumptions, updated and published annually with input from the proponents. All this data feeds computers at
the Concept Analysis Agency (CAA) where simulations to
determine force requirements are run. Although the DA staff
adjusts CAA’s output, the allocation rules and the CBRS will
need overhauling or overriding to produce the coherent force
structure of the 1990s and beyond.

STRUCTURE VIA DOCTRINE

In "A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond," the
Chief of Staff states that our contemporary doctrine, ALB,
provides the basis for designing forces. If it does
establish “the foundation for the Army’s disciplined evolution
to the future,” then one should be able to review the
capstone manual for this doctrine, FM 100-5 Operations, and
glean insight linking structure and doctrine. However, other
than defining the types of forces, this manual seldom refers
to organizations. It does say that superb soldiers and
leaders, a well understood doctrine, and equipment sufficient
to the task “must be unified harmoniously into effective
fighting organizations.”

Do our organizations facilitate the leaders’ ability to
bring maneuver, firepower and protection to bear on all the
different kinds of enemy? Are our forces organized for
operational maneuver which seeks a decisive impact on the
campaign? The doctrine says that tactical maneuver seeks to gain and sustain the initiative, exploit success, preserve freedom of action, and reduce vulnerabilities. Even with help from the corps, can a LID maneuver? Are we organized to bring enough firepower upon the enemy to defeat his ability and will to fight? Are we organized to substitute massed fires for massed troops? What about firepower at the operational level; can it disrupt the movement, fire support, command and control, and sustainment of enemy forces or achieve decisive results?

The fundamental tenets of ALB doctrine "are the basis for the development of all current US Army doctrine, tactics, and techniques. All training and leadership doctrines and all combat, combat support, and combat service support doctrine are derived directly from, and must support these fundamental tenets." What about the design and structure which must also support the tenets? Is our Army as a whole, its immobile corps filled with multiple types of oversized divisions with a sprinkling of separate brigades and regiments, properly organized to fight ALB throughout the operational continuum? In reality don't we have units that are strategically mobile but not tactically flexible, and units that are tactically mobile but not strategically deployable? Based on the
complexity of our support systems both are probably not as operationally mobile and sustainable as our maneuver based doctrine and worldwide threats require.

The argument should not lie with today's doctrine and force structure. In today's changing world, the vision should not be a result of a debate over how we fight today's battles with today's forces. The debate should be how to optimize the structure of our Army to meet the threats of the future. The marriage of doctrine and structure must be more tangible than in our present publications and, thus far presented, in ALBF.

CONCLUSION

Challenges to the structure of the 1990s and beyond are abundant. The key challenges which a vision must incorporate are the relationship between the military strategy and budget constraints, communications with Congress, the space game, and the relationship between structure and doctrine. The decision to maintain readiness and accept risks in modernization and sustainment makes building the correct force structure for the 1990s and beyond all that more critical. Therefore, how well we predict the future (Chapter IV) and how well we structure for it (Chapter V and VI) are the keys to a correct vision.
ENDNOTES


4. Ibid.


7. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-1 The Army, p. 1.


9. Ibid.


11. T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, p. 427.


14. Vuono, p. 3.

15. Ibid.


17. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
CHAPTER IV
THE FUTURE

In "A Strategic force for the 1990s and Beyond" the Chief of Staff points out that "... there will be no substitute for the leadership that the United States has provided to the West. No other allied or friendly nation has, or is likely to develop the necessary economic, political, and military power to replace the United States..." With this leadership role, the U.S. cannot turn its back on any region of the world. For this reason, many feel that U.S. commitments to collective security and deterrence require a
higher level of readiness than we have ever had.\textsuperscript{3}

Because of the recent changes in the Soviet Union, one may be tempted to overlook the predictions of Army 21 as they relate to that country. Army 21 warns that the Soviet Union is the "only nation possessing the military power to threaten the existence of the U.S."\textsuperscript{4} The probability of finding ourselves involved with the Soviet Union at the war state of the operational continuum remains low in probability, high in risk. Nevertheless, the Soviets will continue to use low cost and low risk projections of power in the Third World in support of their interests. Third World instability in the other states of the continuum creates the greatest challenges to the Army.

Third World nations, emerging as regional powers, will become more prominent in future strategic plans.\textsuperscript{5} These states will gain the political, economic, and/or military power to influence affairs that could threaten U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{6} As they "gain significant military capabilities, they may resort more readily to force in settling local disputes."\textsuperscript{7} One does not need to look far to find these disputes which include the endless Arab-Israeli conflict, religious fundamentalism, apartheid, insurgencies in Latin America and Philippines, not to mention leftover civil wars.
in Asia and potentially the Second Mexican Revolution. 8

Third World threats are no longer trivial military problems; this trend will only continue. 9 Today, twelve Third World armies have more than 1000 tanks, and by the turn of the century fifteen developing nations could produce medium range missiles. 10 The proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons to less stable nations is a serious possibility. 11 The weapons productir- capability of nations like Brazil, India, South Africa, Israel, and South Korea, all add another dimension to the complexity of Third World. The unpredictability and the uniqueness of each conflict will challenge any strategy and the structure to support it.

U.S. actions in Grenada and Panama have helped reduce the lingering domestic fears of another Vietnam; many feel, however, it would be "unlikely that the United States in the foreseeable future would be willing to commit sizable combat forces to a low-intensity conflict." 12 The development of the operational continuum concept, which replaces the spectrum of conflict concept, will help the Army articulate the types of operations concerning what was once labeled low intensity conflict at the low-end of the spectrum.

Understanding how to apply force across the operational continuum is important because of the sophistication of
weapons, due in part to the sale of heavy Soviet combat equipment, in every theater of the world. The potential for peacetime competition to move to conflict is constantly growing. When conflict does present itself, "the importance of sophistication increases, rather than decreases, since you're dependent on a more precise, not massive, application of force."\textsuperscript{13}

The Army faces at least two more trends which will challenge the way business was done in the past. First, the bipolar world's influence is quickly giving way to a multipolar world's. Second, more independent allies and the skillful Soviet public diplomacy will complicate security choices and erode U.S. ability to maintain bases, port access, and overflight rights.\textsuperscript{14}

This look at the macro view only highlights some of the challenges the Army faces. Although meeting these challenges requires coordination of activities throughout the government, the Army cannot ignore their effects on structure. Unlike the past when high probability meant low risk and low probability meant high risk, the Army must be prepared to face high probability and high risk scenarios.
THE BATTLEFIELD

The macro trend that each conflict will take on a uniqueness carries over to the battlefield. Regional threats will range from peasant armies that achieve mass with numbers of people to large, disciplined, well trained, mechanized forces with superior mobility and firepower. Thus, the U.S. "must maintain the capability of protecting vital interests wherever they are threatened. That could mean confronting a fully equipped army in the developing world."

The proliferation of sophisticated weapons and the reduction in the reliance on nuclear weapons increases the importance of conventional forces. Portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, proven in the Middle East and Africa, are already widespread. Modern fighter and attack aircraft offer significant long-range strike capabilities. By the turn of the century, dozens of Third World nations will have short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, all of which could mount biological or chemical warheads. Thus, an increasing number of developing countries have the "ability to engage in sustained, mechanized land campaigns."

Battles of the future will be short and intense as forces quickly mass, conduct violent engagements, and rapidly disperse. Potentially, chaos will reign as a result of the
extension of the battlefield in time and space, the fluid and non linear nature of the actions, and the destruction (deliberate and collateral at almost nuclear effects) created by conventional munitions. Units will be at risk throughout the battlefield creating new definitions for close, deep and rear operations.

Units of the future should feature smaller sized, self-sustaining formations, increased mobility, agility, organic firepower, and improved command and control. Extended weapons ranges and improved reconnaissance and target acquisition will lead to increased use of maneuver by fire. Forces will be able to destroy enemy units with precision fires and to control terrain by fire in lieu of occupying it. Thus, maneuver and firepower at the operational level will take on a new nature.

Around the world, the battlefield will be saturated with weapons of great range, pinpoint accuracy, and mass destruction. A lethal, sophisticated enemy can present himself at any point along the operational continuum. As a result, the range of threats will grow in quality and quantity. For an island nation which accepts the leadership role, "rapid strategic deployability and mobility at the operational and tactical levels will continue to grow in
importance." In light of this future battlefield, the structure of the Army will take on a much more important role. At the tactical, operational and strategic levels the structure of the Army will be critical to success along the operational continuum.

AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE

In October 1987, the Combined Arms Center was tasked by General Thurman to develop the AirLand Battle Future (ALBF) concept. On 15 November 1989, Col. Kempf of the Combined Arms Center briefed the Advanced Warfighting Studies Program students at the Army War College on this concept. With the historical background and with the present U.S. domestic and international situation, many parts of the ALBF call for structure change. The following paragraphs summarize Col. Kempf's briefing as they relate to structure.

ALBF requires the projection/positioning of combat power via strategic deployability and operational and tactical mobility. The force must secure and retain the initiative (tactical through strategic) while throwing the enemy off balance. These how-to-fight concepts focus on the rapid accomplishment of the mission.

The ALBF concept adds future applications to the ALB
Initiative will include strategic initiative. Agility will be implemented through flexibility which includes tailorable units, operational mobility, and increased self-sufficiency. Synchronization, often the most challenging tenet, will include the synergistic effect of sequencing. Depth will include an increased focus on continuous operations while endurance may be added as a fifth tenet. Meeting the challenges presented by the expanded tenets will require an optimum structure from brigade to corps. In light of the future battlefield, sequencing and endurance have an indirect, but significant, impact on structure.

ALBF calls for new labels for Army forces which will include forward deployed, contingency, reinforcing, nation development, and unique mission forces. Although we presently have forces that perform these type roles, to varying degrees of proficiency, the heart of the argument is whether or not our structure of the future will support the needs of the future?

ALBF stresses the strategic role of the Army with more emphasis on contingency operations. The strategic force imperatives of deployability and tailorable forces directly challenge today's structure. To successfully wage a campaign against a fully equipped, modern force which is initially
superior in quantity in a part of the world in which the U.S. has no infrastructure will be an enormous undertaking. However, the Army must be prepared for this campaign. Thus, the transition of the force to one that is tailorable for global intervention (to gain, preserve, and protect national interest) will be a significant transition.

ALBF also stresses that tailorable units will allow the Army to posture for the future. The Army will have the capability to quickly tailor forces for expected and unforeseen events, to use single function units for multi-missions, and to facilitate future changes to force structure/design.

ALBF concepts have been accepted by the Army's senior leadership. If the Army as a whole is to successfully employ these concepts while maintaining readiness and risking modernization and sustainment, an optimum structure must be found. Considering the reductions presently scheduled, the potential for more, and the challenges to structural change, this optimum structure will be difficult to achieve.

**ARMY 21**

The Army 21 force must be capable of fighting throughout the operational continuum in any region of the world. At the
strategic level, it must be rapidly deployable and sustainable. At the operational level, it must be able to maneuver rapidly; it must see deep, strike hard and fast over extended distances. At the tactical level, it must be highly mobile, self-sufficient in combat support and combat service support. It must be able to conduct highly lethal and independent close combat operations.

The Army 21 force must use the entire depth of the battlefield to gain flexibility and survivability. Its flexible, agile, powerful organizations capable of sustained continuous operations in any environment across the continuum must focus on maneuver to defeat the enemy. While maintaining an independent, self-sustainment character for autonomous operations, the force must have a greater fighter to supporter ratio.

The Army 21 force must be able to sequence the battle, which will include surveying the battlefield, positioning the forces, attacking, and dispersing. Army commanders will be given geographical areas of operations and well defined objectives. Although independent actions will be stressed, combat operations must be part of a well coordinated, deliberate, synchronized effort to achieve the synergistic effect so vital for success.
Army 21 outlines the following three types of forces for the Army, intentionally not relating them to current structure:

1. The Close Combat Force (CCF) will be the basic tactical combat force and includes heavy, medium, and light forces. It is self contained fighting force of combined arms with the combat support and combat service support to conduct sustained, independent operations from widely dispersed positions. It will use highly mobile systems to mass and attack the enemy.

2. The Battle Task Force (BTF) will be employed to command and control multiple CCFs. The BTF is a small battle staff to which CCFs will be assigned for the accomplishment of specific objectives. This staff facilitates the need to control forces during the highly decentralized, fast paced battles of the future. The number and type of CCF assigned to a BTF will depend on METT-T.

3. The Land Battle Force (LBF) conducts the operational level campaign to achieve the strategic objectives of the AirLand Force commander. The LBF is the land component of the AirLand Force. The BTF will be subordinate to the LBF and, when needed, reduce the span of control of the LBF commander.

Army 21's Light CCF will focus on dismounted combat.
possessing a high degree of tactical and operational mobility and rapid strategic deployability. The Heavy CCF will focus on great striking and staying power, tactical and operational mobility. Its strategic deployability will be via advanced air and naval lift assets. The Medium CCF will complement the Light and Heavy CCFs across the continuum. It will be less powerful than the Heavy but more deployable; more powerful than the Light but less deployable. The LBF and CCF will have organic support elements. The BTF will not have support forces.

WRONG APPROACH

ALBF and Army 21 have accurately predicted the future; however, the future has arrived ten to twenty years early. As already discussed, the argument for the future force is not whether the present force can get the job done today or tomorrow but whether the future force can get the job done in the future. In virtually every reference and interview, the fact that the division has become too cumbersome for today's battlefield comes across loud and clear. Its reduced tactical and operational mobility, due primarily to its size, and its reduced strategic deployability, due to lift assets, make changes imperative in light of our maneuver doctrine.
The most troublesome part of the methodology with which we are attempting to solve structural problems is the effort ongoing in the Training and Doctrine Command. An ALBF Force Design General Officer Steering Committee met on 4 December 1989 to lay the groundwork for design changes. General guidance was issued by the Combined Arms Center Combat Developments Activity in a message dated 061800 Dec 89, Subject: ALBF Force Designs. The proponents are to produce a base case design for a future heavy division and corps. This bottom up approach without an overall strategic vision will make supporting the national military strategy and the Army's doctrine difficult if not impossible.

In this design, the division is to become a more agile echelon by moving traditional division functions to either brigade or corps. The brigade will become a more self-sufficient organization with more organic capability and a closer relationship with attached units. The division will primarily perform command, control, and integration functions. The base case will include a major change in logistics force design. All battlefield maintenance and combat distribution will be centralized in logistics organizations, Forward Support Battalions, Corps Support Battalions, and Corps Support Groups.
Almost all hope of appropriate structuring is lost with the issue of spaces to each proponent. There is no doubt they will meet their space limitations and in the sterile environment of the briefing room be able to support ALBF. Divarties and Discoms will remain, the dismount infantry strength will continue to be reduced, and vital combat functions (e.g. mortar and anti-tank systems) will be challenged, if not lost completely. In an age when the light forces may become the critical structure, they are not being considered. Without a medium force, the mix, design, and structure of heavy and light forces must be optimum. Spaces cannot be ignored but they cannot be the most dominant parameters in developing the vision.

THE VISION

The Chief of Staff in his white paper, "A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond," makes the point that the Army will "have to adapt its structure to carry out the new responsibilities that the American people and our civilian leaders will expect us to perform." In the future, the Army must be versatile, deployable, and lethal to fulfill its strategic roles. These roles include providing forward deployed, contingency, and reinforcing forces for deterrence,
sustained land combat, and conflict termination in areas of vital interest. Although each of the pillars of defense play a role in making the Army a versatile, deployable, and lethal force, force structure will be the most difficult to correctly change in support of the Chief’s vision.

The Army must be a versatile force because we cannot afford to maintain large, specialized forces for every geographical area and type of combat. Versatility includes the right mix of active, reserve, heavy, light, and special operations forces, sustainment stocks, “and, above all, high quality in all aspects of the force.” It demands intensive training and frequent exercises to develop the ability to tailor force packages for specific missions without delays for retraining or mobilization.

The Army must be a deployable force because of U.S. interests around the world and its coalition based strategy. Often with little warning time, U.S. units will be required to deploy to and within theaters. “In the 1990s and beyond, the United States will have to rely even more heavily on the rapid deployment of Army forces from the United States to guarantee its security.”

The Army must be a lethal force because the enemy must be defeated as quickly as possible while “preserving our most
valued asset - the lives of our soldiers." Lethality includes modernizing capabilities and structure but the U.S. cannot afford everything technology will offer; therefore, we must maximize warfighting per dollar. "The lethality of the Army of the future will be determined, above all else, by the actual combat readiness of the force - which in turn, is a product of training." 

An enduring Army role will be that of maintaining contingency forces able to deploy immediately around the world. They will require a full range of tailorable capabilities to provide the nation the options calibrated to reflect the most appropriate response. Adequate lift must be made available. In addition, the Army must maintain the unquestioned ability to conduct an opposed entry into combat, which may only be done by air. Therefore, the future Army will have airborne forces. 

CONCLUSION

The task of structuring an Army that is versatile, deployable, and lethal is "doable." With the knowledge of where we have come from, the challenges that are astride the path, and where we want to go, all that is left is determining how to get there. Chapter V will present the macro view; Chapter VI, the micro.
ENDNOTES


2. Carl E. Vuono, A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond, p. 6.


10. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


42. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER V
MACRO VIEW OF THE STRUCTURE FOR THE 1990S AND BEYOND

The purpose of this chapter is to bring the vision of the future structure into focus. From a macro and generic view, the actions that must take place to build the best possible force will be outlined. Without repeating the history, trends, and predictions already presented, this chapter links these facts and opinions to the micro view of how the force should be structured for the 1990s and beyond.

STRATEGY

A well defined national military strategy starts the process of determining how to optimize the force for the future. "What has passed for strategy in the United States during the past forty years has too often been little more than aggregations of service budget requests undisciplined either by an appreciation of the limitations of US military power or by a willingness to make unpleasant choices."1 Our foreign policies must be brought into balance with the military means available for their attainment, enhancement, and protection.2 Senator Glenn presented the correct sequence when he said, "Our combat posture must be set up pursuant to a well-thought-out, well defined national strategy . . . ."
Redefining our responsibilities around the world - that has to come first.\(^3\)

Soldiers in the strategic process must clearly understand the difference between declaratory policy, statements of political objectives with intended psychological effects, and employment policy, the concrete military objectives and plans employing current forces in support of those objectives.\(^4\) The soldier must be involved in the attainment and maintenance of the proper balance between the military means available and the political objectives on behalf of which those means are employed.\(^5\) Military input must be focused on possibilities not hopes and dreams. Strategic decisions must not be made by bureaucrats; warfighters must be at center stage in this process, this art of the possible in a world where constraints require choices between unpleasant or imperfect alternatives.

In the “comeback” years since the Vietnam conflict, the Army’s leadership has refined our superb doctrine, directed the production of the finest weapons, developed the best military training philosophy and systems, and above all manned the force with disciplined and confident soldiers. With the recent changes, the Army’s senior leadership must now add to this list the formulation of the best possible Army input to our national military strategy.
The input to this strategy will require courage because the trends of the past couple years and those predicted for the 1990s undermine the role in which the Army has prospered for over a century. Parts of the Army will fight a vigorous retrograde, aimed at preserving the status quo. Sadly our recovery from the Vietnam days may evoke greater stubbornness.

ARMY INPUT TO MILITARY STRATEGY

In the Chief of Staff's "A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond," the correct theme for the Army's input to military strategy can be found: "no amount of commitment and political will to defend vital interests around the world can substitute for timely deployment of sustainable land forces capable of countering a miscalculation or deliberate aggression by an opponent." This sentence sends a powerful message without using the word deterrence. Our enemies are deterred when they perceive that we have the capability and will to mobilize, deploy, fight, and sustain combat operations.

Deterrence is a concept not a mission. It is defined as prevention by prohibition or danger, and the Army is an instrument of this prevention. The capability part of
deterrence is the responsibility of those in uniform; the willingness, the civilian leadership's. The Army can achieve its portion of deterrence without opening every mission statement with the word deterrence. This fact is important because the deterrence mentality is at odds with the warrior ethos. For a soldier, peace is not the profession; war is. Thus, the corollary places warfighting as the professional soldier's mission, not deterrence. This thought-active vice passive—is conveyed by the "operational continuum," especially "peacetime competition," as presented in the January 1990 pre-publication edition of FM 100-1 The Army.

The Army should begin to formulate its vision by downplaying the passive role as a deterrent in favor of enhancing the Army's usefulness as an affirmative instrument for achieving the national purpose across the operational continuum. Although nuclear weapons will continue to play their deterrence role, the Army must implant the fear of mortal injury in the minds of enemies who challenge the U.S. in the hostile states of the continuum. In the future, the Army's part of deterrence will be its capability and will to prosecute prompt and sustained actions. This capability will manifest itself in special, contingency and reinforcing operations; thus, the Army will play a vital role at any point
along the operational continuum.

In the non-hostile state, peacetime competition, the Army must be able to promote goodwill, harmony and stability so as to turn potential enemies into friends. Success in peacetime competition has the greatest deterrent value because potential enemies become strong friends.

FOCUS THE ARMY

Since the Vietnam conflict, the Army has maintained two communities. One has been prepared to fight World War III as if it were a larger version of the 1944-45 campaign in Western Europe; the other, to fight the ongoing war that pits the U.S. against an array of anti-American forces of varied motivations. These two communities "exist in uneasy tandem, the result of a shotgun wedding between what worked yesterday and what is needed today."

Although both communities share traditions, regulations, doctrine, quality soldiers, modern equipment, and a superb training philosophy, only part of the Army has fought since the early 1970s. This part together with its Marine brother is a regular force, infantry based, readily deployable (most of the time), often well trained (but not always), writing doctrine by the seat of the pants (or not at all), and
learning lessons as it fights. The other part of the Army demonstrates its capabilities without the threat of using them due to the nuclear potential of the battlefield on which it is prepared to fight.

The point is not to eliminate the ability to fight a nuclear campaign. Nor is it that "flesh and blood can do only so much against steel and fire." The point is that the Army must offer the President and the warfighting CINCs the capability to project across the operational continuum the appropriate force in support of our national interests around the world. The Army must create a force, from the first Ranger out the C-141 door to the last reserve component combat service support soldier, that displays the will and capability to support the national military strategy.

If the Army is guilty of a "too late or too light" structure in the future, then it has failed the nation. Parochial lines cannot be drawn between skill and dash and pounds and inches. To the extent the Army deters, it does so through the strength of the four pillars of defense. Tough training, preparedness, and quality soldiers can maintain readiness. Today, risks can be accepted in modernization and sustainment. The Army must structure correctly if it is to support the nation to the degree it has in the past.
vision of the future must include creating an Army ready to help citizens worldwide, in a positive sense, across the operational continuum.

**STRUCTURAL CHANGES**

Success on the battlefield results from a complex array of people, things, and events, one of which is the organization of the force. In terms of organizational theory, little help is available in the civilian world. From a civilian point of view, every organized activity gives rise to two fundamental and opposing requirements, the division of labor into various tasks to be performed, and the coordination of these tasks to accomplish the activity. In the civilian world, these two do not necessarily require synchronization. In fact, where older organizational thought was based on rules for span of control, the new theory involves matrix structure and often violates the principle of unity of command. Successful civilian organizational theory has very little application to structuring combat forces.

The optimum organization effectively incorporates the tenets, imperatives, and principles of war; therefore, the organization should be a design characteristic of the doctrine it serves. "Our brightest minds see a doctrinal imperative
for structural change. Only branch parochialism, unit selfishness, and the irrational love for the status quo will keep the Army from doing what is right.

In the 1980s, the Army experienced the turmoil of Div 86 and AOE. The on-going budget reductions and the potential to undergo another design change, now being formulated by TRADOC, guarantee more turmoil. If this turmoil cannot be avoided then it must be worthwhile.

The inevitable change in force structure should be directed to that outlined in Army 21. This force can be created with varying degrees of difficulty. On the tactical end of the chain of command, the CCF would be today’s brigade. The Army 21 concept of CCFs should be extended to include all types of brigades, combat, combat support, and combat service support. On the more complex end, the ROAD style division would be dismantled moving combat support and combat service support assets either up to corps or down to fixed separate brigades. Today’s corps would become the LBF, which is already suited for conducting operational level campaigns to achieve strategic objectives. With all of its assets moved, the division commander and staff would constitute the BTF which would command and control multiple CCFs.
CLOSE COMBAT FORCES - BRIGADES

Making the CCFs separate fixed brigades is a solution many have reached by studying this subject. For example, two large study groups in the War College classes of 1988 and 1989 proposed the same solution in Mounted Warfare-2004 and Continuous Operations-2004, respectively. Mounted Warfare-2004 determined that "current US tactical units are too bulky and too dependent on support from elsewhere to be in concert with ALB doctrine." This study concluded that the brigade should be the corps commander's building block with which he would tailor his force. Continuous Operations-2004 determined that "organizing the Army based on combined arms brigades will facilitate accomplishing the continuous operations synchronization requirements and improve the force's strategic, operational, and tactical agility." The arguments in these two studies are consistent with ALBF and Army 21.

Separate, fixed, combined arms brigades, the maneuver CCFs will have the agility, cohesiveness, robustness and resiliency to rapidly engage in decisive close combat where the corps commander, the LBF commander, chooses to do so. Fire support, aviation, engineer, air defense, and intelligence brigades, the combat support CCFs, will be self-
sufficient, mobile, survivable, tailorable, and fully aware of their role in the LBF (corps) commander's synchronization plan. The combat service support CCFs will also be self-sustaining and will be able to operate as single or multiple functional units in support the LBF (corps) commander's plan.

The LBF commander will tailor force packages of CCFs which will fight mobile engagements in depth, win and disperse to fight again. These CCFs will meet the lethality, mobility, survivability, versatility, and sustainability requirements of the future battlefield. They will also improve the strategic deployability of the Army in that they will be able to station, embark, debark, and prepare for combat more quickly than forces today.

BATTLE TASK FORCE-DIVISION

The BTF concept is the most innovative part of this vision. On the path from today's structure to that of BTFs, many sacred cows will become hamburger. The BTF will be a mission based organization which the LBF commander would assign tailored forces, multiple CCFs. This tactical headquarters would be capable of employing CCFs in consonance with the LBF commanders plan and intent. In addition, it would prepare orders and plans, estimate logistical needs, and
place priorities on support needs. Unencumbered by administrative responsibilities, the BTF would be the warfighting heart of the battle.

In peacetime, the BTF (old division) commander and his staff would focus on training. With the Combat Training Centers, the Battle Command Training Program, advances in simulations, and time to concentrate on warfighting, the BTF would master the skills of warfighting. Only the cream of the officer and NCO corps would be assigned to these staffs. These staffs would not be oriented to a type force (e.g. heavy or light). They would be skilled in employing multi-CCFs in all regions of the world. They would frequently visit the regions of interest constantly updating warfighting assessments. Their expertise would enhance the warfighting philosophy of the vision.

In peacetime the BTF commander will often wear the hat of installation commander. Although some active duty personnel would work on the installation side of the command, installations would be managed by DA civilians. Contracting functions like DPCA, DOL and DEH have proven cost effective. In the new structure, they will allow the BTF commander and staff the time to concentrate on warfighting.
LAND BATTLE FORCE-CORPS

The LBF will be a combat based organization comprised of fixed organic unit structures with which it will generate combat power to fight the close, deep, and rear operations simultaneously. Offensively, the LBF commander will rapidly mass CCFs to violently strike the enemy at decisive locations. Upon destroying the enemy, CCFs will quickly disperse maintaining the capability for a continuous battle. Defensively, the LBF commander will shape the battlefield by establishing a gauntlet for the enemy to move through. In both cases, the LBF commander will be able to use CCFs and their controlling BTFs to deny the enemy the initiative.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has begun to formula the vision of the force for the 1990s and beyond. From a macro view, the Army must participate in the formulation of strategy with the same professionalism with which it rebuilt the Army after the Vietnam conflict. The Army must take on a complete warfighting character. If the end strength continues its downward trend, the quality of the force will be measured in its warfighting will and capability. Thus, warfighting must be paramount in all that the Army is about. The vision needs
to take the Army will beyond the designs being formulated by TRADOC for the heavy force. The vision can take advantage of the opportunity to take risks and move the Army structure quickly to the Army 21 concept.

Moving to the Army 21 structure will require few changes at battalion level and below. With a vision focused on this structure, the competition for spaces will not be in conflict with the desired force of the 1990s and beyond. As the next chapter...
ENDNOTES


5. Record, p. 2.


11. Ibid., p. 27.


16. Ibid., p. 57.

CHAPTER VI

MICRO VIEW OF THE STRUCTURE FOR THE 1990s AND BEYOND

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the micro, non-generic force for the 1990s and beyond. It takes the data and opinions presented thus far and blends them into a structure that supports ALBF, Army 21, and the Chief’s white paper "A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond." The structure presented in this chapter maintains The Army Long-Range Planning Guidance which stresses the development and fielding of "a force structure that supports the Army's mission and the requirements of the Unified and Specified Commands" while minimizing turbulence in the force. Finally, it maintains realism in those actions required for its implementation.

Successful implementation will require senior leadership, military and civilian, to match the staying power of a Washington, Grant or Marshall. Today's leaders must formulate a strategy consistent with capabilities and will to use them, overhaul or override the PPBS to produce structure consistent with the vision, and work with Congress to produce the best possible force for the 1990s and beyond.

The structural changes presented in this chapter would occur over a period of time in which the domestic and
international scene will be volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. Maintaining focus on the vision throughout this period will be difficult, but the reward will be a structure that can evolve and not one that will require revolutionary changes.

The time to begin these changes is now. Our most challenging enemy, the Soviet Union, is not in the position to wage a conventional World War III and due to its domestic problems cannot be as active as in the past assisting third world struggles for settlement in its favor. The world is also at a turning point in that the bipolar world's influence is decreasing while the multipolar world's influence is increasing. We are very close to, if not at, the time when the later will be dominant. U.S. budget challenges will cause change and turmoil; this change and turmoil must be directed to that vision which best supports national interests and the national military strategy.

JOINT WARFIGHTING

The key link between the macro and micro view is the joint fight. If the Army's role in strategy development and its warfighting focus fail to deter, the Army must offer the CINC or his subordinate commander a deployable, flexible, and
lethal force capable of quickly accomplishing the mission. Because the Army has roles across the operational continuum, the CINC may need any combinations of special operations, forward deployed, contingency, or reinforcing forces. Since inter and intra theater lift will remain less than optimum over the mid-term, moving any combination to the theater will remain challenging.

By basing the Army on CCFs-fixed, self-sufficient brigades of all types-the CINC will accept into his theater discrete combat, combat support and combat service support brigade packages, the total of which would be tailored for the campaign at hand. This concept is not one of piecemeal application of force. Rather, as lift is available, CCFs arrive in the theater fully capable of performing their role in the campaign. For example, with the abundance of Korean infantry, the U.S. forces in Korea may need to be augmented not by maneuver CCFs but by fire support and aviation CCFs.

The number and type of CCFs needed in the CINC's plan would be continually refined with computer simulations, joint exercises, and training at every level. In these efforts the CCFs, BTFs, and LBFs would develop a close relationship with not only the supported CINC but also the sister service units assigned by the plan. The close relationship between the
Army, its sister services, and the supported CINC would enhance the warfighting capability and add to the deterrence of war.

As the flow of CCFs continues into a theater, the CINC would assign them to his subordinate commander(s) who would employ the LBF or the BTF to assist in the span of control of the CCFs. In many cases, the LBF (corps) commander will be the Joint Task Force commander or subordinate commander. The LBF commander may employ the BTF for span of control or may employ it to achieve a particular intent. If the threat requires mobilization, it will also require the support of the American people to defeat it. Therefore, General Abrams' Total Army concept must be maintained.

FOUR TYPES OF LAND BATTLE FORCES

Our history, present trends, and the best predictions of the future indicate that the Army should be structured in the following four types of LBFs: Forward Deployed, Contingency, Reinforcing, and Special Operations. Because of the Army's role across the operations continuum, the number and type of LBFs will be based on domestic and international policies. The LBF will be developed around today's Lieutenant General Commands. The special operations community has recognized the
need for tailoroble levels of command which will allow them to easily evolve to the new structure.

FORWARD DEPLOYED CORPS

The Army would have one Forward Deployed Corps stationed in Europe. It would consist of seven maneuver (six separate maneuver brigades and an ACR), four fire support, three engineer, two air defense brigades, two aviation brigades, and the appropriate combat service support and special operations CCFs to meet the CINC’s needs. The Forward Deployed Corps would have two Battle Task Force (Division) staffs.

The Forward Deployed Corps is subject to the on-going unilateral and multilateral negotiations for the reduction of forces in Europe. The numbers of brigades listed above reflect roughly the most recent reductions offered made by President Bush. The Forward Deployed Corps must have the flexibility to make further reductions or expand. Basing the Army, and thus the Forward Deployed Corps, on brigades will facilitate this flexibility.

CONTINGENCY CORPS

A Contingency Corps would be an active component organization manned at 100% strength—soldiers and equipment—
with all the combat, combat support, and combat service support units needed to perform its missions. Its warfighting focus would include joint exercises, full scale deployment rehearsals, frequent live fire exercises, elimination of training distractors, etc. Although expensive, this focus would maintain our quality force and ensure that the drawdown will not result in another Korean-Task Force Smith tragedy.

Because of the uniqueness of battles, campaigns and the many regions around the world and because of the expense to keep a Contingency Corps at the required readiness level, the present trends support two Contingency Corps. As an island nation, the U.S. must be able to project power in two directions, east and west, across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. One Contingency Corps would be stationed on the east coast focused on Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; the other, would be stationed in the west and focused on Asia and the South Pacific. Each Contingency Corps would work closely with the Southern Command for power projection into Latin and South America. Each would also work closely with the Marine Expeditionary Force pointed in the same direction.

The Army's Contingency Corps and the Marines' Expeditionary Force turf overlap is a minor issue. The Army conducts combat operations on land that defeat the enemy and
seize, occupy, and defend land area. The Marine Corps seizes or defends advanced naval bases and conducts land operations essential to the naval campaign. Projecting power in the future will require both forces to work even closer than they have in the past. Because of the forcible entry requirements, the Marine Expeditionary Force and the Army Contingency Corps will complement each other superbly. For example, the best of each will be used in a combined air assault and beach landing both of which converge on a port for the immediate off load of a heavy force.

The Atlantic Contingency Corps would be stationed at Fort Stewart. It would have three heavy maneuver CFFs formed from the maneuver brigades at Fort Stewart and the 197th Separate Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning. It would have four light combined arms maneuver CFFs, two formed from the brigades at Fort Drum and two from the brigades at Fort Campbell and two BTF, one at Fort Drum and one at Fort Campbell.

One of the toughest turf battles in the implementation of this structure is the dismantling of the Air Assault Division into two light maneuver and one aviation CCFs. With an increasing number of critical eyes on structure, the arguments for this action continue to grow.²

In order for the light design to evolve into a mobile
force of the future, the lift assets of the Air Assault Division must be equally dispersed across the light force. The aviation community stands to gain from this initiative. Without a medium force, additional aviation CCFs will be necessary for success across the operational continuum.

The Atlantic Contingency Corps would have three aviation CCFs, one at Fort Campbell, one at Fort Drum, and one at Hunter Army Airfield-Fort Stewart. It would have two fire support CCFs, one at Fort Stewart and one at Fort Campbell. The remaining combat support and combat service support brigades would be stationed at Forts Bragg, Stewart, Benning and Jackson for easy access to the ports of Wilmington, Savannah, Jacksonville, and Charleston, respectively.

One of the major actions to create the Atlantic Contingency Corps will be to station an air defense CCF on the east coast for rapid deployment with the Corps. This increase and some increase in fire support, after rearranging the XVIII Abn Corps artillery, are justified by the warfighting trends presented earlier.

Because the Pacific Contingency Corps would cover a massive area, it would be headquartered in Hawaii. The creation of the Pacific Contingency Corps is somewhat more complex than the Atlantic. The structural changes already
announced for FY 91 further challenge obtaining the correct mix of forces in this region.

Although the need for heavy forces in the Pacific is much less than that of Europe or the Middle East, the Army must afford the Pacific Contingency Corps some heavy force. One motorized maneuver CCF should remain at Fort Lewis, the only Army installation near a west coast port.

To make heavy forces available for the Pacific Contingency Corps, the U.S. role in Korea will need adjusting. U.S. should relinquish the Combined Army Command to the Koreans and move the 2d Infantry Division south into a reserve position. The forces in Korea would convert to two heavy maneuver CCFs, one fire support CCF, one aviation CCF and one BTF. In the event of conflict in Korea, CINCPAC would deploy the Pacific Contingency Corps Headquarters to Korea with a tailored package of CCFs from elsewhere in the Corps. The Pacific Contingency Corps' initial mission would be reserve for the Combined Forces. The heavy force in Korea would also offer options for its deployment to other parts of the region under the command of the Pacific Contingency Corps.

The Pacific Contingency Corps would have seven light CCFs, three in Hawaii, three in either Fort Ord or Lewis, and one in Alaska. Fire support and aviation CCFs would be
stationed at Fort Lewis and Hawaii. With an air defense brigade at Fort Lewis, the Pacific Contingency Corps would not have the Atlantic’s problem of creating new structure. The remaining combat support and service support brigades would be stationed either in Fort Lewis or in Hawaii. One BTF would be stationed Fort Ord or Lewis and one at Schofield Barracks.

Concurrently with the building of the Pacific Contingency Corps, the Army would streamline its command and control in the Pacific. The I Corps and IX Corps spaces would be combined to build the Pacific Contingency Corps. The Pacific Contingency Corps commander should not be CINCPAC’s ARFOR commander. The Army should return to a four star ARFOR command in the Pacific so that the Pacific Contingency Corps could focus on the warfighting in this massive and vital region of the world.

REINFORCING CORPS

Reinforcing Corps would maintain General Abrams’ Total Army philosophy. Although each reinforcing corps would have a mix of active and reserve component forces, one would be predominantly active component and four predominant reserve component. Neither active or reserve reinforcing corps would be part of a second string army. If any or all of these
corps were employed, they would fight on the most challenging battlefield in history. Thus, they must maintain the same qualities our Army has today. They would offer the Army the ability to expand and contract without taking risk along the operational continuum where the greatest probability of employment lies.

The active component reinforcing corps would be built around the III Corps at Fort Hood and consist of the following:

1. Fort Hood: Three heavy maneuver CCFs, two aviation CCFs, one fire support CCF, and one BTF.
2. Fort Carson: Two heavy maneuver CCFs, one aviation CCF, one fire support CCF, and one BTF.
3. Fort Polk: Two heavy maneuver CCFs, one aviation CCF, one fire CCF, and one BTF.
4. Fort Riley: Two heavy maneuver CCFs, one aviation CCF, one fire support CCF, and one BTF.
5. Fort Bliss: One heavy maneuver CCF and one air defense CCF.
6. Fort Sill: Three fire support CCF.
7. Fort Irwin: One heavy maneuver CCF.

A majority of the remaining combat and combat service support brigades of this corps would be active component.
After the decrease in the division echelon and the increase in the fire support brigades some spaces may need to be reserve component to meet budget guidance.

The four reserve component reinforcing corps would be build around the 1st, 2d, 5th and 6th Army headquarters, assuming the decision to inactivate the 4th has already been made. Initially, they would maintain the same relationship they now have with the National Guard and US Army Reserve in their geographical areas. Over time, the reserve components would be organized into CCFs and BTFs, would be balanced in combat power, and would eventually be standardized.

As the old Army Commander takes on the new duties of Reinforcing Corps Commander, the warfighting philosophy of the Total Army will be enhanced. The active duty Reinforcing Corps Commander's interest in the training and readiness of his predominantly reserve component corps will be more acute for in the event of mobilization, he will conduct pre-deployment training, deploy, and fight his corps. Having these corps commander's and their National Guard BTFs working closely with the CINC for which they support will demonstrate The Total Army's commitment to warfighting.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS CORPS

The Special Operations Corps would be stationed at Fort
Bragg and built around the US Army Special Operations Command. Part of the XVIII Abn Corps would move to Fort Steward to form the Atlantic Contingency Corps and part would join the Special Operations Corps, leaving one major command at Fort Bragg.

As the threat of mechanized armies clashing on the great plains of the world becomes more remote, the importance of successful peacetime competition will increase. As Security Assistance Forces are developed to support the fighting CINCs and as elite combat units are needed to dominate an enemy early in a conflict, the Special Operations Corps' importance will continue to grow. Based on its vital roles across the operational continuum, the Special Operations Corps would continue to evolve over the mid-term. Nevertheless, one Special Operations Corps will meet the requirements for the near-term.

Equal to the dismantling of the Air Assault Division will be the assignment of the 82d Abn Division to the Special Operations Corps. The purpose of assigning the only Airborne Division to the Special Operations Command is twofold. First, with the development of two contingency corps, the NCA can commit one and still have the other in strategic reserve, a mission the 82d has proudly and successfully held for many years. Second, the capability for conventional vertical
assault is unique to the 82d Airborne Division. This capability, in concert with the other structural changes presented in this paper, makes the Special Operations Corps' peacetime command and control of the 82d Abn Div the right choice.

If there is no need for a vertical assault, the light maneuver CCFs of the contingency corps would handle the dismounted infantry missions. If there is a need for vertical assault, it is reasonable to assume that in addition to the conventional vertical assault forces other Special Operations Corps units (e.g. Special Forces and Ranger) would be involved, either preceding or concurrently with the 82d Abn Div. Thus, to which ever corps the 82d Abn Div is assigned, it bridges the gap between the special and contingency operations only when the need for forced vertical entry is required. Whether the 82d Abn Div is commanded in peacetime by the front end or the back end of its wartime mission is the key question. When the traditional parochialism of this question is set aside, the front end is the correct choice.

The 82d Abn Div would become a three CCF and one BTF unit just as the other conventional units are to be structured. In addition to the three fixed, combined arms CCFs of the 82d Abn Div., the Special Operations Corps would command other
CCFs of the old XVIII Abn Corps, which due to operational necessity had to retain the vertical assault capability. Those that did not would join the Atlantic Contingency Corps.

The entire 75th Ranger Regiment should be moved to Fort Bragg. Several advantages can be gained with this move. With the Regiment located with its subordinate and higher headquarters, the entire spectrum of command-leading, caring, training and maintaining—would be improved. With the assignment of the 82d Abn Div to the Special Operations Corps and the move of the 75th Ranger Regiment to Fort Bragg, the training and coordination between the two would improve, another demonstration of warfighting commitment. The close coordination and understanding that would develop under one command will ensure that the Ranger Battalions are never used as conventional forces as they wrongly were in World War II.

CONCLUSION

The force structure outlined in this chapter is not "pie in the sky" and it is not based on the suggested base locations. It can be achieved with as few as 500,000 soldiers. The reinforcing corps allow for further expanding or contracting. Less risk is incurred with this force structure methodology because the risk can be taken at the...
general war state of the operational continuum which holds a very low probability over the near-term. The changes minimize the turmoil at battalion level and below and at the current array of installations.

The major moves of soldiers occur in Korea, which many feel is overdue, in the 75th Ranger Regiment, and in shifting XVIII Abn Corps assets to Atlantic Contingency Corps. The streamlining of the command and control in this region to produce the Pacific Contingency Corps will be leadership type spaces and can be easily affected over time. The major building of new structure centers around an air defense CCF for the Atlantic Contingency Corps and fire support CCFs for the III Reinforcing Corps. The immediate need for aviation CCFs will require shifting of assets and some new structure.

With their tailorable force packages, these four types of corps facilitate the proper top-down structuring of the Army. As the need arises along the operational continuum, these packages will offer flexibility and a force that is deployable, flexible, and lethal. This structure also facilitates the continued improvement of the ability to fight in joint organizations. Further, it provides the Army an integrated force structure which includes all types of Army organizations involved across the operational continuum. But
most of all, this structure will demonstrate, to friend and foe alike, the Army's commitment to being a capable, willing warfighting instrument of the national military strategy.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

This paper has been "a mile wide and an inch deep" for several reasons. The research for this paper began in an effort to determine whether the structure of the Army should be based on divisions or brigades. The research pointed so clearly to studying based on brigades that study of why the Army remained based on divisions was undertaken.

During the early 1970s, studies did support the division base; this support is understandable given the growing Soviet threat and the need to focus the Army on it while rebuilding after the Vietnam conflict. After the major portion of rebuilding had taken place, the division base question did not surface because the Army was supported with the money to have almost everything it wanted.

The research effort then turned towards determining what it would take to affect the structural changes that are being sought from all corners. When combining the arcane adherence to flags, branch parochialism, the PPBS imbalance between commitments and capabilities, Congress' micro-management of the defense budget, the increased rate of domestic and international changes, ... the sense of "can't get there from here" almost prevailed.
The effort then turned to the development of a vision which would guide the Army toward the correct structure for the 1990s and beyond. Vision formulation returns one to fundamentals, philosophy and strategy. Since national military strategy is executed through the CINCs and not individual service strategies, this paper included the need for effective military input to strategy while maintaining the requirement that all a service does must support the joint fight. This paper also captures the need for the Army (and its sister services) to focus philosophically on warfighting while the CINCs and NCA focus on deterrence.

This paper outlines where we have come from and future trends to highlight the type changes that are needed. The inevitable structural changes cannot be made with a simple "spaces" allocation process—at one end of the spectrum—and without military strategy implications on the other. The structural changes of the Army during the next several years of constrained resources need a Napoleonic guardian to ensure every piece of the puzzle fits and to ensure that when the puzzle is assembled it is the same picture desired as when the process began.

WHAT THIS PAPER HAS DONE

This paper has presented from a macro and micro view a
vision for the forces of the 1990s and beyond. It has outlined a "doable" way to structure the force to meet the trends of the future. The resulting structure supports Army 21 and ALBF, their tenets, imperatives, and principles. The structure supports the joint fight by focusing forces at unified regions of the world and realistically stationing them to facilitate that support. This focus clearly affects the perception of warfighting will and capability.

Today's quality force is a result of quality training. This structure enhances the Army's training philosophy from individual to corps. An Army, structured in fixed self-sufficient CCFs, will train individual soldiers and their units in the same configuration as they will operate in during conflicts. For example, the maneuver CCF would contain each of the combat and combat support arms required to fight the non-linear, fast paced, chaotic, and continuous battles of the future. Since the Vietnam conflict, the Army's training philosophy has evolved and matured; it is the best in the world. This philosophy cannot be set aside during and after the restructuring process. The structure presented in this paper supports and will enhance this philosophy.

The multi-echelon techniques already in place will ensure that the CCFs are ready for combat. In peacetime, the Battle
Task Force primary focus is training, training for the battle that may not come because of the expertise it displays. With today’s computer simulations and those of the future, the corps commander will be able to train his CCFs and BTFs to standards never before thought possible.

The Atlantic Contingency Force, pointed to a part of the world has the threat and terrain for the heavy fight, must be near a port. Training at the embarkation task and the integration of heavy and light CCFs will take on increased meaning as the need for deployability, flexibility, and lethality grows. The Pacific Contingency Corps helps give focus for the west coast light forces, makes the forces in Korea more efficient (as the Army reduces structure, it cannot afford to have one entire division tied up with one mission), and streamlines the command and control headquarters in this region.

This structure maintains General Abrams’ Total Army philosophy with the Reinforcing Corps while giving the Army the ability to expand or contract at the macro level—add or subtract CCFs, BTFs, corps headquarters—and to fine tune at the micro level—alter the internal design of the CCFs. These changes can be affected without taking risk where probability of conflict is high. The readiness of the reserve components
will be maintained through the focus of the Reinforcing Corps on warfighting based on the approved plans of a CINC(s).

General Abrams also saw the need for special operations forces and raised the first Ranger Battalion. This need has grown to a Unified Command because of the importance of special operations forces along the operational continuum. By focusing one Corps on one installation on this arena, the Army will display its commitment to be successful at these missions. With the increased need for Security Assistance Forces, the Special Operation Corps may evolve to two corps, a Peacetime Competition Corps and a "Black-battle" Corps. The time for this development may not be far off—if it is not already here.

This structure offers the Army one tremendous advantage—the articulation of forces to Congress. With the multitude of division bases, all of which have different internal designs, the Army developed the Division Force Equivalent (DFE) for the macro view. When the Air Force goes to Congress, it talks in terms of "wings." The Navy, "carrier battle groups." With this structure, Congressmen will not be perplexed with DFEs. The Army will talk in terms of four types of corps. With these corps laid across the operational continuum, the Army would find it much easier articulating to
The Army offers the nation many capabilities across the operational continuum; however, the nation can no longer afford to cover every contingency with a unique force. The Army must be able to tailor itself to meet the needs across the operational continuum. The only way the Army will be successful articulating this fact and employing forces in concert with the national military strategy will be to structure properly for the 1990s and beyond. The structure presented in this paper can be laid across the operational continuum, and all states are covered. In turn, it offers a logical way to expand or contract at any state along the continuum should circumstances require changes.

WHAT IS LEFT TO BE DONE

This paper has not detailed the design of a light or heavy combined arms maneuver CFF. Nor has it detailed how the space reduction of the divisional echelon will help build more fire support CCFs. These are the type designs the TRADOC community has the expertise to produce given a vision of what the total force should look like. This paper has not detailed exactly what units will move where and when. The DA and FORSCOM staffs have the experts who can manage the alignment.
of the present force, active and reserve, into that directed by a vision.

This paper has dodged the medium force issue. With the success of Operation Just Cause and the trends obvious to all, the Army's Light Forces Modernization Plan should answer the medium force questions. As we progress into the 1990s, the contingency operations may take on even more importance. The heavy units of the Contingency Corps may evolve to the medium force by "off the shelf" purchases of the medium equipment. The III Reinforcing Corps, the one predominantly active component, may become the third Contingency Corps. This heavy contingency corps would follow a light/medium contingency corps into a theater.

CHANGES ARE ON THE WAY; MAKE'M RIGHT

Recent domestic and international events have thrust upon the Army tough leadership and management challenges. As stated several times in this paper, the Army's initial answer to these challenges has been to maintain readiness while taking risks in modernization and sustainment. Structure will be reduced. The risk in this reduction will be minimized if the changes are directed toward the correct vision. To keep from coming out of the draw down worse off than before the
build up, the vision of the future force structure must be correct. This paper begins to formulate that vision.
ENDNOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY


