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RESERVE COMPONENT OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT TRAINING:
A KEY INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE ELEMENTS OF POWER

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH L. LUCKETT

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## Title
Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training: A Key Instrument within the Elements of Power

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## Abstract
Deployment of Reserve Component (RC) assets to execute overseas missions has played a major role in United States projections of national interests through the military element of power. The specific focus of this paper is to analyze the capability and effectiveness of humanitarian/civic action (HCA) and engineering deployments to United States Southern Command. Categorical examination will include: (1) general background and/or history of the elements of power and RC overseas training; (2) U.S. Latin American policy; (3) HCA perspectives and evolution of RC involvement; (4) intent and objectives of the
RC Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) program; (5) roles, concepts and funding overview; (6) assessments and results--RC ODT; (7) conclusion and recommendations. Within the framework above, the author's thesis is to increase use of RC military capabilities using combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) assets. Additionally, this paper addresses the idea that use of the RC CS/CSS rich environment in the HCA roles has had only minimum impact on its potential.

The current world order circumstances seem to dictate increased and broader use of the most experienced army units available--RC CS/CSS units.
RESERVE COMPONENT OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT TRAINING;  
A KEY INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE ELEMENTS OF POWER

An Individual Study Project

by

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Deployment of Reserve Component (RC) assets to execute overseas missions has played a major role in United States projections of national interests through the military element of power. The specific focus of this paper is to analyze the capability and effectiveness of humanitarian/civic action (HCA) and engineering deployments to United States Southern Command. Categorical examination will include: (1) general background and/or history of the elements of power and RC overseas training; (2) U.S. Latin American policy; (3) HCA perspectives and evolution of RC involvement; (4) intent and objectives of the RC Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) program; (5) roles, concepts and funding overview; (6) assessments and results--RC ODT; (7) conclusion and recommendations. Within the framework above, the author's thesis is to increase use of RC military capabilities using combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) assets. Additionally, this paper addresses the idea that use of the RC CS/CSS rich environment in the HCA roles has had only minimum impact on its potential.

The current world order circumstances seem to dictate increased and broader use of the most experienced army units available--RC CS/CSS units.
it is not sufficient that the military protect our lands from outside interference or attack—in addition, it is the responsibility of each of us to contribute to the security and well being of our fellow citizens by working together for military and civic progress.

President Johnson, letter to Fifth Conference of American Armies.

CHAPTER I

I. BACKGROUND/HISTORY--ELEMENTS OF POWER AND RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS

A. Elements of Power

Protection and advancement of U.S. interests in the international arena are primarily projected through one or any combination of the four elements of power:

(1) Political/Diplomatic;
(2) Economic;
(3) Socio-psychological;
(4) Military (violent/non-violent).

Within these elements of power are a myriad of instruments or conduits for projection of the power selected for use. For clarification it is necessary to mention one or two examples of instruments resident within each element of power.

1. Political/Diplomatic:
   a. Summits/conferences (Geneva, Yalta)
   b. Bi- or multilateral agreements (Panama Canal Treaty)
3. _Economic:
   a. Unilateral aid or transfers (lend lease to United Kingdom)
   b. Limited or unlimited sanctions (investment - Nicaragua, grain - Russia)

3. _Socio-Psychological:
   a. Educational (Peace Corps)
   b. Information (Voice of America Radio)

4. _Military - Violent/Non-violent:
   a. Non-violent
      (1) Military organizations (NATO)
      (2) Humanitarian/civic action (Berlin Airlift)
   b. Violent
      (1) 1983 Liberation of American citizens in Granada
      (2) 1989 Liberation of Panama

An essential ingredient for the successful implementation of an element of power is, of course, the ability to project all four. In many cases the elements of power are employed in some combination of two or more as they tend to transcend each other. Additionally, elements of power are dual in their capacity to project U.S. interests, either by assisting or deterring the policies/interests of other nations in relation to U.S. interests.

The specific focus of this paper is on the fourth element of power -- military. Within the military element of power,
concentration will center on the non-violent option using RC assets in application to Humanitarian/Civic Action (HCA).

In recent years, evolving force structure and force modernization within the RC have brought to military strategy a myriad of new options capable of enhancing efforts to project U.S. national interests and influence around the world. Reserve Component units have become major players in the formulation of U.S. defense plans. This increased emphasis on the RC in current defense policy raises important questions that must be addressed if we are to realize the full potential and utility of our Reserve Forces.

National Security Strategy of the United States, 1988, summarizes the RC role with this quote:

The Total Force policy established in the early 1970's places increased responsibilities on the Reserve Components of U.S. forces... Reserve units perform important functions on a daily basis. Priority for manning, training, and equipment modernization is not based on their peacetime status as forces [in reserve], but on the basis of direct integration into the nation's operational plans and missions.1

B. Overseas Training

Evidence of that integration into the nation's operational plans and missions is more clearly understood and appreciated through close examination of RC participation in overseas training through Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises and the RC ODT program.
Since 1981, RC units and cells have been deploying overseas in support of the warfighting Commanders-in-Chief (CINCS). RC units deploy to approximately 100 countries annually. The following chart depicts deployments since 1981:

PROGRAM TRENDS
(FY 81 THRU 90)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Units/Cells</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>9,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>12,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>1,932</td>
<td>36,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>2,601</td>
<td>46,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>57,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>2,536</td>
<td>49,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,822</td>
<td>42,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>1,938</td>
<td>45,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 (Projected)</td>
<td>2,592</td>
<td>50,473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Types of units typically deployed include infantry, artillery, armor, special forces, engineers, aviation, medical, military police, public affairs, psychological operations, civil affairs, maintenance, and public affairs. In addition to overseas deployments, RC units participate in various Continental U.S. (CONUS) training opportunities, including the National
Requisite, however, to an in-depth discussion regarding RC support to HCA projects and the RC's role in SOUTHCOM strategy is a basic working knowledge of U.S. Latin American (LATAM) policy and historical HCA application.

C. U.S. LATAM Policy

Historically, U.S. involvement in LATAM is perceived in a convenience or reactionary role. Throughout its existence America has looked for "important" world issues on the European stage—a U.S. policy which essentially ignored our soft underbelly and allowed our Latin friends to be exploited. Tranquil and subservient "Banana Republics" were all the United States wanted from the region, and we nourished their continued existence by striking diplomatic agreements with the wealthy ruling families in each country. Results of this policy are well known: Batista in Cuba, Somoza in Nicaragua, and Torrijos and Noriega in Panama. These dictators were basically left alone by the United States because they contained their domestic problems, which fit neatly underneath the complacent U.S. policy umbrella for the region.

Repression in South America flourished during the 1960's and 70's and was so rampant in 1975 that only Venezuela and Colombia had retained civilian governments. The remainder of South America faced a modern bureaucratic and authoritarian leadership
that banned political parties, suppressed trade unions, negated constitutions and implemented torture and other methods of violating basic human rights.

The authoritarian regimes began toppling in mass toward the decade's end, victims of economies run afoul, failure to attain domestic political support and negative world opinion, especially in view of U.S. emphasis placed on human rights in the late seventies.

South American politics began the 1980's concerned with the type of political structure that would replace authoritarian rule, and which countries would be affected first, and how. Early in the 1980's South American countries began leaning toward democratic politics and have gained momentum with dramatic rapidity. As the mid-1980's approached, a key U.S. LATAM policy issue had become the possibility of consolidating democratic inroads throughout the continent. The teetering and fragile democracies would now face a test of survival, one that would be doomed to failure without free world assistance!

D. HCA, Historical Perspective

Although civil assistance had been on the scene for years and practiced by military units as directed, HCA as an instrument within the military non-violent element of power only came into being through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Section 505(b) was added to the act, stating:
In the extent feasible and consistent with the other purposes of this part of the act, the use of military forces in less developed friendly countries in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development should be encouraged.3

It is one of the key civic action directives because in it President Kennedy related civic action to the stages of subversion in less developed countries:

1. In countries fighting active campaigns against internal subversion, civic action is an indispensable means of strengthening the economic base and establishing a link between the armed forces and the populace.

2. In countries threatened by external aggression, forces should participate in military civic action projects which do not materially impair performance of the primary military mission.

3. In countries where subversion or external attack is less imminent, selected indigenous military forces can contribute substantively to economic and social development and such a contribution can be a major function of these forces.4

It is the third stage or course of action this paper will highlight. As originally conceived by American planners, civic action was supposed to be on a no-cost or low-cost basis. Each project was to be funded by the host government with little or no monetary expenditure by the United States. Over time this
program has become one of our most important foreign policy initiatives. Humanitarian assistance and civic action assets, with the goal of enhancing regional social and economic stability, are geared to help underdeveloped nations alleviate the root causes of insurgency: poverty, ignorance, neglect, disease and hunger. The HCA initiative as an instrument of military power for use within Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) strategy is not a sole U.S. military venture nor a humanitarian handout; but rather, HCA is a jointly planned and executed activity, conducted by U.S. and host nation (HN) governments and military agencies, local community leaders, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Military civic action initiatives are not designed to supplant either host country or international aid programs, such as those of USAID, but rather serve to complement existing programs. Military civic action enhances civil military relations, deprives local insurgencies of support by reducing popular dissatisfaction, and improves the image of the host country and U.S. armed forces. The measure of success attributed to these combined civic action programs is reflected by the increasing number of nations which implement their own programs.

President Kennedy, the catalyst for modern American commitment to civic action, speaking to a group of Latin American diplomats commented:
The new generation of world military leaders has shown an increasing awareness that armies can not only defend their countries— they can, as we have learned through our own, help to build them.

E. Evolution of RC Participation

Initial deployment of RC units for overseas training occurred in the late seventies within the structure of planned JCS exercises. Precise numbers of units and personnel were not recorded until 1981. Steady growth of RC deployments coupled with a need for control and accountability prompted the Department of Defense (DoD) to establish the RC ODT program. United States Forces Command (FORSCOM) was appointed executive agent for the program, which is managed by the RC Training Division within the J3 Directorate. The impact of RC ODT around the globe is illustrated by the following list of 96 countries. In excess of 500,000 personnel have trained in these countries since 1981.
Major engineering exercises began deploying to SOUTHCOM in 1984. These deployments have trained in excess of 85,000 RC soldiers with the preponderance being trained after 1984. National Guard units from the Second Continental United States Army (CONUSA) area provided the engineering flag. Exercises conducted through 1990 have included deployments to Panama, Honduras, and Ecuador. Future exercises are tentatively planned for Panama and Venezuela.

Following is a listing of RC engineering exercises which have been conducted since 1984.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise Name</th>
<th>CONUSA</th>
<th>RC Component</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman I</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blazing Trails 2A</td>
<td>2A/5A</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blazing Trails 2A</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blazing Trails 5A</td>
<td>5A</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abriendo Rutas 2A</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blazing Trails 4A</td>
<td>4A</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuertes Caminos 1A</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuertes Caminos 4A</td>
<td>4A</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuertes Caminos 6A</td>
<td>6A</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuertes Caminos 5A</td>
<td>5A</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These exercises deployed an average of over 12,000 personnel annually. It is significant to note that RC annual deployments double CINCSOUTH's in-theater strength—a point of interest to be addressed in a following chapter.
ENDNOTES


3. Edward Bernard Glick, Peaceful Conflict, p. 70.

4. Ibid., p. 71.

5. Ibid., p. 23.

CHAPTER II

II. PROGRAM INTENT AND OBJECTIVES

A. Intent (General)

Original intent of the RC ODT program was unit deployment and employment within a theater of operations for conduct of additional training events. Program design intended to improve the readiness of our forces for the eventuality of war. That intent remains valid and continues to be realized in each RC deployment around the world today. As the program has matured, the purpose and objectives have been refined to fit current needs of both the warfighting CINC and RC units.

B. Objectives (General)

Objectives for RC units within the basic design of ODT are the conduct of mobilization deployment, execution, redeployment and recovery training. Tailoring train-up time prior to deployment is essential, because it provides a vehicle for long-term staff planning. Additionally, interface between Active Component (AC) and RC staffs serve to strengthen CAPSTONE alignments. This training is real world and extends beyond CONUS-based mobilization planning and training value. Simple transition to overseas exercise sites by road, rail, ship and air represents objectives that easily exceed normal mobilization exercises—a training vehicle previously unavailable to RC units.
Advantages provided to warfighting CINCs include RC assistance in their mission of providing a highly visible demonstration of U.S. resolve in support of overseas commitments. Among other positive impacts, the CINC capitalizes on opportunities to train RC forces as they will fight—tailored to conduct operations in distant environments. Lastly and probably representing the biggest bang for our training dollar, is the maximized impact on host nations and gaining commands without the expensive stationing costs inherent with long-term active component presence.

C. Intent and Objectives (SOUTHCOM)

With the general intent and evolving objectives of the ODT program identified, next is the examination of the program’s original intent and objectives in SOUTHCOM.

Historically, JCS-directed exercises conducted in SOUTHCOM have been engineer oriented. Each exercise, recently two per year, has a CONUSA organizing and deploying a task force of engineers and support soldiers to repair/construct/upgrade roads and conduct HCA projects. Execution phase is normally five months; however, detailed planning generally precedes execution by eighteen or more months, with post-exercise recovery lasting up to four months. It is especially important to note that the process transcends every level of command in developing new and enhancing resident skills of staff and key personnel.
At first glance, mission execution may seem a task easily replicated during CONUS annual training periods. However, assumptions of that nature are simply not true. Execution of the mission requires extensive planning, control, and dependence on real-time systems that are not artificial and pose real-world problems. The "simple" task of road building or rock drilling is not as simple as one would think when it occurs in austere environments. The lack of U.S. bases and equipment in the region require lengthy logistic tails.

Redeployment and recovery from overseas operations provide tremendous training value as a result of a true systems test. Following annual training events in CONUS, the operations tend to become routine. The opposite is true during SOUTHCOM engineering exercises. Planners must prepare detailed plans for real-world missions and failure to do so, including planning for contingencies within that mission, results in failed execution.

D. Role of RC Forces in SOUTHCOM Through JCS Exercises and ODT

RC units training in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) are indeed an integral part of U.S. political and military strategy in that region of the world, and as such, they represent a viable and necessary non-violent instrument of the military element of power available to the CINC.
These training exercises are providing our senior leadership with the first real gauge to evaluate mobilization, deployment and redeployment capabilities of RC forces.

Exercises involving one or more of the Army's sister services and HN military forces provide experience in joint and combined operations. Additional benefits include closer cooperation with neighboring countries and increased friendship, understanding, and exchange of military expertise.

E. Concept

As stated earlier, the focus of this study is RC forces as an instrument of military power in SOUTHCOM with additional focus on HCA efforts in the region. It is interesting to note that all four elements of power are currently being implemented in this geographic region of the world. The seemingly most effective element of power projected in LATAM is the non-violent use of military forces to conduct civil action, even though the recent use of military force to liberate Panama has been most notable. However, prior to discussion of humanitarian/civic action operations in the region, it is necessary to establish a basic working knowledge of the structure and mission of U.S. SOUTHCOM. SOUTHCOM headquarters, located at Quarry Heights in the Republic of Panama, is responsible for all U.S. military activities in Central and South America. It is significant to note this region represents 20 percent of the global landmass assigned to unified commands. SOUTHCOM serves as the DoD principal executive for
implementing national security policy and strategy in the region. The general mission of SOUTHCOM is to defend the southern flank of the United States and advance U.S. national interests within LATAM. Subsets of that mission include: preparation of contingency plans and strategic assessments; conduct of JCS-directed operations and training; support and assistance to U.S. country teams; promotion of regional mutual security and development; and provision for the defense of the Panama Canal in accord with the Panama Canal Treaty.

Implied within the stated mission are a host of diverse responsibilities which are imperative to the accomplishment of the mission. The important and most obvious implied tasks are: coordination of strategic and tactical reconnaissance; countering international terrorism; countering subversion and illegal traffic of arms and drugs; and the activity coordination of U.S. military service components supporting other unified and specified commands. Major components within the SOUTHCOM structure designed to accomplish the mission are:

United States Army South (USARSO), with approximately 6,690 personnel, is located at Ft. Clayton, Panama, and has the primary mission of ground defense of the Panama Canal. It also supports other regional missions, including deployment to 12 Latin nations for combined training. Medical and engineering assistance and intelligence support activities are additional missions of the command.
United States Air Force South (USAFSO), located at Howard AFB, Panama, with 2,360 personnel is headquartered at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas, and has the responsibility for controlling the air element in defense of the Canal.

United States Navy South (USNAVSO), located at Fort Amador, Panama, and consisting of approximately 419 personnel, maintains a special boat unit, provides fleet support for transient U.S. naval units and coordinates plans for naval forces that may be assigned for contingency operations.¹

F. Funding

With total strength numbering less than 10,000 and a land mass over twice the size of the United States, SOUTHCOM faces no less than a formidable task.

Examination of SOUTHCOM's slice of the DoD budget reveals how an already formidable task becomes extremely difficult to accomplish. Less than five percent of the worldwide security assistance is allocated to CINCSOUTH. In 1988, countries receiving security assistance were reduced from ten to three--Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.² In recent years SOUTHCOM has operated with less than one percent of both DoD manpower and budget. Currently perceived world order in which the threat will disappear is certain to further reduce federal budget allocations--and in particular defense dollars. Any future reduction of SOUTHCOM's miniscule portion of the defense budget would appear to be fatal to the command.
However, with its lean portion of the DoD budget and an austere command structure of personnel and equipment, SOUTHCOM provides the perfect sandbox for RC training. JCS-directed exercises involving CONUS based units pay all transportation costs involving personnel and equipment from aerial ports of embarkation (APOE) to exercise sites.

In turn, RC funds pay transportation costs of personnel from home station to APOE and all pay and allowances. In-country support costs and equipment transportation costs are forecast by SOUTHCOM to Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) and Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) for budgeting and management of funding required to plan and conduct ODT. Previous coordination by OCAR and CNGB identifies Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) units for program participation. Participation costs in SOUTHCOM have risen substantially since 1984 as illustrated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Cost (M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Minuteman I</td>
<td>$2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Blazing Trails</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Blazing Trails</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Blazing Trails</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Abriendo Rutas</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Fuertes Caminos</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Fuertes Caminos</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Fuertes Caminos</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Fuertes Caminos</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In essence, low-cost RC participation in CINCSOUTH's regional strategy fills an essential requirement otherwise too costly to fund. Chapter Four will address this issue in more depth.
ENDNOTES


It is necessary to preface discussion of the SOUTHCOM concept of operations with a cursory look at U.S. strategic interests in the area and delineation of recent U.S. policy designed to protect those interests. In little more than a decade U.S. concerns in LATAM have been heightened by events such as the Panama Canal Treaty, Salvadoran civil conflict, insurgency in Guatemala, Cuban activism in revolutionary movements, notable increase in migration of LATAM refugees to the United States increased drug trafficking and more recently, liberation of the Republic of Panama and the subsequent deposing of its self-proclaimed "Maximum Leader," Manuel Noriega.

United States policy in LATAM (1980-88) was one of nation building through reinforcement of democracy and assistance to friends. The policy identifies objectives (ends), and resources (means), for advancing U.S. interests. A third ingredient required to administer the policy guidance and ultimately advance U.S. interests is use of an element of power, (military, non-violent). That ingredient is a strategic concept (ways), specifically designed to combat insurgency in the LIC arena.

Military operations in LIC represent only one aspect of the struggle and must be pursued in close coordination with, and in support of, political, economic and social objectives.
Key to implementing such programs is maintaining dialogue and coordination with host government military forces. Assuming the moral legitimacy of such forces and the government they represent, United States military-to-military coordination seeks to encourage host country military forces to work toward mutual goals, emphasizing subordination of military to civilian control and enhancing military professionalism.²

Concomitantly, it should be understood that in most cases countries consist of four transcending systems: political, economic, security and social. When attempting to influence a system to achieve particular objectives, careful planning and coordination must include an understanding of the impact on the other systems. This is particularly true regarding military operations, which impact heavily on the immediate inhabitants.

Military actions must be measured in terms of their impact on the local populace.³

B. Concept of Operations--(HCA)

United States forces have been and continue to be cast in HCA roles. The history of our forces in these programs has seen its ups and downs, to include limited use since Vietnam.

Let's examine the HCA program in SOUTHCOM. Concept designs for HCA programs in LATAM are developed through a series of procedures orchestrated by Civil Affairs units which are CAPSTONE aligned to SOUTHCOM. Through combined efforts of U.S. and HN
forces, which include civil action agencies. HCA projects are identified and prioritized.

JCS-directed engineering exercises are the result of U.S./HN Civil Affairs unit efforts. When possible, one exercise is conducted in Central America and one in South America. These exercises are designed to construct new and repair old infrastructure. Manpower and equipment for the exercises are resourced by FORSCOM, using all three components of the U.S. Army, active, guard, and reserve. CONUS-based engineer Task Forces (TF) are structured to meet the JCS directives. In addition to the vertical/horizontal engineering capabilities of the TF, medical, dental and veterinary assets are structured as part of the force. It is through these engineering exercises that SOUTHCOM is able to employ HCA programs designed to win the "hearts and minds" of the rural campesinos.

Tangible results of the TF concept are realized by all players while at the same time satisfying a triad of concerns/expectations. HN's, FORSCOM and SOUTHCOM represent the legs of the triad. Within the triad framework a trilogy of perspectives is satisfied:

- HN ministers of defense and public works officials in concert with U.S. military forces are able to satisfy political pressures calling for humanitarian/civic assistance.

- The FORSCOM perspective is one that satisfies its mission of providing army forces to the fighting CINCS, while enhancing opportunities for unique training evaluation and readiness.
Lastly, SOUTHCOM perspectives are realized through reinforcement of freedom and assistance to friends. In the process, administration policy is projected within the overall U.S. interests in LATAM.

Typical expectations of the HN accomplished by engineering task forces are:
- road/bridge construction and repair;
- repair of civic structures, e.g., schools, churches;
- well drilling;
- medical and dental care for the populace within reasonable distance of the project site (Up to 2000 people a day have been treated over a ten-to-twelve-week period.);
- veterinary services which innoculate three-to-four-thousand cattle over the exercise period.

SOUTHCOM goals/expectations realized include: provision of a military presence outside the command's capability; fostering of additional military to military relationships both with HN and CONUS-based units; opening of previously closed doors and a demonstrated U.S. resolve in the region.

From the FORSCOM perspective, CONUS based units realize enhanced staff planning, additional AC/RC (total force) interface, hands-on real world training opportunities not routinely available to RC forces, and valuable training in mobilization, deployment and redeployment. Increasing roles in national defense plans dictate needed training opportunities.
Thus, the degree of success using an RC instrument within the military element of power is measured by its continued ability to satisfy the triad of concerns/expectations.

C. The Premier RC Training Opportunity

As previously stated, the advent of RC ODT provided units a training vehicle unequaled in their history. Suddenly the often asked question of, "Can the RC mobilize and deploy overseas?" was answered. Not only was the answer yes, it was yes and successfully. From 1981 through 1988, SOUTHCOM participation grew from less than 20,000 personnel involved in overseas deployments to more than 82,000. The proof was, in fact, in the pudding. The following chart details participation by each of the seven reserve components, including growth rates experienced since 1981.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cells/</td>
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<td>Cells/</td>
<td>Percent Change</td>
<td>Cells/</td>
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<td>Units</td>
<td>Pers</td>
<td>Units</td>
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<td>Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>5785</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>1195 - 5785 = 606.7%</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>2169</td>
<td>2169 - 3500 = 46.9%</td>
<td>1308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>3422</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>228 - 3422 = 44.7%</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18 - 186 = 75.5%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>363 - 0 = 100%</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Reserve</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>6931</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>670 - 6931 = 4.1%</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard Reserve</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>301 - 0 = 100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>19824</td>
<td>94230</td>
<td>94230 - 571 = 1643%</td>
<td>2757</td>
</tr>
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Overseas training opportunities abound throughout the world. Requirements far outstrip the capabilities of RC forces to satisfy the seemingly unsatiable appetite of our warfighting CINCS.

Major JCS overseas exercises with heavy RC participation include Reforger and Display Determination in Europe, Bright Star in Southwest Asia, Team Spirit in the Pacific and Blazing Trails/Fuertes Caminos (BT/FC) conducted in Central and South America.

All of these exercises utilize RC units, are certainly vital to U.S. interests, and provide essential training for the total force. As in all ODT, RC units are afforded an opportunity to evaluate their capabilities to mobilize, deploy, execute, redeploy and recover. Additionally, CAPSTONE relations are strengthened and training is tailored to wartime missions.

In comparison with the three major regions of the world, RC training opportunities in SOUTHCOM are certainly the most unique and realistic, if not the best available. Consider the following SOUTHCOM unique characteristics relative to other AORS.

- Use of military capabilities instead of a show of military force.
- One of a kind training environment (tropical and high altitude).
- Training is within a real world mission—not training for contingency (hands on, real time).
- Deployment to hostile LIC environments.
- Longer than other major exercises anywhere in the world.
- Provides engineering training unequaled in other exercises.
- Lack of logistical support base in exercise locations.
- Long overland supply lines—the 1987 exercise in Ecuador was the most severe test of our ability to support forces deployed to an austere environment that we have faced in years.

Although the exercises have evolved, placing priority on training and maintenance for engineer units, those changes have not altered life for the logisticians supporting engineering training exercises. There is little margin for failure as a learning experience.

In the areas of the world where these exercises take place, it is imperative to remember that politics, U.S. policy, and resources (both U.S. and HN) can quickly have an impact on planning and execution. Training commanders to be adaptable is as important as training engineer equipment operators. Flexibility must be built into all aspects of the operation, from mobilization through recovery.

The unique training benefits received from such deployments are not available in any other environment, thus providing the best ODT available for RC forces. A prime example of the quality of training available in SOUTHCOM and the flexibility required to respond is the 1987 deployment to Ecuador. "Abriendo Rutas," meaning "opening roads"—a change in the exercise name from "Blazing Trails"—was a road upgrade on the coast. Flexibility became the word of the day after a massive earthquake devastated...
the interior of Ecuador. Thousands were suddenly isolated from the rest of the country, extensive damage rendered infrastructure useless and destroyed an oil pipeline stretching coastward out of the Amazon basin.

At the request of government officials the exercise site was shifted to the interior. The mission changed to road and bridge construction. Equipment lists, some already marshalled for sealift, had to be altered. Once in port, the equipment was convoyed, without incident, in excess of 700 km across the Andes at heights exceeding 10,000 feet to the jungle floor. From the small village of Archidona, RC engineer units and their logistical support elements (LSE) proceeded to upgrade approximately six miles of what amounted to little more than a cart trail leading to the west bank of the Rio Hollin. Once upgrade operations reached the river, a 100-meter span of panel bridge with gabion support and massive concrete was erected. Approximately 5 km of new road was then constructed on the east bank. Additionally, HCA projects to include medical assistance exercises were designed to treat the rural residents.

Aside from the obvious utility to RC units regarding unique training opportunities, other important accomplishments were realized. As previously discussed, the all important triad of objectives/concerns was satisfied. An edifice was left in place for the HN, in this case, new and improved roads with a bridge
for Ecuador, additional U.S. presence and resolve in the region for CINCSOUTH, and a rare and realistic mission training opportunity for RC units.

Contrasting RC ODT opportunities within the SOUTHCOM AOR and training in the other warfighting CINC areas, Brigadier General William A. Navas, Deputy Director, Army National Guard, stated:

Training in SOUTHCOM is pure training as compared to training for contingencies in other parts of the world. It is performing at an operational level at the low end of the conflict spectrum... training within a real mission and in a hostile environment.

After a visit to the exercise site, a report prepared by the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) for the Secretary of Defense, included the following very significant statement:

The role of the Reserve Components in SOUTHCOM illustrates an important dimension of the Total Force Policy. The mission of SOUTHCOM, to support U.S. national security policy in Central and South America, is absolutely critical to the United States. The National Guard and Reserves are full partners with the Active Component and are contributing to the accomplishment of SOUTHCOM missions.

Annual deployments to SOUTHCOM exceed 12,000 ARNG and USAR soldiers. Included in those numbers is a 365-day-a-year Air National Guard rotational tactical fighter element. These soldiers and airmen constitute a force capability more than two times the authorized strength level of SOUTHCOM. This growing and capable force represents one of CINCSOUTH's most viable applications within the military element of power.
1. Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Operational Considerations for Military Involvement in Low Intensity Conflict, p. 10.


IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS

A. Success and Praise

Success takes on many faces in a program as large as RC ODT. The faces are almost as many and varied as the countries and peoples encountered. Certainly, one of the most important successes is stronger military-to-military relationships. United States soldiers have set excellent examples for HN forces, particularly the proper approach required when dealing with civilian leadership and authority. Positive results have increased confidence of HN citizens in their governments. The promotion of goodwill by our soldiers has even served to open previously closed political doors in under-developed nations of the world.

In many cases, the interface of U.S. and LATAM military agencies has enhanced diplomatic relationships between that particular nation and ours. An excellent case in point is the Ecuador exercises in 1987. The American soldier developed such a rapport with the HN military and rural populace that new and broadened dialogue was enhanced. Additionally, strengthening of U.S. ties with the people in the region are realized when U.S. and HN soldiers return to their respective communities to share their experiences.

In LATAM, U.S. military successes in engineering exercises can be equated in two ways: 1) lessons learned which are
institutionalized at the U.S. Army Engineer School; and 2) enhancement of HN military engineering skills. Although the exercises are valuable from many perspectives, the experience gained through building corduroy roads in the tropics could conceivably supply the margin of victory should the United States be forced to fight in similar environments.  

Additionally, the experience gained by RC commanders and staff is invaluable. Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., just prior to his recent retirement as Chief, National Guard Bureau, reflected on the impact ODT has had on RC command and staff experience.

I suspect our battalion and brigade commanders have had a comparable and sometimes higher level of experience than many active component officers. If you look at the many units that we have sent to SOUTHCOM and Korea year after year, or to Europe for Display Determination, REFORGER, and other exercises, we have commanders out there with a great deal of practical experience. Their staffs are equally trained and experienced.

Praise for the success of RC deployments comes from many sources, including the soldiers, their commanders, home state political figures and even national politicians, but the real taste of success comes for the soldier who experiences valuable real world training--satisfaction in knowing he is among the best at what he does. The soldier's bottom line comes from knowing he has operated in often hostile environments under austere conditions emphasizing competence and professionalism and, at the
same time, leaving behind him tangible advances in the daily lives of thousands.

8. Shortfalls/Limitations/Risks

As in all endeavors, regardless of success levels, some problems exist. These problems must be readily identifiable and quickly fixed, or reduced in impact. The ODT program has identified major shortfalls and corrective steps have been implemented as required.

Initially, deployments to SOUTHCOM carried with them a lack of experience, both in overseas operations and in tropical environments. In the early years problems were solved by throwing more manpower into the fray. As the exercises evolved, TF's grew in size, and in fact, the massive TF's created problems.

Areas in which difficulties were experienced include fiscal management, property accountability, authorized stockage list (ASL), supply operations, maintenance, lessons learned vanishing from rotation to rotation, lack of unit integrity in combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) elements, and loss of training time on the ground. These mistakes resulted in lengthy and costly recovery periods at ENDEX.

Evaluations of both the external and internal nature provided insight required to correct TF mistakes. A combination of reports by the Army Audit Agency (AAA) and Government Accounting Office (GAO), and reviews by USARSO and FORSCOM have helped to
fine tune the problems experienced by FC TF. Some of the fixes recommended by AAA and GAO have been instituted in the program and others are in the process. One major finding that has been rectified in cooperation with USARSO and FORSCOM is a trade-off between training (an RC concern) and mission accomplishment (a SOUTHCOM concern). In some exercises, so much attention was directed toward mission accomplishment that unit training suffered. The problem was one of biting off more mission than time and resources could overcome. Discussion with SOUTHCOM and less specificity in terms of mission promises to HN government officials has all but alleviated the problem. The lesson learned was that throwing all available manpower and equipment at a problem does not necessarily guarantee resolution of the problem, or equate to unit training. Rather, it tends to exacerbate both the problem resolution and unit training.

A second fix which is being incorporated into the FC exercises is a standardized TF model consisting of 500 soldiers. This model will contain the TF size by limiting airframes for troop rotations to three, authorizing only one sea transport for equipment haul, and holding exercise duration at 20 weeks, or ten two-week rotations. Previously, exercises had lasted up to six months, and commanders determined the TF size and equipment density without question.

Improvements expected as a result of the model are:

- Key staff continuity;
- Unit integrity;
- Mission continuity;
- Reduction of excess personnel;
- Better transfer of property accountability.

The TF model provides for approximately 360 rotational personnel, 100 duration soldiers and a 40-man AC engineer platoon to provide continuity for the exercise during rotational weekends. The model will provide adequate control mechanisms needed to check previous shortfalls, thus improving the program.

As in most military operations, risk is one of the main ingredients and FC exercises are no exception. Even with precise personnel and equipment models and the best qualified soldiers, a lack of solid staff planning and leadership can result in falling short of objectives, damaging our national image and degradation of overall training effectiveness.
ENDDNOTES


V. RESULTS, RISKS AND REFLECTIONS

Accepting armies, is there a way of making more versatile use of them? Can they be made to fulfill valuable secondary functions without degrading or destroying their ability to fulfill their primary function of national defense? In the developing countries especially, how can we utilize the energy, discipline, training and technical capacity of the armed forces for purposes other than illegal intervention in politics and the overthrow of legitimate governments?1

Latin America, long on the back burner of U.S. priorities regarding foreign policy, has recently claimed its portion of center stage. Regional events of extraordinary nature have vaulted it to the forefront. Most notable of these events were the elections in Nicaragua and the liberation of Panama. Revolutionary socio-economic, political and military changes are engulfing the region at an unbelievable rate, while exacting changes and consequences of a profound impact.

Many challenges to U.S. interests exist in the region with the major challenge being one of understanding the emerging transition of the region. Analyzing the root causes and their likely consequences will be paramount regarding formulation of future policy. That policy will need to address long-term U.S. strategic interests while accommodating the collective interests of the Latin American people.

When reviewing our policy toward Latin America, confusion and inconsistencies are revealed. Starting with the Carter policy of
peace, human rights and economic cooperation, we then moved to Reagan's four D's: democracy, defense, development and dialogue. We now find two more D's, drugs and debt, coupled with the Bush policy, one that is bipartisan, moderate, and more multilateral. However, in examination, even amidst changing U.S. policy thrusts, our U.S. interests have remained rather constant:

1. Stability in the region;
2. Denial of hostile influence/control;

Although not as prevalent as in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, political and social revolution is alive and well in the Americas. However, economic well-being is emerging very slowly, if at all. This environment requires an evolving U.S. policy which must address three major issues: (1) improvement of poverty levels in support of the region's overall economy; (2) debt reduction; and (3) elimination of drug trafficking. Although most of the countries are democracies, they are shaky and live under the threat of insurgency and military coup. United States approaches in supporting political structures and economic improvements have not fostered internal stability. Consistent multi-year programs with adequate funding will encourage and strengthen the economies of these democracies. This type of comprehensive program will enhance regional democratization in the long term. With the elimination of Noriega, and the restoration of democracy, Panama could become a
shining example of successful policy, but only with consistent aid from the United States.

Improved conditions in the region will require a complete reshaping of leadership attitudes across the board. Governments of all countries in the Americas need to firmly plant in their minds that conditions will change only if respective economic conditions improve. The political systems of these nations must address the best interests of the people, thus reducing outside political ambitions and interventions.

Countries must accept the fact that whatever government they choose, improvements will require generations. There are no quick fixes. The United States, if it really wants to help, should refrain from demanding democracy as a condition for doing business with governments. United States policies should respect the people's rights to self-determination as long as those governments do not pose security threats to the hemisphere.

Lastly, it is the promotion of democracy and free market economies in the region which make it important to the United States. Our policy over the past 35 years has been to seek preservation of a shaky status quo in Latin America, thus ensuring stability on our southern flank. However, Communists, insurgents and narco-terrorists, by attacking the shaky status quo, defended by an entrenched and often repressive government, "of the few, by the few and for the few," are championing the rights of impoverished masses. They have staked claim to what
Many consider the moral high ground. It is within the power of the United States to reclaim the moral high ground in Latin America by concentrating its resources on eradicating the poverty, ignorance, and disease that fosters insurgency.

The situation in Latin America is clearly a form of LIC. Often a protracted struggle at the low end of the operational continuum, it seeks to achieve political, socio-economic or psychological objectives through various political, economic and military pressures. The United States currently is developing and refining its doctrine for LIC. Prominent in our doctrine is recognition of the overriding importance of a socio-political environment in insurgency situations and the compelling need for the government to address grievances of the populace.

Our policy of providing political, economic and military assistance to pro-democratic forces has proven functional. However, our lack of multi-year commitment does not support long range planning and execution to those nations. This lack of continuity degrades our credibility and subjects the governments to a subservient relationship. Countries are still torn by deep and longstanding political, economic, social, and ethnic divisions. Our assistance has helped, but the problems they face, internally and externally, are long term and systemic.

One of the most viable and cost effective approaches to a long overdue policy of sincere commitment to the Latin American people is a sound and durable HCA effort. While
counterinsurgency cannot succeed through civic action alone, neither can it be lastingly successful without it. Various U.S. agencies, to include the military institution, have been involved in the effort to some degree. Some success has been achieved in conjunction with HN agencies in meeting the needs of their people. However, the successes of those agencies, notable as they have been, represent only the establishment of a sound base for a regional HCA program.

Opportunities for civic action in Latin America are abundant and much remains undone in the effort to eradicate causes of poverty, popular discontent and the safeguarding of our hemispherical interests. The difficulty lies in identifying specific problems, prioritizing tasks and marshalling local and U.S. resources to meet them. As a key element of our policy toward the region, civic actions can be broadly divided into two categories: (1) promoting the civic action concept within the region; and (2) conducting actual HCA programs in concert with combined exercises and/or disaster relief operations.

How viable is our military structure as a conduit for HCA? Can civic action and the traditional, but often necessary military function, always be carried out simultaneously without the former degrading the latter. Where is the potential HN expertise found to assist in the HCA effort?

In developing countries the level of skills in the military is generally superior to general public skills. Basically this applies to educational attainment, technical skills,
organizational skills and with respect to values, compatible with modernization. As a technical development leader, this institution is called upon to provide services not normally associated with military institutions in developed countries. 3

Military-to-military relations have proven to be productive in SOUTHCOM exercise programs. As discussed earlier, military relationships have opened political doors and dialogue previously non-existent. RC forces have played a major role in SOUTHCOM HCA efforts primarily through participation in JCS exercises and mission training opportunities.

United States reserve forces are increasingly assisting SOUTHCOM in "securing the southern flank of the United States." National Guard and Reserve units and individuals now routinely deploy to the SOUTHCOM area of operations in a variety of missions. 4

The most effective military units for projecting U.S. interests through HCA programs are CS/CSS assets and in particular RC forces, as the majority of CS/CSS structure is found there. Such units are most effective because they have vertical and horizontal engineering capabilities and medical/veterinary expertise—the stuff of which HCA is made.

In the early stages of insurgency, when the main effort is "nation-building," CS/CSS forces play the primary, not the support, role. In a reversal of the "normal" role where CS and CSS units follow combat troops, CS and CSS forces are usually the first in and the last out. 5

Given the possibility of a continuation of recent history in Europe and other areas around the world, HCA may become a more
familiar role for U.S. forces. Additionally, plans to stand down significant portions of our active forces carries weighty messages for RC forces. Contingency uses for the RC could become overwhelming.

With that backdrop, the number of countries which have lived since 1945 under varying types of oppressive regimes are currently rushing to embrace liberty, and maybe even democracy, while looking to the West for some form of assistance. Coupled with the imposing needs of SOUTHCOM, it would appear CS/CSS capabilities will be in great demand, at least through the remainder of the 90's.

Fortunately, RC forces have never been better prepared for such a situation. From the late 70's and through the 80's, RC units underwent extensive modernization of equipment, to include upgrading of personnel through innovative and demanding training. Substantial parts of that training have included ODT, literally around the globe. Since 1981, over 500,000 RC personnel have participated in ODT, with much of the training including HCA.

HCA efforts in SOUTHCOM have only scratched the surface—much remains to be done. Sufficient RC assets are available and they need to train somewhere—let's do it in Latin America at a much greater tempo than in the 80's. We must pursue a policy in that vein.

In order to move in an accelerated way—an idea whose time has arrived, replete with unprecedented opportunity, we must
acquire congressional bi-partisan agreement on the policy. Agreement is an absolute essential if a consistent, long-range plan is to be successfully implemented. If a well-forged policy implemented with sincere commitment were in place, it would hasten regional stability by encouraging continued growth of democracy while enhancing protection of human rights.

Evolving world order events indicate unprecedented opportunity for directing U.S. efforts toward other regions of the world. Communism as an ideology has taken a direct and telling blow of great magnitude. If communism (the Soviet Union) survives at all, the ability to recognize it by comparison to what we have known in the past, will be at best, difficult. Accordingly, the threat we have stared down in Europe since World War II is not likely to rear its ugly head again in the near future. Soviet priorities must address domestic strife in a most expedient manner. As a result, U.S. risks involved have been lessened. The Soviets are not likely to have assets available for major moves in the region through this decade. Nor will their levels of economic strength be adequate for influencing the area through Cuba and Nicaragua to the extent recently experienced. Additionally, circumstances seem to dictate a lessening of security issue priorities, possibly freeing resources to assist our southern neighbors in solving economic and social unrest.
Lastly, RC forces deployed to SOUTHCOM have become and will continue to be essential in the advancement of U.S. regional interests. Through their efforts and skills, new dialogue is opened and old dialogue is enhanced; fledgling and teetering democracies are strengthened; new economies are born through infrastructure development; and the hearts and minds of the populace are won and influenced by a non-hostile event which reveals the humane side of a strong U.S. military.

While always recognizing the primacy for U.S. military existence, our senior leadership must continue to develop innovative and compensating approaches for non-violent use of military capabilities as an element of power. The use of military capabilities instead of military force is fully capable of projecting U.S. interests throughout the world.
ENDNOTES


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