COAST GUARD MOBILIZATION LOGISTICS,
HOW CAN A CAPABILITY BE DEVELOPED?

BY

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Mobilization logistics is a growing problem within the U.S. Coast Guard. There have never been any personnel resources dedicated to planning for sustainment of Coast Guard mobilization efforts. The result is that the endurance of mobilized or deployed Coast Guard forces cannot be reliably predicted. This paper examines the evolution of the service's logistics processes to gain an understanding of the forces that have driven its development. An overview of the current logistics structure is provided to illustrate...
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COAST GUARD
MOBILIZATION LOGISTICS,
HOW CAN A CAPABILITY BE DEVELOPED?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College
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ABSTRACT

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In 1984, a U.S. Navy supply officer who had knowledge of the status of supply support on the U.S. Coast Guard's High Endurance Cutters (WHECs), wrote a memorandum to his superior which stated that ships of this class could not be relied upon to perform war time missions. He had learned that these ships did not consistently carry their authorized allowance of spare parts and consumables as required. As a result, the ships could not be expected to complete the routine and preventative maintenance that would be necessary on any deployed vessel. Shortly after that memorandum was written, the first ships of this class began off-loading spare parts preparatory to entering the Fleet Renovation and Modernization (FRAM) program. The removed materials were inventoried. The results of the inventory were most disturbing. It was found that approximately fifty percent of the parts that had been carried onboard were in excess of authorized allowance levels or were for equipment that was no longer installed onboard. Some required spare parts and consumables were not being carried by the ships. This event briefly raised the visibility of logistics problems within the fleet as it was reasonable to assume many other Coast Guard cutters were in a similar condition. Considerable management attention was focused on the problem for a short time.

In the Autumn of 1987, the Coast Guard assembled a planning
committee to develop a mobilization and operations plan for deployment of a squadron of patrol boats to an area outside the continental waters of the United States. The operation was named Blue Shark. During their early research, the members of the planning committee discovered that the Coast Guard did not have a comprehensive doctrine to support the mobilization of its forces.\footnote{The plan for Operation Blue Shark was assembled with some difficulty and without benefit of a broad Coast Guard logistics doctrine. The plan was never implemented so the quality of the logistics concepts which it would have used were never tested. This event failed to attract the same high level of management attention that resulted from the excess of spare parts for the High Endurance Cutters, but it did get the attention of some officers at lower levels.}

During the later part of 1988, CAPT John E. McCarty, USCG conducted a study of Coast Guard logistics issues. He emphasized the following points in his final report to the Chief, Office of Engineering and Development on 26 January 1989:

\textit{First, there have not been and are not now resources planning for mobilization and so that function is not being performed in any systematic fashion. Second, as a result, the sustainability of a mobilization/deployment evolution can not be reliably predicted.}

CAPT McCarty continued by explaining that he did not mean that the Coast Guard was unable to support deployed forces. Instead, he was pointing out that there would be a logistics learning curve extending into a mobilization period or deployment. This learning curve could result in significant evolution of the logistics
process. Despite the softening explanation, this learn-as-we-go thesis would not bolster the confidence of a commander at any level. In recognition of CAPT McCarty's report, and in response to growing concern for the problem, the office of the Coast Guard's Chief of Staff included the following in its list of proposed study topics for Senior Service School students:

Mobilization logistics is a growing problem within the Coast Guard given the growing technical environment. How should the Coast Guard develop and implement a logistics capability to meet the variety of Coast Guard missions, including mobilization and be compatible with the Navy?

This paper will explore this topic, the dilemma of a lack of logistics doctrine for mobilization or deployment of Coast Guard forces. The method used will be to first review the evolution of logistics processes within the Coast Guard to gain an understanding of the forces that have driven the development of the processes in the past. Particular attention will be paid to recent developments. The structure of current logistics systems within the Coast Guard will be examined using existing instructions to gain insight into the service's overall objectives with respect to logistics. Next, general literature in the logistics field will be surveyed for basic concepts and truths with respect to the art and science of logistics. Special attention will be given to those concepts which may have application to the Coast Guard. Finally, relevant concepts and current joint logistics doctrine will be applied to the Coast Guard's mobilization logistics problem. A framework will then be proposed for development of a logistics capability to meet the service's many existing and future missions.
ENDNOTES

1. CAPT John E. McCarty, U.S. Coast Guard, Memorandum to Chief, Office of Engineering and Development (USCG), SSIC 11019, 26 January 1989, p. 2.

2. Ibid., p. 1.

3. RADM M.E. Gilbert, U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant (G-CCS) letter to Senior Service School students, SSIC 5000, 26 June 1989.
CHAPTER II
COAST GUARD LOGISTICS HISTORY

The need for logistics support of Coast Guard systems was recognized at the genesis of the service. A Congressional act of August 4, 1790 authorized "the establishment and support of ten cutters." The Congress made clear by its wording of this statute that it understood that logistics support was important if the nation's first revenue cutters were to meet the many missions which would be required of them.

The service and its equipment have changed much since this small beginning, but the requirement for logistics support has not been altered. The methods of logistics support have evolved substantially, especially in recent years. Until June of 1987, logistics was a locally managed function for most types of hardware. There are two relatively longstanding examples of central logistics support within the service. They are electronics equipment support, and aircraft and aviation equipment support.

Of the centrally run Coast Guard logistics systems, the support of aircraft and aviation equipment was and is the most pure. Aircraft and aviation equipment are supported through the Aircraft Repair and Supply Center (AR&SC) in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. Virtually all aviation support material is issued from this single stocking point. This includes material from the federal supply system which is often redundantly stocked at the AR&SC in addition to the primary stocking points. All depot level
repairs to aviation equipment, aircraft components and airframes are accomplished in the adjoining repair facility. With configuration changes also centrally controlled, this logistics system is very efficient in both process and cost.

The logistics support of electronics equipment in the Coast Guard is also generally central in focus. Electronics equipment is distributed from the Electronics Inventory Control Point (EICP) in Brooklyn, New York. The EICP also arranges for depot level repairs of the standard equipment in most cases on an equipment exchange basis. Malfunctioning equipment is exchanged for new or reworked equipment. Depot level repairs are frequently accomplished under contract at civilian facilities. Configuration control of electronics equipment is less stringent than in the aviation community. Equipment is added, removed and on occasion modified to meet various local or mission requirements on ships and at small boat stations. This nonstandard equipment is usually repaired locally. Less expensive equipment is often simply renewed. This departure from configuration discipline has complicated operations and logistics support of electronics equipment on occasion.

Until June 1987, the logistics support of other equipment systems in the Coast Guard were broadly decentralized. Operating units were expected to be self supporting. While there were recommended allowances, individual units decided independently on the mix and stocking levels for the spare parts they would hold. The decision to adjust stock levels was based largely upon what
equipment broke last or upon a unit's budget level. Support gaps that resulted from lack of local expertise, infrastructure or funding at the lower command levels were covered by group commanders. When support requirements exceeded group capabilities, district commanders provided a final level of support. Local commercial vendors played an important role in the logistics support process by filling voids in unit capability and equipment stocking levels. This was the concept that allowed the 378 foot WHECs to carry stocks fifty percent above recommended levels.

While some units carried stocks well above allowance, some equipment was not supported at all. It was common for equipment that was not mission critical to fall into a condition of disrepair. This maintenance failure even included safety equipment. One example of how poorly this system could work is found in my haunting personal recollection of a utility boat which had been operating for several months without a working, installed bilge pump. When the quantity of bilge water reached a level that caused concern, dewatering was accomplished using portable emergency pumps. The command operating the boat had a threefold justification for allowing the installed pumps to go unrepaired. There was no time for repair because of operational requirements, they could not get the required parts and finally they didn't know how to make required repairs.

This description of the condition of logistics processes in the Coast Guard during the early and mid 1980s is important in that it illustrates the state of logistics execution in the Coast Guard
at a time when counter-narcotics duties were taxing the service severely. It also shows the low level of interest being paid to logistics by the service. Vital logistics services were delivered in a random fashion with no one clearly responsible and in charge. Beyond the lack of coordination for execution of logistics support, there was also very little short or long range logistics planning for peacetime or wartime missions. Logistics support of the more traditional material systems had developed over 200 years with the evolution of the service. The systems in force were fragmented, poorly defined and inefficient. They were designed/evolved to meet logistics requirements of the past and at best the present. At this point in time, the service simply did not understand the value of an efficient, integrated logistics system. Emphasis was placed upon optimizing the commander's freedom of choice and flexibility.

In January, 1987, the Commandant ordered the consolidation of many support functions into two Maintenance and Logistics Commands (MLCs), one for each coastal region of the service. In concept, much of the Coast Guard's logistics support would now be focused through these two Commands. This change was directed not to improve longstanding logistics problems, but instead it was done in an effort to make the Coast Guard's support structure leaner and to make more spaces available for the service's growing operational requirements. In June 1987, most support infrastructure was removed from district staffs. Most of the removed personnel were reassigned to New York and Alameda,
California to form the two new MLCs. In the development of new operating procedures for these commands, many of the logistics problems of the Coast Guard became more visible. Conceptual, doctrinal, and financial problems quickly became evident to those establishing the new organizations. Most of the problems were beyond the capability of the MLC commanders to correct.

In response to some of the newly articulated logistics problems, the Coast Guard Organization Manual (COMDTINST M5400.7B) was amended on June 15, 1987. The change increased the responsibilities of the Comptroller in the area of logistics management. The Office of the Comptroller was tasked with policy formulation, oversight, and review of the Coast Guard logistics process. It was hoped that this unification of the management of logistics would also help correct growing problems in supporting shipboard equipment and correct the perceived inefficiencies of allowing individual units to set spare parts and consumable stocking levels.

It is important that no personnel spaces were allocated to accomplish this new function. The new functional statements for the Office of the Comptroller included tasking in the area of logistics planning and mobilization logistics, but little energy was expended in these areas. Since the limited resources available were previously dedicated to present day support issues, most effort continued to be directed toward improving peacetime logistics support. There was some progress in this area. Shortly after this tasking, the Chief of Staff approved the concepts of
mandatory allowances, centralized shipboard supply control and configuration management. "Activity in mobilization logistics was sporadic and generally limited to efforts necessary for participation in multi-service conferences." CAPT McCarty suggested three reasons for this continuing lack of attention to the mobilization logistics problem.

First, the penalty for deferring attention from mobilization logistics is not immediate nor is it quantifiable. The opposite can certainly be said about lack of attention to peacetime logistics execution. In the peacetime environment a logistics failure can easily result in reduced safety or casualties during accomplishment of a mission. It could also result in a mission not being met. These problems will always be more visible than mobilization planning, at least until mobilization is required.

Second, there is no existing billet pool that can be directed toward mobilization logistics. Finally, and perhaps most important, there "is a general lack of understanding as to what mobilization scenario(s) a logistics doctrine must support." This statement implies that the Coast Guard's mobilization logistics problem is more than a logistics issue and cannot be solved without help from outside the logistics arena.

In the autumn of 1987 a study group headed by RADM M.E. Gilbert examined the structure of the Coast Guard headquarters staff. The purpose of the study was to look for personnel economies which might be realized by consolidating staff functions. Savings would be applied to operations just as they were when field
support functions were realigned with the formation of the Maintenance and Logistics Commands.

The study team recognized that mobilization logistics is an integral part of the total logistics effort. It also recognized that there was no activity in the mobilization logistics area because no resources were committed.

The report from the study group proposed significant changes in the structure of the headquarters staff. Among the recommended changes was the establishment of a Logistics Sub-directorate to give logistics issues a single point of focus. The new sub-directorate would include an element which they labeled the Mobilization Planning Staff. This staff element would be composed of 13 spaces which would be reprogrammed from the savings anticipated from the reorganization. It is significant that this is the first occasion where any Coast Guard group indicated that the need for giving attention to mobilization logistics was so great that personnel should be committed exclusively to the process rather than tasked in a collateral fashion. Further, they suggested a source from which the spaces might come.\(^4\)

Coast Guard headquarters was reorganized in the spring of 1988. The scale of the reorganization was not as great as recommended by RADM Gilbert’s study group. The Logistics Sub-directorate was not established, nor was the Mobilization planning staff.\(^5\)

Prior to the public announcement of the minor headquarters reorganization, the Coast Guard’s Chief of Staff advised the
Comptroller that the Chief, Office of Engineering would take on expanded responsibility in logistics management. He was tasked to "manage and administer logistics mobilization planning for the Service." The Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve was tasked with responsibility "for the Reserve logistics of the Service to insure readiness of Coast Guard Reserve forces." No space resources were provided to either staff for the fulfillment of these functions. I believe that these shifts of tasking represent acknowledgement that the Comptroller's staff was not taking any action in the area of mobilization logistics and that they had no capability in that area.

It was hoped that by shifting these functions, that motivation and resources might be found in other program offices. This tactic appears to have met with partial success as some planning for reserve mobilization logistics is now being accomplished. There is no central planning function nor are the various functional offices being tasked with specific requirements and requirement suspense dates. Until specific tasking is assigned, it is unlikely that conditions will improve. Logistics support plans for future operations are likely to duplicate the one prepared for Operation Blue Shark. They will be ad hoc plans developed for specific operations. The resources employed for both planning and execution will likely be borrowed from other activities.

Conditions have changed little since the revision of tasking just described. CAPT McCarty described the current status of mobilization logistics with these words:
As a general statement it is fair to say that the Coast Guard is not prepared to function in the technical environment of mobilization logistics and consequently is not capable of preparing an authoritative and integrated plan for mobilization. More importantly, perhaps, there is not the staff or infrastructure to maintain and exercise such a plan. The elements of mobilization logistics which are not present in peacetime logistics are largely ignored by support managers and certainly are not presently incorporated in existing supply policy.  

Less than two months after CAPT McCarty submitted his report, the second revision of the Coast Guard Logistics Support and Mobilization Plan (LSMP) was released to the service. The manual is intended to provide "Guidance for Coast Guard mobilization planning and information necessary for the proper coordination of Coast Guard personnel and logistic support during a contingency or mobilization." The existence and imminent revision of this manual was not discussed by CAPT McCarty in his report. It is unimaginable that he was not aware of the manual. It is possible that he did not know that a revision was underway. He clearly did not feel that the manual could contribute much to the birth and application of a usable doctrine for Coast Guard mobilization logistics.

This discussion of Coast Guard logistics history has shown that there is no clearly articulated mobilization logistics policy in the Coast Guard. This problem has been visible to senior Coast Guard leaders for several years. With the exception of moving the functional responsibility for developing a doctrine from one office to another, positive and structured action has not been taken to develop a mobilization logistics doctrine. The resulting message
is that the status quo is good enough, at least considering the many other priorities that face the service. The Coast Guard has survived early wars with England and Spain, the United States Civil War, two World Wars, wars in Korea and Vietnam, prohibition and the current drug wars without a doctrine for mobilization logistics. The question must be asked, why worry about such a doctrine now? One answer to this question is given in a research proposal presented to the Coast Guard by the Logistics Management Institute.

At times of mobilization or when so directed by the President, US Coast Guard (USCG) Cutters perform national defense missions as part of the Navy, even when involvement is not preceded by their formal transfer to the Department of Navy. This was the case for the USCG units in Korea and Vietnam, and more recently the case for the USCG's participation in the joint forces mission to Grenada. There is a strong likelihood that USCG units will engage in future defense related operations under non- or partial-mobilization conditions, and will again do so without being transferred to the Department of Navy. Hence, planning guidance for supply support for USCG units engaged in defense missions should apply to both mobilization and non-mobilization conditions, and should provide a single concept of support applicable to any period when the units are under Navy operational control.

This statement was written before it was apparent that the Cold War was coming to an end, but it was clear, even then, that low intensity conflict was a growing threat. The Coast Guard's current logistics policy does not account for this. It also fails to recognize that joint service operations are becoming more likely in the counter narcotics war. The Coast Guard's dependence upon and coordination with the Navy's logistics support apparatus will be a key to success in these operations.

Another reason for concern was outlined by VADM David E.
Jeremiah, Director of Navy Program Planning. He stated that "Coast Guard requirements for logistics support are not presently quantified, and therefore, their effects on the Navy upon wartime transfer of the Coast Guard cannot be assessed." He was concerned with the difficulty the Navy might face in supporting the Coast Guard's undefined support requirements. He was also troubled by the demands that those unquantified requirements would place upon the Navy at a time when his service would already be greatly taxed by other mobilization requirements.

Clearly, there is reason to develop an integrated and unified mobilization logistics doctrine for the Coast Guard. To be useful, it must be done in consonance with the joint service policies of the Department of Defense with special attention to the requirements and practices of the Department of the Navy. A thoughtfully developed doctrine will be useful in peacetime as well as during contingency and mobilization periods.

ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p. 2.


5. U.S. Coast Guard, Service-wide message notice, ALDIST 078.88, 281530Z APR 88.


7. Ibid.
8. CAPT John E. McCarty, U.S. Coast Guard, Memorandum to Chief, Office of Engineering and Development (USCG), SSIC 11019, 26 January 1989.

9. Ibid.

10. U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Logistics Support and Mobilization Plan (CG LSMP), Commandant Instruction M4081.1B, 10 March 1989, p. 1.


12. Jeremiah, David E., VADM, USN, Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, Navy and Coast Guard Board, 26 August 1987.
CHAPTER III
EXISTING POLICY

The lack of a comprehensive doctrine for mobilization logistics in the Coast Guard has been demonstrated. It will now be useful to briefly examine the statements of mobilization logistics policy which are now in force and have application to the Coast Guard. Inconsistencies and conflicts between these documents and other policy will be highlighted in an effort to illustrate problems in the development of an integrated service doctrine.

DOCTRINE FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF JOINT OPERATIONS (JCS PUB 4-0)

The Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations (JCS PUB 4-0) is the keystone document for logistics doctrine. It "establishes joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and conducting logistics support joint operations." It outlines the Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrine on command relationships and assigns specific responsibilities for logistics support and management. It describes procedures for use by the Unified and Specified Commands (Combatant Commands) when exercising directive authority in conducting logistics support operations. Guidance is provided to the military services for the preparation of plans supporting the theater commanders-in-chief (CINCs) and for the preparation of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Definitions are provided
for logistics terms in common use. Considerations which have special significance to the logistics planner are listed.

Of particular importance here, is the explanation that a logistics concept results from a logistics estimate. The estimate may consider the supportability of one or several possible courses of action. In my experience, the logistics estimate of supportability is seldom considered in the development of Coast Guard logistics concepts. Instead, Coast Guard concepts are often based upon how similar operations were supported in the past with little consideration for the supportability of the course of action being considered. The definition of the logistics concept is refined in two paragraphs.

(1) The logistic concept is not simply the gathering together of information on the various logistic functional areas: supply, maintenance, medical. Rather, it is the organization of capabilities and resources into an overall theater warfare support concept.

(2) The logistic concept should include a narrative description of how operations will be supported. It should give special attention to the major LOCs to be developed and used, and the general echelonment of support across these LOCs. If there is to be a Communications Zone (COMMZ) to support a land campaign, of a network of intermediate and advanced bases to support a maritime campaign, their general organization and functions should be laid out.

A broad overview of factors which are important to the development of logistics concepts is included. Basic logistics principals and considerations are discussed at length. These factors and principles will be discussed in detail later in this paper.
NAVY CAPABILITIES AND MOBILIZATION PLAN (NCMP)

The Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP) (OPNAVINST S3061.1B) provides policy for the Navy deliberate planning process for logistics. It outlines the requirements for development of logistics plans in support of operations plans. The NCMP is prepared by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and includes scenarios for a prolonged, global, conventional war that provides a basis for Navy Echelon II logistics support and mobilization planning. A key product of the planning process is the Logistics Support and Mobilization Plan (LSMP). The requirements and format for the LSMP are described in detail in the NCMP.

COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES PLAN (CG CAPLAN)

The Coast Guard Capabilities Plan (CG CAPLAN 9900-88) attempts to define policies governing Coast Guard logistics support. Logistics responsibilities for Coast Guard commanders are listed. It refers the reader to the Coast Guard LSMP for policy on logistics. It gives a brief overview of the Coast Guard's concept of support. Under this concept procedures used in peacetime are extended to contingency and mobilization situations. It indicates that the support objective is the sustainment of forces engaged in contingency operations. It tasks Commanders of Coast Guard forces (CCGFs) with providing for the support needs of subordinate forces. An overview is given of Prepositioned War Reserve Material Requirements (PWRMR).
There are significant inconsistencies between this document and other Coast Guard policy. There are also impractical requirements. While all Sponsors Requirements Documents written by program offices since 1974 have leaned toward minimum manning levels and small weight and volume design margins, the CG CAPLAN requires that afloat units be self supporting to the "maximum extent practicable." This requirement will prove difficult to meet for the newer cutter classes which are supported by maintenance augmentation teams and shoreside parts bins. Floating units are encouraged to revise allowance lists based upon actual demand without regard for the cutter's weight and moment constraints. It also suggests that allowance lists can be modified by a commander's operation plan.

There are also internal inconsistencies in the CG CAPLAN. For example, it indicates that the "Navy is expected to provide sufficient weapons and ammunition to meet Coast Guard identified requirements." This statement is followed by encouragement for unit commanders to consider other sources of supply outside the federal supply system. In its present form, and with its many inconsistencies and conflicting information, this document does not provide the clear guidance on Coast Guard capabilities and doctrine that is needed by logistics planners.

COAST GUARD LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND MOBILIZATION PLAN (CG LSMP)

The Coast Guard Logistics Support and Mobilization Plan (CG LSMP) "provides guidance for Coast Guard mobilization planning and
information necessary for the proper coordination of Coast Guard personnel and logistic support during a contingency or mobilization." It "must address the logistics and manpower requirements identified in the various OPLANS." It is intended to be the spring board for Coast Guard logistics planning. Its stated primary purpose is to facilitate timely and phased expansion of logistics support to operating forces during emergencies or mobilization. It is a supporting plan for the NCMP and CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT operations orders.

The plan explains the legal authority for the Coast Guard to operate under the Department of the Navy providing references to the sections of the Code of Federal Regulations which apply. Wiring diagrams of peacetime and wartime chains of command are included.

The CG LSMP describes the operational command structure and responsibilities when the Coast Guard is transferred to the Department of the Navy. It also outlines logistics, budgetary and programming responsibilities. An outline of Coast Guard wartime and peacetime duties is included to give planners an overview of the missions for which they must plan. The plan does not include organization charts of the Coast Guard's peacetime or wartime logistics support structures. There is no information on how Coast Guard and Navy logistics support systems interact in either peacetime or wartime. The CG LSMP also states that Coast Guard units with no wartime mission will be deactivated immediately after M-day eliminating the requirement to planning for their logistics
According to the plan, "when operating as part of the Department of the Navy the Coast Guard will use two separate logistics support systems, (Navy and Coast Guard)." Logistics support will be furnished by the established fleet logistics support forces except that pre-M day channels for support will be used "insofar as practical for Coast Guard forces not assigned to Naval operations and for Coast Guard peculiar spare parts, equipment and personnel." 

Responsibility for logistics support and mobilization planning is assigned to each commander. General guidance and formatting information is provided for development of subordinate level policy documents. Broad guidance is provided on manpower mobilization and personnel policies which must be followed, including recall of the reserves and retirees. Mobilization training concepts and requirements are also included.

Finally, there is a strong statement of policy concerning cutter manning that effects both logistics and operational planning within the Coast Guard and the Navy.

Coast Guard women are an integral part of the crew and would be in various positions of responsibility, including: Commanding officers, XO's, E0's, OPS Officers, and critical enlisted ratings. The removal of these key personnel on short notice would weaken our military readiness capability and have major operational impact on some units due to the training and experience needed for these jobs. Any provisions which would require the Coast Guard to train one crew for a vessel's peacetime missions and another for its wartime missions are fundamentally unsound. The removal of women from deployed vessels would further complicate the matter.

This statement is but one example of a number strong
statements of policy affecting mobilization logistics that are included in the CG LSMP. In general, guidance is provided on a broad array of topics which are important to the mobilization logistics area. This was not the case in previous versions.

Earlier versions of the CG LSMP were criticized by senior Navy personnel for improper format, limited scope and failure to address logistics support resources required by the Coast Guard for mobilization. The earlier plans did not have the required, comprehensive appraisal of the resources and services that the Coast Guard has available to support OPLAN execution. They also did not have the required summary of the resources and services that will be required from other organizations. This version is much more complete and appears to have overcome many of the earlier shortfalls. While it is an improvement, it does still have many deficiencies. Among its shortcomings are a lack of a detailed appraisal of the resources and services that the service has available to support operations. It also fails to identify the resources and services that are required from sources outside the service with the status of arrangements underway to ensure their availability.

There are also several statements of policy in the plan which are likely to create problems. The first is the assignment of responsibility for logistics support and mobilization planning to commanders. This concept may have worked well in earlier times when each commander had support personnel assigned to his staff. It is probably flawed under the Coast Guard's current support
structure. When support functions and personnel were realigned to
the Maintenance and Logistics Commands in 1987, operational
commanders lost the experienced personnel necessary to assemble
workable logistics support plans to the new commands. As a result,
it is unlikely that operational commanders can now assemble
workable mobilization or logistics support plans without the direct
involvement of headquarters and MLC support personnel in their
planning efforts.

The concept of using pre-M-day support channels after
mobilization, where practicable, for Coast Guard unique materials
while taxing the Navy component commander for support of other
items is another potential problem area. "While the concept of two
channels of supply support might have sufficed in the past,
changing conditions and requirements indicate there may be a need
for a revision of the concept to reflect present day reality and
practicality."\(^{12}\) Coast Guard peacetime logistics support procedures
do not provide any capability to identify items critical to defense
operations and their supply sources. Further, current supply
procedures do not provide a method to quantify demand for the
purpose of determining war reserve stocking requirements.\(^{13}\) The
fundamental problem is not that the concept of dual support is
necessarily bad, but rather that the present structure, condition,
and procedures of the Coast Guard's logistics support structure
must be changed significantly before such a system can be expected
to work. The CG LSMP fails to acknowledge this reality. In
addition, wisdom of operating two separate, and on occasion
redundant, support systems at a time when the country's infrastructure is already overtaxed must be questioned.

The publications discussed above represent the core of existing mobilization logistics policy which has relevance to the Coast Guard. While these publications provide a framework for developing a mobilization logistics support for the Coast Guard, there is much to be done in both concept development and policy formulation. Policy conflicts and deficiencies must be corrected while following basic logistics concepts.

ENDNOTES

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations (JCS PUB 4-0) Final Draft, November 1989, p. i.

2. Ibid., p. III-6.


5. Ibid., p. D-5.


7. U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Logistics Support and Mobilization Plan (CG LSMP), 10 March 1989, p. i.

8. Ibid., p. I-3-5.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. II-1-11.


13. Ibid., p. 3.
CHAPTER IV
LOGISTICS CONCEPTS

The evolutionary nature of the Coast Guard logistics process has resulted in the development of a menagerie of systems which do not always conform to basic logistics theory. Why is theory important to developing concepts for logistics? While theory does not tell us precisely how to organize or act, it can help us to understand the essentials. It is these essentials that are not always evident in Coast Guard logistics support. Coast Guard support actions often follow the course to short term goals, without regard for broader objectives. Actions of convenience frequently take precedence over systematic methods which have proven effective over the long term. There are a number of generalities which have evolved from logistics theory which are important to the development of concept for development and implementation of a Coast Guard mobilization logistics capability. The more important will now be highlighted in the paragraphs that follow.

Acquiring sound logistics theory is not easy. In *Supplying War*, Martin Van Creveld expressed his concerns that there are hundreds of books on strategy and tactics for each one on logistics. Even his work was more of a narrative of history than a discussion of logistics theory. As his book and others suggest, there is a strong bond between strategy and logistics. This bond
must be recognized and used by strategists and logisticians alike. The strategist must understand that "logistic planning is an integral part of strategic planning" and that all things are not possible. The logistician must remember that innovative thought on his part may provide the only route to a successful strategy. Neither the strategists nor the logistician work independent of the other.

Logistics is a command function, but its planning and practice is of interest to anyone involved in or dependent upon an operation. Every element of a command has logistics needs. Every strategic and tactical concept includes support requirements. The scale and nature of those requirements must be clearly articulated to logistics planners.

"A key factor in providing logistic support is the type and amount of management attention directed toward the effort."

Higher levels of management must show interest and provide oversight for logistics or support will suffer. This will invariably occur because logistics activities are generally more mundane than operational endeavors and as a result the attention of personnel at all levels tends to drift to the things which are most exciting.

Basic management theory suggests that successful establishments will have simple, clearly defined organizational structures. Management authority will be commensurate with responsibility. Resources will be balanced with organizational priorities. Senior leadership must apply these principles to
logistics support or expect that the support provided to operating units will be less than required.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize seven principles of logistics support. Together, they provide conceptual pillars for organization, planning, management, and execution. The success of a logistic support effort depends upon the skillful application of these principles. It is the application of these principles to the specific situation or mission that defines the overall concept of logistics support. The Joint Chiefs state very clearly that the principles are not intended to be a checklist for logistics planning. Instead, they form a suggested guide for analytical thought.

The first of these principles is responsiveness, the right support in the right place at the right time. The principle of the objective is paramount in warfare. In a similar fashion, responsiveness is the core principal of logistics. Without responsiveness the remaining principles have no importance. Simply put, if support is not provided where and when it is required it has little or no value.

Simplicity is aptly described as "the avoidance of complexity." It limits communication requirements and reduces confusion. Simplicity is important to organizational concepts, support processes, plans and execution.

Flexibility describes the ability to adapt logistics concepts, structures and processes to a changing mission environment. These changes in tactical situations, mission changes and altered
concepts of operation. Fundamental to the principal of flexibility is anticipation, redundancy, reserve assets, alternative planning and echelonment.

Economy is providing support at the least cost in terms of the balance between available resources and those required to accomplish the mission. This parallels the principle of war known as the economy of force.

Attainability is the capability to deliver the essential support required to commence operations. The logistics estimate is completed, sourcing is begun and the concept of logistics support is developed.

Sustainability carried logistics support past the commencement of operations or logistics support continued over time. The focus of sustainability is the requirement to support forces to achieve long term objectives. "Long term support is the greatest challenge for the logistician."

Sustainability requires redundancy and development of alternatives. It requires the ability to meter support to ensure that critical resources are available at the times of most essential demand.

Survivability is the ability of the organization to endure in the face of possible destruction. Dispersion and resilience are key elements of this principle. Dispersion is accomplished at the cost of economy. Resilience is rooted in the development of alternatives and echelonment of capabilities.

Each of these principles has application to the problem of supporting Coast Guard missions and development of a mobilization
logistics capability. They will be the foundation for a plan for change.

ENDNOTES


2. Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 231.


7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. IV-1.

8. Ibid., p. IV-6.
CHAPTER V

THE COAST GUARD MOBILIZATION LOGISTICS PROBLEM

The lack of a mobilization logistics capability within the Coast Guard is rooted in seven fundamental problems. The influence of these problems reaches farther than the relatively simple issue of providing a mobilization logistics capability for the service. They affect the entire logistics support of the Coast Guard. In order of their influence, they are:

1. The Coast Guard lacks a national defense doctrine.
2. The Coast Guard logistics support structure is diverse in purpose and process. It lacks central focus and unity of doctrine.
3. There is no sense of ownership of logistics functions by Coast Guard commanders or service members.
4. There is no central focus and accountability for logistics planning and support in the Coast Guard.
5. Logistics support does not receive consistent management attention from senior Coast Guard leaders.
6. Logistics support is a relatively low priority concern for the Coast Guard.
7. Contingency planning is a low priority for the Coast Guard.

The laws establishing the Coast Guard's military function are found in Titles 10 and 14 of the U.S. Code. They assign the responsibility to protect the U.S. coasts through the Maritime Defense Zones. The statutes are very vague about what the Coast Guard's wartime missions should be. This deficiency has not been corrected by guidance prepared by the Department of Transportation.
or the Coast Guard itself.

The commanding officer of a medium endurance Coast Guard cutter, having modern and sophisticated weapons systems, has complained that this absence of doctrine has resulted in the service being guided by what it did in World War II, rather than by strategic vision. He argued that the problem has resulted in inconsistent service actions, made it difficult to set service priorities and resulted in irrational procurement decisions. Much of his discussion centers around the difficulties this has posed for logistics support. Much has been written in the recent wave of trendy books on innovative management about the need for having a common knowledge of the establishment's collective purpose. John Naisbitt argued in *Megatrends* that too much cannot be said about the need to share the vision of what an enterprise is about with the entire organization. This need has yet to be fulfilled in the Coast Guard. The result of specific concern here is "a general lack of understanding as to what mobilization scenario(s) a logistics doctrine must support". This makes for an impossible task for support planners.

The historical section of this paper described the condition of the Coast Guard's logistics support infrastructure. Efforts to consolidate responsibility and authority for logistics policy development under one directorate failed when the headquarters reorganization proposal of RADM Gilbert was not implemented. The result has been the continuation of a complex and ununified support structure that cannot be described in simple terms and is
understood by few in the service.

Coast Guard members have developed a "logistics-phobia." The message received by service members from the realignment of support functions under the Maintenance and Logistics Commands in 1987 was that logistics support is a second order, second class process. The message was so loudly heralded that many Coast Guard Academy cadets of the class of 1989, with four years of technical training, chose operational rather than support assignments on graduating. Even from their idyllic perspective, it was clear that being associated with logistics is considered to be career limiting.

Logistics planning is divided among several Coast Guard headquarters offices. These range from the Office of Engineering to the Office of Readiness and Reserve. There is no single point of coordination and policy. The resulting likelihood for conflicting policy and planning guidance is high.

The growing operational demands of the drug war and the turbulent budget battles of the last decade have distracted management from most other issues. It has been easy for management to overlook logistics support issues in view of these weighty and immediate priorities. The demands of the drug war and shrinking budgets are not likely to lose force in the immediate future. It is likely that other priorities will be born which will provide other sources of distraction.

Logistics support will always be low in priority when politics demand more service for less. The only solution to this issue is to defer support to accommodate an expanding mission. What must
be remembered is that this action can only be a temporary response. In time, training, supply levels, and maintenance will fall to a level that is unable to support any mission.

Deferral of contingency planning is easy when the need for plans is not expected to occur soon. There are always real-time problems that need immediate attention in an environment where the planners for tomorrow are also responsible for actions today. It is unlikely that there will ever be a mobilization logistics capability in the Coast Guard so long as the people responsible are also tasked with other duties.

Each of these issues cuts deeply into the Coast Guard's ability to develop a mobilization logistics capability. None will be easy to correct.

ENDNOTES


2. John Naisbitt, Megatrends, p. 94.

CHAPTER VI

FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A MOBILIZATION LOGISTICS CAPABILITY FOR THE COAST GUARD

This study has shown that there are several issues that stand in the way of developing a mobilization logistics capability for the Coast Guard. None of them can be corrected instantly. The correction of some will help in the correction of those remaining. Some will not be correctable until other, higher level problems have been solved.

First and foremost, the Coast Guard must have a defense doctrine. This should be the service's first priority. The absence of a defense doctrine impacts every aspect of the service, from recruiting, to training, to the development of contingency plans. It is the very hallmark of a military service and the Coast Guard must make the necessary sacrifices to have one now.

The concept of logistics support in the Coast Guard needs a thorough review. Logistics policy must be unified and its source centralized under one authority. Rules for inventory and procedures should duplicate those prescribed by the Navy to provide easier interface with the Navy in peacetime and to allow easier transition to the Navy in the event of war. An effort should be made to combine control of all logistics support functions under a single command. In order to further ease the transition to Navy control of the Coast Guard during mobilization, consideration
should be given to permanent transfer of all support functions to the Navy, with resources. This would ensure compatibility of peacetime and wartime logistics processes. It would give the Navy control over the current supply process producing unified procedures. It would also expose the Navy to current Coast Guard supply demands, enabling them to begin generation of a database for wartime demand forecasting.

Coast Guardsmen must be trained to believe that logistics, like readiness is an all hands responsibility. This attitude must be reinstilled at all levels throughout the service. Commanders must reassume the responsibility for logistics support of their commands. Given the Coast Guard's new support structure, this does not mean that commanders must support themselves as was done in the past. It does mean that they must involve themselves in the process by developing realistic support plans, articulating real requirements and conserving the limited support resource.

Contingency planning must become a priority or it will not occur. If the Coast Guard is to have a mobilization logistics capability, personnel resources must be committed to the tasks of policy development and planning. These personnel cannot be encumbered by other seemingly more urgent duties. It would be a logical step to assign these people to the same staff component that would develop the Coast Guard defense doctrine since the emerging mobilization logistics capability would support that concept.

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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

It has been shown that the development of a mobilization logistics capability for the Coast Guard will not come simply or easily. The close of the Cold War will reduce the impetus to commit the required effort to make it happen. Several general deficiencies will have to be corrected before there will be any hope for correcting the Coast Guard's mobilization logistics problem. If these higher level issues, such as the lack of a Coast Guard defense doctrine, can be successfully addressed the service will benefit on a plane well above the scope of this paper. These issues remain as a barrier to the development of a mobilization logistics capability.

If we truly wish to overcome the Coast Guard's mobilization logistics problem, we must first decide that having this capability is a service priority. Then we must commit the resources necessary to make it happen and support them vigorously. There is no better time to start than the present since "the best way to prevail over a problem is simply to begin."¹

ENDNOTE

¹. Brown, p. 67.


6. Jeremiah, David E., VADM, USN. Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, Navy and Coast Guard Board, 26 August 1987.


