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THOUGHTS ON FORCE FUTURE

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by

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Thoughts on Force Future

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ABSTRACT

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THOUGHTS ON FORCE FUTURE

Decisions about force structure are among the most basic ones that all military leaders face. Napoleon once said that "one always has enough troops if he knows how to use them." The recent extremely successful operation in Panama could be a positive indicator to U.S. Army force developers as to how much is enough. Despite a separation of two centuries, force development issues are just as important to LTG Carl Stiner, the current commander of XVIIIth Airborne Corps and the commander of the joint task force that conducted the incursion into Panama, as they were to Napoleon. In fact, General Stiner quite emphatically says to his subordinates that the most important aspect of a force development or a force integration issue is that units at all levels "must get organized in order to complete the development task successfully." Organize by structuring the unit to best accomplish the mission. For that matter, the biblical hero Gideon had force structure problems, organizing his force to fight outnumbered and win, even before centuries were being counted.

THE PROBLEM

This work is intended to provoke thought and stimulate discussion in the force development community. An examination of regionally directed contingency corps to solve our force structure dilemma will be posited. Although the problem is complex and the ramifications are far reaching,

2 LTG Carl W. Stiner, Commander, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, conversation 26 Nov. 1989. (Cited by permission of LTG Stiner.)
simply stated, the problem is: What should the Army look like to face the future? On the surface, it would appear that now would be the time to drastically cut the active force. This, of course, assumes a short term risk. The fact that our chief adversary in the world is revolutionizing everything from his forward presence in Europe, through his new defensive posture, to his world view, certainly presents a temptation to slash. Austerity is not necessarily the answer. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Carter, strikes at the heart of the problem by stating that "the Soviet Union is only a one-dimensional global power, that is, noncompetitive economically, socially, or ideologically, but very strong militarily. The West must take into account that enormous Soviet military might in any comprehensive policy response to the dramatic crisis of the Soviet world." Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono further outlines the complexity of the dilemma in his January, 1990, White Paper: "While some threats to U.S. security appear to be abating, other complex and dangerous challenges are emerging. These include terrorism, trafficking in illicit drugs, proliferation of sophisticated weaponry in potentially hostile developing nations, and regional instability that threatens democratic regimes." Comprehensive policy to deal with these multifarious issues must include force development. Today the U.S. Army confronts these decisions on a broad front. The future of the Army is important to all Americans, whether civilian, soldier, or military family member. What should be done about the future force in light of current world events? How to make the inevitable cuts is a factor affecting each life. Which installations to

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deactivate, which units to remove from the active force, and what will be the effect on family support programs are questions everyone wants answered. Many lives will be affected in a big way.

The initial consideration must be capability. The force must maintain characteristics like "versatility, deployability, and lethality," to be viable globally.\(^5\) The Army must be a genuine, legitimate deterrent across the continuum of threat and in all three worlds. To approach this problem from all angles, and to surround all of the questions with well thought out answers would require focusing on every issue from manning and basing, to training and sustaining. It is not within the scope of this work to do that; rather, this paper seeks only to provide one method to structure.

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A short historical perspective of how the current force has been developed and some of the factors which have affected that development is useful to understand the process by which U.S. forces have evolved in the past. Since World War II, the people in the force development business have been faced with a "growing communist menace" that set parameters and established the future force based on this threat and a myriad of other factors. General Donn Starry's view describes part of this problem. He says that, "we have a notorious record in this country for summing up our military adventures and misadventures by preparing to do the whole thing over again, only better."\(^6\) Today, it will be difficult not to be constrained

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\(^5\) Ibid. p. 10
A paradigm that caused the expensive evolution from the Pentomic to Reorganization Of Army Divisions (R.O.A.D.) ; and from R.O.A.D. to "mix and match" creativity driven by necessity in Vietnam. The Division Restructure Study, Division 86, Army of Excellence, Army 21, and other similar test and evaluation evolutions have established the rules. These "rules"—sometimes arbitrary and parochial, and always expensive, in terms of manpower turbulence and budget dollars—tend to cause unnecessary, short-sighted internal arguing, such as with the heavy/light and the mechanized/motorized issues.

The changing role of the Reserve Components—"never to be left behind again," according to General Creighton Abrams—is more evidence of this type of evolution.7 The motorized 9th Infantry Division, acknowledged to be "plucked" on the spur of the moment by General Meyer, furthers the premise.8 General Wickham's influence that made low intensity conflict and the light division the priority of the 80s is also support for this notion.9 As the force evolved, so did the doctrine. By blending an agile, "active" defense doctrine to a deep-attack mentality, and adding the joint vertical dimension to the battlefield—the AirLand Battle was born. The force evolution and the changes in doctrine were based on a variety of national and military strategies that initially relied upon a nuclear response as containment; then a more flexible response for that containment, and what is now being touted as "containment plus."10

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9 Ibid. p.102
Our current force structure has been built to support national and military strategy. Colonel (Ret.) Arthur Lykke, a recognized expert on this subject, defines strategy as: "The art and science of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to further national interests, priorities, and policies." General Maxwell D. Taylor, in 1960, correctly analyzed how it is really done: "The determination of U.S. strategy has become a more or less incidental by-product of the administrative process of the defense budget." General Taylor’s remark is probably more true today than it was when he said it. It becomes more difficult to get to a force for the future with less and less of a share of the budget. A coherent military strategy—which Mr. Lykke defines as "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force"—is the only clear map to that force.

The same dilemma remains that has always faced U.S. planners and policy makers. U.S. responsibility in Western Europe (N.A.T.O.), which comes from historic and cultural background, is one horn; the U.S. global supervisory role, like it or not, is the other. The latter presents some relatively hefty challenges across the board, but especially to strategists and war planners. There are some lesser developed countries with armed forces that bear significant attention. The Panamanian Defense Force, for instance, was surprisingly strong. The current force, notwithstanding the shortage of

12 Col. (Ret.) Arthur Lykke, Handout of Presentation: Carlisle Barracks, U S Army War College Class of 1990, Fall 1989. (Cited by permission of Col. (Ret.) Lykke.)
13 Lykke, p 9
assets to well suited to the post-World War II strategy of being prepared for in Europe. That strategy, most would think, is about to undergo some interesting, if not revolutionary, changes through the next decade. These changes are the far reaching ones with the complex ramifications. What, then are the implications to changes in the force structure?

Dr. Russell F. Weigley--the noted historian from Temple University, author, and frequent lecturer at the U.S. Army War College--has said that one of the major lessons of Vietnam, this country's most notable regional conflict, is that Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), suitable for war in Europe are not necessarily appropriate for more limited actions. His inference, of course, is that the war in Vietnam was a limited war in which U.S. force structure was found woefully wanting. Combat divisions were not organized for countering insurgencies and "nation building." Dr. Weigley also noted that General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of staff, while speaking to France's Foreign Minister Georges Bidault in the early fifties said "that the crucial thing to remember about Indochina was not military. Smith said that any second rate general should be able to win a war there if there was a proper political atmosphere." Between the French and U.S. generals that tried, there were some first rate ones that failed, insofar as the political atmosphere dictated their action, or in some cases inaction. The point here is the inextricable tie between political and military issues. Issues which so profoundly affected U.S. force structure that some have concluded poor military performance was the result. The force must be

14 Weigley, lecture to Advanced Warfighting Seminar, Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College Class of 1990, Fall 1989. (Cited by permission of Dr. Weigley.)
born of coherent strategies, clear objectives, and enlightened concepts, both political and military.

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-1 states that "military strategy is the combination of military objectives (ENDS), military concepts (WAYS), and military force (MEANS), to achieve national security policy objectives." This "MEANS" then, is not only one-third of the ends, ways, and means triad, but also an extremely important part of the political process.

Today, revolution, rather than evolution, may be the best tack. Recent events in Eastern Europe, serious budget constraints, post closures, the incursion into Panama, and a host of other related actions have once again turned the talk of restructuring our Army into action. The Chief of Staff has given planners the direction necessary to take the Army into the future. Despite the past system, recent events have proven a certain success. "Past successes, however, do not guarantee future peace."17

CURRENT STRUCTURE

The current structure supports the political goal of "presence." This presence suits itself for regionally projected contingency forces, as well. A quick look at the 2d Infantry Division (2ID) organization, a hold over from the old "H" series Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), reveals the nature of regional force structure. The division uses standard organizations of this TOE tailored to meet the special requirements of its theater of operations, Korea. The 2ID is based on the heavy division design and modified to support a heavy/light mix of six maneuver battalions. This

17 Vuono p.5
mixing is done to support regional considerations. Combined or coalition warfare is also part of the process, not only in Korea, but everywhere that there is U.S. presence. Currently, there is significant overseas U.S. presence in Hawaii and Alaska for island security and projection to Korea and the western Pacific; in Europe for defense; and now in Panama to protect and build the nation, as well as provide stability in the region. All of these forward deployed forces have some regional peculiarities.

The U.S. Army is organized, trained, and equipped to fight a mid-intensity to high-intensity conflict in Europe. With two heavy corps, hundreds of support organizations, prepositioned overseas materiel, 45 years of presence there, and Europe as the historical first priority— the Army in Europe has always been ready for any eventuality there. Events in Europe and Panama in only the last two months of 1989 would seem to send a signal that priorities are changing. A tremendous troop reduction in Europe, however, still requires a plan to reinforce there.

Stationed in the Continental United States (CONUS), are a variety of division types at numerous locations designed according to a formula to reinforce units in Europe within a specific number of days or as quickly as possible. Serious questions have always existed as to just how and how fast these units could get to Europe and in what shape they would be to fight upon arrival. With the threat apparently diminishing, there comes a corresponding increase in warning time. All of this points to other, less threatening areas of the world upon which to focus and, thereby, to "lighten" the force structure of the U.S. Army. The heavy structure in CONUS has become the starting point for force reductions, with several units

already identified for stand down. Drawing down the structure must not also draw down readiness. The U.S. must maintain forces that allow conventional and nuclear parity in those places that are vital to U.S. interests. These forces create a natural deterrence and regional stability is achieved. Conventional Force Europe (C.F.E.) negotiations must not strip forward deployed forces beyond this point.

Forward deployed forces, regardless of where they are deployed, must be able to execute the AirLand Battle-Future doctrine. The tenets of this doctrine will not change, regardless of the force structure, according to planners at the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth.\textsuperscript{19} These forces must continue to be supplied superior intelligence and be kept mobile, agile, and—most importantly—lethal. Evolving technology must be exploited in these areas. Manpower spaces may need to be sacrificed in order to save the money to let this vital effort continue. Forward deployed forces must train routinely to integrate contingency forces into the theater, rapidly and decisively to win, quick and big. Giving up spaces to pay for essential and expensive training events might also become a necessity.

**PLANNING THE FUTURE FORCE**

Looking beyond the turn of the century the AirLand Battle-Future planners envision the U.S. Army to consist of these forward deployed forces, contingency forces, reinforcing forces, unique mission forces, and nation developing forces. \textsuperscript{20} Combining the latter four under the term contingency

\textsuperscript{19} AirLand Battle-Future Doctrine, presentation and handout, Col. Stephen Kempf, Plans Officer, Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, Nov. 1989. (Cited by permission of Col. Kempf.)

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid
force would lead to the building of regionally directed, specifically tailored units. Even future mission, regardless of the size of the force, is predicated on adequate rapid lift, air and sea, for that force to be able to fulfill its roles around the world. The Army has always been dependent upon others for deployment. "Even the best structured, most ready, and most modernized force cannot be employed or sustained without adequate strategic lift. The United States cannot afford to risk the effectiveness and credibility of its overall defense strategy by failing to develop and field adequate worldwide lift assets. The airlift and sealift assets that are available or are currently approved for acquisition are inadequate." This is not a new requirement, but a neglected one.21

Sizing forces for regional contingencies is an operational problem. Regional contingency corps must have a mix of "type units," from which to quickly tailor to project into the region for which they are organized. The combat structure must be able to execute deep, close, and rear operations in any environment posed by the regional METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops available, Time). By the same token, the support structure must also be able to operate in these same areas. The 1973 Echelons Above Division (EAD) study eliminated the field army from the force. "Field army functions were assigned to corps which joined the division and battalion as a unit of maneuver. The battle tested formula of alternating echelons tasked to provide a range of combat, combat support, and combat service support with intervening levels to the concentration of maneuver elements was lost. Although the brigade remained a unit of concentration, the capability to rapidly concentrate maneuver combat power under a purely operational

21 Vuono, p.13
echelon died at that point and must be reestablished."  

22 Our Army, its corps filled with multiple types of oversized divisions with a sprinkling of separate brigades and regiments is not necessarily organized to effectively fight AirLand Battle. In reality don’t we have units that are strategically mobile but not tactically flexible, and units that are tactically mobile but not strategically deployable?"  

23 A corps/brigade type structure would be a logical solution to this apparent structure versus doctrine problem. Further evidence is provided by two large study groups in the U.S. Army War College classes of 1988 and 1989 who proposed the same solution in Mounted Warfare-2004 and Continuous Operations-2004, respectively. Mounted Warfare-2004 determined that "current US tactical units are too bulky and too dependent on support from elsewhere to be in concert with AirLand Battle doctrine."  

24 This study concluded that the brigade should be the corps commander’s building block with which he would tailor his force.  

25 Continuous Operations-2004 determined that "organizing the Army based on combined arms brigades will facilitate accomplishing the continuous operations synchronization requirements and improve the force’s strategic, operational, and tactical agility."  

26 The arguments in these two studies are consistent with AirLand Battle-Future doctrine.

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25 Ibid.

A threat must also be considered. Each region in which there are potential threats to US vital interests must be assessed. A brief look at the world with an eye to the future, in terms of developing a viable force to meet regional challenges, would be useful.

REGIONAL THREATS

In Southwest Asia, there are twelve shooting disputes ongoing. This is not to say that they will always be ongoing; but it does seem likely, given the history of the region, that there will be some sort of destabilizing action there. "Even if conflicts in the region do not threaten the peace of the world, there is therefore reason enough for the United States, still the foremost world power, to help the region embrace the logic of global change."27 As the rest of the world's petroleum resources are depleted, a situation projected as early as the first decade of the next century, this region will become even more critical to the survival of all nations that are dependent on oil than it is now. Since the United States, as recently as 1989, was apparently ready to risk combat action to keep the oil flowing through the Persian Gulf, this criticality should alert planners that the force must be employable in this diverse region. Employed U.S. forces could face armored formations, air inferiority, and equipment recognition problems arising from the proliferation of weaponry from foreign military sales. These challenges, coupled with the possible use of nuclear weapons by developing countries and a myriad of other possibilities, make this region a singular priority. If the Straits of Hormuz are important, then the Bab el Mandeb---

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where, by necessity, Saudi Arabian oil passes as it is shipped south out of the Red Sea—is just as important.

In Central America, the situation may differ. "As the new decade unfolds, Latin America has become synonymous with drugs, illegal immigration, death squads, guerillas, capital flight, and that nefarious term, 'U.S. intervention'." There appears to be no end in sight or long-term solution. "The U.S. approach avoids attending to politically divisive issues that offer no immediate gains, but are nevertheless full of both pitfalls or opportunities in the long run. The situation is made worse by skepticism about the region at the most senior level of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. As a result, circumstances have not triggered a positive vision of hemispheric affairs, nor contributed to a coherent long-term program. Any force employed in this region, for whatever reason, will have to be extremely flexible. The porcupine theory applied by Fidel Castro in Cuba may well work throughout the region in the future. That theory, simply stated, is if small countries bristle with armed forces, they become too painful an objective for American military intervention. Further complicating U.S. dealings in the region are the factors of nonpayment of debts and increasing flows of drugs to the U.S., the leading user nation. The latest U.S. incursion into the region points out dramatically the need for more "kinder and gentler" forces in the active component for operations in Central America. More military police units, medical and other service type units, and perhaps more aviation units to assist host country officials in building infrastructure that is service oriented should be the focus. A more rapid

29 Ibid p 118
non-building operations after future combat operations may lessen the combat blow and, therefore, strengthen the U.S. position. The CINC and the corps commander need these type forces, task organized and readily deployable, to make this shift as rapidly as possible. The insurgencies in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras also seem likely to threaten the region for years to come. Dealing with insurgencies is a capability that U.S. forces need to build and retain.

In South America, debt and economic instability are also rampant, but the most important factor in the region is the so-called "drug war" being waged against the cartels of the Andean Ridge. Forces to fight this war must be diverse enough to train indigenous forces in all aspects of waging this war as well as being prepared to fight it themselves. Intelligence units, civil affairs units, aviation units, and special forces units in the same corps, routinely training together and establishing relationships built on mutual respect and trust, are an absolute must.

In the Pacific area, the situation is even more diverse. North Korea looms as a tough future adversary. "In the past several years, North Korea has begun a leadership transition that, at least in contrast to that of China, appears relatively smooth and harmonious. Kim Il-song has made clear his intention of passing the baton to his son, Chong-il. By all accounts, this process is considerably more advanced than one might expect... To the extent that Kim's efforts represent an attempt to protect against possible 'revisionist' tendencies and to ensure the continuation of his 'revolutionary' tradition, Chong-il's succession would likely be accompanied by a heightening of the salience of political and ideological objectives, and an increased North Korean motivation to maintain a high level of military..."
effort.” In the event of war as a result of these actions, our contingency forces must get there fast, be overwhelming, and get any conflict over quickly. No easy task, as witnessed by history!

The insurgency in the Philippines seems to be endless. The coup-ridden Aquino government still needs U.S. presence to remain a viable government. This is seriously complicated by nationalism and the basing issue.

Southeast Asia looms in the region with all of its problems. “Any developments there should satisfy China-- a vital consideration, since unless China is minimally satisfied there can be no peace in the region.” In the future, it is not inconceivable that U.S. interests in that area could again drive the National Command Authority to project combat power there.

The vastness of the Pacific area of operations is threatening in itself. The Pacific region has always been our huge back yard, and we cannot afford to change that now. Our alliance with the Japanese and their relative power in the world simply will not allow it. For all of this, it is imperative to have a forced entry capability in this area of operations.

The CINC in Europe cannot sit idly by either. Like a half dead rattlesnake, one or another dying communist regime may decide that it would be in their best interest to strike. CINCEUR, like CINCENT, is also faced with the problems of Lebanon, Syria, and the resource-draining Israel. United States presence in Europe must also continue to focus on this

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32 Ibid. p.102
A SOLUTION

The logic of a contingency response is well presented by XVIIth Airborne Corps G-3 Plans. "Given that the status quo is acceptable regional balance of power, (sic) and that U.S. policy objectives include maintaining that power balance, then the U.S. should respond to regional crises with any or all elements of national power. When the military option is selected, then the military force must be able to respond properly."33 A proper response can only be made by properly structured forces tailored for regionally

specific missions. Employment of a combat division of any kind would more than likely not be the best course of action in most cases. In fact, history since World War II would show that the U.S. Army deploys by brigade. Our natural proclivity and, perhaps, sentimental attraction to structuring the force around existing "flags" is a paradigm that must be broken. Divisions, like the Roman legions before them, are obsolete. Separate brigades are lighter, more supportable, and more flexible. The force for the future is a regionally directed contingency corps which should be made up of tailored brigades. The force package that the corps commander has to choose from, if his mission is always to be executed in the same region, will always match his family of plans. His training and exercise program will be focused. Important relationships will be built, not only among the members of the contingency corps, but also within the region. A case could be made that XVIIIth Airborne Corps, for over a year, has been a regionally directed contingency corps for the U.S. Southern Command. Almost 100 percent of the corps' effort in training, planning, and rehearsing during that time was aimed at Panama.34 By mixing "lightfighters" from the 7th Infantry Division, with mechanized elements from the 5th Infantry Division, paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, U.S. Marines, in-country special forces, aviation, and conventional units, and special operations elements from three services—a true joint contingency effort was made. This joint task force had trained and exercised together routinely. General Stiner, the joint task force commander, also had available any element he needed from the 24th Infantry Division, the 10th Mountain Division, or the 101st Air Assault Division. In addition, should he have required them, both the 197th

34 Stiner, in conversation, 26 Nov 1989 (Cited by permission of LTG Stiner)
Infantry with Armored Brigades and the remainder of the 7th Special Forces Group are available. The idea of a standing joint task force with a menu of diverse forces from which to choose, and a specific region upon which to focus is viable.

The same idea can be used for each region that holds U.S. vital interests. Therefore, the creation of three CONUS-based contingency corps to respond to crises regionally is one solution to the future force equation. Current forward deployments should be cut to the levels that short term risk assessment will allow. Because presence insures access, some continuing stationing is necessary everywhere the U.S. wants to retain some level of commitment.

For Southwest Asia and the Middle-East, the contingency corps would, by necessity, be made up of a diverse series of brigades. The corps commander should have more heavy elements from which to choose for the initial, and follow on operations in this region. The terrain surrounding areas in the region that border likely hot spots, such as the Bab el Mandeb, as well as the armor threat posed by likely regional enemies are more conducive to the use of heavier forces. This corps would also provide the initial reinforcement package for Europe. One way to organize this corps would be to mix the heavy and light brigades from the divisions east of the Mississippi River, add one each airborne and air assault brigade, and add both heavy separates that are currently structured in XVIIIth Corps. The requirement to break up the airborne and air assault divisions will likely be the toughest turf battle to be fought to achieve this structure. The air assault units would require their own aviation assets, meaning that current

aviation structure in the 101st would have to be tripled. This could be done by cross leveling across the Army, with a concurrent training program. Light forces would also require additional mobility and firepower assets to be effective in this region. These assets are currently available in the structure. Special operations forces (SOF)—including special forces, psyops, and civil affairs units currently structured for employment in this region—should become organic to this corps and the other two as well. Cross leveling and rethinking the structural position and role of division support and service support assets would also be necessary in all three corps.

To the West, the Pacific area of operation also offers some unique challenges in terms of threat, terrain, and space. The most important challenge is Korea, which poses the greatest threat to Army force planners. The Pacific package would include light brigades from Hawaii and Alaska, airborne and air assault brigades, heavy brigades from Ft. Carson and Ft. Riley and special operations forces already aimed at the region. A proper mix of separate brigades make a potent, tailorable package viable for the entire Pacific.

In the South, mixing heavy separate brigades from Ft. Hood and Ft. Polk with separate light brigades from Ft. Ord and airborne and air assault brigades is a proven success. Design of the pre-crisis and post-crisis force is just as, if not more important than, the design of combat units. Special operations and, perhaps, Engineer forces should be the leader for these missions in this region. By adding more of these type units to this corps, along with units to accomplish any affordable security assistance that a host country requests may lead to crisis avoidance. Many of these types of units are currently in the reserve components and need to be made part of the active force.
How, then, is it possible to arrive at this corps-oriented, regionally-focused Army of the future? In CONUS, this proposed force has one corps stationed on the West Coast focused on PACOM; one on the East Coast, focused on CENTCOM and EUCOM; and one in the southern U.S., focused on SOUTHCOM. This would require breaking up the division structure, creating or moving around some support assets to ensure that the separate brigades were self-sustaining for the short term, and creating or activating the pre-crisis and post-crisis units described above. All of this could be done with a minimum of turbulence and relatively cheaply over the period of short term risk. Liberally figuring the average brigade strength in the corps as 4000, then adding the Ranger Regiment, which is left intact with its current mission, and adding the various existing corps level support organizations—the CONUS based strength of forces actually deployable could shrink considerably. These forces would also give planners some interesting options, if they are told to keep the active Army end strength under 500,000.

CONCLUSION

A clear path to the future force structure of the U.S. Army is not available. Creative force design—perhaps even revolution, rather than evolution—is a way to that future. To stimulate creative planning is useful and strengthens every endeavor. By the year, 2055—when the average student in the U.S. Army War College Class of 1990 is turning 100 years old—the force will probably be totally joint. The contingency corps of that time may have air fighter, air-lift, space-force, and naval carrier brigades with which to respond to contingencies. The great grandchildren of the Class of
90 may have the opportunity to attend the U.S. Space Academy and join the force as mission specialists. They may wear one of only three types of collar insignia—maneuver, fires, or support—regardless of mission area: maritime, land, air, or space. No matter how it "really" will be, the threats will probably still be regional, and the contingency corps may still be the heart of any U.S. response to a crisis.

General John Foss, Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command sums it up this way: "We are certain that the design requirements of a future Army (1995 and beyond) must start now so that we will have a view and guiding light of our future requirements. During this period of change we can then shape the units of the Army to meet our future force, as well as providing a focus to our new equipment needs. The greatest mistake we could make is to take our Army of the 70s and 80s into the 21st century."36