THESIS

JCS PLANNING: ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

by

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Supplementary Notation

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Abstract

Strategic planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has been a source of criticism due to the lack of quality and timely military advice needed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act made organizational changes to help solve JCS planning problems, but failed to address other fundamental problems such as the lack of Presidential participation in planning, the lack of recognition of strategic role of today's information technology in joint strategic planning and the lack of training and experience of planning officers. This thesis provides a high-level overview of both the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) currently being revised, and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) designed to improve deliberate planning by the unified and specified commanders. Conclusions and recommendations are given to address the DoD's decentralized and incompatible planning systems currently in use, and to improve the flow of information from the JCS to the President.
JCS Planning: Assessment and Recommendations

by

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ABSTRACT

Strategic planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has been a source of criticism due to the lack of quality and timely military advice needed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act made organizational changes to help solve JCS planning problems, but failed to address other fundamental problems such as the lack of Presidential participation in planning, the lack of recognition of strategic role of today's information technology in joint strategic planning and the lack of training and experience of planning officers. This thesis provides a high-level overview of both the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) currently being revised, and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) designed to improve deliberate planning by the unified and specified commanders. Conclusions and recommendations are given to address the DoD's decentralized and incompatible planning systems currently in use, and to improve the flow of information from the CJCS to the President.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"The principal organizational goal of DoD, both in 1949 and now, is the integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four Services to prepare for and conduct effective and unified operations in fulfilling major U.S. military missions." [Ref. 1:p. 2] But over the past 20 years, there have been less than spectacular results of U.S military operations that have been attributed to organizational shortcomings such as inadequate joint operations and joint planning [Ref. 1:p. 15]. Examples cited are the results of the Vietnam conflict during the Johnson and Nixon administrations [Ref. 2:p. 222], the attempted hostage rescue during the Carter administration [Ref. 1:p. 359], the attack on the U.S. Marines in Lebanon [Ref. 2:p. 312] and the invasion of Grenada [Ref. 1:p. 363], the later two occurring during the Reagan administration.

The lack of satisfactory joint operations can be illustrated most pointedly by the initial stages of operation Urgent Fury, the 1984 invasion of Grenada:

...the U.S. units were poorly coordinated and ill prepared for the invasion. The failure extended to every unit: when a group of Delta Force commandos failed to take the airport on the morning of the invasion, Ranger units had to make an unexpected parachute assault on the island. The subsequent failure of the Rangers to subdue the airport's defenders meant that the airborne landing on the afternoon of the 25th was unexpectedly contested. The Marines who landed at Pearl were ordered to make an amphibious assault on Grand Mal Bay because a SEAL (Navy
special operations) team had failed to rescue the governor
general; the assault took 24 hours, against light
resistance. Even more critical, intelligence officers
failed to locate the U.S. students on the island. The
last group wasn't rescued until the third day of the
invasion. It's now clear that the Cubans could easily
have shot the students had they desired. In addition,
some students later said that they only felt in danger
when U.S. units launched an assault to free them. [Ref.
2:p. 320]

The Department of Defense (DoD) agency that is
responsible for joint operations and joint planning is the
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). In 1986
Congressional legislation passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act
in an attempt to improve joint planning. However, the JCS
has been slow to institute proper planning that would
provide the desired "joint" oriented military advice [Ref.
3:p. 12].

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis will address three areas in determining how
military planning and advice has been and could be improved.
It will identify (OJCS) planning problems. It will review
changes made to correct some of these problems. And lastly,
it will provide analyses of these and other potential
changes for long-term system viability in the OJCS.

1. Problems

The most critical and publicized problem concerning
the performance by the JCS, has been the JCS's inability to
provide adequate and timely cross-service recommendations to
the President and Secretary of Defense [Ref. 4:p. 8]. The
poor U.S. military performances during major operations previously identified are the result of "organizational and procedural problems that hamper it (OJCS) from fully carrying out its responsibilities." [Ref. 1:p. 157] Some of the overall organizational and procedural problems identified are:

- Insufficient OJCS Review and Oversight of contingency plans [Ref. 1:p. 206].
- Service-oriented vice joint-oriented military advice [Ref. 5:p. 19].
- Ineffective and confusing chain of command.
- Inadequately defined national objectives by the President [Ref. 5:p. 25].

This thesis will examine these and other major problems with JCS joint planning efforts. And more specifically, it will seek to identify areas pertaining to Information Technology (IT) which have prevented DoD from accomplishing timely and quality planning.

2. Changes

In supporting the changes required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, two planning processes, short-range and mid-range planning, are going through major revisions. Short-range planning refers to the planning conducted by unified and specified commanders covering the zero to two year time period. Mid-range planning refers to the two to ten year time period that is conducted by the JCS [Ref. 6:p. 106]. The following questions are asked: What changes have been
made to correct the stated problems within short-range and mid-range planning? What do the planning systems look like with these changes? And who, within short-range and mid-range planning, has been effected by recent changes?

3. Analysis

An ever-changing political and technological environment may always require DoD changes. Therefore, the questions must be asked: Are the changes that have been, or that are in the process of being made, sufficient to solve planning problems that have caused less than satisfactory performances during military operations? And if they are not sufficient, why not?

It is the contention of this thesis that there is an underlying problem that must be addressed in addition to implementing the changes directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This underlying problem concerns DoD's mismanagement of information during planning, specifically at the JCS level. The real issue is the lack of current information systems which have prevented effective planning. Ultimately, the question is how IT systems and IT management can be changed or enhanced to improve joint planning.

B. STRUCTURE OF THESIS

The remaining chapters of this thesis are divided as follows: Chapter II briefly describes the military planning process prior to 1986, before changes resulting from the
Goldwater-Nichols Act were implemented. Chapter III discusses the problems and related causes of the JCS planning process. Chapter IV discusses the changes in the planning process that have been or that are soon to be implemented, specifically those involving responsibilities of senior officials, mid-range planning, deliberate planning and information technology. Chapter V is a discussion and analysis of the changes described in Chapter IV. Chapter VI provides conclusions and recommendations.

C. METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this thesis involved several steps and processes. The first step consisted of gathering as much information as possible concerning military strategic planning conducted within the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the JCS. As part of this data collection, the associated problems that have surfaced due to ineffective military operations were documented. After reviewing this information, the next step was to describe how the current strategic planning process was conducted.

Learning about the current procedures of strategic planning by the JCS was difficult. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) process/procedures are being revised presently, and only an extremely small number of J-5 officials are familiar with the new initiatives. Because current documentation has yet to be published referencing
the new procedures, interviews were conducted with JCS personnel. Most of the interviews were conducted by phone, but several were conducted in person.

A major source of information on the new military planning process was the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) conference (15-19 July 1989). All the documentation referring to the JOPES program addressed in Chapter IV was obtained from this thesis trip. The following sections list specifically the different information sources used for this thesis.

1. Archival Records

The primary document used to gain the overall conceptual picture of the mid-range planning, short-range planning, the JCS organizational structure and the future implementation of JOPES was the "The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1988." This document was referred to frequently to look up definitions and general facts.

Two key documents that were instrumental in the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 were the Senate Staff Report and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Report. Both stressed the necessity for change in the defense organization. These documents presented a thorough analysis of many apparent problem areas that have slowly come to light because of consistently inefficient and less than outstanding results in military operations since the Vietnam conflict.
Recommended changes from these reports are listed in Appendix G. Current opinions on the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act came from Dr. Hammond's paper "Fulfilling the Promise of the Goldwater-Nichols Act In Operational Planning and Command."

The viewpoints of the military officer planners were obtained from two papers: "An Analysis of Joint Operational Planning" and "Reforming the Joint Military Establishment." No information could be found discussing information management as a critical element for improving military advice/planning.

2. Interviews

Interviews were conducted in person and by phone. The following data involves interviews within the two categories.

By telephone:
- Five Joint Staff Officers: three from J-7, two J-5.
- One USTRANSCOM Officer.
- One OPNAV-605 Officer.
- One DCA official.
- Twenty-three interviews.

In person:
- Five Joint Staff Officers: three from J-7, two from J-5.
- One retired J-5 Officer.
• One CEXEC Inc. Official.
• Eight interviews.

The interviews conducted with J-5 Officers concerned the JSPS that is being revised and submitted for approval. The interviews with the other Officers focused on the JOPES project.

3. **Attending Conference**

   The most important segment of the research for IT information came from attending the JOPES conference which was held at the Armed Forces Staff College. Because of delays in the development of JOPES, the many changes that the JOPES program has encountered, and the lack of any JOPES reference material at the Naval Postgraduate School, the JOPES conference became the sole source for information involving future joint strategic planning goals. Documentation of JOPES functional descriptions, support elements and procedures description were critical in learning both the purpose and proposed functional components of JOPES.

4. **Correspondence**

   A few documents were transferred by mail, but correspondence by this method proved to be very slow. It took approximately seven days to send or receive correspondence to and from the Pentagon. A more efficient and effective means to communicate was via the Defense Data Network (DDN). Difficulties occurred when JCS officials had
accounts on different networks, i.e., the WWMCCS Network. One official in J-5 had an account on the DDN which made it very easy to receive or send messages from my personal computer at home. This proved more efficient primarily due to the time difference between the Naval Postgraduate School and Washington D.C..
II. DESCRIPTION OF JCS PLANNING PROCESS

The overall strategic planning process consists of three systems, the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Operating Planning System (JOPS). They each interrelate to produce outputs that include the President's Budget (PB), Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), tasking to combatant commanders (JSCP) and combatant commander Operational Plans (OPLANs).

This chapter describes the processes, elements and procedures involving these three systems as it exist today and do not reflect the programs and proposals currently being recommended/developed. These changes are discussed in Chapter IV.

Prior to discussing these three systems, a brief description of the functions and responsibilities involving senior planning officials is provided. The functions and responsibilities described are those before the changes implemented by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, and are so indicated.

A. DOD PLANNING OFFICIALS

There are numerous planning officials associated with the JSPS and PPBS that are the cornerstone of military
planning and essential to the joint planning process. These officials within the NCA and OJCS are the critical links who integrate the different planning systems to create a complete joint planning process.

1. **NCA**

The National Command Authorities consist of the President and the Secretary of Defense who by law are the only individuals with the authority to order troop movement and/or direct the Armed Forces for the execution of military action. [Ref. 6:p. 25]

2. **OJCS**

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an element within DoD that includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff and the agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1953, two separate command channels were established. An operational channel was established from the Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, to the unified and specified commanders. The second channel was the support channel, that went from the Secretary of Defense, to the military departments, to the unified and specified commanders [Ref. 5:p. 14]. Before being revised by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the statutory responsibilities of JCS included preparing strategic plans and direction of the armed forces, establishing unified commands in strategic locations, reviewing major material and personnel requirements of the armed forces and formulating policy on
military education and joint training. These responsibilities are summarized in Appendix A. The following sections briefly describe three areas of the OJCS, the CJCS, the Service Chiefs and the Joint Staff.

a. CJCS

In 1958 the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as senior military member of the JCS, was given the authority to have a vote during JCS deliberations, and task the Joint Staff on his own authority [Ref. 5:p. 14]. The CJCS and the Service Chiefs combined to form a committee that supplied the civilian leaders with military advice [Ref. 5:p. 40]. In 1984, the CJCS was appointed as the spokesman for the CINCs on operational requirements [Ref. 5:p. 15].

b. Service Chiefs

The Service Chiefs, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Chief of Staff for the Army (CSA) and the Chief of Staff for the Air Force (CSAF) may offer advice to the President, NSC and Secretary of Defense. They are responsible, to the respective Service Secretary, for the management of that Service, for appointing Operations Deputies of the JCS (OPSDEPs) and Deputy Operations Deputies, JCS (DEPOPSDEPs) who work with the Director and Vice Director of the Joint Staff. As an integrative part of the staffing process, the OPSDEPs and DEPOPSDEPs consider the less important issues or
screen the major issues to be forwarded to the Service Chiefs. [Ref. 6:p. 36]

c. Joint Staff

Prior to 1986, the Joint Staff worked for the corporate body of the JCS in developing required advice and plans required to direct the unified operation of the combatant forces [Ref. 5:p. 40]. Under the Director of the Joint Staff there were five Directorates [Ref. 6:p. 38]:

- J-1: Manpower and Personnel Directorate.
- Directorate for the JCS Support (JS), DIA.
- J-4: Logistics Directorate.

B. JCS PLANNING PROCESS

The process of joint military planning is critical in today's global environment in order to better utilize scarce DoD resources not only during wartime, but also in peacetime. Joint, mid-range, planning is attempted by encompassing the JSPS and PPBS into an integrated planning system that plans for the two to ten year time frame [Ref. 6:p. 6]. The overall process entails formulating politico-military assessments; dictating proper planning guidance; developing, testing, analyzing and choosing effective strategic concepts and options; and appointing appropriate forces and resources. These systems interrelate to form a
planning cycle aiding the senior decisionmakers in producing military strategies/plans and accurate amounts of resources (equipment and manpower). The forces will in turn be able to utilize necessary amounts of equipment, as applied to developed strategies and plans, to achieve national objectives when necessary.

1. JSPS

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the formal medium by which the CJCS carries out his responsibilities involving strategy development and providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces. The JSPS feeds into the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) which produces a plan, a program and a budget for the DoD. It broadly consists of a series of documents providing assessments, resource allocations and planning guidance. [Ref. 7:p. 2-8] A proposal to revise the JSPS is currently being reviewed and is discussed in Chapter IV. The publication referencing DoD's strategic planning process is the MOP 84 "Joint Strategic Planning System."

The entire JSPS process has a six year cycle with a new cycle beginning every other year. The overlap of the processes is designed to instill flexibility into the planning process, flexibility in the sense that updates of any part of the cycle can be entered into an appropriate process that is being executed. [Ref. 6:p. 103]
In order to collect, analyze and produce the necessary information, six documents are produced sequentially to facilitate the development of the JSPD, the JSCP (issued to the unified and specified commanders), and to develop other critical inputs used within the PPBS. The following sections discuss the documents developed within the JSPS and the staffing process involved in developing JCS views.

a. IPSP

The Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP) is prepared annually by DIA and presented to the CJCS. The IPSP contains CJCS advice to the Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA on military intelligence requirements and priorities to support national objectives. Tasking assignments are also contained to gather intelligence required for the JIEP. [Ref. 6:p. 105]

b. JIEP

The Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP) consists of intelligence collected by the entire intelligence community, including the CIA, DIA, Services and CINCs that constitutes the intelligence basis for the JSPS. The JIEP contains intelligence appraisals concerning global and regional situation estimates of enemy forces and their potential threat to U.S. security interests. [Ref. 6:p. 105]
c. JSPD

The Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), along with its three Supporting Analysis documents JSPDSA I, II and III, are used in strategic and force planning. The JSPD I tasks the CINCs in estimating minimum risk force requirements needed to achieve national objectives. The JSPD II contains the minimum risk force assessments submitted by the CINCs. The JSPD III contains the planning force required to execute national strategy. It considers simultaneous conflicts, allied capabilities and U.S. resources availability. The JSPD, prepared by J-5, is also used to assess the POMs developed by DoD agencies. [Ref. 6:pp. 106-107]

d. JPAM

The Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) is the CJCS's view on the adequacy and the associated risks of the total forces contained in the Service POMs to execute national strategy. [Ref. 6:p. 321]

e. JSAM

The Joint Security Assistance Memorandum (JSAM), prepared by J-5, contains CJCS's views on the funding levels estimated for the security assistance programs prepared by the Department of State involving low-intensity conflicts. [Ref. 6:p. 108]
f. JSCP

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) contains guidance on military strategy and projected military forces/capabilities that is issued to the CINCs for short-range operations planning. [Ref. 6:p. 321]

2. JCS Staffing Process

MOP 132 requires a JCS staffing process to be executed if a major JCS policy is to be determined, if requested by a JCS member or if one is likely to result in the rejection of a CINC request [Ref. 6:p. 155]. The following describes the complicated OJCS staffing procedures illustrated in Figure 1. These procedures take place in developing JCS positions on issues [Ref. 6:p. 156]. The procedures can apply to developing JCS view during deliberate planning procedures (OPLANs) or during strategic planning procedures (JSPS).

a. Step One

Step one consists of the OJCS receiving a request for JCS views from the White House, NSC, Secretary of Defense, particular Joint Staff components, Federal Agencies or CINCs.

b. Step Two

Step two involves the Director of the Joint Staff reviewing the request and forwarding it to the appropriate Joint Staff Directorate.
Figure 1. Processing Joint Actions [Ref. 1:p. 155]
c. Step Three

Step three begins when the Directorate reviews the request and assigns the request to an Action Officer (Major/Lieutenant Commander or a Lieutenant Colonel/Commander). The Action Officer has the responsibility for preparation of the draft paper that will eventually explain the issue and propose appropriate solutions. Simultaneously, each Service is informed of the request. The OPSDEP then assigns a Service staff Action Officer to work with the Joint Staff Action Officer. Both the Directorate and Service OPSDEP gives general guidelines to the action officers indicating what the general contents of the paper should entail.

The steps that follow are dependent on the amount of time available, the magnitude of the task and the relationships with previously developed views by JCS.

d. Step Four

Step four is performed if a rapid response time is required. If a rapid response time is not required the AO proceeds to step five. If a rapid response is required, there are two options:

- If a recent assessment has been done involving the JSPS, then the Joint Chiefs will forward this as their response.

- If no prior assessment has been done, the Joint Staff Action Officer and the Service staff Action Officer will work closely with the Joint Staff Planner and Service Staff Planner (Colonel/Captain), their superiors, to shorten the normal lower level iterative process. The
service Planner's responsibility is to their service in the staffing process.

e. Step Five

Step five is completed if there is ample time and no prior response has been developed. The Joint Staff Action Officer and the Service staff Action Officer meet to establish a schedule for preparing the response and discuss the issue to be addressed. If there is time, inputs from the appropriate unified or specified command will be requested, otherwise the Joint Staff will attempt to represent these viewpoints.

f. Step Six

After this meeting the Joint Staff Action Officer begins step six and prepares the initial draft. The staff of each Service or combatant command may write part of this initial draft. A significant reason for this participation is that the Service staffs are much larger and have more data with related analysis to which the Joint Staff does not have access.

g. Step Seven

Step seven has the Joint Staff Action Officer and Service staff Action Officer meeting again to discuss Service's positions relating to the content of the paper. Suggestions on possible changes are discussed and the Joint Staff Action Officer makes a second draft reflecting the
consensus of the meeting. Minority views not included can be argued during the next step.

h. Step Eight

Step eight is the same as the previous step except that it involves the Joint Staff and Service staff planners, unless they were already involved in the previous step. The planners create a third draft to represent the consensus views and the Service planners forward it up the chain of command, i.e., the Service planners send it to the Service Operations Deputies.

i. Step Nine

Step nine requires that the Operations Deputies meet with the Joint Staff Director to discuss the paper. On topics of lesser importance, the OPSDEPs, if in full agreement, will approve the paper, enabling the Director to sign and transmit it on behalf of the JCS. On major issues or if there are remaining differences, the paper is sent to the Chiefs of Staff.

j. Step Ten

Step ten, the last step, has the Chiefs of Staff discuss the draft produced in step nine and make final decisions. If, in a rare occurrence, there still remains a disagreement, the minority view may be added to the final paper.
3. **PPBS**

The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is the cyclic process that determines the DoD portion of the President's budget that is submitted to Congress. The planning phase starts with the assessment of possible threats and culminates with the development of force objectives that will insure U.S. security. From the joint perspective, the planning phase is initiated with the submission of the JSPD to the Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Option Review (SOR). The President then makes Strategy and Option Decisions (SOD) regarding the military strategies proposed in the SOR which are then included in the Defense Guidance (DG). The DG, which ends the Planning phase, includes firm guidance on goals, priorities, objectives and fiscal constraints to be used in the development of Service Program Objective Memorandum (Service POMs). [Ref. 6:p. 107]

The programming phase translates force objectives into program force structures in terms of resource requirements. From the DG, Service Secretaries submit recommendations to the CJCS proposing specific applications of their portion of the DoD appropriations. These recommendations constitute the Service POMs. The CJCS reviews the POMs to ensure that program recommendations are consistent with and capable of achieving national strategy objectives. Any alternatives or disagreements are
incorporated into Issue Papers (IPs) and resolved by the Defense Resources Board (DRB) with the results recorded in the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). [Ref. 6:p. 108]

The budget phase translates planning and programming into annual funding requirements. The PDMs are distributed to the DoD components for the formulation of Budget Estimates. After review hearings are thoroughly conducted by OSD, DRB, OMB and JCS Staff, the Program Budget Decision (PBD) is formed and submitted to the President. From the PBD, the President formulates the President's Budget (PB) and submits it to Congress in January. The PB, consisting of detailed appropriation recommendations for the upcoming fiscal year, undergoes extensive Congressional reviews and is hopefully passed by 1 October, the beginning of the fiscal year. [Ref. 6:p. 110] Details involving the Congressional reviews of the President's Budget is beyond the scope of this thesis. A summary time line of the PPBS and JSPS is illustrated in Appendix B.

C. DELIBERATE PLANNING

As opposed to the two to ten year time period that the JSPS plans for, deliberate planning involves planning for contingency operations within the zero to two year time frame. Deliberate planning begins after the JSPD has been published and the JSCP (the principal task-assigning document) has been issued to the unified and specific
commanders. The JSCP assigns preparation of contingency plans with the end product of this process being CONPLANS, OPLANS and OPORDS. [Ref. 6:p. 137] Current deliberate planning is conducted at the CINC level in five phases:

- Initiation Phase.
- Concept Development Phase.
- Plan Development Phase.
- Plan Review Phase.
- Support Plan Phase.

The deliberate planning process is supported by the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS). JOPS is the current DoD directed and computer supportive system required to be used for joint deliberate planning. JOPS enables unified and specified commanders to translate JCS task assignments into the developing, analyzing, refining, reviewing and maintaining of CONPLANS, OPLANS and/or OPORDS. [Ref. 6:p. 134]

JOPS has gone through several updates since its inception in the 1960s. The latest version of JOPS is a system within the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). WWMCCS interfaces with numerous systems such as Nuclear planning and Execution (NPE); intelligence, weather and logistics systems; and Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (TW/AA) and space defense systems [Ref. 6:p. 261]. WWMCCS's primary role is to support national-level command and control operations, but it also supports the
combatant commanders command and control operations on a noninterference basis. Users are able to communicate with other users via the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN). [Ref. 6:p. 118] Further details of JOPS and WWMCCS is beyond the scope of this thesis.
III. PROBLEMS WITH JCS PLANNING PROCESS

The overall problem facing DoD today is the less than satisfactory results from military operations. The causes of these problems have been attributed to organizational and procedural deficiencies within DoD [Ref. 1:p. 1]. The Senate Staff and CSIS Reports submitted in 1985 have discussed these causes in depth [Refs. 4:p. 1; 1:p. 614]. Therefore, a thorough analysis involving each major cause is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this chapter will focus on one particular cause of defense problems, the structural, procedural and IT problems associated with the JCS planning process.

The JCS planning process has drawn widespread criticisms for its failure to produce quality and timely integrated military advice for the President and the Secretary of Defense (the most important result from the JCS strategic planning process) [Ref. 1:p. 157]. It should be noted that senior civilian officials generally view advice from senior military officers as good when given individually. It is the advice derived from the "corporate" structure planning process that has been viewed as being inadequate [Ref. 5:p. 18].
A. STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL CAUSES

In identifying the causes of improper military planning, the military reform studies have directed most of their analysis towards the organizational structure and procedures. The following sections identify six significant patterns.

1. Lack of Policy Direction from the President

If joint military operations are a clear DoD strategy, then an overriding problem that affects the progress of joint planning/operations is the lack of clear Presidential policy direction being given to the OJCS [Ref. 8]. In addition to national strategic guidance having a tendency to be abstract, political leaders "are inclined to leave policy unarticulated or ambiguous or even inconsistent in order to avoid presenting their critics with clear targets and their adversaries with reliable predictions about future behavior."

[Ref. 3:p. 39] This has certainly left the Services to continue in planning and developing their own policies and programs to meet Service "sub-goals," not joint oriented goals, for 18 Army divisions, 600 Navy ships and 40 Air Force Wings.

The President, the military's Commander-In-Chief (Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in corporate terminology) must be the source from which clear strategic policy and support emerges. The Goldwater-Nichols Act specified that the "President shall transmit to Congress each year a
comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States." [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT. 1075] An unclassified version of this report, referred to as the National Security Strategy Report, was submitted in 1987 and 1988 under the Reagan administration, but was not submitted in 1989 under the Bush administration. The 1988 and 1989 reports were criticized for being too generic in nature and failing to prioritize national objectives [Ref 10:p. 3].

Well-defined policy emphasizing joint planning and operations directed from the President would result in a much more integrated, "joint" oriented and unified effort by the various DoD components and personnel. But, not since President Eisenhower's term has a formal document setting forth clear and specific national objectives been delivered to the DoD [Ref. 5:p. 25].

2. Over-emphasis on Budgeting

There is an overly extensive focus by the Pentagon, Congress and the media on the budget process. Civilian and military officials simply focus all of their attention on the material "inputs" which results in the insufficient focusing on the "outputs" such as the quality of national strategy and personnel, the preparation and evaluation of OPLANs and the execution of national policy decisions. [Ref. 1:p. 620]

Each chamber of Congress reviews virtually every line item of the defense budget at least three times.
annually. Within each chamber of Congress, a separate committee controls the three annual reviews. This redundancy on the upcoming year's budget not only results in an excessive workload, but also undermines any rigorous attempt to develop long-term plans and programs. [Ref. 4:p. 32]

Resource budgeting, being a separate decision-making process, actually competes with, instead of supporting, resource programming. This often results in less visible programs, originally determined necessary during the planning phase, not receiving OSD backing, and being rejected or changed significantly. [Ref. 4:p. 39]

3. Decentralized Structure

Tradition and history has created four strong separate Services, each of which in the past has played distinctly different and separate roles during military conflicts. As a result, the JCS and CINCs have been unable to overcome the powerful political strength of each Service and remain constrained by the Service-oriented material and forces provided to them [Ref. 5:p. 42]. Lieutenant General John Cushman also comments, "Because the military services and departments are the strong and enduring institutions of the military establishments, the JCS have long been failing the field commands in their harmonizing functions." [Ref. 5:p. 31]
The Secretary of Defense, who is provided a full measure of power over the DoD by formal statutory authority, also lacks the actual power and influence to effectively manage the DoD. He simply has not been able to overcome the powerful institutional forces of the individual Services. [Ref. 1:p. 10]

Besides the difficulty in over-riding the political strengths of the separate Services, the continuous growth of the DoD to meet administrative and operational needs has also made centralized managing of the DoD difficult. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for managing an organizational structure that is the largest and most complex in the world. Within DoD there are 12 major defense agencies consisting of approximately 1265 military installation and properties and over five million personnel (active duty, reserve and civilian employees). There are also over three million personnel in the private sector who provide services and/or products to DoD. An organization with such traditionally strong Services, and of such a mammoth size, has made, in this author's opinion, any attempt by OSD and OJCS to successfully perform integrative planning extremely difficult.

A decentralized DoD was encouraged by President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger and was reflected in the delegation of tasks and responsibilities to the individual Services, thus allowing the Services to dominate.
the decision-making process [Ref. 3:p. 5]. An additional factor causing the decentralized Services to dominate decision-making is the "dual-hatting" responsibilities within the JCS, where the Service Chiefs are also the Joint Chiefs. This dual responsibility creates a conflict of interest since a Service Chief must defend the programs and interests of the Service he represents and also be able to rule against those same programs in the interest of "joint" priorities. Because the Service Chiefs frequently defend their individual Service programs, many tough trade-off decisions are not made. [Ref. 5:p. 21]

Decentralization is further enhanced by the number of subordinates reporting to top DoD officials. The Secretary of Defense has 41 senior military and civilian officials who report directly to him, and the Service Chiefs have between 35 and 48 senior officials reporting directly to them. [Ref. 1:p. 628] One individual can not effectively manage the type of national issues required when there are 30 to 40 senior officials reporting to him. This situation only enhances excess delegation of authority and responsibility that facilitates decentralization.

4. **Functional Organization Structure**

The DoD organizational structure, particularly OSD, is focused on functional areas such as research and development (R&D), manpower and policy. Mission outputs and objectives are viewed at lower management levels within
these functional areas. Therefore, joint oriented objectives, strategies and mission capabilities are represented at too low of a management level. This results in critical DoD missions being viewed from a narrow, single and decentralized functional perspective. [Ref. 1:p. 614] This type of structure, it appears, would only make it more difficult to conduct top-down, integrated planning along mission capabilities.

5. **Lack of Integration**

The primary uniformed official responsible for the integrated military advice given to the President, NSC and Secretary of Defense is the CJCS [Ref. 6:p. 35]. One of the causes for ineffective JCS planning has been the inability for the CJCS to fulfill his role as an integrator. Referencing the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the following quote points out the dual responsibilities of the CJCS:

Admiral Crowe, at least judging by his actions, has interpreted this provision to mean that, as chairman, he should be an advocate for the needs of each CINC. This practice is consistent with the plainest meaning of the statute yet is inconsistent with one of the main objectives of the law, the provision that he should be the principal military advisor to the secretary of defense. He cannot be both principal advisor to the secretary and advocate for each of the CINCs any more than he can be the advocate of each of the services and adequately perform his role as the principal military advisor of the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 3:p. 10]

As the principal military advisor, the CJCS must be able to set priorities and choose among Service and CINC programs. The inability to integrate Service plans and programs will
certainly effect the military advice forwarded to the President.

6. **By-passing Formal Process**

Another visible pattern that indicates failure in planning and that further deters DoD interoperability involves making key decisions outside the normal process, i.e., not following standard planning procedures by eliminating required personnel during planning meetings [Ref. 11:p. 11.7]. Since the military has, at least perceptually, inadequately fulfilled their role in the formulation of military strategy, the civilian components of government have attempted to bypass the formal strategic planning process. Former President Nixon had a secret foreign policy decision-making quorum identified as making critical national strategy and policy decisions without any knowledge or participation from the OJCS [Ref. 2:p. 232].

Also, when President Reagan met with Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland to hold "nonsubstantive discussions" with the Soviet General Secretary, the summit nearly resulted in negotiating away 50 percent of all U.S strategic missiles. Unfortunately, even though the top Soviet military official was present, Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, the top U.S. military officer, the CJCS, was not invited to the summit to provide advice in such "nonsubstantive discussions." [Ref. 2:p. 341]
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CAUSES

In addition to the causes previously listed, there are also causes associated with military planners not having the adequate analytical tools, i.e., modern computer hardware and software systems, required to support the receiving, assessing, changing and transmitting of timely and accurate information required to develop accurate military plans [Ref. 3:p. 18]. Current information systems do not allow JCS planners to conduct joint strategic planning efficiently or accurately with the amount of information required to be handled [Ref. 12:p. I-4].

Mainframes, personal computers and networking architecture of just ten years ago can not meet today's enormous amounts of information requirements to process more data faster and more accurately. Also, hardware developed just a few years ago can not operate the complex software programs or satisfy real-time communication requirements. There is a continuing need to update current hardware systems and architecture in order to meet integrative planning objectives. Information systems are available and must be acquired to obtain, analyze and communicate more data faster for planners over greater distances.

1. JOPS

The current system used for short-range military planning, the Joint Operating Planning System (JOPS), can not meet the standards required by today's military
planners. Because JOPS, developed in the 1960s, consist of antiquated system design hardware and software, it is incapable of both supporting the JCS planner in national strategy planning and is also a system that is too slow, cumbersome, expensive and extremely user unfriendly for CINC planner utilization. It is a system that takes a great deal of time to learn how to operate, and the reports and information produced are not always what the user wants or needs. [Ref. 12:p. I-4] Often, CINC planners must communicate within JCS to receive guidance on how to apply complicated functions of JOPS [Ref. 12:p. III-16].

Despite reducing the time to produce an OPLAN from two years to approximately twelve months, JOPS still restricts the CINC planners from developing, integrating and analyzing alternate solutions that may be more effective. JOPS, because of the time restrictions and limited data resources, does not enable the planners, at any level, to maintain flexibility, i.e., develop alternative solutions [Ref. 12:p. I-4]. The systematic planning conducted by strategy planners must require several options to be looked at in a short period of time to maintain flexibility and obtain the best choice(s) of action [Ref. 13:p. 89].

JOPS planning capabilities have never been expanded to enhance the JCS planners in planning. JOPS supplies results for best method(s) and actions to accomplish an assigned task [Ref. 6:p. 128], but is designed to only
assist the short-range deliberate and time-sensitive planning process for the formulation of OPLANs, CONPLANs (Operation Plans in Concept format) and OPORDs (Operation Orders), not mid-range strategic planning within the JSPS.

2. Data Redundancy, Dependency and Decentralization

The proliferation of information, including both relevant and irrelevant data, has inundated the federal government. Arguably, this has created the tendency to conduct too much hands-on management to insure information is being handled correctly. This "micro-management" has caused a further reduction in the time available to provide quality policy direction by our civilian leaders. Civilian leaders, therefore, have less time to develop and forward national objectives which further effects the ability of the military to link force capabilities to national objectives [Ref. 4:p. 9]. Despite the large effort to reduce paperwork and streamline planning efforts, the numerous levels of management and the time required to access planning data in an organization of more than 1600 global installations results in extreme duplication of time consuming processes. The fix all in the past has been to add more staffs and/or extend time requirements to handle micro-management and the increase in data. Continuously adding more people and staffs has resulted in an even more bureaucratic, complex and decentralized organization. [Ref. 1:p. 145]
What has been lacking in the past is DoD data element standards that would reduce the unmeasurable amount of data redundancy within the joint planning community, and allow interoperability of DoD information systems. The redundancy of data and the overlapping of uncountable databases has created decentralization, and an absence of a rational and realistic division of work. This has lead to greater complexity, friction, delay, duplication and inefficiency to the point that OSD, Congress and the Services are encroaching on the planning duties assigned to the OJCS. (Ref. 1:p. 9) The failure to implement data element standards has allowed all DoD agencies to continue creating more and more incompatible information that further decentralizes the overall organization.

What has significantly increased the planning time for JCS planners has been their dependency on having to access required planning data through individual Service planners. JCS planners do not have the data available directly from their databases and do not have random access to Service databases. Therefore, planners are largely dependent on the Service databases for their needs. This increases planning time significantly and also potentially bias the information actually given to the planners.
C. SUMMARY

Joint operational and strategy mistakes in Vietnam, Lebanon, Libya, and Grenada have been attributed to, in a large measure, ineffective joint operational planning according to key officials who were directly involved. There have been attempts to overlook these mistakes and the related causes because: [Ref. 5:p. iv]

- The joint operational capability has not been severely tested or required since WW II.

- Operational defects tend not to repeat themselves (making it difficult to find and correct problem trends).

- Operational mistakes may be attributed to the realism of war as to anything else.

Modern weapons have decreased significantly the time required to transition to wartime doctrine and command and control. Relying and allowing for the shift to an "ad hoc" type planning organization in the transition to war is not a satisfactory planning outlook. "Joint" planning and the tools to conduct it quickly and accurately must be acquired and utilized prior to an actual conflict.
IV. PLANNING PROCESS CHANGES

The most recent Congressional effort to correct the problems and related causes discussed in Chapter III has been the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the goals of which were to: [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT 994]

- Reorganize the DoD.
- Strengthen civilian authority.
- Improve military advice to the President, NSC and Secretary of Defense.
- Ensure that proper authority and responsibilities are given to unified and specified commanders for the accomplishments of missions assigned.
- Increase attention to the development of strategy and contingency planning.
- Provide for more efficient use of defense resources.
- Improve joint officer management policies.

This chapter discusses the changes being implemented to correct the joint military advice/planning problems associated with mid-range planning, short-range planning and IT. A summary of the changes in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and the recommendations of the 1985 Senate Staff and CSIS Reports are summarized in Appendix C.

This chapter focuses on the two of the three systems, JSPS and JOPS, that are currently undergoing major changes. JSPS is awaiting approval of proposed recommendations, and JOPES, designed to someday replace JOPS, is to begin
implementation of the first version in late 1989. Also discussed are the information systems changes that are being initiated to insure interoperability of the JOPES program.

A. DOD PLANNING OFFICIALS

The NCA and OJCS planning officials associated with the JSPS and PPBS are the critical links who integrate the different planning systems to create a complete joint planning process.

1. NCA

The National Command Authorities consist of the President and the Secretary of Defense who by law are the only individuals with the authority to order troop movement and/or direct the Armed Forces for the execution of military action. [Ref. 6:p. 25] The President is now required to submit annually, to Congress, a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States [Ref 9:p. 100 STAT 1075] Also, OSD, specifically the Under Secretary of Defense, is now required to submit annually to the JCS, policy guidance concerning contingency planning [Ref. 3:p. 22].

2. OJCS

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an element within DoD that includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff and the agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the role of formulating military advice, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff has no executive authority over combatant forces. The chain of command is from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders [Ref. 6:p. 32]. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has directed changes to the CJCS and the Joint Staff that will improve joint planning and advice.

a. CJCS

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, identified under the Goldwater-Nichols Act as head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is now the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense. He may, and does, consult with other JCS members and combatant commanders in formulating military advice. He then presents the range of advice received from the other JCS members to the NCA. The CJCS is the communication link between the NCA and the combatant commanders, and also acts as spokesman for the combatant commanders concerning requirements, programs, and budgets. [Ref. 6:p. 34] A summary of the CJCS's functions is listed in Appendix D.

b. Joint Staff

The Joint Staff assists the CJCS with the unified operation of the combatant forces, the integration of the three services into an efficient team and unification of the strategic direction of these combatant forces. With a desire for a more centralized organization by a growing number of civilian officials, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has
frozen the number of personnel within the Joint Staff and is now restricted to 1627 military and civilian personnel.

Under the Director of the Joint Staff, who assists the CJCS in managing the Joint Staff, J-7 and J-8 have been added to now create seven Directorates (see Appendix E):

- J-1: Manpower and Personnel Directorate.
- Directorate for the JCS Support (JS), DIA.
- J-4: Logistics Directorate.
- J-7: Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate.

B. MID-RANGE PLANNING

This section discusses JCS mid-range planning, specifically the JSPS. The time line located in Appendix F illustrates the documents that are developed and actions that are taken during the proposed JSPS process. Steps involving the budget process, and the President's submission of the annual budget, have also been included in the time line to illustrate how strategic planning theoretically precedes fiscal planning.

The proposal to revise the JSPS would consolidate numerous documents and simplify, at least conceptually, the overall JSPS planning process, and is currently under review.
for approval. Once approved, the JSPS would consist of the following steps. [Ref. 14]

The initial step of the JSPS is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). Inputs from the Services, CINCs and intelligence sources such as DIA assess current DoD strategy, potential threats and global political conditions. The JSR is summarized in the publishing of the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA).

From the JMNA the CJCS formulates his guidance, the Chairman's Guidance (CG). J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) of JCS receives the CG from the CJCS and begins an iterative process of developing and assessing strategy options. The resulting options are incorporated into the development of the NMSD. The NMSD provides strategic planning and force structure advice to the President.

From the NMSD, J-5 produces the JSCP and forwards it to the combatant commands for the development of concept and operational plans within short-term/deliberate planning.

The MOP 84 document is currently being revised to reflect these new procedures and documents, if approved. A draft copy of the revised MOP 84 was unavailable during the writing of this thesis.

C. DELIBERATE PLANNING

The following changes have been proposed in the deliberate planning process. Deliberate planning would
start after the NMSD has been published, the Secretary of
Defense issues contingency planning guidance (PGCP) to the
JCS and the JSCP has been issued to the unified and
specified commanders. Another major change would be the
application of JOPES to the deliberate planning process.
The JOPES program currently being developed would consist of
seven new phases that would, in conjunction with JOPES,
significantly reduce the time required to produce OPLANs and
OPORDs.

1. JOPES

In order to correct the military planning and
execution deficiencies that have occurred since Korea, an
effort began 12 years ago to build a system that would
replace current planning and execution tools. The Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), which J-7
of the JCS is the main proponent and the Defense
Communications Agency (DCA) is the implementing agency, is
the follow-on system that intends to integrate the two
current deliberate and time-sensitive planning and execution
systems, JOPS and JDS (Joint Deployment System) [Ref. 6:p.
251].

JOPES will be formed into a system designed
primarily to satisfy the information needs of senior-level
decision makers in conducting joint planning and operations.
[Ref. 6:p. 251] By supporting the national (level I),
theater (level II) and supporting organizational (level III)
levels, JOPES will give "collateral" support to the JSPS and PPBS [Ref. 6:p. 252]. As the joint command and control system for conventional operation planning and execution, JOPES will address the DoD mission areas of mobilization, deployment and sustainment by supporting capabilities that include [Ref. 15:p. ES-1]:

- The transmission of timely and accurate information on the status and location of forces and major resources.
- The speedy development and implementation of operation plans and options.
- The formulation and transmission of direction to, and the receipt and assessment of reports from appropriate commands and organizations. [Ref. 6:p. 261]

In relation to the JSPS and the PPBS, the functions of JOPES begin upon the issuance of military tasks contained in the JSCP. The functions then continue through option selection and the development of courses of action (COAs), OPLANs and OPORDs. The functions end when the plan is cancelled, the operation ends or the crises is resolved. Under JOPES the process of developing a detailed, fully integrated implementation plan of the approved COA will only be completed when required. The basic details required would have already been completed and approved in the COA development. [Ref. 6:p. 255]

a. GOALS

"The principal goal of JOPES is to develop one set of procedures for both deliberate and time-sensitive planning." [Ref. 6:p. 253]. With the two plans
differentiated by only the length of the planning cycle, JOPES will enable the combatant commanders to be more responsive to NCA and CJCS guidance on military operation planning, deliberate or time-sensitive. One of the primary objectives of the JOPES project is to enable theater level commanders to develop OPLANS, when required to be developed, within 45 days [Ref. 6:p. 253]. This capability takes tremendous pressure off the planners regarding time management and allows them to devote more time to test different options, review possible plans and review potential requirements. The planners were previously unable to conduct in-depth planning reviews since OPLANS were taking up to 24 months to develop. Other goals include:

- Provide a smooth transition from deliberate planning to actual execution [Ref. 15:p. ES-7].
- Permit theater commanders to more effectively and rapidly manage military operations.
- Standardize policies and procedures that will be similar during peacetime, wartime, or crisis situations.
- Support rapid development and evaluations of military options and COA's.
- Utilize ADP and communications technology advances.
- Ensure the dissemination and presentation of timely, accurate, and properly aggregated information.
- Allow planners to identify resource shortfalls. [Ref. 15:p. ES-2]

Achieving these goals is possible with proper intelligence information and analysis support covering the period of the operation plan (e.g., one year). JOPES, unlike JOPS, will
integrate strategic and current intelligence into each phase through intelligence database/systems interfaces [Ref. 7:p. 2-13]. This function was previously not possible due to the various intelligence resources not having automatic database system integration capabilities to support JOPS [Ref. 7:pp. 2-12].

JOPES will update the current user-unfriendly, time-consuming and incompatible information systems with more efficient systems that include modern automated data processing (ADP), communication hardware and a functional architecture consisting of an integrated database, data management, decision models and presentation choices [Ref. 7:pp. 2-24]. JOPES will be an overlay to numerous subsystems that are now being developed via the prototyping process. Version 1, as opposed to previously used terms consisting of releases, blocks and increments, is planned to be introduced at the end of 1989 with subsequent versions implemented approximately every six months [Ref. 16].

2. Revised Deliberate Planning Phases

As previously mentioned, the phases that constitute deliberate planning are being revised under JOPES [Ref. 6:p. 253]. The new phases will be seven interrelated functions that will include monitoring, threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, COA development, executive planning, implementation and simulation and analysis. The JOPES planning cycle will be initiated with
the JSCP (JCS issuing specific tasks) and culminated in the development of an approved COA. It is envisioned that detailed OPLANS will be prepared only when required by the NCA, JCS, or the CINCs [Ref. 15:p. I-3]. Only CONPLANS submitted for JCS approval will be required at this stage due to the capability of JOPES functions formulating an OPLAN in 45 days, vice the approximately 12 to 24 months it currently takes, and OPORDs within three days of NCA COA selection [Ref. 15:p. ES-1].

a. Monitoring

The Monitoring function will allow users to obtain information concerning friendly, enemy and neutral forces and resources. Data from unit, base and command levels will be processed to provide consumption, attrition and utilization information. Through continuous intelligence collection, collation and evaluation, interrelated databases will be updated automatically as data is entered into the system [Ref. 7:pp. 2-23].

b. Threat Identification and Assessment

The Threat Identification and Assessment function will involve detecting actual or potential threats. After appropriate decisionmakers are notified of the threat and of the threat's the capabilities and intentions, this function will supply information for strategic planning at the national level and courses of action at the theater level. Figure 2 shows the functional components contained
Figure 2. Threat Identification and Assessment Process
in the Threat Identification and Assessment phase. Threat identification will involve the following procedures: [Ref. 15:p. III-5]

- Monitor and evaluate the situation.
- Problem recognition.
- Evaluate impact.
- Identify threat to national interests.
- Identify intelligence tasks and requirements.
- Assess intelligence assets.
- Adjudicate intelligence asset shortfalls.
- Redirect Intelligence collection.
- Collect and analyze data.
- Develop and publish intelligence estimate.

c. Strategy Determination

Strategy determination, as applied to the deliberate planning process by combatant commanders, is supported by JOPES to not only assist the theater level decisionmaker during deliberate and/or time-sensitive planning, but also assists the NCA, NSC and JCS in formulating viable objectives and options to counter the threat. This function will involve formulating politico-military assessments, developing strategic concepts and options, apportioning forces and other resources, and formulating planning guidance. [Ref. 6:p. 254] These are the elements that will lead to the development of COAs, OPLANs, and OPORDs. Planners will use the forces and
resources specified in the JSCP, JCS orders, Service capabilities documents and previously approved OPLANS (or COAs when available) in utilizing this function. [Ref. 15:p. I-7] Figure 3 provides a breakout of requirements necessary to support this JOPES function that involve:

[Ref. 15:pp. III-12--III-25]

- Analyze national strategic guidance.
- Review and assess current situation and historical data.
- Develop strategic concepts.
- Develop and test options.
- Approve and recommend options.
- Prepare and issue guidance.

It should be noted that these procedures, though only involving short-range time frame, are similar to the procedures carried out during the (mid-range) joint strategic planning system previously discussed.

In determining an appropriate strategy, the JCS collaborates with the Services and supported commands in analyzing relevant information. Such information would be derived from National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), the NMSD, and the DG [Ref. 15:p. ES-9]. Other data sources are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), etc. The Strategy Determination function will focus on short term strategy requirements and will assist the NCA and JCS in formulating suitable and feasible near term military actions to counter the threat.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE STRATEGY DETERMINATION PROCESS

IDENTIFY & ASSESS
FOREIGN COUNTRY
POLITICAL/MILITARY PLANS
AND OBJECTIVES

- IDENTIFY MILITARY ACTIONS AND ASSESS INTENTIONS
- ASSESS IMPACTS OF ALLEGIANCES AND ALLIANCES
- IDENTIFY & ASSESS LEADERSHIP & THEIR PHILOSOPHIES

IDENTIFY & ASSESS
FOREIGN MILITARY
CAPABILITIES AND TRENDS

- IDENTIFY CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURES AND TRENDS AND ASSESS IMPACTS
- IDENTIFY & ASSESS DOCTRINE, TACTICS AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
- IDENTIFY & ASSESS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
- IDENTIFY & ASSESS CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS AND IMPACTS

IDENTIFY & ASSESS
FOREIGN COUNTRY ECONOMIC & SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

- IDENTIFY & ASSESS ECONOMIC RESOURCES REGARDING FUTURE & CURRENT STRATEGIES
- IDENTIFY & EVALUATE DEMOGRAPHIC ISSUES REGARDING CURRENT & FUTURE STRATEGIES

IDENTIFY & ASSESS
TO NATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Figure 3. Strategy Determination Process
To accomplish this objective, the individual processes will enable the user to assess politico-military information, develop and evaluate military strategy and objectives, apportion resources, formulate concepts and military options and develop planning guidance that will allow the theater level commander to then develop courses of action. [Ref. 15:p. I-14]

To satisfy the deliberate planning functional requirements in the areas of strategy determination, J-5 will submit sub-JSEs (JOPES Support Elements) that address: [Ref. 16:Part II,p. 2]

- Political-Military Assessment Process.
- Option Generation Process.
- Guidance Preparation Process.

Again, these requirements are to apply to deliberate planning, they will involve short-range time frames in developing specific planning guidance. [Ref. 16:Part III, JSE-J046,p. 1]

d. COA Development

The COA Development capability will help the supported commander develop, test and select COAs based on NCA/JCS strategic guidance received, primarily from the JSCP.
e. Executive Planning

This function will prepare the approved COA for implementation. The process will develop a detailed and fully integrated plan involving mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities. Because of the speed at which this plan can be developed, it will only be created when required and not for every approved COA.

f. Implementation

The implementation function will enable decision-makers to monitor and analyze actual events and compare them to scheduled plans, thus enabling decision-makers to make more accurate adjustments when necessary.

g. Simulation and Analysis

Simulation and analysis applies the automated analytical tools to the assessments and forecasts conducted in the other JOPES functions. The intelligence required to support this process will consist of the aggregate of all intelligence resources supporting the other functions. Though a small subset of the entire system, an example of current simulation and analysis prototypes within military Logistics include: [Ref. 17:p. 6]

- Industrial mobilization.
- Bulk Fuel.
- Wartime host nation support.
- Ammo systems.
- Civil engineering.
• Force augmentation.
• Medical.
• Logistic feasibility.
• Logistics Aspects of Modern Aids to Planning (MAPP).
• Personal Computer Logistics Capability Estimator (PC-LCE).
• Feasibility Analysis and Transportation Evaluator (FATE).

3. Information Availability

Information availability will be achieved by the JOPES Intelligence (JOPES-INTEL) Interface. It will provide the means for interoperability within and between the operations and the intelligence communities during the planning for and the execution of joint operations. [Ref. 18:p. I-7] The current focus of JOPES-INTEL is on the Threat Identification phase. To fulfill initial requirements of unified and specified commanders, data integration from multiple systems and respective databases will be required to form the JOPES Intelligence Integrated Database (JIIDB) [Ref. 19]. Interoperability of the numerous subsystems is being made possible through current endeavors in achieving DoD data standardization between the joint planning agencies.

a. WISDIM

The WWMCCS Information System JOPES (WIS-JOPES) Data Administration program is establishing standardized data elements to enable joint planning system developers to
utilize interoperable data elements in the development of JOPES subsystems. This is absolutely required to ensure effective and efficient joint communications throughout WWMCCS and in developing user-unique applications. There exist today over 6000 system required data elements in the joint planning arena. Through standardization and eliminating redundancy, JOPES will require less than 1000 data elements [Ref. 19]. To facilitate proper standardization, the WWMCCS Information System Dictionary for Information Management (WISDIM) and PC (Personal Computer) WISDIM have been designed to be the data administrator's tool for a central repository of standardized data elements.

WISDIM will be used on mainframes as the repository for several system data dictionaries such as JOPES, DoD, DIA, Air Force, Navy, etc. WISDIM for personal computers/work stations, WISDIM PC "is an automated data dictionary with emphasis on data information about data elements contained in multiple existing Joint Operation Planning and Execution Systems." [Ref. 18:p. I-25] Simply stated, PC WISDIM will contain the JOPES data dictionary and be located on local personal computers as an off-line system.

PC WISDIM will be included in the 44.5 megabyte removable cartridge drive as part of the WIS Workstation. The data dictionary will function on an Oracle database.
management system to assist the user easy access to the data element standards. To maintain functional and data currency, these cartridges will be updated approximately every three months. [Ref. 19]


b. WWMCCS ADP Modernization (WAM)

Current and future capabilities of JOPES will function on the WWMCCS currently being updated/modernized by the WAM program. The increasing amount of data within WWMCCS, the growing complexity of questions being asked by users and the changing nature of the collection and use of data has resulted in a strong need for effective, centralized data administration [Ref. 21:p. I-3].

Modernization of the existing WWMCCS standard ADP is required to ensure that more timely and accurate planning along with command and control is made available to the national, theater and supporting levels of command. By installing modern software (e.g., JOPES), the latest database management systems and intelligent workstations, WAM will be able to support JOPES functional modules, related software systems, and global telecommunications. Commanders at updated command and control sites using Distributed Processing System-8 (DPS-8) mainframes will
access and send information via a modern information system that will support these and future capabilities. This can only be achievable on a single interactive, interrelated global system with current information technology.
V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF MILITARY PLANNING

Chapter II described the JCS planning process, and Chapter III dealt with the probable causes leading to insufficient planning advice. The proposed JSPS and JOPES designed to enhance planning, were summarized in Chapter IV. The changes that have made and those being proposed are significant, but the question remains: Will JOPES and the proposed JSPS be enough to enhance joint/integrative planning within the JCS's strategic planning process? And if not, what other areas, including IT, must be addressed to improve planning? This chapter discusses and analyzes those areas of change within the JCS organizational structure/procedures and IT that will improve military planning and those, in this author's opinion, that will continue to restrict the planning process.

Definite improvements have been made to the planning process by making the CJCS principal military advisor, increasing NCA planning involvement, consolidating the JSPS, upgrading IT, improving the system development process and increasing system interoperability.

A. ANTICIPATED IMPROVEMENTS

The passing of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the proposed changes in the JSPS and the development of JOPES
can be considered monumental contributions to improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of DoD planning. The last
major DoD reorganization effort occurred in 1958 under
President Eisenhower [Ref. 5:p. 12], and the last primary
information system developed for deliberate planning is
1960s technology that was updated in the early 1970s [Ref.
6:p. 121]. Considering these efforts are nearly 30 years
old, the efforts by Congress, JCS and DCA will make marked
improvements involving the JCS organization/procedures and
IT in the following ways.

1. Organizational Improvements

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, that resulted from the
well prepared 1985 Senate Staff and CSIS Reports, and the
recent JSPS change proposals are changes that intend to
improve numerous DoD planning deficiencies. Three
significant improvements to be noted: the identification of
the CJCS as principal military advisor; the increased NCA
planning involvement; and the consolidation of the JSPS
process.

a. CJCS as Principal Military Advisor

The Goldwater-Nichols Act identified the CJCS as
head of the JCS and principal military advisor to the
President, National Security Council and Secretary of
Defense. The law also gives the CJCS principal authority in
managing the Joint Staff which previously was assigned to
the corporate body of the JCS [Ref. 6:p. 34].
Such provisions were needed to allow for a stronger, more independent CJCS. He now has the positional authority to make and formally present appropriate decisions regarding integrative military strategy [Ref. 6:p. 34]. The provisions also enable him to give better guidance to the Joint Staff that is independent of the Services, e.g., the Service Chiefs [Ref. 3:p. 15].

b. Increasing NCA Planning Involvement

The Goldwater-Nichols Act directs the President to transmit annually to Congress, in a classified and unclassified form, a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT 1075]. It also directs the Secretary of Defense, after approval of the President and consultation with the CJCS, to submit annually to the CJCS, written policy guidance for developing and reviewing contingency plans [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT. 996]. This is a positive step to ensuring that the President and Secretary of Defense, the absolute leaders of DoD, will provide clear and specific strategic guidance and objectives needed to enhance planning unity and integration.

c. Consolidation of JSPS

The proposed changes regarding the JSPS consolidates several reports into a more streamlined and understandable planning process. The number of inputs required of the previous planning phase of the PPBS (see Appendix C) made it difficult to perform any amount of
integration during the complicated process. The new process, because of more unified efforts and conceptual simplification, will allow for better questions to be asked that will result in better integrated answers.

2. Management of IT

DCA, JCS and "joint" Service efforts to improve IT management at the CINC and JCS level are commendable. It is the opinion of this author that organizational and procedural changes can not be totally effective unless the management of information technology is properly conducted. These efforts include significant improvements involving the systems being delivered by changing IT system development methodologies which has improved the interoperability of DoD information systems.

a. Upgrading IT

The JOPES and WAM programs, now being managed by DCA, upgrade much of the IT that dates back over ten years. The advancement in IT during the 1980s has been accomplished faster than anyone thought possible. The investments made in modern technology will soon allow senior decision-makers to gather, analyze, manipulate and disseminate relevant information. The functions, used to support missions required to fulfill national objectives, will be achieved by tele-conferencing, simulation and analysis, decision support systems and graphics display of enemy regions/cities/streets on a real-time basis.
Initially, it can be counted on that "JOPES will cut across established organizational lines of responsibility to achieve the close coordination of DoD and other federal sector components needed for compatibility of procedures." [Ref. 6:p. 256].

b. Updating System Development Methodology

The DCA and JCS recognized the need to change the JOPES program design methodology from a more "traditional," e.g., System Development Life Cycle (SDLC), method to the Prototype system design methodology. This will more efficiently develop the over 80 functional support elements derived from over 600 system requirements [Ref. 16:p. 1]. The prototype methodology will have numerous advantages for the JOPES project:

- Prototyping allows requirements to be refined and technology upgrades to be included without necessitating a complete program restart.

- The design by prototyping delays the tremendous amount of paper documentation that would normally be required in the requirements definition and design specifications until the delivery phase.

- The project development risk is substantially decreased by being able to make iterative improvements, improvements that come directly from increased user involvement. This is especially important with a large project involving a long life cycle.

- Prototyping will allow top officials who are not directly involved with JOPES and not familiar with the latest information technology, to see the growth of the project and the potential applications.
c. Improving System Interoperability

Though system interoperability is still a problem that is addressed later, critical steps have been taken to create necessary standards to insure interoperability within the JOPES program. Hardware system acquisitions have been made requiring that the globally located sites maintain compatibility. Also, establishing software, such as WISDIM and PC WISDIM that J-7 is highly involved with, will allow data elements located at any site to be received, updated and/or transmitted to any other JOPES workstation much quicker because the data elements will not have to be re-defined. Data standards are necessary to eliminate the large number of local, unintegrated databases that currently exist. [Ref. 19]

B. REMAINING PROBLEMS

Despite the substantial improvements in the DoD planning process, it is the contention of this thesis that there are continuing problems concerning the JCS organization, planning procedures and IT that prevent DoD strategic planning from reaching the potential required for a more efficient and powerful military organization. These problems include the following.

1. Emphasis on Operational Planning to the Detriment of Strategic Planning

DoD continues to emphasize operational planning to the point which few changes are made that will improve
strategic planning. The two types of planning, strategic and operational, are defined as follows.

Strategic planning can be defined as the process of identifying goals, analyzing the environment, identifying threats and opportunities, formulating strategies and being able to implement integrated programs/plans that are capable of being adjusted to environmental changes. Broadly described, it is comprised of three fundamental processes, an analytical or creative process, an organizational process and an implementation process, integrated to form a unified planning process [Ref. 22:p. 313]. Structured as a sequence of activities within a specific timetable, these processes represent an attempt to integrate the planning and implementation of goals, objectives, tasks and requirements.

Operational planning, on the other hand, focuses on more specific goals and objectives and involves the non-integrative extrapolation from current programs and resources to develop plans to meet particular requirements. This process assumes current trends will continue and does not take into consideration possible external or internal environmental changes.

Because of the reasons listed in the sections to follow, JCS's ability to conduct integrative strategic planning that cuts across Service lines still will not be possible. Services continue to have enough political strength to receive approval for Service-oriented programs.
Also, policy guidance from the NCA has not specifically directed changes such as CJCS performing more as Service integrator, eliminating dual responsibilities of Service Chiefs and focusing more on planning instead of budgeting. These reasons all affect DoD's inability to conduct integrative/strategic planning needed to conduct successful joint operations.

2. Lack of Policy Direction from NCA

There has been a lack of clear and specific guidance given by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense regarding strategic planning. President Reagan's 1987 and 1988 reports on national security strategy were an effort to reverse that trend, however, prior to these reports, formulated national policy and/or objectives that are both coherent and cohesive had rarely been given to the JCS. The JCS previously had to extrapolate national policy from the President's state of the Union message, press releases, committee meetings, etc. [Ref. 5:p. 25] The 1987 and 1988 reports were not comprehensive or specific enough to either list prioritized national objectives or transmit in a classified form which the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires. Additionally, President Bush has yet to submit such a report for 1989. [Ref. 10:p. 2]

The planning guidance required from the Secretary of Defense to be submitted to the CJCS provides only policy guidance for the preparation and review of short-range
contingency plans. Such guidance is needed, but it fails to supply mid-range or long-range strategic guidance needed for JCS to develop the necessary plans and programs during the PPBS. [Ref. 8]

3. Lack of an Integrated Database

There does not exist a Service integrated database or standard data elements for JCS action officers/planners to access during the planning process or during the development of JCS views. "Generally, because the Service staffs are larger and have data and analysis not available to the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff action officer must rely a great deal on Service staff contributions." [Ref. 1:p. 156] Therefore, the JCS planners are unable to develop accurate and/or timely reports because of the excessive time needed to communicate with Service action officers, combatant command joint staff counterparts and other JCS staff members. [Ref. 1:p. 177]

Unintegrated databases also affect JOPES testing and evaluation. Despite JOPES' impressive outputs and the ease of use demonstrated during the 1989 JOPES conference, the data used on prototypes was customized data, tailored specifically for each particular prototype. These prototypes will be evaluated at the field level as part of the prototyping process, but the prototypes will not be able to be truly tested without access to actual data. If customized or a tailored set of data is used, an accurate
performance evaluation needed for project enhancements will not be possible.

4. Insufficient Planning Experience, Training and Analytical Tools

Joint Staff planners still lack the experience/knowledge, training and analytical tools to produce independent, accurate, integrative and timely planning analysis. "The Joint Staff rarely attracts officers with such skills, even under the new Joint Specialty Officer Program mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and until now it (Joint Staff) has done next to nothing to generate the necessary specialized knowledge." [Ref. 3:p. 17]

The Goldwater-Nichols Act places emphasis on recruiting more capable personnel with more joint experience. But the Joint Staff action/planning officers are still not required to have any prerequisites prior to his/her joint tour such as formal military training in joint planning/operations, training regarding other Service capabilities/limitations and training involving the use of the joint planning information systems. Lack of sufficient training, knowledge and analytical tools to evaluate answers and alternatives leaves the planners highly dependent on Service oriented information and analysis [Ref. 1:p. 18].

With the amount of time required to learn other service missions/capabilities, the joint planning process (including the cumbersome and time consuming staffing
process discussed in Chapter II) and the analytical means to conduct joint planning, it is easy to see without proper training and experience why planners are ill-prepared for joint duty [Ref. 12:p. I-4].

5. **JCS Overload**

The process of developing JCS advice for a request from the NSC, NCA, CINCs, or Services or for a particular JCS planning document are too numerous, extremely laborious, too time consuming and fail to produce meaningful recommendations on issues involving more than one Service. These type of results have encouraged senior civilian leaders to rely on civilian staffs for information that should be provided by JCS. [Ref. 1:p. 157] Some have stated that the JCS system is not organized or operated to effectively perform these operations [Ref. 1:p. 158]. This may be illustrated by the fact in 1986 nearly 20,000 policy papers were reviewed. One issue involved the participation of the Secretary of Defense and took several months to resolve whether or not skimmed milk should be sold in military stores. [Ref. 2:p. 336]

6. **CJCS Not Fulfilling Integrator Role**

The CJCS has not begun to fulfill the role envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and provide essential integrated advice to his superiors or to the JCS and CINCs. He has primarily acted as spokesman for the individual CINCs and has not integrated the plans and
programs as a whole. This has been primarily the fear of becoming a competitor of the CINCs and Service Chiefs and losing their support, for the CINCs and Service Chiefs could easily utilize their independent lines of communication to the Secretary of Defense and Congress. [Ref. 3:p. 12]

The Goldwater-Nichols Act has given the CJCS complete authority over the Joint Staff, eliminating the Joint Staff from working for both the CJCS and the Service Chiefs. The Joint Staff is the CJCS's primary integrating tool and a strong Joint Staff producing strong quality products is a critical element in the CJCS realizing his role as integrator and not just a spokesman. Being able to fulfill the role as an effective integrator, thus overcoming the traditional Service oriented goals and programs, will take complete and specific top-down support from the President and Secretary of Defense, not just from the CJCS. [Ref. 3:p. 16]

7. "Dual-hatting" by Service Chiefs

The Service Chiefs still maintain a conflict of interest by having dual responsibilities, "dual-hatting." They are responsible for joint planning recommendations to the CJCS and managing and leading his respective Service. [Ref. 1:p. 166] A Service Chief's responsibility to lead his Service precludes his agreement to joint planning recommendations that are inconsistent with plans and programs supported by his Service [Ref. 4:p. 16]. The
Goldwater-Nichols Act did not direct any changes that would solve the dual-hat function of the Service Chiefs. They still have the joint role and yet must possess the highest interest of their respective service to maintain service support.

Part of the problem involves the Service Chiefs having the potential of losing the support of their respective Service if they subordinate the interest of their parent Service to the larger interests of national defense, just as the CJCS has the potential of losing the Service Chiefs support by focusing on integration of service roles. This obvious conflict of interest is considered as the primary cause of the deficiencies of the JCS planning system. [Ref. 1:p. 6]

8. Over-emphasis on Budgeting

There is an over-emphasis and control on short-term budgeting during the PPBS [Ref. 1:p. 620]. Virtually every line item of the annual budget goes through at least three reviews within each Congressional chamber. These intense, yet redundant reviews that are directed on the short-term budget prevents Congress, JCS and OSD officials from focusing on other important issues such as strategic planning priorities and allocating appropriate resources towards those resources. [Ref. 4:p. 31]

Even though the tight budget control by Congress has encouraged a more centralized DoD involvement, it has also
prevented the DoD to determine or plan for critical, integrative type resources that may be required in the future, i.e., eight years that the proposed NMSD projects [Ref. 5:p. 26].

In this author's opinion, this over-control has resulted from a budget problem during the previous administration. Increasing DoD budgets were not applied to integrative planning. "Service wish lists took the place of Joint Strategic Planning Documents, with budget plans 'no more than POMs that were stapled together, one right on top of another.'" [Ref. 2:p. 288] This enabled the "reach" of the Services to out-weigh the "realism" to the point where the pendulum has swung to where even the possibility of integrative planning has been stifled.

9. Improper IT Management Structure

IT within the DoD is controlled by the wrong DoD agency. The upper level IT management within the DoD still maintains the same structure as it did 20 years ago. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) still has ultimate authority concerning IT in the DoD [Ref 23:p. 4]. Unfortunately, IT today is not only significantly different than it was 20 years ago but, the strategic use of IT focuses on a completely different dimension. No longer are computers fed by computer cards to automate data processing in such areas as financial accounting. IT is a critical asset in gathering, manipulating and disseminating
information, especially for the real-time requirements required by the CINCs, JCS and NCA.

A comptroller traditionally places emphasis on cost-benefit analysis involving price strategy of potential programs. Many of the cost/benefits analyses are difficult to establish precise monetary figures and result in "soft" numerical figures. This type of management structure representation can not focus on the growth strategy of future IT requirements. The result is an undercutting of the operational level inputs to develop IT and programs like JOPES to maintain a competitive edge.

10. Under-utilization of JOPES

The scope of the JOPES program is not being applied high enough in the planning process to solve the inadequacies of JCS strategic planning. So far JOPES only involves short-term strategy planning, e.g., the strategy determination phase contained in deliberate planning, and not yet incorporated into the JSPS. The JOPES Functional Description Document illustrates that JOPES will: "Assess Threat. Develop Enemy/Friendly Situation for the Mid-Range Period. Input to Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)." [Ref. 7:p. 4-26] Yet, the same document states in several definitions involving JSPS (mid-range planning) documents that it (the document) "has limited opportunity to be integrated into JOPES." [Ref. 7:p. 2-8]. It appears, at least to this author, that there are conflicting opinions
concerning the possible applications of JOPES. A critical problem exists in strategic planning, and JOPES could possibly enable the JSPS process to be more efficient, if its use were expanded to include mid-range planning.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The focal point of this thesis is centered upon a major problem that degrades United States military operations--ineffective military planning/advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Legislative action of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act attempted to resolve this problem by restructuring the top levels of the JCS. But the Act did not consider a major root of the planning problem: information mismanagement due to the lack of efficient information systems necessary for today's planning.

The speed and wide-spread availability of modern weapon systems is requiring planning of military operations for future contingencies be conducted in less and less time. But the ability to decrease planning time is becoming more difficult because of increasingly scarce resources, the increase in government micro-management and dissimilar Services attempting joint operations with outdated and incompatible information systems. To maintain the competitive edge against potential enemies that possess weapons equal to ours, information retrieval, analysis and dissemination by decision-makers must be better and faster.

This chapter reviews the original research questions, identifies findings resulting from this thesis and then
addresses recommendations that will further improve JCS strategic planning and advice.

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions developed in Chapter I were divided into three areas regarding DoD planning: problems, changes and analysis. The following is a review of those questions.

1. Problems
   - What are the major problems with the joint planning efforts by the JCS?
   - What areas, that pertain to Information Technology (IT), have prevented DoD from accomplishing timely and quality planning?

2. Changes
   - What changes have been made to correct the problems with JCS planning?
   - What do the planning systems look like with these changes?
   - Who has been affected by these changes?

3. Analysis
   - Are the changes that have been made, or that are in the process of being made, sufficient to solve improper planning that is causing less than satisfactory performances during military operations?
   - Specifically addressing the management of information, how has the delay in upgrading current information systems effected the methods in planning?
   - And what areas of IT, relating to management and potential systems, can be changed or enhanced to improve joint planning?
B. THESIS FINDINGS

Recent U.S. military operations have consistently failed to demonstrate effective joint Service operations, despite "the principal organizational goal of DoD...," "the integration of distinct military capabilities of the four Services to prepare for and conduct effective unified operations in fulfilling major U.S military missions."

[Ref. 1:p. 2] It was determined that a critical cause of less than outstanding joint military operations was the insufficient planning and advice from the JCS.

1. Recent Changes

The most significant change implemented thus far to address this problem was the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed in 1986. This Act was the first major reform to be legislated in over 30 years. It directed DoD to make numerous organizational and procedural changes that would reorganize DoD, strengthen civilian authority, improve military advice, place more authority and responsibility on CINCs for the accomplishments of missions, increase attention of strategic and contingency planning, improve joint officer management policies and other purposes [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT. 992].

An important change involving the JCS planning process has also been developed, although not implemented. In an effort to improve the military planning process, the JCS, specifically J-5, recently has proposed a revision of the current JSPS process. The JSPS is a key to the
"planning" phase of the PPBS process and has received much criticism that it has not effectively contributed to the PPBS.

Another important change is the JOPES program, designed to update the current deliberate planning system, JOPS. A project that started over ten years ago, JOPES will apply the tremendous advances in computer hardware and software technology to a system that has consistently been criticized as being slow, difficult to learn and operate, inoperable with other systems and missing many joint oriented functions critical to the short-range planning conducted by combatant commanders.

2. Positive Outcomes

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, the JSPS proposal and the JOPES project have made, and will make significant improvements to the DoD planning process. These changes will enable the JCS to begin crossing Service lines in order for integration of distinct Service capabilities to take place. The following changes briefly point out these improvements.

a. NCA Planning Involvement

The President is now required to submit annually to Congress, a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT 1075]. Also, the Secretary of Defense is now required to submit annually, to the CJCS, written policy guidance for the
preparation and review of contingency plans [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT 996] These two changes are part of the specific top-down guidance addressing national goals and objectives required for a coordinated effort by the DoD [Ref. 1:p. 7].

b. CJCS: Principal Military Advisor

Strategic military advice was previously given by the JCS as a corporate body. The Goldwater-Nichols Act now assigns the CJCS as the principal military advisor to the President, NSC and Secretary of Defense. This allows for a more independent CJCS that will strengthen the CJCS's ability to present prioritized cross-Service advice to the NCA and NSC. [Ref. 3:p. 9]

c. Joint Staff Under CJCS

As per the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Joint Staff is now managed by the CJCS vice the corporate body of the JCS. The Joint Staff will no longer encounter the Service oriented pressure of the Service Chiefs during planning. In assisting the CJCS in his duties and responsibilities, the Joint Staff will be more independent in providing unified strategy of the combatant forces, military operational advice for unified command and integration of the armed forces into a unified efficient team [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT 1010].

d. Revised JSPS

The revised JSPS proposed by J-5, illustrated in Appendix D, would consolidate numerous documents that are
currently required. It would also simplify, at least conceptually, the overall JSPS planning process. By implementing a more manageable process, the planning phase of the PPBS would be more effective in providing mid-range "strategic" planning guidance. [Ref. 14]

e. Enhancing Deliberate Planning

The JOPES program, once completed, will update the current deliberate planning systems, JOPS and JDS, with modern computer systems hardware and software [Ref. 6:p. 251]. JOPES will give the combatant commanders the ability to receive and transmit real-time information, and also reduce the time required to develop OPLANs to 45 days (currently requiring 12 to 24 months to develop) and reduce OPORD development to three days. [Ref. 6:p. 253] This capability is achievable through efforts by J-7 to create data element standards that will allow the different joint planning Services and agencies to communicate and share critical planning information.

3. Continuing Problems

The DoD, consisting of over five million active duty, reserve and civilian employees, is the largest and most complex organization in the Free World [Ref. 1:p. 14]. Since it has been over 30 years since the last reform measures were conducted, the studies conducted in 1985 were able to identify many uncorrected problems within the DoD. Because of the large number of problems and the tremendous
size and complexity of the DoD, it is unimaginative to think that recent changes are the "cure-all" to the problems that have been identified. Therefore, problems discussed in Chapter V continue to effect the planning process either because the changes failed to address these problems or because the changes were inadequate. These problems are summarized below.

a. Problems Not Addressed

The problems that remain have a significant impact on the military planning process and the ability to integrate Service capabilities. Some of these problems exist because the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the proposed JSPS revision and the JOPES program have failed to address them. These include:

- Over-emphasis on budgeting [Ref. 1:p. 620].
- "Dual-hatting" responsibilities of the Service Chiefs [Ref. 1:p. 166].
- Inadequate analytical tools for JCS planners to perform accurate and timely planning [Ref. 3:p. 17].
- Mismanagement of DoD IT [Ref. 19].

b. Problems Inadequately Dealt With

The changes implemented thus far have failed to adequately solve particular problems, therefore allowing some of these problems to continue. These problems include:

- Lack of sufficient national strategic guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense [Ref. 8].
- Continued by-pass of the formal planning process [Ref. 2:p. 341].
Lack of Service integration by JCS [Ref. 1:pp. 12-18].
Lack of an integrated database, IT and IT management standards to implement one [Ref. 19].
Insufficient planner experience and training [Ref. 3:p. 17].
Improper JCS response to requests [Ref. 2:p. 336].

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents recommendations that would improve the JCS planning process based on the analysis conducted in Chapter V.

Recommendation: Ensure the President conforms to the Goldwater-Nichols Act in transmitting annually, in a classified and unclassified format, a comprehensive report on the national security strategy that includes specific policies and objectives for large and/or small joint military operations.

Rationale: This recommendation would address the need for having specific, comprehensive national strategic guidance from the President that has yet to be effectively given. [Ref. 10:p. 3] Specific objectives and goals would enhance the achievement of a coordinated effort toward these goals by the various DoD components [Ref. 1:p. 7]. Also, written Presidential guidance requiring JCS joint planning and operations is the forum needed to strengthen the integrative authority of OJCS, specifically CJCS, to
overcome the dominance of Service oriented goals that JCS has not been able to overcome.

**Recommendation:** The President and Secretary of Defense should demand and use integrated advice from the CJCS.

**Rationale:** By demanding integrative advice from the CJCS, the CJCS would no longer have to fear the possibility of the Service Chiefs using alternative channels of communication to the NCA to reinforce Service interests or gain approval of Service oriented programs/plans. If the NCA can dictate the primary objective of joint planning then "the CJCS's constituency will become the Secretary of Defense, not the CINCs or the service chiefs or anyone else." [Ref. 3:p. 45] The services would have to work with the JCS, not around them. Full support by the NCA would help eliminate the traditional political strength of individual Services and the traditional dependencies within the JCS that has contributed in preventing effective Service integration.

**Recommendation:** Increase JCS planner education and training by ensuring:

- The joint-specialty program recruits quality officers by increasing "joint-specialty" visibility within the Services. There also must be evidence proof that joint-specialty personnel will have a high rate of promotion and an attractive career path.

- JCS and Service planners be required to attend a comprehensive joint planning course that would include learning other Service capabilities/limitations, JCS planning process and use of analytical tools. [Ref. 12:p. V-20]
Rationale: The quality of personnel actually performing research, analysis, development and implementation of military plans is still a critical requirement no matter what the organizational structure and procedures. JCS planners must have the ability to "acquire and analyze critical information about force capabilities and requirements and produce independent, integrated findings" for the CJCS, despite having little service cooperation. [Ref. 3:p. 50] Because of the lack of joint planning experience, the amount of data to be analyzed and the lack of analytical tools, the task of learning how to perform as a joint planner is taking too long [Ref. 12:p. IV-16]. Considering normal tour lengths of three or four years, the fact that it sometimes takes between one and two years for planners to learn the joint planning job to an effective level is unsatisfactory.

Recommendation: Add the analytical tools contained in JOPES functional capabilities to the Joint Staff for use in JSPS planning.

Rationale: The JOPES Intel-Interface will contain global intelligence that could be oriented toward the development of several JSPS documents, thus improving the ability of JCS planners to collect and analyze information during their planning process. The functions of JOPES are to significantly improve the deliberate planning process by having enhanced functional capabilities and receiving
continuous global intelligence from numerous sources. By being able to quickly access global, strategic information, the processes and functions applied to deliberate planning could also be used by JCS planners to develop JSPS documents. Therefore, JOPES would support both strategic planning (JSPS) and deliberate planning. Figure 4 shows this relation, and also the sequential development process of specific documents within each planning system. Reductions in planning time and increases in quality options are predicted to occur with the unified and specified command level planning process. If the same results can be applied to the Joint Staff planners in their JSPS process, then the quality and timeliness of information going to the CJCS would be greatly improved.

Figure 4. System Relationships
Recommendation: Move the management of DoD IT away from the ASD(Comptroller) and create an ASD(CIS) (Computer Information Systems) to manage IT.

Rationale: IT entails a completely different strategy today than it did 20 years ago. It no longer consists of just accounting/cost analysis functions and strategy. Today, IT is a very real part of the growth and success of military planning and operations, and is crucial for DoD to remain a competitive edge on possible adversaries. To achieve these objectives, the IT responsibility must be taken away from the cost/analysis strategy experts within ASD(C) and given to ASD(CIS).

Recommendation: Give J-7 Assigned Responsibility Authority (ARA) to dictate the establishment of data element standards to DoD joint planning Services and agencies.

Rationale: To enable JOPES functional information systems to possess more efficient interoperability capabilities, data standardization is necessary. The number of data elements contained in individual databases is increasing everyday. But, thus far, data elements standards have not been directed to be established, and the capability of interoperability between information systems is getting much more difficult to achieve.

Recommendation: Change the annual President's national budget to a biennial national budget.
Rationale: The over-emphasis on the short-term annual budget and the rigorous reviews it encounters has stifled much of the strategic planning capabilities attempted during the JSPS and the PPBS. Increasing the budgeting cycle to two years would decrease Congressional control of budgeting, give planning and programming more credibility and return to the DoD the ability to plan for future critical programs established during the JSPS and PPBS [Ref. 4:p. 32].
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Automated Data Processing</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANSI</td>
<td>American National Standards Institute</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>Action Officer</td>
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<td>ARA</td>
<td>Assigned Responsibility Authority</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
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<td>WISDIM</td>
<td>WWMCCS Information System Dictionary for Information Management</td>
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DEFINITIONS

The following are definitions/comments that have been used throughout this thesis:

- **Budget Estimates**: Budget estimates are submitted by Service and DoD agencies based on approved programs from the PDM and the most recent estimated fiscal guidelines.

- **Chairman's Guidance (CG)**: Initial top-down guidance provided from the CJCS for the framework for the development of strategy options and the NMSD.

- **Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)**: Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense. He may, and does, consult with other JCS members and combatant commanders in formulating military advice. He then presents the range of advice received from the other JCS members to the NCA. He is the communication link between the NCA and the combatant commanders. The CJCS also acts as spokesman for the combatant commanders concerning requirements, programs, and budgets. [Ref. 6:p. 34]

- **Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)**: The CJCS's assessment of the Service POMs to see if the capabilities are sufficient to implement developed national strategy, including operation plans.

- **Concept Plans (CONPLANs)**: An operation plan in concept format.

- **Defense Guidance**: The document that the Secretary of Defense issues to the DoD military agencies for the development of their POMS. The DG includes firm guidance on goals, priorities, objectives and fiscal constraints. [Ref. 15:p. xiv]

- **Deliberate Planning**: Formalized military operational planning that involves the short-term time frame. It begins upon receiving a planning task, i.e., JSCP from the JCS, and ends when a plan has been approved. [Ref. 7:p. 2-9]
• Issue Papers (IPs): Consist of possible alternatives or disagreements resulting from POMs submitted from the Services and DoD agencies. After the DRB selects the issues to be reviewed, they are collected by OMB and the Services (with inputs from JCS and CINCs) to form Issue Books (IBs). The DRB makes final resolutions of the issues which are recorded in the PDM.

• Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA): A planning document prepared for the Secretary of Defense by the CJCS, with participation of the JCS, CINCs and the intelligence community, that assesses the U.S. military capabilities and compares them with those of possible adversaries. The JMNA covers a five year time frame, e.g., 1989 JMNA examines 1990-1994.

• Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP): A biennially published document that initiates the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and the deliberate planning process. It provides guidance to theater level commanders for the development of CONPLANs and OPLANs in order to be able to accomplish specific tasks based on short-term military resources and capabilities. [Ref. 6:p. 321]

• Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS): Initiated with the development of national military goals, objectives and strategies, it is the formal process that enables the CJCS to carry out his responsibility in developing and furnishing strategic direction to the Armed Forces [Ref. 6:p. 321]. It also provides assessments, resource allocations and planning guidance to military planners.

• Joint Strategy Review (JSR): A review that initiates the JSPS cycle to assess the threats or potential threats and current DoD strategy. Inputs are received from the Services, CINCs, NCA and intelligence sources such as DIA.

• National Command Authority (NCA): Consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense who by law are the only individuals with the authority to order troop movement or to direct the Armed Forces for the execution of military action. [Ref. 6:p. 25]

• National Military Strategic Document (NMSD): Formerly the JSPD, a planning document issued biennially by the JCS that gives strategic planning and force structure advice to the President, National Security Council and the Secretary of defense in order to support national objectives. The NMSD also serves as the foundation for development of DG. [Ref. 15:p. xvii]
• National Security Council (NSC): An organization designed to assist the President in national security policy. The statutory members are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. The CJCS, Director of the CIA and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisors. [Ref. 15:p. xxi]

• National Security Decision Directive (NSDD): A directive issued by the President, via the Secretary of Defense, to the JCS at the beginning of the administration and thereafter when required. The NSDD involves the President's decision on national policies, objectives, strategies and forecasted budget levels.

• Operation Plan (OPLAN): A plan developed by a unified or specified commander for conducting military operations in a hostile environment. OPLANS are developed in response to tasks assigned by the CJCS and may be used as a basis for an OPORD. [Ref. 6:p. 329]

• Operational Planning: Focuses on specifying goals and objectives and translating them to programs and budgets in order to determine plans required to meet the specified goals. It does not account for possible environmental changes, i.e., it extrapolates from the current conditions and resources. [Ref. 17:p. 4]

• Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS): An element within DoD that includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff and the agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the role of formulating military advice, the JCS does not have executive authority over combatant forces. The chain of command is from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. [Ref. 6:p. 32]

• President's Budget (PB): The document the President sends to Congress each January estimating the national budget, and recommending desired appropriations in detail for the upcoming fiscal year. [Ref. 6:p. 332]

• Program Budget Decision (PBD): The PBD is formed after thorough review hearings by OSD, DOD, OMB and JCS staff members concerning the military department's budget submissions. The Military departments conduct presentations and answer questions as necessary during these hearings.
• Program Decision Memorandum (PDM): The DRB's final decisions involving Service POM issues that are in turn distributed to the DoD components for the formulation of Budget Estimates.

• Service Chiefs: The Service Chiefs, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Commandant of the Marine Corp (CMC), Chief of Staff for the Army (CSA) and the Chief of Staff for the Air Force (CSAF) offer advice to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense and are responsible, to the respective Service Secretary, for the management of that Service. The Service Chiefs are also responsible for appointing Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OPSDEPs) and Deputy Operations Deputies, JCS (DEPOPSDEPs) who work with the Director and Vice Director of the Joint Staff. The OPSDEPs and DEPOPSDEPs consider the less important issues or screen the major issues to be forwarded to the JCS. [Ref. 6:p. 36]

• Service Program Objective Memorandum (SPOM): Recommendations from the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense that includes proposed applications of their portion of DOD appropriations. [Ref. 6:p. 333]

• Strategic Planning: Analyzes an organization's external and internal environment and searches for new trends, uncertainties and viable options in order to adapt to future contingencies. It integrates an organization's goals, policies and action plans into a unified plan as well as formulating and allocating resources required based on organization objectives and potential environmental changes. [Ref. 17:p. 3]

• Strategy and Option Decision (SOD): The President's decision regarding the military strategies proposed by the SOR. The President's decisions are then incorporated into the DG.

• Strategy and Option Review (SOR): Conducted by the Secretary of Defense to review developed military strategies and force recommendations contained in the NMSD, after which are forwarded to the President

• Strategy Option Assessment/Review: An iterative process conducted by JCS to develop mid-range national military strategies/options and assess the optimal fit relating to required capabilities. The results are submitted as inputs into the NMSD.
APPENDIX A

STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

(Title 10, Section 141)

• Prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces.

• Prepare joint logistic plans and assign logistic responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those plans.

• Establish unified commands in strategic areas.

• Review the major material and personnel requirements of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and logistic plans.

• Formulate policies for the joint training of the armed forces.

• Formulate policies for coordinating the military education of members of the armed forces.

• Provide the representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

• Perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

[Ref. 5:p. 58]
APPENDIX B

PPBS AND JSPS:
THE JOINT PERSPECTIVE

[Diagram showing planning cycles and timelines for CY 1984, CY 1985, and CY 1986, with various labels such as President, OMB, NSC, SECDEF, OSD, DRB, CJCS, JCS, OJCS, Mildep, CINC, and Intelligence Community.]
APPENDIX C

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED AND DIRECTED CHANGES
(not all inclusive)

A. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff: Composition; Functions

- The CJCS is to be the principal advisor to the President, NSC and Secretary of Defense.

- Other members of the JCS are military advisors to the President, NSC and Secretary of Defense.

- The CJCS shall, when he considers appropriate, consult with and seek advice of the other JCS members and the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

- The CJCS shall, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, NSC and/or the Secretary of Defense of the range of military advice and opinion concerning a particular matter.

- Members of the JCS may submit to the CJCS advice or opinions that disagree to the advice or opinion that the CJCS presented to the President, NSC and/or Secretary of Defense.

- The CJCS shall establish procedures to ensure that his own advice is not delayed due to the submission of advice from other members.

- The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, give advice to the President, NSC and/or the Secretary of Defense when requested to do so.

- After first informing the Secretary of Defense, any member of the JCS may make recommendations to Congress relating to the DoD.

2. Chairman: Functions

- May attend and participate in NSC meetings, acting in his role as principal military advisor.
(See Appendix E for further CJCS functions.)
3. **Vice Chairman**

- The Vice Chairman, appointed by the President, can not be a member of the same service as the CJCS.
- Serve for a term of two years and may be appointed for two additional terms.
- Must have the joint specialty code and have served at least one joint duty assignment as a general or flag officer.
- May participate in all JCS meetings, but may not vote unless acting as Chairman.

4. **Joint Staff**

- The CJCS manages the Joint Staff and the Director of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff shall perform such duties as the CJCS prescribes.
- The Secretary of Defense shall ensure the Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to support the CJCS in providing unified strategic direction of the combatant forces for an integrated and efficient team of land, naval and air forces.
- The Joint Staff shall not have executive authority.
- Total number of members, armed forces and civilian, shall not exceed 1627.

B. **SENATE STAFF REPORT: "THE NEED FOR CHANGE"**

1. **OJCS**

- Disestablish the JCS allowing Service Chiefs to dedicate all their time to Service Duties.
- Establish a Joint Military Advisory Council consisting of a Chairman and a four-star officer from each Service.
- Reduce Service staffs involved in joint planning to no more than 25 military officers from each Service.
- Establish the DRB in statute with appropriate Service representation.
- Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to provide military advice in his own right and to independently manage the Joint Staff.
• Designate a Deputy Chairman for the Joint Military Advisory Council.

• Specify that one of the Joint Military Advisory Board's responsibility is to inform higher authority of all legitimate alternatives.

• Specify a statutory relationship between the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Military Advisory Council, Joint Staff and OSD.

• Make the Joint Military Advisory Council and Joint Staff part of OSD.

• Require members of the Joint Military Advisory Council have substantial joint experience.

• Authorize the Chairman to specify staffing procedures of the Joint Staff.

• Authorize the Chairman to develop and administer a personnel management system of joint duty officers.

• Establish a joint duty career path for each Service.

• Strengthen the requirement for joint duty for promotion to flag or general rank.

• Authorize the Secretary of Defense to approve extensions of joint tours past four years.

• Eliminate the size restriction of the Joint Staff.

• Require the Secretary of Defense to do a comprehensive study of the General Staff concept.

• The Secretary of Defense promulgate planning guidance for contingency plans, and develop a continuing exercise program to test such plans.

C. CSIS REPORT ON DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

• Designate CJCS as principal military advisor to the NCA and NSC.

• The CJCS, with Joint Staff assistance, provide force planning recommendations based on policy and realistic resource projections by the Secretary of Defense.
• The role of the under secretary of defense for policy should be expanded to include responsibility for program integration on a mission basis.

• Establish a third under secretary with broad oversight responsibilities for functions relating to operational forces readiness.

• Reduce the size of OSD staffs.

• Shift to a biennial budget to streamline the congressional review process and focus on broader national strategic priorities.

• DoD should develop a long-range capital investment plan for better cost projections for major weapon systems.
APPENDIX D

FUNCTIONS OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The CJCS is the principal military adviser to the
President, National Security Council and Secretary of
Defense. Subject to the authority, direction and control of
the President and Secretary of Defense, the CJCS is
responsible for the following principal functions:

A. Strategic Direction

- Assist the NCA in furnishing strategic direction of the
  Armed Forces.

B. Strategic Planning

- Prepare strategic plans, including plans that conform to
  resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to
  be available during the time frame the plans are
  effective.

- Prepare and joint logistic plans and mobility plans to
  support those strategic plans.

- Perform net assessments of the capabilities of the Armed
  Forces and its allies cas compared to potential enemies.

C. Contingency Planning

- Provide for preparation and review of contingency plans
  and advise on critical deficiencies and strengths in
  force capabilities.

D. Requirements, Programs, and Budget

- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of
  requirements of the unified and specified commands.
• Advise the Secretary of Defense that primary and alternate program recommendations and budget proposals conform with priorities in previously established strategies.

• Assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs.

E. Doctrine, Training and Education

• Develop doctrine for joint employment of the armed forces.

• Formulate policies for coordinating military education and training.

• Formulate policies for joint training of the military.

F. Other Matters

• Exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff.

• As directed by the President, attend and participate in meetings of the NSC.

• Advise and assist the NCA on establishing combatant commands.

• Transmit communications between the NCA and combatant commands.

• Review plans and programs for adequacy and feasibility.

• As appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders.

[Ref. 6:p. 35]
PLANNING

SOD

SCR

DG

NSDDI

BUDGETING

PB

PDM

PBD

VMSC 92-93

JCS

REV

JSCP 91-92

CON PLAN

OPLAN

MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 1990
LIST OF REFERENCES


8. Phone call between Dr. P.Y. Hammond and the author, 15 September 1989.


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