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THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS!
HOW MUCH SUPPORT IS ENOUGH?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES L. HAYNES

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

27 FEBRUARY 1990

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
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paper will discuss Army involvement to date, recommend possible alternatives and additions to the involvement under the current provisions of the law, and finally, look to the future to what our involvement may become.

Specifically, it will address the Army's current challenges and trends in respect to legal issues. It will address the issues and difficulties we face in interdiction and eradication efforts. Finally, it will address future use of Army assets as the "build down" occurs and make recommendations on the preparation we must take in anticipation of current laws being amended.
THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS!

HOW MUCH SUPPORT IS ENOUGH?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Haynes

Colonel E.H. Dinkel, Jr.
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
27 February 1990

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ABSTRACT

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The United States Army is becoming increasingly involved in this Nation's campaign against the war on drugs. Changes continue to evolve on the type support that civilian law enforcement officials seek and receive. We have seen modifications to existing laws which allow and encourage greater involvement but stops short of committing forces to the actual battle. The Army has accepted the role to the degree authorized but is capable of doing more. This paper will discuss Army involvement to date, recommend possible alternatives and additions to the involvement under the current provisions of the law, and finally, look to the future to what our involvement may become.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** ............................................ ii

**LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS** ................................ iv

**CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION** .......................... 1

**CHAPTER II. CURRENT CHALLENGES AND TRENDS** ........ 4
- DOD and the Posse Comitatus .......................... 5
- Changes in the Law ..................................... 6
- Changes in Strategy .................................... 7

**CHAPTER III. CHALLENGES TO SUPPLY INTERDICTION** ....... 10
- Maritime Interdiction .................................. 10
- Air Interdiction ........................................ 12
- Border Interdiction ..................................... 13
- C3I Issues ............................................... 17

**CHAPTER IV. CHALLENGE FOR ERADICATION EFFORTS** ........ 20
- National Guard Efforts .................................. 20
- Active/USAR Support .................................... 22

**CHAPTER V. OTHER ARMY SUPPORT** ....................... 25
- Drug Treatment ......................................... 25
- Additional Housing Opportunities ....................... 27
- Manpower Pool .......................................... 27
- Prisons/Prison Camps .................................... 28
- Role Models .............................................. 29

**CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS** ............................ 32
- Assessment of Current Operations ....................... 32
- Future ................................................... 34

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ............................................ 36
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1  ESTIMATED FEDERAL DRUG SEIZURES........ 12
FIGURE 2  U.S. ARMY EQUIPMENT ON LOAN FOR........ 15
           DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT
THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS
HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The final chapter has yet to be written on exactly what resources are needed to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. The Drug Abuse Act of 1972 was the genesis of the sweeping changes we have seen in the drug strategy. These changes have resulted in a realignment of resources, exceptions to existing laws to support enforcement operations, and establishment of drug czars at the highest level. The legislated outgrowth of those changes have seen the Department of Defense becoming increasingly involved in supporting civil agencies' drug enforcement efforts. The question is how much is enough?

BACKGROUND

The prevalence of illegal drug use in the 1980s has not shown a marked decline despite all the efforts taken. While these efforts continued to focus on supply reduction as well as demand, relatively little success had been realized.
On 14 September 1989, President Bush declared war on drugs. This Declaration has not resulted in the United States Army engaging in decisive battles as have previous war declarations. If we are in fact at war, we must examine all phases of counter-narcotics and formulate courses of action that will allow us to close with and destroy the enemy. When announcing the fiscal year 1991 budget, President Bush proposed a package of $10.6 billion to fight the war and called drugs "the nation's number one concern." Although he claimed progress in the war on drugs he stated, "Given the headlines we've seen recently, it's clear we're only getting started."

This increase represents an increase of over one billion dollars from previous years budget submissions. Will this additional money be the catalyst that gets us over the hurdle in this war or will it require more?

This paper will be limited to Army roles in defeating this enemy. It will address current trends and challenges, provide a brief history of the legal and political evolution of active army use in the war, and recommend additional areas where attention should be focused.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER II
CURRENT CHALLENGES AND TRENDS

The efforts to curb drug abuse have grown substantially over the recent past; however, there has not been a corresponding decline in their use. There is evidence that some nations have become involved in this lucrative endeavor by protecting the operation from legitimate police efforts.

Former Secretary of State George Schultz highlighted growing national security concerns when he tied terrorism activities with the destabilizing influence of illicit drugs\(^1\). In an address to the Miami Chamber of Commerce, he stated: "We have seen how Cuba uses drug smugglers to funnel arms to Communist insurgencies and terrorists. And it is not hard to imagine that smuggling massive amounts of drugs into Western nations may serve their broader goal of attempting to weaken the fabric of Western democratic society..." Presumably, the Secretary of State had evidence confirming this allegation yet our efforts seem to be as ineffective in 1990 as they were in 1984. If drug production is tied to terrorism, why haven't we done away with laws that prelude the military's total involvement?

Even though some success has resulted from the drug crack down, the "drug of choice", cocaine, has continued to be available for use. The National Institute on Drug Abuse
(NIDA) released the results of its periodic National Survey on Drug Abuse\textsuperscript{2} which estimated "frequent" use of cocaine in any form has doubled since 1985. This suggests the ineffectiveness thus far of that portion of the drug war.

A natural outgrowth of this increased consumption has been to look at nontraditional law enforcement agencies to contribute to the national effort. But why has it taken so long to develop an enforceable strategy using all available assets? A historical perspective of the legal ramifications can provide reasons for the reluctance to engage in an all out effort.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE POSSE COMITATUS

Certain elements of the Department of Defense have been precluded from active, direct involvement over the civilian population with certain exceptions. This restriction is written as law and known as the Posse Comitatus Act and provides: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both." (Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1385). This act became law shortly after the Civil War (1878)\textsuperscript{3} with the primary intent of restricting military participation in
Civilian law enforcement activities. One of the reasons for adopting the law in the first place was because of the excessive use of the Army and the resulting abuses while enforcing the reconstruction laws in the southern states. Although speculative, evidence does exist that one intent of the law was to preclude states from waging another civil war against the newly formed government.

Three specific areas in the Constitution lend credibility to this theory. The uneasiness of a standing Army led the framers to "name the President the Commander in Chief of the Army", require all members of the Army to "swear an oath of allegiance to support and defend the Constitution of the United States" and finally, by limiting the President's "delegation of authority to employ the Army." 

**CHANGES IN THE LAW**

Gradual codification of the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act has resulted in the Department of Defense receiving increased numbers of requests for support from local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. The most significant exception is a modification to the Posse Comitatus Act in 1981 entitled "Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials." This act clarified the law in the areas of providing criminal information; providing military equipment and facilities; and providing
expert military advisors. It also authorized the use of military personnel to operate such equipment and to perform surveillance operations but did not authorize search, seizure, or arrest privileges. Changes in the law have evolved because of the nation's will to get tough on drugs and has ultimately caused a revised national strategy.

**CHANGES IN STRATEGY**

Prior to the 1981 amendment, the Defense Department had shown a reluctance to degrade military capabilities by becoming involved in drug operations. This was not an adopted, parochial approach but supported both the law and the general definition of national strategy and interests. The traditional, broad definition accepted as descriptive of U.S. vital interests were "those interests against the infringement of which we are prepared to take some kind of military action." This definition alone excluded certain national interests. The resolve to commit the military forces to combat drug lords was not seen as realistic since drugs do not infringe on U.S. vital interests.

As with the change in the laws, gradual changes have occurred reflecting new National and Army strategic roles. It is now a strategic role of the United States Army to provide support to U.S. civilian authorities in activities such as interdiction of illicit drug traffic. The
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 declared that it would be policy of the United States Government to create a Drug Free America by 1995. If this language is more than mere rhetoric, it is obvious that significant changes must be made to combating drugs. For example, we should exhaust all avenues to obtain exact proof of the terrorist connection to drugs. If we do so, the resolve to commit forces against this enemy could be realized. The first area which should be considered for additional Army support is in the area of interdiction.
ENDNOTES


Interdiction of illicit drugs is extremely difficult because of the various types of conveyances used to transport them. Cargo ships, airplanes, wheeled vehicles, and concealed on or in individuals using commercial travel are but some of the most common methods. Last year, 355 million people entered or re-entered the country along with more than 100 million vehicles, 20 thousand vessels, 635 thousand aircraft, and eight million containers. In addition, more than 9 million people entered the country illegally between Ports of Entry. Some drugs are shipped directly into the United States from the producing nation while others are shipped to other countries for distribution into our borders. These multiple means of shipping precludes establishing a blockade of drug producing countries that have vessels/aircraft bound for our borders.

MARITIME INTERDICTION

The Department of Defense has engaged in interdiction efforts on an ever increasing basis. A tactic that has gained support from the U.S. Congress is the joint operations between the Navy and the Coast Guard.
Although the Navy and the Marine Corp are not included in the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act itself, they are bound to the law as a matter of policy. The Department of Defense Directive requires prior approval of the Secretary of Defense before the Navy or the Marine Corps can participate. The United States Coast Guard being an element of the Department of Transportation, is not bound by the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act.

In practice, the Navy and the Coast Guard developed an innovative approach to allow joint participation. The method for this joint employment is for a member of the Coast Guard to participate as an active member on deployed Naval ships. During routine operations within the Mediterranean Sea, cargo ships are monitored. Intelligence sources at port often provide information as to the cargo therein. If the ship is detected, the U.S. Naval ship is reflagged as a Coast Guard vessel and the drug laden vessel boarded by the Coast Guard representative and Naval personnel under his command.

This has resulted in some success but has proved to be more expensive than successful. In 1987, this method used 2,500 ship days, 591 flying hours, and cost 29.6 million dollars. The results only netted 20 vessels seized, 110 arrests, 225,000 pounds of marijuana, and 550 pounds of cocaine recovered. (See Figure 1 for a comparison of total Drug Seizures during FY 1987 and FY 1988).
FIGURE 1
ESTIMATED FEDERAL DRUG SEIZURES
(IN POUNDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1987</th>
<th>FY 1988</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>198,000</td>
<td>+29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>+35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>1,660,000</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on data provided by U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and INS/Border Patrol (limited reporting).

This is obviously only a fraction of the drug supplies coming into the United States. 45 percent of the cocaine seized in 1988 was carried by private aircraft, more than double the amount seized from private vessels.\(^4\) Even if the U.S. had the resources to expand maritime interdiction, it is obvious that such actions would not substantially reduce the supply of illegal drugs. The challenges to stop the flow of drugs into this country via the air are equally as difficult as the maritime efforts.

AIR INTERDICTION

As noted above, drugs entering the United States by aircraft present a significant challenge. Some profess to
regulate air corridors and any aircraft that violates the regulation and fails to heed warnings should be shot down. Presently, there is no authority to engage such aircraft nor is the Department of Defense seeking such authority. The opportunities to make a mistake and shoot down innocent victims appear to be the most common criticism of this tactic and will likely prevent its use.

If we elect not to engage potential enemies in the air, we must design tactics which will allow us a reasonable chance of success. The most common method currently being used is to attempt to follow the aircraft to landing. More often than not, the pilot abandons the aircraft at the point of arrival and flees the scene. To counter this, we should continue providing the radar systems currently in use as well as the aircraft to track the possible traffickers. In addition, we should provide surveillance aircraft to locate probable landing zones. Once these have been located, National Guard units should conduct routine training operations in the area to accomplish their readiness requirements while providing a cordon of the field. The active forces could be used to locate the landing zones in those areas in close proximity to existing installations.

BORDER INTERDICTION

A most logical point of interception is along our
national borders and our ports of entry. The United States Army has offered much assistance to law enforcement officials in carrying out this strategy, but maybe not enough. Considerable amounts of equipment have been loaned as depicted in Figure 2, (List of Loans To Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies). This list is growing on a steady basis yet the availability of drugs is not diminishing proportionately. While this equipment no doubt greatly enhances civil capabilities, it is not enough. Personnel support to all facets of the interdiction effort is needed.

Activation of Joint Task Forces at Key West, Florida, Oakland, California, and Fort Bliss, Texas is a step in the right direction. The missions of these Task Forces are still in the embryonic stage and classified above this research project; therefore, details are omitted.

There is no doubt that the increased use of the National Guard is an invaluable initiative. Perhaps it is time to inundate the effort with all available resources to stop trans-shipment of drugs into this country.

With eight million containers entering the country annually, it seems prudent to assign search responsibilities at least in part to the Army. As long as the containers are the subject of the inspection, no violation of the Posse Comitatus Act occurs. The active component has 179 narcotic detector dogs in the inventory. Consideration should be given to employing these assets as well as U.S.
FIGURE 2  
U.S. ARMY EQUIPMENT ON LOAN  
FOR DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT  
(as of 17 January 1990)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 C12</td>
<td>$4,805,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 UH-60A Blackhawk</td>
<td>$64,440,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 OH-6A</td>
<td>$159,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Equipment</td>
<td>$6,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>$69,411,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications/Electronics Equipment</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Radar Sets AN/PPS-4A</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Night Sights AN/PVS-2</td>
<td>$23,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Night Sights AN/PVS-4</td>
<td>$35,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121 Night Goggles AN/PVS-5</td>
<td>$544,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Infrared Viewer AN/PAS-7A</td>
<td>$318,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Night Vision AN/UAS-11</td>
<td>$1,326,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 Platoon Early</td>
<td>$401,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Anti-Intrusion Sensors</td>
<td>$236,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Battery Chargers</td>
<td>$23,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Equipment</td>
<td>$271,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>$3,271,086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 Machine Guns, M60</td>
<td>$248,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84 Grenade Launchers, M79</td>
<td>$60,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,056 Rifles (M40A2 &amp; M14)</td>
<td>$190,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80 Winchester</td>
<td>$8,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Mortars</td>
<td>$188,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Shotguns</td>
<td>$1,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Equipment (Includes</td>
<td>$92,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>254 Protective Masks)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>$790,563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Vehicles</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Trucks</td>
<td>$262,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Boats</td>
<td>$23,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Motors</td>
<td>$17,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Equipment</td>
<td>$8,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>$311,663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Grand Total                 | $73,784,839 |
troops to conduct sporadic, intensive searches of incoming cargo.

The Army should also conduct small unit exercises in drug smuggling areas in the vicinity of the borders. A tactic now used by the drug smugglers is to attach a "fuzz buster" to a donkey and send it across the border. If the alarm sounds, the remaining burros laden with narcotics are not sent across. Recently, humans have been used in place of the burros as a means for the drug runners to gather intelligence on our operations.

This type of tactic should alert planners that they must be as innovative as the smugglers. The manner in which our forces are employed must be varied frequently. It is just like any other tactical operation, you must not be predictable. Occasionally, unmanned sensors should be placed in areas to canalize our foe to enter our borders where we have the best advantage. Likewise, our tactics should be varied to move the sensors away from the border allowing the smugglers to actually enter U.S. territory before sensors detect them. Information received incidental to these exercises should be processed as intelligence with local law enforcement authorities.

No other federal agency has the expertise to conduct this type of operation other than the U.S. Army. The training value derived for a Military Intelligence General Support Company using organic equipment to detect actual
intruders could be immense. Likewise, the scenario lends itself to be an excellent training opportunity for Cavalry units to conduct missions which are closely related to their wartime missions.

To commit the forces available to win the war, maybe it is time to amend the Posse Comitatus Act again to allow the United States Army Reserves and active forces greater flexibility in the interdiction efforts. The fact is, there has not been a reported conviction by courts martial proceedings for violations under 18 U.S.C. 1385. One may question the viability of a law that has been around over 100 years and never resulted in a conviction. Should we continue to keep a law on the books that greatly inhibits our ability to prosecute a declared war on drugs? Although the new act did much to clarify the law, the restrictions imposed may still be too restrictive to allow success.

C³I ISSUES

Department of Defense operations such as those described above are simply not enough to sever all modes of transportation. For example, it is not prudent to try and stop all ships as "drug suspects". The shipping industry wouldn't accept that tactic. Nor is it prudent to try and stop all air traffic into this free nation. Critical to the success is to know which ships and planes are transporting drugs and concentrate on those. This is only possible if our intelligence efforts are enhanced.
The 1988 Defense Authorization Act assigned the military the lead responsibility for command, control, communications, and intelligence. Previous wars have seen the US Army aggressively using all sources of intelligence to find and locate the enemy. This does not seem to be the case in this war. Existing intelligence efforts must be integrated, not only in the Army and the Department of Defense, but throughout all agencies supporting the drug war. Since most agencies, Federal, State and Local, maintain and operate their own intelligence capacity, the key to success depends on sharing that information. As an interim, the Department of Defense should use existing intelligence and communications facilities to share this information. Enhanced intelligence and communications efforts could result in more accurate interdiction of those vessels transporting drugs.
ENDNOTES


8. Soldiers, 1 January 1990.


12. Soldiers, 1 January 1990
CHAPTER IV
CHALLENGE FOR ERADICATION EFFORTS

Even if we were totally successful in our interdiction efforts, the problem is not solved. Domestic marijuana production now supplies 25 percent of all marijuana consumed in the United States. In fact, marijuana is said to have become the single largest cash crop in some of our states.\(^1\)

If we elect not to eradicate drugs from our own soil, why should we expect other nations to do so on their's? Will other governments seriously consider a request to do away with their most lucrative cash crops when we fail to do the same? The first step in an eradication program must come from within our own borders. After we have demonstrated the resolve to eliminate the drugs harvested in the United States, we can legitimately ask others to do the same.

NATIONAL GUARD EFFORTS

As stated before, the National Guard, unless Federalized, has no restrictions under the Posse Comitatus Act and is authorized by law to conduct search and seizures and make arrests.\(^2\) The Guard is equipped with the most modern equipment available to conduct reconnaissance to
detect marijuana fields but with few exceptions as shown later. All fifty states have submitted mission plans on their proposals to the Department of the Army's National Guard Bureau indicating their plan to assist in the drug war. The varying degree of activity differs with each mission plan. Perhaps it is time for the Department of the Army to issue mission orders rather than requesting mission plans. Instead of asking "what will you do for me", maybe a directive detailing "what you will do for me" is appropriate.

The National Guard has approximately 458 thousand members.\textsuperscript{3} Sheer numbers alone offer an awesome capability to search within familiar territory, i.e., one's own state, for plots of marijuana. Active and Reserve forces could also be used to assist in conducting aerial reconnaissance missions as long as pertinent laws were not violated.

Budget cuts are as imminent in the National Guard as they are in the active component but OPTEMPO will not be reduced significantly from existing levels according to a recent Army War College speaker.\textsuperscript{4} If routine training missions were to include reconnaissance missions as a matter of routine, neither mission would be sacrificed.

The National Guard provides a significant amount of flying hours to drug detection, but training in their home stations lends itself to doing more. Routinely, Guardsmen train in their home state. This includes all types of units
in all types of terrain. An implied (if not a specified) mission for every operation should be to locate and report any suspected marijuana fields. If the U.S. Government would offer incentives for the Guard units locating drugs by providing additional training funds, the program would be more likely to succeed.

**ACTIVE/USAR SUPPORT**

The Active component as well as the U.S. Army Reserves could also provide limited assistance in the eradication efforts. Although precluded by law from direct involvement, policy authorizes the use of equipment and personnel for detection. Here again is a place where training opportunities could be integrated with this mission. Small unit operations could train in areas known to be possible growing areas. To that end, aerial reconnaissance could locate the fields and civil authorities (including National Guard Units) could be dispatched to destroy the crop much in the same manner suggested for interdicting drugs being flown into remote airfields.

Although the National Guard is highly trained and equipped, there are some cases where the equipment on hand is not adequate for successful mission accomplishment. In those cases, the active components should supplement the guard with equipment and the operators within the restrictions of current law.
Perhaps the next most significant area where the active forces can assist the National Guard is in the area of special operations training. For example, Photographic Reconnaissance Operations missions could be tied to valuable training for our active forces while practicing their trade, and at the same time train the Guard personnel to enhance their skills in the art.

The destruction of home grown drugs could be critical in soliciting other nations to joining our war. The ways and means are available if we have the resolve to employ them. We have professed to be "one-Army" for some time. Now is the time to consolidate our resources and apply the maximum casualties possible on this enemy. I am sure that if the enemy were conventional forces from the Soviet Union, we would have no reservations of providing the National Guard needed equipment to gain success.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER V
OTHER ARMY SUPPORT

This chapter discusses several actions which could have application to our efforts in the drug war. The pending reductions in the Army's force structure has far reaching impacts which may offer alternatives to present conditions and operations. It was recently announced that the perceived reduced Soviet threat would result in a "build-down" of Defense Department assets, both personnel and facilities. This reduction may offer solutions to problems we are currently experiencing.

DRUG TREATMENT

In 1988, the Department of Defense entered into an agreement with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to initiate a partnership to link federal personnel, facilities, and other resources to combat drug abuse and to treat victims of drugs.\(^1\) Earlier the Commission on Alternative Utilization of Military Facilities had been established to review possible installations excess to the needs of the Department of Defense.\(^2\) This commission ultimately identified nineteen U.S. Army facilities as possible candidates. In addition to those facilities, the Secretary of Defense announced an additional thirteen Army facilities that were excessive to the needs as
a result of pending budget cuts and strength reductions.  
Although much has been discussed in this area, relatively little has come to fruition. The time to act is now. The number of drug related emergencies resulting in hospital admissions has increased by 121 percent between the years of 1985 and 1988.  

These installations should be vacated as soon as practical and turned over to appropriate medical providers. NIDA estimated that four million Americans had serious drug problems (based on having taken drugs 200 or more times in the previous twelve months). They went on to estimate that one quarter of those Americans could stop using drugs with the help of friends, family, clergy and/or self motivation. Another one quarter were identified as hard-core addicts unwilling to stay drug free. The remaining two million drug users represent a group for whom treatment may offer a reasonable chance of recovery.

If these installations are converted to treatment facilities, the opportunity to provide additional hospitals to support treatment of drug victims can be greatly expanded. Several of the installations scheduled for closing have adequate hospital facilities on them. For example, Letterman Army Medical Center, California and the Army hospital in Fort McClellan, Alabama are active hospitals with modern equipment. These and similar facilities should be vacated and released to appropriate
medical providers for drug treatment and rehabilitation centers.

**ADDITIONAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES**

Other possibilities exist to support the drug war by utilization of the installations housing. The commission recommended fifty-two stand alone housing installations for closure. These facilities coupled with the family housing units on the original and subsequent base closures offer alternatives for the impoverished citizens currently forced to reside in drug laden slums. Obviously these quarters are not considered to be "exclusive neighborhoods" but when compared to living conditions currently available, they no doubt offer better facilities that presently exist.

**MANPOWER POOL**

Another source of assistance may come from the troop reductions pending in the Army. The Drug Enforcement Agency has a total force of only 2,800. Current policy is to encourage our outstanding soldiers terminating their active service to join the National Guard or the Reserves. Many outstanding Military Police in particular and others possessing unique skills should be encouraged to continue serving their country in other law enforcement agencies such as DEA. Reportedly, the Military Police Corps fair share of troop reduction equates to one battalion for each division deactivated. If plans announced earlier come to
fruition, at least two battalions of trained military police will be released from the Army. These personnel should be quickly integrated into other law enforcement agencies to reduce the amount of training time required for qualification.

PRISONS/PRISON CAMPS

Routinely we are reminded of the severe problem associated with prison overcrowding. Felony drug convictions now account for the single largest and fastest growing sector of the Federal Prison population. One of the reasons for this is the Congressional imposed minimum sentence for drug convictions. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has attempted to minimize the time and the cost of procuring new prisons by seeking existing facilities which can be acquired. To compliment this program, the Bureau seeks other facilities suitable for housing prisoners considered to be minimum security risks. In fact, the Hampden County Sheriff's department in Springfield, Massachusetts recently took over the National Guard Armory for purposes of housing prisoners. This action was as a result of prison overcrowding in the county.

Many minimum security prisoners are being paroled to make room in the jails for new offenders. For purposes of this paper, minimum security risk refers to those prisoners identified as non-violent inmates serving short sentences,
nearing release of current sentence, or those who have proven that they are rehabilitated. The installations being considered for closure should be surveyed to see if the requirements for prisons and/or prison camps are met. This could become a means of reducing the overcrowding of existing facilities thereby making space for hard core drug traffickers in maximum security prisons.

ROLE MODELS

The other area under this category which the active forces can play a significant role is as role models. The United States Army has significantly curtailed the drug consumption of its forces over the past several years. Much of this success is directly attributable to frequent and random drug testing. It is not likely that our free society would succumb to the type of control measure inherent in the military; but, there is evidence that we are moving toward that direction. One example of this is the order from former President Reagan to randomly subject transportation employees to drug testing. Another example is the practice by some colleges and universities requiring athletes to submit to urinalysis.

The Army can capitalize on this trend in two ways. We can send our soldiers (recruiters and others) into schools to educate potential volunteers. The U.S. Army is held in high esteem by many of the youth of America. If units would
participate in an "adopt a school" program, the influence could take on greater importance. Most importantly, these soldiers can highlight a bonafide system which rewards non-users.

The other means to assist in demand reduction is to advertise the success the Army's program has enjoyed. This could possibly have an effect on those concerned over violations of individual rights to the point where drug testing is not seen as evil but as a great benefit to society.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Without doubt, the drug problem in the United States has reached epidemic proportions. This proliferation has resulted in an increased Army involvement within provisions of existing laws. In as much as this additional support to civilian law enforcement agencies has not shown a marked decline in drug availability, the law has been amended to authorize even more support. A critical consideration that the Army must address is how much additional involvement may and will we be required? Will we be ready to meet the challenge of greater involvement?

The role of the Army has evolved from an insignificant role to the present point where an annual expenditure of literally billions of dollars is applied directly to the war. The problem remains that we still have no clear strategy for war termination.

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

Participation to the war effort has been limited to a combat support role. Our soldiers are involved with other U.S. agencies and foreign nations training eradication and interdiction operations. Much of the transportation and
intelligence gathering equipment dedicated to the war is owned and operated by Army forces.

The Department of Defense has been assigned responsibility as the lead agency of the Federal Government for detection of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs and for the integration of U.S. command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets. The volume of drugs entering the nation would indicate that additional assets are needed either to detect or to interdict. Current laws preclude the active component from committing adequate assets to the interdiction phase of the operation.

To date, the only Army assets committed directly to an active role of the drug war has been the National Guard. They have been called upon to wage direct, offensive actions but not in a unified direction. Each State submits their plan of attack rather than receiving their mission from the top. Clear, achievable goals should be devised and given to the National Guard Bureau on exact missions. Until this is done, the effort will continue to be disjointed.

It is time to question our strategy. The National Guard has fewer training days available yet they are the only ones committed directly to this war. Obviously, the United States Army can not unilaterally decide to implement an offensive action without Congressional approval. We should begin to plan for that campaign. The people of the
nation will not continue to accept a war in which every major battle is lost. When the national will to win the war becomes evident, laws will be changed again and the active forces committed to action to win the war. The U.S. Army must prepare that battle plan now.

FUTURE

The most significant thing the Army can do under present constraints is to anticipate the predictable changes and train accordingly. This war will have rules of engagement unlike any ever known before and must be taught before engagement. Collateral damage will have more significance because in many cases the property may be owned and operated by United States citizens.

The build down of the force structure offers an opportunity to significantly enhance the service support effort to the drug war. Facilities scheduled to be vacated should be turned over to housing, prison, and/or medical authorities for use of the drug war casualties. The trained forces which are soon to be released from this "build down" should become prime candidates for integration into State and Federal Law Enforcement Agencies. The Army should consider a program which insures proper placement of trained personnel thereby reducing initial training time.

Every effort should be made to integrate the active and reserve forces into the war within provisions of the current
law. Training sites should be carefully selected to coincide with suspected border crossing locations. Narcotic detector dogs should be employed at Ports-of-Entry to search inanimate objects not for the purpose of arrest but to limit the drug supply.

The vastness of the capital gains in the drug war presents a new dilemma never before encountered in a war. The money to buy success is available. It is unlikely that our soldiers have ever been tempted with a multi-thousand dollar bribe not to accomplish a mission but that possibility may become reality as our involvement grows. We must anticipate these things and start training for them now.

A precedent has been set with the Congressional changes to existing laws. The Army must be prepared to take on the additional responsibilities that will come if the laws are amended again. The war on drugs can be won if we use innovative approaches such as those addressed in this study. If the Army is to play a significant role in that victory, we must anticipate future involvement and train accordingly.
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