A HISTORY OF DEFENSE REFORM SINCE 1970

by

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Thesis Advisor: Nancy C. Roberts

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This thesis develops a history of Defense Reform from 1970 to the present and attempts to demonstrate a linkage between concept generation and the outcomes of subsequent policy formulation. The origins of Defense Reform are examined beginning with developments and prominent personalities of the immediate post Vietnam War period and continuing to the present. In examining these developments, significant events are noted along with publications pertinent to the event. The results indicate that the phenomenon of defense reform has had a significant effect on the Defense Department's structure and policy. However, the full results of that effect cannot be completely determined due to the limitations of time and sources available for this study.
A History of Defense Reform Since 1970

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis develops a history of Defense Reform from 1970 to the present and attempts to demonstrate a linkage between concept generation and the outcomes of subsequent policy formulation. The origins of Defense Reform are examined beginning with developments and prominent personalities of the immediate post Vietnam War period and continuing to the present. In examining these developments, significant events are noted along with publications pertinent to the event. The results indicate that the phenomenon of defense reform has had a significant effect on the Defense Department's structure and policy. However, the full results of that effect cannot be completely determined due to the limitations of time and sources available for this study.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During every period of prolonged peace certain central lessons of war are often forgotten. In that context, historians and analysts frequently redevelop these forgotten lessons of international conflict, and formulate new observations on the effectiveness of a nation's security apparatus, and its ability to wage war as an instrument of national policy.

In the late 1960's the Vietnam War was enormously controversial in the United States, creating profound divisions and confusion in the national life. By 1970 a majority of Americans opposed the Vietnam War, and as a consequence, there was a general repudiation of the U.S. Military as the bearers of an unwanted history. (Sonnenberg, 1985, p. 441) During this period of national trauma, a mood of public indignation and frustration arose over the apparent inability of the U.S. Department of Defense to achieve its espoused goals, particularly with respect to its ability to conduct strategic planning, in order to effectively organize, train, and equip forces to wage war. It was out of this sense of indignation and frustration that the concept of defense reform received considerable public and private momentum.

For the purposes of this analysis, Defense Reform is defined as the systematic attempt by the nation's political
and social leadership to identify deficiencies in the organization, managerial and leadership procedures of the Department of Defense in order to improve the way the United States goes about planning, acquiring, and operating its armed forces, with the ultimate goal of ensuring U.S. security.

This thesis will seek to lay the basis for an analysis of Defense Reform since 1970 by identifying critical sources of defense reform and attempting to assess the impact of the effort to achieve Defense Reform on the Defense Department.

Three research questions will be addressed:

1. Who have been involved in Defense Reform and what are their main ideas?

2. What are the major events that established the context for defense reform in this period?

3. To what extent were the individuals concerned with reform efforts during this period successful in introducing change in the Department of Defense?

A. GOALS OF THE STUDY

The primary thrust of the thesis will be to identify a history of defense reform. A secondary aspect of the study will focus on the impact of reform efforts in changing defense structure and policy.

B. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Time and research constraints preclude a study of all aspects of defense reform. It is entirely possible that alternative sources exist, and not all of them can be identified within the confines of source availability for a
study of this nature. Therefore, this study will not attempt to determine the effectiveness of a type of reform effort. Additionally, it will not address the consequences of reform efforts, nor will it focus on specific issues of acquisition or procurement reform.

C. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The study is divided into six chapters. Chapter I introduces and describes the format of the thesis. Chapter II, entitled, "Sources of Defense Reform Since 1970," is divided into two parts. Section A identifies several of the principle architects and personalities that have been affiliated with issues of defense reform and discusses their main ideas and recommendations. Section B identifies some of the key organizations, both public and private, and one public commission, that have been proponents of defense reform and briefly discusses their goals and constituencies. Chapter III, entitled, "U.S. Military Operations Since 1970," provides a summary of the principle U.S. military operations since 1970, which because of their inconclusive outcome, raised a number of controversial defense issues to the public agenda and subsequently influenced the process of defense reform. Chapter IV, entitled, "Descriptive Overview of Reform Efforts," provides a chronology of the actions of the key persons identified in Chapter II and the sequence of events that took place in the context of reform in order to establish
a cause and effect relationship between the reformers' actions and subsequent changes that were implemented within the Defense Department. Chapter V provides an analysis of the defense reform efforts that took place during the period covered and attempts to assess the impact of these efforts. Chapter VI, entitled, "Conclusion and Recommendations," provides a summary and recapitulation of the thesis and concluding analysis, to include a recommendation on the benefit of an increased understanding of the process of defense reform.

D. METHODOLOGY

An historical methodology will be employed using primary and secondary sources to seek answers to the three research questions identified above. A primary source is defined as a work that was written at a time that is contemporary with the subject, and a secondary source is defined as a work that discusses the subject but was recorded after the time contemporary with it.

The historical method involves obtaining information about a period and then making judgments about the significance, meaning, and relevance of that information. The method is not necessarily scientific and thus may be subject to biases and inaccuracies.
E. DATA COLLECTION

Active data collection for this study began in the spring of 1989 and terminated in the fall of 1989. The data collection consisted of a literature search for resource material and in-depth interviews with several of the key players.

Resource material consisted of official documents from the executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government, think tank reports, magazine and newspaper articles, and editorials, and articles and position papers written by various public policy entrepreneurs.

Four interviews were conducted in Washington, D.C. during the week of 25 to 29 September 1989. Each of these interviews are cited in the list of references. The interviews were used to gather factual and background information on each of the interviewees, and they were asked to describe major life accomplishments and provide perspectives on issues of defense reform. All of the interviewees were from positions outside of government at the time of the interview, although each had previously been employed in some capacity by the government.
II. SOURCES OF DEFENSE REFORM SINCE 1970

Defense Reform has its origins with many sources, but for the purposes of the period covered since 1970, appears to have been concentrated around a small group of legislators, writers, military officers, and civilian analysts in the Washington, D.C. area. Although reform was not limited to this geographic locale, it appears that the nation's capitol, as the focus of legislative and executive authority, provided center stage for a receptive audience both in the government and with the public at large.

Whether or not the concept of Defense Reform can be defined as a movement in the sense of an emerging grass roots organization with specific goals, or whether it was simply a loose confederation of individuals with some common ideas and desires is a matter of ongoing debate (Interview Canby, 1989). However a number of key players' and organizations have

1Author's Note: In describing the key players in this study the following terms are defined: Public Entrepreneurship, the process of introducing innovation, the generation and implementation of new ideas, in the public sector; Policy Intellectual, the originator of an innovative idea; Policy Entrepreneur, a person outside the formal positions of government, who introduces and facilitates the implementation of new ideas in the public sector; Bureaucratic Entrepreneur, a person who occupies nonleadership positions in government and introduces and implements new ideas from his particular vantage point in public organizations; Executive entrepreneur, a person who from his leadership position in governmental agencies and departments, generates and implements new ideas; Political Entrepreneur, a person who
received considerable public recognition in this area and are discussed in the following two parts of this chapter.

A. KEY PLAYERS

1. William S. Lind


From 1977 to 1986 he served as Legislative Assistant for Armed Services to former Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado. Since 1987 Lind has been affiliated with the Free Congress Foundation, Center for Cultural Conservatism from where he has continued to write for a number of military and professional journals as an advocate of defense reform. (Interview Lind, 1989)

It was in 1976/1977 that Lind first began to receive considerable prominence in defense reform circles when he publicly challenged Army doctrine then being developed by General William DePuy (TRADOC) and his Deputy Brigadier General William Dyke. The Army at that time was engaged in revising many aspects of its doctrine. In the process of introduces and implements new ideas as a holder of elective office. (Roberts and King, 1989, pp. 2, 13)
rewriting Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (1976 edition) the generals had briefed selected members of congress and the public that their updated version represented an improved doctrine based on "fighting outnumbered and winning" and "winning the first battle." (Interview Canby, 1989) Lind, in an article published in *Military Review*, in March 1977, publicly refuted their version of doctrinal progress from the perspective of his own knowledge of military history, maneuver warfare and tactics. (Lind, 1977, pp. 55-65) From this debate considerable public discussion ensued, particularly in congressional circles. (Interview Canby, 1989)


The essential thrust of Lind's theories have dealt with the U.S. Military's concept of land warfare. Lind rejects what he feels has been our past concept of conducting wars of attrition dominated by massive firepower. Instead he advocates the adoption of a concept the Germans demonstrated in World War II. This concept of land warfare is based on maneuver and is more effective he argues, especially for the
side with fewer men and less equipment. He states for example:

We have generally depended on our tremendous manpower and material to overwhelm forces that were better, unit by unit. We gin up the production lines and crush the enemy with steel safes. That is no longer the circumstance—we are the smaller force—and our doctrine and training must change to reflect it. (Fallows, 1979, p. 63)

Lind, along with his political mentor, former Senator Hart, has consistently advocated a reexamination of our concept of land warfare, emphasizing that it is counterproductive to merely spend more money to buy more hardware. (Hart, 1981)

Over the past few years Lind has published a number of articles in the Marine Corps Gazette. He has developed a sympathetic following within the Marine Corps, and it is not surprising that he is favorably disposed toward the Marines. He has a significant influence within the Marine Corps and access to some of its senior leadership. (Saxman, 1989, p. 58)

2. Colonel John R. Boyd USAF (Ret.)

Colonel Boyd was a renowned fighter pilot and instructor during his active duty days in the U.S. Air Force. As a Captain he developed tactics that are still a basis of the U.S. Air Forces' approach to air to air combat. (Hart, 1986, p. 5) An early proponent of defense reform, he has been periodically employed since his retirement as a Defense
Consultant at the Pentagon, and currently resides in Florida. (Fallows, 1979, p. 62)

Colonel Boyd received considerable prominence for the development in February 1979 of an unpublished briefing entitled "Patterns of Conflict," in which he formulates his Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) theory. This theory, which is studded with historical references from the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. to Clausewitz, the Blitzkrieg, and the Vietnam War, is the product of three years of Boyd's starting-from-scratch self-education in the nature of combat. (Fallows, 1979, p. 62) Boyd's theory contends that the outcome of combat is determined not by the bigger cannon, or even by the larger force, but by the shrewdest combination of equipment, training, and ideas toward the end of adaptability. He bases his theory on his reflections of the air combat records of the Korean War, when the maneuverability of U.S. Jets appeared to count more than the technological superiority of the Soviet-manufactured North Korean Jets. The essential element of his theory is that all levels of conflict, from the boxer in the ring, to the general in the tent, consist of endless cycles of Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action. Whoever goes through these

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2The brief, "Patterns of Conflict," was updated and reprinted by Colonel Boyd in August 1987 under the new title "A Discourse on Winning and Losing." For continuity, the first title of the brief is used throughout this thesis.
cycles the more quickly will prevail, because his adversary's actions will become "more and more irrelevant, since they are responding to actions you have already changed." (Fallows, 1979, p. 62) In every case the critical competition is in time.

The element of confusion and sheer human weakness also figures prominently in this scheme. Boyd cites countless reports from World Wars I and II and quotes the ancient Chinese military Theorist Sun Tzu. Boyd's approach also dictates strategy and tactics--a strategy of striking at the head rather than hacking away at the limbs, and tactics of giving each low level unit maximum freedom to adapt and exploit the opportunities that open up as the battle progresses. (Boyd, 1979)

3. Dr. Stephen L. Canby

Age 56, B.S. USMA, West Point (1956), Ph.D. Political Economy and Government, Harvard University, a veteran of six years of active duty service as an Army infantry officer, Dr. Canby is currently a Washington, D.C.-based defense consultant with C&L Associates. He is also an adjunct professor with the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. (Interview Canby, 1989)

During his active duty Army service, Dr. Canby served tours in the Federal Republic of Germany and at the Ranger School, Fort Benning, Georgia. As a young Captain, Canby was tasked with writing a manual on small-unit infantry tactics.
He attempted to write a new manual to reflect actual combat experiences. Upon initial circulation at the Army's Infantry School the new manual was received with mixed reviews from established departments with entrenched interests. (Hart, 1986, p. 7)

After leaving the Army, Dr. Canby received his doctorate from Harvard and went to work for the RAND Corporation and later for Technology Service Corporation. In both instances he was employed as a defense analyst. In the 1970's, he moved to Washington, D.C. and established himself as an independent Defense Consultant. (Hart, 1986, p. 7) He has authored numerous studies on military strategy and tactics, military organization, and defense manpower. (Barlow, 1981, p. 43)

Dr. Canby feels that the need for defense reform in the U.S. goes back as far as World War II. He states that U.S. Army performance in land warfare was not effective both on the continent and in the Philippines, but because we won the war it was difficult to criticize those institutions that achieved success at that time. However events since World War II have clearly established a need for reform in Canby's view. He cites the Korean War, Vietnam Conflict, Mayaguez Incident, Desert One, Grenada, and the Beirut Bombing of U.S. Marines, as all being instances that highlight the need for reform within the U.S. defense establishment. It was a trip to Israel with Dr. Edward Luttwak that particularly highlighted
the need for defense reform in the U.S. Military in Canby's mind. During this trip Drs. Canby and Luttwak were met and briefed by the Israeli Defense Forces' Brigadier General Ben-Gal of the 7th Brigade in the Golan Heights. Brigadier General Ben-Gal effectively demonstrated for his visitors the use of barriers as a "rationing device" in linear warfare. It was a concept Canby feels the U.S. Army has missed entirely. (Interview Canby, 1989)

Among the more widely received of Dr Canby's publications is his article "Military Reform and the Art of War" published in the Fall 1982 issue of International Security Review. Canby's essential theory of defense reform, as espoused in this article is that defense spending alone is not a good measure of military prowess and capability. It is merely a measure of input and the burden upon society. He defines "Military Superiority" as a condition of strategic parity and conventional superiority. (Canby, 1982, p. 246) He argues that in the nuclear age, unless one side obtains a dramatic strategic advantage, the only usable forces are conventional, and that is where improvements should be concentrated. Whatever western military inferiority exists, Canby feels is due, not to inadequate resources, but to a lack of combat forces, and to a tactical and operational passivity stemming from a doctrine emphasizing positional defense of linear lines and firepower. The solution he espouses is structural realignment, stating that U.S. and western military
inferiority, if it exists, is purely self-inflicted. Canby is a firm advocate for updating doctrine to increase the ratio of combat units, and he argues for the improved use of technology and manpower, and an enhanced strategy and closer integration with allies. (Canby, 1982, pp. 245-268)

4. Dr. Edward N. Luttwak

Dr. Luttwak first arrived in the U.S. in 1972. Describing himself as an Armenian born in 1942, he and his family left their ancestral home in Transylvania, in what is now Rumania, at the end of World War II. He spent most of his adolescence attending Jesuit schools in Palermo, Italy, and received further education in England (London School of Economics), Israel, and in the United States (Ph.D. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland under the noted academician Dr Robert Stacker).

Dr. Luttwak's military experience is limited to Royal Army Reserve training he participated in while a student in England. He has also been a frequent observer of military activities in Israel. (Interview Luttwak, 1989)

As of this writing Dr. Luttwak is holder of the distinguished Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, at the Center For Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant to the National Security Council, Department of Defense and Department of State. He has also performed contractual work for the U.S. Army and foreign armies on tactical and operational matters,
independently, and in conjunction with his partner Canby of C&L Associates. He has lectured at universities in the U.S. and abroad, as well at the National Defense University, the War Colleges, and other U.S. and foreign military schools. An accomplished and prolific writer, he is the author of eight books, including *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, *On the Meaning of Victory* and *The Pentagon and The Act of War*. Additionally he has published numerous essays, articles and editorials for periodicals and journals in the U.S. and abroad.

With respect to defense reform in the U.S. Dr. Luttwak feels that:

> We have an outmoded military establishment, which failed in Vietnam, Iran, and Lebanon, and continues to fail silently in providing adequate military readiness,...and is in need of drastic fundamental reform. (Luttwak, 1984, title page)

In his writings he attempts to demonstrate that no matter how great our defense expenditures, we can rebuild America's military effectiveness only through systematic change and a unified strategy. He sees the source of the Pentagon's ills as caused by the presence of "too many officers, a materialist bias, and mismanagement of personnel, etc." Overall there is the failure to have developed a coherent national military strategy. A solution that he offers is the creation of a general staff or "national defense officers" divorced from separate service loyalties. (Luttwak, 1984, p. 272)
Dr. Luttwak differs from many of his fellow advocates of defense reform in that he is acutely aware of "how real reform depends on insiders who are both real reformers and real insiders." He feels strongly that when an outside reformer is given the opportunity for acceptance by the establishment, he should move into the fold and subsequently support the establishment from within in order to effectively implement his ideas. (Interview Luttwak, 1989)

Not without his critics, however, Dr. Luttwak was initially closely affiliated with Lind and some other prominent defense reformers, but their relationships soured when it was alleged by some that Luttwak's views were tainted by his supposed acceptance of remuneration from the Northrup Corporation for his advocacy of the development of the F/A-18 Aircraft as a needed technology reform. (Interview Lind, 1989) Additionally, by his own admission, Luttwak feels that his consulting contracts with the Department of Defense have been severely curtailed because of the personal intervention of former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger over allegations of Dr Luttwak's competence. (Interview Luttwak, 1989) Neither of these allegations can be substantiated by this researcher.

5. Michael R. Burns

Currently a 38 year-old Senior Fellow with Business Executives for National Security (BENS), Inc. of Washington, D.C., Mr. Burn's affiliation with defense reform has been more
in the position of expeditor and observer, rather than as writer and theorist. A graduate of Iona College and Long Island University (M.A. Political Philosophy), Mr. Burns has been closely affiliated with a number of the more prominent elected and appointed personalities associated with defense reform since the mid 1970's. In particular he has been a keen behind the scenes observer of the inner workings of the Congressional Defense Reform Caucus (to be discussed later in this chapter) and related groupings and official organizations affiliated with defense reform in the Washington, D.C. area.

Burns' work experience includes employment with the Heritage Foundation from 1979-81, work as a Congressional Fellow in National Security Affairs, Legislative Assistant to Representative Newt Gingrich (Republican, Georgia), and Special Assistant to Mr. Ray Raehn of the U.S. Global Strategy Counsel of Washington, D.C.

His personal background does not include active or reserve military service, and he has been employed with BENS Inc. for the past six years.

It is from his unique vantage point as a somewhat detached observer that Burns is able to offer a number of elucidating insights on the subject of defense reform since 1970. An example of this is seen in his citation of an oft-quoted comment of General Lynch, U.S. Army (Retired) who would frequently ask congressmen and their staffers to explain "What is the incentive a guy has to advance on an enemy sniper?"
The answer to this hypothetical question, in Burns' view, was not readily amenable to a neat tweak in the Congressional Defense Budget, and caused many congressmen and staffers to become concerned with the notions of incentives and disincentives with respect to directed behavior. He therefore acknowledges a growing congressional recognition in the late 1970's and early 1980's of the necessity for a moral dimension to be added to defense thinking that had been woefully insufficient up until that time.

Mr. Burns feels that as we as a nation have moved further and further away from the agony of Vietnam, our "corporate denial of the existence of this dilemma" will pass and more effective self-examination of our government processes will be possible. (Interview Burns, 1989)

6. James Fallows

A former speech writer for President Jimmy Carter, James Fallows is currently Washington Editor for the Atlantic Monthly. He has extensive overseas journalistic experience, primarily in Asia, and has undoubtedly done the most to popularize the ideas of defense reform. He is the author of several highly acclaimed books including National Defense (1981) and More Like Us (1989). However, it was a series of articles that he wrote for the Atlantic Monthly in 1979 and 1981 that projected him into the arena of defense reform.

The first article, "Muscle-Bound Super Power, the State of America's Defense," published in October 1979,
highlighted concerns that the nation's military security was inadequate and emphasized a fear that the United States' military had become shackled to high technology that might fail when put to the ultimate test of combat. The article emphasized the crucial public debate then underway, about not only how much to spend on national defense, but how better to spend it. (Fallows, 1979, p. 59)

The second article, entitled "The Civilianization of the Army," published in April 1981, dealt with ongoing concerns about the effectiveness of the all-volunteer force in view of the then current quality of the incoming volunteers, and the institutional changes that had been implemented to recruit and retrain the all-volunteer force. Although written before the recruiting/retention successes of the mid-1980's, the article alleged that conditions of service in the contemporary all-volunteer force undermined the unique qualities a fighting force must posses. As a solution to this dilemma Mr. Fallows advocates a return to the draft, albeit in this case a reformed draft that does not suffer the unjust inequities of the Vietnam-era conscription. (Fallows, 1981, pp. 98-108)

Although not necessarily a policy intellectual, but more a conveyer of other theorist's ideas, Fallows has been portrayed as a key personality in advocating concepts of defense reform.
7. **Harry G. Summers Jr.**

A retired U.S. Army Colonel with a distinguished career as an infantryman and designated Army Strategist, Colonel Summers holds bachelor's and master's degrees in military arts and science. His active duty career included an instructor tour on the faculty of the U.S. Army War College as holder of the General Douglas MacArthur Chair in strategy, and an instructor tour at the Army's Command and Staff College. He was a member of General Creighton Abram's strategic assessment group and served in the office of the Army Chief of Staff from 1975 to 1979. (Summers, 1981, p. 122)

Summers is currently a contributing editor for *U.S. News and World Report* (S. HRG. 100-257, 1987, p. IV), and his articles on strategy have appeared in a number of periodicals including *Military Review* and *Naval Institute Proceedings*. (Summers, 1981, p. 122) It is, however, his publication *On Strategy, The Vietnam War in Context* that has received the most critical acclaim and review with respect to issues of defense reform. (Interviews Lind and Canby, 1989)

The focus of Colonel Summers' theory has been to seek a balance in the critical issues facing the post-Vietnam Army. He readily acknowledges criticism of the Army for over-reliance on attrition and its failure to appreciate the benefits of maneuver when dealing with principles of land warfare. He feels such criticisms serve a useful function to the degree that they cause the Army to examine its
organization and doctrine. But he argues further that since criticisms are frequently one-sided and argumentive, they often oversimplify and confuse the issue. He alludes to the problem of reform as not a simple one of "either/or" but a much more complicated one of "both/and." The true problem he feels is the need to maintain a proper balance between such competing demands as leadership and management, attrition and maneuver. He also acknowledges a compounding concern for what he calls the "unfortunate" constitutional requirement to justify military needs to the congress in monetary terms which frequently causes the complexity of balance to be overlooked.

Colonel Summers further challenges civilian leadership to be aware of the imperatives of military operations. He feels they need to understand that national policy affects not only selection of the military objective, but also the very way that war is conducted. (Summers, 1982, pp. 1-4, 111-121)

8. Pierre M. Sprey

An engineering graduate of Yale University and Cornell University, Pierre Sprey has an extensive background in analytical studies dealing with such subjects as tactical air effectiveness and NATO force structure. He worked as a Special Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1966 to 1970, and was formerly a research scientist with Grummen Aircraft Corporation and later a Vice President of Enviro Control Inc. Since 1977 he has been the president of his own defense consulting firm, Pierre M. Sprey Inc.
Although most of his writing has been done under contract, his expertise, particularly in the matters of tactical aircraft design and employment of such aircraft as the A-10, is well known throughout the defense community. His link to military reform has been in his advocacy of hardware effectiveness and in his articulation of the need for improvements in the weapons acquisition system, particularly in the areas of competitive procurement, operational testing and competitive prototyping. (Barlow, 1981, p. 44)

9. Charles C. Moskos

A distinguished American military sociologist, Charles C. Moskos ia a veteran of enlisted U.S. Army service during World War II and is currently a professor at Northwestern University in Chicago. His expertise in military sociology rests on a broad base of more than 20 years of research and writing. (Thomas, 1989, p. 79)

The key element of Moskos' contribution to defense reform is the institution-to-occupation (I/O) model that he first developed in 1977. Simply put, this model sees the motivation of military personnel as falling between two opposing poles: loyalty to the military institution itself ("the calling") and loyalty to the occupation ("the job"). Moskos originally advanced this model in opposition to what he saw as the domination of defense planning by economic analysts and their purely material considerations that had led to the establishment of the all-volunteer force. He submits that a
failure to recognize the distinction between the institutional and organizational requirements of the military has led to inherent defects in the all-volunteer force. Moskos has perceived that soldiers are in the all-volunteer force just to have a job. Lacking traditional loyalty to their calling, these soldiers are deficient in morale, discipline and unit cohesion. (Moskos, 1989, pp. 3-14)

Moskos advocates a requirement for national service based on an emotional preference for a socially-representative military in addition to the common desire for more effective recruiting of better qualified personnel. He advances the sentimental argument of militia versus regular army that dates from the days of the Continental Army. Moskos is convinced that the health of a democratic society demands that military service be a recognized civic duty frequently performed and that its military be representative of all levels of that society. Thus the all-volunteer force, whatever its quality, will continue to be fundamentally flawed in his view. (Thomas, 1989, p. 80)

10. David Packard

A graduate of Stanford University's engineering program, David Packard, together with his associate William Hewlett, founded the spectacularly successful Hewlett-Packard Company in 1938. The company is the world's leading manufacturer of electronic test and measurement equipment, and Mr. Packard is the chairman of the board. His familiarity
with the problems of defense management and his keen interest in defense reform derives from his business career and his service as Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1971. (Packard, 1987, p. vi) His rise to prominence with respect to defense reform came with his appointment by President Reagan to the chairmanship of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management from 1985 to 1986. The final report to President Reagan was a document entitled *A Quest for Excellence*. This report contains an analysis and a series of recommendations designed to improve defense management, and many of the recommendations have since been implemented in one form or another.

The recommendations themselves are divided into four major areas: national security planning and budgeting, military organization and command, acquisition organization and procedures, and government-industry accountability. They can be briefly summarized as a call for streamlining the defense bureaucracy and upgrading the acquisition work force, in addition to a selected list of other measures. (President's Commission, 1986)

11. **Edward R. Jayne**

An Air Force Academy graduate and a holder of a doctorate in political science and national security policy from MIT, Jayne was selected as a White House Fellow following his first Vietnam combat tour as an A-1 Skyraider pilot. As the recipient of two silver stars and five Distinguished
Flying Crosses, he was assigned to the Executive office of the President (Nixon at the time) where he worked as a special assistant to the director of the Council on International Policy. After this assignment he was reassigned to a second tour in Southeast Asia, this time flying F-4 fighter bombers out of Thailand. Upon his return to Washington, still in uniform, he joined the National Security Council Staff as a specialist on defense policy and programs. Zbigniew Brezinski arranged for him to stay on through the Carter Administration. President Carter, impressed with his qualifications at age 32, invited him to resign his Air Force commission as a major and accept appointment as associate director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which Jayne accepted. (Canan, 1982, pp. 34-35)

While Jayne was in this position he spoke out and worked forcefully for a more closely supervised defense budget that attempted to force the services to winnow their annual wish lists, and do a better job of rationalizing their technologies and form-fitting their forces. Jayne was persuaded that the military suffered more from incoherence of forces and weapons than it did from an aggregate shortage of spending money. He used the budget to "ride heard" on the DOD to include their planning and policy making efforts as measures of their effectiveness. (Canan, 1982, p. 34)
Jayne left the Office of Management and Budget in mid-1980 to become Director of Aerospace Planning, a newly created post, at General Dynamics Corporation. (Canan, 1982, p. 76)

B. ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMISSION

1. Congressional Military Reform Caucus

Founded and organized in the summer of 1981 by Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado, and Representative G. William Whitehurst, Republican of Virginia, the Defense Reform Caucus is a bi-partisan group of representatives and senators loosely united by a vaguely defined goal of achieving some measure of defense reform. (Interview Lind, 1989)

The caucus initially prided itself on having no leaders or staff and attempted to achieve its goals by forging consensus. Basically the members would like those in charge of the nation's defense to plan ahead, starting with congress and ending with the lowest rifle platoon. Once that is done they would like tactics and weapons to fit the plan. The plan in their view, is more important than sophisticated, gold-plated weapons. The original caucus membership consisted of about 54 Representatives and Senators and their 1982 membership is appended as Appendix A. (Marsh, 1982, pp. 55-56)

In the current 101st Congress, the caucus stands at about 130 members, and it is formally co-chaired by Senator William V. Roth Jr., Republican of Delaware, and
2. **Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)**

   Founded in 1982, CSIS is an independent, tax exempt, public policy research institution, based in Washington, D.C. Its stated mission is to advance the understanding of emerging world issues in the areas of international security, economics, politics, and governance. It does no classified or proprietary work and its reports are available to the public. Within its functional programs of Arms Control, National Security and Political-Military Affairs, it has been closely affiliated with issues of defense reform. It is funded by private sector contributions and through corporate and government research projects. (Brochure, CSIS, 1989)

3. **Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Inc.**

   A commercial trade association founded in 1982 by Stanley A. Weiss, an American Businessman, BENS Inc. seeks to apply successful business practices to what they describe as "the challenge of building a strong, effective, affordable defense." Its membership consists primarily of business executives and entrepreneurs, who work to bring the lessons of the corporate world to the management of national security. It has established a reputation as a conservative grass roots network of about 5000 businessmen with interests in the military, economic, and institutional aspects of national security. (Singer, 1989)
4. **The Heritage Foundation**

A Washington-based, tax-exempt, non-partisan policy research institution, The Heritage Foundation publishes a wide variety of research in various formats for the benefit of decision-makers and the interested public. An avowedly conservative foundation, its principle source of support is through the receipt of tax-deductible gifts from individuals, corporations and associations. The foundation's primary forum for the dissemination of ideas is through the publication of a series of policy studies. These publications are in-depth analyses of major issues written by scholars or experienced professionals in the appropriate field. Since the late 1970's the foundation has published a number of policy studies related to issues of defense reform. They also publish a quarterly journal of public policy and sponsor a Washington Semester Program for interested undergraduate and graduate students to increase their knowledge of Congress and the legislative process through first-hand experience with congressional internships and individual research. (Barlow, 1981)

5. **The Packard Commission**

The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management was an ad hoc group of retired senior military officers, former defense officials, and business executives, that was appointed by President Reagan in 1985 to study the U.S. Defense Establishment and formulate recommendations for
its improvement in light of recent concerns dealing with the military's recent performance in Lebanon and Grenada. As discussed in Section A, the industrialist David Packard was named to the Chairmanship of the Commission.

The findings and recommendations of the Commission (The Packard Commission) were contained in a report entitled "A Quest For Excellence." This report was a comprehensive call for defense structural reorganization and it provided specific recommendations to address coordination and procurement deficiencies. The recommendations are summarized in four areas as follows.

a. National Security Planning and Budgeting

The report calls for a rational system whereby the Executive branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national military strategy, the forces to carry it out, and the funding that should be provided—in light of the overall economy and competing claims on national resources. (Commission Summary, 1986, p. xvii)

b. Military Organization and Command

The commission made two recommendations. The first was to improve the command of deployed U.S. military forces under the unified commanders, including both the established worldwide commands, and those assigned for specific actions. Second, the commission recommended that the chairman of the JCS and the unified commanders should be given a stronger role in the process of deciding what new weapons
should be acquired and in distributing the resources available among the military departments. (Commission Summary, 1986, p. xx)

c. Acquisition Organization and Procedures

The commission recommended that improvements be made in the process by which the Department of Defense and Congress buy military equipment and material in three ways. One, by creating the new position of an undersecretary of defense for acquisition (a procurement czar). Two, by making better use of technology to reduce cost and improve performance. Three, by restructuring a joint Requirements and Management Board co-chaired by the acquisition czar and a newly created vice chairman of the JCS. (Commission Summary, 1986, pp. xxi-xxvii)

d. Government-Industry Accountability

The commission recommended that civil and criminal enforcement of defense procurement activities be made more effective by improving current standards of conduct for personnel concerned and by increasing clear and coordinated oversight of contractor performance without impeding their efforts at self-improvement. (Commission Summary, 1986, p. xxvii)

C. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Although this summary of key personnel and organizations is decidedly limited, it represents a concerted effort to
identify some of the principle architects and associations affiliated with issues of defense reform for the period covered. The list is admittedly not all-inclusive, and research constraints inhibit such an ideal. However it is perhaps useful at this junction to note that a number of additional players are involved, and in order to preclude any criticism of neglecting their viewpoints, their names and vocations/affiliations are appended as Appendix B.
III. U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS SINCE 1970

A. THE VIETNAM WAR

On the 20th of February 1970, the Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, began peace talks with representatives of the North Vietnamese Government in Paris, France. These talks were aimed at extricating America from what had become the longest and potentially most divisive overseas military venture in U.S. history. It would be an additional three years before a final Vietnam Peace Pact was signed on 27 January 1973, and an additional two years after that before all U.S. forces were finally extricated from Vietnam with the fall of the Saigon Government on 30 April 1975. (Summers, 1985, pp. 52, 57, 59)

More than 50,000 American servicemen died in that war. Residual effects of the conflict's negative public image would effectively drive two presidents from office and resulted in a national schism that has since been described by some authors as an expansion of "the great divorce" between "the other America of Defense" (i.e., the military) and the American people, in particular the social and intellectual elites of America. (Hadley, 1986, p. 52)

A critical element of the American military effort during the war was the employment of an attrition strategy that essentially involved the use of heavy firepower in combatting
Vietcong guerrillas and North Vietnamese regulars in South Vietnam. Effective though it was in attriting the enemy, it alienated the American public because of its immense destructive power and its apparent inability to lessen the opposition's will to fight. (Summers, 1985, p. 359)

Additionally because of the continued high cost of the war, both in terms of economics and in terms of manpower, and the less than candid image projected by American civilian and military leaders concerning this cost, considerable domestic opposition to the government's wartime policies developed among the American people. This public discontent was in a large measure directed towards the U.S. military. Events came to a tragic head on 4 May 1970 at Kent State University in Ohio.

As with many college campuses across the country at that time, student disturbances had broken out at Kent State University in opposition to a recent U.S. military "incursion" from South Vietnam into neighboring "neutral" Cambodia. After student protestors torched the Kent State University ROTC building, Ohio Governor James Rhodes called out the Army National Guard to restore order. In the ensuing melee, a group of poorly disciplined Army Guardsmen, under harassment from the crowd, fired their rifles at the demonstrators, killing four, including an Army ROTC cadet. This incident sparked massive nationwide protests against both the
continuing Vietnam war effort and the U.S. military's association with that effort. (Summers, 1985, p. 215)

By far the greatest cost to the American military of the war in Vietnam was the shift in values of the American people. Support for the military was simply not forthcoming. Public recognition that a functional military requires extraordinary performance and cultural support was denied. This denial can be attributed to many factors, but one in particular stands out. This factor concerns the public's perceived infringement of its right to receive accurate military information during the course of the war, especially in terms of casualty reports and conduct of the war, even if that information was sensitive enough to have an impact on the capacity of the military to fulfill its objectives. More than any other single issue in the great debates that raged during the Vietnam era, this issue eroded the special trust that exists between any nation and its military. (Summers, 1985, p. 215)

B. KEY EVENTS SINCE THE VIETNAM WAR

In the 20 years since the initial American drawdown in Vietnam in 1969-70, the U.S. military launched no fewer than five major military operations to apply force in support of the government's foreign policy objectives. These operations were: (1) the raid on Sontay prison in North Vietnam to

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\(^3\)U.S. military personnel strength in Vietnam peaked at 543,400 on 30 April 1969. (Summers, 1985, p. 50)
rescue 70 American POW's alleged to have been held there; (2) the rescue of the crew of the S.S. Mayaguez in Cambodia in 1975; (3) the mission into Iran in 1980 to rescue the hostages held at the American embassy in Teheran; (4) the participation in the multinational force in Lebanon from 1982 to 1983 in support of the Gemayel government; and (5) the invasion of Grenada in the Caribbean in 1983 in order to topple a hostile regime and replace it with one more accommodating to U.S. interests. In each of these instances the U.S. military demonstrated a need for reform by either failing to accomplish its mission or else by mounting operations characterized by serious shortcomings in military technique. (Gabriel, 1985, p. 5) The five operations and their outcomes are briefly described as follows.

1. The Sontay Prison Raid

In the early morning hours of Saturday, 21 November 1970, a 56-man special operations assault force under the command of U.S. Army Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons raided the Sontay prison camp located about 30 miles west of Hanoi, the capital of North Vietnam. Sontay was a North Vietnamese POW compound alleged by some U.S. intelligence analysts to have held approximately 70 American pilots as prisoners.

The raid was the first major military operation planned directly by the JCS, and the planning staff was drawn from all military services and included representatives from the major intelligence agencies. Stateside training for the
raid had begun six months earlier at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and the assigned mission of the assault force was to liberate and retrieve the Americans held as POW's.

The raid itself was a perfect application of military technique, from the initial launch of the heliborne assault force at Udorn Air Force Base in Thailand, to its final recovery; none of the assault force were killed or wounded. But there were no American servicemen to rescue. Upon arrival at Sontay, the raid force found the compound to be void of POW's. However, in the course of the raid the assault force did kill an exceptionally large number of personnel who were later revealed by intelligence sources to be Russian and Chinese advisors that had been housed in a nearby barracks.

The POW's had been moved four months earlier, and the after-action report would show that Defense Intelligence Agency analysts were aware of that information. The only people involved who were not aware that the camp was empty were the members of the raid force itself.

Thus, a bold plan, with realistic training, and near flawless execution, failed to achieve its objective due to an intelligence dissemination failure. Post-raid analysis attributed this failure to the JCS command structure, which demonstrated that once it was committed to a course of action based on bureaucratic consensus, it was unable to recognize the validity of contrary data, and terminate an operation that
had achieved a momentum of its own. (Gabriel, 1985, pp. 35-60)

2. The Mayaguez Rescue

On Tuesday, 15 May 1975, approximately 225 U.S. Marines of Battalion Landing Team 2/9, embarked in U.S. Air Force helicopters from Utapo Air Force Base Thailand, assaulted Koh Tang Island, Cambodia in an attempt to rescue the civilian crew of the S.S. Mayaguez. The S.S. Mayaguez was an American merchant ship that had three days earlier been seized in an act of piracy on the high seas by the Cambodian Navy. Unknown to the assault force, the 39 American merchant crewmen of the Mayaguez had already been released through international diplomatic efforts, and in the ensuing assault on what turned out to be a heavily defended island, 18 men were lost (including three bodies left behind), and 50 men were wounded. Post-incident reports cite commanders with risking the lives of 250 Marines, Sailors and Airmen in a pointless venture to rescue a crew that was already safe. Additionally, the military intelligence community was cited for failing to provide accurate and timely combat intelligence.

Different casualty figures have been cited by various researchers for this incident. Hart and Lind cite the figure of 41 U.S. Marine KIA's to rescue 40 Mayaguez crewmen. (Hart 1986, p. 2) These are figures which may have been taken from initial media reports. Gabriel cites figures taken from official DOD casualty reports, which may or may not be more precise.
as to the nature and disposition of hostile forces on the island. (Gabriel, 1986, p. 83)

3. The Iran Rescue Mission

On 24 April 1980, combined American military forces launched an attempted special operations rescue mission to liberate the 53 American hostages who had previously been seized by Iranian militants at the American embassy in Teheran, Iran in November 1979. Proceeding to a clandestine intermediate refueling site (code named "Desert One") in the middle of the Iranian Dasht-e-Kavir desert, the airborne/heliborne rescue force was allegedly crippled by the failure of a sufficient number of Navy CH-53 helicopters to arrive at the refueling site to continue with the mission. Subsequently an on-site decision to abort the mission was made and concurred with by National Command Authorities. In the ensuing departure confusion at Desert One, a Marine-piloted helicopter collided with a parked Air Force C-130, and the resultant explosion and fire claimed the lives of eight U.S. servicemen and ultimately resulted in the compromise of American plans to rescue the hostages. This event has been described as a watershed in marking the decline of American military prestige and competence and dramatized the inability of U.S. military planners to conceive and execute a military operation even though they had almost six months to organize it. (Hadley, 1986, pp. 3-28)
4. The Multinational Force in Lebanon

On Sunday, 23 October 1983, American Marines, as part of a multinational "peacekeeping" force at Beirut International Airport, were hit by a terrorist truck bomb attack which resulted in the deaths of 241 U.S. servicemen, and over 100 wounded. The ensuing public outcry eventually resulted in the "redeployment" of all U.S. forces out of Lebanon. A subsequent examination of events in Lebanon during the 533 days of U.S. presence revealed a high degree of incompetence and failure in the application of military technique. The implication was that the American military had great difficulty executing operations for which it planned or in adjusting plans to changing circumstances. This failure has been attributed to a U.S. military structure that is heavily bureaucratized, and that diffuses responsibility, often resulting in such a tragic separation of execution and planning. (Gabriel, 1986, pp. 117-146)

5. The Grenada Invasion

On Tuesday, 25 October 1983, Operation "Urgent Fury" began. This was a combined U.S. military invasion of the island of Grenada in the Caribbean, involving all branches of the American armed forces, including elements of the clandestine Delta Force. Coming hard on the heels of the Beirut airport bombing debacle, the invasion was launched by the Reagan administration as a political operation orchestrated to convey an impression of U.S. military
credibility, with the ostensible purpose of preventing nearly 800 American students at the island's medical school from falling hostage to the local government's new revolutionary regime. The regime was alleged by the Reagan Administration to have had all the trappings of a Soviet proxy.

Moving against what was later considered to be marginal opposition, a number of glaring shortcomings were revealed in the American military structure during the subsequent three-day operation. These shortcomings included:

1. Intelligence—Intelligence failed to provide adequate information about the location and strength of enemy positions.

2. Ground Forces—With a substantial numerical advantage the U.S. Army ground advance was much too slow to effectively neutralize enemy opposition, and there was a clear failure to seize enemy strong points suddenly and in depth. There was a high proportion of non-hostile fire deaths and injuries compounded by inadequate medical facilities and treatment. Heat exhaustion was extensive and caused in part by the use of new heavy battle dress fatigues.

3. Command and Control—Command and Control appeared to have been conducted more to give each of the services an opportunity to get in on the show rather than to successfully conduct a combined exercise. (Gabriel, 1986, pp. 149-186)

C. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This summary of the U.S. military record since 1970 reveals a trend of mixed success, for example, in Vietnam, the methods prescribed by the political order for waging the war were highly successful in attaining their objectives, i.e., attriting the enemy and obtaining a significant "body count."
However, continual battlefield successes, waged in accordance with politically prescribed methods and means, seemed to have no relative bearing on the eventual outcome of the war and ultimately may have contributed to its adverse conclusion. Furthermore, it seemed there were few attractive mechanisms available that could have prescribed alternative methods of waging the war that might have been more suitable in attaining the established policy objectives of the conflict.

In Grenada, on the other hand, the political objectives were clearly attained. However, the battlefield performance of a well-trained and well-equipped force, with few politically imposed engagement restrictions, left much to be desired.

These examples of a potentially adverse trend have been greatly magnified in the eyes of the attentive public who share significant concerns about national defense. A long string of military failures or irrelevant successes is frequently cited as the most important reason we need a new defense structure, a structure that will enhance the military's operational style in order to successfully achieve national security objectives. A military system that consistently fails to achieve stated objectives in support of national policy is seen by many as endangering the existence of the nation it supports. (Hart, 1986, p. 3)
IV. DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW OF REFORM EFFORTS

The ineffective nature of the military operations discussed in Chapter III established the context in which a like-minded group of analysts and writers, introduced in Chapter II, joined together to effectively galvanize public opinion around the issue of military reform. The events previously described and the actions of these and other individuals associated with reform efforts can perhaps best be conceptualized in terms of a chronology which highlights the dates of the critical incidents, the publication dates of reformers' books and articles, and the dates of the specific actions taken in support of defense reform by both the reformers and affiliated public policy entrepreneurs who were in a position to affect reform efforts.

A. THE CORE GROUP

In the late 1970's five of the individuals (see below) profiled in Chapter II came together to form what has been described by one of their members, Bill Lind, as "the core

5Author's note: "As used here, efficiency is an economically-oriented term referring to the assembling of a military asset at a minimum of cost or waste. Effectiveness, however, is a militarily-oriented term referring to the ability of a military force to fight and defeat enemy forces." (Barlow, 1981, p. 2)
group of the military reform movement." (Interview Lind, 1989)

While conceding that defense reform efforts had multiple inputs, Lind credits this group with generating the most significant impact on military reform efforts at that time, through their unique ability to create an awareness and forge a political consensus which ultimately resulted in defense legislation and defense policies that reflected many of their reform ideas. (Interview Lind, 1989)

According to Lind, "the core group" consisted of himself, John Boyd, Steven Canby, Norman Polmar, Pierre Sprey, and several others. Their activities are perhaps best amplified

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6 In the late 1970's and early 1980's Lind was reluctant to identify prominent active duty officers who were sympathetic to military reform efforts. He felt that they should remain anonymous to preclude career isolation and suppression. (Interview Lind, 1989) However two who have since been identified and can be named are: then-Lieutenant Colonel Michael Wyly USMC, who was instrumental in introducing the doctrine of maneuver warfare into the Marine Corps' Amphibious Warfare School in 1982, and then-Major General Alfred Grey USMC, who introduced maneuver warfare as doctrine for the Second Marine Division in 1981. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 38)

7 Civilian reformers inside the Defense Department identified by Lind are Franklin C. "Chuck" Spinney, a budget analyst, and A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management systems specialist, and author of The Pentagonists. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 8) Reformers outside the Defense Department mentioned by Lind include: Dr. Jefferery Record, a prominent author on national security affairs and a former aide to Senator Sam Nunn; Dina Rasor, a defense procurement consultant, Paul Hoven, a former helicopter pilot in Vietnam; and Joe Burnice, who worked for the reform-oriented Project on Military Personnel; and Drs. Richard Gabriel, author of Military Incompetence, and Paul Savage, both of St. Anselm College (p. 9).
by Lind in a number of his writings. Lind defines the objective of the military reform movement as: "an attempt to discover the root causes of our military failures, develop the ideas necessary for restoring military effectiveness, and turn those ideas into policy." (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 4)

John Boyd is described by Lind as being the intellectual patriarch of the core group, his brief *Patterns of Conflict* is cited as containing a substantial portion of much of the original military theory developed in this century. Boyd's emphasis on being able to modify one's own movements in combat faster than an enemy can react to them, and the application of this notion to the full range of thinking, strategy, force planning and tactics, is a key element in the proposed strategy of the reform movement. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 6)

Dr. Steven Canby is described by Lind as the tactician among the core group of military reformers. His expertise and contributions have come in his knowledge and writings on small unit infantry tactics and in his strident opposition to reliance on a doctrine of positional defense and attrition warfare. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 7)

Pierre Sprey is the hardware reformer in Bill Lind's core group. He is credited with placing an emphasis on the understanding that the highest price technology is not necessarily the most effective in combat. To provide a basis for the improvement of weapons, Pierre Sprey has pioneered the
use of accurate combat history to derive crucial effectiveness characteristics. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 8)

Norman Polmar, not profiled in Chapter II, is a Washington based contributing editor for the publication Janes' Fighting Ships, and is credited by Lind as being a naval and aerospace analyst for the group. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 7)

Although not considered by Lind to be a member of "the core group," Army Colonel Harry G. Summers is credited by Lind as being the principle writer who initially pointed out a number of the lessons of our ten year war in South East Asia. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 1) In reviewing Summers' book On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, published in 1981, Lind states that Summers effectively argued that we confused preparing for war, with the conduct of war, and that our strategy was essentially budget-driven and primarily a function of resource allocation. Thus, in spite of our commitment of billions of dollars into technologically complex weapons systems, we were beaten by an opponent who had a more realistic view of war and relied on strategy, tactics, and simplicity (p. 2).

As evidence of the linkage of "the core group" both Lind and Canby cite the group's collective writings in the document, Reforming the Military, which was published by the Heritage Foundation in 1981. (Interviews Lind and Canby, 1989) This document contains individual essays written by each of these individuals, plus an essay by Luttwak, which
argue that the way to improve the fighting effectiveness of our general purpose forces is not to spend more money on them, but to restructure the way they are organized, equipped, and employed. (Barlow, 1981, p. iv)

Additional acknowledgement of the close association of "the core group" was provided by their later public testimony in Congress⁸ and the group's public recognition as described in the media by such individuals as former Under Secretary of the Navy Woolsey and John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago. (Interview Lind, 1989)

Woolsey, in his 1981 editorial in the Washington Post entitled, "Billions for Defense," states, "The Godfathers of the reform movement are John Boyd, a retired Air Force pilot; Bill Lind, on Senator Gary Hart's staff; consultant Steve Canby; and one or two others." (Woolsey, 1891)


⁸Later findings of the group's joint testimony in Congress includes such examples as the joint testimony by Record and Summers on 27 January 1987. (S. HRG. 100-257, 1987, pp. 705, 714)
1. **Summary of Findings Concerning the Core Group**

As a core group these reformers have strongly criticized past land warfare doctrine that emphasized the role of heavy firepower and attrition. Far better, they say, to emphasize rapid maneuver and small independent units that can penetrate and disrupt an enemies' forces. To this end, they also stress the importance of experienced and cohesive military units to exploit opportunities on the battlefield. Theirs is an emphasis on war that is real.

For the maritime environment, the reformers have emphasized the importance of being able to modernize a ship's weapons quickly. They acknowledge the importance of sea-based aviation, but they want that flexibility for most ships, not just a few big, and in their eyes highly vulnerable, aircraft carriers. Hence they have pushed for the spreading of aircraft to a large number of combatants and for the development of modular weapons and sensors to speed up ship modernization.

This core group of military reformers has originated from sources far different than the traditional systems analysis approach to military matters. They emphasize strategy, not mathematical models; bold innovation, not marginal changes; and military history, not management. In their writings they are impatient with the slow pace of change in the U.S. military and civilian bureaucracies, and as a rule they do not accept what they perceive as a mechanical passing
on of doctrine from one military generation to the next. They do not perceive military breakthroughs will come by the addition of larger more expensive weapons tied to cumbersome logistics. (Woolsey, 1981)

B. THE CONGRESSIONAL MILITARY REFORM CAUCUS

A second major development of reform efforts at this time was the formation of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus in June and July 1981. (Interview Lind, 1989)

As profiled in Section B of Chapter II, the reform caucus has been the primary organizational vehicle or coordinating mechanism of political forces that have been effective in implementing the core group's principle ideas. It has provided a critical forum for the translation of proposals and issues into programs and policies. As described by one bureaucratic entrepreneur, Michael R. Burns (see Chapter II.A), the Congressional Military Reform Caucus came to fruition as a result of the key event at Desert One in Iran in 1980 (see Chapter III.B). Mr. Burns feels that this incident was an apocalyptic event within congressional circles in Washington. It provided the catalyst that caused many congressmen from both sides of the aisle to arrive at the heartfelt conclusion that something was indeed wrong with the American National Security Establishment. In Mr. Burns' view this event caused efforts to coalesce with regard to defense reform in the Congress.
Hence the time was right in late 1981 for the implementation of much of what the core group of reformers was arguing for. Several general themes with respect to defense reform began to emerge from the Congress that gave form and substance to the reformers' activities.

A number of Congressman became interested in hearing Colonel Boyd's lengthy presentation "Patterns of Conflict." Mr. Burns refers to this as the "acid test" of a member's commitment to the concept of defense reform. He additionally cites the work of Colonel Everest Richione USAF (Retired) concerning U.S. Air Force Fighter operations in Vietnam, and the work of Colonel Robert Dilger USAF (Retired) concerning the AX fighter, as being crucibles in developing Congressional thought on defense reform, with an attempt to translate reform theories into practice. (Interview, Burns 1989)

1. Summary of Findings Concerning the Congressional Military Reform Caucus

The Congressional Military Reform Caucus has served as both an educational tool to bring about change, and as an implementer of change through its ability to directly affect

9The AX fighter concept ultimately evolved into the A-10 aircraft, and its developmental evolution is frequently cited as an example of the reformers' efforts to curtail the USAF's frequent over-emphasis on extensive, over-priced technology. In this case the Air Force was forced to recognize the merits of a limited technology derived from a data base that incorporated "real world" battlefield requirements for a central European scenario. In their presentations, Colonel Dilger and Pierre Sprey utilized data obtained from research conducted by Russel Stolfi, second reader for this thesis.
the larger congress as a whole with respect to the passage of
defense related legislation. Its mere existence has provoked
reactions from those within the defense establishment that
have ranged from denunciation to enthusiastic acceptance.
(Marsh, 1982, p. 55) While loosely structured and very
diverse, the caucus' membership, in keeping with the
philosophy of the core group of reformers, has generally
supported the use of advanced technology, but not technology
that is complex and cumbersome. (Interview Lind, 1989)

The caucus developed an options committee in late 1981
that received formal input from Lind, Canby, Boyd and Sprey.
This input resulted in a formal list that was entitled:
"Options For Action on the Fiscal 1983 Defense Budget." While
never actually implemented in its entirety, the list addressed
general defense policy and some specific weapons programs, and
established a direction for future caucus activity.¹⁰ (Marsh,
1982, p. 56) In the ensuing years the caucus has continued to
work in this manner by developing options from various inputs
and then attempting to implement through legislative action.
(Interview Lind, 1989)

¹⁰Some options on this 1983 list included: Cancelling the
F-18, Transferring offensive mine warfare from the Navy to the
Air Force, Building "stealth' fast missile boats for the Navy
and Cancelling the Lockheed C-5. None of these options were
ever implemented.

One option on the list that was implemented was an
option to support an inexpensive ground support aircraft for
the Air National Guard. This was essentially accomplished
with the A-10. (Marsh, 1982, p. 56)
The success of the reform caucus can be measured in two ways, first in their legislative successes, which will be discussed in the next chapter, and second in the future placement of its membership in positions to influence the defense establishment.

Of the original 1982 membership shown in Appendix A, it is significant to note the eventual shift of two members to the executive branch of government, and their subsequent rise to appointed positions of leadership in U.S. military affairs.

Robin L. Beard (R. Tenn), an original caucus member and a reserve Colonel in the Marine Corps, was eventually defeated for his house seat in 1984 and was subsequently appointed by President Reagan as a U.S. Representative to the NATO Council of Ministers in Belgium, not an insignificant position from which to influence the U.S.' NATO military policy particularly with respect to doctrine.

Most recently, former Representative Richard B. Cheney (R. Wyo) was appointed by President Bush to succeed Frank Carlucci as Secretary of Defense. (CIS, Vol. 20, March 1989, p. 72)

Additionally, several members of the caucus have risen to significant leadership positions within the Congress itself. As of this writing Representative Newt Gingrich (R. Ga), the son of a career Army infantryman, and in Lind's eyes "one of the most active members of the reform caucus," is a key member of the House Armed Services Committee, overseeing
principle legislation dealing with defense related budgetary and personnel matters. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 265) Senator Sam Nunn (D. Ga.) is currently the chairman of the Senate Armed Services committee. (S. HRG. 100-257, 1987, p. II) Senator John Warner (D. Va) sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee's Naval Affairs Subcommittee, and has thus developed a significant influence in the area of naval shipbuilding. (S. HRG. 100-257, 1987, P. II)

Although the founders of the reform caucus--Senator Gary Hart and Representative Whitehurst--have since retired from the Congress, both continue to be active in a number of defense-related seminars and conferences. Hart, a former Colorado senator, was a frontrunner in the 1988 presidential campaign until a furor over his private life altered his standing, and he dropped out of the race altogether.

Dr. G. William Whitehurst, a professor of history at Old Dominion University from 1950 to 1968, and again from 1987 to the present, served nine terms in congress as Representative from the Second District of Virginia, from 1968 to 1987. In his congressional career he eventually arose to become the second ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee. He too remains active in defense affairs, most recently serving on the conference staff of a seminar on Soviet Military Doctrine at Old Dominion University in May 1989. (Grassey, 1989)
C. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 1983

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 1983 included an amendment to strengthen the weapons testing process. This amendment established the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Testing and Evaluation (Asst SecDef OT&E). (H.A.S.C. No. 97-33, 1983)

Described by Lind as the first major legislative success of the military reform effort, the act had the effect of establishing for the first time a central office for the coordination and testing of proposed military weapons systems under real world field conditions. Additionally the act included provisions for actual live firing of proposed weapons prior to their acceptance by the military. (Hart and Lind, 1986, p. 9)

Since this initial success, there have been a number of smaller legislative attainments that have occurred based on the improved data obtained from this new weapons testing structure. These successes include providing some better equipment for the Reserves and National Guard, such as the F-18 Aircraft, mandating warranties on some types of military equipment, providing estimates of what a weapons system should cost early in a program so that future price increases are easily detected, and ultimately in 1983, forcing the cancellation of the Army's Sergeant York close-in air defense weapons system by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. (Lind, 1986, p. 10)
D. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986

On 7 May 1986 the Congress passed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act\textsuperscript{11}, better known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, after its two primary sponsors in the Senate (Senator Barry Goldwater, R. Arizona) and House (Representative Bill Nichols, D. Alabama).

As noted in Chapter IV, this act essentially incorporates a number of the recommendations of the Packard Commission and establishes them as public law. A Packard Commission member who provided congressional testimony supporting the act was Woolsey, and additional supporting testimony was provided by reform proponents Luttwak, and General Meyer. (H.A.S.C. No. 99-53, 1987, pp. IV, V) House and Senate Armed Services Committee members supporting passage of this act included the original Defense Reform Caucus members Nunn and Gingrich, (Appendix A) and new Reform Caucus members Boxer and Roth. (Morrison, 1989, p. 46)

The Act stresses the civilian supremacy of the President as Commander in Chief and spells out the role of the Secretary of Defense, providing him with increased power "within the Department of Defense on any matter which the Secretary chooses to act." (Goldwater, 1988, p. 354)

The major institutional changes the Act imposed on the Department of Defense are as follows:

\textsuperscript{11}Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986.
1. The act greatly strengthened the JCS Chairman in setting policies, drafting military strategies, and shaping Pentagon budgets. The Chairman was established as the senior ranking officer in the U.S. Military and the entire joint staff would henceforth answer to him alone. (HASC No. 99-53, 1986, p. 1048)

2. The act established a four star deputy chairman of the JCS, reporting to the chairman, who would become acting head in the absence of the chairman. (HASC No. 99-53, 1986, p. 878)

3. The act retained ten basic commands, and added statutory provisions that considerably strengthened these commands, giving them much greater control over resources and personnel to support their missions. In a major change, Navy and Marine Corps Officers now assigned to these commands are responsible directly to their field commanders, not their service chiefs at the Pentagon. (HASC No. 99-53, 1986, p. 878)

4. The act established a career specialty for officers on joint duty assignment and clearly hinged future assignments and promotions on joint duty. Procedures were established to monitor the careers of joint duty officers, and a record of joint duty would be needed for consideration for flag rank. (HASC No. 99-53, 1986, p. 893)

5. The act establishes a new Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition. This "Acquisition Czar" is the Pentagon's top procurement official, and is expected to attempt to achieve considerable savings for the DOD through joint purchases and other means. (HASC No. 99-53, 1986, pp. 905-925)

In the words of its chief senate sponsor, Senator Barry Goldwater:

...the act is an attempt to renew the military's financial and functional integrity. The chairman and the vice chairman must now produce, in consultation with the services, useful and timely advice to the President....More than ever before, the commanders in chief in the field will decide how to carry the war to the enemy, and the unified commander will report directly to the President and Defense Secretary. Separate ground, sea, and air warfare by individual services is gone forever. (Goldwater, 1988, pp. 353-356)
E. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS

On 20 August 1982, the U.S. Army substantially revised its institutional doctrine in response to a number of pressures for change that had been exerted by reform sources both internal and external to the Army. (Interview Lind, 1989) Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, promulgated on that date, contained a number of significant changes from past doctrine and established a new thrust in the Army's way of thinking. A few of the changes, chiefly the concept of the AirLand Battle, maneuver-based tactics and the addition of the operational level of war as a separate field of military activity, stimulated a great deal of debate (Holder, 1985, p. 22), and clearly originated, at least in part, in response to Lind's original critique of Army doctrine in March 1977. (Lind, 1977, pp. 54-65) Additionally, Mearsheimer writes that this 1982 version of FM 100-5,

...and a number of associated documents contain numerous passages remarkably similar to various passages in the reformers' writings. Luttwak for example, told the Wall Street Journal that he was "startled to see" whole paragraphs of his work showing up in the doctrine. (Mearsheimer, 1983, p. 291)

FM 100-5, Operations, is:

...the Army's keystone warfighting manual. It explains how Army forces plan and conduct campaigns, major operations, battles and engagements in connection with other services. It furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, material acquisition, professional education and individual and unit training...(it is) the Army's principle tool of professional self-education in science and the Art of War, and presents a stable body of operational and tactical principles rooted in actual military experience. (FM 100-5, 1986, p. i)
The principle significance of the August 1982 edition of FM 100-5, lies in its embracement of the three dimensional "AirLand Battle" doctrine as the Army's new basic fighting doctrine. In the eyes of its drafters, the doctrine reflects "the structure of modern warfare, the dynamics of combat power, and the application of the classical principles of war to contemporary battlefield requirements." (FM 100-5, 1986, p. 9)

The AirLand Battle doctrine, in a departure from previous doctrine, recognizes the importance of the operational level of warfare, and its focus on the seizure and retention of the initiative and its insistence on the requirement for multiservice cooperation. Its basic tenants emphasizing initiative, agility, depth, mission orders and synchronization, establish a new style for combat, and set a renewed stage for a joint service outlook that did not exist before.

Additionally, FM 100-5 acknowledges the intangible factors of combat power, such as the state of training of the forces employed, troop motivation, leader's skill, firmness of purpose and boldness. These are precisely the nonquantifiable aspects of the moral dimension to defense thinking that Burns alleged had been woefully insufficient up until that time (see Chapter II.A).
That adaption of this document is indeed a major institutional change\textsuperscript{12} for the Army is reflected in the fact that for all practical purposes, the study of operations ended in the U.S. Army after WW II. It is alleged by some that this was perhaps due to the advent of nuclear weapons, and the common belief in the Army at that time, that these weapons of mass destruction meant the end of conventional warfare. FM 100-5 counters that belief with a renewed emphasis on operations as a vital link between grand strategy and minor tactics, and provides an emphasis on war that recognizes the fast-paced conventional nature of many potential conflicts. (Holder, 1985, pp. 23-24)

Finally, FM 100-5 embraces the reformers' concept of maneuver warfare as a dynamic measure of combat power, in a manner that did not previously exist in Army Doctrine. The old emphasis on firepower/attrition warfare that formerly existed in Army doctrine is simply no longer there. (Interview Canby, 1989) In its place is a recognition of maneuver at both the operational and tactical levels. (FM 100-5, 1986, p. 11)

\textsuperscript{12}For the purposes of this research institutional changes will be considered as those changes in structure or policy that arose from the various military services themselves, as a result of an increasing awareness by serving military officers and appointed DOD officials of the need for new strategies to address emerging problems.
F. THE MARITIME STRATEGY

The push for the development of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy is credited to Edward Jayne, a reformer who operated slightly earlier and outside of the circles of many of the other reformers. Jayne, in his capacity as President Jimmy Carter's Associate Director of the Office of Management and Budget, gave a lecture at the Naval War College in February 1978 that "struck fear in the hearts of the admirals." (Beatty, 1987, p. 37) At this lecture Jayne warned the Navy that it had better come up with a strategic rationale to justify its budget requests at a time when restoring the credibility of our ground defense in Europe was an urgent priority of U.S. foreign policy. Seapower supporters in the audience heard Jayne with great skepticism and many felt that his speech was "an exercise in intellectual arrogance by a very young former Air Force Officer who knew next to nothing about the Navy." (Canan, 1982, p. 45)

With this speech in mind, it is then alleged by Jack Beatty, a journalist for the Atlantic Monthly, that the Navy's leadership subsequently devised a maritime strategy that responded to Jayne's critical lecture (Beatty, 1987, p. 37) and to other criticisms of the Navy's "rigid traditionalism" made by Lind and Polmar in 1978 (Hart, 1978, p. x).

What emerged was the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, first published by then CNO, Admiral James D. Watkins in a U.S. Naval Institute Supplement in January 1986. It has since been
described as "the most definitive and authoritative statements of the Maritime Strategy that are available in unclassified form." (Watkins, 1986, p. i)

The Watkins article is accompanied by companion pieces authored by then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and the Commandant of the Marine Corps General P. X. Kelly (with Major Hugh K. O'Donnel Jr.). The espoused goal of the Maritime Strategy is: "to use maritime power, in combination with the efforts of our sister services and forces of our allies, to bring about war termination on favorable terms." (Watkins, 1986, p. 3)

Described by Beatty as "the major change made in United States war planning by the Reagan Administration," the Maritime Strategy has been drawn from national objectives and statements of national strategy, to form a cohesive policy planning document for the Navy. (Beatty, 1987, p. 37) The strategy has enjoyed widespread acceptance within Navy circles and can essentially be broken down into three major objectives.

The first objective is to destroy Soviet submarines in their bastions before they can "surge" out into the untrackable reaches of the Atlantic or Pacific where they would cut sea lines of communication.

The second objective is to pin down Soviet ground and tactical air forces at the far flung edges of the Russian land
mass, and thus keep them from being shifted to what would be the critical battle along the central front in Europe.

The third objective is to destroy not only the Soviet attack submarines, but also Soviet ballistic missile submarines, which can unleash nuclear annihilation. (Beatty, 1987, p. 38)

The central institutional change that this strategy introduces into Navy thinking is that it switches the main emphasis from a past defensive strategy of "sea control" to an offensive strategy that seizes the initiative early in any potential conflict with the Soviets, and carries the war to them. The Maritime Strategy was conceived as a planning document that emphasizes both forward offensive operations to secure control of the seas, and "power projection" operations against enemy forces or territory. (Watkins, 1986, p. 4-17)

That the strategy's authors acknowledged the provocation and influence of the reformers in drafting this strategy is seen in Lehman's off-the-cuff response to Hart and Lind's criticisms of Navy Strategy when he stated: "I hope Gary Hart's book gets a big sale...in the Soviet Union." (Beatty, 1987, p. 37)

G. FLEET MARINE FORCE MANUAL 1 WARFIGHTING

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1) Warfighting, was issued by Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, on 6 March 1989. This publication delivers a new
doctrine to the Marine Corps that has been described as the Commandant's philosophy on warfighting. (Lloyd, 1989, p. 24)

As a background to understanding the origins of the Commandant's philosophy it can be noted (see footnote #5 earlier in this chapter) that he developed a professional rapport with Lind, Boyd and Canby during his tour as Commanding General of the Marine Corp's Education Center from 1979 to 1982. He subsequently embraced many of the reformers concepts of the operational art and maneuver warfare while serving as Commanding General of the Second Marine Division from 1982 to 1984, to the point of convening a maneuver warfare board within the division to promulgate the concept. (Interview Lind, 1989)

The stated objective of FMFM-1 is to describe a Marine Corps philosophy for the preparation and conduct of war. It describes an "understanding of the characteristics, problems and demands of war, and derives a theory about war based on that understanding. This theory in turn provides the foundation for how (the Marine Corps) prepare(s) for war and how (it) wages war." The book "does not contain specific techniques and procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values." (FMFM 1, 1989, p. i)

That the book represents a major institutional change for the Marine Corps, and is a tribute to the efforts of the military reform group is seen in its wholehearted embracement
of the concept of maneuver warfare a la Lind et al. (FMFM 1, 1989, p. 58) An example of this is seen in reference to Boyd's OODA loop in the document's discussion of concentration and speed. (FMFM-1, 1989, p. 31)

In summary FMFM-1 represents the embracement of a new style of warfighting for the Marine Corps, and a departure from some past concepts of the Corps' forte of amphibious warfare. ("Indeed the word amphibious is not even mentioned in the document." (Lloyd, 1989, p. 24)) The document has had its critics within the Marine Corps, but thus far their criticisms have been primarily in the realm of semantics and terminology, and not in the overall concepts embraced by the publication.

H. CHAPTER SUMMARY

A summary of the chronology provided in this chapter is contained in Appendix C.
V. ANALYSIS

The failure of the presidentially-made war in Vietnam, and the mixed success of several of the military operations subsequently undertaken in support of national objectives ended public deference to what had been a relatively exclusive executive control of the U.S. Department of Defense. In this environment the public was receptive to new ideas concerning defense structure and policy. These ideas were generated and promulgated by a group of policy intellectuals who sensed the ineffectiveness of the established style of defense operations. Their ideas were eventually well-received by bureaucratic and political entrepreneurs within the defense decision making apparatus who were able to translate the ideas into substance and effect structural and policy change.

As a consequence Congress passed several acts of legislation to change a Department of Defense felt to have grown too ineffective and too independent. The intention was to get Congress more involved in the defense oversight process. Additionally, within the Defense Department, a number of change agents who were receptive to new ideas, eventually moved into positions where they were able to institute, by administrative fiat, significant policy changes reflecting the innovative concepts generated by the policy intellectuals.
This phenomenon can be explored in more detail by examining the cause and effect relationships established in the following sequence of activities.

First, the Vietnam War, and the five subsequent military operations undertaken in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives, established the context in which a desire for defense reform was apparent. General dissatisfaction with the ineffective manner in which the war and the subsequent military operations were conducted characterized this context.

Second, concepts (e.g., The Operational Art of War, Maneuver Warfare etc.) were generated in response to this context by a number of public policy intellectuals. A few of these individuals established a core group, based on their desire to pursue a common goal, defense reform. This core group articulated proposed solutions to serious military problems that prevailing defense policies were unable to handle.

The policy intellectuals were supported in their efforts at concept generation by several organizations often referred to as think tanks (CSIS, The Heritage Foundation etc.), which were important for several reasons. First the think tanks provided a funding base to support the policy intellectuals. Secondly, they provided the policy intellectuals with an essential vehicle from which to debate and build on one another's ideas. And finally, the think tanks lent
credibility and prestige to the promulgation of the reformers' ideas.

One ad hoc organization that was also associated with concept generation was the Packard Commission which, although not necessarily affiliated with other reformers, moved on a parallel track with them in so far as serving as a vehicle for concept generation.

The third activity in this sequence involved policy formulation based on the concepts generated. The defense decision structure, which included a like-minded network of appointed and elected officials who shared an interest in defense reform, provided the vehicle from which to accomplish the translation of concepts into outcomes. Subcomponents of the two parts (the Congress and the executive branch) of this decision structure were critical in effecting this translation. The Defense Reform Caucus of the Congress was a political force receptive to the reformers ideas that served to focus discussion on the sensitive issues under consideration and provide support in the form of political entrepreneurs.

On the executive side of the decision structure, the eventual rise of reform-minded supporters to positions of influence as executive entrepreneurs in their own organizations contributed to the formulation of policies that embraced the ideas of the original reformers. Two of the more
prominent executive entrepreneurs referred to in this study were Generals Meyer of the Army and Grey of the Marine Corps.

Finally, the outcomes produced by policy formulation derived from the legislative component of the decision structure and administrative fiat from the executive. These outcomes reflected the concepts generated by the original reformers (policy intellectuals), and in several instances they provided public testimony in support of those outcomes (i.e., hearings testimony by Luttwak and Fitzgerald). Additionally, in several instances the drafters of the legislative initiatives acknowledged the source of their inputs (i.e., Goldwater's acknowledgement of the influence of the Packard Commission findings).

For the purposes of clarifying the interconnectivity of these sequential activities, Figure 1 presents a flow diagram as an analytic model that graphically illustrates the flow of events described above.

Starting on the lower left side of the figure, we begin with the context from which the resultant sequence of activities flow. Next, moving up and to the right, is the concept generation phase as the source of solutions to serious military problems perceived during previous operations. Continuing up and to the right in the diagram, policy formulation is the focal point for the culmination of concepts generated, translated, and fashioned into final
ANALYTIC MODEL OF DEFENSE REFORM

OUTCOMES
Administrative Fiat or Enactment
DOD Appropriations Act of FY 83
Goldwater-Nichols Act
FM 100-5
The Maritime Strategy
FMFM-1

POLICY FORMULATION
Decision Structure/Organizational Vehicle
Congress (Defense Reform Caucus)
Executive (Military Services)

CONCEPT GENERATION
Key Individuals/Organizations
Policy Intellectuals
Core Group of Policy Intellectuals
Packard Commission
Think Tanks: CSIS, Heritage Foundation Etc.

CONTEXT
The Vietnam War
Sontay Raid
Mayaguez Rescue
Iran Rescue Mission
Lebanon Intervention
Invasion of Grenada

Figure 1. Analytic Model of Defense Reform
outcomes, which consisted of legislative enactments and administrative fiat.

This analytic model of defense reform has similarities to other topologies of public entrepreneurship such as the one developed for state education reform by Roberts and King in August 1989. (Roberts and King, 1989, p. 13)

The sequence of activities provided in the model above points to the major finding of this study. The concepts generated by policy intellectuals within the context of the post-Vietnam era did have a considerable effect on subsequent defense structure and policy. There was linkage between this generation of defense reform issues and final outcomes. Most of these concepts were generated by civilians outside of the defense establishment, and their success in introducing change reveals that they had considerable impact on the effort to achieve defense reform.

One may speculate, however, that the momentum of this effort may now be limited by its very success. It is entirely possible that the reformers and the congress are no more able to exercise a great deal of influence now than in the past. If anything, it can be argued that the defense reformers and a receptive congress are fragmented in influence because of the larger number of participants dealing with issues of defense reform. This is due in part to the increase in interest in issues of defense reform. Witness the proliferation of publications listed in this study's
bibliography that continue to offer new ideas for reform (i.e., Fitzgerald's *The Pentagonists* (1989), Gansler's *Affording Defense* (1989), and Fallows' *More Like Us* (1989)). With this increase in the number of inputs, it becomes more difficult to coordinate people, to achieve consensus and to present a common view. Thus the ability of defense reformers to act as a movement and to speak authoritatively with one voice may have diminished, and often these people now appear as more of a very loose confederation than as an organized body. The former position seems to be more the case as one observes this continuous effort of reformers in trying to generate audience attention.

Nonetheless, defense reform efforts for the period 1970-present have had a significant effect on the defense establishment. A number of institutional and legislative changes have been implemented that reflect the ideas of the reformers, and the implementation of these ideas has directly changed the structure and policies of the defense establishment.
VI. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis has attempted to demonstrate how reform efforts have had an effect on the defense establishment's structure and policy through an examination of the history of defense reform from 1970 to the present. Major sources of defense reform were identified, the context in which they operated reviewed, and the outcomes of reform efforts summarized.

This history reveals some important findings. First, major wars and even minor military operations are catalysts for change. There is a linkage between perceptions of the outcome of the event (war), new ideas generated as a result of those perceptions, and actions taken by the nation's decision making structure based on their receptiveness to those new ideas. Second, of the defense reform concepts generated during this period, all seemed to originate from sources outside of the defense establishment. While some of these sources may have at one time been affiliated with the defense establishment (i.e., active duty service, defense consultant etc.), it would appear that they were more adept at concept generation while operating from the outside.

With respect to defense structure and policy, it should be clear that defense reform efforts, as they occurred during this period, did result in outcomes that had an effect on that
structure and policy. An analytic model of defense reform was offered to conceptualize this cause and effect relationship, and it was noted that this model is similar to other models in the field. Finally, it was speculated that because of an apparent proliferation of interest in issues of defense reform, continued efforts at reform may have a diminished impact because of the difficulties of maintaining consensus with a variety of inputs.

Limitations of the study preclude a thorough analysis of all sources of reform; alternative sources may exist and should be considered in order to complete a more thorough analysis of the subject. Limitations, as noted in Chapter I, include constraints on time and resource availability. Data collection, for instance, was limited to a literature survey and the use of personal interviews. An enhanced source of data collection might include the use of a more complete review of primary sources to develop long-term trends on the activities of sources of defense reform. Additionally, this study made no determination on the effectiveness of the outcomes in terms of achieving the original goals of the reformers. These would be two areas for future research to document.

The findings of the study raise some important issues for the U.S. Department of Defense. As with any organization, the Defense Department faces two challenges. First, the need to maintain its core values. Second, the need to adapt to
external threats to its existence. Like all bureaucracies that have a life of their own, the Defense Department is resistant to change. Yet if it cannot renew itself, it may undermine its own effectiveness in the long term. Thus an infusion of ideas is needed to keep the organization alive and capable of adapting. Hence the issue becomes one of balance, how to foster and create an infusion of ideas, while at the same time maintaining some singularity of voice that is often necessary for the support of core values.

An answer to this dilemma cannot be provided here. However, based on the implications of a study of this nature, the following comments are perhaps appropriate.

In a world that is rapidly witnessing a new equation between the west, the socialist bloc and the developing countries, the U.S. must possess a credible military force if it desires to maintain its place in the world order. The task facing defense planners over the next decades, therefore, is to recognize that broad trends are underway, and that there is a need to continually "manage" defense affairs so that the Defense Department is capable of dealing with uncertain threats to U.S. national interests in an effective and efficient manner.

An enlightened management of this nature requires a continual injection of new ideas from either external or internal sources, an understanding of the process of change, and an appreciation that the problems of the Defense
Department are complex and require more than simplistic solutions. Thus an awareness of how the defense reform process operates and its subsequent effects on structure and policy, is of critical importance to the defense decision making leadership.

Given the considerable strength possessed by the U.S. Department of Defense, it ought to be possible to continually realign its structure and policies without any adverse long-term effects. Therefore, an enhanced understanding of the process of reform should be encouraged. The value of such an understanding can be seen in terms of the opportunity it affords an attentive management to evaluate alternative proposals in order to improve the strategic outlook of the organization.
APPENDIX A

MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL MILITARY REFORM CAUCUS--1982

The Senate Republicans are: William S. Cohen (Me.), Slade Gorton (Wash.), Arlen Specter (Pa.), Ted Stevens (Alaska), John W. Warner (Va.).

The Senate Democrats are: Gary Hart (Colo.), J. Bennett Johnson, Jr. (La.), Carl Levin (Mich.), George Mitchell (Me.), Sam Nunn (Ga.), Claiborne Pell (R. I.), David Pryor (Ark.), Jim Sasser (Tenn.).

The House Democrats are: Donald J. Albosta (Mich.), Tony Coelho (Calif.), Thomas A. Daschle (S.D.), Norman D. Hicks (Wash.), Byron L. Dorgan (N.D.), Vic Fazio (Calif.), Thomas M. Foglietta (Pa.), Martin Frost (Tex.), Dennis M. Hertel (Mich.), James R. Jones (Oklahoma), Ton Lantos (Calif.), Dave Mcurdy (Oklahoma), Stephen L. Neal (N.C.), Bruce F. Vento (Minn.).

The House Republicans are: Robin L. Beard (Tenn.), Douglas K. Bereuter (Neb.), Thomas J. Billey, Jr. (Va.), William F. Clinger, Jr. (Pa.), Richard B. Cheney (Wyo.), Larry E. Craig (Idaho), Lawrence J. Denardis (Conn.), Charles F. Doughtery (Pa.), Jack Edwards (Ala.), David F. Emery (Me.), Cooper Evans (Iowa), Paul Findley (Ill.), Newt Gingrich (Ga.), Bill Green (N.Y.), Thomas F. Hartnett (S.C.), John Hiller (Ind.), Duncan Hunter (Calif.), Ken Kramer (Colo.), Bob
APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AFFILIATED WITH ISSUES OF
DEFENSE REFORM 1970-PRESENT

Abshire, David M., President, CSIS.

Barlow, Jeffery G., National Security Analyst, Heritage
Foundation.

Burnice, Joe, Defense Analyst.

Canan, James, Author.

Fowles, James, Reporter.

Fitzgerald, A. Ernest, GS-18, Management Systems Deputy,

Gabriel, Dr Richard A., Academic/Author.

Gansler, Jacques S., Defense Analyst, The Analytical Services
Corporation. Formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Material Acquisition).

Grey, Alfred M., General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the
Marine Corps.

Hadley, Arthur T., Soldier/Author/Journalist.

Henning, Charles Paul, Defense Economist.

Hoven, Paul, Defense Analyst.

Jones, David, General, Chairman, JCS, U.S. Air Force, Retired.

Martin, David C., Author/Journalist.

Meyer, Edward C., General, (Ret.), Former Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Army.

Meyers, Daniel J., Soldier/Author.

Polmar, Norman, Naval Author, Former Associate Editor, Janes'
Fighting Ships.

Rasor, Dina, Defense Procurement Consultant.
Record, Dr. Jeffrey, Senior Fellow, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

Savage, Dr. Paul, Academic/Author.

Spinney, Franklin C., Budget Analyst/Author.

Walcott, John, Author/Journalist.

Wyly, Michael, Colonel USMC, Author.

Woolsey, James R., The Honorable, Former Undersecretary of the Navy.
APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN DEFENSE REFORM SINCE 1970

Key military operations which provided the context for reform are highlighted in bold. Major actions taken by the various policy intellectuals, or bureaucratic and political entrepreneurs, to heighten public awareness of the situation are indicated by an asterisk. The remainder of the chronology consists of some of the principle legislative and institutional changes affecting defense structure and policy that were generated during this period.

The chronology establishes a sequence of certain events preceding others, and as a result of this sequence, it attempts to support a cause and effect relationship between the events.

21 November 1970--Son Tay Prison Raid executed by U.S. Forces into North Vietnam. No prisoners found to be rescued.

30 April 1975--North Vietnamese Army captures Saigon, Vietnam War Ends.


March 1977--William S. Lind publishes his critical appraisal of Army Doctrine in 100-5, in Military Review.*
February 1978--Edward R. Jayne presents a critical lecture on the role of the Navy at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.*


24 April 1980--Iran Rescue mission aborted at "Desert One," 8 U.S. Servicemen killed, hostage rescue plans compromised.

1981--The critical issues booklet, Reforming the Military, is published by the Heritage Foundation. This publication contains essays by reformers Luttwak, Canby, Polmar, Lind, and Sprey.*

20 August 1982--FM 100-5 is published as a new Army doctrine by the Department of the Army. This doctrine embraces concepts of the operational art of war and maneuver warfare which were originally proposed by Lind in the March 1977 issue of Military Review. Additional doctrinal concepts proposed by Canby and Luttwak are also incorporated.

1 October 1982--The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 1983 implemented. The Act contained an amendment to establish The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Test and Evaluation, in an effort to strengthen the weapons testing process. This act was attributed by Lind to be one of the first successes of the Defense Reform Caucus.

Fall 1982--Steven L. Canby publishes "Military Reform and the Art of War" in International Security Review.*

23 October 1983--Beirut Airport Bombing, 241 U.S. Servicemen killed.

February 1985--Toward a More Effective Defense is published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). This is the final report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project. Members of the report steering committee include the reformers Gansler, General Meyer and Woolsey. Additionally the original Congressional Reform Caucus members Nunn, Gingrich and Cohen are also part of the committee.*

16 October 1985--Staff report to the Senate Armed Services Committee entitled, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, is published. The report includes input from Luttwak. (S. PRT. 99-86)*

January 1986--The Maritime Strategy published by the U.S. Naval Institute. This strategy responds to criticisms of the Navy made by Lind, Polmar and Jayne in 1978.

28 February 1986--The Interim Report of the Packard Commission is published. The report contains recommendations for changes in defense structure some of which were later incorporated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.*


7 May 1986--Goldwater-Nichols Bill passed by Congress. Previous hearings testimony from a number of reformers and input from the Packard commission is a factor in passage.

30 June 1986--A Question for Excellence, the final report to the President of the Packard Commission is published.*

12 January, 3 April 1987--Senate Armed Services Committee hearings held on "National Security Strategy." Principle witnesses include Dr Record, Colonel Summers and General Meyer. (S. HRG. 100-257)

28 April, 4 November 1987--House Armed Services Committee, Investigations Subcommittee hearings held on DOD
Reorganization Implementation. Principle witnesses include Fitzgerald who has been identified by Lind as an earlier advocate of procurement reform. (H.A.S.C. No 100-34)

November 1988—Making Defense Reform Work is jointly published by the Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) and the CSIS. This document is a report of the Joint Project on Defense Reorganization, and the CSIS receives input from Luttwak.

6 March 1989—FMFM 1 published as Marine Corps doctrine by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This doctrine embraces many of the operational and maneuver concepts of Lind, Boyd and Canby.
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