THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: A GUIDE TO THE RENAISSANCE OF U.S. NAVAL STRATEGIC IN THE 1980s

REVISED EDITION

by

CAPT PETER M. SWARTZ, USN and
JAN S. BREEMER, BIBLIOGRAPHERS,
with JAMES J. TRITTEN, Principal Investigator

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Prepared for:
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES:
A GUIDE TO THE RENAISSANCE OF
U.S. NAVAL STRATEGIC THINKING
IN THE 1980s
Revised Edition

by

Capt. Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy, and
Jan S. Breemer, Bibliographers
and James J. Tritten, Principal Investigator
Acknowledgments

This bibliography was prepared for OPNAV OP-06/OP-603J under contract N62271-89-M-3250 with James J. Tritten acting as principal investigator. Jan S. Breemer was responsible for selecting, annotating and incorporating new source materials.

This bibliography remains the "brainchild" of Capt. Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy and much of the material newly included in this work was made available by Capt. Swartz from his extensive holdings of maritime strategic writings. Others who contributed to this work by making their files available or by pointing the bibliographer to important sources that otherwise would have been overlooked, include Roger W. Barnett of National Security Research, Inc., Floyd 'Ken' D. Kennedy, Jr. of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), James L. George of the Hudson Institute and Ger Teitler of the Royal Netherlands Naval Institute (KMI). Dr. Teitler was particularly helpful in directing the bibliographer's attention to recent European writings on maritime strategy.

Jan S. Breemer is responsible for the selection and annotation of newly included reference sources.
Notes On Revised Edition

This is the second revised and updated edition of *The Maritime Strategic Debates: A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s*. The original version, prepared by Capt. Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy, first appeared in part in the U.S. Naval Institute's special "White Paper" supplement to the January 1986 issue of the *Proceedings*. The first revised edition was published in the spring of 1988 by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School as "Technical Report NPS-56-88-009," again authored by Capt. Swartz. This revision continues to build on Capt. Swartz' pioneering work. Key changes from the first two editions include the following:

- annotated entries alphabetized by author's last name;
- approximately 200 additional entries, including, in particular, an extensive sample of overseas views and commentary.

Since the publication of the bibliography's first edition, the volume and range of written commentary on maritime strategical issues has grown by leaps and bounds. Accordingly, the 200 new entries in this document barely scratch the surface of the recent literature on the subject. It is hoped that a later revision will "catch up."
CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

NOTES ON REVISED EDITION

I. THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: 1979-1985

II. THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATE: 1986. THE WATERSHED YEAR

III. THE DEBATE CONTINUES: 1987 AND BEYOND

IV. SISTER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS AND VIEWS

V. ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS AND VIEWS

VI. SOVIET STRATEGY AND VIEWS

VII. PEACETIME, CRISSES AND THIRD WORLD CONTINGENCIES

VIII. FLEET BALANCE: ATLANTIC VS. PACIFIC VS. MEDITERRANEAN

XI. WAR GAMING

X. ANTECEDENTS

XI. MAKING MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: INFLUENCES

XII. MAKERS OF MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS

A. The Public Debates: Criticisms and Kudos
B. The Public Record: OP-603
General Introduction

This is a bibliography with a point of view. It takes as a departure point the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, as enunciated by the civilian and military leaders of the U.S. Government, especially the Department of the Navy. It includes criticism of and commentaries on that strategy, as well as items relating the Maritime Strategy to overall national and allied military strategy, and to historical precedents. In addition, it covers both how the Strategy was developed and who developed it, and the important role of wargaming.

The Maritime Strategy has generated enormous debate. All sides and aspects of the debate are presented here. The focus, however, is on that Strategy. Absent are discussions of naval affairs which do not have as their points of departure—explicitly or implicitly—the contemporary Maritime Strategy debate.

In order to trace the ebb and flow of ideas and events over time, items are listed chronologically, by occurrence or publication date, rather than merely alphabetically. Authoritative official statements of the Maritime Strategy are indicated by an asterisk (*). Explicit direct commentaries on the Maritime Strategy are indicated by a double asterisk (**). The other items listed deal implicitly with various antecedents.

Publications on Sister Service and Allied contributions to the Maritime Strategy are listed separately, to aid the reader/researcher. (Admittedly, this and other artificial topological devices run against a central theme of the Maritime Strategy—its global, "seamless web" character. Also, only cursory attention is paid to pre-1981 Navy strategic thinking on global war, a structural shortcoming that cannot legitimately be cited as evidence that such thinking was lacking.)
I. MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: 1979-1985

American military strategy and its maritime component have been debated since the foundation of the republic. Following World War II, maritime strategy concerns centered around peacetime presence, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and the Navy's role in nuclear strike warfare against the Soviet Union. During the late 1950s and 1960s the focus shifted to limited war and deterrence through nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) operations. In the early 1970s, the debate centered on then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt's formulation of the "Four Missions of the Navy": strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and peacetime presence. A major body of literature began to be created then on presence. In the mid-1970s, sea control seemed to dominate discussions.

In 1978, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward became Chief of Naval Operations. His views on strategy had been heavily influenced by his experience as Seventh Fleet Commander and Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief in the post-Vietnam environment. Admiral Hayward's focus was on flexible offensive forward power projection, conducted globally and in conjunction with allies and sister services, especially against the Soviet Union and its attacking forces. Much of this was a return to concepts familiar to U.S. naval officers of the first post-World War II decade. That era's focus on nuclear strikes, however, now broadened to encompass a much wider range of options, primarily conventional.

Admiral Hayward outlined his views publicly in his initial 1979 testimony before Congress, and subsequently in the pages of the Proceedings. The naval strategic renaissance and the resultant debate he and others sparked continues to this day, fueled by the statements and policies of the Reagan Administration, especially its first Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., who served from February 1981 to April 1987.

The initial public Maritime Strategy discussion of the early 1980s had largely taken the form of a debate on the pages of American public and foreign affairs and national security periodicals. This debate has focused on two themes: the general forward strategic principles (and certain highly publicized Norwegian Sea examples) enunciated repeatedly by Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. and a perceived "Maritime Strategy versus Coalition Warfare" dichotomy incessantly alleged by former Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer and others.

At the same time, however, the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in conjunction with officers of their sister services and allied, had been asked to develop for internal use a detailed description of the Maritime Strategy component of U.S. national military strategy. This Maritime Strategy rigorously integrated into one clear, consistent document a number of long held views of Navy and Marine Corps senior officers, certain newly refined concepts developed in the fleet and at the Naval War College, agreed national intelligence estimates, the strategic principles articulated by Secretary Lehman and other Reagan Administration officials, and a thoughtful discussion of the variety and range of uncertainties inherent in the strategy.
Concepts developed by the Navy's warfare communities and fleets, as well as by Army, Air Force, joint and allied commanders, were examined and incorporated as appropriate. Where inconsistencies appeared, hard choices were made. Uncertainties and limitations were identified. Properly, the job was spearheaded by the Strategic Concepts Group on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-603).

The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy was codified initially in 1982 to focus Navy program development efforts more tightly. Its basic premises already had been underlying Navy planning, gaming, and exercises. Subsequently, congressional testimony in 1983 released an initial edition of the Maritime Strategy to the public. A classified revision to the strategy statement was approved by the Navy's Program Review Committee (chaired by then Vice Admiral Carlisle Trost) in October 1983 and signed and distributed Navy-wide by Admiral James D. Watkins, then Chief of Naval Operations, in 1984.

Various unclassified elements of the strategy began to find their way into naval affairs journals, especially the Proceedings. Writings on naval strategy that did not take the Maritime Strategy as a starting point began to fade. By 1985, enough authoritative congressional testimony, speeches, op-ed pieces, journal articles, and letters-to-the-editor, penned by senior naval officers and well-placed civilian commentators, had appeared for the essential elements of the Maritime Strategy to be accessible to the public. Public commentary gradually shifted from exegeses on the press conferences, speeches, and articles of Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Komer to discussions on aspects of the actual Maritime Strategy developed largely by military officers from national and alliance guidance and approved by civilian leadership.

Promulgation of the Maritime Strategy fostered increasing public and government discourse. Within the Navy, the interplay among the Maritime Strategy, force-level planning, fleet plans and operations, and professional education and training became a governing dynamic. In the open literature, the number of writings on the strategy rose from a handful of newspaper and journal articles in 1981 to an avalanche of government documents, books, and articles in 1986, including over 145,000 copies distributed of the Proceedings' watershed "The Maritime Strategy" January 1986 supplement alone. This quantitative leap was accompanied by qualitative changes in the background of the commentators and the sophistication of their arguments.

Contrary to much uninformed external criticism of the early 1980s, the Maritime Strategy was presented by the Navy as only one, albeit a vital component of the national military strategy. It was not presented as a recommended dominant theme of that national strategy. Also contrary to earlier uninformed criticism, the strategy embodied the views of unified and fleet commanders as well as Washington military and civilian planners and Newport thinkers. The Navy Department and the fleet were now speaking with one sophisticated voice to, and increasingly for, the nation and its allies.


Corddry, Charles W., "Navy Grows Toward 600-Ship Fleet, But Sustaining It May be a Problem," Baltimore Sun, May 22, 1985, p 1. Cites Congressional Budget Office (CBO) skepticism that the 600-ship fleet goal may not be sustainable with the anticipated decline of defense budget growth.


and Harry Train. Admiral Long's Pacific Command "Concept of Operations: and his Pacific Command Campaign Plan were important building blocks for the Maritime Strategy.

Getler, Michael, "Too Late to Stop Fleet Buildup, says Navy Secretary," Washington Post, December 2, 1982, p 16. Reports on a Brookings Institution seminar on military budgets, including SECNAV Lehman's rejection of calls for reduced Navy spending as "too late to stop it."

Getler, Michael, "Lehman Sees Norwegian Sea as a Key to Soviet Naval Strategy," Washington Post, December 29, 1982, p 4. Reports Lehman's call for a navy and strategy to fight a global war at sea, involving simultaneous operations in multiple theaters. U.S. pressure against the Kola Peninsula (which Lehman denied meant taking the carriers close to the Soviet mainland) will afford "a tremendous bit of leverage because (the Soviets can't afford to lose that...They'd lost their whole strategic submarine fleet if they lose Kola."

Geyelin, Philip, "Mr. Lehman's Dream Navy," Washington Post, October 2, 1981, p 29. Question's the Navy's need and ability to fight a "global Trafalgar conveniently confined to blue water and conventional weapons."


* Hayward, Thomas B., Adm. USN, Untitled remarks before the annual convention of the Association of Naval Aviation, Wings of Gold, Summer 1982, pp 57-60. The former CNO and one of the "founding fathers" of the maritime strategy of the 1980s takes on the "convoy syndrome" that he claims was being foisted upon the U.S. Navy in the 1970s. The key principles of the Navy's strategy today (1982), he says, are superiority, rejection of the "short war" theory, forward operations, and "to take the fight to the enemy at the time we want to, where we want to, at our option and not his."

Healy, Melissa, "Lehman: We'll Sink Their Subs," Defense Week, May 13, 1985, p 18. Reports the SECNAV's oft-publicized comment, made on April 19, 1985, that U.S. submarines will attack the Soviet SSBN fleet "in the first five minutes of the war."


* International Combat Arms, May 1985, Interview with SECNAV John F. Lehman, Jr., pp 12-13. The SECNAV explains why the Navy's 600-ship goal must be based on the "worst case" scenario of a general conventional war with the Soviet Union. Automatically
embedded within this scenario, claims Lehman, is "every conceivable peacetime crisis (as) a subset."


Klare, Michael T., "Securing the Fire Break," World Policy Journal, Spring 1985, pp 229-247. Sees forward offensive operations for ships with both nuclear and conventional capabilities as eroding the
firebreak between nuclear and non-nuclear combat and raising the likelihood of nuclear war.


* Lehman, John, Remarks before the Jewish War Veterans of the USA, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1984. Reaffirms the need for a forward strategy to "throw the Soviets on the defensive."


Sees Maritime Strategy as the basis for horizontal escalation doctrine, and both important only as U.S. Navy budget rationales. "The idea of horizontal escalation itself is too inherently implausible to find an enduring place in American strategic doctrine."


Maze, Rick, "CNO, SecNav in Agreement on Strategy, Lehman Says," Navy Times, June 20, 1983, p 9. Disputes media reports that the CNO and SECNAV are at odds over the early forward deployment of carrier battlegroups into the Barents Sea.


Morland, Howard, "Are We Readying a First Strike?" The Nation, March 16, 1985, p 297. Written by the "disarmament coordinator" of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, this article charges that the deployment of the Trident D-5 will upset the "stability" of MAD, and "could provoke the Russians to launch a pre-emptive strike." Urges cancellation of the MX, D-5 and Midgetman
missile programs, and the establishment of mutually-agreed SSBN "sanctuaries."

** Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective," Proceedings, October 1983, pp 66-81. By a former Under Secretary of the Navy and the first Director of the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies. See especially pp 70 & 74 on the maritime strategy and the role of the Naval War College. "You have to discard the term 'naval strategy,' and even the slightly more modern variant, 'maritime strategy' and talk instead about the naval contribution to national strategy...Newport is not, of course, the planning center for the Navy. It is, however, one place where naval officers get together and try to produce better ideas."


Nathan, James A., "The Return of the Great White Fleet," The Nation, March 5, 1983, pp 269-71. Invokes the wrong numbers and the wrong arguments to inveigh against the "current wager on naval power (as) a dangerous and costly gamble" that "makes nuclear war more likely."


Advocates choke point defense, vice carrier-based airpower, vs. the Soviet homeland.


** O'Rourke, Ronald, "U.S. Forward Maritime Strategy," Navy International, February 1987, pp 118-122. A thoughtful essay on the evolution of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy during its formative years, including a discussion of the "mix of the new and the old" in the Navy's strategic thinking, and the relationship between strategy and force sizing. O'Rourke makes the important point that rejection of the strategy's forward component in favor of reliance on "defensive" operations could result in a requirement for more than 600 ships.


Oakland Tribune, March 23, 1984, "A Strategy of Suicide." Compares the U.S. Navy's forward strategy with the charge of the light brigade during the Crimean War. Cites retired Adm. Stanfield Turner and others to the effect that sending the carriers into Northern waters would likely result in a "major catastrophe."


Perry, Robert, Lorell, Mark A., and Lewis, Kevin, Second-Area Operations: A Strategy Option (Publication R-2992-USDP), Santa


Polmar, Norman and Truver, Scott C., "The Maritime Strategy," Air Force Magazine, November 1987, pp 70-79. A good account of the indebtedness of the Maritime Strategy to Adm. Hayward's tenure as CNO, and a bleak prognosis for the Navy's "overall capabilities to carry out the operational plans, the 'contingency operations' that underpin the Maritime Strategy."


Posen, Barry, and Van Evera, Stephen, "Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment," in Oye, Kenneth A., Lieber, Robert J. and Rothchild, Donald (eds.), Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, Boston: Little Brown, 1983, pp 67-104. Critical of all aspects of Reagan Defense policy and strategy, including offensive conventional warfighting, especially with naval forces. "Overall, a counteroffensive strategy is a bottomless pit, since it generates very demanding missions that cannot be achieved without huge expenses, if they can be achieved at all...a counteroffensive strategy defeats the basic purpose of American conventional forces--the control of escalation." Advocates a 10-carrier force,

Powers, Capt. Robert Carney, "Commanding the Offense," Proceedings, October 1985, especially pp 62-63. Central strike warfare theme of the Strategy is criticized, along with the tactical organization evolved thus far for its implementation.


U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, Nomination of John F. Lehman, Jr., to be Secretary of the Navy, January 28, 1981, Washington: USGPO, 1981. "I think the major need of the Navy today is the establishment by the President and the Congress of a clearly articulated naval strategy, first and foremost."


experience as a primary driver of Maritime Strategy. Especially good as the role of Adm. Thomas Hayward as Pacific Fleet Commander, originator of the "Sea Strike" study, and Chief of Naval Operations.


** Watkins, Adm. James D., "Reforming the Navy From Within," Defense 85, November 1985, pp 18-20. The CNO on the role of the Maritime Strategy within the Navy, and its basic characteristics. "We lean heavily on our unified commanders-in-chief and Navy fleet commanders to help strengthen, modernize, and then put into
practice our naval strategy. This plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust dynamic strategy that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strategic issues as viewed by all key U.S. military leaders worldwide, not as viewed by a parochial naval bureaucracy in Washington."


* Watkins, James D., Adm., USN. "Alliance Maritime Power and Deterrence of War." Remarks at the International Seapower Symposium, Newport, RI, October 21, 1985. A plea and agenda directed at an audience made up largely of allied naval representatives for "bringing our common perspectives to bear on a common problem" i.e. the integration of U.S. an dallied maritime deterrence and war-fighting capabilities and plans into a "global coalition deterrence strategy." The CNO's proposed "building blocs" toward this goal are: (1) bilateral navy-to-navy talks, (2) mutually-supporting bilateral maritime strategy agreements, (3) joint regional maritime strategies, (4) war-gaming, and (5) a global coalition strategy aimed at maritime deterrence.


* *Wings of Gold*, Winter 1981, "CNO Discusses Current Issues." Outgoing CNO, Adm. Thomas B. Hayward discusses the need for a 600-ship and 15-carrier navy that will "make them worry about our being the threat in a very significant way." He predicts that the new Reagan administration's "new direction" will make his successor "much more able to create havoc in the Kremlin (make Gorshkov worry more) which is just what we want to do."


II. THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATE: 1986: THE WATERSHED YEAR

In late 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley, having ensured that the Maritime Strategy met their requirements and represented both their thinking and that of their superiors, submitted manuscripts containing the strategy’s basic tenets (less its uncertainties and limitations) to the Naval Institute. Following the publication of "The Maritime Strategy," a special supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings, public discussion of the strategy took on a new, sophisticated tone, more relevant to the actual requirements of U.S. national security decision making. Subsequent statements by President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and others confirmed for the public that the strategy was consistent with higher civilian and military defense guidance.

In the United States and abroad, discussions ranging from global warfare with the Soviets to naval history, fleet balance, and peacetime and crisis operations became suffused with the vocabulary and concepts of the Maritime Strategy. Much of the writing was now done by senior military officers. Most notably, a spate of broad-gauged articles by naval aviation, surface, and submarine warfare specialists appeared, transcending narrow "unionism." Knowledgeable civilian strategic thinkers and historians also offered their cogent commentary on the Strategy.

Proceedings now served as the primary forum, along with the Naval War College Review, Sea Power, and Naval Forces. The arena, however, also broadened to include more newspapers and popular magazines. The public affairs and national security journals rediscovered the Maritime Strategy, but now in a manner that brought together not only academics, pundits, and military retirees, but also serving naval professionals. By 1987, the uniformed naval officer corps once again, as in the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan or of the pre-World War II War Plan Orange, had captured the high ground and catalyzed thinking about the Navy’s role in national and alliance strategy.


Maritime Strategy in peace and war within the overall context of Nordic military security. See especially Chapter 20, "The Battle for the Norwegian Sea," the author's "climax."


Chicago Tribune, February 1, 1986, "The 600-Ship Mistake," p 3. Worn out argument that the Navy is building the "wrong" fleet for the "wrong" problem, and should concentrate instead on building "cheap" diesel submarine for offsetting the Soviet Union's 3:1 underwater advantage.
Clancy, Tom, *Red Storm Rising*, New York: Putnam, 1986. Fiction. Wartime Maritime Strategy implemented under drastically changed assumptions, some plausible and some fanciful, to suit the storyteller's needs. Soviet fear of global forward pressure leads to preemptive seizure of Iceland, SSN surge to the Atlantic, but operations are somehow limited to Central and Northern Europe only. Inherent flexibility and lethality enables NATO navies to adapt rapidly and successfully, but with heavy losses. In this vein, see reviews by Capt. David G. Clark in *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1987, pp 139-141, and Adm Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.) in *Proceedings*, March 1987, p 164. Cf Hackett and McGeorch et al, *The Third World War: The Untold Story*, cited in Section V below; and Hayes et al, *American Lake*, below, Chapter 19, which addresses the Pacific in a hypothetical global war, although probably not in a manner in which Capt. Clark or Adm. Hayward would agree.

Cohen, Eliott A., "Do We Still Need Europe?" *Commentary*, January 1986, pp 28-35. A Naval War College faculty member views NATO flanks and the Far East as of increasing importance. Sees little utility in discussions of stark strategic alternatives, e.g. "Europe vs. the Pacific, going it alone vs. having allies, keeping resolutely to the sea vs. preparing to engage the Red Army on the continent.

Connell, John, *The New Maginot Line*, New York: Arbor House, 1986, pp 71-81. Another journalist, this time British, for whom the strategy debate is largely between Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Komer, and solely driven by budgetary considerations. Arguments totally derivative from other journalists. It would have been news four years earlier.


Daniel, Donald C., *Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability*, Champagne IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986. An excellent survey by a Naval War College faculty member. Concludes that "It seem(s) implausible the U.S. could so reduce the number of Soviet SSBNs that the U.S.S.R. might be pushed into using the remainder." See especially pp 151-157.

Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document. This study achieved a certain notoriety due to its endorsement by Dr. Larry Korb, a former Reagan Administration defense official and earlier advocate of a 600-ship Navy.


Drury, F., "Naval Strike Warfare and the Outer Air Battle," Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 46-52. Sees the Maritime Strategy as merging the two concepts, which he feels had grown apart, into one coherent plan to defeat the Soviet air threat.


structure. Major concern, however, seems to be with the semantics of the term "Maritime Strategy."

**


Isherwood, Julien, "Russia Warns Oslo on U.S. Base," *Daily Telegraph*, August 13, 1986. Cites major Soviet propaganda offensive against forward battle group operations in the Norwegian Sea, the so called "Lehman Doctrine."


Landersman, Capt. S.D., USN (Ret.), "Naval Protection of Shipping: A Lost Art?" *Naval War College Review*, March-April 1986, pp 23-34. By a member of the initial U.S. Navy Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Excellent critique of U.S. Navy attitudes and practices regarding Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) as well as Naval Protection of Shipping (NPS), essential but too-little-discussed aspects of the Maritime Strategy which are often overshadowed by discussion of concomitant forward operations. See also his "I am a...Convoy Commodore," *Proceedings*, June 1986, pp 56-63.


* Lehman, Hon. John F., Jr., *Maritime Strategy in the Defense of NATO*, Washington: CSIS, September 25, 1986. His 1986 views: "No maritime strategy can be a successful strategy without an effective land deterrent on the continent of Europe. The forward strategy articulated by the Reagan administration is, in fact, orthodoxy of the oldest sort, conforming precisely to NATO alliance doctrine. In summary, we have a maritime strategy in the defense of NATO that is universally accepted by the maritime forces of Europe and the United States."


Liska, George, "From containment to Concert," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1986, pp 3-23, and "Concert Through Decompression," Summer 1986, pp 108-129. U.S./Soviet rivalry seen as "fed primarily by its own momentum and, at bottom, by the timeless asymmetry between land and sea powers." Argues, however, for a "land-sea power concert" by the two. "The salience of sea-over land-based power has diminished as the principal maritime power finds it increasingly difficult to maintain clear naval superiority."


Mearsheimer, John, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," International Security, Fall 1986, pp 3-57. Despite its biases, distortions, and misleading discussions of the development of the Maritime Strategy over time, probably the most important piece of writing critical of the Strategy to date. Faults the Maritime Strategy for its "elastic quality," actually regarded by U.S. naval officers as one of its great deterrent and warfighting strengths. This West Point graduate and former U.S. Air Force officer's bottom line: "The key to deterrence is not the Navy, but the forces that will be fighting on the Central Front. Those forces would be given first priority when deciding how to allocate defense budgets."


O’Neil, W.D., Capt., USNR, "Executing the Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1986, pp 39-42. Argues that Soviet technological strides in submarine quieting, anti-submarine warfare, and air defenses will make the execution of an anti-SSBN bastion offensive increasingly difficult. The "solution" for the U.S. Navy, concludes the author, will lie especially with the further development of "stealth" technologies.


some would argue with specific components of both the strategy and the ships that Lehman seeks, it is a coherent and long-term plan... one that Congress has long demanded from the Navy and the other services."


* "Sailing the Cold Seas," Surface Warfare, May-June 1986, pp 6-8. On the steps being examined and taken to increase U.S. Navy ability to operate in northern latitudes as required by the Maritime Strategy.


Stefanick, Tom A., "America's Maritime Strategy—The Arms Control Implications," Arms Control Today, December 1986, pp 10-17. Appears to favor the Maritime Strategy more than he did in July. "The implicit threat to Soviet ballistic missile submarines during a conventional naval conflict would be likely to yield an advantage to the U.S. Navy in the conventional balance at sea...The likelihood of widespread escalation of the use of nuclear weapons as a direct result of threats or even attacks on Soviet SSBNs in their home waters appears to be low."

Stefanick, Tom, "Attacking the Soviet Sea Based Deterrent: Clever Feint or Foolhardy Maneuver?", F.A.S. Public Interest Report, June-July 1986, pp 1-10. The author seems to lean more to the "foolhardy maneuver" persuasion. "The U.S. must reduce the current emphasis on submarine operations in waters heavily defended by the Soviet Union." But cf his December article, below.


West, Francis J., Jr., et al., *Naval Forces and Western Security*, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986. Contains two essays: "U.S. Naval Forces and NATO Planning" by West, pp 1-9; and "NATO's Maritime Defenses" by Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E. Dougherty, R.Adm. Robert J. Janks USN (Ret.) and Charles M. Perry, pp 10-53. West restates his 1985 *Proceedings* article assertion that there is a profound divergence between U.S. and West European perspective, on the purpose and potential contribution of naval forces in NATO contingency planning, although it is sometimes difficult to understand which Americans and Europeans he is talking about.
The other essay offers an overview of current issues regarding the role of naval forces in NATO strategy.


Williams., Cdr. E. Cameron, USNR, "The Four 'Iron Laws' of Naval Protection of Merchant Shipping," Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 35-42. An argument for convoying. Sees the SLOC protection debate as between convoying and "sanitized lanes." Oblivious, however, to the debate between either or both of these options and forward defense, the more topical issue. See also "In My View," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1986, pp 108-109, and Spring 1987, pp 91-92.


** Wi-nefeld, Lt. James A., Jr., "Topgun: Getting It Right," Proceedings, October 1986, pp 141-146. The Navy Fighter Weapons School seen as a key contributor to the Maritime Strategy's execution, by the School's training officer, one of the new generation of naval officers for whom the Maritime Strategy is truly the cornerstone of his profession.


III. THE DEBATE CONTINUES: 1987 AND BEYOND
The first half of 1987 saw the Maritime Strategy firmly in place as an acknowledged vital element of U.S. and allied military strategy. President Reagan, Defense Secretary Weinberger, Deputy Defense Secretary Taft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Crowe, all publicly cited its importance and utility. Likewise, James H. Webb, Jr. (John Lehman's successor as SECNAV), Admiral Carlisle Trost (Admiral Watkins' successor as CNO), and a number of other top flag officers provided numerous examples of the extent to which it had become the common strategic framework of the naval leadership. Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon was, however, the July 1987 issue of the Proceedings. Therein, the Maritime Strategy formed the baseline for a wide range of discussions of specific U.S. and allied peacekeeping and warfighting issues: by active duty U.S. Navy junior officers, senior officers, and admirals; by naval aviators, surface warfare officers, submariners and a Marine; and by officers concerned with inter-allied relations, regional strategic objectives, fleet operations, and weapons system employment and development.


Arkin, William, A., "Our Risky Naval Strategy Could Get Us All Killed," Washington Post, July 3, 1988, p C-1. A "sampling" of recent U.S. Navy exercises that Arkin claims "prove" the deliberately provocative nature of the Navy's maritime strategy. He concludes with a call for an investigation of the Navy's "practices and strategies (that) threaten international peace in a way that land-based military activity does not."

Arkin, William, "Troubled Waters: The Navy's Aggressive War Strategy," Technology Review, January 1989, pp 54-63. Contrary to appearances, charges Arkin, the Navy has not abandoned its "actual war plans" which, he says, are "belligerent, dangerously ambiguous," the "most likely avenue for escalation all the way to nuclear war," and too "provocative" and "de-stabilizing" to be left to an "intransigent naval bureaucracy." Arkin proposes that maritime strategy be replaced with an all-encompassing arms control strategy that, if consummated, would, in fact, relegate the U.S. Navy to a chapter in history.


** Barnett, Roger W., "U.S. Maritime Strategy: Sound and Safe," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1987, pp 30-33. Written as a contribution to the Bulletin's special issue on "Superpower Arms Race at Sea," this is one of the best strategic explanations of the maritime strategy. Barnett makes the point that the maritime strategy's principal value is its contribution to the deterrence of Soviet-initiated war. The maritime strategy's value as a deterrent, he explains, rests with its escalatory options—vertical, horizontal, or temporal. Barnett points out that the maritime strategy addresses coalition warfare against the Soviet Union, and not "other conflict possibilities or adversaries."

** Beatty, Jack, "In Harm's Way," The Atlantic, May 1987, pp 37-53. Having listened to naval leaders and to college professors, Beatty sides with the college professors. His criticisms, however, place beside Theo Rudnak's sensationalist artwork. See also August 1987, pp 6-10, for retorts by Norman Friedman, Richard Best, Mark Jordan, Bing West and Colin Gray, and a final rejoinder by Beatty, who apparently believes the Maritime Strategy calls for carrier operations in the Black Sea.

** Bennett, Charles E., "The Maritime Strategy" in "Comment and Discussion," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1988, pp 91-92. A spirited rebuttal by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee's Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee to key critics of the maritime strategy, including Mearsheimer, Gould, and Beatty. Rejects their arguments that (a) the 600-ship fleet is being built at the expense of Army and Air Force needs in the NATO area, (b) a "static" defense of the North Atlantic is preferable to a forward offensive, and (c) war can be won with a defensive strategy. The Navy's failure to prepare against mines in the Persian Gulf is blamed on "leadership, either in the White House or in the Pentagon," not the Maritime Strategy.

policy that will allow it to override previous strategic conceptions, including the Navy's maritime strategy, (which) will come under heavy criticism by those using arguments derived from the approach of the systems analysts." Best decries this since "only the Navy has thought through the implications of the continuum of operations in a way which will not cause civilian populations to shrink in horror."

Bliss, Elsie, "Fleet Hardening: Responding to the Nuclear Threat," All Hands, April 1987, pp 30-31. On USN efforts to "harden" its ships, aircraft, and equipment against nuclear attack.


Brooks, Linton F., Capt. USN, and Miller, Franklin, C., "Nuclear Weapons at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1988, pp 41-45. A thoughtful analysis of the political and military value to the U.S. Navy and its strategy of (non-SLBM) nuclear weapons. Brooks and Miller conclude that, although the deterrent value of naval capabilities in and of themselves is small, the Navy must retain at least selected nuclear warfare area (e.g., ASW, AAW) assets in order to: (a) influence the Soviet pre-war calculation of the correlation of forces, and (b) shore up its war-fighting capabilities. In any event, report the authors, strong nuclear forces are an important ingredient in international perceptions of military power.

** Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1988, "Maritime Strategy Submerges," p 55. Claims that budget cuts and public criticism have forced the U.S. Navy to lower the profile of its forward operations in the northern Pacific and Atlantic, and emphasize the use of submarines in place of carrier battlegroups.

Byron, John L., Capt. USN, "No Quarter for Their Boomers." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1989, pp 49-52. The author reiterates the deterrence value and war-fighting importance of placing the Soviet SSBNs at risk, but recommends against committing more than a fraction of the U.S. SSN fleet to this purpose. An American assault on the Soviet SSBN bastions, says Byron,
should have the appearance of an "apparently large" strategic ASW campaign, yet holds back most of the SSNs for other missions.

** Caldwell, Hamlin A., Jr., "A Flaw in the U.S. Maritime Strategy," *National Defense*, July/August 1987, pp 48-51. A sharp critique of plans to carry out offensive SSN operations in Soviet "bastion" waters. Calling the idea a possible "blueprint for disaster," Caldwell enumerates what he believes are the Soviet submarine fleet's important tactical and logistical advantages in home waters. He concludes that a "more realistic opening move must be selected that insures that U.S. naval power would truly influence the outcome of any war with the Soviet Union."


* Crowe, Adm. William J., "Statement on National Security Strategy," U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-Hundredth Congress, First Session, *Hearings on National Security-Strategy*, January 21, 1987, Washington: USGPO, 1987 (forthcoming). Solid concurrence in the Maritime Strategy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "In recent years we have benefited from some excellent conceptual thinking by the Navy about global maritime strategy—how to phase operations in a transition from peace to war, clear the way of submarines opposing military resupply or reinforcement shipping and use our carrier battle groups for either offensive strikes or in direct support of such allies as Japan, Norway, Greece and Turkey. It is imperative, of course, to fold these concepts into our larger military strategy and that is exactly what we are doing."

Cushman, John H., Jr., "Navy Warns of Crisis in Anti-Submarine Ware," *New York Times*, March 19, 1987, p 19. Outgoing Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering and Systems Melvyn Paisley on need for increased Navy ASW research: "We are faced with a crisis in our anti-submarine warfare capability which undermines our ability to execute maritime strategy." For context, however, see actual Paisley statements before congressional committees, 1987.


Daniel, Donald C., "The Future of Strategic ASW," Paper presented at the Dalhousie University Conference on "The Undersea Dimension of Maritime Strategy," Halifax, N.S., Canada, June 24, 1989. One of the most respected American commentators on the subject of strategic ASW concludes that, despite contrary declaratory policies, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will be capable within the next ten years, of threatening the other's SSBNs with sufficient credibility to make the costs, risks and possible pay-off worthwhile. Daniel proposes that the only possible benefit of an American anti-SSBN campaign would be to tie up defending Soviet general purpose forces. But he warns that the U.S. effort ought to be "modest," and that it must guard against the possibility that the Soviets use their bastioned SSBNs as "bait" to "trap" the most capable Western ASW assets.


Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Naval Strategic Perspectives in the Context of Arms Control," Washington, DC, February 1989. This OPNAV "white paper"
summarizes the U.S. Navy's current (early 1989) position on the various naval arms control proposals and "trial balloon" that have emanated from the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev years. It recommends that a public strategy of "damage control" will not suffice, and that the service embrace instead a "pro-active approach" with the aim of educating the public and allies on the necessity that naval arms control calculations be guided by strategic considerations rather than the wishful urge for controls for their own sake.

**

**
Donatelli, Thomas, "Go Navy," The American Spectator, February 1987, pp 31-33, on the linkages between defense reorganization and the maritime elements of the national military strategy. Supports the Maritime Strategy, and fears for its future under the new Defense Department set up.

* Dunn, V. Adm. Robert F., "NANews Interview," Naval Aviation News, March-April 1987, p 4. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare comments on "today's maritime strategy in terms of its effects on Naval Aviation: Tactical commanders must deal with the strategy on a day-to-day basis. From that derives a new tactical awareness."

Freedman, Lawrence, "Arms Control at Sea," paper presented at the Royal Naval Staff College Conference, "Decade of the '90s: Response to Change," Greenwich, UK, February 14, 1989. Finds that the characteristics and capabilities of naval forces are far more complex than those on land, and are, therefore, much less amenable to "traditional" arms control "solutions" (cooperation, predictability, parity, and stability). Freedman concludes that naval arms control "will remain a not-very-good idea whose time has not yet come."

**
defined scenario-dependent systems analytical measures of effectiveness, and ignored the hallmark of naval force—flexibility and ambiguity. Urges that naval forces cannot and should not be optimized to a given scenario—"flexibility, or ambiguity, rather than actual striking power is (their) great virtue." Most controversial is Friedman's idea of using the carrier battlegroup for a "bait-and-trap" strategy whereby Soviet submarines and bombers would be deliberately drawn into a (losing!) shoot-out within carrier strike range of the Soviet homeland. The skeptic is reminded of Den, Bien Phu!

Friedman, Norman, "The U.S. Navy, 1990-2010: Prospects and Problems," paper presented at the Royal Navy Staff College Conference, "Decade of the '90s—Response to Change," Greenwich, UK, February 15, 1989. A wide-ranging prognosis of the possible implications of East/West political change, technological progress, and budgetary and manpower pressures for the foreseeable size and structure of the U.S. Navy. Among Friedman's "predictions" are the following: (1) larger, self-maintaining combatants may become more economical to buy in the long run, (2) ships should be built for longer life expectancies than is presently the norm, (3) cheaper electronics may lower the cost of ships, and (4) a smaller military-age population will force a heightened degree of shipboard automation.


"From the Editor," Submarine Review, January 1987, pp 3-5. Challenges some of the basic strategic concepts of the Maritime Strategy regarding the employment of SSNs.

Gaffney, Frank, Jr., "Navy Steers Risky Course on Tac-Nukes," Defense News, June 12, 1989, pp 31-32. Strong criticism of the U.S. Navy's recent announcement that it will phase out and not replace obsolete shipboard nuclear weapons. Warns that a "non-nuclear" navy could tempt the Soviet Union to start a nuclear war at sea, and worse that West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, "who has made a career of weakening Western security," will use the Navy's decision to advance his own campaign at eliminating short-range nuclears from West German soil.


** George, James L., "La nuova strategia navale degli Stati Uniti (The U.S. Navy's New Maritime Strategy)," Revista Marittima, November

** George, James L., "Maritime Mission or Strategy?" Naval War College Review, Winter 1989, pp 47-55. Proposes that the purposes of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy might be better understood if its three "phases" were explained in "traditional" mission terminology—deterrence, presence, sea control, and power projection.

** Glaser, Charles L. and Miller, Steven E. (eds.), The Navy, the Maritime Strategy and Nuclear War, (forthcoming in 1988). Examines whether the strategy might cause escalation and the results if it did.

* Goodman, Glenn W. Jr. and Schemmer, Benjamin F., "An Exclusive AFJ Interview with Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, pp 76-84, especially p 79. The Chief of Naval Operations discusses his views on the Maritime Strategy, including forward pressure, anti-SSBN operations, and relations with the NATO allies. "Our intent is to hold Soviet maritime forces at risk in the event of war. That includes anything that is out there."

** Gray, Colin S., and Barnett, Roger W., "Geopolitics and Strategy," Global Affairs, Winter 1989, pp 18-37. Offers a geo-strategic prescription for the hierarchy of American national security interests and military force allocation (strategic nuclear, land, maritime). Rejects a deterministic view of the continental-maritime divide, while arguing its long-term (frequently subconscious) conditioning effect on national security policy choices. The American geo-political "window" on the world, say the authors, mandates that a NATO-Warsaw Pact war be seen in campaign terms, and that the U.S. contribution emphasize (maritime) access to the Eurasian land mass first, and only indirectly a commitment of forces on land.


** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy: Europe and the World Beyond," Naval Forces, No. 5, 1988, pp 28-41. Western naval power, harnessed to a global maritime strategy, argues Gray, is critical to the
successful deterrence and, if necessary, the defeat of Soviet war-fighting objectives in Europe. He exemplifies his case by citing the precedents of World Wars I and II, and suggesting the military advantage over the long haul of a maritime coalition over a continentally-based opponent. Elsewhere in his article, however, Gray at least intimates that it was not so much seapower as the Allies’ superior economic and industrial strength that won both wars.

**

Gray, Colin S., "The Maritime Strategy in the US/Soviet Strategic Relations," Naval War College Review, Winter 1989, pp 7-18. Geopolitics, not incompatible ideologies, claims Gray, determine the necessity for the United States to offset Soviet power on the Eurasian continent. Geopolitics also dictate that U.S. and U.S.-led strategies are centered on seapower. Only superior maritime power, argues Gray, can serve to exhaust the Soviet Union's superior continental position, produce "domestic unraveling," and ultimately defeat Moscow. The author notes that, over the past 400 years, no maritime-led coalition has ever lost a great war against continental coalitions; others, Paul Kennedy in Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, for instance, would interject that superior economic power has been the decisive factor.

**


**


**


Hendrickson, David C., The Future of American Strategy, New York: Holmes and Meiser, 1987. A new and different perspective. Advocates a scaled-back mix of continental and maritime strategies and forces. Sees some U.S. naval forces particularly useful in Third World contingencies, especially carriers, but would cut back on naval, air and ground forces he sees as only useful for highly unlikely forward global operations against the Soviets. Wrongly believes this includes Aegis cruisers and destroyers.

*


* Inside the Navy, May 8, 1989. Report on the U.S. Navy Secretary-designate Lawrence Garrett confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. A summary of written answers by Garrett to the Senate Armed Services Committee during confirmation hearings in the first week of May 1989. As such, they probably offer the first insight into the new Navy Secretary's views on the maritime strategy. Garrett reportedly defined the latter as a "set of strategic principles" and a "global view of fleet operations, for deterrence and crisis control," as well as a "dynamic concept which both influences and reacts to fleet operations and budgetary issues."


** Keller, Lt. Kenneth C., "The Surface Ship in ASW," *Surface Warfare*, Jan/Feb 1987, pp 2-3. "Any future ASW conflict, by necessity, will be fought in accordance with the maritime strategy." Another of the new generation of naval officers gets, and passes, the word.

** Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "The Maritime Strategy in a New Environment: Maritime Sufficiency," *National Defense*, March 1989, pp 10-13. *National Defense*'s maritime editor offers practical suggestions to "stimulate discussion on the parameters of maritime sufficiency" in an era in which "Cold War rhetoric" can no longer suffice to justify American naval strength. His principal proposal is to create an active/reserve naval force structure sized to the dual requirements of (1) day-to-day (active) peacetime naval presence, and (2) emergency (reserve) NATO mobilization and reinforcement.
Korb, Lawrence J., "A Blueprint for Defense Spending," *Wall Street Journal*, May 20, 1987, p 34. "The Navy's proper wartime job is...to secure the sea lands necessary to support a ground campaign and to take the Soviet Navy out of the war, not primarily by seeking it out and destroying it, but by bottling it up. For this, a 12-carrier Navy should suffice."

"Lehman on Sea Power," *U.S. News and World Report*, June 15, 1987, p 28. "The maritime strategy I've promoted is not new; it is NATO strategy that was never taken seriously, a formula for holding Norway and the Eastern Mediterranean, two high-threat areas."

**Lessner, Richard, "Quick Strike: Navy Secretary's Wartime Strategy is Conteste Legacy," *Arizona Republic*, March 29, 1987 pp C1+. Comprehensive discussion of the issues, including a lengthy interview with Secretary Lehman on the eve of his departure from office, on his Maritime Strategy opinions. Contributes, however, to the erroneous view running throughout America journalism that the Strategy was solely his creation.**


**Lind, William S., and Gray, Colin S., "The Maritime Strategy—1988," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 1988, pp 53-61. Two noted strategic commentators debate the "maritimeness" of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. Lind, relying on Mahan and Corbett's classic definition, finds that, "what the Navy has been calling its maritime strategy is, indeed, no such thing," but instead, "merely the naval component of the continental strategy that the United States has followed since the end of World War II. "He advocates expanding the debate and address the issues of a "true maritime strategy." Gray, on the other hand, sounds much more comfortable that the Navy, after 100 years of "strategically undisciplined tracts," has come to fully recognize the benefits and limits of naval power. At sea, he maintains, the offense has historically proven the strongest form of warfare. The long striking range of modern seabased weapons, Gary believes, will force the Soviet fleet to "come out and do battle in the Norwegian Sea."

Linder, Bruce R., "What Happened to the 600-Ship Navy?" *Naval International*, July/August 1988, pp 382-85. Blames OSD "political expediency" more so than budgetary pressures per se for the Navy's failure to reach the 600-ship goal. Foreseeable of older combatants, reports the author, will not likely be matched by new construction, so
that fleet levels will probably continue to decline, mostly at the expense of amphibious and support forces.


** Metcalf, Joseph, III, V.Adm., USN (Ret.), "The Maritime Strategy in Transition," paper presented at the Royal Navy Staff College Conference, "Decade of the 90s: Response to Change," Greenwich, UK, February 15, 1989. Discussion by the former Commander Second Fleet of the impact of long-range cruise missiles on the U.S. Navy's strike capabilities, notably the "new dimensions" that have been brought to the "forward" meaning of forward strategy.

Morris, Clark R., "Our Muscle Bound Navy," *New York Times Magazine*, March 1988. Derides the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy as a "desperate improvisation to justify yearned-for weapons systems," especially the "1,000-foot chunk(s) of floating metal." Invokes the standard litany of objections against large-deck carriers and forward operations, while applauding small carriers and the convoy escort strategy.

**Navy News & Undersea Technology, "The Navy's Maritime Strategy Has to Evolve...But is it the Right Strategy at All?" August 1, 1988, pp 4-5. Reports the comments made by Capt. James Lynch, USN, member of the Navy's Strategic Think Tank (STT), and William S. Lind of the Military Reform Institute at the 1987 U.S. Naval Institute symposium, "Future U.S. Naval Power" in San Diego, CA. Lynch and Lind agree that the Soviet threat can no longer be the sole object of American maritime strategy, but disagree on the implications for U.S. national security in general, and the Navy's purposes in particular. Lynch maintains that a proliferation of international centers of political, economic and military power heightens the importance of a maritime strategy aimed at the protection of trade, chokepoints, and SLOCs. Lind calls for "re-uniting the West," to include the Soviet Union, against the future specter of a resurgent "East."


**O'Rourke, Ronald, "The Maritime Strategy and the Next Decade," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1988, pp 34-38. The U.S. Naval Institute's 1988 Arleigh Burke prize-winning essay by the Congressional Research Service's leading naval analyst offers the U.S. Navy some salient words of advice on how to keep its reborn strategic awareness from "falling through the cracks." O'Rourke warns that the Navy must take steps to ensure that its maritime strategy is further developed and articulated publicly, and not "tossed out of the window" as a Lehman artifact" or a meaningless catch-all rubric for any and all routine activities and contingencies.

occasionally inaccurate in tracing the prehistory and history of the Strategy, probably because of deficiencies in the public record.

**


**


**


**


**

Reagan, President Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington: the White House, January 1987. The framework within which the Maritime Strategy operates. Clear focus on global, forward, coalition approach, especially vs. the Soviets. See especially p 19: "U.S. military forces must possess the capability, should deterrence fail, to expand the scope and intensity of combat operations, as necessary," and pp 27-30: "Maritime superiority is vital. (It) enables us to capitalize on Soviet geographic vulnerabilities and to pose a global threat to the Soviet's interests. It plays a key role in plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It also permits the United States to tie down Soviet naval forces in a defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic missile submarines and the seaward approaches to the Soviet homeland..."

Rostow, Eugene V., "For the Record," Washington Post, June 30, 1987, p A18. Extract from a Naval War College lecture by a former high Reagan Administration Arms Control official: "I can imagine no better antidote for the frustration and irritability which now characterize allied relationships than allied cooperation in mounting successful applications of counter-force at outposts of the Soviet
empire and shifting geographical points around its periphery. The Soviet empire is extremely vulnerable to such a peninsular strategy."

RUSI Newsbrief, April, 1988, "NATO's Challenge on the Northern Flank," pp 29-31. An error-filled "analysis" of the northern thrust of the U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy. Proposes that the maritime strategy must prove successful in a "30-day" European war, that the Soviets "would probably launch their SLBMs rather than have them destroyed by NATO," and that the Walker-Whitworth and Kongsberg-Toshiba affairs have "called into question the credibility of the strategic missile submarine," and have "invalidate(d) the use of Western hunter-killer submarines to close in on Soviet home waters."

Sakitt, Mark, Submarine Warfare in the Arctic: Option or Illusion? Stanford, CA: Stanford University International Strategic Institute, 1988, 93 pp. This monograph considers the tactical and environmental (read acoustic) problems the U.S. Navy can expect to encounter when carrying out a strategic ASW campaign in Arctic waters. Using the results of a series of simple search, attrition and acoustic propagation models, the author concludes that "reasonable expected outcomes for the U.S. Navy do not appear very promising," and that the "Arctic naval game seems to be one in which the defenders, the Soviets can dominate." Tactical and environmental difficulties aside, the book cautions against the risk of unwanted escalation, and recommends that possible naval arms controls might consider a trade-off between U.S. agreement on Soviet SSBN sanctuaries, and Soviet acceptance of a numerical SSN cap.

Sea-War Plan All Wet?" Columbus Dispatch, April 7, 1987, p 10A. A call for a "vigorous review" by the Pentagon of "Lehman's plan," including "aircraft carrier battle groups...sent to the...Barents, (a plan) never...formally approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, or NATO." As has often been the case with public journalistic commentary on the Maritime Strategy, no mention was made of the extent to which the Strategy reflects longstanding JCS, SECDEF, or NATO policy and strategy, or of its roots in the naval officer corps.

Smit, E.D., Jr., Capt. USN, "The Main Utility of the Navy," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1988, pp 105-107. Recommends that the strategic purposes of the U.S. Navy in a European conflict be re-directed away from attacking the Soviet SSBN fleet, to sinking the Soviet (general purpose) Navy. The author acknowledges that a successful outcome will contribute little to the events on land, but avers that it is a worthwhile objective on its own merits and with a pay-off that will become evident "after the war is over."


Tritten, Cdr. James J., "Nonnuclear Warfare," Proceedings, February 1987, pp 64-70. By the Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. On the symbiotic nature of nonnuclear and nuclear warfare, at sea and
ashore, under conditions of crisis response, intra-war deterrence, and warfighting.


* Trost, C.A., Adm., USN, "The Goal and the Challenge," Sea Power, October 1988, pp 13-30. In an interview the CNO acknowledges that the 600-ship goal will not be reached in 1989, but that forward strategy will remain central to the Navy's peace and wartime deployment philosophy. According to Trost, "carriers sailing into the Kola Gulf and lots of other things...are not, nor have ever been, envisioned as part of our forward-based maritime strategy."


* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Bringing Down the Bird of Thought," speech at the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 18, 1987. The CNO cautions maritime strategy planners on the risks of "set-piece thinking," and on the need to guard against drawing conclusions about Soviet naval intentions "through their writings or through their military capabilities themselves."

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Global Role Demands a 15-Carrier Navy," Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1989, p II-9. Reiterates that 15 is the minimum number of carrier battlegroups necessary to support the Nation's global commitments in war and peace "at a prudent level of risk."

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Looking at the Future of the Navy," remarks at U.S. Naval Institute Conference, San Diego, CA,
July 27, 1988. The CNO foresees a 21st century naval threat environment that will differ little from current international conditions, but that will feature important technological changes in all three warfare dimensions—surface, subsurface and air. Even so, reports the CNO, the Nimitz-size aircraft carrier will remain "the centerpiece of naval warfare."


* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Requirements Drive Navy Force Levels," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1989, pp 34-38. The CNO warns that a "precipitate rush to dismantle naval forces because of premature optimism over the presumed evolution of the global balance of power could be a most costly misreading of history." Trost projects a future international environment that will be increasingly complex, politically and technologically, and that will, therefore, *heighten* the importance of forward deployed and sustained naval forces, including a minimum of 15 aircraft carriers.

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "This Era and the Next: American Security Interest and the U.S. Navy," speech at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, January 10, 1989. A plea to preserve a forward-deployed 15-carrier Navy while the West guardedly watches the progress of the "Gorbachev era."


* Trost, Carlisle H., Adm., USN, "In the Sail Left, Thinking of U.S. Seapower," remarks at Military Sealift Command (MSC) Change-of-Command Ceremony, December 19, 1988. The CNO decries the disappearance of America's maritime industry and warns that the country "will lose its identify as a maritime nation...."

Truver, Scott, "Phibstrike 95 - Fact or Fiction?" Armed Forces Journal International, August 1987, pp 102-108. A case study of how the Maritime Strategy has been used as a framework by the Marine Corps to develop an amphibious warfare concept of future operations.

**

**


Weltman, John J., "The Short, Unhappy Life of the Maritime Strategy," The National Interest, Spring 1989, pp 79-86. The author reports that the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy under the Reagan Administration was largely the produce of budgetary plenty and the intra-service dominance of the carrier and submarine communities. Both conditions, he claims, have ceased to exist, so that planning and force procurement will shift to a strategy "emphasizing defensive sea control in support of the land battle..." This development, Weltman concludes, "can only strengthen the constraints against any assault upon the Western alliance."


Wettern, Desmond, "The Paradox of Decline: Are Convoys the Only Alternative?" Sea Power, April 1989, pp 147-159. The writer, a longtime British commentator on maritime affairs, seems to think so. The decline of the West's acoustic advantage, he says, has made the protection of the Atlantic SLOCs by way of a "Ramboesque" forward offensive a doubtful proposition. He concludes that, unless the West successfully develops active towed sonar arrays, alternative ship protection strategies such as "Moving barriers" and patrolled lanes," will probably prove as great a failure as the "patrolled sea lanes" and "hunter-killer" concepts of the two world wars. Accordingly, the one remaining option may well be the re-adoption of the convoy system.

White, David F., "Atlantic Sealife Commander Says Containerization Hurts Readiness," Journal of Commerce, April 7, 1988, p 12B. Reports the concern expressed by the new chief of the Military Sealift Command, Atlantic, Capt. Thomas J. Batzel, USN, that the progressive containerization of merchant fleets will leave his command short of enough breakbulk freighters to carry odd and oversize cargoes such as tanks, trucks and artillery.

predicting that the latter "Aspect of the forward strategy will start fading as soon as Lehman leaves the Navy Department." This seems doubtful, given the primary role of the officer corps in drafting the Maritime Strategy; time will tell. See also retort by Bennett, Rep Charles E., "A 600-Ship Fleet is What's Needed," Washington Post, April 22, 1987, p 19.

** Wilson, George, "Soviets Score Silent Success in Undersea Race with U.S.," Washington Post, July 17, 1987, p A20. Claims Adm. Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "has never been enamored of the forward strategy" and that "other Defense Department officials said the forward strategy started to sink as soon as Lehman left the Pentagon." On the former, see Crowe testimony earlier in 1987, cited above. On the latter, see Mark Twain's cable from London to the Associated Press 1897.

** Winnefeld, Lt. James A., Jr., "Fresh Claws for the Tomcat," Proceedings, July 1987, pp 103-107. On the relationship between the Maritime Strategy, CVBG operations, and hardware requirements. "The F-14D is not just another nice fighter; it offers a significant enhancement of the CVBG's ability to execute the maritime strategy. The aircraft's true worth is apparent only in this light."

Wood, Robert, "The Conceptual Framework for Strategic Development at the Naval War College," Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, pp 4-16. Further development of the views of this Naval War College strategist/faculty member. His focus is now on integrated national military strategy and its teaching and gaming. See also commentary by R.Adm. J. A. Baldwin, President of the Naval War College, pp 2-3.
IV. SISTER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY

The Maritime Strategy fully incorporates U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force and Army contributions to the global maritime campaign. In fact, the case can be made that more thought has been given to actual joint combat operations (as opposed to problems of command relationships or lift) by the Navy and Marine Corps in codifying the Maritime Strategy than by either the Air Force or the Army in developing their own "cornerstone" publications. The open literature on potential Army contributions to maritime warfare, such as air defense batteries based in islands and littoral areas, is particularly weak.


Atkeson, MG Edear, USA (Ret.), "Arctic Could be a Hot Spot in Future Conflicts," Army, January 1986, pp 13-14. Fanciful proposal for expanded U.S. Army role in helping implement the Maritime Strategy, "An Army air cavalry force, properly tailored for the mission, should be able to locate submarine activity under the ice as well as, if not better than, another submarine."


Chipman, Dr. Donald D., "Rethinking Forward Strategy and the Distant Blockade," Armed Forces Journal International, August 1987, pp 82-88. Argues for joint integrated USN-USAF wartime operations in NATO's Northern Region, the GUIK gap, and the Norwegian Sea. Well in keeping with the Maritime Strategy.

In October 1987, US sea and airlift capabilities were reorganized under a new unified command, the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The new organization promised to improve the efficiency and coordination of the Nation's trans-Atlantic reinforcement assets, but the article reports, it has been unable to stop the growing decline in national life resources, especially shipping.


Fraser, Ronald, "MDZ Mission Defines Coast Guard Wartime Role," Navy Times, October 20, 1986, p 27, on the role of the Maritime Defense Zones.


Griggs, Roy A., Maj., USAF, "Maritime Strategy on NATO's Central Front," Military Review, April 1988, pp 54-65. Urges that the United States and its Navy develop capabilities and doctrinal concepts for using the conventional warhead Tomahawk (TLAM-C) in support of the NATO/US Army follow-on forces attack (FOFA) AirLand Battle concepts. Deep-interdiction TLAM-C strikes from disperses surface and subsurface combatants early in a conflict, says the author, would be "one way the maritime strategy could effectively support ground forces on the central front." A key problem still to be solved, concludes the article, is the creation of quick-reaction, on-scene shipboard TLAM strike planning centers.


Hooker, Richard D., Capt., USA, "NATO's Northern Flank: A Critique of the Maritime Strategy," Parameters, June 1989, pp 24-34. An Army officer criticizes, in his words, the "narrow prescriptions called for in the Maritime Strategy," urging that the Navy's sister services "enter and participate in the debate" over the defense of the Northern Flank in particular, and the "tone and substance of the strategic vision that must guide all our forces into the next century." Hooker's specific objections to the maritime strategy's northern flank gambit center on the risk of nuclear escalation, and the concession,
to the Soviets, of important geo-strategic and force-ratio advantages. Also disputed is the maritime strategists' claim that submarine SLOC interdiction has relatively little priority in Soviet Navy planning. The author concludes with the recommendation that options for the defense of northern Europe be "rigorously submitted to the discipline of an articulated and integrated conception of national military strategy," notably consideration of ground and air force equipment pre-positioning in Norway.

**


U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub. 2)*, Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1986. Reflecting the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Title 10 and Title 32 U.S. Code, as amended, and DOD Directive 5100.1 (The "Functions Paper"), JCS Pub. 2. governs the joint activities of the U.S. armed forces. See especially Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2-3, charging each Military Department, including the Navy, to "prepare forces...for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war." This responsibility (and not, as some critic charge, a desire to somehow usurp the authority of the JCS or the Unified and Specified Commanders) was the primary impetus and justification for Navy and Marine Corps development, promulgation and discussion of the Maritime Strategy. It is the Navy Department's framework for discharging its responsibilities to "organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea."

U.S. Air Force, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (AFM 1-1)*, Washington: Department of the Air Force, March 16, 1984. The "cornerstone" Air Force doctrinal manual and, therefore, a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Takes a somewhat narrower view of potential areas of mutual support than does the Navy. See especially the discussion of objectives of naval forces on p 1-3, neglecting projection operations, e.g., strike or amphibious warfare; and pp 2-15, 3-1, and 3-5/3-6, covering possible Air Force actions to enhance naval operations, virtually all of which are incorporated in the Maritime Strategy. Note, however, the lack of mention of any concomitant naval role in enhancing "aerospace" operations, and the lack of discussion of USAF AAW contributions to maritime warfare, a key element of the Maritime Strategy.

U.S. Army, *Operations (FM 100-5)*, Washington: Department of the Army, August 20, 1982. The Army's "keystone warfighting manual" and, therefore, a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Almost no discussion of Army/Navy mutual support, however, e.g., air defense and island/littoral reinforcement. Included on p 17-7 a useful discussion of the importance and essentially maritime nature of the
NATO northern and southern European regions. Superseded in May 1986; distribution now restricted to U.S. government agencies.


V. **ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY**

The Maritime Strategy as developed by the U.S. Navy of the 1980s is heavily oriented toward combined (and joint) operations, and this was reflected in the *Proceedings* January 19867 Supplement, "The Maritime Strategy." The postwar U.S. Navy had never been "unilateralist." Allied contributions to the global campaign were worked out years ago and then had been continually updated in the drafting of allied war plans, Memoranda of Agreement, and other documents. They have been routinely discussed at annual Navy-to-Navy staff policy talks and CNO-to-CNO visits, held between the U.S. Navy and each of its most important allied associates. Thus, most of the hard bargaining and tradeoffs had already been done, and integrating allied efforts with the U.S. Navy component of the Maritime Strategy was not particularly difficult. Once the Maritime Strategy was drafted, it was briefed to key allied CNOs and planning staffs and to NATO commanders. Allied feedback was considered and utilized in updating revisions to the Strategy, and the process continues today.

Alford, Jonathan, "The Current Military Position on the Northern Flank," *Marineblad* (The Hague), December 1986/January 1987, pp. 601-08. Speaking at a May 1986 conference on "Britain and the Security of NATO's Northern Flank," the former deputy director of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) invokes the syllogism, "Who controls the Norwegian Sea depends on who controls the North Norwegian airfields. Who controls those fields depends on who gets there first, and who gets there first depends on who controls the Norwegian Sea." Alford concludes that the growth in strategic importance of NATO's northern region has turned Great Britain in "at least as much as a flank country as (a) central" alliance member. Accordingly, for Britain the maritime vs. continental alternative "falsifies and obscures the issue." If British military capabilities must be cut, they should fall on the Central Front.

Archer, Clive, *Britain's Surface Fleet: How Little is Enough?* Centrepiece Paper No. 13, Aberdeen, Scotland: University of Aberdeen, Centre for Defense Studies, Summer 1988, 28 pp. Reports that national and allied security requires that Britain reverses the numerical decline of its surface fleet, and take a more active role in the defense of the North Atlantic. Early Royal Navy forward deployment in the Norwegian Sea, says Archer, would serve these purposes: (1) demonstrate allied solidarity and deter precipitated Soviet action, (2) "hold the fort" and (3) "sanitize" the South Norwegian and North Seas in preparation of the arrival of U.S. Navy reinforcements, and (4) influence possible naval arms control negotiations. On the latter, the author notes that the European voice in matters will be "relatively proportionate to their naval strength."


Barresen, Jacob, Capt. Royal Norwegian Navy, "U.S. Carrier Operations in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea." Paper presented at the International Comparative Workshop on Soviet Seapower, Sortland, June 1988, 24 pp. This paper takes aim at the conventional wisdom that the forward deployment of carrier battlegroups into the Norwegian Sea will amount to a charge-the-light brigade. Capt. Barresen concludes instead that a two or three-carrier battlegroup, provided it is afforded adequate land-based AAW and ASW support, can establish sea control north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and possibly "profoundly change the correlation of forces on NATO's northern flank." Such a force, he reports, will increase allied air defense and anti-submarine capabilities in the North by factors of five and five-to-ten, respectively.

Bjarnason, Bjorn, "Iceland and NATO," NATO Review, February 1986, pp 7-12. By one of Iceland's leading journalists. "It is crucial that in any defense of sea routes between North America and Western Europe, ...the Soviet fleet is confined as far north towards its home base at the Kola Peninsula as possible...the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap...is not an adequate barrier; instead, NATO envisages a forward defense in the Norwegian Sea." Includes update on the defense debate in Iceland.

Boerresen, Capt. Jacob, RNN, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy," Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 14-15, by the military secretary to the Norwegian Minister of Defense. "During the 1970s, NATO and
the USA expressly limited their carrier operations...to the waters in and south of the GIUK gap, Norway...found this situation rather uncomfortable...The official Norwegian reaction to (forward deployment of CVBGs) has been positive, (but) Norway is...sensitive to all developments that it fears may threaten the low level of tension."

Boerresen, J., Capt. Royal Norwegian Navy, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy," Naval Forces. When this article was published, the author was military secretary to Norway's Minister of Defense Johan J. Holst. The views expressed can, therefore, be read as a reliable statement of Norway's defense preferences. In this case, Boerresen stresses his country's "reluctant embrace" of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. Occasional forward deployments of American carrier battlegroups, he says, are desirable, but not as permanent presence. The writer also has misgivings with an anti-SSBN strategy, and he worries over the "well-known phenomenon that American commitments fluctuate over the years." He cautions his American readers that they should not presume that permission to station their carriers inside Norway's territorial waters will be timely and automatic.


British Atlantic Committee, Diminishing the Nuclear Threat: NATO's Defense and New Technology, London: February 1984. A group of retired British generals and others rail against the "practicality" and "very purpose" of the NATO reinforcement


Caufriez, Chaplain G., "Comment and Discussion: Plan Orange Revisited," Proceedings, March 1985, pp 73 & 79. From Home Forces Headquarters, Belgium, a plea for Norwegian Sea vice GIUK Gap defense, lest "at one go, the northern flank would have crumbled."


Chichester, Michael, "The Western Alliance: Politics, Economics and Maritime Power," Navy International, January 1987, pp 4-6. While warning that the U.S. naval largesse on behalf of Western Europe's maritime security may not outlast the Reagan Administration, Chichester repeats his call for the creation of a "European maritime pillar," organized under the umbrella of the EEC or Western European Union (WEU), and headed up by Great Britain, "the leading maritime power in Europe."

Chichester, Michael, "NATO's Maritime Power: Its place in a New Strategy," Navy International, August 1986, pp 504-06. Between the U.S. Navy's (over) commitments, the possibility that the Soviet Union will re-direct its expansionary appetite away from the Central Front, and European desires for a louder voice in Western coalition strategy, the time has come, says the author, for a "combined European maritime defense policy" that will take charge of the security of the eastern Atlantic.

Chichester, Michael, "Towards a European Maritime Policy," Navy International, November 1988, pp 538-40. One of the most vocal spokesmen for the creation of a European "maritime pillar" deplores the failure by the Western European Union (WEU) to translate the
recent dispatch of Western European flotillas to the Persian Gulf into a "European standing naval force" for use "outside the NATO theatre."

Childs, Nick, "The Royal Navy: Which Way Forward?" Navy International, April 1989, pp 169-71. Proposes that perhaps only significant (including British) arms reductions on the European Continent will "save" the Royal Navy's surface fleet from declining below the stated force objective of "about 50" destroyers and frigates. Still, child's questions if it may not be wiser to "balance" the fleet in favor of submarines and maritime patrol aircraft as opposed to surface combatants if the Royal Navy, in concert with its European allies, intends to "hold the ring" preparatory to the arrival of American reinforcements. Given the Royal Navy's weakness in air defense capabilities, concludes Childs, doing so effectively "must be considered fanciful."


Crickard, F.W., R.Adm., RCN (Ret.), "The U.S. Maritime Strategy—Should Canada Be Concerned?" See entry under Yost, William J.


De Savornin-Lohman, J.P., "De Nederlandse Politieke Benadering van het 'Out-of-Area' Probleem ('The Dutch Political Approach to the 'Out-of-Area' Problem')," *Marineblad* (The Hague), May 1988, pp 192-198. Synopsis of the Dutch Government's policy on NATO "out-of-area" issues, which includes: (1) rejection of a NATO out-of-area "strategy" per se in favor of preparations to deal with situations on an ad hoc basis, (2) a preference for political solutions through international forums such as the United Nations, (3) a rejection of out-of-area military operations under NATO auspices, and (4) an emphasis on indirect contributions in support of the direct contributions by the larger NATO members, e.g., the provision of transit facilities or force compensations. The article includes a useful discussion of the Dutch decision to send mine warfare forces to the Persian Gulf. Note is also made of existing NATO plans to protect shipping outside the treaty area in the event of a crisis with the Soviet Union.


Department of Defense (Australia), *The Defense of Australia: 1987,* Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 19, 1987. The first official Australian Defense "White Paper" since 1976 ensures continued RAN cooperation within the Maritime Strategy. "In the remote contingency of global conflict...our responsibilities would include those associated with the Radford-Collins Agreement for the protection and control of shipping. Subject to priority requirement in our own area the Australian Government would then consider contributions further afield...for example, our FFGs...are capable of effective participation in a U.S. carrier battle group well distant from Australia's shores."
Dibb, Paul, Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. Against Australian involvement with United States and other allied contingency planning for global war. Claims that Radford-Collins Agreement "convoying and escort connotations which extend more than 2000 nautical miles west of Australia to the mid-Indian Ocean suggest a disproportionate commitment of scarce resources to activities which may be only marginally related to our national interest and capabilities." An input to the March 1987 government White Paper on defense.

Diehl, David, "Norwegian Admiral Watns Maneuver Limits," European Stars and Stripes, September 17, 1988, p 3. V.Adm. Torolf Rein, NATO’s allied commander northern Europe, comments on exercises "Teamwork '88," and proposes that, while he is pleased with the Alliance's new forward strategy, Norway's resources "can't go on to exercises of this type a year."


** Eberle, Adm. Sir James, RN, "Editorial," Naval Forces, IV/1986, p 7. By a former top Royal Navy and NATO Commander-in-Chief. "The New Maritime Strategy is to be welcomed as a brave effort to bring some much needed clarity into the field of maritime strategic thinking, but it is more likely to be welcomed in Europe by naval officers than it is by political leaders."


Forces. Includes latest official West German defense policy and strategy views. See especially pp 27-29, 76-77, 111, and 211-216. Declares unequivocal German support for "forward defense at sea in accordance with the NATO commanders' maritime concept of operations, which "calls for countering the threat far from friendly sea routes and shores. Interdiction of enemy naval forces should be effected immediately in front of their own bases." Differentiates clearly, however, between such use of naval (and air) forces and "aggressive forward defense by ground operations in the opponent's territory," which "NATO strategy rules out."

Gann, L.H. (ed.), The Defense of Western Europe, London: Croom Helm, 1987, surveys all the defense forces of all the Western European nations. Particularly useful is Nigel de Lee's "The Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces," pp 58-94, which examines in some detail their wartime sea and air concepts of operations in the Norwegian Sea, the Baltic approaches, the Baltic itself and inshore waters. These concepts are well integrated into the Maritime Strategy. As regards Denmark, de Lee notes: "Plans for naval action are based on aggressive tactics in depth, and this entails a forward defense." Particularly useless is the highly parochial chapter by Col. Harry Summers USA (Ret.), allegedly on "United States Armed Forces in Europe," which should have been styled "The U.S. Army in Germany."


Greenwood, David, "Towards Role Specialization in NATO," NATO's Sixteen Nations, July 1986, pp 44-49. Argues against a significant Eastern Atlantic naval role for Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany and Denmark. This translates out as largely an attack on the existence of the Dutch Navy, one of the world's best.


Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy and Crisis Stability," *Naval Forces*, No. 6, 1986, pp 34-44. Excellent discussion of how the Soviet Union and the West might agree on a set of formal or informal "rules" for routinizing the periodic forward deployment of NATO naval forces in the Norwegian Sea without upsetting the "Nordic balance." Were such "normal times" rules to be broken, says Grove, this would serve as a "tripwire" for the West to initiate the maritime strategy's "Phase I" crisis reinforcement.

Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy," *Bulletin of the Council for Arms Control (UK)*, September 1986, pp 5-6. Regards the Strategy as "self-consciously offensive" and "self-consciously coalition-minded, yet, another example of the growing difference in mood between the two sides of the Atlantic." Challenges fellow Europeans to inject amendments reflecting their own "interests and fears." The "difference in mood" he sees, however, may well be more between military leaders and some political writers on both sides of the ocean than between Americans and Europeans.


Haesken, Ole, et al, *Confidence Building Measures at Sea*, FFI Rapport-88/5002, Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, November 10, 1988. An exhaustive study of the desirability/feasibility of 14 different types of possible confidence building measures (CBMs) at sea for the Nordic region. The study finds 5 possible measures "clearly promising" (e.g., notification of exercises, incidents-at-sea agreements), 6 with "uncertain value" (e.g., limitation of exercises, exchange of shipboard exercise observers), and 3 "clearly unsuitable." Each of the latter would entail the creation of "permanent zones" of naval exclusion, e.g., limited...
presence, weapons (SLCM) limitations, and limited base access. This is requisite reading for anyone concerned with the possible impact of maritime CBMs on operations efficiency, deterrence, and forward naval planning generally.

Heginbotham, Stanley, J., "The Forward Maritime Strategy and Nordic Europe," Naval War College Review, November/December 1985, pp 19-27. Notes that U.S. Navy's maritime strategy means different things to different people, and that the European allies will accept or reject the strategy, depending on their particular interpretation (e.g., "deployment doctrine" vs. "horizontal escalation doctrine"). The author concludes that, "it is important to bear European sensitivities in minds and to shape a strategy in ways that are most likely to draw European support rather than opposition."


Holst, Johan Jorgen, "The Security Pattern in Northern Europe: A Norwegian View," Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/January 1987, pp 622-33. Excellent discussion by Norway's defense minister of his country's "security calculus," including, in particular, the country's relationship with the Soviet Union based on the "trade-off between considerations of deterrence and reassurance." Most treatments of the linkage between the Central Front and the Northern flank focus on the first as the "dependent variable." Holst reminds the reader that this relationship is much more synergistic: "The size and topography of North Norway would require a would-be attacker to commit fairly large forces which would then not be available for allocation to the central front or the Baltic region...and...NATO's ability to hold the central front is vital, therefore, also from the point of view of constraining Soviet options for diverting forces to the Nordic area." Holst is less than sanguine about some of the declaratory aspects of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. He specifically cautions against putting the Soviet SSBNs at risk, against using Norwegian territory for "horizontal escalation,"
and against a U.S. Navy "permanent naval presence in the Norwegian Sea." By contrast, he does support the idea of a "reasonable frequency of presence...in order to emphasize the American commitment to the defense of Norway."


Huldt, Bo, "The Strategic North," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1985, pp 99-109. Reviews the evolution of the Nordic area from a regional "buffer zone" to a central area in global strategy. The Swedish author suggests that, given the transition of the region from being a flank area to "being perhaps directly in the line of fire," a renewed Danish and Norwegian interest in NATO's nuclear deterrent "should not be ruled out as totally inconceivable."


Jane's NATO & Europe Today, May 3, 1989, "NATO Votes New Navy War Rules," p 3. Reports the adoption by NATO of new roles of naval engagement, defining when naval commanders may open fire against potential adversaries. Does not spell out whether ROEs have been tightened or liberalized.
Jansson, C. Nils-Ove, Cdr., Royal Swedish Navy, "The Baltic: A Sea of Contention," Naval War College Review, pp 47-61. Notes that the Baltic Sea is a "backwater maritime theater" no longer due to three key developments: (1) the forwardness of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy, (2) NATO's FOFA concept, and (3) the rejuvenation of the Soviet TVD system. The article goes on to postulate a wide range of possible Soviet offensive and defensive scenarios for the region.


Kawaguchi, Hiroshi, "Japan's Evolving Defense Policy," NATO's Sixteen Nations, April 1989, pp 21-24. An explanation of how Japan's decision, in January 1987 to repeal the one percent of GNP ceiling on defense expenditures will provide for a robust defense and will not likely be reversed despite the prospect of regional detente. In the area of Far East maritime security, Kawaguchi (a research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University in Washington, DC) suggests that a START agreement will likely result in the elimination or at least important reduction of the Soviet SSBN fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk. The result may be that the Soviet Pacific Fleet, relieved of its task of SSBN protection, "would have more room for other activities."

King-Harman, Col. Anthony, BA, "NATO Strategy—A New Look," RUSI, March 1984, pp 26-29. By a former long-time member of the International NATO Staff. Alleges and decries a NATO "lack of political direction in the maritime sphere. It has been largely left to SAULANT himself to develop and implement a maritime strategy for deterrence...There is also a Tri-MNC concept of operations again carrying no political endorsement." Calls for a new NATO "strategic review," one result of which, he anticipates would be a finding that "reinforcements...would only need the minimum of maritime protection."

the Soviets, however, in contrast to U.S. Maritime Strategy and other allied writers.


Mackay, Cdr. S.V., RN, "An Allied Reaction" Proceedings, April 1987, pp 82-89. Concludes that a peacetime USN Norwegian Sea CVBG presence is required with concomitant "greater commitment from Norway," and "a firm and agreed-upon line...on ROEs. There are clear indications from recent exercises that this Maritime Strategy is the way ahead for U.S. maritime forces and not solely to support the cause for a 600-ship Navy...the supporting maritime nations in NATO must follow the lead. (But) We in Europe must be sure that the Maritime Strategy is a genuine U.S. policy for the future and not just a product of the current administration." See also "Comment and Discussion," July 1987, pp 19-20.


Matsukane, Hisatomo, "Japan and Security of the Sea Lanes," Global Affairs, Spring 1989, pp 49-64. The director of the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies and a former lieutenant general in the Japanese army warns that the Soviet Pacific Fleet threat is aimed mainly at the Pacific sea lines of communications. To prevent the Soviet fleet from breaking out into the open ocean, the author makes three main recommendations: (1) a change from "passive to active defense" by Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces, including teaming up with U.S. forces for "coordinated strikes on regional Soviet facilities," (2) tighter integration of U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities, and (3) the creation of a "well-articulated regional defense, involving far-reaching cooperation and collaboration" between the United States, Japan, and other regional Far East-Pacific nations.

The Maritime Strategy in the context of the overall military situation in Northeast Asia. "The new 'Full-Forward' strategy of the U.S. Pacific Fleet...is certainly in the interest of Japan's conventional security." He is less sanguine regarding Japan's nuclear security, however.

Nathan, James A., "How's the Strategy Playing With the Allies?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1988, pp 57-62. The author asserts that American's overseas allies, especially in the Pacific region, are skeptical about the intent, manageability, and wherewithal of the U.S. Navy's "global" maritime strategy. Fearing that Pacific Fleet carriers may need to be "swung" to the Atlantic, countries such as Japan and Australia are allegedly reluctant to join with the United States in early forward operations and perhaps be left to "hold the bag."

**Naval Forces, No. 7, 1986, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy," pp 14-15. An anonymous, but presumably Norwegian, author explains the "reluctant Norwegian embrace of the maritime strategy." While acknowledging Norway's "uncomfortable" security situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the article expresses worry nevertheless that a heightened U.S. military profile in northern waters could negate Norway's past efforts to strike a balance between "deterrence and reassurance." Cited are these specific concerns: (1) an American submarine campaign against Soviet SSBNs might trigger nuclear escalation, as well as serve to denude the Norwegian Sea-deployed carrier battle groups of their own SSN protection; (2) the Soviet Union could counter U.S. forward deployment with its own increase in force levels, the latter could become a permanent feature of the Nordic "strategic landscape," whereas the U.S. presence may turn out to be a passing phenomenon; and (3) there is no guarantee that U.S. Navy forces will arrive in time and at places of Norwegian choosing.

Netherlands Advisory Committee on Peace and Security, Burden Sharing: A Political Task, The Hague, May 1989. Report prepared for the Dutch ministries of defense and foreign affairs. Concludes that the American perception (real and imagined) of an inequitable Alliance defense burden should be re-dressed less through higher European defense expenditures than by way of a broader "European" responsibility for its own security. The revival of the Western European Union (WEU), and the dispatch of European naval units to the Persian Gulf are reported as "signals" to the United States that "Europe" is indeed prepared to share burdens outside the Atlantic treaty area. The Report acknowledges that a "united Western Europe" may not always make itself heard to U.S. liking, and must guard against living up to the fears of some Americans that "1992" will inaugurate a "fortress Europe."

Nishihara, Masashi, "Maritime Cooperation in the Pacific: The United States and its Partners," Naval War College Review, Summer 1987, pp 37-41. "The U.S. strategy of horizontal escalation by which the United States would open up armed tensions in different parts of the world, in order to force the Soviets to disperse their forces, may not meet Japanese interests."


Olsen, Edward R., "The Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1987, pp 38-49. A reminder that U.S. perceptions of what-needs-to-be-done in the "American lake," i.e. Western Pacific, are not always shared by the regional states. Most nations in the area, says Olsen, fully appreciate the maritimeness of their geo-strategical and economic circumstances; however, they have so far failed to "co-sign" the American estimate of the Soviet danger, and remain uncertain of how exactly an American maritime strategy would cope with this danger.


Pruijs, A., Capt., RNLN, "De verdediging van de Noordflank is meer dan de verdediging van Noord-Noorwegen" ("The Defense of the Northern Flank is More Than the Defense of Northern Norway"), Marineblad (The Hague), April 1987, pp 96-107. A review of the importance of the Nordic region to the security and defense of Central Europe. A maritime forward defense, says this serving officer in the Dutch Navy, is codified in the 1982 NATO Defense Planning Committee-approved Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS). Western European navies and amphibious forces
must be prepared to respond to a crisis quickly and in force, pending the arrival of the U.S. carrier reinforcements.


Riste, Olav and Tamnes, Rolf, *The Soviet Naval Threat and Norway*, Oslo: Research Center for Defense History (FHFS), National Defense College Norway, 1986. See especially pp 18-22. Two Norwegian defense specialists see recent U.S. naval and other efforts as providing "from the Norwegian point of view...a considerably improved probability that the supply lines to Norway will be kept open." See also Tamnes' "Inter-ation and Screening," (also FHFS 1986), on Norwegian attitudes the 1970s and 1980s.


Secretary of State for Defense (UK), *Statement on the Defense Estimates 1986: 1*, London: HMSO, 1986. See especially pp 29, 34, and 60-61. "...enemy attack submarines are successfully to be held at arm's length from the critical Atlantic routes. Defense against these submarines would begin when they sailed; the availability of U.S. ships in the Eastern Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities cannot be assumed; U.S. and European navies are continuing...to ensure the preservation of an essential margin of allied maritime superiority in key ocean areas."


Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. NATO's plans for defense of its Southern Region, including allied and U.S. Navy Sixth Fleet/STRIKEFORSOUTH Mediterranean operations and Turkish Black Sea operations.


Stryker, Russell F., "Civil Shipping Support for NATO," NATO Review, February 1986, pp 29-33. By a U.S. Maritime Administration official and member of the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. On the shipping that is to use the North Atlantic SLOC.

Teitler, G., "The Maritime Strategy: Uitdaging ook aan de bondgenoten" ("The Maritime Strategy: Challenge for the Allies"), Marineblad (The Hague), June 1986, pp 332-38. One of the most astute Dutch commentators on international maritime affairs advises the "Royal Netherlands Navy to answer the "challenge" of the American maritime strategy, and make up its minds whether to "sign on," or maintain its preoccupation with the "southerly defense" of the Atlantic SLOCs. Without active participation in the maritime strategic debate, warns Teitler, the Dutch Navy is likely to find itself relegated to "specialized" tasks such as sweeping mines in the North Sea and English Channel. See also the commentary by Veassen and Van Waning in the September 1986 issue of Marineblad.


The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (10th and subsequent editions), Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1981 and
subsequently. The basic official public document of NATO policy and strategy. See especially latest (1984) edition, pp 108-111, 143-144 and 380. "The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic would be to ensure security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding the sea lands and denying their use to an enemy, to conduct conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and airfields and to support operations carried out by SACEUR. NATO's forces (have) roles of neutralizing Soviet strategic nuclear submarines, safeguarding transatlantic sea lines and in general preventing the Warsaw Pact from gaining maritime supremacy in the North Atlantic."

Thorthon, T.E., Lt. Cdr. RN, "Have We Really Got It Right? Reflections on NATO's Naval Strategy," Armed Forces (London), August 1987, pp 349-50. A British naval officer warns that NATO is without enough grey hulls to afford the risk of an early forward offensive and should, therefore, plan on "establishing the strongest possible blockade in the vicinity of the GIUK gap."


Tonge, David, "Exposure Troubles NATO's Northern Commanders," Financial Times, October 27, 1982, p 3. Reports NATO Northern Region ground commanders' concerns that carrier battle groups may not arrive in the Norwegian Sea early enough.


the British Fleet, Adm. Hunt, on forward Royal Navy and NATO submarine, including anti-SSBN operations.


Vaessen, Jules, Capt., RNLN, "The Maritime Strategy and de bondgenoten" ("The Maritime Strategy and the Allies"), Commentary on Teitler's "The Maritime Strategy: Uitdaging ook aan de bondgenoten," Marineblad (The Hague), September 1986, p 471. Writes that the American maritime strategy's emphasis on threatening the Soviet flanks is a move in the right direction, away from NATO's myopia with defense on the ground in Europe's center. If it does not want to find itself a minor partner to the British Navy, warns Vaessen, his service had better take an active role in the development of a new Atlantic maritime concept.

Van Eekelen, W.F., "De Noordflank van NAVO" ("The Northern Flank of NATO") Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/January 1987, pp 599-600. The Dutch defense minister takes note that the 'Nordic Balance' is a political concept in need of a military balance, including an allied naval presence. Van Eekelen supports the Norwegian position that the creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone (NFZ) cannot be isolated from a much broader agreement on European de-nuclearization.


Van Reijn, J.A., Lt. Col., Royal Netherlands Marines, "De Koninklijke Marine naar het jaar 2000" ("The Royal Navy Toward the Year 2000"), Spiegel, Vol. 22, No. 87, 1987, pp 11-25. This article in the quarterly journal of the Royal Netherlands Naval Institute offers a prognosis of the domestic and international factors that the author believes will shape the roles, missions, and capabilities of the Dutch fleet during the final decade of the 20th century. Norway and the Norwegian Sea are labeled "the key to Europe's security." Confirmed is the Dutch Navy's northern "tilt." The author voices his belief that Dutch naval plans will be influenced increasingly by an emerging "European pillar" within NATO. Uncertainty about the continued
pre-eminence of Europe in U.S. thinking, the questionable longevity of the U.S. Navy fleet build-up, and certain geographic considerations imply these European naval tasks in the Norwegian Sea: (1) a permanent peacetime presence, (2) crisis control and deterrence through increased presence, and (3) acting as the first-line-of-defense pending the appearance of U.S. reinforcements. On the out-of-area "problem," the writer emphasizes that, "it can hardly be maintained in the future that NATO's security interests...are limited to the Atlantic treaty area." The American plans for "horizontal escalation," he says, signify that US/Soviet out-of-area confrontation is not likely to leave Europe untouched, and that this alone is sufficient reason for the Europeans to participate in out-of-area crisis decision-making and deployments.


Veassen, Jules J., Capt., RNLN, "De maritieme expansie van de Sovjet Unie: Schoolvoorbeeld van geïntegreerd maritiem beleid: ("The Maritime Expansion of the Soviet Union: Textbook Example of an Integrated Maritime Policy"), Marineblad (The Hague), March 1987, pp 56-65. Voices strong support for the U.S. Navy's plans to defend NATO's northern flank through a forward offensive. National and coalition interests mandate that the Dutch Navy team up with its British and possibly West German sister services, and join the U.S.
maritime strategy, and, in the event of a crisis, act as a European "gap filler" force preparatory to the arrival of the U.S. battle groups.


Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay?" Navy International, May 1986, pp 304-08. Speculating that Gorshkov's successor, Admiral Chernavin, may shift Soviet Navy Strategy to planning for a massive U-boat style Atlantic tonnage campaign, Wettern urges that the European NATO navies must choose between a large increase of convoys escort forces or joining the American preference for forward strategy. If the latter course is chosen, he concludes, the Europeans must ipso facto prepare to join in "global strategy," including active participation in -out-of-area hostilities.

Wettern, Desmond, "NATO and Maritime Strategy," Navy International, December 1987, pp 472-75. Questions the apparently discrepant NATO reinforcement and resupply shipping requirements as variously reported by CINCHAN, SACLANT, and the 1986 NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS). Quotes the outgoing CINCHAN, Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, to the effect that Allied maritime forces share the U.S. Maritime Strategy's intent to "operate forward defense...behind enemy lines in enemy waters."

Woodward, Sir John, V. Adm., RN, "Strategies, Concepts, and Their Maritime Implications," The RUSI Journal, June 1986, pp 11-14. The commander of the British task force during the Falklands war reports that the existing mix and quality of the Royal Navy's capabilities is just about the right one, that can and must be maintained with proper management and in spite of a zero-growth defense budget. Since Britain cannot cut back on its maritime commitments in the NATO area and elsewhere, its naval planners must emphasize a greater rationalization of effort, including longer production runs, standardization of equipments, closer international collaboration, etc.

Associations in the wake of the country's recently-published White Paper on Defense, which included the announcement of Canada's controversial nuclear submarine buying plan. Individual contributors include: General P.D. Manson, Chief of Defense Staff, W. Harriet Critchley of the University of Calgary, Derek Blackburn, MP and Defense Critic for the New Democratic Party, Rear Admiral F.W. Crickard, former Deputy Commander of Maritime Command, and Rear Admiral A.P. Gay, a retired French naval officer. Most relevant to the American maritime strategy is Crickard's "The U.S. Maritime Strategy—Should Canada Be Concerned?" Crickard's answer is "yes," and he notes that, "At the navy-to-navy level, there was neither prior consultation with the US on its maritime strategy nor, to my knowledge, has there been any organized naval or defense assessment of it in Canada."

VI. **SOVIET STRATEGY AND VIEWS**

U.S. and allied Maritime Strategy is not a game of solitaire. The Soviet threat, along with U.S. national and allied interests and geo-political realities, is one of the fundamental ingredients of that strategy. No attempt can be made here, however, to recount the considerable literature that exists on Soviet naval affairs. The focus in the relatively few works listed below is how the Soviets view their own maritime strategy as well as ours, and how correctly we have divined their views. A critical issue is which missions they see as primary and which they see as secondary, for their navy and for those of the west, and whether these priorities will change soon. Much material on the Soviets also can be found in other entries in this bibliography.


Dalaere, Martijn, "De Verbetering van de Russische Onderzeeboottechnologie en de Amerikaanse Maritieme Strategie" ("The Improvement of Soviet Submarine Technology and the American Maritime Strategy"), *Marineblad* (The Hague), October 1988, pp. 419-27. This Dutch author argues that a U.S. strategic ASW campaign against the Soviet SSBN bastions is no longer credible in light of recent Soviet advances in submarine quieting, and urges that the United States and its allies turn instead to protecting the Atlantic SLOCs by means of barrier and escort strategies. Yet, having concluded on the improbability of a successful anti-SSBN campaign, the writer then turns around to warn how American success could trigger a Soviet use-them-or-lose-them strike!
** Daniel, Donald C.F., "The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at Sea," *Survival*, July/August 1987, pp 138+. The Director of the Naval War College's Strategy and Campaign Department concludes, inter alia, that Soviet decision makers will use nuclear weapons at sea only if they have already been used ashore, or if NATO uses them at sea first.


** Falin, Valentine, "Back to the Stone Age," *Izvestia* (Moscow), January 24, 1986. Condemns the U.S. Navy for planning to use forward deployment as a means for "taking any dispute to a global level," and using "non-nuclear means against the other side's nuclear forces and thus improving its own nuclear position." American naval planners, says Falin, do not expect the Soviet Union to respond with nuclear means, but he asks, how would the United States react if Soviet Navy forces were to apply "naval and air pressure in the spirit of Watkins' concept against American ships, bases and territory?" The author provides his own answer: "They (American decision makers seize on nuclear weapons in response not even to a threat to their arsenals, but to minor inconveniences for U.S. Policy." Highlights opposing arguments by Barry Posen. See also commentary by Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: The Soviet Union Reacts," *Proceedings*, April 1986, p 111.


Operations in the Mediterranean" is especially good on the interplay of Soviet and U.S. Maritime Strategy. The excellent paper by Alvin Bernstein of the Naval War College and the paper by Anthony Wells have also been reprinted elsewhere: the former in National Interest, Spring 1986, pp 17-29; the latter in National Defense, February 1986, pp 38-44.

Gorshkov, R. Adm. Serge G., The Sea Power of the State, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. See especially pp 290 and 329. "The employment of naval forces against the sea-based strategic systems of the enemy has become most important in order to disrupt or blunt to the maximum degree their strikes against targets ashore...."

**


**


**


Mayer, Charles W., Jr., Cdr., USN, "Looking Backwards into the Future of the Maritime Strategy, Are We Uncovering Our Center of Gravity in the Attempt to Strike at Our Opponent's?" Naval War College Review, Winter 1989, pp 33-46. Citing the "lessons" the Soviets have presumably learned from the U-boat wars of World Wars I and II, the author warns that the wartime practice of Soviet Naval Strategy may be much more offensive than the planners of the maritime strategy seem to anticipate. Recommends that U.S. naval planners be prepared with the Soviet Navy's capability to stage a massive submarine onslaught against the Atlantic sea routes.


** Mozgovoy, Aleksandr, "For Security on Sea Routes," *International Affairs* (Moscow, 1/1987, pp 77-84, 103. See especially p 83, on the Maritime Strategy as "an unprecedentedly impudent document, even given the militaristic hysteria reigning in Washington today."


Perov, I., Lt. Gen. Soviet Army, "Aggressive Essence of New U.S., NATO Concepts," *Zarubezhnaye Voyennoye Obozrenie*, No. 2, February 1988. Detailed appraisal of NATO's alleged plans to integrate emerging technologies (ETs) and "more aggressive concepts of warmaking" into "air-land" (Air-Land Battle, FOFA) and "air-sea" (Maritime Strategy) "operations." Central to the new American "sea strategy," says the writer, are plans for "mass employment of cruise missiles against naval and coastal targets together with deck-based tactical and strategic aviation." Perov is evidently painfully aware of the SLCM "revolution" at sea.

mine warfare, and shallow-water ASW initiatives, in addition to "carrying the fight to the enemy."

Rabe, Heinz, Lt. Col., Volksarmee of the German Democratic Republic, "U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Norwegian Sea?" Volksarmee (GDR), No. 32, 1986. East German condemnation of the American "illusion of limiting war in Europe and being able to keep their own territory away from counterstrikes," while creating the "murderous concept" of a "Sixth Fleet" in the Norwegian Sea.


Rosenberg, David Alan, "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything Worse" Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy," Naval War College Review, Summer 1988, p 69-105. Excellent summary and interpretation of Soviet commentary on U.S. maritime strategy between 1986 and 1988. Principal findings include: (1) the Soviets do not appear to have acknowledged the maritime strategy as a "doctrine" or "strategy" of national standing but instead as an example of "naval art" designed to perhaps influence U.S. national policy; (2) Soviet discussions of the U.S. Navy's "new strategy" are used mostly to highlight the U.S. Navy's capabilities and not the strategy's strategic significance; and (3) the maritime strategy may have generated or accelerated a heightened Soviet interest in naval arms controls.


Sharpe, Richard, Capt. RN (Ret.), "Will We Have the Forces With Which to Counter Soviet Naval Strategies?" Navy League of the United States, The Almanac of Seapower 1989, Arlington, VA, January 1989, pp 28-42. The editor of Jane's Fighting Ships. voices skepticism with the accepted Western view of the Soviet Navy as a
"defense" force that, in time of war, will be preoccupied with the protection of its SSBN bastions.


Strelkov, Captain First Rank V., "Naval Forces in U.S. Direct Confrontation Strategy," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 5, 1983, pp 78-82. Highlights maritime roles of allies and sister services as well as USN.


Trofimenko, Genrikh, "The Blue Water Strategy," excerpt from The U.S. Military Doctrine, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986, pp 193-99. A prolific Soviet commentator on U.S. National Security Policy, Trofimenko claims that, until the 1970s, U.S. Navy policy had been dominated by the twin goals of bolstering the threat of its SSBN fleet, and the projection of power in the Third World. Since then, it has paid increasing attention to "domination of the high seas," including the control of chokepoints and the projection of "general purpose" power against the shores of the Soviet Union. "Of course," says the
author, "The U.S. military cannot fail to understand that any direct attack by a US naval vessel against a Soviet ship entails the risk of this isolated incident escalating to a conflict between the two nations."


VII. PEACETIME, CRISIS, AND THIRD WORLD CONTINGENCIES

Most of the above works deal principally with use of the Navy in general war. What follows are books and articles of the 1970s and 1980s discussing the uses of the U.S. Navy in peacetime, crises, and "small wars" (the "Violent Peace" of the Maritime Strategy). Many of these derive from the increased discussion of peacetime presence as a naval mission engendered by Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and Stansfield Turner in the early 1970s. Thus, the contemporary era of U. S. Navy thought on peacetime presence operations began about five years prior to that on forward global wartime operational concepts. Both bodies of thought, however, have built on the earlier literature of the late 1950s and 1960s on the role of the U.S. Navy in limited war.

While most of the items listed below focus on the U.S. Navy, some of the most important elements on the peacetime/crisis/"small war" activities of the Royal Navy and the Soviet Navy have also been included. In addition, certain of the "White Papers" and "Defense Reports" published by various defense ministries around the world routinely highlight the peacetime operations of their naval forces. Especially notable in this regard are the annual British "Defence Estimates" and Canadian "Annual Reports."


Baker, Caleb, "Retired Admiral Complains of Lack of Realization in Navy," Defense News, September 19, 1988, p 45. The Navy's former (1973-78) Fiscal and Budget Director, Rear Admiral Stanley Fine, USN (Ret.) criticizes the Navy's alleged preoccupation with the Soviet threat in force and strategy planning as symptomatic of a "lack of realization." Fine believes that if the Soviet periphery must be attacked, it can be done easier with land-based airpower than carrier aviation, and concludes that the service's most likely preoccupation in the future will be the same that has been the main business since World War II, i.e. deterrence and crisis control in the Third World.

Barnett, Capt. Roger W., "The U.S. Navy's Role in Countering Maritime Terrorism," Terrorism, Vol 6, No 3, 1983, pp 469-480. A primary architect of the Maritime Strategy argues that while the U.S. Navy is well prepared against attacks on its own ships and
installations, its role in deterring terrorist attacks on U.S. merchant ships or overseas facilities "cannot be suggested to be a large one."

Bentinck, M.R.O., "NAVO's Out-of-Area Problematiek" ("NATO's Out-of-Area Problems"), Marineblad (The Hague), May 1988, pp 185-191. Good discussion of the complexity of NATO solidarity on the "out-of-area" issue. According to the author, permanent yet manageable dilemmas are (1) the diverseness of interests and vulnerabilities of the member states, (2) different expectations among the allies on the need and/or obligation for consultation, and (3) the obligation of allies to compensate for the out-of-area efforts of one ally.


Bull, Hedley, "Sea Power and Political Influence," in Power at Sea: I. The New Environment, Adelphi Paper Number 122, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974, pp 1-9. "The period we are now entering will be one in which opportunities for the diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, will be severely circumscribed."


Cable, Sir James, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," Proceedings, August 1986, pp 36-41. Forcefully argues that the days of gunboat diplomacy are by no means over. Denigrates those who have said otherwise.


Coutau-Begarie, Herve, "The Role of the Navy in French Foreign Policy," Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 36-43. By probably the most important contemporary French writer on naval strategy. The recent French global experience, one not often discussed in an English-language literature dominated by U.S., British, and Soviet examples.


Etzold, Thomas H., "Neither Peace Nor War: Navies and Low-intensity Conflict," in Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H.


Hill, Capt. J.R., RN, "Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea," Survival, March/April 1975, pp 69-72. Takes issue with Young's article. Suggests that "in the turbulent future, maritime forces are likely to be more rather than less in demand both at home and away."


Levine, Daniel B., Planning for Underway Replenishment of Naval Forces in Peacetime (CRM 5-77), Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1985. Much more than underway replenishment. Examines U.S. Navy fleet exercises, crisis response and surveillance operations. Analyses them by ocean area, frequency, and number/types of combatants used.


force undertaken by an assailant who has engaged in war in the victim's region and who is militarily prepared and politically stable compared to the victim."


"Navy Cuts Carrier Presence in Mediterranean, Gulf Areas," Washington Times, November 24, 1986, p 4-D. On adjustments to U.S. Navy routine forward presence posture to enhance Navy flexibility and reduce individual ship OPTEMPO.
Neutze, Cdr. Dennis R., JAGC, "Bluejacket Diplomacy: A Juridical Examination of the Use of Naval Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy," JAG Journal, Summer 1982, pp 81-158. By the legal advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations. Very comprehensive examination of the lawfulness of the political uses of U.S. naval power in terms of domestic and international law, going back to the framers of the Constitution. Sees such political uses as expanding in the future.

New York Times, September 12, 1988, "The Naval Gap in the Persian Gulf," p A-18. Lead editorial that acknowledges the Navy's "critical role in ending the Iran-Iraq war," but that criticizes the service for what is called its failure to build a "balanced fleet" suitable for contingencies other than war with the Soviet Union on the high seas. See also Adm. Trost's rebuttal in the October 8, 1988 issue of the New York Times.


Trost, C.A.H., Navy's Strategic Victory in the Gulf," New York Times, October 8, 1988, p 26. Rebutts the Times editorial of September 12, 1988, claiming that the Gulf war "validated the Navy's choices at the lower end of the spectrum in the most demanding and realistic environment—combat."

Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Naval Chief Disputes Columnist," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 18, 1989, p 8. The CNO rejects criticism by columnist Richard Reeves in the January 21, 1989 edition of the Inquirer that the 600-ship fleet build-up has been "unbalanced"
at the expense of sufficient mine countermeasures and sealift capabilities.


Vlahos, Michael, "The Third World in U.S. Navy Planning," Orbis, Spring 1986, pp 133-148. By a former Naval War College faculty member. Argues the U.S. Navy has recently refocused its attention on its contributions to a global allied campaign against the Soviets, to the detriment of planning for more likely and qualitatively different Third World contingencies.


VIII FLEET BALANCE: ATLANTIC VS. PACIFIC VS. MEDITERRANEAN

Geographic flexibility is one of the great strengths of naval power. Yet, the U.S. Navy's global posture since World War II has often looked like a series of hard-and-fast theater commitments, more appropriate to less flexible land-based types of forces. The articles and letters below illustrate current problems of implementing a balanced global Maritime Strategy with limited naval forces in the face of competing regional demands. They were selected because of their focus on the need for hard choices by the Navy regarding fleet balance; articles merely trumpeting the importance of an area or discussing regional priorities solely at the geopolitical level are omitted.

Babbage, Ross, "The Future of the United States Maritime Strategy and the Pacific Military Balance." Paper presented at the Conference on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, May 19, 1988, 33 pp. This paper considers a number of "wild cards" that, according to the Australian author, might upset some of the key assumptions that underlie the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy for the Pacific theater. Those assumptions concern the likelihood of nuclear escalation, Soviet avoidance of a two-front (Atlantic and Pacific) war, the collaboration of America's Pacific allies, and the future of American superiority in ASW. Based on his conversations with Chinese officials, Babbage reports that China might choose the "kick-in-the-door" option, and launch an assault against the Soviet Far East if the Soviet Union were to lose a conflict badly and its disintegration appeared likely. In any case, concludes Babbage, Soviet fear of such an eventuality could exert "substantial war-termination leverage."

Baggett, Lee, Jr., Adm. USN, "NATO at Sea: Future Maritime Power," The RUSI Journal, Autumn 1988, pp 5-8. SACLANT describes the Soviet maritime threat to the North Atlantic Alliances as a "double envelopment" of self-serving naval arms control proposals on the one hand, and continued qualitative improvements of seagoing capabilities on the other. Both, says Baggett, are aimed at surrounding "our strategy, closing off all avenues of maneuver and leaving us with nothing but unacceptable options." As far as SACLANT's capabilities for war are concerned, reports Baggett, a shortage of forces to simultaneously support the Northern flank and directly defend Atlantic shipping, compels an early forward offensive. NATO presently possesses a large enough pool of shipping to support Re/Re and economic shipping needs, but the trend continues downward.


Desh, Michael C., "Turning the Caribbean Flank: Sea-Lane Vulnerability During a European War," Survival (London), November/December 1987, pp 528-51. The author warns that a judiciously timed Cuban entry into a NATO-Warsaw Pact war could impose an intolerable strain on allied resupply and reinforcement capabilities, and even "tip the balance decisively in favour of the Warsaw Pact." The article posits a "menu" of alternative Cuban Caribbean SLOC interdiction scenarios, and potential U.S. counter options. The author concludes that the most credible and least resource-diverting U.S. response would be a combination of "defensive" SLOC protection, backed up by the withheld threat of retaliatory nuclear TLAM strikes.


Foley, Sylvester, R., Adm., USN, "Strategic Factors in the Pacific," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1985, pp 34-38. The CINC PACFLT reviews the main international political "strategic factors" he believes will dominate the efficiency of his forces and war plans in the Pacific-Indian Ocean region. They are" (1) the ability of the National command Authorities (NCA) to respond promptly to
ambiguous crisis indicators, (2) the stability of the U.S. relationship with Japan, China, and the Philippines, (3) the necessity for an Indian Ocean presence, and (4) the security of the Aleutian "rear area." Foley wonders whether the Soviet Pacific Fleet will restrict its operations to a defensive naval campaign on behalf of SSBN bastion waters.

**


Hayward, Tomas B., Adm., USN (Ret.), and Hays, Ronald J., Adm., USN (Ret.), "It is in the Interest of the West to Make Perestroika Work Throughout the Pacific," Navy League of the United States, The Almanac of Seapower 1989, Arlington, VA, January 1989, pp 44-58. A former CNO and VCNO team up to urge that future roles of U.S. Naval power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans be dominated by the twin goals of (a) seeking strategic stability among the maritime aspirations of the regional nations (mainly India and Japan), and (b) "easing tensions" with the Soviet Union. The authors specifically call for a U.S./Soviet dialogue on the possible adoption of naval confidence-building measures, including perhaps a re-consideration of the U.S. Navy's practice of fleet exercises close to Soviet shores.

Heppenheimer, T.A., "Victory at Sea?" Science Digest, September 1985. A journalistic account of how the United States intends to safeguard the Atlantic SLOCs in the event that, "for the third time in a century, the world is at war."


* Jane's Defense Weekly. "NATO's Southern Strategy Outlines," December 17, 1988, p 1547. CINCUSNAVEUR, Adm. James Busey, USN is quoted to the effect that NATO's maritime strategy on the Mediterranean flank will seek "strategic leverage" by taking the initiative at an "early stage" and "using NATO strength against Warsaw Pact vulnerability."

Kennedy, William V., "Moving West: The New Theater of Decision," Naval War College Review, Winter 1989, pp 19-32. Expands upon former NAVSEC Webb's theme that U.S. interests and military commitments ought to be re-focused from Western Europe to the Far East. Kennedy believes that the United States can best deter the Soviet Union from aggression, and, come war, achieve a favorable outcome, by exploiting its comparative military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet military position in the Far East. He calls for a "North Pacific Strategy" that, with the help of 15 (1) carriers, and possibly in conjunction with China, would aim at no less than the occupation of the Siberian periphery, the defeat of Soviet power east of the Urals, and the post-war reconstitution of a Soviet "progressive government that could abide the opening of the entire Soviet Union to the free interchange of ideas, labor, and investment."


Komer, Robert W., "A Credible Conventional Option: Can NATO Afford It?" Strategic Review, Spring 1988, pp 33-38. A "continentalist's" solution for strengthening NATO's conventional war-fighting posture that calls for a build-up of up to 30 days of war reserves, the creation of additional reserve formations, and greater reliance on "deep strike capabilities."

Kurth, James R., "The United States and the North Pacific," paper presented at the Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, The Australian National University, August 1987. Evaluates the "dilemma of deterrence vs. provocation" that the author claims is part and parcel of a maritime strategy based on the forward deployment of naval forces during a US/Soviet crisis. Kurth recommends that the United States can limit the risk of premature crisis escalation and Soviet pre-emption by forward converging its naval and marine forces at locations within closing range of their intended targets, yet still at the limit of the Soviet Union's pre-emptive strike potential. Concludes that the "Reagan version" of the maritime strategy will probably change in form and in shape, but that naval forces will become an increasingly important element in Western defense planning.

Lehman, John, "Successful Naval Strategy in the Pacific: How We Are Achieving It, How We Can Afford It," Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 20-27. Asserts that the Regan Administration's "common sense" approach to Pentagon and Department of the Navy management and procurement has resulted in more bang-for-the-buck, thus permitting the Navy to meet national commitments in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters with sufficient assets simultaneously.

Linn, Thomas C., Maj., USMC, "Amphibious Shipping Shortfall Undermines Maritime Strategy," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1989, pp 54-58. Makes a convincing case that current trends point to a widening gap between the U.S. Navy's strategic requirements for amphibious lifts, and the maritime strategy's programmatic goals. The author reports a strategic warfighting need for two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)—one each for the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but fears that actual capabilities will soon fall short of even the 1983 program goals of one MEF-plus-MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade). The article also urges various technological steps to make future amphibious lift forces less vulnerable.


Pay, David J., "The U.S. Navy and the Defense of Europe," Naval Forces, No. 1, 1988, pp 28-35. Good critique of maritime strategic critics whose arguments and reservations, says the author, "seem to be based on a mistaken choice between maritime and continental forces and a rather strange assessment of nuclear risk." Disagrees that the U.S. maritime strategy and 600-ship fleet build-up have come at the expense of the American NATO commitment. The maritime strategy, concludes Pay, may be a "symptom" of a U.S. re-assessment of global priorities away from Western Europe, but it is hardly the cause.


Snyder, Jed C., "Strategic Bias and the Southern Flank," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1985, pp 123-42. A critique of NATO's Central Region-oriented "prism" addressing the Mediterranean basin, the author concludes that a multiplicity of crisis points, the growth of local Soviet naval power, and the lack of political and military cohesion, have brought about an area where "NATO is weak where the Soviet incentive to strike may be strongest."

Till, Geoffrey, and King, Richard, "A Standing Naval Force for Northern Waters?" Naval Forces, No. 5, 1987, pp 16-18. NATO must prevent Soviet naval power in the Norwegian Sea from becoming a "kind of perceived maritime dominance" by default. In order to counter such a development, Till and King believe that the idea of a Standing Naval Force for Northern Waters (STANAVFORNOR), patterned after STANAVFORLANT, is worth thinking about.

Train, Harry, Adm., USN (Ret.), "Maritime Strategy in the Mediterranean," Adelphi Paper (London), No. 229; "Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean," Part 1, Spring 1988, pp 49-60. Excellent account of the strategical interconnectedness between the Mediterranean and Atlantic theaters, and, as a consequence, the inter-theater wartime flexibility of U.S. naval forces on forward deployment in the Mediterranean. Train believes that, with the possible exception of the Mediterranean's easternmost portion, NATO command of the Mediterranean is virtually guaranteed even if COMSTRIKFOR'S battle groups may need to be swung into the Atlantic. Also a good overview of NATO's naval command hierarchy in the Mediterranean area.
Van der Meulen, J.W., "Zuid-Afrika's Strategische Betekenis voor het Westen" ("South Africa's Strategic Significance for the West"), Marineblad (The Hague), May 1988, pp 214-22. Excellent overview of the Western interest, past and present, in South Africa as a potential military-strategic partner. The author concludes that neither South Africa's military potential, nor the country's importance as a source of strategic minerals (or for that matter, the nature of the Soviet threat) warrant a closer association with the Pretoria Government.
IX. WAR GAMING

As is well discussed in previous sections, U.S. and allied navies, other services, and joint and allied commands have a variety of means at their disposal in peacetime to test the wartime validity of aspects of the Maritime Strategy, besides debate and discussion. They actually participate in fleet exercises, advanced tactical training, and “real world” peacetime and crisis operations, and they conduct extensive operations analyses and war games. Most of these avenues are generally inaccessible to the public, however, save one: gaming. There are over a half-dozen commercial board and computer games now available that can provide players with insights into modern maritime strategic, operational, and tactical problems and potential solutions, and thereby further enhance players’ understanding of the Maritime Strategy. Like all simulations, however, they each have their limitations, and even built-in inaccuracies (as the various reviews point out). Thus, they cannot by themselves legitimately be used to “prove” validities or demonstrate “outcomes.” Nevertheless, playing them is the nearest many students and theorists of Maritime Strategy can even come to actually “being there,” and, therefore, is an activity that can only be encouraged.

** Balkoski, Joseph, Second Fleet, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. Plamer, Proceedings, March 1987, pp 160-162. “Those of us without access to the War College’s computers can test the waters north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and gain insight into the problems and opportunities inherent in the application of the Maritime Strategy.” Can be played simultaneously with Sixth Fleet, with forces shifted from one set of maps to the the other, in a simulation of war in both Northern and Southern European waters and adjacent areas.


**

Perla, Peter C., "Wargaming and the U. S. Navy," *National Defense*, February 1987, pp 49-53. By a leading Center for Naval Analyses war gamer. "The Navy is continuing a process of using wargaming, exercises, and analysis to address the aspects of major issues for which they are best suited...a classic example of this process can be seen at work in the 2nd Fleet. Taking the promulgated maritime strategy as his starting point, the commander, 2nd Fleet, proposed a concept for operating the NATO Striking Fleet in the Norwegian Sea. A wargame was held at the Naval War College to explore this concept, and analysis was undertaken to quantify some of the issues raised by the game. Then an exercise was held in the area of interest, which confirmed some assumptions and raised new questions. A new series of games and analysis was capped by a second major exercise, as the process continues." See also his "What Wargaming is and is Not," co-authored by L.Cdr. Raymond T. Barrett, *Naval War*
X. ANTECEDENTS

The general and historical literature on naval strategy is admittedly vast. What is presented here are only books that describe earlier strategies, conceptualized, planned and/or implemented, which are analogous to key aspects of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy today. The materials are generally listed chronologically, by historical period covered.

** Breemer, Jan S., "The American Origins of the Maritime Strategy," Marineblad (The Hague), November 1987, pp 410-15. Reviews the recent (mid-1970s to early 1980s) historical antecedents to the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy, and concludes that it is up to the European navies to clarify which parts of the maritime strategy meet with their approval and which not.


idea of a "second-front" Pacific strategy aimed at relieving Soviet pressure in Central Europe, and safeguard the allied SLOCs.


Gough, Barry M., "Maritime Strategy," The Legacies of Mahan and Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power," *The RUSI Journal*, Winter 1988, pp 55-62. A comparison of the two premier Anglo-American theorists of seapower with reference to their respective contributions to the understanding of (a) the relationship between naval power and global power, and (b) the significance of historical "lessons" for contemporary maritime strategy. The author finds that neither Mahan or Corbett, nor their modern-day successors, can always provide the correct answers to naval strategic problems, but that history can provide a framework for asking the "right" questions about the objectives of naval force in both peace and in war.


Admiralty is a brilliant evocation of how the maritime strategies of the past have been fought at the strategical, tactical, material and, most important, human levels. The author narrates four critical naval battles of the past—Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway and the Atlantic U-boat campaign, each representing contemporary "capital" naval technology—the ship-of-the-line, the dreadnought, aircraft carrier, and submarine. The description of how the crews that fought at Trafalgar alone is worth the book's reading. No doubt, many readers will find Keegan's most controversial observation in the final chapter, "The Empty Seas," which predicts that the future of seapower rests with the submarine.


Marolda, Edward J., "The Influence of Burke's Boys on Limited War," Proceedings, August 1981, pp 36-41. By a prominent Navy Department historian on the influence of the Navy officer corps on national strategy a generation ago. "Between 1956 and 1960, the Navy added its considerable influence to the intellectual campaign within
the national defense community for a reorientation in strategic policy."


** Reynolds, Clark G., "The Maritime Strategy of World War II: Some Implications?" *Naval War College Review*, May/June 1986, pp 43-50. Prescribes certain "principles" of maritime strategy learned from World War II, but cautions that, "in strategy making, the greater danger than a complete ignorance of history is its misapplication."

Antecedent naval postwar air strike strategies by a leading historian of U.S. Navy postwar strategy.


Starr, Chester G., *The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989, 105 pp. This is a fascinating small volume that throws much light on the interaction between a land and seapower in the Mediterranean world of antiquity. It is so in particular because the findings and conclusions sharply contradict the author's starting premise. The latter takes issue with Mahan's claim that the power and wealth of the classical thalassocracies (Greece, Rome, Carthage) were historical "proof" of the decisive influence of seapower on history. Not so, says Starr. The rise and fall of the classical empires originated on land. Ironically, however, the author finds that the Greek and Carthaginian maritime empires fell because at the same time that both permitted
their fleets to decline, their continental opponents (Sparta and Rome, respectively) made the conscious choice to build up naval power. Similarly, as long as Rome possessed the world's first "standing fleet" the emperial sealines of communications and coastlines were secure. The later empire's vulnerability to barbarian raids and invasions can be blamed perhaps as much by the decline of that fleet as by the overextension of the legions on land. One is tempted to draw this lesson: a maritime power may not be able to overcome a strong landpower, but the reverse is certainly true if the continental opponent takes to the sea as well.

Teitler, G., "De slagvloot en de SLOCs" ("The Battlefleet and the SLOCs"), Marineblad (The Hague), October 1986, pp 521-25. Relates the offensive thrust of the U.S.Navy's maritime strategy to the Navy's Pacific war experience, the Mahanian philosophy of the "big battle," and, indirectly, the British Navy's tradition of securing the SLOCs by "indirect" means, i.e., seeking out and defeating the opponent's battlefleet. The British tradition on "indirect" defense is contrasted with the Dutch tradition of "direct" defense, i.e., the protection of shipping by way of escort strategies. The author concludes that even a 600-ship U.S. fleet will make an early forward offensive against the center of Soviet military strength in the North a high-risk substitute for reliance on a mix of direct and indirect SLOC defense strategies.

Teitler, G., "Van de Krim naar Kola: Algemene en Bijzondere Beschouwing over Maritime Strategie" ("From the Crimea to Kola: A General and Special Consideration of Maritime Strategy," Marineblad (The Hague), June 1988, pp 261-67. The 19th century Crimean War is used to illustrate the essence of grand and maritime strategy as the exploitation of assymetries, including assymetries in timing (surprise), space (maneuver), and escalation (e.g., the "second front option"). The key to NATO's strategic success, says Teitler, will be to offset the Soviet Union's assymetrical advantage on the Central Front with the West's (maritime) ability to (a) deny the Soviets a "short war," (b) threaten Moscow's vulnerabilities outside the European area, and (c) threaten to regain nuclear dominance by placing the Soviet SSBNs at risk. Teitler reminds his readers, however, that few assymetrical advantages come at no cost. Excellent article.


U.S. Navy, Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study (Unclassified Executive Summary), Washington, DC: March 18, 1978. A progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Whereas the latter stresses the role of the Navy in a global conventional war with the Soviets, however, the former tended more toward emphasizing the extent of the range of potential uses of naval power.

** Viahos, Michael, "Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism: 1919-1942," naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 7-22. By a former Naval War College faculty member. How wargaming prepared the U.S. Navy for war in 1941, and how it is doing so again today, including linkage between gaming and planning.


XI. MAKING MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: INFLUENCES

Barlett, Henry C., "Approaches to Force Planning," Naval War College Review, May-June 1985, pp 37-48. By a Naval War College faculty member. Provides eight approaches to Force Planning, but each such "approach" can, and does apply to the drafting of Strategy as well. They are presented by the author as pure types, stark alternatives, but in actual practice (for example, in the development of the Maritime Strategy) their influence on the strategist is often simultaneous to a greater or lesser degree. His list of approaches: "top-down, bottom-up, scenario, threat, mission, hedging, technology and fiscal." The first four were probably the most important influences on the Maritime Strategy of the late 1940s/early 1950s and the 1980s; "Mission" and "hedging" were relatively more important from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s. "Threat" influences tended to be driven more by perceived capabilities in the 1940s through the 1970s and more by perceived intentions in the 1980s. Critics tend to focus on "technology" and budget" influences. There is actually also a ninth approach, "historical/academic" approach, which tends to focus the strategist on "lessons of history" and/or the great classics of military thought. All these approaches coexist with the organizational and psychological influences on war planning identified by Jack Snyder. The remaining citations in this section give examples, drawn primarily from the Maritime Strategy debates.


Jordan, Frank E. III, "Maritime-Continental Debate: A Strategic Approach," National Defense University, Essays on Strategy V. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988, pp 205-234. An excellent Ciausitzian critique of what the author contends is the artificiality of the "Mahan vs. Mackinder" framework of the contemporary maritime-continental debate over American national security goals and means. The appropriate U.S. strategy, concludes Jordan, is one that "is neither purely continental nor purely maritime, but rather one of global (yet strategically limited) integrated naval and land campaigns directed toward preserving the critical US center of gravity." The latter includes the Eurasian rimlands and narrow seas, and the capabilities, naval and otherwise, needed to protect their security. Conversely, the Soviet center of gravity encompasses the Soviet regime and its war-making mechanism, mainly the Red Army and strategic nuclear forces; the
necessity for escalation control demands that U.S. strategy exclude a
direct attack against this Soviet center of gravity.

Proceedings, February 1984, pp 344-39. By a former member of the
Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Calls for a strategy based on
defeating Soviet strategy, a "threat-based" approach. Unlike Barlett,
however, McGruther's approach is rooted in intentions as well as
capabilities. (Vlahos chapter, cited in Section I above.

Moodie, Michael, and Cottrell, Alvin J., Geopolitics and Maritime
Power, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981. A good example of "hedging" focus.
Regards Lehman's "Major change" as not enough. Also wants
greater naval activity in the Caribbean, periodic visits to the South
Atlantic, an enhanced fleet in the Western Pacific and continuing
large-scale activity in the Indian Ocean. See also Sea Plan 2000, cited
in Section X above.

Nailer, Peter, "The Utility of Maritime Power: Today and
the changes in the elements that have characteristically made up
"maritime power" (fighting fleet, a trading fleet, bases). Changes
such as increasing warship cost and complexity, and the
internationalization of merchant shipping, says Nailer, are making
it progressively more difficult to convincingly state-the-naval-case.

Neustadt, Richard E. and May, Ernest R., Thinking in Time: The
Uses of History for Decision-Makers, New York: The Free Press,
1986. Seeks to focus decision-makers/users of the "historical"
approach. Has direct relevance for strategists, a sub-category of
"decision-makers." For example, the "cases" highlighted in Section
VIII of this addendum and in its predecessor, The Crimea, Salonika,
the Russian Intervention, World War II, etc., can all be profitably
examined using the Neustadt-May methodology.

Peter Swartz, Capt., USN, "Floating Bases Moving Out to Sea?"
NATO's Sixteen Nations, April 1989, pp 65-69. A "founding father" of
the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy proposes a variety of alternative
basing schemes for solving the prospective gap between U.S. global
commitments and the dwindling number of readily accessible
foreign host-country bases. Concludes that no single technological or
political option is likely to answer the case, so that the future
American overseas basing infrastructure will probably be a mix of
facilities on foreign soil, complemented by novel floating base
concepts, fast sea and airlift, and space-based systems.

Takes issue with literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the
Offensive. Offensive military doctrines are needed not only by states with expansionist war aim, but also by states that have a strong interest in protecting an exposed alley." See also Synder, Jack and Sagan, Scott D., "Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Counterforce," Winter 1986-87, pp 187-198.


* Webb, James H., Jr., "For a Defense That Makes Sense," *New York Times*, May 21, 1989, p 38. Calling the post World War II retention of large U.S. military forces in Europe and South Korea a "historical anomaly," the former SECNAV appeals for an end to "our strategic rigidity" and a return instead to the country's "historical role as a maritime nation." Webb insists that, even while all the parties involved, including the Europeans and the United States, agree that a European war is extremely unlikely, institutional conservatism and "rice bowls" paralyze U.S. decisionmakers from undoing the heavy financial and security burden on the Continent. He concludes that the key element to the future deterrence of a Soviet attack against Western Europe ought to be the American retaliatory threat of second-front operations in the Pacific.

* Webb, James H., Jr., Untitled remarks at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, January 13, 1988. Calls for the United States "to take a fresh look at the world and our place in it, and to seriously debate the posture of the U.S.military in that context." Maintains that post-World War II shifts in the global economic and military balance dictate a re-allocation of U.S. military forces away from "static" positions in NATO-Europe, and in favor of globally mobile naval and amphibious "maneuver" forces.
XII. MAKERS OF MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS

The Maritime Strategy was originally drafted primarily, although certainly not exclusively, by U.S. naval officers for U.S. naval officers. Not only were agreed national, joint, and allied intelligence estimates and concepts of operations utilized as fundamental "building blocks," but great importance was also attached to long-held views of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps leadership, to the concepts of operations of the fleet commanders-in-chief, and to the views of thinkers in uniform (active duty and reserve) at the Naval War College and the Center for Naval Analyses.

Much of what is in the Maritime Strategy is hardly new, and would be especially recognizable to naval officers who developed U.S. and allied naval warfighting concepts in the late 1940s and 1950s. Likewise, elements from key strategy products of naval officers and civilian thinkers of the late 1970s, e.g. the 1976 National Security Council Maritime Strategy study, naval reservist John Lehman's 1978 Aircraft Carriers, and the Navy's 1978 Sea Plan 2000 and Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (NWP 1, Rev.A), are also evident in the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.

Much of what is new in the Maritime Strategy is the linked, coherent discussion of (a) global warfare, rather than separate service and theater operation; (b) warfare tasks, e.g. anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface, strike, amphibious, mine and special warfare, rather than traditional "platforms" or "unions"; (c) the specific geopolitical problems facing the U.S. Navy, and other maritime elements of the 1980s; and (d) the current conventional wisdom regarding Soviet Navy capabilities and intentions. This approach was largely driven by the primacy of the need for the Strategy to satisfy current global operational requirements of fleet and other force commanders, over the future requirements of competing bureaucracies in Washington. Its effect in fostering common reference points for all portions of the contemporary officer corps, especially junior officers, is already being felt.

While much of the robustness of the Maritime Strategy derives from its roots throughout the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and elsewhere, both over space and over time, it owes a high degree of its current utility to its initial approval and promulgation by successive Chiefs of Naval Operations in Washington and to its codification by their staffs (OPNAV). These include especially the successive Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), heads of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and staff officers in that branch. OPNAV is the one organization tasked to focus on maritime strategy, and to view it not only in a balanced global manner but also within the bounds of actual current national military planning parameters.

OPNAV's capabilities in this endeavor are due in part to the existence of the Navy Politico-Military/Strategic Planning subspecialty, education, screening, and utilization system. This personnel system, while somewhat imperfect, has been identifying, training, and using naval officers in a network of strategists, in Washington, Newport, the Fleet, and elsewhere, for over a decade and a half.
Nevertheless, despite the clear postwar historical roots of the Maritime Strategy and its codification in and dissemination from Washington by some of the best minds in the national security affairs community today, a number of publications appeared in the last decade decrying a lack of strategic training and thinking in the Navy, past and present, and ignoring or misunderstanding the critical role in strategy development of naval officers in staff positions. This literature, as well as some counters to it, is briefly outlined below.

A. The Public Debate: Criticisms and Kudos

"413 Named as Proven Subspecialists," *Navy Times*, September 9, 1985, p 58. The Navy system for identifying the "pool" of naval strategists. Results of the seventh biennial U.S. Navy selection board that identifies "proven" subspecialists for further mid-and high-level assignments in the eight fields of naval Political-Military/Strategic Planning. Earlier lists appeared in *Navy Times* back into the 1970s. Includes many of the builders of the Maritime Strategy. Note that these names constitute not only the "Corps of Naval Strategists," but also the Navy's Politico-Military and Regional Affairs experts.

Brooks, Captain Linton F., "An Examination of Professional Concerns of Naval Officers as Reflected in Their Professional Journal," *Naval War College Review*, January/February 1980, pp 46-56. A future primary contributor to the development and articulation of the Maritime Strategy decries the paucity of articles on strategy in the Navy professional literature of the late 1960s. This era was admittedly dominated by Vietnam and an internal professional view of the Navy as primarily an infinitely flexible limited war fire brigade, but it did, however, also see the publication of R.Adm. J.C. Wylie's *Military Strategy*, R.Adm. Henry Eccles' *Military Concepts and Philosophy* and Adm. Joseph J. Clark's coauthored *Sea Power* and *Its Meaning*.

Bruins, Berend D., "Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?" *Proceedings*, January 1982, pp 52-56. Also "Comment and Discussion," March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20; May 1982, p 17. The Proceedings throws three more retirees and an active-duty non-strategist into the public fray. Meanwhile, fleet plan staffs, the Strategic Studies Group at Newport, and the one intelligence officer and nine line officers (six with PhDs) assigned to OP-603 were at the time actively laying the groundwork for the Maritime Strategy. Illustrative of the limited public visibility of actual naval strategic thinkers before 1982-83.

November 1981, pp 84-87; January 1982, p 76; March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20. Posed the questions, "Where will we get our future strategists?" Implied that the Navy had no real answer to the question, a view shared by most of the eight commenters and discussants chosen for publication by Proceedings, only one of whom was familiar with actual Navy practice in this area. Illustrative of the limited public visibility of true U.S. Navy strategic thought before 1981-82.


** Bush, Ted, "Libyan Exercise Exemplifies New Navy Strategy," Navy Times, February 10, 1986, pp 45-46. OPNAV strategists illuminate a variety of aspects of the Maritime Strategy and its origins. Note that, unlike open-literature authors, actual practicing strategists usually remain nameless to the general public. This hardly means, however, that they are somehow less important.

** Clark, Charles S., "In Person: Fred H. Rainbow: Charting a Course for the Navy's Debates," National Journal, February 21, 1987, p 435. On the role of the Proceedings in orchestrating "some heated forensics over the Navy's trumpeted Maritime Strategy (while) similar Air Force and Army journals often reflect the blandness of official restraints." The Institute has come a long way in just a few short years. Like the Naval War College and the Naval War College Review, the Naval Institute and the Proceedings are clearly at the cutting edge of maritime strategy debate today.


Crackel, Lt. Col. Theodore J., USA (Ret.), "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels," Public Interest, Summer 1984, pp 18-30. "The services have produced no strategic thinkers at all." He is especially hard on War College faculties, including the Naval War College: "None of the war college faculties is in the forefront of development in any of the military disciplines they teach." Actually, no group has been more in the "forefront of development in the "discipline" of Maritime Strategy (SECNAV, the CNO, the OP-06 organization, and the Strategic Studies Group aside) than the Naval War College faculty, as is evidenced by their prominence in this bibliography. Crackel is a military historian by training with little apparent experience in actual strategy or policy-making, and with an
almost exclusively U.S. Army-oriented academic and operational record. Unlike most practicing U.S. naval strategies, he has apparently self-fulfilled his prophecy and "discovered that the think-tanks in and around Washington are a more congenial environment."

Davis, Capt. Vincent, USNR (Ret.), "Decision Making, Decision Makers, and Some of the Results," in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed.), The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment, Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources, 1986, pp 23-62. A somewhat anachronistic characterization of the contemporary Navy as one with "too few thinkers," driven by acrimonious debates among factions of naval officers. "Rancorous disputes simmer among its 'big three unions—the carrier, submarine and surface-warfare admirals.'" Thus, the seminal thinker and writer on naval strategy and bureaucratic politics of the 40s, 50s and 60s sees no essential change in the Navy of the mid-80s, despite conscious Navy efforts to take his earlier counsel to heart in its development of a transcendent Maritime Strategy. Cf articles by V. Adms Demars, Schoultz, and Dunn, leaders of the submarine and air warfare communities, and by Lts. Winnefeld, Peppe and Keller, the rising generation, cited in Sections II and III above.


Hanks, R. Adm. Robert J., USN (Ret.), "Whither U.S. Naval Strategy?" Strategic Review, Summer 1982, pp 16-22. An outstanding OP-60 of the 1970s challenges the U.S. Navy to develop a coherent strategy, an activity being vigorously pursued even as the article was published.


**


Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "Naval Strategy for the Next Century: Resurgence of the Naval War College as the Center of Strategic Naval Thought," National Defense, April 1983, pp 27-30. Covers the
resurgence of the Naval War College, although without describing
the linkages between that institution and the strategic planners in
Washington, through which Naval War College thinking is actually
translated into Maritime Strategy elements. Also see 1983 Murray
article cited in Section I above.

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Thinking About Strategy," Shipmate, April
1982, pp 18-20. SECNAV's charge to the officer corps.

**
"an unusually large number of naval officers do not recognize fully
the switch from 'defense' to 'offense' that the Navy's high command
believes is necessary." But cf "The United States Navy: On the Crest
of the Wave," The Economist, April 19, 1986, p 49 cited above: "What
is certain is that an entire generation of junior and middle-grade
naval officers now believes that the first wartime job of the Navy
would be to sail north and fight the Russians close to their bases."

* 
Marryott, R.Adm. Ronald F., "President's Notes," Naval War College
Review, November/December 1985, pp 2-4. By the 1985-86 President of
the Naval War College and 1983-84 Director of Strategy, Plans, and
Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist. On development
of the Maritime Strategy, and the Naval War College's vital
supporting contribution.

**
Offense, Ship Design and Archimedes," Navy News and Undersea
Technology, July 18, 1986, p 2. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Surface Warfare views Maritime Strategy as of little concern to
Navy junior officers. Not a common view.

Milsted, L.Cdr. Charles E., Jr., "A Corps of Naval Strategist,"
Masters Degree Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1983. Based
on the somewhat skewed open literature available during this period.
As with Bruins, above, "strategy" and "long-range planning" not
well differentiated. Proposed establishment of a network of
specifically educated and trained naval strategists responsible for
long-range planning. Following his own model, Milsted was
subsequently assigned to OP-603 from 1983 to 1985, where he became
a key contributor to the codification of the Maritime Strategy. Cf U. S.
Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners' Conference cited in
Section I above.

Murray, Williamson, "Grading the War Colleges," National
war-colleges, the Naval War College at Newport, sets the standard by
which the other war colleges should be measured. The strategy and
policy curriculum has justifiably acquired a reputation as the
premier course in the United States, if not the Western world, for the
examination of strategy. So high is the Naval War College's reputation, that over the course of the past few years it has attracted a number of the best young military historians and political scientists in national security affairs to Newport."

**Stavridis, L.Cdr. Jim, "An Ocean Away: Outreach from the Naval War College," Shipmate, November 1985, p 8, on the role of the Naval War College in contributing to OP-603's codification of the Maritime Strategy and in "getting the word out" to mid-grade naval officers. By a former OP-603 member.

**Tritten, Cdr. James, "New Directions," Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, p 94. By the Chairman of the Naval Postgraduate School National Security Affairs Department and a former OP-60 staffer. On the revitalization of Naval history and strategy studies at the "PG School."


Woolsey, R. James, "Mapping U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s," International Security, Fall 1981, pp 202-207. By the 1977-1980 Under Secretary of the Navy. "The other side of the coin." A call to bring the "American academic intellectual establishment" and the military establishment more in touch with each other by focusing the efforts of the former on the actual "defense policy" problems of the latter, vice exclusively on "(a) the politico-military situation in the four corners of the globe and (b) nuclear and arms control theology." For similar disconnects that have occurred even within the field of "nuclear theology" itself, see Rosenberg, David, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Theory vs. Practice," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1987, pp 20+. "Theorists and consultants have had little impact on the development of nuclear weapons policies. Rather, strategic planning should be seen as a governmental process, carried out largely by military officers and civilian bureaucrats."

B. The Public Record: OP-603

From 1982 to the present, the primary U.S. Navy organization charged with codifying, refining, and articulating the consensus in the Navy regarding the Maritime Strategy has been the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Organized by V.Adm. William J. Crowe (then OP-06) and R.Adm. Robert Hilton (then OP-60) in 1978, OP-603 evolved into an office of about a dozen post-graduate educated, trained, professional operator-strategists, including U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Central Intelligence Agency officers.

Almost invisible to the general and national security affairs academic publics, especially when contrasted to the Secretary of the Navy,
the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-06 and OP-60, the operational commanders, the Strategic Studies Group and the Naval War College, these officers have nevertheless been those principally responsible for the development of the Maritime Strategy as a unified, coherent, global framework and common U.S. and allied naval vision.

As with war planners, but unlike war college faculties, their output is largely classified. Nevertheless, they, and their superiors, OP-60 and OP-60B, have also achieved respectable open publication records. Typically, their writings prior to assignment to OP-60/603 reflect their diverse operational and academic interests and achievements; their publications during and after their assignment as strategists usually reflect their work on the Maritime Strategy. For the latter, see the entries cited earlier in this bibliography by R. Adms. Hanks, Maryott, and Pendley; Capts. Barnett, Brooks, Johnson, McGruther and Swartz; Cdr. Hickman, Kalb and Milsted, and L.Cdr. Pocalyko and Stavridis. For the former, see the entries below. They represent, admittedly, only a portion of the record, limited only to the products of those officers who were specifically and principally assigned to codify the Maritime Strategy, generally the OP-603 "Branch Heads" and "Maritime Strategy Action Officers" serving from 1982 through 1986. They are provided only to illustrate the breadth of experience and depth of thought members of the U.S. Navy's current, functioning "Corps of Naval Strategists" bring with them when they report for duty.


**


# INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name and Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1.  | Defense Technical Information Center  
    Cameron Station  
    Alexandria, VA 22314 |
| 2.  | Dudley Knox Library  
    Naval Postgraduate School  
    Monterey, CA 93943-5100 |
| 3.  | Director of Research Administration (Code 012)  
    Naval Postgraduate School  
    Monterey, CA 93943-5100 |
| 4.  | Chairman  
    Department of National Security Affairs (Code NS)  
    Naval Postgraduate School  
    Monterey, CA 93943-5100 |
| 5.  | CAPT Dick Diamond, USN  
    Strategic Concepts Branch  
    OP-603/Room 4E486  
    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
    Washington, D.C. 20350 |
| 6.  | Mr. Linton Brooks  
    NST Delegation  
    Department of State  
    Washington, DC 20520-7511 |
| 7.  | RADM Phillip D. Smith  
    OP-60/Room 4E566  
    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
    Washington, D.C. 20350 |
| 8.  | CAPT James Stark, USN  
    Executive Director  
    CNO Executive Panel Staff (OP-00K)  
    4401 Ford Avenue  
    Alexandria, VA 22302-0268 |
| 9.  | Dr. James George/Library/  
    James McConnell/Bradford Dismukes/Floyd Kennedy  
    Center for Naval Analyses  
    4401 Ford Avenue  
    Alexandria, VA 22302 |
| 10. | RADM Thomas A. Meinecke  
    OP-65/Room 4E572  
    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
    Washington, D.C. 20350 |
| 11. | Andrew Marshall  
    Director, Net Assessment  
    OSD/NA Room 3A930  
    Office of the Secretary of Defense  
    Washington, D.C. 20301 |
13. VADM R.J. Kelley  
DCNO Plans, Policy and Operations  
OP-06/Room 4E592 PNT  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington, D.C. 20350

14. Strategic Studies Group (SSG)  
Naval War College  
Newport, RI 02840

15. CAPT Peter Swartz, USN  
USNATO/DOD  
APO New York 09667-5028

17. Dr. David Perrin  
Center for Naval Analysis  
4401 Ford Ave.  
Alexandria, VA 22302-0268

18. Dr. James J. Tritten  
Department of National Security Affairs  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93943-5100

19. CDR Richard 'Mitch' Brown  
Department of National Security Affairs  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93943-5100

20. Dr. Jan S. Breemer  
Department of National Security Affairs  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93943-5100

21. Dr. Ger Teitler  
Koninklyk Institute voor de Marine  
Het Nieuwe Diep 8  
Post Bus 10000  
1780 CA Den Helder, The Netherlands

22. CDR James McCoy  
International Institute for Strategic Studies  
23 Tavistock Street  
London WC2E 7NQ  
England

23. Professor Geoffrey Till  
Department of History and International Affairs  
Royal Naval College  
Greenwich, London SE10 GNN  
England
24. CAPT Richard Sharpe, RN
    Foundry House
    Kingsley, Borden, Hampshire GU 359LY
    England

25. Dr. Eric J. Grove
    41 Martin Grove
    Morden, Surrey SM45AT
    England

26. Dr. Roger W. Barnett
    National Security Research, Inc.
    3031 Javier Road, Suite 300
    Fairfax, VA 22031

27. Col. Kees Homan, RNLMC
    Clingendaal 7
    2597 VH The Hague
    The Netherlands

28. CDR Julius J.J. van Rooyen, RNLN
    Ministerie van Defensie
    Defensie Plannen
    Plein 4
    2511 CR The Hague
    The Netherlands

29. Dr. Rodney Kennedy Minott
    Department of National Security Affairs
    Naval Postgraduate School
    Monterey, CA 93943-5100

30. Dr. Henry Gaffney, Director
    Strategic Policy Analysis Group
    Center for Naval Analyses
    4401 Ford Ave
    Alexandria, VA 22302-0268

31. CAPT Larry Seaquist, USN
    OSD/S&R
    The Pentagon, Rm 4E829
    Washington, DC 20301-2100

32. Professor John A. Williams
    Department of Political Science
    Loyola University of Chicago
    6525 North Sheridan Road
    Chicago, Illinois 60626

33. Dr. Donald Daniels, Director
    Strategy and Campaign Department
    Center for Naval Warfare Studies
    Naval War college
    Newport, RI 02840
35. Mr. Frank Uhig Jr., Editor
   Naval War College Review
   Naval War College
   Newport, RI 02840

36. CAPT Paul Bloch, USN
   Operations Analysis Department
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5100

37. CAPT James A. Barber Jr., USN (Ret)
   Executive Director
   U.S. Naval Institute
   Annapolis, MD 20814

38. Mr. Fred H. Rainbow, Editor-in-Chief
   Proceedings
   U.S. Naval Institute
   Annapolis, MD 20814

39. Mr. Robin Pirie, Director
   CNO Strategic Studies Group
   Naval War College
   Newport, RI 02840

40. Library
    U.S. Naval Academy
    Annapolis, MD 21402

41. Library
    U.S. Air Force Academy
    Colorado Springs, Co 80840-5701

42. Library
    U.S. Military Academy
    West Point, NY 10996

43. Library
    Naval War College
    Newport, RI 02840-5010

44. Library
    U.S. Army War College
    Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

45. Library
    Air University
    Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 36112

46. Library
    National Defense University
    Fort Lesley J. Mc Nair
    Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

47. Library
    Industrial College of the Armed Forces
    Fort Lesley J. Mc Nair
    Washington, D.C. 20319-6000
Political Science department
U.S. Naval Academy
ATTN: CDR George Breedon
Annapolis, MD 21402