CASE STUDIES IN STRATEGIC PLANNING

Edited by

JAMES J. TRITTEN

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Rear Admiral Ralph W. West, Jr.                      Harrison Shull
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This report was edited by:

JAMES J. TRITTEN
Associate Professor
Department of National
Security Affairs

Reviewed by:

THOMAS C. BRUNEAU
Professor and Chairman
Department of National
Security Affairs

GORDON SCHACHER
Dean of Faculty and
Graduate Studies
Case Studies in Strategic Planning


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INTRODUCTION

The attached case studies are a deliverable for the project "Strategic Management for the Defense Department" sponsored by the Director, Net Assessment, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and co-sponsored by the OSD Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch and the Director of Defense Policy National Security Council Staff. A companion technical report, "Strategic Management for the Defense Department," NPS-56-88-031, September 1988, details the project's genesis and efforts during the first year. A follow-on (estimated September 1990) Final Report will outline subsequent results. No attempt is made to duplicate that information in this volume.

The case studies contained herein were prepared by strategic planning curricula students enrolled in the National Security Affairs (NSA) Department revised capstone Seminar in Strategic Planning (NS 4230), taught during the Spring Quarter, Academic Years 1988 and 1989. This seminar in 1988, was the first opportunity to introduce strategic management concepts to students enrolled in the NSA strategic planning curricula. Subsequent to that quarter, all NSA strategic planning students take two Administrative science courses in strategic planning/management.

The cases herein were recycled to and revised by students that took NS 4230 during 1989. They will be used in subsequent offerings of NS 4230 and in the capstone strategic management course in the Administrative Sciences Department, Strategic Management: Public and Private. This course, MN 4105, was also revised substantially to introduce public sector material - much of it taken from the cases developed by the NSA students.

NSA and Administrative Sciences faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School who teach these two courses will continue a case study development effort for classroom use. Initial briefings on this case study effort was made to the sponsors at a meeting held in Monterey on 19-20 July 1988.
The first three cases contain individual examples of Navy strategic planning and one case of joint service planning with emphasis on the Navy and a maritime theater of military operations. The first of these involves a historical example of strategic planning done by the Navy prior to World War I. Inter-war strategic planning and in particular, war planning, is examined in the second case study. In both cases, the relationship of pre-war planning to execution of plans during a war is of interest to the reader.

The third report deals with more recent attempts at long-range strategic planning within the Navy. This effort includes an overview of general strategic planning system within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, an examination of a special ad hoc planning effort conducted by the Navy that made use of the expertise at the Naval War College, and the recent 1980s Maritime Strategy effort. The Reagan administration Maritime Strategy is an example of strategic planning and strategic management conducted by a staff organization itself. Readers should also look at a more indepth analysis: “A Theory of Naval Strategic Planning,” by LT John R. Hafey, Naval Postgraduate School, Masters Thesis, June 1988, 119 pp.

The fourth case contains a non-DoD strategic planning example that Navy strategic planning students would have not normally been exposed to prior to this research project.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh case studies contain examples of strategic planning and management done at the Washington headquarters level. The fifth case is an example of strategic planning which results from a Congressional mandate, and performed by line organizations within the executive branch of government. The 1987 and 1988 White House reports, National Security Strategy of the United States, represent planning in the abstract - a plan not tied at all to any execution effort.

The sixth case is an example of a Blue-Ribbon panel commissioned jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. As the previously mentioned White House
reports, Discriminate Deterrence is the result of planning done without regard to execution of that plan under a strategic management scheme. The seventh case is the result of original research done on the introduction of competitive strategies (a business concept) into the defense Department. For a more indepth analysis of this effort, see “Analysis of the Competitive Strategies Methodology (U),” Naval Postgraduate School, by LCDR Michael C. Vitale, USN, Masters’ thesis, December 1989, 190 pp.

The Competitive Strategies Initiative, as proposed by Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger in 1986, used the interaction between U.S. strategic nuclear air-breathing forces and Soviet strategic air defences from 1957-1986 as a specific example of a successful case of strategic competition. Our study results indicate the contrary and that there are not yet in place in DoD sufficient monitoring and evaluation systems to ensure a successful competitive strategic effort.

Each case has a background of the international or national context at the time, a brief description of the strategic planning/management system itself, key assumptions made by personnel involved in the process, and an analysis of the key elements that resulted in success or failure of the plan or the execution of that plan.

Comments from the sponsors and other readers of this report should be directed to the project investigators:

Associate Professor, James J. Tritten (Code 56Tr)
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100
(408) 646-2143
Autovon 878-2143
Associate Professor, Nancy C. Roberts (Code 54Rc)
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA  93943-5100
(408) 646-2741
Autovon 878-2742
I. BACKGROUND

In the late nineteenth century, the United States was beginning to emerge as a world power. The industrial revolution was in full swing as the nation and the entire civilized world was undergoing a vast metamorphosis. Machinery replaced animals and wind as the source of power in a more modern world. The United States was at the center of this new world as steam power shrunk the apparent distance between the continents. In all, the United States found itself undergoing tremendous changes, at a rate never before imagined possible.

The Navy found itself totally caught up in this era of change. The shift from sail to steam was the most obvious of the changes that the Navy was forced to deal with. Equally important, the Navy was now part of a nation with true global interests, and also with some very powerful potential adversaries. Germany, England and Japan were nations with naval power capable of challenging United States interests around the
globe. These changes in technology and the world balance of power led many people in the Navy to believe that an organized, formal method of planning was needed in order to maintain the force level and degree of modernization required for the Navy to fulfill its mission in protecting the nation’s interests.

In an effort to cope with not only the growing complexity of changing from sail to steam, but also the inability of the Commissioners to manage the burgeoning detail associated with operating a Navy in a bureaucratic government, the Bureau system was established in 1842. Unfortunately, none of the Bureaus had the responsibility for supervising the employment of ships or preparations for war.

Several events in the late nineteenth century influenced the formation of the Navy General Board. The first event occurred in March, 1882 when the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was established under the Bureau of Navigation. The purpose of the ONI was to get information for the Navy’s use in war and peace.

In October, 1884, the Naval War College was established and began instructing Naval Officers about the importance of tactics, strategy, and the value of war plans.

In June, 1889, the Bureau of Navigation’s role was expanded to include supervision of the fleet. This consolidated the forces necessary for a Navy General Board. The Bureau of Navigation was responsible for the operations of the fleet, and had the ONI to provide the necessary
intelligence information. In addition the Naval War College was available to supplement the effort with planning expertise and manpower.

Many critics of the General Board pointed to the successes of the Navy in the Spanish-American War and said that those victories vindicated the existing planning system. The opponents’ attitude was that the General Board was an attempt by some people in the Navy to fix a system that wasn’t even broken. Proponents of the Board argued that it was Spanish incompetence that led to the United States’ victory. In the presence of a formidable foe, the weakness of the Americans’ plans would have rapidly become apparent and led to disastrous defeat.

One final influencing factor was the Congressional promotion of Admiral Dewey to the rank of Admiral of the Fleet, with lifelong tenure. Because Admiral Dewey suddenly outranked the Bureau Chiefs and the Fleet Commanders, there was no job in the Navy for him. The following year a billet was created.

In the year 1900, the Secretary of the Navy John D. Long authorized the formation of the General Board. The job of this board, composed of highly competent naval officers, was to plan for war. More specifically, it sought to plan for war with Germany and Japan, though not exclusively so. The type of war planning the General Board was to engage in dealt with more than just the operations and tactics of naval warfare. It also included planning for the force levels required for the Navy to conduct the wars the General Board envisioned possible in the not too distant future.
The final output of the General Board was a war plan delivered to the appropriate fleet commander. The war plan delivered was not, however, a pure product of the General Board. Before its delivery, it was reviewed/amended by the Intelligence Office, the Naval War College and even the appropriate fleet commander. Recommendations for force levels to support the war plans were delivered less formally via memoranda delivered to the Secretary of the Navy.

The General Board never really saw its plans implemented. The war with Germany in 1917 did not develop in the Caribbean as foreseen, since the German fleet was kept bottled up by the British for most of the war. By the time World War II came around, and scenarios much more closely resembling those they envisioned became reality, the General Board had lost its effectiveness and power as a planning body, as the Navy had come full circle and reverted to its pre-1900, more ad hoc planning style.

The original objectives of the General Board were to:

1. gather information on foreign powers,
2. prepare war plans, and
3. train officers in the art of war making/planning.

The second and third objectives were accomplished by the General Board, but collection of information was often inadequate because the collectors were not well informed on what type of information the General Board wanted. They tended to provide information that was too detailed
and overlooked the broader picture. This lack of information limited the Board's capability to perform accurate net assessments.

II. THE GENERAL BOARD SYSTEM

The General Board’s composition, as originally established by Secretary Long, was as follows. There were to be two categories of membership: ex-officio and individual. The ex-officio members were: the Admiral of the Navy, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the Chief Intelligence Officer, the President of the Naval War College, and the principal assistant of each of the last two officials. Individual memberships were to be three in number at or above the rank of Lieutenant Commander.3 The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation was assigned as the custodian of the war plans developed by the General Board.4 Additionally, he served as the General Board’s head in the absence of the Admiral of the Navy. Meetings were required at least once each month, and at least two of the monthly meetings each year were required to include daily sessions of at least one week’s duration. After only one year, the composition of the board was changed to eliminate the assistants to the President of the Naval War College and the Chief Intelligence Officer and instead allowed the Secretary of the Navy to designate by name as many members, above Lieutenant Commander, as he desired.5.

General Board decisions were taken by vote. Each member had one vote, regardless of rank.6 Admiral Dewey, the original head of the board, was adamant about not permitting senior officers to influence the votes of
junior board members. Therefore, he permitted board decisions that he did not agree with to be forwarded over his signature. This attitude was not always popular with soon-to-be retired Admirals who were serving on the board in a non-voting capacity, as they found themselves overruled by voting officers much junior to themselves.

The actual planning process revolved around a group of committees formed to handle the different types of plans required. The most important of these committees was the Executive Committee. It was the function of the Executive Committee to prepare the agenda for the General Board’s meetings and to take a preliminary look at material presented to the General Board. Also, the Executive Committee met on a near daily basis and that, combined with its reviewing functions, made it the most powerful committee of the General Board. Originally the Board’s chairman formed other committees and assigned tasks to particular members of the Board based on their expertise. After two years, two other permanent committees were formed. The First Committee had responsibility for fleet organization, combined operations with the Army, mobilization plans, and the analysis of foreign fleets. The Second Committee was assigned war plans, naval militia affairs, and sea transport.

Originally, the General Board was not going to have a permanently assigned staff to assist in the planning process. This idea was soon abandoned and officers of all ranks were assigned to the Board to help with the administration and to lend expertise to the planning process. Additionally, help could be sought from the War College or from the
Bureaus, especially on military matters that required a particular technical knowledge or experience.

One of the key elements in the functioning of the Board was its relationship with the Intelligence Office and the Naval War College. The Intelligence Office served as the Board’s source of information. The War College provided extra personnel when needed and served as a type of reviewing or proofing station for the plans the Board authored.

III. KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

Key assumptions made by the proponents of the General Board prompted then to feel that the old planning system was inadequate. These assumptions dealt mostly with the nature of the next war. It was assumed that the next war would have a very sudden beginning, be very complex in nature, and have a very high tempo. Germany and Japan were also assumed to be the most probable enemies. The Board’s supporters felt that the old ad hoc system of planning was not up to the challenge of preparing the nation for such a war. It was felt that proper planning could be done only by those whose job it was to plan, and not by the Bureau Chiefs who were too busy with the administration of their departments to give any serious effort to the process of preparing effective war plans.

The Navy was not totally void of planning activity before the General Board came into existence. Each of the Bureaus had plans of their own for various contingencies. With no central planning system or method
of review, these plans were often uncoordinated, and sometimes directly at odds with each other. However, the parochial attitude of the Bureau Chiefs was strong, and they felt they knew what was best for themselves and the Navy. They saw the existence of the General Board as an erosion of their power and, in a way, they were correct. Thus, the old system of Bureaus was a constraint on the planning function of the General Board as the Bureau heads retained the true power base in the Navy.

In addition to the Bureau Chiefs, extremists in the Line Officer ranks sought to constrain the General Board. These officers saw the General Board in the old terms of the Staff versus Line power struggle that had existed in military organizations for decades. The Line Officer community saw the Board as a tool used by Staff Officers to wrestle more power away from them and to place them in a subordinate position to the Staff Officers.

Resistance also came from outside the military. Congressional leaders saw two major problems with the General Board. First, they feared the formation of a “General Staff”-type organization as an effort by the Navy to stray from the traditional subordination of the United States military forces to the civilian leadership. Specifically, it was felt that the General Board might reduce the role of the Secretary of the Navy to that of a puppet. Second, they were very comfortable with the power being held by the Bureau Chiefs because it permitted numerous pork barrel projects from the Navy to appear in their districts.

Some real constraints came directly from the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. For the General Board to be effective, a strong Secretary was
required to counter the resistance of the Bureau Chiefs. Unfortunately, the position of Secretary of the Navy was viewed either as a political pay-off or as a stepping stone to a more important position. As a result, between 1902 and 1909, there were seven different Secretaries of the Navy. Also, many of the Secretaries were unwilling to resist the Bureau Chiefs even when they supported the Board’s ideas. They often believed that maintaining harmony within the Navy was more important than defending the Board’s position.

IV. ANALYSIS

There were three major elements and two minor ones that led to removing the task of war planning from the General Board.

First, within the Navy there was a division of opinion. The partisan Bureau Chiefs felt that their power to make decisions for the Navy was being undermined by the General Board’s recommendations. This opposition increased the conflict between the Line and Staff Officers. Additionally, with the death of the General Board’s founder, Rear Admiral Taylor, in 1904, support rapidly vanished for the Board because of the methods used by its supporters to gain a legislative sanction. Board supporters were accused of resorting to “muckraking and chicanery” in order to gain the backing they needed. These tactics backfired and instead of support they only fostered ill-will toward the formalizing of the General Board.
Second, Congressmen opposed the continued existence of the General Board because it would reduce government spending within their districts. Since the General Board decided matters based on what was in the best interest of the Navy, individual Congressmen would no longer be able to count on the Navy to spend government funds in their home districts. Some Congressmen also feared that the General Board would become an American version of the German General Staff and might weaken the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Third, the lack of consistent leadership that resulted from revolving the job of Secretary of the Navy frequently during this period was detrimental to the General Board. Those Secretaries who liked the ideas presented by the Board did not remain long enough to see the ideas implemented. Also, in view of the internal opposition and the Congressional opposition, there was no benefit for any of these men in supporting such a controversial organization.

Rear Admiral Taylor's plan to establish the General Board first and legitimate it afterward through legislation, contributed to the demise of the Board as the central planning body for the Navy. Without the formal backing and legitimacy that Congressional legislation would have brought with it, the Board was doomed to failure. Despite the fact that the Congress had approved the formation of a similar body for the Army, it was reluctant to do the same for the Navy. This was blamed, in large part, on poor salesmanship of the General Board by the Navy. Since there was no law supporting the General Board, when the first real crisis arose
World War I, support for the Board evaporated and planning responsibilities reverted back to the Bureau Chiefs.

With the onset of the crisis in Europe in the 1910's serious war planning reverted back to the Bureau Chiefs and the General Board concept was never given a chance to prove its worth. Though the General Board continued to exist into the 1940's, any power or influence as a planning organization was gone by the end of the first World War.

The second minor element which contributed to ruin of the General Board was the failure of the Board itself to properly take into account logistics problems. It was easy for those opposed to the Board to use the Board's own plans against it since they were not well thought out where logistics was concerned. Not that there were necessarily any better plans around at the time, but the Board’s oversights on logistics often became the Board’s own worst enemy. Additionally, the General Board never established any workable system for the implementation of the plans it formulated, and thus the Board’s plans rapidly deteriorated into little more than intellectual exercises. As a result, operational commanders rarely took the plans formulated by the General Board as seriously as the planners did.

The overall goal of the General Board was to prepare the Navy for the next war. In order to accomplish this it sought to centralize Navy planning into a single body, with people, tools and time to formulate well thought out, feasible war plans. This noble cause rapidly degenerated into a bureaucratic power struggle over who was to do the planning for the
Navy. The onset of a crisis brought a premature end to that struggle. The
nation opted to stay with the old system when danger arose, rather than put
its faith into an unknown and unproven system. With victory came
vindication for the old Bureau system and the General Board would have
no chance to reassert itself in the inter-war years.
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The joint service war planning process of the inter-war period (1919-1941) produced a variety of plans in response to the changing national security problem of the United States. In the early years of that time period, the greatest effort was expended on Plan Orange, one of the color plans first proposed in 1904. An evolving international and domestic environment resulted in its replacement as a contingency plan to implement U.S. policy by the Rainbow series of war plans in 1938. However, a generation of naval officers that had been indoctrinated into the concept of Plan Orange were able to execute a modified version of the plan during the global Allied offensive against the Axis powers in the final phase of the Second World War.
I. BACKGROUND

Until the Spanish-American War, the national interests of the United States in the Pacific region were primarily economic, based on whaling and commerce with the Asian market. The great powers of Europe had long been extending their influence into the area and had established colonies throughout the region. During the later half of the nineteenth century, as the United States grew economically and politically stronger, its interests eventually conflicted with those of Spain. The result was the Spanish-American War. Although the war started in Cuba, Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of the Navy and heavily influenced by the works of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, instigated operations by the American naval units of the Asian Squadron, commanded by Commodore George Dewey, against the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay. This action resulted in a victory for the Americans, securing a colony in the Far East for the United States.

How the Philippines relate to the national interest and the national security policy of the United States has been argued ever since this event. The initial debate concerned whether the United States should make the islands a possession or not. One element of the policy, claiming that imperialism was against the principles of the American Republic, argued for immediate independence of the islands. Another element argued that the future of American economic interests were in Asia, and that the United States must retain the Philippines as an outpost for American commerce. The appearance of a squadron of German ships forced the issue, and the Philippines were made a colony to prevent the division of the islands by the European powers.
The United States was left with an obligation to protect the islands, located 7,000 miles from the West Coast of the United States. Upon implementing this policy, a militarily significant opportunity was lost when Germany took over the Carolinas, Marianas, and Marshall Islands—essentially cutting off the sea lines of communication between the United States and the Philippines. Despite the defeat of Germany in the First World War, the security situation of the Philippines did not improve, as Japan took advantage of Europe's concern with the war to pursue an expansionist policy.

After the war, Japan was granted a League of Nations Mandate over the Carolinas Islands, leaving the United States in the same situation. The Japanese acquisition also complicated the support of the "Open Door" policy of the United States towards China. Japan herself had already begun to flex her newly developed national power, as evidenced by her victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. The rise of Japan as a Pacific power began to be recognized by the European powers when it defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War 1905-1906. The United States implicitly recognized her emergence indirectly when President Roosevelt decided the Treaty of Portsmouth largely in its favor in 1906.

To an outside observer, Japan's government had the appearance of a Western-style parliamentary structure; however the position of the armed forces was unique, holding power equivalent to the elected civilian leadership. The military pressed for increasing expansion to enhance the power of Japan, and took drastic action, including assassination of members
of the civilian leadership to get their proposed policies enacted.\textsuperscript{5} The aggressive nature of Japanese policy became apparent in 1931 when troops were moved into Manchuria, violating the Nine-Power Treaty. The other signatories, and also the League of Nations, were ineffectual in forcing Japan to withdraw its troops.\textsuperscript{6} Lacking adequate sanctions against the Japanese, and the political will to oppose Japan's aggression or break out of the treaty limits, one of the few alternatives open to the United States was to have its military make plans for future war.

At the beginning of this period, the Joint Planning Board continued to develop the color series of war plans, which had been established in 1904. These were a series of campaign plans, which assumed war with a single opponent, each assigned a color: red represented Great Britain, green represented Mexico, black represented Germany, and orange represented Japan.\textsuperscript{7} Of these plans, the one which received the most attention was Plan Orange. As remote as war appeared at this time, war with Japan was the least remote; additionally, the consequences of war with Japan were the most serious.

This was due to the location of the Philippines. Given the great distance from the United States and the small garrison, the Philippines were extremely vulnerable to any attempt by Japan to extend its influence into Southeast Asia. The Philippines dominated the sea lines of communication between Japan and Indonesia and Indochina. By 1924, Plan Orange had been officially accepted by the Joint Board and signed by the Secretaries of War and the Navy. Plan Orange was revised officially at least five times.
by 1938, notwithstanding continual review within the War and Navy Departments.

Despite official acceptance of Plan Orange, differences in perception of war goals between the Army and the Navy continued to cause controversy. Given the vulnerability of the Philippines, some Army planners believed that their service's primary mission was defense of the continental U.S. They proposed that in the event of a war with Japan, a defensive position should be established in the Pacific (using the triangle formed by Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama), and the Navy should conduct a mobile defense of the coastline within that area. On the other hand, the offensively-oriented Navy planners relied on Mahanian principles and proposed an offensive, attacking strategy against Japan.

These basic questions were not resolved, as is apparent in both the 1937 and 1938 revisions of Plan Orange. In 1937, a compromise plan was submitted to the Joint Board. In 1938 the Joint Board had to force a compromise from the planners by appointing two personalities, General Embick and Rear Admiral Richardson, to get the plan approved. The result was, predictably, a vague plan. However, even these vague compromise plans had made progress in terms of the general idea of a progressive advance westward to regain the Philippines. Exact time schedules were not formulated, but concepts were.

By the late 1930s, the international arena had changed significantly with the rise of the Axis powers. In 1939, the Rainbow Series of war plans (numbers 1 through 5) were developed, differing in enemies, allies, and
defensive spheres. All the Rainbow Plans envisioned some type of hemisphere defense and envisioned fighting more than one enemy. During the years of planning, many scenarios were envisioned, including those of enemy surprise air attacks. Some plans attempted to fight a "two front" war with limited resources.

Rainbow 5 was selected as reflecting the most likely future situation. It envisioned a coalition (to include the U.S.) conducting a strategic offensive in Europe against Germany, and a strategic defensive in the Pacific Theater in order to assist France and Great Britain, by fighting in Europe, Africa, or both. This was the origin of the grand strategy of defeating first Germany, and then Japan, the primary enemy in the Pacific.

As the international environment continued to change, national security concerns of the U.S. became intertwined with those of its potential allies. The Washington Staff Conferences were held in 1941, followed by the American British Conversations between the planning staffs of both nations to coordinate future policy if the U.S. were to enter the war. The result of this conference was the ABC-1 report.

II. JOINT WAR PLANNING SYSTEM, 1919-1941

The agency responsible for the development of joint service war plans was the Joint Planning Committee, established in 1919. The Joint Planning Committee was subordinate to the Joint Army-Navy Board, which had been originally established in 1903. The first Joint Board had consisted of eight members, four from the General Staff of the Army, and four from
the General Board of the Navy. Their charter was to consider "...all matters requiring the cooperation of the two Services in an effort to reach agreement on a program acceptable to both." 

The Joint Board met monthly; it was found to be a frustrating forum for resolution of questions of policy, both for the services, which often had differing views, and for the political leadership, which expected a unified position with no dissent among the military leadership. Some of the more difficult questions it addressed involved strategy for the Pacific region. One example concerned the location of future naval bases. The Army wanted to pursue a strategy of forward defense in the Philippines, and wanted a base on Manila Bay and fortifications to protect the capital at Manila. The Navy preferred a more flexible strategy of sea control, and preferred bases at Guam and Pearl Harbor to provide a secure line of communications with supporting facilities to allow the fleet to operate throughout the Western Pacific. Another dispute arose over the disposition of the U.S. Fleet; should it be predominantly in either the Atlantic or Pacific, or evenly split between the two oceans? The completion of the Panama Canal only partially solved this problem.

By 1914, meetings of the Board had been suspended three separate times by the President due to his dissatisfaction with the Board. During WWI, the Joint Board was not involved in running the war effort, and met only twice. The two service secretaries approved a recommendation in 1919 by the War Plans division of the General Staff of the Army to reorganize the Joint Board, to give it the power to initiate studies of strategic issues, and to provide it with a staff of planners from both
services. Membership on the "new" Joint Board was dependant on billet rather than appointment. The members from the Army were the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the G-3 section, and the Chief of the War Plans Division; the members from the Navy were the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of the War Plans Division. Serving as a permanent staff to the Joint Board was the Joint Planning Committee, consisting of officers from the War Plans Division of each service.

A close relationship developed along service lines among various organizations which supported the Joint Planning Committee. The Army planners were drawn from the War Plans Division of the General Staff. The War Plans Division was one of the five sections of the General Staff. The other sections were: G-1, Personnel; G-2, Intelligence; G-3, Operations; and G-4, Logistics. Officers to be assigned to the General Staff were educated at the Army War College, which was heavily involved with the General Staff. Firm ties were established with the Naval War College to facilitate joint planning. The students studied the war planning process and wrote their own plans that were quite realistic; often the War Plans Division asked the school to conduct special studies. The efforts "...did not provide the War Plans Division of the General Staff with plans that could be dusted off as war came to America;...however,... officers attending the War College...were conditioned to think in global terms totally out of proportion to the contemporary capabilities of the small services that sent them to reflect on war and to plan for it for a year as students."
Traditionally, the Navy has been more operationally oriented and has not had the advantage of a centralized General Staff, despite efforts to establish one in the early part of the twentieth century. In 1919 a War Plans Division designated OP-12 was formed in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. About twelve officers were assigned and were responsible for naval planning until mobilization for WWI. The Naval War College did not serve the same purpose as the Army War College. Since there were General Staff billets to fill, the officers attending the Naval War College could devote time to operational matters of the fleet. In addition to the theoretical aspects of war that their Army counterparts studied, the practical part of their education consisted of wargaming exercises rather than planning exercises. Wargaming, in turn, tied into the war planning process by serving as the official testing agency of the assumptions and expectations which supported the war planning doctrines used by the Joint Board and OP-12.

The process of developing a plan and gaining its approval began with the Joint Board authorizing the preparation of new plans or the revision of existing ones. The Joint Planning Committee would then conduct a study; make an estimate of the situation including the intentions and capabilities of potential enemies and friends; devise a plan, coordinated with the War Planning Divisions of both services; and submit it to the Joint Board for approval. If the plan was approved, the Joint Board would submit it to the service secretaries for their signatures. By the time this process was completed, the situation had often changed sufficiently to require a new plan. Some important features of the system included the ability of the military to initiate the planning process, a reluctance to make hard choices,
a tendency toward compromise, and the ultimate approval of the plan by a
civilian political appointee.

In this overview of the organizations involved in the planning
process, one can detect an emphasis on developing strategic thought, rather
than a search for the ultimate strategy. Future leaders within the system
were prepared by familiarizing them with the national strategic problem
and establishing various underlying war fighting and planning concepts.
Given the changing international and domestic environment of the inter-
war period, and the technological and doctrinal innovation that was part of
this time frame, this emphasis was to serve the nation well in the future.

III. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

Any military problem can be analyzed in three major categories that
define the requirements of attainment of the desired objective; space, time,
and means. An additional set of assumptions and constraints exists in the
larger political context of national security where diplomatic and economic
concerns must be coordinated with the military aspects of the situation.

In the spacial dimension, the deployment of a limited number of
military forces to meet international commitments and potential threats
results in a series of trade-offs. Specifically, although the security of the
Atlantic/European sphere was more vital to the national interest than the
security of the Pacific/Asian sphere, the threat in the Atlantic sphere did
not manifest itself until late in the inter-war period. By that time, the
threat had also grown in the Pacific sphere. Similarly, the potential areas of
operations in the Atlantic sphere were in closer proximity to the U.S., and thus more logistically supportable, than the areas of operations in the Pacific. These twin constraints, relatively lower national interests and logistic supportability, combined with the limited forces available, were some of the considerations of planners formulating early versions of Plan Orange. The planners had to decide how space was to be utilized: either offensively or defensively. To make this determination, they had to understand the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

The temporal dimension consists of time as an absolute measure and time as a relative measure. Time as an absolute changed drastically as the parameters of the war plans changed from the 90-day campaign envisioned in the original Plan Orange to the rather open ended time component of the Rainbow series, which envisioned the defeat of Germany before the defeat of Japan. In the relative measure of time, it was determined that the U.S. would not be the aggressor, and that Japan would strike first, thus surrendering the initiative to them.

The last category of military consideration is the means to implement the plan. This includes the forces available, their war fighting doctrine, and their organization. The Washington Naval Treaty (1922) and the London Naval Treaty (1930) limited numbers and tonnage of capital ships available to the fleet, and prohibited the U.S. from fortifying any possessions west of Hawaii, thus constraining the means available to the military. Additionally, fiscal constraints and isolationist attitudes limited the peacetime force structure of the United States armed forces.
Counter to these constraints were the innovations occurring in naval aviation, land aviation, submarine operations, amphibious assault, and naval at-sea logistics. A combination of technological and doctrinal innovation and the changing assumptions expanding the time component of war plans served to change the operational aspects of inter-war planning.

A separate military consideration of the planners was whether forces would be organized under a unified command with a joint staff or as separate forces under a joint system of command. The planners recommend that "...all forces should be under the immediate command of an officer of their respective service, but that it was essential to have a single over-all commander with a joint staff to control each phase of the operations." The Joint Board rejected the requirement for unified command, but in a review of a later version of the plan, the Secretaries of War and Navy approved the concept.

A major constraint was imposed on the joint war planning process due to the lack of guidance provided by the political leadership. One reason for this might have been a perception held by the President and Secretary of State that specific guidance given to the military might limit their freedom of action in diplomatic policy. One effort during the inter-war period to allow for the participation of State Department representatives in the planning process failed. In the 1920s, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes "...rejected a bid for a formal and permanent liaison between the departments (of State, War, and Navy)." Later, in 1935, as the international situation grew more uncertain, the Secretaries of
the War and Navy Departments asked the Secretary of State to designate a representative to meet with the Joint Board; this request was granted.22

In 1939 as the international situation became even more ominous, President Roosevelt changed the reporting relationship of the Joint Board.23 It now reported directly to him, although still via the respective secretaries. Also, although not formally in the planning process, similar war planning talks occurred at informal meetings of the "War Council" composed of the President, his military advisors, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the service Chiefs.24

IV. ANALYSIS

Key elements of both the joint war plans and the joint war planning system of the inter-war period will be the subject of this analysis. The war plans, Orange and Rainbow Series, are part of the historical record as variations of both were either implemented or part of the military policy of the nation. The planning system which produced those plans evolved into the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which currently struggles with the same types of problems that the inter-war planners faced. The joint plans could be judged as success, as they provided the framework for the operations that eventually decided the war in favor of the Allies. Victory in the war can also be attributed to other important factors, however, such as industrial production and the political strength of the Allied coalition. The joint planning system, given its inability to resolve differences among services in the planning process or to ensure the support of the political leadership, might be classified as a failure, however, the system produced a number of
broad strategic concepts that aided the military in the conduct of the war, and perhaps through the articulation of difference, the services came to a better mutual understanding.

The joint war plans of the inter-war period began as nothing more than elaborate campaign plans and evolved into a concept for a global strategy. In this evolution, the plans became more flexible with multiple possibilities to achieve the objective. As the plans became more flexible, the matching of ends to means became more realistic, and the time component became tied more to the mobilization capacity of the United States rather than to a time table to operationally deploy a force to do battle with the enemy.

Any plan must be judged on the basis of feasibility and suitability. Feasibility is a measure of ends and means; suitability is a measure of the ability of the plan to accomplish its stated objective. As contingency plans, the early variations of Plan Orange, were not feasible. They required the 9,000 Army troops garrisoned in the Philippines to hold out against an estimated 300,000 Japanese troops available in the Philippines thirty days after the initial Japanese attack. Meanwhile, the U.S. battle fleet would sortie, and dash across oceans, to fight the Japanese fleet in a decisive battle to gain sea control and then relieve the Philippines to end the war within ninety days after hostilities commenced. The forces required to implement this plan were not available within this short span of time, and as arms control, a weakening domestic economy, and pacifist attitudes further drew down force structure, the war plans became less feasible.
Later versions of Plan Orange required a progressive advance across the Pacific, seizing islands suitable for advanced air and naval bases, and relieving the Philippines enroute to placing the Japanese home islands under siege by air and naval forces. This version expected a prolonged war, which meant that sufficient forces could be mobilized, over time, to accomplish the objective.

The Rainbow Series of plans increased the scope and sophistication of available war plans. Though the Rainbow series did not contain the operational details of the Color Series, they did recognize some important facets of a future war. First, aggressive action by the Axis powers could harm American security interests; thus Germany and Italy joined Japan as potential enemies, and the defense of the Western Hemisphere once again became a prime concern. Second, a future war would be global in scope, and would be a contest between alliances rather than between individual nations. Third, the strategy must be supported by mobilization planning to build up forces in as orderly a manner as possible, when required. The ABC-1 report, building on the U.S. perspective of Rainbow 5, even went so far as to provide the framework for a potential alliance with Britain and a rudimentary war plan.25

The suitability of the war plans produced by the joint planning process when judged within the political-military context of the period appears adequate. The early Plan Orange envisioned a limited war with a single nation as an opponent, with the relatively narrow objective of regaining possession of the Philippines. The Rainbow 5 plan envisioned a
coalition war with the wider objective of the defeat of the opposing coalition.26

Three key elements of the joint planning process were the attempt to coordinate the Army and Navy, to coordinate civilian and military policy, and to coordinate policy among the members of the coalition. A review of the plan shows that the system was flawed; many important issues were ignored and various conflicts arose among the participants in the planning system.

Coordination between the Army and Navy was often due to perceptual differences. It takes a great deal of effort to comprehend and synthesize the many viewpoints that exist between the services and among factions within each service. Paradoxically, it is this situation which proves the value of war plans written by military professionals, rather than civilian "experts". A planner who has attained a specific perspective through operational experience, and who then transcends that perspective through education and introspection, has an advantage over an outsider lacking that experience.

The coordination of civilian and military policy is often slighted in peace time. The conservative estimates of the military in balancing ends and means is often disrupted by the peacetime over-commitments when compared to peacetime force structure. International agreements such as arms control treaties, can also disrupt calculations of ends and means, especially if provisions are not made for contingencies requiring rapid "break out" from the treaty despite domestic pressure due to the actions of
a potential opponent. The most important element in the planning process with regards to coordination of political and military policy is the receipt of political guidance. Although generally forthcoming after a build-up of tensions occurs, dialogue between military planners and civilian policy planners is a requirement for realistic planning.

Coordination of coalition policy is a difficult balancing act where the goals of the coalition must be compared to the goals of the individual nations. If not careful, an ally can be almost as dangerous as an enemy. Therefore, the determination of coalition policy must be primarily the responsibility of the political leadership rather than the military.

The joint war plans themselves were documents which often were reflections of compromises and infighting among the services, and which often lacked both the guidance and support of the political leadership. However, the joint planning system, by concentrating on devising possible solutions to seemingly insoluble problems, and by eventually injecting a fair amount of realism into the process, produced a cohort of officers that could shape the nation's war effort.
A review of U.S. post-WW II national security policy emphasizing the assumptions made by planners and the political process of ultimate security decisions written by a former State Department and Pentagon official. The first two chapters discuss the inter-war and war-time period.

This article relates the diplomatic maneuvering after the Spanish-American war which eventually impacted the national security problem of the United States and the development of Plan Orange.

Gael, Henry G. "War Planning at the War College in the Mid-1930s."
Parameters, Vol XV no. 1, pp. 52-64.
The education of U.S. Army planners at the Army War College, and their participation in the war planning system.

A portion of the history of the wartime activities of the JCS, prepared by the Historical Section of the staff, based on official documents.
The strategic requirements of Plan Orange, combined with the efforts of the United States Marine Corps to redefine their mission, led to the development of amphibious doctrine. As Plan ORANGE was implemented in the Pacific Theater, amphibious assault was an important operational concept.

A discussion of the unsuitability of the offensive-oriented aspects of Plan Orange and its unsuccessful implementation by MacArthur in the defense of the Philippines in the early days of the U.S. involvement in WW II compared with the assumed unsuitability of the offensive-oriented aspects of The Maritime Strategy in a future war with the Soviets. The article does not recognize the later versions of Plan Orange which envisioned a prolonged campaign, aspects of which were implemented in the war.

Part of the U.S. Army history series of World War II. Detailed analysis with extensive primary source referencing.
An essay on inter-war and WW II strategic planning which discusses in turn the development of naval, land, and air strategies.

This article relates how the nature of war planning changed as Europe became embroiled in war. Plans became more realistic as means were better matched to ends. The activities of the planners in the previous two decades had set the outlines of strategy, so that as war became imminent, more detailed planning could occur.

The development of the aircraft carrier as a weapon of war in the United States Navy.

Analysis compares the contemporary "Maritime Strategy", published by the U.S. Navy, with the basis concepts of war Plan Orange.
Relates the deliberations of the Joint Army-Navy Board concerning Pacific strategy within the international and domestic political context in the years 1903 to 1913.

This article emphasizes the considerations of Army planners, and the need to change assumptions as the environment shifts.

Part of the U.S. Army history series of World War II. Detailed analysis with extensive primary source referencing.

An account of international efforts at naval arms limitation in the inter-war period and its effect on U.S. foreign and military policy.

Eleven case studies are presented of U.S. decision-making.


An analysis of the Allied coalition strategy of WW II, and how Plan ORANGE fit into that strategy.


Short analytical article comparing war planning against Japan with that as planned against the Soviet Union today.


An interpretive work utilizing both primary and secondary sources which analyzes the policy, strategy, and operations from the American point of view of the Pacific Theater in WW II.


A well-written survey of American military history that is extensively documented.


14. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 56


19. Hayes, History of the Joint Chiefs, pp. 4-5


24. Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 84.


NAVY STRATEGIC PLANNING

LT James A. Pelkofski, USN
LT John R. Hafey, USN
LT Jon A. Greene, USN

Many analysts feel that the key to efficient operation of the Department of Defense is effective strategic planning, but most sense that the Department of Defense and, perhaps especially, the Navy have not planned effectively. This study will examine three attempts by the Navy to formulate and execute long range planning. The first “case” will discuss the Navy’s systems for long-range planning. The second and third, however, will examine more ad hoc planning processes that resulted in outputs known as Sea Plan 2000 and The Maritime Strategy. After discussing the background and systems of these three cases, the objectives, assumptions, and constraints of the processes will be discussed. Finally, the three processes will be evaluated. The focus of this paper will not be the outputs of these processes (what they recommended), but the processes themselves.
THE NAVY’S STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

I. BACKGROUND

The Navy’s first experiment with long-range planning was the General Board. Between 1900 and 1951 the General Board advised the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) on force levels and strategic issues to a 10 year horizon (Ref. 1:p. 62). Once influential, the General Board lost power after a reorganization of Navy planning responsibilities in 1945 (Ref. 2:pp. A-1--A-4). In 1954 the Navy attempted to revive long-range planning by convening the Ad Hoc Committee to Study Long Range Shipbuilding Plans and Programs. The renewed interest in strategic planning continued in 1955 as the Navy formed the Long Range Planning Objectives Group (OP-93) and the Naval Warfare Analysis Group (Ref. 3:pp. 53-54).

The CNO tasked OP-93 with advising him on broad issues such as naval missions and requirements 10-15 years into the future (Ref. 1:p. 63). Its major output was an annual statement of Long Range Objectives. This document was widely circulated within the Navy to simplify and direct the planning of subordinate levels (Ref. 2: pp. A-9--A-II).

With the advent of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), OP-93 gradually lost influence. In 1963, the group was removed from the office of the CNO and placed under Navy Program Planning (OP-090--now OP-08) (Ref. 2:p. A-12). In 1964, its major output, the Long Range Objectives, became the Medium Range Objectives.
The document was far more fiscally oriented and less conceptual than its predecessor. Later the Navy Strategic Study replaced the Medium Range Objectives. The Deputy CON for Plans and Policy (OP-06) developed this policy document specifically for use within the PPBS (Ref. 2:p. A-l4). Finally, the Systems Analysis Division (OP-96) took over Navy long-range planning functions, and the Long Range Objectives Group was disestablished.

Thus since the early 1960s, PPBS and systems analysis, working on a 5-10 year horizon, have dominated Navy planning (Ref. 2:pp. A-14--A-15). The outputs of the process have been mostly budget-oriented, force structure planning rather than conceptual studies, and have exhibited a lack of integration and centralization (Ref. 2:p. A-19).

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM

Long-range planning in the Navy today is the product of two systems: extended planning and strategic planning. The former uses short-term trend analysis and linear extrapolation; the latter uses a non-linear approach that seeks to identify and influence future discontinuities (Ref. 4:pp. 2-3).

The extended planning system is part of the PPBS. The CNO's Program Advisory Memorandum initiates the process by highlighting key force structure changes needed to execute the Navy's strategy (Ref. 5:p. 26). In the Program Planning and Development Phase, resources are assigned to programs to fulfill the guidelines from the CON and SECNAV (Ref 5:p. 23).
Paralleling this process, the Director of Naval Warfare (OP-07) develops Warfare Mission Area Appraisals. These are studies of trends in naval warfare 5, 10, and sometimes 20 years into the future, designed to provide a link between the Navy’s strategy and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) (Ref. 5:pp. 31-32). These studies divide naval warfare into mission areas, and develop and publish “strategies” in a Master Plan (Ref. 5:p.33) using an alternative futures methodology (Ref.4: Enclosure (1)). Strategic planners within the various warfare areas and in OP-06 contribute to the Master Plans (Ref. 6).

Ending the process, OP-08 integrates these inputs to formulate the POM (Ref. 5:p. 24), a list of Navy force structure desires for the next five years. Finally, the POMs of the Navy and the other services are aggregated into the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) for the Department of Defense.

What the Navy calls strategic planning is the product of several groups. Foremost is OP-OOK, the Navy Long Range Planning Group, working for the CON within the CNO Executive Panel (CEP) (Ref. 6). OP-OOK’s mission is “(to) advise the CNO on a wide range of scientific, political-military, and strategic matters; to examine long-range Navy planning issues; and to serve as the link between the CNO and the CEP” (Ref. 7) Two important annual outputs of OP-OOK are its Long-Range Planner’s Conference, designed “to address long-range planning issues of importance to senior level officers involved in the Navy’s long-range
planning process” (Ref. 7) and the Long Range Assessment--a 20 year planning projection (Ref 6).

Two other strategic planning groups within the Navy are the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) located at the Naval War College and the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). The SSG supplements the work of OP-OOK and conducts both long- and short-term projects (Ref. 8). OP-603 deals primarily in strategic concepts and forecasts to a 10-20 year horizon (Ref. 9).

SEA PLAN 2000

I. BACKGROUND

The financial burden of the Vietnam War and the Great Society, shifted budgetary priorities away from defense force modernization. As a result, the Navy retired many ships without replacement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and naval end strength declined dramatically. The Ford Administration sought to reverse this trend; its last five year Shipbuilding Plan called for purchasing 157 ships at a cost of about 60 billion dollars.

After taking office in January 1977, President Carter initially supported the Ford plan. As work began in earnest on Carter’s first defense budget, however, the Administration’s enthusiasm waned. A draft Defense Guidance implied that a Navy of 450 ships with 10 carriers would fulfill projected strategic requirements. This was significantly below the Navy’s estimate of required forces: 600 ships and 15 carriers. The Administration based the draft Defense Guidance on a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation
in Central Europe. According to the scenario, naval forces would engage only in defensive sea control operations. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) maintained that force sizing based on this scenario would produce a military capable of meeting all other contingencies.

When the Navy questioned the planning assumptions of the draft Defense Guidance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown directed Navy Secretary W. Graham Claytor to commission a study group to articulate the Navy’s position. The product of this study group was Sea Plan 2000.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM

The Sea Plan 2000 “system” was an ad hoc, one-time planning committee, headed by Francis J. “Bing” West, then of the Naval War College’s Center for Advanced Research. The panel consisted of ten naval and two Marine officers, between the ranks of 0-4 and 0-6, and four technical advisors. The group produced two large SECRET volumes and an UNCLASSIFIED executive summary.

The first step taken in the planning process was to project a wide range of situations in which future naval forces might participate. These situations were based on past uses of naval forces rather than any specific scenario. The group then determined the force levels and platforms required to meet those situations and backed up the force level predictions with extensive battle and campaign analyses. The plan sought to answer two questions: (1) what can policy makers expect from naval forces? and (2) how capable are our forces--and the corollary, what forces are required--to carry out these tasks through the year 2000? The planners
assumed that decision makers knowledgeable about the range of activities that naval forces perform in support of national policy will make better decisions on the future size and structure of the Navy.

To determine what capabilities future forces should possess, the panel contended, one must relate national security objectives to naval missions or tasks. They accomplished this by postulating key national security objectives and outlining the series of measures or tasks that naval forces would have to perform in support of these objectives. With this framework established, the panel recommended the forces required to effectively execute the tasks based upon extensive analytical studies. Finally, the panel listed different budgetary options and detailed the risks associated with each.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY

1. BACKGROUND

During the late 1970s, there was a convergence of several factors that eventually led to the Navy’s adoption of the Maritime Strategy. First, an unsatisfactory U.S. foreign policy record in the 1970s led to a desire for a more assertive U.S. stance. Second, the works of several naval theorists resurrected the concepts of classical naval theory, which the advent of nuclear weapons had discredited. Third, there was a development of widespread offensive thinking within the Navy’s officer corps. Next, the work of analysts like Robert Herrick and James McConnell shattered the widely held view of the Soviet Navy as a mirror-image of the U.S. Navy. Gradually, the Soviets were accepted as having an essentially defensive
strategy at sea. Finally, in June 1978, the President appointed Admiral Thomas B. Hayward as Chief of Naval Operations. Hayward’s appointment was an affirmation of the new offensive thinking in the Navy. As CINCPACFLT, Hayward had directed the “Sea Strike Strategy” project, a strategy emphasizing aggressive, forward carrier operations. Moreover, Hayward wished to change the nature of the debate within the Navy from a budget battle into a discussion of conceptual issues of global maritime strategy.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM

In April 1981, Admiral Hayward formed the SSG in Newport. Bright young officers, selected for their education and experience, staffed the SSG for one year of work. The SSG reported directly to the CNO, but worked out of Newport to take advantage of the resources and atmosphere of the Naval War College and to insulate itself from the crises of the Pentagon.

From the outset, Hayward directed the SSG to think about the task of winning a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. The first group of SSG officers sought to overcome the parochial thinking of various “unions” within the Navy and reach a consensus on how to fight such a war. Their methodology was to synthesize the strategic thinking of the most senior and powerful officials in the Navy. They went from office to office, inside and outside of the Pentagon, in pursuit of this goal. The first SSG established the conceptual basis and feasibility of forward aggressive naval strategy. The second SSG continued the previous efforts, refining the work of the first group.
Their studies laid the ground work for what was to become the Maritime Strategy. The proximate cause of the strategy’s birth, however, was the desire of Hayward and many other senior naval officers to link force development to strategy and "...to get the entire OPNAV staff moving in the same direction" in developing the POM. They decided the best way to do this was to produce a strategy for the Navy.

Within the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603), Lieutenant Commander Stan Weeks was assigned to carry out the task. Quickly it became clear that this was not just another assignment and Commander W. Spencer Johnson was assigned to assist Weeks. They turned to the SSG’s work, analyses of the Soviet Navy by the Center for Naval Analyses and the Office of Naval Intelligence, and to the basic concepts supplied by the CNO. Within three weeks they had developed a SECRET draft briefing. The purpose of the study was to provide internal guidance to the OPNAV staff for force planning and budget decisions, to ensure they were “all singing from the same sheet of music.” But within two months, Weeks and Johnson briefed the new CNO, Admiral James D. Watkins, and their briefing had become the Navy’s official Maritime Strategy.

Admiral Watkins had several objectives he wished to achieve as CNO. First, he wanted to tap the knowledge and experience of the CINCs in order to define and resolve some of the key issues facing the Navy. Perhaps the primary issue was how the Navy might help deter the Soviet Union. Second, Watkins wanted to revitalize the Naval War College as a center of strategic and tactical thinking and to reinvigorate strategic
thinking in the Navy. Finally, he wanted to emphasize joint operations, particularly with the Air Force, and the coalition nature of the U.S. defense effort. Watkins saw the Maritime Strategy as a tool to help achieve these ends. Thus, within a few months, some loosely coupled ideas developed by the SSG had become the basis of Watkins’ presentations to Congress on how the Navy would fight a war.

The next phase of development for the Maritime Strategy took place when Commander Peter Swartz, relieved Weeks and Johnson of their responsibilities for the document. Swartz felt his basic task was to bring the disparate strategic thinking of the Navy’s “unions” into convergence. Instead of relying on the SSG, he conducted his own synthesis of thinking within the Navy. As the outline of the first revision of the Maritime Strategy, Swartz chose the Pacific Command Campaign Plan developed under Admiral Robert Long, CINCPAC. This plan was consistent with Hayward’s Sea Strike study and with the first version of the Maritime Strategy. Swartz briefed the draft strategy extensively, some 75 times, before various audiences before the CNO signed the final version in May 1984. Nearly every one of these briefings led to further modifications or clarifications of the strategy.

In the summer of 1984, the Navy distributed the Maritime Strategy widely in a classified version to educate naval officers. Finally, in January 1986, an unclassified version of the strategy was published in a special supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
OBJECTIVES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND CONSTRAINTS

I. OBJECTIVES

These three cases are quite distinct in some senses. For example, the process in the long-range planning system is highly bureaucratized and formalized, while the Sea Plan 2000 process was completely ad hoc; the Maritime Strategy falls somewhere in the middle. The formal system deals primarily with force structure, while the Maritime Strategy deals, ostensibly, with war-fighting. Nonetheless, the three efforts had similar objectives, assumptions, and constraints.

The objectives of all three cases related in some manner to force structure. The Navy uses the formal system to procure what it needs or wants. Sea Plan 2000 was a clear attempt to influence budgetary decisions over the short-term by emphasizing their long-term effects.

What was the purpose of the Maritime Strategy? Perhaps the most appropriate response is, "Which Maritime Strategy?" The Maritime Strategy has come to signify many things to many people. William Lind contends that, depending on the source, the essence of the Maritime Strategy may be: (1) headlong attack by carrier forces against the Kola Peninsula, (2) the concept of horizontal escalation, (3) or merely an offensive orientation with specific targets left up to the CINCs (Ref. 12:p. 54). To this list one could add an emphasis on a strategic ASW campaign and, perhaps, even on amphibious landing. In any case, a primary objective for developing the Maritime Strategy was to provide coherent
direction within the Navy for making budgetary decisions. Some have contended that the document has become a tool for each of the Navy's "barons" to rationalize his own procurement plan. While this may carry some truth, the Maritime Strategy defies simple description. It has been used to seek various objectives: to bring coherence to the budget process, to define how to win a conventional war with the Soviets, to educate naval officers, as a declaratory strategy to enhance deterrence, and, yes, as a tool for advocating large Navy budgets.

II. ASSUMPTIONS

There are several common assumptions that have been made in the planning process. First, all three processes start from the assumption that the nation needs a navy, and that naval forces have the best capabilities for fulfilling certain types of strategic requirements. No attempt is made to examine whether land-based aircraft or airborne troops, for example, could better fulfill these missions.

Similarly, all three processes have generally assumed that the present force structure, in configuration, is the most appropriate for fulfilling strategic objectives. Moreover, there is a disturbing consistency in the number of forces that these processes recommended. Before Sea Plan 2000, the Navy claimed it needed 600 ships including 15 carriers. The optimal fleet suggested by Sea Plan consisted of 15 carriers and 586 active ships. In the era of the Maritime Strategy, of course, the Navy has continued to lobby for 15 carriers and 600 ships. This is remarkable consistency over a 15 year period.
A third assumption has been that any future war would be conventional and protracted. There is almost no discussion of short conventional conflict or nuclear war at sea in either Sea Plan or the Maritime Strategy.

Finally, the Navy has assumed, especially in the cases of the PPBS system and the Maritime Strategy, that a long-range planning process that plans by attempting to achieve consensus is the most effective mode of planning, or at least the most effective mode feasible in the Department of Defense.

III. CONSTRAINTS

The first constraint placed on the planners was that their work had to directly impact the budgetary process. With the possible exception of the SSG, all planners were under pressure to produce documents that were relevant to the POM process and that were published in time to impact the POM. Fiscal constraints are exacerbated by the high and rising costs of naval platforms and technology. As the budget grows tighter, the range of options for planners dwindles. Moreover, while the long lead-times and service lives of naval platforms would seem to mandate a truly long-term planning horizon, the POM process focuses the Navy’s attention on, at best, a 5 to 10 year horizon.

Second, the necessity of reaching consensus within the Navy and working with present force structure has hindered innovative planning. The realities of shared power among groups with vested interests in specific platforms stifles experimentation with radical new force structures.
or concepts. When the budget is tight, the programs with an established power base tend to survive, and newer, innovative programs tend to suffer.

Time available to the individual for long-range planning is another barrier. Strategic planning requires coherent imaginative thought that cannot be produced in a hurried atmosphere, such as that of the OPNAV staff. Two few planners have the opportunity for this sort of contemplation.

Finally, the lack of national guidance constrains effective naval planning. Generally, military planners have received inadequate guidance on what political-military situations to consider and on the objectives to be sought in war. This lack of guidance makes any sort of planning subject to parochialism and inadequate political insight of the scenario in which forces might be used.

ANALYSIS

The success of these three planning attempts is mixed. While the Navy was quite successful at using the PPBS to achieve desired procurement decisions in the 1980s, the 1970s were lean years. Moreover, the planning in the PPBS is hardly “strategic.” The five year horizon is simply too short when one considers that, for a ship, the span from concept development to end of service life can be over 40 years. Furthermore, the POM and the FYDP tend to exhibit a “bow wave effect.” When programs are not approved for the fiscal year under question they are normally
delayed. As time goes on, more and more programs are delayed into the “out years.” Often this results in the later years of the FYDP exhibiting no appreciation of fiscal realities.

The long-range planning system is more difficult to comment on. OP-OOK’s charter is to advise the CNO. Nonetheless, it would seem important for this organization to promote discussion of the concepts and strategies that will be important in the future—to educate naval officers and to benefit from the ideas derived from promoting dialogue. OPNAV Instruction 5000, “Long Range Planning”—does little more than list several long-term plans that should be generated for various mission areas (conventional strike warfare, anti-surface warfare, AAW, ASWQ, etc.) (Ref 4: p. 1).

This relative silence of OP-OOK in the strategic debates of the Navy is perplexing. This silence is not an indication of ineffectiveness, however; it is intentional. The group advises only the CNO and the CEP in order to insulate itself from the bureaucratic infighting that might occur should they support measures that might impinge on the “turf” of one of the Navy’s power brokers. If the group has unimpeded access to the CNO, and he uses their briefings to shape today’s decisions with a view toward their long-term effects, OP-OOK may be doing exactly what strategic planners are supposed to do. Any conclusion as to whether this is the case, however, would have to come from the CNO himself.

Sea Plan 2000, again, has had mixed results. Over the short-term the document was seen as a highly political response to the Carter
Administration’s call for a smaller Navy. Moreover, its publication coincided with revelations of cost-overruns in shipbuilding. Thus, the panel produced few immediate results. If one looks at longer-term success, however, Sea Plan may be judged more favorably. The events of the last two years of the Carter administration confirmed the relevance of naval forces and led to a distinct buildup in naval forces that lasted through the first term of the Regan administration. Moreover, Sea Plan 2000 was an important doctrinal foundation for the Maritime Strategy. In this regard, one could conclude that the Navy has institutionalized the findings of the Sea Plan panel.

It appears too early to comment on the success of the Maritime Strategy over the long term. In the short-term, however, it should be considered moderately successful. It has unified the Navy, created an esprit de corps, promoted strategic thinking, and has been important to the Navy’s legislative success during the 1980’s. Whether the strategy has provided coherence to Navy budgets, however, is arguable. Moreover, the strategy has to some extent wedded the Navy’s force structure to a specific scenario: global conventional war with the Soviet Union centered on the Central Front. Should the Soviets significantly reduce their forces in Central Europe, as their leaders have promised, the Navy will have to rapidly rethink its legislative strategy. This retrenchment would inevitably lead to charges that the Navy is merely trying to protect its own “turf” and build ships that the nation does not need. Should this occur, the Maritime Strategy could come to haunt the Navy’s leadership.
In general, the Navy’s success with strategic planning in these three cases has been marginal. Major General Perry Smith, USAF (Ret.) suggests that there are fifteen “laws” of successful strategic planning (Ref. 13:pp. 14-22). Let us examine a few of these laws, and a few added by the author, to determine the reason for the successes and failures of Navy strategic planning.

First, Smith contends that planners must be able to explain to policy-makers the benefits of long-range planning, then get and maintain the support of these officials. The leaders of the Navy commissioned both Sea Plan and the Maritime Strategy. But, if one looks at the history of institutionalized long-range planning, clearly the Navy, as a whole, has not come to appreciate the process. Offices like OP-93 and OP-00X have had little influence and were short-lived. One must ask the question of whether OP-OOK does not face a similar fate.

Second, Smith maintains that long-range planners must have direct access to decision makers and not have to coordinate their positions with other offices. While it appears that Sea Plan 2000 was formulated under such conditions, the PPBS certainly does not conform to this criteria. Nor does the Maritime Strategy. In this case, even the independent SSG went out of their way to coordinate their product with the power brokers in the Navy. On the other hand, OP-OOK has just such a charter. Whether the actualities conform with this charter is a matter of conjecture, however.

Next, the long-range planning process must lead to some decisions in the short-term in order to prove its value. In all three cases, the emphasis
was to provide short-term budgetary impact. This aspect, no doubt, contributed to the quick adoption of Sea Plan and the Maritime Strategy by the Navy.

Smith also contends that successful strategic planning processes must be institutionalized. The fits and starts of planning in the Navy show that this has not been the case. OP-OOK, however, is in place today and, with luck, may become an institutionalized center for strategic planning in the Navy.

Finally, Smith contends that planners must avoid excessive constraints. While the planner needs budgetary, technological, and temporal constraints to make planning realistic, constraints on force structure and size, for example, may inhibit imaginative thinking. In all three cases, the planners assumed that future force structure would remain consistent with present force structure. Moreover, all three processes have resulted in a consistent Navy position advocating a 15 carrier, 600 ship force. One must wonder if the size of the Navy, too, was assumed at the beginning of each study.

Additional elements of strategic planning, not addressed by Smith, seem essential for the Navy. First, strategic planning, if it is to be widely disseminated, needs to consider the political milieu. Sea Plan 2000 was released at a most inopportune time, and as such, was seen as a self-serving, bureaucratic attempt by the Navy to increase its budget.
Second, Naval forces have a tremendous advantage over air and ground forces in terms of flexibility. For this reason, it is advantageous to the Navy to focus on capabilities—as was the case in Sea Plan—rather than scenarios—as in the Maritime Strategy. Tying force structure to a specific scenario leaves the Navy in the lurch should that scenario suddenly become highly unlikely. Instead the Navy should emphasize its utility over a broad range of possible combat and peacetime operations.

Finally, it is valuable to look at what strategic planning ought to be, to see if the Navy does strategic planning at all. First, strategic planning should be long-range—10 to 25 years into the future. The PPBS is inadequate in this regard, of course. The Maritime Strategy, too, focuses on the present and near-term future. Even Sea Plan 2000, while ostensibly looking forward more than 20 years, assumed force structures and strategies of both sides would not change over those twenty years. This makes one wonder if Sea Plan was really concerned with long-range issues or merely trying to effect short-term budgetary decisions.

Strategic planning should also serve an integrative function—to ensure all the disparate parts of a large organization like the Navy are moving in the same direction. While PPBS, the Maritime Strategy, and Sea Plan all produced documents to which the various “unions” in the Navy eventually agreed, this does not necessarily constitute integration. Integration should take different ideas and form them into a coherent overall concept or strategy. What we see in all three cases is a satisfying, “lowest common denominator” outcome. While the various parts of strategy should have a synergistic effect, in these cases it appears the whole
is less than the sum of the parts. For example, by failing to devote adequate attention to mine warfare, should war come our powerful surface and subsurface forces could be largely sunk or struck in port. Conversely, diverting some of the resources now allocated for aircraft carriers to mine warfare, might permit the Navy to get more aircraft carriers into the fight.

Next, strategic planning ought to be broad and, at least in part, conceptual. The Navy's efforts, however, have dealt almost exclusively with force structure issues. Even the Maritime Strategy, which discussed war-fighting, sought not so much to find a better way for the Navy as to inject some rationality into the procurement process.

Finally, strategic planning ought to be visionary. The sense that one gets from all three processes is that naval warfare will not have changed much 25 years after the study. This is akin to saying that naval warfare in 1964 (when the Soviets had just been embarrassed in the Cuban missile crisis by a dearth of naval forces and had only a few primitive cruise missiles) would be very similar to naval warfare in 1989. Given the changes in the last 25 years, could this possibly be true?

CONCLUSION

This paper has not presented the strategic planning efforts of the Navy in a favorable light. What should be obvious at this point, however, is that the lack of strategic planning is not necessarily the Navy's fault. A system of shared power operating on short-term budgetary decisions is
simply not well-equipped to perform centralized, long-term planning. The solution to the Navy's strategic planning problem, then, would be to change the system. But, the price America pays for a less efficient military is small in terms of the benefits the system promotes, thus, systemic change simply is not an option.

While the prospects for excellent strategic planning in the Navy seem poor, one should not conclude the Navy cannot make marginal improvements. The improvement will not come, however, from the PPBS. This system promotes an attitude and an atmosphere that stifles truly strategic planning. Occasional ad hoc studies like Sea Plan 2000 would certainly play a critical role in an improved Navy strategic planning system, but the bulk of the work must be done by an institutionalized group like OP-OOK. As discussed, the track record of OP-OOK is not clear. There is no reason, however, that OP-OOK and the SSG cannot provide the same type of guidance to the Navy that the Navy General Board did in the first half of the century. The determinant of whether this might come about, however, is the attitude of the Navy's leadership. If the leaders empower these groups to perform innovative, truly strategic planning, there is no reason that the track record of the General Board cannot be duplicated.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY


2. The Maritime Balance Study--The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1979. This study analyzes the applicability of corporate strategic planning to the Navy and endorses the adaptation of some applicable aspects. The study stresses the need to develop definite objectives and to establish a strategy based on output services rendered, rather than on force composition. It emphasizes the need to prioritize and plan according to these priorities, recognizing both capabilities to accomplish essential tasks and inability to achieve others. Several appendices are attached, including an excellent history of long-range planning in the Navy.

3. Bruins, Berend D., "Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1982, pp. 52-56. This article discusses strategic thought in the Navy concluding that the Navy needs strategists and that such strategists must come from within the service, not from civilian "think tanks." The author reviews planning in the Navy and recommends improvements. A major point in the article is that time is needed for strategists to be trained and to apply their training.


7. OP-OOK CNO Executive Panel Staff Navy Long Range Planner, Photocopied notes from slide presentation, Developed by CNO Executive Plan, (OP-OOK), 1988. The slide program presents an overview of the mission of OP-OOK and the CEP. In addition, the long-range planning in the Navy and recent events and topics of planning interest are reviewed.


12. Lind, William S., "Maritime Strategy 1988: Bad Strategy?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 1988, pp. 54-61. A criticism of the Maritime Strategy. Claims that it is not actually a maritime strategy at all, but the maritime component of a continental strategy. Moreover, Lind claims, the strategy is so poorly defined that it serves little purpose.


15. Davis, The Politics of Innovative Patterns in Navy Cases, University of Denver, 1967. This booklet discusses behavioral characteristics in large organizations, focusing on the Navy. Three case studies are reviewed (the development of a nuclear weapon delivery capability for carrier aircraft, the development of nuclear propulsion, and the development of fleet ballistic missiles). The work is an attempt to identify a pattern of behavior characteristic to the Navy. The conclusion is that the Navy tends to engage in intra-service bureaucratic battles. The findings are generally superficial and subjective.


thinking. Although Friedman acknowledges the controversy surrounding the Maritime Strategy, he defends the strategy over alternative systems of force-planning. A major advantage of the Maritime Strategy, according to Friedman, is its basis of interactive analysis and its inherent flexibility.

18. George, James L., et al, Review of USN Long-Range Planning, Center for Naval Analysis, 1985. This research memorandum surveys the present and past aspects and offices involved in Navy long-range planning. In addition, a review of the various plans that resulted from these processes is included. Appendices include a history of long-range planning in the Navy, excerpted from The Maritime Balance Study, and summaries of current Navy long-range planning and the influence of corporate planning methods. Although suggestions are offered to improve the Navy’s approach, the study strongly implies the present system is adequate.


between the use of set-piece scenarios versus flexible capabilities as a guide to planning.


24. Etzold, Thomas H., “The Navy and National Security Planning in the 1970s,” in Harry E. Borowski’s Military Planning in the Twentieth Century, USAF Office of History, 1986. The author argues that Navy planning failures in the 1970s were a result of three factors: (l) divergent assumptions between the Navy and other national security decision-makers, (2) reliance on a theory of sea power that had become less effective than supposed, and (3) over-reliance on scenario-building to rationalize force procurement.
END NOTES

1. This paper is in part a distillation and compilation by LT Green of separate papers by LT Pelkofski and LT Hafey.

2. The term strategic planning is used here to mean long-range planning. The terms will be used interchangeably throughout the paper.

3. This section is largely based on Ref. 10.

4. This section is largely based on Ref. 11.
NASA

LT David A. Hildrebrand, USN
and
LT Tricia Vislay, USN

I. BACKGROUND

During the 1960s, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was a management system with a mission. In order to overcome tremendous technological obstacles in a relatively short period of time, NASA successfully integrated a multitude of subsystems into a single master system. This single "super-system" was designed to accomplish one unique goal: to put a man on the moon and then bring him safely back to earth.

NASA was able to accomplish this ambitious goal only eight years after it was announced by President John Kennedy. The achievement was due in large part to the flexible system of management created by NASA's initial administrators. The management system had its drawbacks, however, it impacted negatively on NASA's ability to chart its future course. This paper explores the influence of NASA's decentralized management structure on the organization's ability to conduct long-range planning during the course of the Apollo program from 1961 through 1968.
The circumstances under which NASA was created greatly affected the agency's identity throughout its "formative" years. The Soviet Union had launched Sputnik I in November, 1957, and President Eisenhower felt obliged to respond. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 established NASA to help counter the perceived threat to national security represented by the Soviet feat. The U.S. had had its national pride offended, and many feared that the nation had fallen irretrievably behind in the "space race." Both Congress and the American public demanded that something be done quickly to rectify the situation.1

The Eisenhower Administration's response was swift, but proposed legislation did not meet with the full approval of a cadre of defense-minded Congressmen. In particular, Eisenhower's plan to give civilians full control of the new space agency led to concerns that he was not taking the threat to U.S. security seriously enough.2 The nucleus of the new agency's management was to come from the organization that NASA had replaced, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and critics felt that these administrators were too conservative to lead the nation in its quest to best the Soviets in space.3 Eisenhower managed to prevail, however, and civilians took charge of the entire U.S. space effort, with the exception of programs directly related to weapons development or military operations.4

During the first three years of NASA's existence, there was a great deal of disagreement between the executive and legislative branches of government as to the level of effort the U.S. should exert in space. NASA submitted its first ten-year plan in 1960; it called for "an expanding program on a broad front," and included manned flight, first orbital and
then circumlunar; scientific satellites to measure radiation and other features of the near-space environment; lunar probes to measure the lunar space environment and to photograph the moon; planetary probes to measure and to photograph Mars and Venus; weather satellites; continued aeronautical research; and development of larger launch vehicles for lifting heavier payloads. The President attacked this ambitious program as too expensive, while Congress felt it was much too limited. Until the end of Eisenhower's term in January, 1961, Congress attempted to pour more money into the space effort, but the President, more concerned about the nation's budget and in possession of more accurate intelligence information about Soviet capabilities - thanks to U-2 overflights - refused to agree to increase appropriations to the agency.

When the new president, John Kennedy took office early in 1961, he found that the political climate favored his desire to lead the U.S. into space. Three months after his inauguration, Kennedy ordered Vice President Lyndon Johnson to conduct a survey of the U.S. space program. Leading off Kennedy's tasking memo were questions:

"Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man? Is there any other space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win?"

The goal Kennedy was looking for materialized as the Apollo program. The lunar landing mission and manned spaceflight programs necessary to prepare for it became the "dominant activity within the
agency" almost overnight. Support for Apollo, from the president, Congress and the American public was nearly unanimous. NASA had been given its mandate to put a man on the moon.

II. MANAGEMENT

NASA's management structure weathered almost constant change through the 1960's. This was due in large part to the conscious efforts of NASA's Administrator, James E. Webb, who headed the agency from 1961 to 1968. Webb tried to maintain a state of "desired disequilibrium," in order "to avoid those concepts and practices that would result in so much organizational stability that maneuverability would be lost." As a result, any attempt to describe NASA management during this period must be either very lengthy or very general. The following discussion focuses on major characteristics which remained stable for much of the 1960s.

During the agency's early years, NASA's field centers reported to Headquarters program directors rather than to general management. This tended to create a gulf between the field centers and Headquarters, and the program directors tended to be more narrowly focused than the multi-purpose field centers. In 1961 a reorganization placed the field centers directly under the Associate Administrator. This change proved to be unworkable: not only did it place an extremely heavy workload on the Associate Administrator, it also undermined the authority of Headquarters program directors and resulted in a "free-for-all" between the field centers and Headquarters.
After 1963, NASA settled into the organizational structure that was fairly well sustained for the remainder of the decade. Management was highly decentralized, and most of the responsibility for day-to-day operations rested with field centers. Lead centers were responsible for managing projects, or NASA's "output." Since a project could include several subsystems appropriate for action by other centers, the lead center for that project had authority to coordinate with these other centers without consulting NASA headquarters.

Three program offices-Manned Space Flight, Space Sciences and Applications, and Advanced Research and Technology - were responsible for ensuring that the field centers did not abuse their autonomy and pursue tangential agendas. In order to accomplish this, field centers were required to adhere to a set of uniform organizational procedures, and allocation of resources to the field centers was controlled. Field center activities were reviewed, although this frequently occurred after the fact. Finally, a system of checks and balances prevented any single program office from predominating over the others. The philosophy that Webb tried to instill throughout NASA was "management by exception," so that "higher levels of management were called on for decisions only when something extraordinary occurred in the process of executing approved projects."

Given this decentralized management structure and the disparity among the functions and sizes of the program offices, it is not surprising that each office developed its own unique approach to planning, although there were some similarities. For instance, most of the planning conducted by the planning offices was "intermediate-range planning," for programs...
with lead times of about five to seven years. This planning process included formulation of proposals for new projects; review, approval, and resource allocation for implementation of the proposals; monitoring of progress; and readjusting goals and allocations as necessary. The tool used by senior management to control the process was the Phased Project Planning (PPP) system. PPP was formally adopted in 1965 by means of a policy directive which essentially ratified what was already being done.

PPP was intended to force rational evaluation of a project, since it required cost/benefit comparisons at specific phases of project development: during advanced studies, in project definition, through project design, and during project development and operations. Project Approval Documents, or PADs, were also part of the intermediate-range planning process. PADs had to be signed by NASA's administrator before work could begin on a given phase; a PAD was required for each phase. PADs were reviewed annually and updated when necessary.

Throughout NASA's early years, long-range planning within NASA was nominally the responsibility of the Office of Plans and Program Evaluation, which reported directly to the Administrator. When this office was dissolved in 1963, it was replaced by two separate bodies: the Policy Planning Board, which reported to the Administrator, and the Planning, Review Panel which reported to the Associate Administrator. The Policy Planning Board was itself eliminated in 1965, and from then on agency-wide long-range planning was conducted primarily by ad hoc study groups and advisory panels composed of representatives from the external
There was never a formal connection between long-range planning and PPP or budgeting. 20

III. ASSUMPTIONS/CONSTRAINTS

NASA operated under three major constraints during the 1960s, each of which had an impact on the agency’s ability to plan, particularly over the long term. The first constraint was the restriction on civil service salaries. The import of this constraint is highlighted by the constant efforts of top NASA management to persuade the Civil Service Commission to increase the number of positions within NASA that were subject to less stringent salary limits. These efforts were not entirely successful; NASA’s ability to entice personnel with handsome paychecks was therefore often subject to Congressional control. 21 While NASA was not truly crippled by this constraint, the agency did have to offer some type of reward other than financial compensation to acquire and retain the scientists and engineers it required. This affected the agency’s ability to plan.

A second, related constraint was innate to NASA’s workforce. One-third to two-fifths of NASA employees were scientists or engineers. 22 The engineers, especially, were among the best in the country. 23 While this was obviously to NASA’s advantage in some ways, it introduced some complications into the planning process. The typical NASA scientist or engineer got job satisfaction from working on projects he found interesting. As professionals at or near the cutting edge of their fields, they could have very definite ideas about what those projects should be. Because of the nature of its mission, NASA believed that the ability to...
attract some of the "best and brightest" was mandatory. In order to do this, NASA had to guarantee a certain amount of scientific freedom. Long-range planning could be interpreted as an impediment to pursuit of scientific inquiry.

The third constraint was inherent in the demands of the Apollo schedule. NASA had originally estimated that it would be able to put a man on the moon by about 1971; Kennedy insisted that this goal be met not later than 1968. All of the field centers and program offices would be involved in the Apollo project. It was necessary to ensure that good working relationships existed among all of these entities. One of Administrator Webb's concerns was that a fixed long-range plan would alienate some of the program offices and field centers, each of which had its own ideas about the course the U.S. space program should pursue. The disparate professional opinions about the goal toward which the agency should work would eventually adversely influence the agency's ability to complete the Apollo project on time.

IV. ANALYSIS

The Apollo program produced a curious combination of impressive success and long-term problems for NASA. In 1963, the agency settled into a decentralized system of management, similar to that which had existed prior to November, 1961, so that field centers were subordinated to program offices. The more centralized arrangement the agency had used during the interim, when field centers reported directly to the Associate Administrator, had been intended in part to gain firmer control of the
centers. 27 The 1961 reorganization had resulted in internal confusion, so that center directors and program officers were unsure of their roles. 28 Because NASA had to keep the Apollo program on track, it was unwilling to devote the time that may have been necessary to allow people to become accustomed to this new system.

By September, 1962, the manned spaceflight program had reached impasses and delays at the Associate Administrator level, and informal coordination at lower levels was not functioning properly. As a result, the position of Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Centers was established; the Director of the Manned Space Flight Program Office assumed this position in addition to his original directorship. In effect, this removed three field centers from the Associate Administrator's control, and placed them under a program director, thus again injecting decentralization into the system. In 1963, the entire NASA organization was restructured once more, and adopted a system similar to that used prior to November, 1961. 29

The attempt to centralize control of NASA programs did not last long enough to succeed. Although NASA's Associate Administrator later claimed that the 1961 reorganization was not intended to be permanent, the factors that led NASA to revert to its more comfortable decentralization were compelling at the time: the confusion over formal lines of authority, the breakdown of informal cooperation, and the pressure of externally imposed deadlines. 30 NASA was able to turn the less-controlled management system to its advantage, and used such a system to put a man on the moon. Whether the centralized system could have likewise met that
goal is unknown. Informal lines of communication have always played a major role within NASA; the success of a centralized system would have depended to some extent upon whether or not the informal system could mesh with it.

The system worked well because it had a well-defined goal, the formal management structure was flexible enough to adapt itself to the decentralization, and the informal liaison network was resilient enough to survive reorganization attempts. Decentralization certainly did not detract from NASA's achievement of its mission. The Apollo project undoubtedly caused the agency to hesitate to commit to a more controlled structure; NASA was apparently unwilling to impose strictures that impeded its number one program.

Because of its decentralization, NASA Headquarters took on a reactive rather than proactive role, and responded to initiatives that originated in the field. Headquarter's function was to allocate resources, monitor progress, and assess results, not to initiate new projects. The entire manned space flight effort was working toward a single major goal at the time, and proposals from field centers promoted that goal. The other two program areas, however, lacked coherent goals. Both the Space Sciences and Applications and the Advanced Research and Technology efforts had little focus. Although this lack of focus might have been inherent in the nature of these efforts, Headquarters had no mechanism to enforce a unifying mission on them. In fact Headquarters did not seem to consider it necessary to do so, perhaps in part to preserve scientific freedom and avoid internal discord. Furthermore, after the Apollo
program, a lack of internal agreement also manifested itself within the Manned Space Flight office.31

NASA during the 1960s failed miserably at long-range planning. It had established no internal procedures or organizational structures capable of translating long-range plans into intermediate-range programs. Within the agency, long-range planners reported to the Administrator, while field centers initiated proposals for new projects. Seldom did the two factions meet on common ground.

The absence of a formal mechanism for turning plans into programs was a symptom of Administrator Webb's disbelief in long-range planning. "He would not commit himself publicly to new programs where costs were unpredictable, Congressional approval uncertain, the likelihood of changes ever-present, and the program offices themselves deeply divided over long-range plans," notes one observer.32 One might argue that the first three of these factors are inherent in all attempts at long-range planning; the real problem was Webb's inability or unwillingness to impose a unifying vision on the program offices.

As long as NASA had a popular, externally imposed goal to work toward, the agency functioned admirably. In 1965, however, with Apollo well on its way to realization, "there was almost no agreement within NASA as to what should follow the lunar landing."33 Apollo had unified NASA: attempting to plan beyond Apollo threatened to divide the agency. NASA had become a bureaucracy, and plans for the future inevitably threatened various bureaucratic interests. Once man had reached the
moon, there were arguments that future space research could be conducted at least as well with unmanned probes; this would have necessitated a shift in the balance of power among the program offices - something which Manned Space Flight would certainly resist.

As suggested above, the long-range planning that was actually conducted at NASA occurred in its field centers, with occasional input from outside task forces and panels. The field centers contributed advanced studies to develop a very broad range of missions: "flight missions beyond those currently approved, or studies of as yet unapproved spacecraft, launch vehicle or aircraft systems that may lead toward such future flight missions or studies leading to significant changes on an already approved configuration of spacecraft and launch vehicles." NASA Headquarters exercised limited authority over these studies with PADs, and consequently contented itself with merely passing judgment on the initiative of others. Politics also impeded NASA's ability to study future alternatives: approved studies were sometimes assumed by Congress to be approved programs, and they were therefore politically sensitive.

Although NASA was also permitted to seek advice from outside agencies, there was no formal requirement for it to do so. The advisory process was "unpatterned and unsystematic." Scientists from outside NASA often demanded more control over NASA's science policy, something which Administrator Webb was unwilling to surrender.

In summary, a variety of problems led NASA to avoid true long-range planning. James Webb did not believe in long-range planning for his
agency; he presumed that the agency's future would be determined by political considerations. He may have been correct, but there was little he could do to control such a factor. Perhaps long-range planning was beyond the scope of NASA's mission in the 1960s: if one of the first steps in the planning process is to define the characteristics and trends of the environment, one might accept that this was NASA's primary responsibility through its early years. NASA in the 1960s had to conduct exploration to define the environment in space, so the next generation could plan the exploitation of space. In such an endeavor, the choice of goals is logically a product of external politics; there can be no rational cost/benefit evaluations if both costs and benefits have yet to be determined.


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former NASA administrator, fairly good source for the rationale behind management system. Bibliography, but no index.
END NOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 19-20

3. Ibid., p. 19


6. Hirsch and Trento, pp. 36-37


11. Rosholt, p. 43.

12. Levine, pp. 43-45.


15. Levine, p. 142.

16. Levine, p. 158.

17. Levine, p. 158-159.


22. Levine, p. 115.


25. Levine, p. 36.


27. Levine, p. 36.


29. Rosholt, p. 256.

30. Levine, p. 256.
31. Levine, p. 244.


34. Levine, p. 147.


36. Levine, p. 250.
INTRODUCTION

In 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed by Congress and subsequently became known as Public Law 99-443. Section 603 of this law requires the President to transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the U.S. national security strategy. Accordingly, the Reagan Administration submitted two such reports, first in January 1987 and the next in January 1988. To date the Bush administration has not formulated a national security strategy although there are some elements of what may become his national security strategy in a document entitled Building a Better America dated 9 February 1989. For the purpose of this paper however, general statements made by President Bush in that document will not be included here.

While the intent of the Public Law 99-443 is to clarify the objectives of the national security strategy, it is difficult to define the exact importance of the two presidential documents of 1987 and 1988 with respect to the actual employment of strategic options. At the very least, the documents provide a framework around which specific strategies may be more fully defined and implemented. But it also remains clear that the
national security strategy, as proposed by the President, remain general in scope and rather generic in nature. Additionally, the two reports considered here are replete with unnecessary rhetoric with regard to general statements and devoid of specifics with regard to implementation. In that respect, one might question how these documents add to what is already available in other official Presidential documents and statements.

The documents are called "national security strategy reports," but how "strategy" is meant to be understood is never made clear. It is presumed here that strategy refers to the way in which the U.S. intends to develop and apply its resources to accomplish its national and international objectives. Additionally, there does not exist a classified version of these same reports. Surely, this is an omission of great magnitude which necessarily detracts from their relevance and usefulness. It is inconceivable that any nation could publicly declare the exact nature of its security strategy. One omission that appears in both reports is the lack of prioritized national objectives. Surely not every objective is considered "vital" to U.S. national security interests. Nor is there a range of choices made clear on how best to achieve U.S. objectives. These are serious omissions that call into question the amount of thought actually invested in the product.

An additional element to be considered when questioning the importance of these documents is that under the U.S. system of government the President does not have the final say in setting U.S. strategy. On the other hand, while the reports cannot speak for the nation, the President's
view of national strategy is very important since he is the nation's chief executive and the commander-in-chief of the nation's military.

Another factor which tends to cloud the utility of the documents is that they are issued at what is termed to be a "time of strategic transition." The 1987 report states that the postwar era ended in the 1970s. During that decade, the U.S. lost its position of global preeminence which it held at the onset of the postwar era. However, neither the 1987 nor the 1988 report enumerates the characteristics of the new era except for the loss of U.S. preeminence. Furthermore, both reports claim that the present U.S. strategy is the same as that adopted at the beginning of the postwar era. This claim creates a confusion: how can the U.S. maintain the same strategy if the world environment has fundamentally changed?

This paper analyzes the 1987 and 1988 national security strategy reports as examples of strategic management. After a review of the nature of the system of management and of the key assumptions and constraints of the reports, a discussion will be provided of the key elements of the present U.S. strategy as outlined in both the 1987 and 1988 reports.

SYSTEM OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Under the U.S. system of government, the ultimate responsibility for national security rests upon the citizens themselves. The U.S. government is merely the creation of the American people, instituted to secure their unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The U.S.
Constitution thus embodies the form of government which the American people have chosen to secure their rights.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the government's responsibility for national security is divided between the President and Congress. The President is the chief executive and the commander-in-chief of the U.S. military. The President has the power, by and with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors and other public officers. Balanced against this power of the President, the Congress has the power to lay and collect taxes, to provide for the common defense, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to define and punish offenses against the Law of Nations, to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and to make all laws which are necessary and proper for executing the powers vested in the federal government by the Constitution. Under this system, the President and Congress must cooperate in order to formulate and to implement U.S. national security strategy.

The 1987 and 1988 National Security Strategy Reports recognize this system of strategic management. The 1987 report states that:

The continued development and successful implementation of U.S. National Security Strategy is a major responsibility of the Executive Branch. But the Administration cannot accomplish this alone. Developing and supporting a National Security Strategy for the United States that provides a sound vision for the future and a realistic guide to action must
be a cooperative endeavor of the Congress and the Administration. (1987 report, p. 40)


The Constitution requires the President "from time to time to give the Congress information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."

However, more than anything else, it is the federal budget which forces the President and Congress to work together. Without money, the President can achieve very little. To obtain money, the President must convince Congress to raise the money and to allocate it to the desired programs. The Goldwater-Nichols Act recognizes this reality and specifically requires the President to submit the national security strategy report on the same date on which the proposed budget is submitted. Presumably, the report is intended to be an explanation of the national security aspects of the budget.

ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

A. KEY ASSUMPTIONS IN THE REPORTS

On the cover page of the 1987 national security report, President Reagan is reported as saying, "Freedom, peace and prosperity...that's what America is all about. for ourselves, our friends, and those people across
the globe struggling for democracy.” This concept of America’s mission in the world is the unifying theme of both the 1987 and 1988 reports.

The reports elaborate the meaning of the concepts of freedom, peace and prosperity. Freedom is the ultimate value, because it seems to be the best means of achieving everything else which is good. The 1987 report confidently asserts that “if we are to achieve the kind of world we all hope to see, democracy must continue to prosper and expand.” (1987 report, p. 9) Peace is the result of a stable equilibrium of international forces. To achieve peace, we must ensure that hostile states or groups of states are deterred from seeking to dominate the Eurasian land mass (1988 report, p. 1), and that no power dares to initiate a nuclear war. (1987 report, p. 22; 1988 report, p. 15) Thus, peace requires strong U.S. conventional and nuclear forces. Finally, prosperity is the result of a commitment to capitalism and free trade. The 1987 national security strategy report explains that “we believe that market-oriented policies are key to greater growth in America and throughout the world.” (1987 report p. 12)

The 1988 report states that freedom, peace and prosperity are at the heart of the U.S. strategy and that this strategy has been the basic U.S. approach to world affairs ever since the Second World War. This continuity reflects “the fact that the strategy is grounded in unchanging geographic considerations, and designed to preserve the fundamental values of our democracy.” (1988 report, p. 2) The report refutes the “commonplace criticism that U.S. National Security Strategy changes erratically every four to eight years as a result of a new Administration taking office.” (1988 report, p. 1)
B. CONSTRAINTS ON THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The biggest constraint on the U.S. management system for national security is the continual need to seek consent from those being governed, a constraint which the Founding Fathers believed to be the essence of just governmental power. The President, despite his position as the chief executive, must seek consent from a wide range of groups in order to implement national security strategy. The 1988 report concludes:

The Administration and Congress must both work harder to build a bipartisan public consensus on our National Security Strategy and the resources needed to execute it.... Renewed consensus will be forged on the anvil of public debate - among responsible officials in government, between the Congress and the Executive, in consultation with our allies and friends, and among the larger community of interested and concerned American citizens. (1988 report, p. 41)

The cost of seeking such a consensus is a major reduction in the President’s freedom of action in world affairs; however, this cost has been consciously accepted by the American people as the price of ensuring government by the consent of the governed.

ANALYSIS OF KEY ELEMENTS

According to the 1987 and 1988 reports, the key elements of the U.S. national security strategy are: (1) the spread of democracy, (2) the containment of Soviet influence, (3) the avoidance of nuclear war, and (4)
the spread of free market policies. While there has been significant national debate over the implementation of these goals, it does seem fair to say that these goals have been the essence of U.S. strategy since the Second World War. Measured over this period of time, the strategy has been a success. However, international affairs pose a very long term global struggle, perhaps an eternal one. Over time, the world changes, therefore aspects of U.S. strategy must change to reflect the new conditions. While the present strategy's commitment to democracy and the avoidance of nuclear war will probably prove to be enduring aspects of U.S. strategy, other aspects may have to change to accommodate changing world conditions.

A. THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY

The heart of the U.S. national security strategy is its commitment to "the promotion of our democratic way of life." (1987 report, p. 9) The 1987 report states that:

History has shown us repeatedly that only in democracies is there inherent respect for individual liberties and rights. In the postwar world, democracies have also exhibited extraordinary economic vitality. (1987 report, p. 9)

The role of the U.S. is to be a "beacon for democracy" and to provide active support to democratic forces. However, the report acknowledges that there are limits to what the U.S. can achieve:
Change must come from within, following a path dictated by national and local traditions. In some instances, assistance and guidance is better provided by other democracies or multi-laterally. Patience and respect for different cultures and recognition of our own limitations must guide our effort. (1987 report, p. 9)

Examples of successful promotion of democracy are U.S. assistance to postwar Western Europe and Asia and, more recently, West European assistance to democratic movements in Spain and Portugal.

It should not be a surprise that a commitment to democracy is a basis thrust of U.S. national security strategy. It is also a basic thrust of U.S. culture and government. Furthermore, the individuals who formulate U.S. strategy, the President and Congressmen achieved their positions through the democratic process. At times other U.S. values may conflict with its commitment to democracy but it is impossible to imagine a U.S. national security strategy which lacks such a fundamental commitment.

The difficulty in spreading democracy, which the 1987 and 1988 reports recognize, is that democracy cannot thrive unless it exists in a supportive culture. Not all existing cultures are supportive of democracy; and even if these cultures evolve into being more supportive, such cultural evolution is a slow and difficult process. The 1987 report’s admonition for “patience, respect for different cultures and recognition of our own limitations” is critical for the success of the U.S. strategy. Given the U.S. culture’s deep commitment to democracy, the necessary political commitment for such a long term goal probably exists. The difficult part
of the strategy will always be the need both for patience and for a sense of our own limitations.

B. THE CONTAINMENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE

Both the 1987 and 1988 reports agree that "the most significant threat to U.S. security interests remains the global challenge posed by the Soviet Union." (1987 report, p. 6) The only basis for U.S. and Soviet cooperation is "the common goal of avoiding direct confrontation and reducing the threat of nuclear war." (1987 report, p. 6)

The problem with the goal of containment is the ambiguity in the nature of the U.S.-Soviet competition. In the late 1940s, when the containment of the Soviets became a national goal, George Kennan defined the problem of containment as blunting the expansionistic impulse of a radical regime until its radical nature was moderated by the passage of time. Presumably, once this cooling had taken effect, the U.S.-Soviet competition could be handled on a more normal diplomatic basis. Arguably, this cooling has already occurred. Certainly the Soviet Union under Gorbachev in 1988 is significantly less radical than it was under Stalin in 1948. If so, the 1987 and 1988 national security strategy reports are at least partially obsolete. By focusing too much on the Soviet Union and too little on the rest of the world, they fail to develop the comprehensive strategic framework which is now needed.

However, this concept of the nature of the U.S.-Soviet competition is not the only one. John Foster Dulles tended to see the struggle between the
U.S. and the Soviets as a clash between good and evil. Accordingly, the struggle is intense and will not end until one side is totally vanquished. This interpretation of the containment strategy appears to be the same contained in the 1987 and 1988 reports. If this view is correct, then the reports' emphasis on Soviet containment provides a good blueprint for renewing and continuing the U.S. leadership of the Free World.

Determining the nature of the U.S.-Soviet competition is difficult. As stated by the 1987 report, "only a handful of people in the Politburo can claim with any confidence to know the Kremlin's precise near-term, tactical plans..." (1987 report, p. 6) Nonetheless, the 1987 report was confident that Soviet history clearly demonstrated the Soviet's long-term strategic goal: Soviet global hegemony. But doubt crept into the 1988 report. The report seemed torn between characterizing recent Soviet reforms as a campaign of disinformation and characterizing them as "hopes for fundamental changes in Soviet behavior." (1988 report, p. 5) The 1988 report concluded with a wait-and-see attitude.

Interestingly, the 1987 report, while emphasizing the continuity of U.S. strategy since the Second World War, observed that "the postwar era came to an end during the 1970's." (1987 report, p. 3) The report noted both that a policy of Soviet containment was the essence of our postwar strategy and that containment was an expensive policy. Given the economic reality of the postwar era, i.e., U.S. economic dominance, we could afford such a policy. However, in the new era, "the United States no longer has an overwhelming economic position vis-a-vis Western Europe and the East Asia rimland." (1987 report, p. 3) Combining these 1987 economic
observations with the 1988 observations about the changing nature of the Soviets, the U.S. may very well be leaving the era of containment. If so, what will be our new strategic framework? Strategically and diplomatically, the U.S. is probably now in an era of fundamental transition.

C. THE AVOIDANCE OF NUCLEAR WAR

The policy of containment has always included a concept of military deterrence. The 1988 national security strategy report states that in order to deter the Soviet Union, “We must make clear to its leaders that we have the means and the will to respond effectively to coercion or aggression against our security interests.” (1988 report, p. 13) The 1988 report describes the U.S. strategic nuclear forces and the supporting nuclear doctrine as the “essential foundation” of deterrence. (1988 report, p. 14) The U.S. nuclear doctrine is that we deter by maintaining response flexibility and by targeting Soviet assets which are essential to their war-making capability.

However, the nuclear age has posed a severe dilemma to the American people, a dilemma not yet comfortably solved. Because of the American belief that Soviet expansion threatens U.S. values, the U.S. has been committed to deterring that expansion. In the nuclear age, that deterrence has required massive U.S. strategic nuclear forces. But now, given the size of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, there is a growing fear that if a nuclear war erupts, basic U.S. values may not survive.
The 1987 and 1988 reports are sensitive to this dilemma. In both reports, former President Reagan unequivocally stated. "I have repeatedly emphasized that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." (1987 report, p. 22; 1988 report, p. 15) The reports view the basic problem as being how to deter the Soviets while reducing the risk of nuclear war. The solution proposed by both reports is by maintaining the strength of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces, maintaining U.S. alliances, developing strategic defenses and seeking equitable and effective arms reductions which do not compromise our alliance obligations.

If the U.S. is entering a post-containment era, certainly the problem of avoiding a nuclear war will remain. An interesting issue is how might the new era affect the problem of avoiding nuclear war? If Western Europe and Japan accept the principle that they must be more self-sufficient militarily, how can they do this, to their own satisfaction, without developing significant nuclear arsenals? If they develop these arsenals, the U.S. may no longer be able to define the nuclear threat as only coming from the Soviet Union. If the future holds a proliferation of nuclear superpowers, arms negotiations may expand from being bilateral in nature to being multilateral in nature. Furthermore, if the nuclear threat to the U.S. increases due to an increase in the number of nuclear-armed rivals, strategic defenses may become even more critical than they are now to the welfare of the United States.
D. THE SPREAD OF FREE MARKET POLICIES

The 1987 and 1988 reports assert that U.S. national power rests on the strength of our domestic economy (1988 report, p. 11; 1987 report, p. 11) and that U.S. prosperity is dependent on the cooperation of Western Europe and Japan. (1988 report, p. 11; 1987 report, p. 12) Thus, the major economic goal of the U.S. national security strategy is to promote market-oriented policies through close consultation and negotiation with our allies. In addition, the U.S. recognizes a need for the developed nations to assist the developing nations to “realize sustained, non-inflationary growth” and to help them resolve their debt problems. (1988 report, p. 12)

The main obstacle to such international economic cooperation is domestic political pressure. The 1988 report acknowledges that “the challenge to the United States now is to avoid letting tensions and disputes over trade issues undermine domestic support for free trade....” (1988 report, p. 12) This same potential pressure exists within each of our allies as well.

The problem with a global free trade policy is that there is no effective enforcement mechanism. The only enforcement mechanism now is the threat by each nation to retaliate, with trade barriers, against violators. This threat of retaliation probably works in times of global prosperity; but the mechanism may fail in times of hardship when it is most needed. Such a failure was demonstrated by the trade barriers which sprang up at the onset of the depression of the 1930s.
Free trade among the industrialized nations was a predominant economic feature of the postwar era. Will it continue to be so? The example of OPEC in the 1970s and 1980s is illustrative of one possible course for economic cooperation among nations. In the 1970s, the OPEC nations, led by Saudi Arabia, cooperated to control the world supply of oil and its price. All the OPEC nations benefitted, but to varying degrees. By the 1980s, national hardships and international rivalries led some nations to seek a greater share of the group benefits. Their rivalries led to a breakdown in cooperation, and the price of oil dropped as each nation unilaterally increased its production of oil.

Was the economic cooperation among the industrialized nations during the postwar era a product of the U.S. ability to act as a leader due to its predominant military and economic power? Arguably, it was. Thus, with that predominance at an end, the foundation for that cooperation may now be a lot weaker than it was ten years ago. If so, the trend for cooperation may not be able to survive a severe setback in the global economy. On the other hand, perhaps the policy makers of the post-containment era will learn from the experience of the postwar era, and continue to cooperate economically, even without a clear leader. Only time will tell.

CONCLUSION

Neither the 1987 nor the 1988 national security strategy report indicates possible new directions for U.S. strategy now that the postwar era has ended. This failure may stem from the fact that the American people
themselves are not sure what the new era may look like or what the new U.S. role may be. In contemporary American political rhetoric, one can sense an awareness of change. The American people remain committed to democracy, the U.S. remains a powerful military and economic power, the Soviets remain a powerful rival and nuclear war still poses a serious dilemma. Yet there seem to be important changes underway. Perhaps the Soviets are different from what they were in the late 1940s. The U.S. may no longer be able to guarantee the security of itself and its allies, without an increased contribution from those allies. If the allies increase their military strength, will the character of the alliance change? Probably. Furthermore, the U.S. may not have the same commitment to free-market policies that it has to democracy. Future economic challenges may bring the present U.S. economic policy into question.

Under the American system of government, it is the people who decide the long-term direction of the nation. When the world situation is itself not clear, the American people will be divided as to the best strategic direction for the country. Accordingly, the 1987 and 1988 national security strategy reports will probably be remembered as glimpses of U.S. strategy in the midst of fundamental flux.

In assessing the impact of these two national security strategies on Soviet thinking, one source, Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, indicated that the Soviets considered the 1987 report (the one being studied at the time) to be “highly anti-Soviet” in tone and in substance. It would probably hold true that Soviet front organizations for propaganda would denounce the U.S. national security strategy as
contributing to instability among the Super-powers and negatively impacting the current atmosphere of detente.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States faces a major challenge in preparing for the security environment of the early 21st century. This environment will become increasingly multipolar as Japan and China rise to major power status. Proliferation of high technology weapon systems should be expected as well as a growing disparity in the standards of living between the leading powers and many Third World countries. The animosity created by this disparity, coupled with the availability of highly accurate, relatively inexpensive weapons, will make this an extremely dangerous world from the standpoints of terrorism, blackmail, and small-scale attack.

A nearer term problem deals with maintaining our deterrent posture and containment of Soviet expansion. In spite of public announcements, the Soviets are continuing an unprecedented military buildup in conventional as well as nuclear forces. They are also feverishly pursuing military applications for advanced technologies. Although direct U.S.-Soviet military interaction is improbable, there exists a distinct likelihood that the need will arise to put down Soviet sponsored insurrections in remote
locations throughout the world. In a crisis, lack of a credible deterrent against the Soviets could prove disastrous.

Faced with the responsibility of organizing America's resources to ensure her continued physical security in the evolving world, President Reagan commissioned an advisory committee to investigate the policy and strategy implications of the applications of advanced technology as they related to strategic offense, strategic defense, and the conduct of theater war (including conventional war). The President's charter also charged the committee with assessing the utility of and recommending applications for advanced technology concepts relating to U.S. security interests under conditions of peace, crisis, and theater or strategic war.

The 15 month period spanning the Commission's deliberations witnessed the employment of U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf, continued Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan, the October '87 stock market crash and resultant world economic system oscillations, the launching of a Chinese ballistic missile submarine, implementation of the Reorganization and Acquisition Improvement Acts of 1986, continued Soviet claims of glasnost and perestroika, a multitude of Third World problems, and U.S. involvement in several major overseas basing disputes. Other issues which surfaced either concurrently within this period, or shortly thereafter, including the resignation of Casper Weinberger as Secretary of Defense, Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) reduction negotiations with the Soviets, the Presidential election primaries, and a major across-the-board Defense Department budget cut. All of these
events had a major impact on the nation's perceived strategic direction needs.

Discriminate Deterrence, the product of the efforts of the Advisory Committee on Integrated Long-Term Strategy as reported to the President on January 12, 1988, is touted as "...having alerted us to the new varieties of danger that lie ahead, and having shown us that, in our present condition, we are unprepared for the changes we are about to encounter." At first glance it appears that this excellent strategic work is about to be swept into oblivion even before its content is digested. It has failed to receive official Presidential endorsement and is never mentioned in the fiscal year 1989 Secretary of Defense report to Congress. However, if one looks beyond the rhetoric and focuses on the driving forces behind our national strategy, it becomes obvious that the substance of Discriminate Deterrence is having considerable influence. The beliefs and recommendations set forth in the document form the basis of a "second generation" strategic document, "Competitive Strategies," which promises to provide vital strategic direction for our country.

II. THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The Long-Term Integrated Strategy Advisory Commission was established on October 24, 1986 with a charter lifetime of 18 months (later extended to 24 months). The Commission reported directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President's National Security Advisor. The bipartisan Commission was co-chaired by Fred Ikle, a former Reagan Administration Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and Albert Wohlstetter, an
accomplished strategic analyst. Other members included former National Security Advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Clark, former Secretary of State Henry Kissenger, Admiral James Holloway, Generals John Vessy, Bernard Schriever, and Andrew Goodpaster, Ambassador Anne Armstrong, Harvard University Professor Samuel Huntington, and Rockefeller University President Joshua Lederberg.

In preparing the Discriminate Deterrence document this distinguished group was formally supported by a research staff, an administrative staff, a public affairs counselor, and representatives acting for the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Individual representatives from the Joint Staff, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force were also provided. In addition to this support, the Commission received valuable counsel from members of Congress, the President's Science Advisor, members of the National Security Council Staff, numerous professionals in the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, and from a broad range of specialists outside the government.3

Information provided by the above sources was disseminated among special study groups (the research staff) for discussion and analysis. These groups were organized to investigate such things as the security environment for the next 20 years (Future Security Environment Group), the role of advanced technology in military systems (Technology Group), interactions between offensive and defensive systems on the periphery of the Soviet Union (Offense-Defense Group), the U.S. posture in regional conflicts around the world (Regional Conflict Group), and the effects of
shifts in the world's population distribution (Demographic Study Group). The first four groups were chaired by Commission members, while the fifth was managed by the National Defense University. The results of these were synthesized by the Commission's co-chairs to produce a coherent, unified statement of the recommended strategic directions for the nation.

Although not explicitly defined, a logical framework of analysis was followed in producing the study. First, a concept of the future environment was developed through the efforts of the Future Security Environment Working Group and RAND's National Defense Research Institute. Next, U.S. national goals and interests were compiled from the Constitution, statements from the President's National Security Strategy of the United States (1987), and the personal beliefs of the Commission members--most notably Ikle, Wohlstetter, and Gorman.

This third component introduced a filter through which all information was judged. It was felt that the United States faced a changing security environment. In this new environment, concentration on the apocalyptic threat would be undesirable and might be self-defeating. Also, the challenge of deterring war would remain a prime concern and could best be served by exploiting the discriminating capabilities of long-range, precision weaponry. Finally, the lessons of El Salvador impressed on the members the importance of employing the indigenous population in regional conflicts rather than U.S. combat troops.

Having postulated a credible future environment, and having succinctly defined the U.S. goals and interests, the Commission’s next task
was to define the future threats to our nation. This was accomplished by comparing the projected future environment with U.S. interests as well as assessing trends in the military capabilities of various countries (particularly the Soviet Union) against those of our own.

The final step entailed the formulation of a set of principles and recommendations that could be used to revise the current U.S. "grand strategy" to bring it into line with contemporary realities. These were presented as Commission's main points in its January report.

III. KEY PLANNING ELEMENTS

A. ASSUMPTIONS

Several key assumptions were made in formulating the Commission's report. The first assumption, inherent in statements expounding methods to avoid war with the Soviet Union, maintained that the Soviets are deterred by a credible fighting force. It was also assumed that superpower conflicts could be limited. The following statement contained in the report's section covering the extreme threats provides illustration: "To deter the more plausible Soviet attacks, we must be able to respond discriminately, but must also have some prospects of keeping any such war within bounds--of ensuring that it does not rapidly deteriorate into an apocalypse." The Commission was extremely critical of the strategic doctrine of "mutual deterrence" and maintained that we should never rely on stability through mutual vulnerability for our security.
A second assumption dealt with establishing a credible measurement of military capability. The Commission assumed that total annual military expenditures and annual outlays for capital stock provide an adequate measure of military strength. To develop estimated values for these, the following procedure was used: 1) a roughly consistent set of "backward-looking" and "forward-looking" estimates was produced for each by employing an aggregate production function expressing the unknown as a function of inputs of capital, labor, and technological change, and the output in 1980 value rubles; 2) key model parameters were based on historical evidence and recent experience, then modified to conform to explicit judgments concerning the course of future (in the next two decades) development; 3) ruble-to-dollar conversion was accomplished using CIA ruble value estimates and conversion rates; and finally, 4) output values in 1980 dollars were converted to 1986 dollars using the U.S. GNP price deflator. Other measures of military strength are acknowledged such as order-of-battle data, readiness and training levels, the state of morale and leadership, among others. The previous methods were chosen for their descriptive utility and ease of documentation.

Although based on empirical analysis, the global economic reorganization expressed in the report assumes that trends in certain operative factors (labor and capital distributive shares, rates of change in factor productivity, savings-investment rates from annual income, base year capital stock estimates, depreciation rates on capital stock, and demographically-consistent labor supply estimates, will follow their predicted directions. Great care was taken to be thorough in the formulation of these trends so only minor fluctuations should be expected.
The report emphasizes the continuing need for strong NATO forces to deter aggression by the Warsaw Pact thereby disclosing another major assumption: that the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances will continue as viable entities throughout this period of change. However, several Commission members warned that discriminate deterrence (or the discriminate use of force) will be necessary to ensure the existence of a united Europe in the future.¹¹

B. CONSTRAINTS

Few actual constraints were levied against the planning system. The Commission received enormous cooperation from all the resources it called upon. Funding for the project included an estimated $40,000 in salaries for a professional staff and secretarial support as well as $50,000 for various fees, travel, and administrative costs. Additionally, $500,000 was provided for contractor support.¹² Finally, the Commission's stature was greatly enhanced by the prominence of its members.

One limitation that had been placed on the Commission was that of time. The Commission's charter expired after a maximum life of 24 months. Even though the initial report was complete, the Commission members stood ready to assist in implementing its conclusions. Once the charter expired though, this mass of talent and influence was disbanded. Independent efforts of the various working groups were also constrained by this deadline.
The Commission's scope was also limited. Its name reflects reality in that the Commission's sole function was to serve as an advisory body. It was constrained to operate under the provisions of Public Law 92-463, Executive Order 12024 and implementing CSA and DoD regulations for Federal Advisory committees. As a result, its findings and recommendations cannot, of their own, formulate policy or direct acquisition.

C. COMMON GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Good planning systems provide a focal point for the ensuing effort. In the case of the Advisory Committee on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, this guidance was provided by its charter.

"The Advisory Committee on Integrated Long-Term Strategy will serve the public interest by providing the Secretary of Defense and the President's National Security Advisor with an independent, informed assessment of the policy and strategy implications of advanced technologies for strategic defense, strategic offense and theater warfare, including conventional war."13

The members also shared the belief that "...need demanded regeneration of certain basic concepts and ideas."14 These included concerns about the developing security environment, the future of deterrence, and the role of technology in providing for national security.
One final note is the fact that the conclusions of the Discriminate Deterrence report were unanimously supported by the Commission's members, a remarkable attribute in light of the diversity of its personalities.

IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

An uninterrupted trail of efforts to define a comprehensive national strategy for the United States can be traced to Truman's NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948), "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security." Since then, no fewer than 13 such attempts have been made to codify our national strategy. Aaron Friedberg analyzed these efforts to identify patterns of success and failure as well as to develop a strategy that could be used to improve the chances for success of the efforts of the Advisory Committee on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. His results indicated that: 1) the ability of a planning effort to influence subsequent government policy declines as an administration increases in age; 2) those efforts completed shortly after inauguration fare better since the new President's strength is generally at its peak and a consensus exists as to the need for setting strategic guidelines within a new administration; 3) attempts at midcourse correction are of moderate success either because the initial danger is perceived to have disappeared or because the people who formulate the revisions lack credibility; and, 4) studies completed just prior to a major public catastrophe can capitalize on the ensuing unrest.
He suggests three strategies that can be used for increasing the probability that a planning effort will prove effective. The first calls for a broad-brush diagnosis of the existing problems accompanied by general recommendations to treat the situation. A second approach involves identification of a specific threat combined with a specific plan to deal with it. The final method portends that a unifying theme should be developed along with an attendant set of loosely related recommendations for specific programs designed to counter a perceived threat.

Other problem areas for past plans were identified as: 1) inattention to prediction, 2) lack of a sense of urgency concerning the threat, 3) a moderation in American perceptions of the Soviet Union, 4) the inability to define a set of peacetime military goals and a "competitive strategy" for achieving them, and 5) failure to successfully incorporate arguments for strategic defense capabilities. These and other marketing tactics ("corridor work," staff meetings with influential groups and Congressional leaders, open discussions with the press, and release timing, for example) were carefully pursued by the Commission members, but the impact of the West European outcry over the report's implications proved too strong.

Michael Howard, Regius professor of modern history at Oxford University, Karl Kaiser, director of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, and Francois de Rose, a former French representative to NATO, provided a lucid enunciation of the European concerns over Discriminate Deterrence in an article for International Herald Tribune. The first concern involved the report's passages on the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe. Although they acknowledged the
need for modern, discriminate, nuclear weapons, the group contends that failure to link the use of these weapons directly to escalation into a wider, more devastating war (other than one in which nuclear weapons are employed only to deny success to invading Soviet forces) undermines the most important basis of alliance: the community of risk. Their real concern is that Europe may become a limited nuclear battle zone.

A similar concern revolved around the report's proposal to develop conventional forces that are capable of stopping a Soviet invasion of Western Europe dead in its tracks without resort to nuclear weapons.

"The notion of a grand conventional conflict to defeat Soviet forces has no support in Europe, primarily because the means do not exist but also because it would be likely to produce the kind of annihilation of Europe that Americans fear from nuclear escalation."17

A third concern centered on the report's proposal that NATO ground forces should be prepared to mount deep-strike attacks across the NATO-Warsaw Pact border. Development of such a posture would be "both economically and politically unacceptable in Europe."18 It is also feared that such a posture would be perceived as an offensive force build-up that would endanger East-West relations.

The final European concern was that the report neglected Europe's role as an actor in future world politics. They accused the report's authors of treating Western Europe "only as an object and not as an actor in
politics—not even considered worth mentioning as a force influencing the strategic environment 20 years hence.”

Only one other public critique has emerged that could possibly have an influence on the fate of the report. The shortfall identified claims that the report did not adequately deal with the nation's economic situation and could therefore be of only limited use. According to one journalist, "What's needed now is an equally serious and high-level study integrating national security strategy with the economic realities faced by the United States." In fact, the Commission did consider the international economic environment and did relate costs to the programs recommended for support of our national security. The problem was that these findings were not published with the lead document. Instead, they were pending publication as the output from the Future Security Environment Working Group. Also, scope of the Commission's deliberations was limited by its mandate. Had an economic study been requested, this group could have produced an extremely good one.

As mentioned above, Discriminate Deterrence has failed to achieve public endorsement by those who commissioned it. Examination of the Commission's charter shed some light on the fate of this report, but the ominous forces of politics and international relations have obviously played a role in its public demise. Perhaps the one shortfall not planned for, an Administration not willing to take certain painful steps for the sake of national security, has proven to be its undoing.
END NOTES

1. Charter of the Advisory Committee on Integrated Long-Term Strategy as filed with the Armed Services Committee, January 5, 1988 (pages not numbered in original).


5. RAND produced an unpublished document as an input to the Future Security Environment Working Group that presented and discussed trend estimates of GNP, annual military spending, and annual purchases of capital military stock for 15 countries for the period 1950-2010.

6. Phone conservation with Dr. Whitt, April 21, 1988. See also Discriminate Deterrence, pp. 33-37 for a discussion of the "extreme threat."
7. Discriminate Deterrence, p. 5.

8. Ibid., p. 37

9. This procedure is outlined in the previously-mentioned RAND study.

10. RAND used these factors to develop their economic model for predicting the future view of the world economy.


12. See the Commission's charter section G.

13. Ibid., section B

14. Phone conversation with Dr. Whitt on April 21, 1988.

15. Aaron Friedberg's memo to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy is entitled "Analysis of Past Planning Efforts," The most recent revision available is dated July 29, 1987.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

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2. Conne, Ernest, "A Strategic Study Worth Another Look," Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1988, p.14. Not a condemnation of the Discriminate Deterrence report. Recommends looking at the economics involved with the strategies. The author did not know that the commission had already done this and reported their findings in another document. The Discriminate Deterrence report was limited by charter to security issues.

3. Correll, John T., "Discriminate Deterrence," Air Force Magazine, p.6, March 1988. This article depicts Discriminate Deterrence as the document that alerts the U.S. to the potential problem of not being able to meet the future "threat," as defined in the Discriminate Deterrence report.

although it may not be implemented in its entirety, will most likely be integrated into the national planning systems incrementally.

5. Howard, Michael, Kaiser, Karl, and de Rose, Francois, "Deterrence Policy: A European Response," International Herald Tribune, February 4, 1988 (see OPINION column). This title gives the article away. It typifies the objections of the NATO allies to anything that might disrupt their current programs. The "center-of-the-universe" is in Western Europe.

COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES

LT David J. Kern, USN
and
LCDR Eddie W. Daniel, USN

In February 1986, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announced the establishment of a Competitive Strategies Initiative (CSI) within the Department of Defense (DoD).1 Since that time both Secretary Weinberger and his successor Frank Carlucci have taken steps to institutionalize this process of strategic planning. Yet to be determined, is whether Secretary Cheney will continue with the program. But, until the future of Competitive Strategies is resolved, the question remains just what is Competitive Strategies and how will it influence U.S. military strategic planning?

I. BACKGROUND

A Competitive Strategies analysis employs a chess match methodology which aligns enduring U.S. strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses in a move-response-countermove sequence. This process seeks to exploit areas of potential high leverage gain that will ideally result in a new military capability reflecting a combination of operational concepts, systems, technologies, and organizational approaches.2
The idea of aligning "enduring U.S. strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses" is an excellent one, although it happens to be contrary to the traditional American approach to strategy where the United States would seek out the enemy's strength and destroy it. It is always a good idea to align strength against weakness, but winning (achieving political objectives) may not be attainable unless the enemy's strength is first defeated. The idea may also encourage overoptimistic hopes for strategic achievements with minimum expenditures by the United States.\(^3\)

Competitive Strategies is not a new strategy. It is, instead, a method of strategic thinking that can be used to evaluate defense strategy and planning in light of the long-term military competitions. In other words, Competitive Strategies is a tool to help make strategies and associated resource allocation decisions. Competitive Strategies is not intended to cope with every issue, it is more situation-oriented. It focuses on selected, key, high-leverage areas in a move-countermove-countermove analysis (i.e., with a given U.S. initiative, what is the likely range of Soviet responses and, with these given responses, what actions could the U.S. then take?).\(^4\)

If the Office of the Secretary of Defense thinks that he has found something new in the Competitive Strategies concept, one must wonder what it has been doing in previous years. Since strategy is by nature competitive, there are grounds to question the firmness of the official intellectual grip on the subject.\(^5\) The idea of contrasting the strengths and weaknesses of one's military forces against those of the enemy has long
been a prescription for military success. For example, the famous 19th
century Japanese master swordsman, Miyamoto Musashi, urged his students
to carefully study the fighting styles of other schools in order to learn how
to defeat them.\textsuperscript{6} Competitive Strategies applies this traditional military
concept to the modern national security environment.

Since the end of World War II, the concept of deterrence has
evolved into a primary goal of U.S. military forces. The CSI proposes to
enhance deterrence by developing policies which will direct peacetime
superpower competition into safer areas.\textsuperscript{7} This DoD initiative also
recognizes that the domestic needs of the United States require the
employment of efficient military acquisition policies in the face of a large
Soviet military investment.\textsuperscript{8} The CSI establishes task forces which study
the force structures necessary for the efficient maintenance of deterrence in
potential conflict scenarios.

The first Competitive Strategies Task Force met in July 1987 to
study the scenario of a high intensity conventional conflict between NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces on the European Continent. The members of this
task force proposed four areas in which NATO’s superior information
processing capability could be aligned against the Soviet requirement for
strict time management and high tempõ operations. The result of the task
force was to identify technologies crucial to maintaining a competitive war
fighting edge which would be necessary to deter a future Soviet attack upon
NATO.\textsuperscript{9}
It is too early to tell what the effect of this first Competitive Strategies Task Force Report will be. In the overall system of U.S. defense planning, the contribution of Competitive Strategies remains small. The CSI is an ad hoc system of planning employed by the Secretary of Defense concurrent with, and if used properly, augmenting, the standardized process of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPBS). Unless the results of the Competitive Strategies Task Forces are incorporated into both U.S. war plans and the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), the CSI cannot succeed even if it is institutionalized.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES METHODOLOGY

The Competitive Strategies methodology involves aligning enduring U.S. strengths against enduring Soviet weaknesses over a 5-15 year time frame. The goal is to create a new or improved U.S. military capability in high leverage areas, thereby gaining advantages for the U.S. A military capability involves various combinations of doctrine, operational concepts, training, procedures, organizational approaches, systems, and new technologies. Properly understood, a new or improved military capability may include, but ideally goes beyond, mere systems and technologies. Competitive Strategies aims to channel the long-term military competition into areas where the Soviets function ineffectively and where they obtain minimum results for given costs in time, effort, and money.10

In establishing an explicit methodology for exploring the competitive relationships of military adversaries, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
was able to draw upon the experience of U.S. corporate strategic planners. Beginning in the early 70s, corporate planners began to examine methods of developing policies which would create a competitive economic advantage. In particular, Dr. Michael Porter at the Harvard School of Business began a series of lectures on Industry and Competitive Analysis. In a broad sense, the CSI methodology has much in common with the corporate approach to competitive strategic analysis.

Dr. Porter describes corporate competitive strategy as the system of developing goals and policies which then shape a corporation's strategy for economic competition. His book, *Competitive Strategy*, is based on the proposition that these strategies for competition should be based upon an explicitly formulated analytical approach. Dr. Porter suggests a series of questions whose answers will form the basis of a competitive strategy:

- What is your current strategy? The answer to this question requires both the explicit statement of current goals and policies and also a listing of the assumptions upon which the current strategy is based.

- What is happening in the environment? This question focuses on analyzing the industry in which the competition will take place, potential adversaries, and external factors relevant to the competition (government policies, environmental concerns etc). This analysis concludes by examining the strengths and weaknesses of all competitors in the contemporary environment.

- What should your strategy be? This question forces the corporation to examine whether the assumptions of its
current strategy apply to the competitive environment. Several alternative strategies are developed. In the end a strategy must be chosen.

The prevalent question remains whether the competitive strategies created by Porter for corporate use, can be adapted effectively by the Department of Defense for national security.

The first Competitive Strategies Task Force employed a narrower methodology than their corporate contemporaries. The task force members developed their analysis in five phases.

- Critical Soviet military tasks were identified.
- U.S. strengths were aligned against Soviet weaknesses;
- Several candidate strategies were developed;
- Potential Soviet responses were identified; and
- U.S. countermoves were developed and net result determined.

This Competitive Strategies analysis should be viewed as supplementing the systems analysis methods already being employed in PPBS.

Competitive Strategies provides an adaptive framework for analyzing operational concepts while systems analysis focuses on weapon system comparisons. Competitive Strategies is able to postulate the effects of changing U.S. goals on the future competition. Systems analysis must analyze the goals established for the current budget cycle. Competitive
Strategies narrows its analysis to selected competition scenarios. Systems analysis must encompass the entire plan for U.S. defense acquisition.\textsuperscript{14}

The results of Competitive Strategies analysis is injected into the PPBS system by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Technological systems identified by the CSI are placed on a list and tracked through the budget planning system. These lists are then transmitted to the respective Service Secretaries so that important competitive technologies are afforded a protected status.\textsuperscript{15}

Currently, the CSI expects to expand its methodology by designing computer simulations and war games which will validate the strategic concepts developed by the Competitive Strategies Task Forces \textsuperscript{16}. These war games will also provide an excellent forum for educating policy makers on the benefits of the Competitive Strategies Approach.

\section*{III. EVALUATION OF THE COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES INITIATIVE}

The basic assumptions in Competitive Strategies, according to the Department of Defense Competitive Strategies Office are: \textsuperscript{17}

- The US and Soviet Union are involved in a long-term competition.
- Competition occurs in time of peace, crisis and conflict.
- Military is only one component of the competition.
- Defense is a resource constrained on both sides.
Defense investments are only partially influenced by an opponent's actions.

Other considerations include national interests and objectives, foreign policy, internal security demands, etc.

Thus, not purely action - reaction.

The Soviets, or any other opponent, are capable of beating the US at its own game.

The stated institutional goals of the CSI are to:

- Maintain credible deterrence in the face of substantially greater Soviet defense investments;
- Make past Soviet military investments obsolete, thereby reducing the military threat... and making them realize that cooperation is a more beneficial choice;
- Channel the competition into safer areas; and
- Channel the competition into areas less costly for us and more costly for them in offensive weapons.

Examination of these goals reveals several assumptions implicit in the Competitive Strategies process. First and foremost, the principal adversary identified by the CSI is the Soviet Union. There is no indication that this analysis will be applied on a broader scale in order to examine alternative competitors in the national security arena.

Second, Competitive Strategies planning is focused on the national security environment 10 to 15 years in the future. The conflict scenarios developed for the future are intended to guide procurement policies in the
current peacetime environment. The development and execution of competitive policies assumes the continued peaceful coexistence of the US and the Soviet Union.

Third, the Competitive Strategies Task Forces, while looking to exploit any competitive advantage, will probably focus on technology as the answer. US strategic planners tend to assume that technological advantage will continue to provide for US national security.

Fourth, the Competitive Strategies methodology seems to assume that Soviet military procurement policies can be influenced by US procurement policies in a sort of action-reaction arms race model. This is a very difficult assumption to verify. On the surface there appears to be supporting evidence. The US development of the B-52 is often cited as an example of a successful competitive strategy. The deployment of B-52 strategic bombers supposedly forced the Soviet Union to spend enormous resources on air defense. This argument, however, overlooks the possibility that other events may have caused Soviet concern over air defense. For instance, it may have been spurred by U.S. intelligence aircraft which systematically overflew the USSR in the late 1950s. The formulation of an action-reaction superpower procurement model oversimplifies a complex decision-making process.

Even assuming that these assumptions are valid, the Competitive Strategies process is greatly constrained by bureaucratic environment of DoD military planning. First, the CSI is confined to influencing DoD
policies only. the Competitive Strategies process is not free to examine the larger score of U.S. national security policy.

Each of the individual players in the Competitive Strategies process is influenced by parochial bureaucratic interests. The strategic planning performed by Competitive Strategies Task Forces is based upon an analysis of future US war fighting capability. Current war plans are developed by the Unified and Specified Commanders and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The potential for internal conflict is high if civilians in Competitive Strategies Task Forces attempt to usurp this traditionally military function.

The implementation procedures of the Competitive Strategies process promise to protect technological programs considered vital to the future security needs of the nation. The creation of protected programs reduces the ability of the service secretaries to determine their service budgets. Friction may be created by programs lobbying the Competitive Strategies Task Forces for protection behind the backs of the service secretaries.

IV. ANALYSIS

The chess match methodology in a move-response-counterresponse sequence, as used in Secretary Carlucci's Annual Report to the Congress for FY 1989, is contrary to common knowledge that war, and even peacetime defense preparations, is not remotely like chess. A chess match is governed by rules, with all the pieces visible and each player moving in turn. Unfortunately, war is not like that, as Clausewitz asserted with the ideas of the "Fog of War," and the "Friction." There are no rules between
two competing, or warring, nations. If Competitive Strategies must allow for this fluid environment of no rules or boundaries.19

One should not overemphasize the negative aspects of assumptions and constraints when examining the Competitive Strategies Initiative. Any strategic planning initiative developed within the DoD would be based upon assumptions, and resistance always accompanies change. The important question is, "Are the assumptions invalid or the resistance insurmountable?"

The assumptions used by the CSI are generally accepted by the U.S. defense establishment in general. Most U.S. war fighting doctrines (Maritime Strategy, Flexible Response, etc.) are based on a characterization of the soviet union as the enemy. Also, it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. and USSR will not soon go to war since the CSI is intended to guide peacetime procurement policies. The assumptions that U.S. technological advantage can offset Soviet numerical advantage and the modeling of an action-reaction arms race while untested, will not damage U.S. war fighting capability should they prove untrue.

The fundamental idea behind Competitive Strategies is an expression of such commonplace wisdom that it is amazing, and slightly appalling, that people, especially political and defense leaders, should find it so novel. There may be several pitfalls associated with current thinking in regards to Competitive Strategies, which may be:20
1. **The overvaluation of technology.** Americans, in modern history, have counted technology as one of their strengths. A great deal of the competitive strategies literature reflects the belief that new technologies can be the key to military success. The danger may be a blind search for new weapons or a way to use the older ones differently, while ignoring the fundamentals, such as how to wage war and the human factors.

2. **Neglect of enemy responses or initiatives.** When designing competitive strategies it may be convenient to assume a rather stupid and cooperative enemy. An important reason why planners should understand the probable error of believing that clever ideas can substitute for hard fighting, is because clever ideas have a way of being countered. The Soviets, or any other adversary, have a reasonable chance of countering any technological advantage which U.S. may develop with their own technological skills. Competitive Strategies mandates a very serious Red team analysis.

3. **The problem of fashion.** Competitive Strategies is a good idea, but good ideas can become bad ideas if they assume fashionable status and if development of strategy is last rhetoric and budget gimmicks. It makes good copy for the press and for Congress to argue that new technologies, tactics, and operational concepts can reap rewards quite disproportionate to effort and costs. But, more often than not, victory (or whatever goals are desired) has to be earned the old fashioned way, one has to fight hard for it. This is not to say the U.S. should not develop the latest technology and strategies to employ it, but, at the same time, preparations must be conducted to wage the less attractive war of attrition if Murphy's Law denies the swift victory.
There is no question that resistance to Competitive Strategies exists within DoD. For example, an unnamed Defense Department official recently noted:

... not everyone has the same view of competitive strategies. Various people will pass judgement as to what is competitive on a priority basis and they will attempt to promote their pet rocks. They will have their own budget resources. It will confront a lot of people here who want everything without any notion of priorities. It will force them to make choices.

The results of the first Task Force seemed to support the established ware fighting doctrines of the various services. The four initiatives proposed by the Task Force were:

- Countering Soviet Air Operations;
- Countering Soviet penetration of NATO Forward Defense;
- Stressing the Warsaw Pact Troop Control System; and
- Countering Soviet Global and Multitheater Operations.

These four initiatives mesh well with the already established service doctrines of Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA), Air-Land Battle, and Air Force bomber programs such as the B-2 stealth bomber. Most of the initiatives to date have been chiefly concerned with the Central Front, which directly affects the U.S. Army and, to a lesser degree, the U.S. Air Force. The Navy has not been the primary beneficiary of these initiatives.
It is doubtful that the Competitive Strategies process would be able to influence war fighting doctrines without first gaining the support of the applicable military services. It seems, therefore, that the true role of the CSI is to integrate the accepted war fighting doctrines of the services into a comprehensive procurement strategy which will cause the Soviets to continue to spend heavily on their defensive systems.

The ability of competitive Strategies to influence service budgets is already creating some internal friction in DoD. According to Defense News, several U.S. Navy officials are concerned that Navy programs will become neglected as Air Force and Army programs become protected by the results of the first CSI Task Force. Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft has already signed a list of military programs which will receive special protected status in future service budget requests.

The survival of Competitive Strategies depends upon a strong advocate or sponsor from the office of the Secretary of Defense. With the change of administrations from Reagan to Bush, it is yet uncertain whether a strong supporter for Competitive Strategies exists among the new appointees in the Cheney led Defense Department. The advocates of Competitive Strategies are encouraged from the support Congressional leaders have given, and the pressure which they have asserted on both the Executive branch and the Department of Defense to retain Competitive Strategies, rather than adopt the methodology as one of several tools useful to the development of strategy.
The potential advantages of the CSI probably outweigh any negative aspects. Focusing on the long term superpower competition provides an important supplement to the short term focus of the PPBS system. It is too early, however, to judge whether the CSI will ultimately be successful or not. To a large extent, its continued existence may depend upon whether or not the current Administration views the CSI as a political remnant of the Reagan defense program or a tool for the future.

The true test of Competitive strategies will be performed sometime in the future. Will 21st century strategic planners look back and congratulate today's policy-makers as helping to shape a safer superpower competition? U.S. military planners must periodically think about the future because weapons built today will remain in the U.S. Inventory for decades. Competitive Strategies provides a needed forum for conceptualizing future U.S. military needs.

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name and Title</th>
<th>Address and Details</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Dudley Knox, Library</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943-5100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Director of Research (Code 012)</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943-5100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Andrew Marshall</td>
<td>Director, Net Assessment, OSD/NA Room 3A930, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 20501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>COL Steven Rickey, USAF</td>
<td>Competitive Strategies Office, OSD/ES (CSO), PNT Room 1E801/5, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 20301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>CAPT Jerry Murphy, USN</td>
<td>Chief Strategic Planning, USD A PI/SP Room 3E10, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 20301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Director, Defense Policy</td>
<td>OEB Room 308, National Security Council Staff, 17 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Dr. James Tritten</td>
<td>Associate Professor, Department of National Security Affairs (56Tr), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943-5100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Dr. Nancy C. Roberts, Associate Professor</td>
<td>Administrative Science Department (54Rc), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943-5100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Dr. Darnell Whitt, Associate Professor  
Defense Resources Education Management Center  
Code 6417/64Wh  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA  93943-5100

10. Dr. David Whipple  
Chairman  
Administrative Science Department (54)  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA  93943-5100

11. CDR Terry Tierney  
Curricular Officer - NSA/Intelligence Programs  
Code 38  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA  93943  
(forward to students previously enrolled in NS 4230)

12. Dr. Ben Adams  
Deputy Commissioner  
U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission  
Pentagon Room 54670  
Washington, D.C.  20301

13. Dr. Richard T. Ackley  
Commander, U.S. Navy (Ret.)  
Director, National Security Studies  
California State University, San Bernardino  
5500 University Parkway  
San Bernardino, CA  92407

14. LTC Ken Allard, USA  
DACS-ZBAS (Pnt Room 3C641)  
Office of the Chief of Staff  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C.  20310-0200

15. COL David J. Andre, USA  
Special Assistant for Analysis  
ODUSD (Planning and Resources)  
Pentagon, Room 3A7&8  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C.  20301-2100

16. Dr. Roger Barnett  
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)  
National Security Research  
Suite 330  
3031 Javier Road  
Fairfax, VA  22031
17. Dr. Alvin Bernstein
Chairman, Strategy Department
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02840

18. Dr. Donald C. Daniel
Chairman, Campaign and Strategy Department
Center for Naval Warfare Studies
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02841-5010

19. Dr. Brad Dismukes
Center for Naval Analyses
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22301

20. Dr. James George
Center for Naval Analyses
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22301

21. Dr. David K. Hall
National Security Decision Making Department
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02841

22. COL David G. Hansen, USA
Chairman
Department of National Security and Strategy
U.S. Army War College
Box 484
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

23. COL John J. Hickey, Jr., USA
Attn: AWCI Root Hall Room A218
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

24. CAPT William S. Johnson, USN
OP-06A
Pentagon Room 4E592
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20301

25. Dr. Francis X. Kane
Strategic Defense Center
Rockwell International Corporation
2230 East Imperial Highway
El Segundo, CA 90245
26. COL Thomas A. Keaney, USAF  
   Chairman, Department of Strategy  
   National War College  
   Ft. Leslie J. McNair  
   Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

27. AMB Rodney O. Kennedy-Minott  
   Senior Research Fellow  
   The Hoover Institution  
   Stanford University  
   Stanford, CA 94123

28. Director  
   U.S. and International Studies  
   U.S. Naval Academy  
   Annapolis, MD 21402

29. Dr. J. J. Martin  
   Senior Vice-President  
   Science Applications International Corp.  
   10260 Campus Point Drive  
   San Diego, CA 92121

30. CAPT Richard Diamond, USN  
    OP-603  
    Pentagon Room 4E486  
    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
    Washington, D.C. 20350

31. Dr. Kleber S. Masterson  
    Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)  
    Vice President - Booz Allen & Hamilton  
    Crystal Square #2, Suite 1100  
    1752 Jefferson Davis Highway  
    Arlington, VA 22202-4158

32. CAPT James Starke, USN  
    Executive Director  
    OP-00K  
    CNO Executive Panel  
    Center for Naval Analyses  
    4401 Ford Avenue  
    Alexandria, VA 22302

33. Dr. Jeffrey S. Milstein  
    Strategic Analyst and Planner  
    Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
    Plans and Policy Directorate  
    Strategy Division  
    The Pentagon, Room 2E949  
    Washington, D.C. 20301
34. George E. Pickett, Jr.
Northrop Analysis Center
2 Lafayette Center
1133 21st Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

35. Dr. Bruce Powers
Special Assistant for Technology, Plans, & Analysis
OP-05/50W Pnt Room 4E367
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000

36. Michael Rich
Vice President
The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street
P.O. Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90406-2138

37. Dr. James Roche
Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Northrop Analysis Center
2 Lafayette Centre
1133 21st Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

38. Dr. Steven P. Rosen
Strategy Department
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02841

39. J. W. Russel
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Manager, Systems Analysis
Boeing Aerospace
P.O. Box 3999, 8R-83
Seattle, WA 98124-2499

40. CAPT Peter Swartz, USN
USNATO/DoD
Box 102
APO New York, NY 09667-5028

41. Dr. Michael Vlahos
Director, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Service Institute
U.S. Department of State
1400 Key Blvd.
Arlington, VA 22209
42. CAPT Robert B. Watts, USN (Ret.)
Coordinator, Strategic Studies Project
Naval War College Foundation
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, RI 02841-5010

43. Francis J. West
The Gamma Corporation
1818 North Lynn Street, Suite 804
Arlington, VA 22209

44. Dr. Charles Wolf
Director, RAND Graduate School
RAND Corporation
P.O. Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90406-2130

45. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314