Since the end of World War II, the use of military forces to help achieve peace, without using violence, has gained wide acceptance. Most recently, the demise of the Cold War has ushered in a new era of international cooperation and a surge of peacekeeping activity. Although United Nations peacekeeping operations are rapidly growing, the United States has not pursued a position of peacekeeping leadership. The Soviets, however, are seizing the initiative with aggressive support for United Nations peacekeeping and specific (continued on reverse).
proposals for enhancing these operations. As the United States political leadership comes to grips with the changed threat, it should see that active involvement with United Nations peacekeeping is in the national strategic interest. The Army's senior leaders state that peacekeeping is a significant part of the Army's strategic role, however peacekeeping doctrine has only recently been addressed, as an adjunct of low intensity conflict, and the Army has no institutional programs for peacekeeping training. Where is the United States in regard to Peacekeeping and what has the Army done to prepare its leaders and soldiers for these unique missions? This study looks at the history of peacekeeping; reviews the status of peacekeeping doctrine, force development and training; examines the future of peacekeeping; and draws some conclusions about where the Army is and what it might do to prepare for increased involvement in these very different and complex operations.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

PEACEKEEPING AND THE ARMY: WHERE ARE WE?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of World War II, the use of military forces to help achieve peace, without using violence, has gained wide acceptance. Most recently, the demise of the Cold War has ushered in a new era of international cooperation and a surge of peacekeeping activity. Although United Nations peacekeeping operations are rapidly growing, the United States has not pursued a position of peacekeeping leadership. The Soviets, however, are seizing the initiative with aggressive support for United Nations peacekeeping and specific proposals for enhancing these operations. As the United States political leadership comes to grips with the changed threat, it should see that active involvement with United Nations peacekeeping is in the national strategic interest. The Army's senior leaders state that peacekeeping is a significant part of the Army's strategic role, however peacekeeping doctrine has only recently been addressed, as an adjunct of low intensity conflict, and the Army has no institutional programs for peacekeeping training. Where is the United States in regard to Peacekeeping and what has the Army done to prepare its leaders and soldiers for these unique missions? This study looks at the history of peacekeeping; reviews the status of peacekeeping doctrine, force development and training; examines the future of peacekeeping; and draws some conclusions about where the Army is and what it might do to prepare for increased involvement in these very different and complex operations.
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Since the close of World War II and formation of the United Nations, the international community has seen military forces used in innovative, nonviolent ways to assist diplomacy in controlling and ending armed conflict. These novel activities are collectively called Peacekeeping. Most peacekeeping operations have been conducted by several nations combining their efforts to foster a neutral and international character, but not all avoided national self-interests, remained nonviolent, or were successful. Also, there is a wide divergence of opinion as to what types of military missions legitimately constitute peacekeeping, as opposed to interventions or peacetime contingency operations. Despite these stumbling blocks, peacekeeping has become firmly accepted in the international community as a viable and desirable method of helping to control conflict within and among nations.

Where does the United States (U.S.) and particularly the U.S. Army fit into the growth of international peacekeeping? What are our current and future roles? Do we have adequate and clear doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, force structure, equipment, and training programs to carry out the often confusing and complex duties required of peacekeeping forces? This study seeks to examine these questions and provide
some conclusions on where we are, what future peacekeeping duties/missions we may be required to perform, and what we have to do to meet these challenges.

This study will review a broad continuum of peacekeeping activity, considering international, national, military and political aspects. It will not review any specific peacekeeping operation in detail. It will highlight differing opinions, definitions, principles, ideas and concepts, and identify trends to hopefully contribute some thought on the direction of U.S. peacekeeping.

**PEACEKEEPING DEFINED**

There is been a great deal of writing on the subject of peacekeeping, however there is a lack of consensus on exactly what peacekeeping is, and what it is not. The concept of peacekeeping is not contained in the United Nations (U.N.) Charter and the term was not used by the U.N. until 1956, when a U.N. truce supervision force was sent to Egypt following the invasion by Israel, the United Kingdom and France.\(^1\) The term was formalized in 1965 through creation of the U.N. Special Committee on Peace-Keeping [sic] Operations.\(^2\)

**Definitions**

In spite of the fact that the U.N. has been using the term peacekeeping for over 30 years, it still has not produced an official definition.\(^3\) A popular book about the history of U.N.
peacekeeping states that peacekeeping is "an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict."\(^4\)

This description seems lacking when compared to the International Peace Academy's definition:

> Peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.\(^5\)

There are numerous definitions of peacekeeping, but only one more will be cited for comparison purposes. In emerging joint doctrine for low intensity conflict (LIC), the U.S. has defined peacekeeping as:

> Efforts taken with the consent of the civil or military authorities of the belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve and maintain peace.\(^6\)

This narrow definition actually describes only one type of peacekeeping ("trucekeeping"), which will be addressed further in Chapter III.

**Broad Scope**

The variety of peacekeeping definitions is caused by the evolutionary nature of peacekeeping, the wide range of situations and missions which have been called peacekeeping, and the unpredictability of future peacekeeping requirements. Although each peacekeeping operation has been unique, most can be grouped
into the general categories of observer missions and peacekeeping forces. Types of peacekeeping missions include:

- Cease-fire/truce observation
- Withdrawal and disengagement supervision
- Border patrolling
- Prisoner-of-war exchange supervision
- Assistance to civil authorities
- Humanitarian assistance
- Demilitarization and demobilization supervision
- Observe/supervise free elections
- Supervising international/free waterways and territories
- Arms control supervision

"Benefits" from Complexity

The "lack of [a] clear definition [of peacekeeping] provides a measure of flexibility that serves political and operational purposes," a loophole that gives great latitude in applying the term. This fact has not been overlooked by some states that have used peacekeeping terms and inference in an attempt to legitimize, or give a flavor of international acceptance to intervention operations.

One example of stretching the concept of peacekeeping for political purposes is the U.S. invasion of Grenada, "Urgent Fury." This operation was conducted in conjunction with the multinational "Caribbean Peacekeeping Force," which arrived on the island prepared to fight (something peacekeeping forces are
not supposed to do), ahead of the 82d Airborne.\textsuperscript{10} The U.S. State Department described Urgent Fury as collective action by "the Combined U.S.-Caribbean Peace Force...to protect lives and restore order."\textsuperscript{11} However, one analyst says the operation "...was really a smokescreen to conceal the real motive: the seizing of an unprecedented opportunity to rid the Caribbean of an expanding Communist threat...."\textsuperscript{12} Another analyst describes the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force as an "arrangement...that was designed as a rather flimsy fig-leaf which in the event failed to add much respectability to what was after all generally recognized to be an intervention operation."\textsuperscript{13}

This example is cited not to infer that Urgent Fury was unnecessary or in some way illegal, but rather to illustrate the confusion that results when peacekeeping is used to politically color the intent of a military operation that is not peacekeeping. Urgent Fury will be discussed further in Chapter II.

**PEACEKEEPING PRINCIPLES**

Published as fundamentals, essential elements, and most frequently as principles, it is useful to examine the factors which characterize and form the parameters of peacekeeping operations. As with the definition of peacekeeping, there are a variety of peacekeeping principles and only enough will be covered here to indicate differing thoughts and highlight the broad character of peacekeeping operations.
U.N. Principles

The U.N.'s peacekeeping principles were first promulgated in the 1973 Security Council Resolution that established the second UN peacekeeping operation in Egypt. Further refined, they now form the prerequisites for any U.N. peacekeeping operation:

(1) deploy only with the full confidence and backing of the Security Council; and
(2) deploy only with full co-operation and assent of the host countries; and that once deployed the force itself was to:
(3) be under the command of the U.N. through the Secretary-General;
(4) enjoy complete freedom of movement in the host countries;
(5) be international in composition, comprising contingents from nations which were acceptable to the host countries;
(6) act impartially;
(7) use force only in self-defence;
(8) be supplied and administered under the U.N. arrangements.14

U.S. Principles

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff cover peacekeeping principles in a final draft publication on LIC operations, stating they are the "essential elements or preconditions" that must exist if a peacekeeping operation is to be successful:

(1) The consent, cooperation, and support of the parties to the dispute.
(2) Political recognition of the peacekeeping force by a portion of the international community.
(3) A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission with specified and understood rules of engagement (ROE).

(4) Sufficient freedom of movement for the force, or observers, to carry out their responsibilities.

(5) An effective command, control, and communications system.

(6) Well-trained, balanced, impartial, and noncoercive forces.

(7) An effective and responsive, intelligence capability.1

Not surprisingly, two U.S. Services have published fundamental principles of peacekeeping that are somewhat different. Summarized, they are:

1. Consent - All parties, belligerents and peacekeeping participants, must consent to the operations. Consent is a common thread linking all the principles.

2. Neutrality - The peacekeeping participants must think and act impartially.

3. Balance - The belligerents must consent to the geopolitical composition of the peacekeeping force.

4. Single-Manager Control - Peacekeeping operations should have a single head to execute the policies of the mandate.

5. Concurrent Action - Peacekeeping operations are conducted concurrently with other efforts for a permanent peace.

6. Unqualified Sponsor Support - Whatever their contribution, peacekeeping participants should give full and unqualified support.
7. Freedom of Movement - Closely allied with the principle of consent, the peacekeeping force requires unhindered movement throughout its area of operations.

8. Self-Defense - The peacekeeping force has the inherent right of self-defense, which cannot be abrogated.¹⁶

The similarities and differences in the U.N. and U.S. lists are easily recognized. The JCS and Army/Air Force lists each contain some salient points that are not found in the other. A single, consistent, and comprehensive set of U.S. principles would be helpful for field commanders, staff planners and trainers.

The Mandate

Because of its overriding influence, the principle of a clear mandate requires additional attention. As mentioned earlier, each peacekeeping operation is unique, often dealing with ambiguous situations, extreme tensions and the possibility of violence. "The mandate is the peacekeeping force's authority to act. It describes the force's scope of operations including constraints and restrictions."¹⁷ A mandate should contain the following:

1. A clear mission statement.
2. The size of the force.
3. The contributing nations, forces and support.
4. Duration of the operation.
5. Rights and immunities of the force.
7. Appointment of the force commander.
8. Financing.

The mandate should not be considered a rigid document. Whenever there is a need for change, such as alterations to the force composition or mission, the mandate should be amended.

Additional Characteristics

Most modern peacekeeping operations have contained two additional characteristics worthy of mention: formation and deployment under urgent/time sensitive conditions, and an ad hoc organization. These traits have developed through the need to quickly interpose a buffer force between belligerents that have agreed to a truce, and the fact that neither the U.N., nor any other multinational or regional group maintains a standing organization/force for peacekeeping missions. Not surprisingly, these factors have exacerbated difficulties in deploying, employing and achieving early success in peacekeeping operations, particularly those of the U.N.

One final background item: It is necessary to understand that peacekeeping forces cannot keep determined belligerents from fighting. The peacekeepers, lightly equipped and without much fighting power, actually serve a "hostage effect," i.e., the lives of the peacekeepers are ransomed against international acknowledgment of good behavior by the belligerents. This hostage effect and the inability of peacekeepers to maintain a peace, was seen in 1967 when the Egyptians insisted that the U.N.
Sinai peacekeeping force be removed, nullifying Egyptian consent for the peacekeeping mission and facilitating the "Six Day War".20 A peacekeeping force does not prevent the opponents from fighting, but it can provide them with a face-saving way of not continuing their conflict, if they choose to do so.18

ENDNOTES


2. Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, p. 1. Note: The word "peacekeeping" is spelled hyphenated in U.N. and some other references.


6. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of staff Publication 3-07: Doctrine for Joint Operations In Low Intensity Conflict (Final Draft), p. xix. (hereafter referred to as "JCS Pub 3-07").


8. For more detailed discussions on the variety of peacekeeping operations, various definitions and types of peacekeeping missions, see the introductory portions of Wiseman (ed.), Rikhye, Mackinlay, JCS Pub 3-07, and FM 100-20/APP 3-20.


16. U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20: Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict, pp. 4-2 – 4-4. Note: Although approved by its Service chiefs, this manual is currently undergoing some revision prior to publication.

17. Ibid, p. 4-1.

18. JCS Pub 3-07, pp. IV-3 – IV-4. This reference briefly addresses the mandate, however, the mandate's importance is emphasized further by the U.N. in The Blue Helmets: "An unclear or ambiguous mandate means that the operation will face recurrent difficulties and become involved in actions likely to be viewed as controversial." p. 4.


20. Ibid., p. 3.

CHAPTER II

SURVEY OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

History is replete with instances of nations using their military forces, unilaterally and collectively to influence the affairs of other states, usually for the national self-interest of the initiator(s). Modern peacekeeping strives for higher goals in support of international interests. An early example of peacekeeping is the League of Nations' multinational force operation that supervised the Saar plebiscite in 1935; however another world war and more than a decade would pass before continuing, effective and "true" peacekeeping operations would evolve.¹ To assist in unraveling the actual character of past peacekeeping operations, it will help to have an understanding of the various relationships peacekeeping forces may have with the nations in which the force operates.

FORCE - STATE RELATIONSHIPS

Peacekeeping operations have historically followed political dictates rather than scholarly ideals, resulting in relationships between peacekeeping forces and their "host states" that do not always reflect the model portrayed by the U.N.'s principles. One study concludes that there are "six categories of peacekeeping, of which the 'typical' U.N. operation (multinational and neutral) illustrates only one."² The following diagram shows the relationship of the six categories:
Because they violate the key U.N. principles of impartiality, multinational composition and consent of all the belligerents, advocates of the U.N. model would contend that the other five categories do not accurately portray legitimate peacekeeping. However, not all international actions labeled peacekeeping have followed the U.N. model. As the following survey will illustrate, even the U.N.'s peacekeeping forces have not always complied with U.N. principles. Further, as there have been many more peacekeeping operations outside the U.N. than within (over 50 just in Africa South of the Sahara), the
prospects for not following the U.N. model are considerable.\textsuperscript{4} Once again, we see that the peacekeeping business is without exactness and takes many forms.

\textbf{UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS}

In 1988, after 40 years of dedicated effort to control armed conflict, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to U.N. peacekeeping forces. During this period, the U.N. mounted 15 peacekeeping operations with a half million personnel (mostly military) from 58 countries, incurring a loss of over 700 lives. At the time the Peace Prize was awarded in September 1988, the U.N. was conducting seven operations with over 10,000 personnel from 35 countries, at a cost of about $230 million annually, a quarter of the U.N.'s total budget.\textsuperscript{5}

The first U.N. initiative with fielded personnel to help keep the peace was the U.N. Temporary Commission On Korea in 1947.\textsuperscript{6} This, and subsequent U.N. actions in Korea are not included in U.N. lists of peacekeeping operations as a result of their association with the U.N.'s only "military enforcement action [Korean War]," which does not meet the consent, impartiality and other key prerequisite principles of U.N. peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{7}

Subsequent to receiving the Nobel Prize, the U.N. has initiated three additional peacekeeping operations, making a total of 18 since 1948, with 10 ongoing (see Figure 2). Interestingly, the U.N.'s first (retroactively recognized)
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<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>SIZE*</th>
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<td>UNTSO - UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>Truce observation</td>
<td>1948 -</td>
<td>572</td>
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<td>UNMOGIP - UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (Kashmir/Jammu)</td>
<td>Cease-fire supervision</td>
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<td>UNEF I - UN Emergency Force I (Egypt-Israel border)</td>
<td>Interposition</td>
<td>1956 - 57</td>
<td>6,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL - UN Observer Group in Lebanon</td>
<td>Border patrol</td>
<td>1958 (6 mos)</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC - Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (Zaire)</td>
<td>Pacification</td>
<td>1960 - 64</td>
<td>19,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSF - UN Security Force (Dutch West New Guinea - West Irian)</td>
<td>Pacification</td>
<td>1962 - 63</td>
<td>1,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNYOM - UN Yemen Observer Mission</td>
<td>Border patrol</td>
<td>1963 - 64 (15 mos)</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP - UN Force in Cyprus</td>
<td>Cease-fire supervision Pacification</td>
<td>1964 -</td>
<td>6,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPOM - UN India/Pakistan Observer Mission</td>
<td>Cease-fire supervision</td>
<td>1965 - 66 (6 mos)</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMREP - Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>1965 - 66 (17 mos)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEF II - UN Emergency Force II (Egypt - Sinai)</td>
<td>Interposition</td>
<td>1973 - 79</td>
<td>6,973</td>
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<td>UNDOF - UN Disengagement and Observer Force (Golan Heights)</td>
<td>Interposition</td>
<td>1974 -</td>
<td>1,289</td>
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<td>UNIFIL - UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>Cease-fire supervision Pacification</td>
<td>1978 -</td>
<td>6,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP - UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
<td>Monitor troop withdrawals and accords compliance</td>
<td>May 1988 - 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIIMOG - UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group</td>
<td>Observe cease-fire and monitor troop withdrawals</td>
<td>Aug 1988 - 400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM - UN Angola Verification Mission</td>
<td>Verify troop withdrawals</td>
<td>Jan 1989 -</td>
<td>70 mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG - UN Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)</td>
<td>Nation building</td>
<td>May 1989 - 4,650 mil</td>
<td>2,000 civ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA - UN Observer Group in Central America</td>
<td>Verify demobilization, territorial and arms accords</td>
<td>Dec 1989 - 260 mil</td>
<td>350 civ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 1948 - 1989

* Approximate in some instances due to fluctuating requirements.
peacekeeping mission, the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), is still operating.

The financial burden of these operations is of great concern within the U.N., especially since they "seem to be perennially in the red." A recent U.N. report by the Special Committee On Peace-Keeping Operations contains separate comments by 31 member nations, and all but one expressed great concern about peacekeeping costs (the one exception was the United States, which is behind in meeting its U.N. peacekeeping assessments).

As mentioned, the U.N.'s peacekeeping principles have not always been faithfully followed by its peacekeeping forces, particularly when events changed significantly during the operation. Although the U.N.'s principles had not yet been published, its mission in the Congo (ONUC 1960-1964) is a good example of what happens when the principles are not applied. This force was to perform disengagement duties while the Belgian military withdrew, but became actively involved in a civil war, conducting combat operations with a strength that eventually reached nearly 20,000.

Despite their past and current problems, U.N. peacekeeping operations have gained acceptance as a viable means for reducing violence and facilitating peacemaking. The U.N. does not, however, have a monopoly on peacekeeping.

**NON-U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

There are numerous reasons why peacekeeping operations are
sponsored and conducted by regional political organizations, ad hoc multinational groups, or even by a single state. This practice is not in contravention of the U.N. Charter, which was worded to encourage regional resolution of conflicts prior to bringing matters before the world body.  

As a result of superpower and regional/bloc interests, consensus to sponsor proposed peacekeeping missions cannot always be achieved within the U.N. The operation must then be dropped, or taken on by others. One salient example of these circumstances is the Multinational Force and Observers operation in the Sinai. Part of a peace treaty, this mission was eventually sponsored outside the U.N. because of Arab and Soviet opposition to the Camp David accords. In other situations, the belligerents have preferred, or have been pressured to accept, peacekeeping assistance from regional/coalition organizations, such as the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the British Commonwealth.

Non-U.N. peacekeeping operations are not inherently "bad." As one former U.N. peacekeeping force commander states: "The non-U.N. forces have shown several advantages over U.N. forces. Unlike the U.N. system, multilateral forces are well equipped, well trained and have no financial problems...[and are]...able to take more risks." Also, keeping in mind that judgement of peacekeeping operations tends to be a subjective process, there is no evidence that either U.N. or non-U.N. peacekeeping operations are more or less successful than the other.
U.S. PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE

United States politico-military involvement in the affairs of other states has a long history, but few if any of these mostly unilateral actions were peacekeeping, especially when measured against the U.N. model, or the criteria now established in emerging U.S. doctrine. U.S. policy does support the concept of peacekeeping and "historically it is the U.S....which has promoted U.N. peacekeeping and helped to develop this novel instrument of diplomacy."16

Support of U.N. Peacekeeping

To avoid partisanship, which is felt to be unavoidable in a mostly bipolar world, the U.N. prefers not to have superpower military forces involved in its peacekeeping operations. The United States supports this preference, and has gone even further by stating that, in most circumstances, no Permanent Member of the Security Council should be a forces contributor for U.N. peacekeeping missions.17

Accordingly, U.S. support for U.N. peacekeeping operations has not included military forces, i.e., units, but these operations have received U.S. financial and logistical assistance. Only two U.N. missions included U.S. observer personnel, i.e., individual servicemen. The U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO - the U.N. operation from which Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins was abducted and killed), has been operating with U.S. military observers for over
40 years. In the other, U.S. personnel were assigned to the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949, but India forced their removal in 1954 after the U.S. extended military aid to Pakistan, which made U.S. neutrality questionable.18

U.S. Non-U.N. Peacekeeping

A summary of post World War II, non-U.N., U.S. military actions that used the term peacekeeping follows:

a. The Dominican Republic: On 29 April 1965, the U.S. unilaterally landed military forces in the Dominican Republic. The commander, LTG Bruce Palmer, Jr., states that his official "mission was to protect American lives and property; [and that] the unstated mission was to prevent another Cuba...."19 Even though the Organization of American States (OAS) had not been consulted before the invasion, President Johnson wanted OAS support to provide "the United States an umbrella of legitimacy...and a measure of multinational support for his strong anti-Communist position...."20 The United States pressed for an "inter-American peacekeeping force," but there was fear by OAS members that approving such a proposal "would lend legitimacy to a U.S. return to an intervention policy...."21

In the end, the OAS relented and formed the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), which included about 22,500 Americans (peak strength) and 2,000 troops from other OAS members.22 A Brazilian general was selected to command the IAPF, LTG Palmer was appointed his deputy, a combined headquarters was formed, and

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multinational operations commenced on 24 May. The U.N., which had differences with the OAS over what was and was not peacekeeping, also became involved and sent an observer team to Santo Domingo. A political solution was reached and both the IAPF and U.N. withdrew by the end of 1966.18

b. U.S. Sinai Support Mission: As part of the accords following the 1973 "Yom Kippur" war, the U.S. agreed to provide technical assistance to establish and conduct electronic surveillance of key Sinai terrain. The Sinai Field Mission (SFM), the name of the surveillance "force," was established in January 1976 and was manned by about 200 civilian American contract personnel. While not part of the U.N. Emergency Force II, the SFM enhanced the U.N. operation, then expanded its role in 1979 when the U.N. Sinai mandate expired (no consensus in the U.N.). The SFM continued its missions until relieved by the Multinational Force and Observers in 1982.25

c. Multinational Force (MNF) I & II: Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, a negotiated agreement called for the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) forces to leave that country. Israel did not want a U.N. force to supervise the task, but agreed to a multinational force with observers drawn from UNTSO. Constituted by the U.S., France and Italy, this force entered Beirut on 25 August 1982, completed its mission and withdrew in about two weeks. Four days later, the Lebanese president-elect was assassinated, followed by massacres in the Palistinian refugee camps. On 20 September 1982, the Lebanese government asked the MNF to return and help restore its
authority. The force did return (MNF II) and later added a British contingent, but it was no longer a peacekeeping force. There was no agreement by the belligerents, no clear mandate, the force became involved in the fighting and lost its impartiality. While MNF I is considered a success, MNF II was a clear failure and the U.S. withdrew in March 1984.26

d. Grenada: Discussed briefly in Chapter I, the 1983 invasion of this island nation was conducted in conjunction with several eastern Caribbean nations and resembled the Dominican Republic operation by combining peacekeeping terminology with an intervention. However, it differed in several principal areas: (1) The United States did consult with other nations (but not the OAS) and created a multinational force before initiating operations; (2) A combined command was not established; and, (3) The Caribbean Peacekeeping Force operated in a support role, mainly handling POWs and conducting police duties.27

e. The Multinational Force and Observers: The MFO is generally thought to be a model of non-U.N. peacekeeping. It has the consent, cooperation and sponsorship of the parties involved, a clear mandate, no significant financial or logistical problems, is certainly multinational (11 participating nations), has freedom of movement, a generous status of forces agreement, and has a exemplary record of impartiality and non-violence. However, the MFO's uniqueness goes beyond its model of success: Comparing its purpose with peacekeeping principles, it really is not a peacekeeping operation (in the context of maintaining a truce), as the former belligerents had already signed a peace
treaty. "Thus, the MFO is a new phenomenon. It looks like a peacekeeping force, but its role is to build confidence between Egypt and Israel." The MFO's role will be clarified after examination of the "peace development process," discussed in the next chapter.

ENDNOTES


2. University of Illinois, Factors Affecting the Role and Employment of Peacekeeping Forces in Africa South of the Sahara, p. iii.

3. Ibid. Note: The diagram is this study's author, developed from the referenced item.


8. UN Chronicle, p.5.


10. University of Illinois, pp. 82-84.

11. This figure was developed from multiple sources, principally: John Mackinlay, The Peacekeeper's, pp. 19-21; and the UN Chronicle, December 1988, pp. 9 and 19, March 1989, pp. 35 and 37, June 1989, pp. 5, 10, 12-14, December 1989, pp. 15-17.


14. Rikhye, p. 239.


23. Ibid, p. 73.


CHAPTER III

DOCTRINE, FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING

United Nations peacekeeping operations have traditionally gotten off to shaky starts. This situation is primarily caused by the short notice on which these operations have usually been mounted, and because there is no peacekeeping force trained and ready for immediate employment. These factors are a common thread that weave throughout peacekeeping doctrine, force development and training.

Another common thread is the non-commonality of peacekeeping terminology. It is difficult to examine doctrine when its concepts are confused by a non-discriminate use of terms. An effort to bring concept and terminology into focus will be made before moving to a review of peacekeeping doctrine.

THE PEACE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Defining Peace

The first step in coming to grips with peacekeeping concepts and terms is to define peace. Most dictionaries describe peace as the absence of violence. In this context, a truce or cease-fire between belligerents (whether imposed or mutually agreed), could be termed peace. In a more specific view, the International Peace Academy states that peace requires the absence of "the threat of violence." Peace is more than no
war!" emphatically states one researcher, a position taken by most nations and international organizations. Peace which has not achieved conflict resolution, e.g., a truce, is described by peace scholars as "negative peace," because the threat of renewed violence is still present. "Positive peace," on the other hand, is a condition where the parties have resolved their differences and removed the threat of violence. The concept of positive peace will be used here as the definition of peace.

**Peacemaking vs Trucemaking**

The term "peacemaking" is currently used to describe two very different activities. This situation could present particular problems for the U.S., as its peacekeeping doctrine contradicts that of the U.N. and most other nations in concept and definition. While the United States sees peacemaking as the use of force to impose a truce or cease-fire, a more broadly accepted view is that peacemaking is nonviolent action taken to achieve permanent settlement of the dispute, i.e., negotiating a peace treaty. Some may feel this is a trifle point, but its importance in preparing doctrine is significant.

The following concepts/definitions of peacemaking, from documents developed within the U.S. military, establish the U.S. view of peacemaking:

a. A type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force.
b. Situations may arise which require deployment of U.S. military forces to impose peace. These operations are often labeled peacekeeping, but are better described as peacemaking.... While the ultimate objective may be to maintain a peace, the initial phase in peacemaking is to achieve it.⁵

c. The use of force in peacemaking operations is not as clearly defined as in peacekeeping operations.⁶

These quotes represent not only the improper use of a term, but an erroneous mind set within the U.S. military that the forced cessation of hostilities is synonymous with peacemaking. The following non-U.S. military definitions/concepts of peacemaking highlight the contradiction:

a. An effort to settle a conflict through mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful settlement.⁷

b. Thus peace-keeping operations and peacemaking efforts are closely interrelated. The first promotes the second by creating conditions conducive to negotiations...[and]...when peace-making fails, or is not pursued vigorously, one or both parties may give up the possibility of a peaceful settlement and resort to force.⁸

c. The need to establish a nexus between peacekeeping and peacemaking becomes apparent when we examine the two terms.... Peacekeeping has a natural affinity with the concept of "order;" peacemaking with the concept of "justice."⁹

This examination of peacemaking is not suggesting that there is no place for the forceful imposition of hostilities cessation in the peace development process. Force can be used to make a truce, followed by trucekeeping during the peacemaking process. U.S. doctrine developers have recognized that imposing a forced truce is not peacekeeping (categorized under Peacetime
Contingency Operations), but they have erroneously stated that it is peacemaking. A better term would be "trucemaking" (can include violent action), or something similar, but not peacemaking, which is peaceful activity. Correcting U.S. doctrinal terminology will enhance understanding of the peace development process and put U.S. peacekeepers on the same sheet of music as the rest of the world.

The Continuum of Peace Development

When a truce is made between belligerents, active fighting stops (usually) and the international community feels "at peace." This less threatening environment, often aided by "peacekeepers," has resulted in a general acceptance of peacekeeping as being synonymous with truce maintenance (trucekeeping). However, making and maintaining a truce are not equivalent to achieving peace (positive peace). A current example is the Iran-Iraq War where a truce is holding, with U.N. assistance, but peace has not been made. What then is the process of developing peace beyond a truce, and where does peacekeeping fit in the process?

None of the peacekeeping definitions examined in Chapter I claimed that peacekeeping alone could achieve peace. Further, the above discussions of trucemaking, trucekeeping, and peacemaking clearly indicate that the process of achieving peace can include many activities. What has not been explained is how these activities relate to each other, to peace conditions (negative peace, no peace and positive peace) and to politico-military interaction, all of which are involved in the process of
trying to achieve a peace. Research for this study found no documentation that provided this explanation, clarified peace development terminology, or established a framework for a "peace development process." A Continuum of Peace Development has been designed to help fill these needs (Figure 3).

The Continuum contains two additional terms, conflict prevention and treatymaking, that require definition:

a. Conflict prevention: Any and all measures taken to prevent potential belligerents from commencing armed conflict.

b. Treatykeeping: Similar to trucekeeping, however the former belligerents have concluded a treaty to end their dispute and establish peace, but they do not yet fully trust each other and need the security presence of a third party.

No part of the continuum is absolute, however it does illustrate the following key points in the process of developing peace:

a. The peace development process can commence before the start of armed conflict, through peaceful or enforced means.

b. The use of force can be appropriate in the peace development process, although such operations do not meet the doctrinal criteria of peacekeeping.

c. Conflict prevention and trucekeeping can be peacekeeping operations, if they follow key peacekeeping principles, otherwise they are interventions.

d. The closer the peace development process progresses toward positive peace, the more the threat of violence is reduced.
FIGURE 3: CONTINUUM OF PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
TRUCEMAKING
- IMPOSED OR
- NEGOTIATED
- DISENGAGEMENT
- WITHDRAWAL

CONCURRENT ACTIVITY
TRUCEKEEPING/PEACEMAKING
- "ORDER"
- BUFFER FORCE
- OBSERVERS
- CIVIC ACTION
- "JUSTICE"
- NEGOTIATIONS
- PEACEBUILDING
- DISARMAMENT

TREATYKEEPING
- SIGNED TREATY
- CONFIDENCE BUILDING
- NATION BUILDING
- DEMOBILIZATION

“NEGATIVE” PEACE
(HIGH) THREAT OF VIOLENCE (LOW) “POSITIVE” PEACE

PEACE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
CONTINUUM OF PEACE DEVELOPMENT
e. A military force that imposes a truce cannot viably transition to trucekeeping (discussed further later).

f. Trucekeepers (military) and peacemakers (diplomats) work concurrently to achieve a peace treaty and lower the threat of violence.

g. Being nonabsolute, the peace development process is not necessarily sequential; e.g., a successful conflict prevention could move directly to treatykeeping.

Using the framework of the Continuum, it is easier to identify a specific peace development activity, actual or proposed, and relate it to a peace condition, the threat of violence and the requirement for use of force. For example: placing the MFO on the Continuum, we find that it is actually a treatykeeping operation, that will operate in an environment having a very low threat of violence, and will require little, if any, use of force; all of which are correct conclusions.

Having provided some clarification to the muddle of peacekeeping, a review of peacekeeping doctrine can now be made with greater understanding.

DOCTRINE

In comparison to nations that have frequently contributed troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations, Canada and the Nordic countries for example, the United States has little experience on which to properly base its peacekeeping doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (DTTP). The principle U.S.
peacekeeping experience has been the MFO, but U.S. Army leaders serving there report that peacekeeping is not just a simple application of light infantry. Peacekeeping is very much a political endeavor, requiring diplomacy and extreme restraint, a significant contrast to typical applications of military power.

Current U.S. Doctrine

To date, the U.S. DOD has published little official doctrine for peacekeeping. At the top of the doctrinal hierarchy, the DOD has directed the Military Departments to prepare for military operations short of war, reasonably including peacekeeping. The Army's foundation field manual states that, "The Army's missions could involve peacekeeping operations...." Although not true doctrine, the Army's annual "Posture Statement" is current direction from top leadership, and the most recent version (January 1991) states that peacekeeping is a major element of the Army's "Strategic Roles."

Moving down the hierarchy, the Army's capstone manual for military operations briefly addresses peacekeeping under LIC:

As in the past, the Army will also participate in peacekeeping operations which support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in an area of armed conflict. Such operations may be unilaterally or internationally manned and directed. Whatever the case, they will be sensitive and will require a high degree of unit and individual discipline in the forces committed. Units of peacekeeping forces use force only in cases of self-defense.

Mentioned earlier, Army Field Manual/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20 (LIC) has been approved and contains a chapter on peacekeeping.

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The Army has proposed a joint manual for peacekeeping, but not all the Services feel it is necessary. Within the Army, the XVIII Airborne Corps has developed doctrinal type documents (policy guidelines, SOPs, etc.), based on its eight year history of supporting the MFO. This information, plus the large body of peacekeeping knowledge and published DTTP of other nations, can be used to enhance the interoperability/commonality of U.S. peacekeeping DTTP. This is especially important when considering that most peacekeeping operations are multinational, not unilateral.

**Doctrine and Politics**

Once developed, there is a need for caution in executing peacekeeping doctrine. The caution is that U.S. military leaders must accept the largely political nature and direction of peacekeeping operations, which may or may not follow doctrine. For example, a 1987 White House document reported to Congress that peacekeeping operations are "Normally...conducted with agreement of the parties to the conflict."\(^{18}\) This contrasts sharply with JCS draft peacekeeping doctrine which states that:

> The single most important requirement of a peacekeeping operation is the consent of all the parties... If consent of all the parties is not given, the operation is not a peacekeeping operation and should not be pursued according to the doctrine presented in this chapter [Peacekeeping].\(^{19}\)

The bottom line on this issue is: that U.S. political leadership may not view peacekeeping operations in the same manner stated in DOD doctrine, and military forces deployed as
peacekeepers must be prepared to face the realities of the
operation regardless of its cover title.

Transitioning - Imposers vs Keepers

One final doctrinal point is that a trucemaking force that
imposes a truce can not effectively become a trucekeeping force.
One recent study parallels JCS draft doctrine and states that
"peacemaking" (in the trucemaking concept) and "peacekeeping" (in
the trucekeeping concept), are vastly different. Citing the
experience of the U.S. Marines in MNF II, the study concludes
that, "...the two operations are so incompatible, it could be
disastrous to expect a tactical commander to successfully
transition from peacemaking [trucemaking] to peacekeeping
[trucekeeping]." The bottom line here is: peacekeepers must
be impartial and a force that fights to impose a truce will have
lost that trait.

FORCE DEVELOPMENT

The uniqueness of each peacekeeping operation increases the
difficulty of developing an ideal force design. Even if model
units could be developed, the cost of maintaining these narrowly
focused forces for on-call missions would preclude their
formation. The past and most probable future methodology for
constituting a peacekeeping force is by tailoring for the
specific mission.
Force Tailoring

All types of conventional forces should be considered for peacekeeping force tailoring, however the military units generally having the greatest application for peacekeeping duties are light infantry and military police. These force types focus their tactics and training on the use of small arms, without need for heavy equipment or extensive support. Military police further add skills in maintaining order with a minimum use of violence.

In addition to infantry and police, other force capability considerations should include construction/engineering, medical, communications, civil affairs, public affairs, legal services, linguistics, intelligence, and logistics for food service, maintenance, supply and transportation. Following the success of the SFM, an additional consideration should be the use of high technology equipment to enhance surveillance capabilities.

Another important consideration in tailoring peacekeeping forces is the requirement for a high ratio of leaders to soldiers. In combat, one officer is sufficient for a platoon of infantry where tact, diplomacy and compromise are secondary considerations. Most peacekeeping, however, is conducted by small observation teams, patrols and checkpoints, each needing a leader to ensure impartiality and force restraint, and capable of conducting on-the-spot negotiations/arbitration. The exact ratio, and whether these small unit leaders should be all officers or include NCOs, is dependent on the particular circumstances of each operation.21
Force Organization

To overcome the problem of building each peacekeeping force ad hoc, but without having to assume the burden of funding a standing force, several nations have suggested a method for rapidly constituting a tailored U.N. peacekeeping force from its member states. This fairly simple procedure requires that any nation wishing to make forces, equipment or services generally available for peacekeeping missions, furnish the U.N. with a detailed list of its proposed contributions. From these lists, the U.N. can make contingency plans for force tailoring by knowing what is available and what is not. This concept can also be used to select force commanders, i.e., the U.N. can maintain a roster of available, acceptable senior military officers from which the Secretary-General can choose a commander. These procedures are also applicable to regional organizations.

TRAINING

In that peacekeeping is substantially different from typical military activity, how will nations interested in participating in peacekeeping be able to respond rapidly to the call for trained forces? The previously mentioned 31 nation U.N. report on peacekeeping addresses this problem at length, emphasizing collective training schemes.
Training Considerations

The specifics of peacekeeping training programs are beyond the scope of this study, however some mention of considerations for training development is warranted. Presuming that neither the U.N. nor its member states (including the United States) will choose to maintain standing, purpose specific peacekeeping forces, training programs for peacekeeping contingencies should focus on the following:

a. Leader training for officers and NCOs.
b. Development of peacekeeping training materials.
c. Developing lessons learned with the international peacekeeping community.
d. Conducting international peacekeeping seminars on a regular basis.
e. Conducting peacekeeping training exercises, both unilateral and multinational/combined.

The formal training of leaders on the philosophy and practice of peacekeeping is considered key to successful peacekeeping operations. However, the U.S. Army conducts no institutional peacekeeping training. 24

An interesting aspect of training soldiers for peacekeeping is that some consideration must be given to retraining them for their regular duties following a peacekeeping operation. A soldier that has been trained to use violence only as a last resort may pose a hazard to himself and his unit during normal military operations.
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid, p. 148. Note: "The Red Cross does not view peace as the absence of war." International Red Cross Society, International Red Cross Handbook, p. 570. Also, the JCS definition of "routine peaceful competition" infers that peace is without threat of violence. It defines this condition as, "A situation where the political, economic, and informational elements of national power operate without the need for the military element." U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-07: Doctrine for Joint Operations In Low Intensity Conflict (Final Draft), pp. xxi.

4. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-07: Doctrine for Joint Operations In Low Intensity Conflict (Final Draft), pp. xx and IV-15. (hereafter referred to as "JCS Pub 3-07").

5. U.S. Departments of the Army and Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20: Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict p. 4-17. (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-20").


11. This figure is an invention of the author substantially based on research of the bibliography. The terms and definitions of conflict prevention, trucemaking, trucekeeping and treatykeeping were developed to identify and explain the discrete
facets of the Continuum of Peace Development, which have generally been confused with, or considered part of peacekeeping.

12. Wolf D. Kutter, LTC, *Operational Guidelines for US Peacekeeping Commanders*, p. 2. Note: This document is focused on the point that peacekeeping differs significantly from usual military operations.

13. FM 100-20, the multiservice manual on LIC, is the only current, approved DOD publication containing peacekeeping DTTP. It does contain the erroneous concept/definition of peacemaking.


19. JCS Pub 3-07, p. IV-1.


21. In assessing the Dominican Republic operation, GEN Palmer states that all U.S. forces performed well, then interestingly adds: "Marines, however, trained and indoctrinated to be an all-out assault force, find it difficult to adjust to a peacekeeping role." Bruce Palmer, Jr., GEN, *Intervention In the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965*, p. 150.


23. Ibid, remarks throughout the entire report.

24. The Training and Doctrine Command, the Command and General Staff College and the Sergeant's Major Academy all responded to the author's informal inquiry that no peacekeeping instruction was provided in any institutional training for which they were responsible. Peacekeeping instruction at the U.S. Army War College is only incidental to other training.
CHAPTER IV

THE FUTURE OF PEACEKEEPING

With the end of the cold war, there has been a reduction in superpower tensions and an increase in international cooperation. These momentous events are having a profound effect on peacekeeping.

INTERNATIONAL TRENDS

Growing U.N. Role

The effects of relaxed East-West tensions are readily seen at the U.N. After nearly a decade of having its hands tied by national interests, the U.N. fielded five peacekeeping operations between August 1988 and December 1989, and is working on possible missions for the Western Sahara and Cambodia. There is actually a beginning of regional organization-U.N. cooperation in peacekeeping, e.g., the U.N. Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), which was fostered by the OAS, an historic first for the Americas. Additionally, as fear of the super powers diminishes, the United States and the Soviet Union may play more prominent roles in U.N. peacekeeping operations. And, as the U.N. receives greater support to sponsor peacekeeping missions, there will probably be fewer operations by regional organizations, multinational groupings (like MFO), and even fewer unilateral undertakings.
Concentrating peacekeeping sponsorship within the U.N. should help in overcoming the traditional weaknesses of U.N. peacekeeping operations: *ad hoc* formation, lack of established procedures and experienced staff, dissimilar and unsophisticated equipment, lack of training in peacekeeping techniques and combined operations, and poor financial support. The result should be U.N. peacekeeping that is far more responsive, effective, efficient, reliable and respected.

**Increasing Complexity**

As the opportunity for viable U.N. peacekeeping grows, the scope and complexity of these missions is increasing. The current U.N. operations in Namibia, UNTAG, and Central America, ONUCA, are good examples.

The U.N. Transition Assistance Group is part of a long diplomatic process for creating an independent nation from a colony. UNTAG's military force of nearly 5,000 was tasked to supervise the disengagement of several military forces and monitor borders with Angola and South Africa. Its civilian contingent of 2,000 included 800 election supervisors to insure free elections, and 500 professional police officers to monitor the local police. UNTAG also coordinates with the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), which is monitoring the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Additionally, actions by other U.N. agencies to repatriate refugees, provide humanitarian assistance and initiate social, educational and economic programs are being conducted concurrently with UNTAG missions. UNTAG is planned to
end after Namibia is established, about mid-1990.\textsuperscript{3}

The ONUCA operation is equally complex, with the added active involvement of the OAS. Its 260 man military observer force will be spread over five countries to monitor the demobilization and repatriation/relocation of personnel from armed resistance groups. The force has its own aircraft for transport and observation, plus naval patrol craft to watch for arms shipments between Nicaragua and El Salvador across the Gulf of Fonseca. An additional 300-400 civilian personnel will be assigned to handle duties of observation, administration, medical and logistics support. ONUCA officials also coordinate with the U.N. Observation Mission for Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) and the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV), set up by the OAS to actually disarm the insurgent groups.\textsuperscript{4}

**New Missions**

Enthusiasm for success of these very challenging missions is high. This fervor of support is fostering an expanded view of the role future peacekeeping missions might take. Suggestions for new missions include: arms control verification; humanitarian and technical assistance; preventing nuclear piracy, terrorism and drug trafficking; establishing a U.N. naval force to ensure safety of navigation; and the use of peacekeeping forces to prevent, rather than just control, armed conflicts.\textsuperscript{5} This last mission contains great promise for world peace, but demands the most responsive and professional peacekeeping force.
U.S. FUTURE ROLES

Political Attitudes

In examining future peacekeeping roles for the United States, it is interesting to look at the positions other nations have taken on peacekeeping. The previously mentioned 31 nation U.N. report has many specific and seemingly serious proposals, including some in the USSR's four page input. By contrast, the U.S. contribution of less than a page and a half contains only generic comments, plus an embarrassingly pithy remark that the U.N. publication *The Blue Helmets* is out of date and should be revised.6

During the early years of the Reagan presidency, U.S. reaction to proposals that would increase the U.N.'s role in peacekeeping were not favorable. The U.N. had failed to support the Camp David peace accords request for a U.N. Sinai mission and President Reagan was "playing tough" in international relations. The U.S. government overtly expressed a lack of faith in the U.N., which was generally echoed by the American public.7

This position now appears to be changing, but a skeptical attitude toward U.N. peacekeeping was indicated as late as October 1988 when the U.S. ambassador stated that, "Peacekeeping Operations are not an end in themselves [and] we must not allow ourselves to believe that the mere establishment of a Peacekeeping Operation...can end disputes."8 There is truth in this statement, but, coinciding with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, it was an untimely wet blanket. Also, being millions of

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dollars in arrears on its financial obligations to support U.N. peacekeeping operations does not help diminish the perception of a U.S. attitude about the U.N. that is less than enthusiastic.\textsuperscript{9}

\textbf{Change and Leadership}

Change, however, seems to be the order of the day, and previous U.S. ambivalence toward U.N. peacekeeping in Central America was dropped to support the unanimous Security Council decision to create ONUCA.\textsuperscript{10} While this action may be a harbinger of a changed attitude, leadership on the issue of peacekeeping is not being exercised by the United States.\textsuperscript{11} One U.N. observer states that, "...the USA and the Western Powers have allowed the Soviets to seize the initiative in proposing radical changes in the UN's peacekeeping operations."\textsuperscript{12}

The United States has choices to be made concerning its peacekeeping future. Unilateral operations are not viewed as peacekeeping and regional/multinational group operations are giving way to U.N. peacekeeping. For the immediate future, there will be continued reluctance to accept U.S. forces, but the United States has considerable capability to enhance U.N. peacekeeping operations, to lower their costs and increase their effectiveness, without using sizeable troop units. Contributions in logistics, reconnaissance, communications, surveillance, aviation and other technological areas hold great promise.\textsuperscript{13}

The United States can also play a significant role in developing U.N. peacekeeping organization, procedures and training. While the MFO is not U.N. sponsored, it is recognized
as a peacekeeping operation worthy of emulation. The United States was the MFO's principal architect, furnishes its director general, and is largely responsible for its efficiency and effectiveness. The MFO "holds useful lessons for future U.N. forces on command, liaison and resource management."14

U.N. peacekeeping is pregnant with opportunities, needing only a plan of action for U.S. productive involvement. Taking an active role in U.N. peacekeeping will permit a greater influence on these operations and help preclude the need for unilateral U.S. military action, the kind that usually brings the most unfavorable world response.

ENDNOTES


5. United Nations, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations In all Their Aspects, proposals for widening the U.N. peacekeeping role are contained throughout the 16 individual reports. (hereafter called "U.N. Comprehensive Review").


10. Ibid.

11. U.N. Comprehensive Review. While this one document is a limited reference, it does contain support for USSR proposals, e.g., by Australia (p. 5), but no mention is made of any U.S. proposals on peacekeeping.


CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Peacekeeping has come of age. It is now being taken so seriously that competition has begun for superpower peacekeeping leadership, and the Soviet Union has achieved a head start. Having led the Free World for 45 years to successfully contain the Communist threat, the United States now needs to lead in peacekeeping.

Providing a great deal of the U.N.'s financial support, it seems only prudent that the United States should try to effectively influence the growth of U.N. peacekeeping, especially as it evolves into new mission types. For example, through U.N. peacekeeping, the United States could possibly gain international support for such national interests as combating terrorism and control of illegal drug trafficking. However, taking a lead in these activities will require commitment and active involvement, in addition to dollars.

United States peacekeeping doctrine is surfacing through the doctrinal hierarchy, but, only as an adjunct of LIC. The Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) has played a key role in developing LIC doctrine and could do the same for stand-alone peacekeeping DTTP. Regardless of who writes it, peacekeeping needs its own manual, joint, multiservice and/or Army. The current/emerging doctrine contains inaccuracies in terminology definition and does not adequately explain the relationships of peace development activities, principles, peace
conditions and politico-military action. The DTTP manual must convey the peace development process, emphasizing its nonabsolute nature, and strive for clarification, accuracy and consistency in terms, concepts and principles.

Faced with great budget and force reductions, it is nearly inconceivable that the United States would develop special units for peacekeeping. However, the development of contingency plans and earmarking tailored forces for possible peacekeeping missions should be considered. Also, furnishing the U.N. a list of U.S. force and support contributions will not only enhance U.N. organization for prompt peacekeeping operation, but would give the Army broad guidelines for anticipating future missions in support of U.N. peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping has never been as simple as it looked and it is becoming even more complex and sophisticated. There is no question that soldiers must be trained before assuming peacekeeping duties and there will often be little warning time in which to accomplish this vital requirement. The Army's top leaders have stated that peacekeeping is a mission within the Army's five strategic roles; however, the current situation of the Army having no institutional program for peacekeeping training does not support the concept of a "trained and ready" Army capable of conducting peacekeeping operations. Also, as the Army will be primarily responsible for executing U.S. peacekeeping missions, it should take the lead in U.S. DOD training initiatives for peacekeeping.
Training the Army's leaders in the concepts, doctrine and politics of peacekeeping, especially at the intermediate and senior college levels, should be a significant priority for the DA staff and the Training and Doctrine Command. Development of contingency training packages for units and NCO training should also be implemented.¹

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently held a conference in Washington to address the future of international peacekeeping. Attendance was strictly limited, with invitations going only to senior scholars, peacekeeping operators/directors and diplomats. The U.S. ambassador to the U.N. and a Soviet representative were both invited to speak on the role of the Superpowers, and, most noteworthy, a U.S. Army general officer was present to hear the presentations.²

While our statesmen play their roles on the stage of international politics, U.S. military leaders need to press for combined, joint and Service initiatives to prepare for peacekeeping operations. The IISS conference report, expected by midyear, should be studied carefully. It will likely contain great insight to guide the U.S. Army's future in peacekeeping.

ENDNOTES

1. The USAWC should consider enhancing its curriculum by having an advanced course on peacekeeping, and by adding a prominent peacekeeping leader to the Commandant's Lecture Series, e.g., the Director General, or Force Commander, of the MFO.

2. Information regarding the IISS conference was furnished through the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army.
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