NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

CONFERENCE ON THE NAVY IN THE PACIFIC
Edited by
EDWARD A. OLSEN
AUGUST 1989

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Prepared for:
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (P)
Washington, D.C. 20350-1000
The work reported herein was supported by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (P).

Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized.

This report was edited by:

Reviewed by:

Released by:

Edward A. Olsen
Professor
This report consists of one brief and two long sections. The first (brief) section consists of the program for a conference on the role of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific sponsored by this project. Several experts presented their analyses. Several of their prepared and then revised, full written papers. One additional commissioned paper (by E.S. Miller) is included in this section. They are presented in full in the second section. The last section consists of four parts in which a written version of the oral transcript is presented. This section includes all these on the formal program. The conference was well attended (150 people) and very well received. It fully examined the role(s) of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific and assessed regional implications of the Navy's presence.
Conference On

THE NAVY IN THE PACIFIC

AUGUST 13-14, 1987

Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
## PROJECT REPORT: CONTENTS

### A: CONFERENCE PROGRAM

### B: PAPERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHOR</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yoshihisa Nakamura</td>
<td>&quot;The Maritime Strategy and Japan Defense Policy&quot;</td>
<td>1-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert J. Hanks</td>
<td>&quot;U.S. and Its Pacific Allies: Maritime Interdependence&quot;</td>
<td>20-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Barnett</td>
<td>&quot;The Origins of the Maritime Strategy&quot;</td>
<td>42-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheldon W. Simon</td>
<td>&quot;Asian-Pacific Reactions to U.S. Strategy&quot;</td>
<td>87-125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June Teufel Dreyer</td>
<td>&quot;Chinese Perspectives on the Maritime Strategy&quot;</td>
<td>166-187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward S. Miller</td>
<td>&quot;Lessons of War Plan Orange for Maritime Strategists&quot;</td>
<td>188-210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### C: TRANSCRIPT OF SESSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY ONE</th>
<th>PART I</th>
<th>1-83</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAY TWO</td>
<td>PART II</td>
<td>1-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY THREE</td>
<td>PART III</td>
<td>1-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY FOUR</td>
<td>PART IV</td>
<td>1-74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION A

CONFERENCE PROGRAM
CONFERENCE ON THE NAVY IN THE PACIFIC

STAFF AND POINTS OF CONTACT

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT
REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT C. AUSTIN

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT CHAIRMAN
DR. JAMES J. TRITTEN

CONFERENCE COORDINATOR
DR. EDWARD A. OLSEN

POINT OF CONTACT FOR TRAVEL, ACCOMMODATIONS, AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS (ROOT HALL 100):

MS. IRENE DIXON (408) 646-2521
OR
MS. BRIENDA MAANA0 (408) 646-3276
THE NAVY IN THE PACIFIC
13-14 August 1987

DAY ONE

8:00AM - 8:30AM INGERSOLL 122
Welcome: Rear Admiral Robert C. Austin, Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School

8:45AM - 11:30AM INGERSOLL 122
8:45AM - 10:15AM: PRESENTATIONS
Session I (AM) Chair: Dr. James Tritten, Chairman
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School

THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY
- The Maritime Strategy and the Pacific, 1946-1955
  Dr. Michael Palmer - Naval Historical Center
- Origins of the Maritime Strategy
  Dr. Roger Barnett - National Security Research
- Current Views from Washington and elsewhere
  Captain Peter Swartz, USN - U. S. Mission NATO
- Discussants: Colonel Robert W. Molyneaux, Jr., USMC - USCINCPAC, Plans and Policy
  Commander Cort Wagner, USN - CINCPACFLT Strategic Planning Officer

10:15AM - 10:30AM: BREAK

10:30AM - 11:30AM: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

12:00PM - 1:30PM LUNCH - LA NOVIA ROOM
With speech by Dr. Stephen Jurika, Senior Research Scholar, Hoover Institution
"Geo-Politics and Maritime Strategy in the Pacific: The 1990s"
DAY ONE CONTINUED

2:00PM - 4:45PM  INGERSOLL 122

2:00PM - 3:30PM: PRESENTATIONS

Session II (PM) Chair: Dr. Howard Hensel - Air War College

MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS

- USSR and Its Pacific Allies: Effectiveness of Their Maritime Correlation
  Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin - National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School

- U.S. and Its Pacific Allies: Maritime Interdependence
  Rear Admiral Robert Hanks, USN (Ret.)

- U.S. vs. USSR Maritime Capabilities in the Pacific
  Dr. Andrew Marshall - Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense

- Discussant Richard Haver - Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

3:30PM - 3:45PM: BREAK

3:45PM - 4:45PM: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

5:00PM - 5:30PM: OPTIONAL CAMPUS TOUR
MEET IN LOBBY OF HERMANN HALL
(Please sign-up for the tour at the conference registration desk by 3:00PM)

6:00PM - 6:45PM  RECEPTION (NO HOST BAR) - McNITT BALLROOM

7:00PM - 9:00PM  BANQUET - McNITT BALLROOM
*Distinguished Speaker:
"Maritime Strategy and National Policy"
Dr. Claude Buss
Naval Postgraduate School

*(Please note: For students who are not attending the banquet but would like to attend Dr. Buss' speech, there will be additional rows of seats at the rear of the banquet area. The talk will begin at approximately 8:15PM.)
DAY TWO

8:45AM - 11:30AM - INGERSOLL 122

8:45AM - 10:15AM: PRESENTATION

Session III (AM) Chair: Dr. Harlan Jencks, National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School

THE MARITIME STRATEGY AND MAJOR REGIONAL ACTORS

- The Maritime Strategy: The Role of Pacific Alliances
  Dr. Sheldon Simon - Director, Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University

- Chinese Perspectives on Maritime Strategy
  Dr. June Teufel Dreyer - Department of Politics and Public Affairs, University of Miami

- Japanese Perspectives on Maritime Strategy
  Professor Yoshihisa Nakamura - Japanese Defense Academy

- ASEAN & Oceania's Perspectives on Maritime Strategy
  Dr. Owen Harries - Editor, The National Interest

- Discussants: Admiral Tom Hayward, USN (Ret.)

10:15AM - 10:30AM: BREAK

10:30AM - 11:30AM: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

11:45AM - 1:15PM - LUNCH - LA NOVIA ROOM
  With speech by the Honorable Francis J. West
  Gamma Corporation
  "The Maritime Strategy: The Role of Alliance..."
1:30PM - 4:15PM  - INGERSOLL 122

1:30PM - 3:00PM: PRESENTATIONS

Session IV (PM) Chair: Dr. Tom Grassey, National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School

THE MARITIME STRATEGY: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

- The Maritime Strategy Under Alternative Assumptions
  Colonel John Collins, USA (Ret.), Congressional Research Service

- The Pacific Rim as an Economic Dynamo: Implications for the Maritime Strategy
  Dr. Edward A. Olsen - National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School

- Strategy in the Pacific: Offensive or Defensive
  Dr. Alvin Bernstein - Chairman
  Department of Strategy, Naval War College

- Discussant: Dr. Tom Grassey

3:00PM - 3:15PM: BREAK

3:15PM - 4:15PM: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

4:30PM - 5:30PM  - INGERSOLL 122

WRAP UP: Dr. Don Daniel, Moderator - Chairman, Campaign & Strategy Department, Naval War College
SECTION B
PAPERS
THE MARITIME STRATEGY AND JAPAN’S DEFENSE POLICY

Yoshihisa Nakamura

I. INTRODUCTION

For the past decade U.S.-Japan security relations have been debated in both countries. That debate has produced progress in some areas and less progress in other areas. This mixed degree of progress is well illustrated by U.S.-Japan interaction over The Maritime Strategy which is the topic of this paper.

In the past several years Japanese defense policymakers have heatedly debated their defense strategy in the 1990s. This debate was provoked by the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force Initiative (Rikuji Shorai Koso) in which the JGSDF insisted that Northern Japan, especially the south side of the Soya Strait and both sides of the Tsugaru Strait, should be defended strongly. Presently, however, these Initiatives are confronted with several difficulties; first, the strategic thinking gaps between the U.S. Maritime Strategy and the National Defense Policy Outline (Boei Taiko) established in 1976; second, the different interpretations of the U.S. Maritime Strategy among its sister services; finally, the public apprehension about the question of whether “to be involved in the U.S.-Soviet war.” The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to clarify those difficulties and to propose an idea for conquering them.
II. WHAT IS THE JAPANESE GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCE INITIATIVE?

After careful research about the U.S. Maritime Strategy, the JGSDF determined to take the initiative to make a new Japanese military strategy in the 1990s, and proposed the JGSDF Initiative to the Defense Agency in 1985 as a working paper to integrate the three service strategies. The first initiative in the JGSDF paper was to create a consensus on the Soviet motives to attack Japan. The JGSDF Initiative estimated that the Japanese islands per se, geopolitically and strategically, might be a menace to the Soviet Union under a certain situation. The Initiative postulated that Soviet adoption of the so-called "bastion for the bear" strategy will lead Hokkaido to be a threat to the Soviets. According to this strategy, the Soviet Union would attempt to keep its submarines out of harm's way by having them patrol in Soviet home waters--the Sea of Okhotsk--away from Western ASW forces. The Soviets also would envision that their sanctuary-based SSBNs will be protected by a portion of their general purpose naval and land-based air forces. However, they would see Hokkaido as an unsinkable aircraft carrier for U.S.-Japan military operations in and around Soviet home waters. Furthermore, their SLOC posture toward these forces around the bastion could be cut easily by U.S.-Japan forces at the Soya Strait.

In short, the Soviet motives to attack Japan are based upon strategic interests: to eliminate the potential military threats
against its strategically important area. However, in that situation the USSR would try to eliminate these potential military threats.

The second initiative of the JGSDF, therefore, was to describe the most likely international situation under which Japan would be attacked by the Soviet military forces. The initiative supported implicitly the global war scenario. Once war between the U.S. and the USSR breaks out in other areas such as in the European theater or in the Middle Eastern theater, the Soviet Pacific Fleet would have two kinds of military goals. Its first would be to secure the bastion for SLBM forces (the Sea of Okhotsk) from U.S. offensive operations. Its second would be to interdict the SLOC between the continental U.S. and the Middle East. In order to achieve these missions, it is logical that the Soviets would be induced to occupy at least the coastal areas of Soya and Tugaru Straits and to insure free passage through these straits.

The final initiative was to emphasize the role of the JSDF as a deterrent rather than a defense force. According to the JGSDF initiative, a war will arise out of a crisis. Therefore, the very important role of the JSDF during that crisis would be to deter a Soviet military attack. Although the Northeast Asian role of the U.S. military forces is a very important aspect of U.S. military strategy, the JSDF has hardly tackled its interaction with this role. Japan's future strategy, the JGSDF initiatives urge, must be triggered by the recognition of a general crisis and must focus on controlling the crisis, deterring Soviet escalation to an actual attack against Japan, and preparing for the possible transition to war.
During a crisis the JGSDF will change the deployment of its forces from all over Japan to the northern part of Japan, especially at the southern area of the Soya Strait and around the Tsugaru Strait. More than two thirds of the JGSDF troops will be redeployed in northern Japan during such a crisis.

Moreover, in order to deter a Soviet invasion the GSDF will strengthen its function to repel the enemy from Japanese territory. For example, the GSDF will use anti-tank helicopters (AH-1s), domestically-produced SSM-1 missiles, and long range Multiple Rocket Launchers. According to GSDF analysis, the forward defense strategy, to engage the enemy offshore, is favorable for Japan in terms of being a deterrent rather than defense, because Japan will try to be involved in the war, hoping to end it in a modus vivendi. The strategists in the JGSDF are very afraid that the enemy could occupy a limited area around a strategically important strait with a surprise assault, and enforce a quick cease-fire upon Japan. If the expected outcome of the war is a final victory, it would be possible to lose a part of Japanese territory because such a loss would eventually be recovered by a decisive counter-offensive operation. Thus, such a Japanese defense could be based upon the "win the war strategy." On the contrary, the JGSDF estimates that a cease-fire would be more probable than a decisive engagement and that the loss of territory around the straits would give Japan's enemy a potential bargaining asset. Thus, the JGSDF urges, Japan's strategy should seek to deter the military aggression by means of a modus vivendi.
The initiatives expect that the JMSDF will possess the capability to play the roles of strait blockade, which would bottle up the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and of escorting the U.S. CVBGs, which would move rapidly to forward positions. Especially, its escort of the U.S. CVBGs would be more important than the protection of 1000 miles of sea lanes, because such a movement of the U.S. CVBGs, during the crisis phase, will force the Soviets to move their SSBNs into their bastion (The Sea of Okhotsk) and protect them with SSN and other forces.

There is no doubt that the air defense capability over the northern part of Japan must be enhanced. It is often said that the JASDF plans to withdraw its forces from Hokkaido once the Soviets indicate their determination to invade there. The range of the F-15s which are stationed in central Japan, therefore, should be extended to provide air cover over the northern part of Hokkaido rather than over the 1000 miles of sea lanes south of Japan.

In addition to these defensive capabilities developed by the JSDF, the offensive nature of the U.S. Maritime Strategy will contribute to our deterrence in the northern Pacific. Especially, the JGSDF expects that Soviet air power in the Far East will be diffused by the amphibious operations of both the 7th and 3rd Fleets against the Kurile Islands and the Kamchatka Peninsula. Therefore, the JSDF can gain air superiority, at least for a while, over the northern part of Japan. In other words, Japan's strategy, integrated with the U.S. Maritime Strategy, will provide a strong deterrent, because it would require the Soviets to not only invade Hokkaido forcefully but also defend its flank, the Kurile Islands and the Kamchatka Peninsula. In short, it can be safely concluded that the JGSDF
initiatives sought to design the Japanese defense strategy in the 1990s in line with the U.S. Maritime Strategy.

III. STRATEGIC THINKING GAPS BETWEEN THE NDPO AND THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY

The JGSDF Initiative may be a bolt from the blue for the NDPO proponents. Indeed, there are several strategic thinking gaps between the NDPO and the U.S. Maritime Strategy. One of the gaps is how to evaluate the strategic relationship between Japan and NATO or the Middle East. The NDPO is based upon the assumption that any Soviet attack will be carried out against Japan alone, independent of conflict in other areas such as in the European theater, or in the Middle Eastern theater. On the contrary, the Maritime Strategy assumes a global conventional war: the Soviet Union will initiate global conventional war simultaneously in two or three theaters.

The second strategic thinking gap between the U.S. and Japan is related to the differences in our perception of Soviet motives to attack Japan. According to Taiko proponents, the Soviet motive for attacking Japan may be political: to coerce Japan into estrangement from the United States. How will the Soviet Union blackmail Japan? The Taiko proponents expect, first, a small scale and limited invasion of Japan: the occupation of the northern and eastern part of Hokkaido, and several islands along the coast of the Japan Sea and Noto Peninsula. Second, they foresee the Soviets attacking the sea lanes, regarding this as an easy and effective way
to convert military power into political influence against Japan. Finally, Soviet bombardment of Japanese cities is estimated to be an effective military operation to blackmail Japan. In short, the Boei Taiko assumes that the goal of the Soviet military forces in East Asia will be the Finlandization of Japan.

According to the scenario of the U.S. Maritime Strategy, the aim of a Soviet conventional attack against Japan may be to establish a geographic foothold which will, first, guarantee its strategic nuclear superiority in a future nuclear war, and second, will weaken U.S. war efforts in the Middle East. If the Soviet Union could occupy Hokkaido, the Soviet Far East Fleet would possess a free hand to deploy its forces in the Northwest Pacific. The high maneuverability of its navy and air force in the Northwest Pacific would strengthen the bastion for the bear in the Sea of Okhotsk. Such maneuverability will also contribute to the interdiction of the SLOC between the U.S. and the Middle East in war time.

Third, the strategic thinking gap can be seen in respect to the so-called 1000 miles sea lane protection. Since Prime Minister Suzuki announced this concept in Washington in 1981, the ambiguity which is inherent in it has been gradually removed. First of all, the Tokyo government disclosed to the National Diet that, although the National Defense Program Outline did not mention this concept explicitly, it had been underlying the Outline.

Moreover, at the beginning, the 1000 miles sea lane protection was regarded as the peace time mission of the JSDF: to secure the transportation of resources and goods to sustain Japanese modern life. Sea lane protection proponents anticipated that our potential
enemy will attempt to cut the sea lanes before it embarks upon military invasion of Japanese territory because sea lane interdiction will be a very effective way to coerce Japan without triggering U.S. military commitments to Japan under the U.S.-Japan security treaty. However, Prime Minister Nakasone revised this interpretation. While the sea lane defense still meant the protection of cargo boats and oil tankers for Japan, not military supply ships, it would also be a JSDF mission in war time, he said.

Although the tactics of protecting civilian ships is still ambiguous under the 1000 miles sea lanes protection concept, many Japanese envision that the SLOC will be defended with either convoy protection such as the escort of Japanese cargo boats under the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces. For more strategically oriented Japanese, sea lane protection means the protection of corridors, within which the merchant marine can sail freely because the JMSDF defends them from the Soviet submarine threat.

On the contrary, the U.S. looks upon the sea lane protection strategy as a deterrent rather than solely for war fighting. It is meant as a deterrent insofar as its intention is the following:

(1) The U.S. Navy tries to protect the SLOC through military threats against the Soviet Navy; to attack Soviet naval bases, to blockade the strategically important straits, and to detect, pursue and destroy Soviet submarines. In this view, the aggressiveness of the U.S. Navy is the greatest deterrent.

(2) The various U.S. options make the Soviet naval war plans more complicated and more uncertain. Soviet war planners presumably are compelled to consider a variety of threats with which they must cope.
(3) The U.S. concept is based upon the assumption that the possession of "capability" is different from the execution of its "capability." For example, although the U.S. can destroy Valdivostok and blockade Soya Strait in war time, it may or may not carry out such kinds of operations.

(4) The U.S. Navy plays a very important role during crises; the movement of U.S. CVBGs to forward positions during a crisis moves the Soviet SSN and other forces to defensive position of its bastion.

In summary, there have been three kinds of strategic thinking gaps between the NDPO and the U.S. Maritime Strategy: first, political interests vs. strategic interests in terms of the Soviet motive to attack Japan; second, the local war vs. the global war in terms of the war scenario in which Japan will be involved; and third, defense vs. deterrence in terms of the strategic concept to protect the Japanese sea lanes.

IV. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY AMONG THE JGSDF'S SISTER SERVICES

Other difficulties which the JGSDF initiatives have met are the different interpretations of the U.S. Maritime Strategy among its sister services. The JMSDF does not estimate the Soviet military strategy in the same way as the United States. The primary mission of the Soviet navy in the Far East, according to its view, may still be to interdict the sea lanes of Japan, not to defend the "bastion for the bear."
Moreover, the JMSDF regards the Maritime Strategy as a traditional U.S. strategy rather than the unique product of the Reagan Administration and its first Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. In other words, the Maritime Strategy is to reassert the presence of the U.S. Navy as the "senior service" in line with Mahanism. As a result, the JMSDF insists that its primary mission is, and will be, the protection of the 1000 miles sea lanes, not the strait blockade and/or the escort of the U.S. CVBGs.

Furthermore, the JMSDF cannot declare that the escort of the U.S. CVBGs is its mission during a crisis because of the Japanese Constitution which prohibits collective defense. Indeed, Prime Minister Nakasone said in the National Diet that the escort of the U.S. fleet will be carried out only in a wartime situation such as a military attack against Japanese territory and/or against the Japanese sea lanes.

As for the straits blockade mission, it wants to control the straits with the combination of its submarine and surface ships rather than by laying mines. It points out two reasons why it does not want mine operation. One of them is that, once the mines are laid, the Japanese fleet can not enter the Sea of Japan either. It is not surprising that the JMSDF wants to enter there and would attempt to attack the Soviet amphibious ships which support the landing of troops.

The other reason is that mining the straits is an unrealistic operation. It is true that Japan cannot mine the straits during a crisis because it is formal Japanese policy that the straits blockade must be carried out only after Japan would be attacked militarily.
Therefore, the straits would be mined only after Soviet submarines go out to the Pacific and sink Japanese ships.

It seems that there is a consensus among the SDF officers in respect to Soviet motives to attack Japan. The strategic value of the Japanese islands may be more attractive for Soviet decision-makers than their political interests. However, there is a big difference among the three Japanese services in terms of how to attack the strategically important island, Hokkaido. The JGSDF officers are very afraid of a Soviet amphibious operation against northern Hokkaido and both sides of Tsugaru Strait.

From the viewpoint of the Japanese officers, the sea lanes between Japan and the Middle East will be interdicted first, and only after that will the Soviets begin to invade Hokkaido. The JMSDF suggests that a Soviet attack on Hokkaido will be infeasible because of the limited amphibious capability of the Soviet Far East Fleet.

The attitude of the JASDF is ambiguous. It insists that Soviet air power would attempt to destroy the military facilities at the northern part of Japan before they begin to invade Hokkaido. Nevertheless, it does not worry about air superiority over Hokkaido, except for its northern part, because the U.S. will strike back at the Soviet air force bases (at least in Sakhalin) and will be able to neutralize their function.

It is worth noting that the JASDF hardly evaluates the strategic value of Hokkaido in the context of the U.S. Maritime Strategy. As a result, it underestimates the strategic value of northern Hokkaido to blockade the Soya Strait. Rather, it emphasizes the value of
southern Hokkaido. If the Soviets would occupy there, they could menace directly the U.S. Air Force at Misawa, which might be able to neutralize the Soviet air force bases in the Maritime Provinces and Sakhalin. The JASDF, therefore, suggests the JGSDF not redeploy its troops in northern Hokkaido.

The more serious threat, from the viewpoint of the JASDF, with which it must cope, is the Soviet bombers which fly down the Pacific outside the range of its F-15s to attack Japan's sea lanes. Therefore, the JASDF devotes itself to extending the range of its F-15s as well as to possessing AWACS.

IV. THE JAPANESE PUBLIC'S INTERPRETATION OF THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY

Although the three services of the JSDF appear to support the U.S. global conventional war scenario, it is not surprising that the Japanese public will be reluctant to accept such a war scenario because of the "being involved in the war" syndrome. Since the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed in 1951, the Japanese public has been very sensitive to being involved in any type of U.S.-Soviet military confrontation which develops outside of Japanese soil. Although such a sensitivity was dormant after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, it awoke with the pronouncement of the Horizontal Escalation Strategy in the U.S. DOD Annual Report, FY 1983. Furthermore, senior U.S. officials at a recent forum on Pacific Maritime Strategy said that the U.S. will seek to end any Soviet
aggression in Europe with a second front in the Pacific. Due to their remarks, the Japanese public is very sensitive again to strategic integration between the U.S. and Japan, especially with regard to a global war scenario.

It seems to the Japanese public that U.S. naval exercises support the Second Front Strategy. Since the Maritime Strategy was publicized, the 7th Fleet has often entered not only the Sea of Japan but also the Sea of Okhotsk and simulated attacks against Vladivostok.

Furthermore, during U.S.-Japan amphibious operation exercises, it was reported, there was a big discrepancy between the U.S. and Japan regarding the exercise scenario. The JMSDF exercise was based upon a scenario of amphibious operation to recapture Hokkaido. On the contrary, the U.S. fleet exercised within the Sea of Okhotsk under the scenario of an amphibious operation to occupy the Kurile Islands. One leading Japanese newspaper wrote: "the JSDF were entrapped by the U.S." In short, the Japanese regard strategy based upon the global war scenarios as very risky, rather than very sound, because the U.S. might attack the Soviet Union before the USSR attacks Hokkaido.

In addition to Japanese apprehensions about horizontal escalation, vertical escalation issues should be examined here. Although many U.S. security experts criticize operations against Soviet SSBNs as a means to changing the nuclear balance through conventional means, it is not a controversial issue among the Japanese public and even defense policymakers, so far. The Japanese people often discuss the horror of nuclear war but hardly
examine the other aspects of nuclear war. It appears that its horror stops them from thinking about nuclear war and its strategy. Even Japanese defense experts are prone to compartmentalize the strategic issues into two categories, nuclear and conventional strategy, and to disregard the nuclear issues because Japan's non-nuclear policies permeate them. They may be satisfied with their rhetoric about the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In short, there is a threshold between their nuclear and conventional thinking.

On the contrary, the issue of straits blockade is very controversial. As long as the straits blockade is a pillar of the Maritime Strategy in the Pacific, it seems to the Japanese public that this strategy is too provocative to the Soviet Union. Some strategists in Tokyo point out that, once a U.S.-Soviet war breaks out in Europe or the Middle East, the Soviet Union likely would try to occupy the northern part of Hokkaido, and the southern side of the Soya Strait, regardless of carrying out the straits blockade operation. The Japanese public, however, seems to support the argument that the Soviet military commander will decide to invade Hokkaido mainly if his forces were to be bottled up in the Sea of Japan.

There is another problem highlighted by the recent elaboration of the Maritime Strategy in the Pacific: proposals to occupy the Kurile Islands and to use them as bargaining chips at the war termination table. First of all, although with respect to the future U.S.-Soviet strategic posture the Kurile Islands may have value equal to Hokkaido, these islands are not worth even a part of Hokkaido from the Japanese viewpoint. It is worth noting that most
Japanese regard General MacArthur's refusal to accept Stalin's demand for a cession of the northern part of Hokkaido, as his greatest contribution to Japan.

Finally, it would not be so difficult for the Soviets to find an alternative to the bastion of the Okhotsk Sea. If they could occupy even a part of Hokkaido, the Soviets could create a bastion in between its upper jaw, Hokkaido, and its lower jaw, the Korean Peninsula. As a result we should be alert for more aggressive movements on the Korean Peninsula. Soviet military approaches to North Korea may indicate the search for such an alternative bastion. Ironically, the JGSDF initiatives do not allow Japan to deploy its forces in the southern part of Japan.

V. CONCLUSION


It is not clear so far how much the impact of those interpretations will damage the JGSDF initiatives. It would not be surprising if the Japanese public demands revision of the global war scenario. The JMSDF may continue to emphasize the sea lane
protection: either through convoy or corridor protection. There is a view, it is said, that those advocating the importance of the 1000 miles sea lanes protection aim to get as large an appropriation as possible for the JMSDF. The JASDF may show its interests in extending its air defense area to the Pacific rather than to the north.

Nevertheless, if the Maritime Strategy is properly explained to the Japanese public and its defense experts, its defense strategy in the 1990s must be strategically more sound than in the 1980s. The point is: What should the U.S. and Japanese elites do to facilitate the Japanese understanding of the Maritime Strategy?

There is no doubt that recent development of the U.S.-Japan relationship has promoted significant dialogue between the two countries on political and tactical aspects of national security. The SDI and issues are symbolic. However, both people, especially officials (including the military), have not discussed the key strategic concepts: the strategic implications for Japan of the Soviet Union, the viability of the conventional global war scenario, and the differentiation between deterrence and defense.

In order to facilitate Japanese understanding of the Maritime Strategy, a U.S.-Japan joint research project on the strategic concept should be established. Moreover, both countries should hold U.S.-Japan joint crisis gaming, as well as war gaming, on the politico-military level, not tactical level. These joint gaming efforts will contribute to the professional understanding of the Maritime Strategy. In short, a U.S.-Japan integrated strategy along the line of the Maritime Strategy, if such an integration is desirable for both
countries, can be created through a dialogue between the two countries about the strategic concept underlying this strategy.
U.S. AND ITS PACIFIC ALLIES: MARITIME INTERDEPENDENCE

Robert J. Hanks

Since the end of World War II, U.S. defense concerns have been focused primarily on Western Europe, Washington consistently viewing NATO as the lynchpin of American security. By contrast, the Pacific Far East has, until quite recently, generally been ignored. This strategic myopia has, at last, come to be recognized for what it really is. Today, it is clear to even the most casual observer that the nations along the so-called Pacific Rim are just as important to U.S. national security as are those of Western Europe.

Parenthetically, one is compelled to note that the term "Pacific Rim" connotates all those nations which front on the waters of the Pacific Ocean. All too often, when that phrase is used, the vision invoked is limited to the littoral countries of the East Asian mainland along with nearby island states. Nothing, of course, could be further from reality. Canada, the United States, and nations in Central and South America are just as much a part of the Pacific Rim as are the mainland and island nations of the Western, South, and Central Pacific. Of prime importance, economic and national security imperatives—emergent during the past four decades—have rendered this entire portion of
the globe one of growing interdependence. The maritime nature of that interdependence is most clearly revealed by a glance at a regional map.

The Pacific Far East

This is not to say that NATO Europe is no longer an essential element of U.S. security. Clearly, it is. Nevertheless, other portions of the world also play important—in some instances vital—roles. At this moment, for example, the Persian Gulf occupies center stage in the crucial and continuing Free World search for energy.

Still, the impact of Far Eastern countries on U.S. national security is scarcely of less importance than this nation's ties to Western Europe. Trade, alone, reveals that
this part of the globe is of growing significance to American welfare. In recent years, commercial intercourse between Far Eastern nations and the United States has expanded to the point that it now surpasses the total which America conducts with its European allies. Moreover, the United States and Japan today boast the highest Gross National Products (GNPs) in the world. Trade, however, is not the only measure of this region's importance to the United States. There also is the fundamental matter of mutual security.

In the latter instance, it is becoming evident that the Soviet Union is increasingly capable of presenting challenges to the Free World in the Far East which are potentially as dangerous as those they currently pose to Western Europe. For example, the West has long harbored a fear that Soviet seizure of West Germany's industrial heartland would constitute a disaster of major proportions. Soviet seizure of Japan would visit the same sort of catastrophe on the Free World. Only during the past few years, however, has any serious American attention been paid to such developing menaces in the Far East.

Myriad questions promptly come to mind. How grave are perils confronting the West in the Pacific Far East? How should the Free World deal with them? Absent a NATO-like organization in the region, what sorts of military
cooperation could be fashioned to supplement economic, diplomatic, and other, less violent, initiatives?

One has only to glance at this area's history since the end of the Second World war to perceive the profound changes which have occurred. In 1945, following defeat of the Japanese Empire, the United States essentially stood supreme in the Western Pacific. With the exception of a few residual European colonial holdings, countries throughout the Far East were not only clear of occupation forces but free to direct their own destinies. U.S. military forces--particularly men-o'-war of the United States Navy--were present in strength, extending a protective security umbrella over the region.

Although internal political dissidence was abroad at various locations--particularly in China, Indo-China, and Indonesia--the domestic environment in other countries was relatively quiescent. Moreover, no overt threat of international aggression loomed on the horizon.

Conditions remained so until 1949 when the Communist revolution in mainland China culminated in the overthrow of Chiang Kai Shek and the Koumintang. That event was accompanied by two major changes: the Communist triumph in China drastically altered the area's balance of power, and political turmoil suddenly became the Pacific Rim's hallmark. Subsequently, significant additional changes have occurred. Beijing, for example, following its historic
split with Moscow and the chaotic upheaval accompanying the infamous Cultural Revolution, has become something of a positive contributor to regional political stability.

Then, the end of the Vietnam war terminated direct U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, however, that retreat led to extension of Soviet military power to the South China Sea, an unprecedented development. With Russian warships and aircraft presently operating from former American military bases in Vietnam, the entire strategic mosaic in Southeast Asia, again, underwent a remarkable transformation. Furthermore, the Far Eastern security vista has been considerably altered by a progressive unraveling of post-World War II Western solidarity.

Years of discontent in the Republic of the Philippines eventually resulted in the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos and the rise to power of Corazon Aquino. While this change offered the Filipino people hope for genuine political freedom and increased economic well being, it simultaneously cast a dark cloud over the future of two major American military installations in the Philippines: the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay and the U.S. air base at Clark Field.

Loss of access to these facilities manifestly would inflict irreparable harm on the ability of the United States to maintain a meaningful military presence in Southeast Asia and, thereby, to cooperate with allies and friends by augmenting their defenses. Quite simply, there are no
comparably viable alternatives available. At this time, it is not altogether clear what position the Aquino government will take when the leases for these facilities come up for renewal.

To the south, New Zealand's stand against visits of nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships to its ports has decimated the ANZUS Alliance. If not dead, that compact is certainly almost moribund. Of supreme significance, Auckland's position has seriously weakened U.S. ability to sustain a meaningful naval presence in the South Pacific. Additionally, strong pressure to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Southwest Pacific Ocean area is generating further problems for the United States. These developments are particularly significant in light of the determined Soviet campaign to establish footholds throughout the region.

As for nuclear-free zone issues, nuclear-powered warships are universally recognized and, therefore, readily identifiable. Under the New Zealand strictures and the provisions of the proposed agreement, Western and Soviet nuclear-powered warships alike would be banned from entering area ports.

On the other hand, given the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons aboard its warships—whether those ships are nuclear or conventionally powered—all American men-o'-'war would be
barred from calling at any port throughout the region should a nuclear-free zone be established. When seeking entry clearance, however, the Soviets would find themselves subject to no such constraint since they invariably deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard their warships. Thus, despite the provisions of any nuclear-free zone agreement, men-o'-war wearing the Hammer and Sickle would continue to be able to sail these seas and put into ports throughout the South Pacific, as long as they obviously are conventionally powered.

More recently to the north, political unrest in the Republic of Korea has threatened to bring down the regime of President Chun Doo Hwan. In this case, fundamental issues center on the form of government the peoples of South Korea desire and whether they will be able to obtain it. At the moment, answers to these questions remain very large unknowns. From a Free World vantage point, the Korean problem is twofold. First, as domestic political clashes multiply, the defense of the country against obvious threats posed by North Korea are certain to be neglected.

Complicating the overall picture is the age of North Korea's venerable dictator, Kim Il Sung, and the question of succession. It is not altogether certain that he might not undertake one last, desperate effort to unify the peninsula under the Red Banner before his death. Nor is there any assurance that his son--the most likely successor--will not
move to do so immediately after coming to power. Secondly, since the ultimate outcome of the current unrest in South Korea is so uncertain, the nature of the government which could eventually emerge from the current turmoil in that portion of the peninsula might prove to be inimical to Western interests.

Collapse of the South Korean Government would expose the eastern flank of one country not yet examined but upon which free world security in the Pacific Far East is substantially contingent: Japan. Defeated primarily by the United States during World War II, Japan's governing pacifist constitution was dictated by General Douglas MacArthur. In that document, Tokyo renounced armed conflict as a means of achieving national objectives. During the decades since the end of the war, its peoples have refused to spend a reasonable portion of their GNP on defense. As a matter of fact, in the early postwar years, Japan was racked by continuing debate over any expenditures for military forces. The umbrella of American protection, implicit in Japan's U.S.-imposed constitution, provided a facile excuse for many Japanese to insist that their attention and efforts should be devoted exclusively to the nation's economic and social development. Today, these same people are sufficiently confident that the United States is powerful enough and adequately determined to defend their island nation against externally mounted dangers that they remain fairly sanguine
with respect to military threats, despite the huge Soviet buildup in the Far East.

Provisions of this constitution notwithstanding, the Japanese Government eventually won the day with respect to acquiring a modicum of military power but consistently refused to dedicate more than one percent of the nation's Gross National Product to the military. Moreover, to reinforce the notion that Tokyo harbors no predatory aims in East Asia, the Japanese armed services--army, navy, and air--are characterized as "self-defense" forces. Not until 1987 was the defense spending cap breached and, then, not by very much. It is abundantly evident that the Japanese are far more concerned with economic threats than with national security.

It is only fair to them to note that, given the robust nature of the nation's economy, Japanese military expenditures as a percentage of GNP amount, in real terms, to greater spending than that being made by most of America's European allies. Nevertheless, the total still leaves a good deal to be desired in funding a reasonable national defense posture, one capable of making a proportionate contribution to collective security in the Pacific Far East.

For instance, the average Japanese citizen seems to be singularly unconcerned about continuing Soviet occupation of a group of islands--the so-called Northern Territories--seized during the closing days of the Second World War and
never returned, or frequent Soviet amphibious exercises clearly aimed at seizure of Northern Hokkaido which dominates one of the important straits--Soya--Tokyo pledged to close in the event of war with the USSR.

It is in the foregoing overall context that one must consider the degree to which maritime interdependence permeates relationships between the United States and its Far Eastern allies and, indeed, between those nations themselves. After all, the Western Pacific is just as surely a maritime-oriented region as is the Northern Atlantic Ocean area from whence NATO takes its name. And, just as certainly, the security of the United States today
depends, as much or perhaps more, on events transpiring in the Pacific Far East as it does on those occurring in Western Europe. The issue, of course, is how best to protect American and other interests throughout the region.

The first thing which strikes anyone perusing a map of the area is the extent to which salt water dominates its geography. From the Asian mainland to the myriad islands dotting the outlying sea areas, connecting distances are vast. Moreover, if one surveys the trade routes—not only in the Western Pacific but those entering and lacing the Indian Ocean—it becomes painfully clear that Western economic well-being and mutual security depend critically on the Free World's ability to use those sea lanes, in peace as well as in war.

When one considers peacetime transport of normal trade—food, fuel, and raw materials—it is evident that Western control of sea routes throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean regions is mandatory. Once the focus is shifted to wartime requirements, including the indispensable flow of strategic cargoes, the imperatives undergirding such control expand geometrically.

If there is any important lesson to be learned from the carnage accompanying the Second World War, it is that nations which control the oceans, command their destinies. The most quoted international strategic theorists—Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (maritime) and Sir Halford Mackinder
(continental) notwithstanding, an earlier realist put it very well. Sir Walter Raleigh observed that whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade of the world; whosoever commands the trade of the world, commands the riches of the world and, consequently, the world itself. One would be well advised to keep these words of that famed sea captain in mind, even in the world which exists several centuries after his death.

In more recent times, it was the ability of the United States to supply West European nations with the wherewithal--American army, navy, and air units, together with weapons and supplies to sustain hard-pressed Allied forces--which ultimately brought about the defeat of Hitler's Nazi legions and produced victory in Europe. Of even greater significance, insofar as present-day conditions in the Western Pacific are concerned, were the spectacular American naval campaigns of World War II which led to the demise of the Japanese Empire. The maritime imperatives which obtained then, are equally operative in present-day Pacific Far Eastern waters.

Even a cursory glance at a map of the region, one depicting the sea lanes and so-called shipping choke points, can leave little doubt that maritime interdependence is a fact of modern day life in the Western Pacific. Although this strategic equation continues to govern throughout the region, there have been major changes since the days
immediately following World War II. The most important is that the United States no longer, alone, disposes sufficient military power to police all of the waters of the Pacific Far East. Recognition of this reality led, in 1969, to enunciation of the "Guam Doctrine." In a speech on that island, former President Richard Nixon set forth its basic premises.

In essence, he announced that the United States no longer possessed the military power to predominant in areas around the globe where forces opposed to freedom were then operating. As a consequence, regional and national defense would, henceforth, be primarily the responsibility of countries involved. The United States would not do the job for them.

President Nixon hastened to add that Washington stood ready to assist its allies and friends in a number of ways. Where a nation could afford to purchase the means to defend itself, the United States would sell it the weapons required to do so. In those cases where nations could not afford to buy the requisite weaponry, the U.S. Government would provide it at minimal or no cost. Moreover, all countries could call on the United States for additional assistance in the form of training and military advice.

Finally, if any external jeopardy proved to be so great that, absent any further assistance from the United States, defeat appeared to be likely, Washington would consider
military intervention. Initially, such American participation would take the form of committing naval and air forces which constitute the high technology spectrum of defense investment—in money and trained manpower—that many nations cannot afford. Also implicit in this doctrine was the notion that, if necessary, American ground power ultimately would be placed on the balance scales to avert complete defeat and subsequent subjugation of friendly or allied states. Even given the recent buildup of the U.S. armed services under the Reagan Administration, these principles still govern global American military commitments.

So where does all of this leave us? Returning to the previously mentioned map, it is obvious that solutions to ongoing security problems in the Pacific Far East hinge on the fact that the region is almost totally maritime in nature. Moreover, it is essential to recall that Japanese naval forces sealed off allied access to China, the Philippines, and island areas of the South China Sea during the opening months of the Second World War, and they did so almost exclusively with sea power.

George Santayana, the Spanish-born American philosopher observed that those who ignore history are condemned to live it again. Are we now, during these closing years of the twentieth century, to be so doomed? Are we to ignore the growing Soviet naval capability to do what the Japanese accomplished nearly five decades ago? The USSR's military
possession of former American naval and air bases in Vietnam, coupled with the expanded reach of Moscow's Far Eastern military forces based in Northeast Asia present the same sort of challenges the Japanese were able to mount in the opening years of the 1940s. Today, however, these challenges also include the manifest advances in military technology which have taken place since 1941.

Just as it did in the early 1940s, this area extends not only along the far eastern portion of the Pacific Ocean but through the Strait of Malacca and companion Indonesian maritime passages into and throughout the Indian Ocean. Whether it be oil from the Persian gulf fueling American
military forces in the Pacific Far East—stationed in Guam, Okinawa, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea—or strategic cargoes required to keep friendly and allied economies running, the aforementioned sea-lanes crisscrossing these two great bodies of water constitute jugular veins insofar as the Free World is concerned. While this fact strongly affects the advanced industrial nations of Europe and North America, its impact is critical with respect to countries along the Western Pacific littoral.

The foregoing reality alone suggests that Soviet acquisition of former American naval and air facilities in Vietnam—overlooking sea routes throughout Southeast Asian waters—presents dangers which the West will ignore only at its peril.

There are two critical aspects to these latter-day developments. In peacetime, Soviet political influence throughout the region, stemming from its unprecedented military presence in Southeast Asia—air and naval—will almost certainly increase by an order of magnitude. Of even more critical significance, that Soviet presence could, in wartime, spell defeat for the West all along the western reaches of the Pacific Rim.

If one accepts the foregoing evaluation, the basic question which then surfaces is: What can be done about the threats and challenges thereby confronting freedom-loving peoples who populate nations of the Pacific Far East? This
is, perhaps, the most difficult question of all. A cursory glance at the region reveals that, unlike Western Europe, which was terrified by events stemming from the Second World War, many nations in East Asia believe that they are generally insulated from the ongoing struggle between the two postwar superpowers. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The notion that the Pacific Far East is a region of profound maritime interdependence can elicit little argument. Just as Japan was the last major nation to be addressed in the wake of such an assessment, so must it be the first looked to in the search for appropriate answers to regional security.

Manifestly the Far East's economic giant, Japan—excepting an enigmatic People's Republic of China, essentially a land power—must be considered the one nation capable of doing the most to promote regional maritime security. In this regard, one is constrained to note that a good deal of scar tissue remains from Tokyo's World War II attempt to fashion a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Most other states in the Far East harbor deep suspicions about any buildup in the Japanese armed services.

Defense against threats to freedom in East Asia does not, however, require any Japanese capability for so-called power projection. That is to say, carrier strike and amphibious assault forces are neither needed nor desired.
Such acquisition would only fan extant fears stemming from Dai Nippon's World War II conquests.

Japanese protection of waters within a thousand-mile radius of the archipelago's shores—recently agreed to by Tokyo and Washington—is merely a beginning. Air and sea defense of these areas against marauding Soviet submarines and aircraft is essential, but much more is needed. Japanese naval and air forces, in conjunction with those of the United States and with cooperation from intervening littoral states, must be capable of protecting not only peacetime but wartime shipping all the way south to the Indonesian archipelago.

This, of course, brings one to ASEAN, including the Republic of the Philippines. Here one finds a plethora of nations economically and politically dependent upon free use of surrounding international waters. A few of them possess some capability to police their own adjacent seas against moderate threats. None, however, has the capability to defend against major predatory thrusts emanating from the sea, nor can they make substantial contributions upon which their wartime security would inevitably depend. Without meaningful assistance from major seafaring powers, these nations are almost universally exposed.

Still, they all have an important role to play, not only in preserving their own security, but in collective defense of their region. For example, each can grant access to its
harbors, airfields, and repair facilities thereby aiding those nations who do possess the naval and air forces necessary to provide the necessary maritime shield. It is in this context that the future of the present American bases at Subic Bay and Clark Field should be viewed by the Philippine Government as well as by the leaders of other area countries.

Whether ASEAN will ever transform itself from a political and economic compact into a regional military alliance, is highly uncertain. That its member states would require major help in protecting the vast expanses of water which surround and separate them is clearly evident. Still, these nations could make a notable contribution to Free World security in Southeast Asia by employing their own limited assets in cooperation with friendly naval and air forces as well as providing the above-cited facilities access.

Looking farther south, one finds two nations saved from Imperial Japan's expansionist designs by American's ability to resurrect its fleet from the mud of Pearl Harbor and then project its rapidly expanding naval power across the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean. The peoples of Australia--adhering to the ANZUS pact--clearly have not forgotten that lesson. Their counterparts in New Zealand apparently have. One could reasonably conclude that recent Soviet infestation of former U.S. naval and air installations in Vietnam, and
the overtures Moscow continues to make to mini-states throughout the South Pacific, would have alerted New Zealanders to a menace strikingly similar to that which confronted them in the late 1930s as Japan began to give substance to its emerging ambitions.

It seems, however, that the relative remoteness inherent in its geographic position has lulled the New Zealand Government into the altogether unjustified belief that it is immune to events transpiring throughout this segment of the globe. The vision of a huge, black Russian bear—poised to spring from Southeast Asia—seems to have escaped the New Zealanders. What they need to realize that, today, the developing Soviet menace is potentially greater than that which they faced from the Japanese four decades ago. Moreover, the perils stem from the expanding seaborne reach of a prospective enemy, just as they did from that of a different antagonist beginning in 1941.

Two strategic realities must always be borne in mind when considering the Pacific Far East. First of all, the crucial dependence of regional nations on use of the seas is indisputable. From ancient times through the present, waterborne links have played a pivotal role in the history of all nations in and around the Western Pacific Ocean. In recent decades, these links have grown immeasurably in importance as global and regional interdependence have increased at an almost geometric rate. Moreover, this trend
will assuredly continue. Thus, control of the seas will remain a fundamental element of national and collective security, whether it be economic or military in nature.

Secondly, Japan proved during the opening phases of World War II that a dominant naval power can cordon off the East Asian littoral and adjacent waters all the way from the Pacific Arctic to the Indian subcontinent. Furthermore, the post-World War II technological revolution has altered air and naval force capabilities sufficiently to permit such denial to far greater distances than was possible at the height of Imperial Japan's power. It is therefore obvious that efforts to penetrate such a barrier and reestablish access today would be a far more costly endeavor than it was in the early 1940s.

Altogether, one is forced to the conclusion that, despite stunning advances in air transport, the Pacific Far East remains hostage to maritime imperatives. Inasmuch as the United States no longer disposes the military—particularly naval—power to insure regional security in this part of the world, cooperative efforts on the part of all Free World nations is mandatory is individual and collective security is to be preserved. As a famed American sage—Benjamin Franklin—said at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, "We must all hang together, assuredly we shall hang separately." This succinct message should be prominently displayed in the office of every political leader in the Pacific Far East.
Rear Admiral Robert J. Hanks, United States Navy (Retired), is Senior Politico-Military Analyst with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, a consultant to and member of various strategic Institutes, and a lecturer and freelance writer. He retired in 1977 following 35 years in the U.S. Navy. His active duty assignments included service in cruisers, destroyers, and naval aviation; command of a destroyer, a destroyer squadron, and the U.S. Middle East Force. Ashore, he served in the International Security Affairs section of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and at the time of his retirement was Director, Strategic Plans and Policy for the Navy Department. Over the past 25 years he has written extensively on international politico-military affairs and maritime history.
THE ORIGINS OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY

Roger W. Barnett

Thus, the resources which a service is able to obtain in a democratic society are a function of the public support of that service. The service has the responsibility to develop this necessary support, and it can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security.¹

Consider the following strawman:² The maritime strategy was composed by a small coterie of naval officers in the grade of commander and lieutenant commander serving on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. These officers, members of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) of the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division (OP-60) labored through the fall and into the spring of 1981-82. The effort was mounted in response to a request from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations to write a strategic story for the Navy that would provide the necessary link between policy, plans, and programs. The product-zero-based and woven from whole cloth, was to provide a justification for the 600-ship Navy and for a force level of 15 aircraft carrier battle groups.

The intention was to articulate a new, aggressive, forward warfighting policy that would be championed by an aggressive Secretary of the Navy. Anticipated approval by a wholly sympathetic Reagan Administration would thereby capture a larger budget share for the Navy. Portions of the strategy in particular were targeted at the Reagan defense
team--especially the emphasis on direct attacks on the Kola Peninsula from carriers, anti-ballistic missile submarine actions, and the Navy's participation in "horizontal escalation."

The time looked right to distance the Navy as far as possible from the Euro-centric approach of the Carter Administration, and to part company boldly with the notion that all the Navy does is "haul ash and trash." That is, the Navy did not want to be stuck with the essentially unglamorous job of defending the sea lanes to Europe. it had more stimulating, risky tasks in mind for itself. Because this was an inside-the-Pentagon job, because it was pointed at the budget process primarily and not toward establishing warplanning guidance for the fleets, and because it called for actions not in accordance with current doctrine approved by the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. alliances, the strategy had to be written without reference to either the U.S. operating forces or to U.S. allies. Secrecy and compartmentation of the process were essential to its success.

In order to make its case, moreover, the strategy would be required, subtly, to whitewash certain issues--especially the questions of nuclear war at sea, of how the central oceanic sea lanes would be controlled, and of Soviet strategy. Finally, the maritime strategy was carefully crafted to ensure that the Navy's historical Pacific bias
would be perpetuated. The break with the Carterites would facilitate longstanding Navy preference and provide a shrews cover for it.

The strategy succeeded in a way that astonished even its most enthusiastic supporters. It captured the Administration, was used to great effect by the Secretary of the Navy to support and rationalize a large navy program that included two additional large aircraft carriers, converted many critics to the Navy's point of view, captured a much larger budget share for the Department of the Navy, and for all these reasons--especially the last--outraged the other services.

The facts, contrary to the outrageous fiction constructed above, reveal that indeed "the maritime strategy" was authored by a group of mid-grade officers on the staff in response to a request from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. There much of the similarity to the strawman ends, however plausible it might sound. In order to trace the conceptual background of the maritime strategy, and what its architects sought to accomplish, it is necessary first to establish a clear understanding of the elements of strategic thought that inform the strategy, for it is those elements that constitute the true roots of the strategy.
I. ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC THOUGHT

The basic principles around which the maritime strategy is organized are straightforward. The level of specificity with which they are expressed, however, has provided a source of contention from time to time with a variety of critics and supporters alike. This is because it does not offer detail sufficient for critics to home in powerfully with counter-arguments. Moreover, its guidance does not tell programmers precisely how to program, or warfighters how to draw up an operation order.

This is, as the Russians are fond of saying, "not by accident." Strategic guidance must be broad, and it must be presented in simple terms so that it is easy both to comprehend and to recall. The purpose of strategic guidance is to provide a context into which other activities are placed. Criticizing strategy for failing to provide the necessary information to decide among two new competing torpedoes is as improper as carping about a toy manufacturer's instructions for failing to provide information on where to purchase a screwdriver to assemble the toy. The framers of the maritime strategy intended only that their words evoke a very particular image; to wit, when military people—especially naval officers—heard the term they would instinctively know precisely what was intended.

In the final analysis there are six organizing principles for the maritime strategy. First, the strategy would
be subordinate to and an integral part of the national strategy. National strategy documents establishing national strategic policy, classified and unclassified, were drawn upon both to provide a solid foundation for the strategy and to ensure that there were no strategic disconnects. Never was there an intention to create a go-it-alone, independent strategy at sea. National objectives and the means expressed by national policy to attain them were kept firmly in mind throughout the process.

Second, this was to be a forward strategy. Sound strategic policy dictates that the defense of the United States take place as far from U.S. borders as feasible, and the Navy must support the implementation of that far-forward policy. To address adequately the problems traditionally experienced by seapowers in their ability to grapple with powerful adversaries whose strength is on the land, the strategy would require strong support of allies on the continent or its offshore islands. Accordingly, this would clearly be a coalition strategy.

Third, it would be an all-arms strategy. While allies are fundamental to a forward strategy that must deal with a landpower located on another continent, the contributions of sister services are necessary to take advantage of the maximum capabilities that can be realized from the interworking of a variety of armed forces. In this regard,
the participation of the U.S. Air Force was of special value and was to be actively sought and developed.

Fourth, the strategy was to emphasize tactical and theater-level offensives within the context of—at least initially—a strategic defensive war. The coalitions in which the United States is involved are all defensive coalitions. It is a central assumption in U.S. alliance strategy, therefore, that our side will not strike the first blow in a war and will, as a consequence, begin a conflict on the defensive. Nevertheless, as the recent works of Colin Gray and Wayne Hughes serve to remind their readers, the offensive at sea is the stronger form of warfare. Taking advantage of the offensive—in a prudent, not a reckless, way—marks another of the important elements of the maritime strategy.

Fifth, the Soviet Union is the adversary against which the strategy must be developed. Strategy requires more than one actor; it is not solitaire. For strategy to be meaningful it must be devised to accomplish specific objectives in the face of concrete opposition. To the extent that the objectives and the opposition are not made explicit, the strategy will be flawed. The maritime strategy deals solely and exclusively with combatting the Soviet Union in a future war. Sideshow siphon effort from the accomplishment of central objectives. The strategy recognizes this and avoids it.
Since the Soviet Union is a global power, its continental expanse alone stretching across 11 time zones, since the United States maintains alliances and forces on both the European and Asiatic land masses, and since U.S. and Soviet forces are routinely within close range of one another in the various maritime areas of the world on a daily basis, a reasonable assumption for the strategy must be that a war between the United States and the Soviet Union would necessarily be global in scope. Stated slightly differently, over time one side or the other in such a conflict would most likely find that its interests would be better served by expanding the geographic scope of the war.

Finally, the strategy recognized that uncertainties and risks must be considered inherent and inevitable. Some matters, of necessity, must be set aside to be dealt with within the specific context of the pre-war or wartime situation. To do so, however, does mean neither that they are unimportant nor that they are overlooked in strategic conceptualization. Some examples of what lies in this category--set forth as a sampler, not an exhaustive listing--are:

* Warning (Will it be adequate to permit effective execution of the strategy? Will decisions be taken in time to take advantage of the warning that is present?);

* Training and morale (Have personnel been adequately trained to execute the strategy? Will morale support the requisite levels of fighting intensity?);

* Length of the conflict (Should the strategy be aimed at a short, a prolonged, or a long war?);
Nuclear weapons (Will nuclear weapons be used? When? Where--on land or sea? By which side? Why?); and

* Surprise (Will the strategy be sturdy enough to withstand operational, technical, or other forms of surprise?)

These, then, form the central tenets of the maritime strategy. It is with them always and firmly in mind that one must trace the strategy's roots.

A. THE ROOTS OF THE STRATEGY

While many of the precepts of the maritime strategy can be traced, not surprisingly, to a writer who was first interested in the interplay between maritime and land-based forces, Thucydides, today's strategy takes root, also not surprisingly, in the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Yet, Mahan's most famous work, *The Influence of Sea Power on History 1660-1783* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957, original copyright 1890) is not as rich in those specific features of the maritime strategy as is his *The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies*. In this work, written just after the turn of the century, Mahan demonstrated his strategic prescience in a different way than in his earlier, more famous book; and he provided an explicit backdrop to many of the fundamental elements of the maritime strategy. His words are quoted at some length because they are pivotal to support the contention that his is the seminal input to the strategy.
Russia...is working, geographically, to the southward in Asia by both flanks, her centre covered by the mountains of Afghanistan and the deserts of eastern Turkestan and Mongolia. Nor is it possible, even if it were desired, to interfere with...this extended line...for the Russian centre cannot be broken. It is upon, and from, the flanks of this great line that restraint, if needed, must come;...7

It is...the interest of Russia not merely to reach the sea at more points, and more independently, but to acquire ...the returns from which shall redound to the general prosperity of the entire empire.8

...the struggle as arrayed will be between land power and sea power. The recognition that these two are the primary contestants does not ignore the circumstance that...the land power will try to reach the sea and to utilize it for its own ends, while the sea power must obtain support on land....Hence ensures solidarity of interest between Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. [France was noted as the "conspicuous artificial exception," owing to her alliance with Russia] which bids fair to be more than momentary, because the conditions seem to be relatively permanent.9

Upon one flank of the Russian line lies the army of Japan; upon the other, five thousand miles away, that of Germany ....The two extremes of the Russian line, thus open to attack, are most inadequately connected by rail.10

From the conditions, we must be in effective naval force in the Pacific. We must similarly be in effective force on the Atlantic; not for the defence of our coasts primarily, or immediately, as is commonly thought,—for in wartime, however much in defence of right, the navy is not immediately an instrument of defence but of offence....11

From these few excerpts one can recognize the sinews of the maritime strategy as it was articulated much later. Mahan establishes that Russia, even before the Soviet revolution, will be the primary adversary, that it must be opposed by coalitions of forces in both the Atlantic and Pacific,12 that the U.S. navy must take forward positions in
ocean areas contiguous to Russia, and that strategy to oppose Russia from the sea must be offensive in nature.

Through the years the vision of Mahan has waxed and waned, but the central tenets reappear frequently, a testimony to their timelessness. In 1939, for example, one Lieutenant E.M. Eller wrote in the Proceedings,

A fleet exists to fight in order to further strategy. Accordingly, no defensive action should be more than a delaying action until the offensive may be undertaken.... Overboldness has not led to a single fleet disaster, whereas with overcaution the number is appalling: Rozhdestvenski, Cervera, Villeneuve, Graves, Degrassse are the names of but a few leaders who lost through timidity.13

The 1973 "Comment" on the Eller article, stated: "People like Eller in the 1920s and 1930s, by their speech and writings, never permitted the Service to forget this attitude of carrying the war to the enemy. Consequently, the Navy was morally ready when the strenuous test of World War II arrived."14

It should be noted at this point that the words "carrying the war to the enemy," are used in all versions of the maritime strategy to describe phase three of a three-phased strategic operation. Phase one is called 15 "Deterrence or the Transition to War"; phase two, "Seizing the Initiative," and phase three, "Carrying the Fight to the Enemy." Even the terminology adopted by the maritime strategy has its own heritage.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS OF FORREST SHERMAN

To underscore the notion that while the fabric appeared to be new the threads are truly not of recent origin, one can cite the efforts by Admiral Forrest Sherman in the years immediately following World War Two to articulate a strategy for the country as a whole and for the navy in particular. The briefing provided President Truman by Admiral Sherman in January 1947 stands as a very important historical milestone in the development of the current maritime strategy. Discussing the probable character of a major war in the next few years and on navy tasks in such a war Admiral Sherman stated:

We envisage that from the naval point of view such a war would have four distinct phases. The first phase would be one of initial operations by our existing forces, of stabilization of the Soviet offensive, and of mobilization and preparation of additional forces, and of expansion of production of war material. The nation would be on the strategic defensive but our naval and air forces should assume the offensive immediately in order to secure our own sea communications, support our forces overseas, disrupt enemy operations, and force dissipation of enemy strength. In this phase the navy would have a tremendous initial responsibility. Early offensive blows would be of extreme importance in shortening the war.

Strong submarine forces would be required for such tasks as destruction of enemy controlled shipping, reconnaissance, and inshore work, sea-air rescue, patrol of advanced areas and bottling up the Russian Navy.

Specific targets for early carrier attacks might include objectives in Manchuria, North Korea and Siberia to cover withdrawal of our forces from Korea and North China; and objectives in northwest Germany and in northern Italy to cover the retirement of our occupation forces.

Our submarines would be deployed promptly to bottle up the Russian forces in the Far East, the White Sea, the Baltic
and the Black Sea and to patrol the approaches to Alaska and the Aleutians.

The second phase would be one of progressive reduction of Soviet war potential and build-up of our own. Operations would be characterized first by increased offensive action by naval and air forces and by joint forces, and subsequently by general advancement of our base areas as our military power permits. During this phase, large elements of all services would be moved overseas; advanced bases would be established and stocked; and requirements for shipping of all sorts and for naval escorts would increase rapidly.

The third phase would involve continued and sustained bombing offensive. Naval activity would consist of maintaining our overseas lines of communications, protection of troop movements, gunfire support for amphibious landings, carrier action against appropriate objectives, and submarine operations to prevent enemy use of coastal waters.

The final phase would comprise the systematic destruction of Soviet industry, internal transportation systems, and general war potential. As naval targets disappeared, our naval operations would become more thoroughly integrated with ground and air operations, the need for maintenance of heavy carrier striking forces would decrease; while the need for ships for transporting forces and supplies, and for close-in escort and support would remain high.16

II. THE '50S AND THE '60S

The 1950's were a time to fight the Korean War, build aircraft carriers, and implement the "New Look" strategy--turning away from "massive retaliation" and narrowing the focus to theorizing about limited war. The Navy first sought to cement its role in strategic warfare in the early and mid 1950's by procuring large aircraft carriers of the Forrestal and Kitty Hawk classes and long-range carrier-based aircraft designed to deliver nuclear payloads. Later
in the decade the idea was born to place ballistic missiles in submarines that could launch them from submerged positions in a broad expanse of ocean area. Scant attention was paid to maritime strategy per se except to support strategic strikes from the sea against landward targets.

One might offer the not implausible rationale that the high level of attention paid to the strategic arena reflected the Navy's insecurity about the strength of its foothold there, while the relative paucity of discussion of how the navy might operate at levels of warfare below the strategic reflected the Navy's confidence that it could prevail with little difficulty in that arena. The Soviet navy, after all, was a disadvantaged stepchild in the scheme of Soviet security programs, and the Soviet Union was struggling throughout this time frame to recover from the devastation of World War II. Although the Soviet navy was large in numbers and submarine-heavy, although it began to develop ship-launched cruise missiles in the 1950's, and although it counted anti-carrier warfare among its primary missions, it was not considered to be an important threat to the vastly superior U.S. (and allied) navies. Accordingly, the level of development and articulation of maritime strategy for the U.S. Navy during this period was low.

When Admiral Arleigh Burke was the Chief of Naval Operations (1955-1961), he sought vigorously to awaken the U.S. security establishment to the burgeoning power of the
Soviet navy and the threat it posed for the conduct of U.S. maritime operations. Even though by the end of his tour in 1961 the attack carrier force was large and healthy, fleet ballistic missile submarines were being produced at an unprecedented rate, a large dedicated anti-submarine warfare force was in place to defend the sea lanes to U.S. allies abroad, and amphibious forces were the cutting edge of U.S. policy in remote areas of the world, Burke had largely not been successful in convincing the administrations under which he served to support naval programs in the manner he believed they warranted support. Nevertheless, one observer of the scene reported at the time:

Between 1956 and 1960, the navy added its considerable influence to the intellectual campaign within the national defense community for a reorientation in strategic policy.... The idea that future wars would be limited in scope and duration gained rather general acceptance during this time, partly through the efforts of top naval leaders and strategic thinkers. Concurrently, the idea took hold that strong conventional forces deployed forward stood the best chance of deterring Communist attacks or of defeating them in a manner dictated by U.S. decision-makers. The Navy's advocacy of flexible response concept did much to establish it as a tool of U.S. policymaking.17

Obviously, the general principles that would form the backbone of the maritime strategy of the 1980s were already fixed in the minds of the naval strategists of the immediate postwar decades. Just as obviously, moreover, questions of limited war, not a war with the Soviet Union, dominated strategic thought during the 1960s.

One does not require extensive research to demonstrate that the concepts of the time are also reflected in the
language used to describe them, nor to find much that is congenial to the maritime strategy of today. Two excellent examples should suffice to undergird the point. The first is from Arleigh Burke in 1961; the second, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Claude Ricketts in 1963:

POLARIS is not our only seagoing asset for nuclear war. In addition, one powerful, versatile attack carriers contribute to our country's retaliatory capability. These carriers and their aircraft from the backbone of our naval striking power: power that can be projected overseas, power that can carry the fight to the enemy, power that can be used in wars of every kind....

The primary role of sea power in our national military strategy is to contribute to our national readiness to project U.S. power overseas. Sea areas lie between us and any prospective allies. Extensive use of the seas is necessary for support of our allies and for the support of our own military forces on their soil.... These factors dictate an offensive naval strategy. Our Navy must be designed to carry the war to the enemy, both at sea and on land.... Technological advances since have reinforced the validity of this offensive strategical concept. No weapon is foreseen that will change that philosophy in the future.... When force is needed, prompt action is most important, because timely action by comparatively small forces usually precludes the need for larger forces later. By exploiting the quick reaction capability of naval forces, we can either prevent hostilities or contribute greatly to keeping them confined.

In the case of Admirals McDonald and Moorer, Chiefs of Naval Operations during the time frames (1963 to 1970) major funding was devoted to procuring escorts for the carriers, to complete the modest carrier replacement program (three carriers were authorized between 1963 and 1970, John F. Kennedy, Nimitz, and Eisenhower) and to fight the war in Vietnam. Relatively speaking, however, the decade of the 1960's represented the high water mark for the post-war U.S.
Navy. The legacy of maritime forces from World War II had been spent, and the navy found itself embroiled in a war in Southeast Asia for much of which it was ill-prepared.

Perhaps, with the benefit of long-range retrospect, an argument might be made that 1962 marked the turning point. Carriers were at their zenith, the Soviet Navy had not yet emerged from its short-range coastal employment. At the time the U.S. Navy, Burke's difficulties notwithstanding, appears in historical perspective to be at the zenith of its powers. Yet, in 1962 the aircraft carrier was removed from a principal role in the Strategic Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP); the Cuban missile crisis both demonstrated the overwhelming superiority at sea of the U.S. Navy and stimulated the Kremlin to take bold steps to offset that superiority; and the U.S. Navy's participation in the Vietnam War was beginning to accelerate.

By the end of the decade the focus was on the obsolescence of a U.S. fleet that, while still very large--almost 900 ships--was old and had received significant wear and tear in Vietnam. Almost two-thirds of the ships were approaching the twentieth anniversary of their commissioning. The downward trend in numbers of battle force ships that started in the late 60's accelerated breathtakingly in the 70's, as Figure 1 portrays graphically:
In 1968 the inventory of battle force ships stood at 957; a decade later it had fallen precipitously to 468. As one might imagine, this halving of the fleet size had a truly riveting effect on the naval leadership of the time. To add to its despair, the Navy enjoyed little success in drumming up support for its programs. From 1967 through 1971, right at the time when ships were being retired in droves, the Navy stood last among the three services in claiming a share of the defense budget. Across those same years, an average of eight ships was authorized annually\textsuperscript{21}--
enough over the long term to support a fleet of fewer than 200 ships.

Although the U.S. blue-water fleet was obsolescent, it proved capable and proficient enough to support the land war in Vietnam. Strategy for use of the seas was virtually non-existent in this war because, even though an attack at sea (the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964) triggered greatly increased U.S. involvement in the war, there was essentially no opposition at sea. Vietnam military presence peaked in April 1969.

The 1960's also witnessed a new emphasis on rationalizing and analyzing defense programs rather than on formulating and articulating the strategic use of military forces. "In my mind, I equate planning and budgeting and consider the terms almost synonymous," Secretary of Defense McNamara testified before the Congress in 1961. Consumed by a war that struck hard both at morale and at force structure, and forced to meet analysts of the office of the Secretary of Defense in pitched battle on the budgetary front, maritime strategists in the United States retreated into almost total silence for better than a decade.

III. THE 1970S

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., became the youngest Chief of Naval Operations in the summer of 1970. Zumwalt had been schooled in systems analysis, and understood the techniques
that had been in vogue under the McNamara stewardship of the Department of Defense. As one of his first acts, Zumwalt commissioned a comprehensive plan for his four years as CNO, which was to be accomplished within two months of the time he was sworn into office. "Project 60" as it became known, suggested that the best way to corner additional funding for the navy was to use a "four missions" approach:

* Strategic Deterrence,
* Sea Control,
* Projection of Power, and
* Naval Presence.

Acknowledging that the strategic mission was in good shape across the board, and likewise forces for power projection appeared relatively well off, Zumwalt opted to emphasize the sea control mission. Zumwalt was unequivocal:

I feel that the sea control mission has now become paramount more than the projection mission of the carrier, because the power of the Soviet Navy has grown so dramatically....They have a very believable prospect of severing our sea lines of communication. Therefore, the first mission and role of the carrier must be to try to keep open the sea lanes to the United States and to our allies.22

Power projection was rarely discussed as pertaining to conflict with the Soviet Union. It was to be used in other areas of the world in support of the Nixon Doctrine.

Meanwhile, the decline in fleet size, especially in light of concurrent increases in Soviet battle forces, was not far from the central concerns of the leadership. In an extraordinary memorandum, Admiral Zumwalt wrote to Secretary
of Defense Laird in 1971, with respect to the Fiscal Year 1973 budget then in preparation:

I have informed you repeatedly of my concern for the continuing degradation of naval capabilities. In my judgment, the end-FY '70 forces gave us a 55 percent probability of success if we became involved in a conflict at sea with the Soviet Union. Since that time, naval forces have been reduced for fiscal reasons by 111 ships including four carriers; the FY '73 Base Case [the Five-Year Plan] requires a reduction of twenty-eight ships and the decrement [the billion-dollar cut] a cut of thirty-six to seventy-three ships including four to five carriers. While I judge our naval forces today have only a 35 percent chance in an engagement with the Soviet Union, that level of confidence is reduced to 20 percent based on the potential consequences of the Tentative Fiscal Guidance. It is perfectly clear that we are unable to support the fighting of a war overseas by the U.S. or allied forces should the Soviet Union challenge the U.S. for control of the seas....The decremented forces would, for all practical purposes, constitute a one-ocean navy.21

The memorandum is extraordinary for several reasons--its emphasis on quantitative measures, its pessimism about the navy's capability vis-a-vis the Soviet navy, and also for its absence of context. This is a noteworthy example of how military judgments should not be rendered.

The next milestone worthy of mention in tracing the evolution of the maritime strategy was a January 1977 classified study undertaken by the National Security Council staff as the Ford Administration was drawing to a close. The study highlighted many issues about the navy's roles and missions, and the subsequent Comptroller General's report and commentary to the Congress on the NSC study underscored the fundamental differences in the way contributions of the navy to national security were perceived. The NSC study
presaged many of the bedrock concepts present in today's maritime strategy. According to the GAO report:

The NSC study presents a position on the future military environment, foundations for U.S. defense policies, maritime implications of the Soviet challenge, factors in developing a U.S. maritime program, and general Navy force requirements. Within this framework it then presents (1) five future ship force levels, (2) each levels' capability to perform the sea control and power projection functions, and (3) the likelihood of defeating the Soviet threat.... By fall 1976 these five force levels were refined into three future force level options. In January 1977 the President decided on a fiscal year 1978 5-Year Shipbuilding Program that was drawn from these options....

The NSC study judged issues, such as Soviet strategy, length of war, results of campaign analyses, and use of future forces as currently programmed, to influence its recommended shipbuilding program and the future Navy size.24

Not surprisingly, the Comptroller General's Report was critical of the NSC study. Its critique indicated that certain important issues were left unresolved. Echoes of the GAO list of "unresolved issues" can be heard in contemporary critiques of the maritime strategy. GAO asked, for example:

--Should the Navy continue to rely on the carrier for its offensive capability in view of its high cost and vulnerability to antiship cruise missile attacks?...

--Could forward deployment of high-value forces be accomplished with less valuable assets, both monetarily and militarily?...

--Why are general-purpose forces being sized and structured for conventional warfare even though the Soviet Union can, and possibly intends to, conduct a tactical nuclear war?...

GAO concluded: "In effect, the NSC study recommends a shipbuilding program that may not meet the future threat in a
cost-effective manner. The study depicts a future Navy still centered around carrier task groups, despite the admission of the high cost and vulnerability of carriers."25

Admiral James Holloway succeeded Admiral Zumwalt as Chief of Naval Operations, and set about to redefine questions about the navy's missions, functions, and tasks. In 1978 Holloway signed Naval Warfare Publication 1 (NWP-1, Rev. A), *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy*, in which the relationship of the Navy's mission to national military strategy was detailed, and the navy's "functions" were clearly spelled out. Holloway's construct diverged markedly from that of his predecessor. Here is an excerpt:

3.1 U.S. NAVY FUNCTIONS...

Briefly, the navy's two basic functions are sea control and power protection. The ability to perform these functions is a requirement if the U.S. is to utilize the seas to support its national policies and to defeat the forces of any state that would deny such use. The functions of sea control and power protection are closely interrelated. Some degree of a sea control is necessary in the sea area from which the power is to be projected, depending on the type of force to be employed. Conversely, the capability to project naval power was developed in naval forces largely as one means of achieving or supporting sea control....

3.2.1 Sea Control. Sea control is the fundamental function of the U.S. Navy and connotes control of designated air areas and the associated air space and underwater volume. It does not imply simultaneous control of all the earth's ocean area, but is a selective function exercised only when and where needed. Sea control is achieved by the engagement and destruction of hostile aircraft, ships, and submarines at sea, or by the deterrence of hostile action through the threat of destruction. Sea control is a requirement for most naval operations. It is required so that the U.S. Navy may have operating areas that are secure for the projection of power, such as carrier strike or amphibious assault, and sea lines of communication that
assure buildup and resupply of allied forces in the theater of operations, and free flow of strategic resources. Effective sea control also enhances security for the nation's sea-based strategic deterrent.

3.2.1.1 Prerequisite. Sea control is a prerequisite to the conduct of sustained overseas operations by U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force general purpose forces. Modern land warfare generates logistic requirements of such proportions that the overwhelming amount of material needed must be supplied by sea.

3.2.1.2 Implementation. Sea control is achieved by the destruction or neutralization of hostile aircraft, surface ships and submarines which, by their presence, threaten U.S. or friendly forces operating in those maritime areas which the United States must use. Sea control can also be effected by deterring the intrusion of hostile forces into those areas. However, deterrence is less effective than destruction in that it permits the enemy to retain a threatening force in being....

3.2.1.3 Application....Sea control can be achieved or supported in several ways:

1. Sea control is primarily effected by operations designed to locate and destroy hostile naval combat units on the high seas....

3.2.1.4 Power Projection as a Part of Sea Control. The use of carrier and marine amphibious forces in the projection of military power can be an absolute necessity to ensure control and continued safe use of the high seas and contiguous land areas essential to control of the seas. This entails destruction of enemy naval forces at their home bases or en route to those ocean areas which the United States desires to protect, destroying their logistic support, or preventing the approach of enemy forces within range from which their weapons can be employed against U.S. forces....

3.3 U.S. NAVY ROLES IN THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

In the functional exercise of its mission responsibilities within the national military strategy, the U.S. Navy has three main roles: strategic nuclear deterrence, to provide overseas-deployed forces, and security of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

3.3.1 Strategic Nuclear Deterrence. The effectiveness of the submarine launched ballistic missile combined with the virtual invulnerability of the SSBN provides the strongest
deterrent in our strategic nuclear forces, and thus a stabilizing factor in the strategic nuclear balance.

3.3.2 Overseas Deployed Forces. The navy provides operationally ready naval components of overseas deployed U.S. forces to support allies and protect U.S. interests. These fleet elements are deployed to locations where they can engage hostile forces at the outbreak of hostilities and rapidly support forward-positioned U.S. ground air forces, as well as U.S. allies.

3.3.3 Security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). The success of a forward military strategy depends upon the navy's ability to maintain the integrity of the sea lines of communication between the United States and its forward deployed forces, its allies, and those areas of the world essential for the supply of imports. The most vulnerable segments of these SLOCs are the overseas portions lying closest to potential hostile bases and farthest from friendly territory where land-based air and control combatant craft can assist in the protection of shipping. The protection of these most vulnerable sea areas requires that U.S. Navy forces be present in sufficient strength to defeat hostile air, surface, and submarine threats....

The contrast between the Holloway and Zumwalt approaches manifests itself most evidently in the clarity with which Holloway's NWP-1 sought to come to grips with strategic issues and relationships in a way Zumwalt had not.

Admiral Holloway's contributions in returning the navy to its more traditional concepts and reducing the central focus of guarding the Atlantic sea lanes, noteworthy as they were, did not hold sway in an administration in which Department of Defense officials were not at all sympathetic to the navy and its strategic rationale. In the interest of forging a coherent navy position for use in strategy and budgetary battles with the Carter Administration, a broad-gauged study entitled SEA PLAN 2000 was undertaken by the
Although the study remains classified, an unclassified executive summary was produced and disseminated. SEA PLAN 2000 considered three national security objectives—which it explicitly declined to prioritize—against which were arrayed seven missions for the navy.

**OBJECTIVES AND MISSIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Objective</th>
<th>Naval Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--Maintenance of Stability</td>
<td>--Forward deployments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Containment of Crises</td>
<td>--Calibrated use of force against the shore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--Superiority at sea in a crisis setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Deterrence of a Global War</td>
<td>--SLOC defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--Reinforcement of allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--Pressure upon the Soviets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--Hedge against uncertainties of the distant future</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SEA PLAN 2000 then presented three options based upon budgetary growth rates of 1%, 3%, and 4% greater than the rate of inflation.26 The options were said to be balanced so that no mission would be neglected; they differed in degrees of risk and versatility as well as cost. The options are of interest in light of the force goals subsequently adopted by the navy:

OPTION 1 (1% real growth), called for 11 large aircraft carriers and a total active force level of 474 ships. It was "judged to be a high risk option with a low degree of
flexibility, with minimal capability across the range of naval tasks."

OPTION 2 (3% real growth), listed 13 large aircraft carriers and 579 ships in the inventory. It "hovers at the threshold of naval capability across the spectrum of possible uses, given the risks associated with technical and tactical uncertainties."

OPTION 3 (4% real growth), showed 15 large aircraft carriers, 631 total ships (585 active), and was said to provide "a high degree of versatility in the form of a wider range of military and political actions at a moderate increase over Option 2."

Frequently advocates and critics alike point to SEA PLAN 2000 as the true foundation from which the maritime strategy sprang. The unclassified executive summary, however, reveals nothing that is truly unique. Rather, SEA PLAN 2000 acts as a data point which happens to be precisely on the curve leading from the intellectual beginnings of the U.S. maritime strategy—with Mahan, as has been argued here—to the present day.

The next Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, began his term in early 1979 with optimism about the state of the navy and for the near future, and set forth his "Fundamental Principles of Naval Strategy":

...I am pleased to report that there is agreement within the U.S. government today on the proposition that maritime superiority must be the foundation of our national naval policy....
In conjunction with allies maritime forces and facilities, our capabilities must be sufficient to put at risk the survivability of Soviet maritime forces even in their coastal waters and bases.

Fundamental to current naval strategy is the principle that U.S. Navy forces must be offensively capable. The geographic range of the Navy's responsibilities is too broad, and its forces too small, to adopt a defensive, reactive posture in a worldwide conflict with the Soviet Union. We must fight on the terms which are most advantageous to us. This would require taking the war to the enemy's naval forces with the objective of achieving the earliest possible destruction of his capability to interfere with our use of the sea areas essential for support of our overseas forces and allies. In this sense, sea control is an offensive rather than a defensive function. The prompt destruction of opposing naval forces is the most economical and effective means to assure control of those sea areas required for successful prosecution of the war and support of the U.S. and allied war economies.

It is important that we make the Soviets understand that in war there will be no sanctuaries for their forces. We cannot allow them to exploit asymmetries in force structures by, for example, attacking our carriers with land-based air in the expectation that we will not respond with strikes against the aircrafts' bases. Keeping the Soviets preoccupied with defensive concerns locks up Soviet naval forces in areas close to the USSR, limiting their availability for campaigns against the SLOCs, or for operations in support of offensive thrusts on the flanks of NATO, or elsewhere such as in the Middle East or in Asia.

Every major naval engagement must, therefore, be regarded as potentially decisive in terms of its impact on the naval balance, and every U.S. naval unit must have the maximum offensive capability we can build into it consistent with its mission.

The record thus confirms that the preferred strategy for the U.S. Navy since the time of the Second World War has been one that emphasizes deterrence, and if deterrence should fail, fighting far forward with the assistance of allies. The need for continental allies was envisioned by
Mahan, who realized and articulated how critical they would be for engaging a continental land power.

IV. THE WATKINS/LEHMAN MARITIME STRATEGY

When the Reagan Administration was installed in early 1981, its new Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., sought to implement the Republican platform for the 1980 elections that stipulated:

Republicans pledge to reverse Mr. Carter's dismantling of U.S. naval and Marine forces. We will restore our fleet to 600 ships at a rate equal to or exceeding that planned by President Ford. We will build more aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious ships.  

Secretary Lehman entered office vowing to revitalize strategic thought in the Navy and to establish firm links between strategy and programs.

Efforts within the navy staff culminated in briefings by the principals, Admiral Watkins and Secretary Lehman, of the Congress and subsequently in the publication by the U.S. Naval Institute of a supplement to its Proceedings in January 1986 that was described as "the most definitive and authoritative statements of the Maritime Strategy that are available in unclassified form." The Watkins article, accompanied by companionpieces authored by Secretary Lehman and Commandant of the Marine Corps, General P.X. Kelley (with Major Hugh K. O'Donnell, Jr.) is striking not for its unique approach but for its broad, long-term continuity with navy thinking illustrated throughout this report.
The more stable the international environment, the lower the probability that the Soviets will risk war with the West. Thus our peacetime strategy must support U.S. alliances and friendships. We accomplish this through a variety of peacetime operations including naval ship visits to foreign ports and training and exercises with foreign naval forces.

The heart of our evolving Maritime Strategy is crisis response. If war with the Soviets ever comes, it will probably result from a crisis that escalates out of control. Our ability to contain and control crises is an important factor in our ability to prevent global conflict.

* Naval forces maintain consistently high states of readiness because of forward deployments, ensuring operational expertise and day-to-day preparedness.
* Naval forces increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces and sister services.
* Naval forces can be sustained indefinitely at distant locations, with logistics support relatively independent of foreign basing or overflight rights.
* Perhaps most importantly, naval forces have unique escalation control characteristics that contribute to effective crisis control.

If our peacetime presence and crisis response tasks are done well, deterrence is far less likely to fail. Deterrence can fail, however, and we must consider how the navy would be used in a global war against the Soviets.

Should war come, the Soviets would prefer to use their massive ground force advantage against Europe without having to concern themselves with a global conflict or with actions on their flanks. It is this preferred Soviet strategy that the United States must counter. The key to doing so is to ensure that they will have to face the prospect of prolonged global conflict. Maritime forces have a major role to play in this regard. The strategy setting forth their contribution consists of three phases: deterrence or the transition to war; seizing the initiative; and carrying the fight to the enemy.

Phase I: Deterrence or the Transition to War: The initial phase of the Maritime Strategy would be triggered by recognition that a specific international situation has the potential to grow to a global superpower confrontation. Such a confrontation may come because an
extra-European crisis escalated or because of problems in Europe....

The goal of this phase is deterrence. Through early, worldwide, decisive use of sea power we--along with sister services and allies as appropriate--would seek to win the crisis, to control escalation, and, by the global nature of our operations, to make clear our intention to cede no area to the soviets and to deny them the option to engage in hostilities on their terms. While seeking to enhance deterrence at the brink of war, we must also consider that deterrence may fail. Thus preparing for the transition to war, specifically to global war, is an integral aspect of this phase....

The need for forward movement is obvious. This is where the Soviet fleet will be, and this is where we must be prepared to fight....

Forward deployment must be global as well as early. Deployments to the Western Pacific directly enhance deterrence, including deterrence of an attack in Europe, by providing a clear indication that, should war come, the Soviets will not be able to ignore any region of the globe....

Phase II: Seizing the Initiative: We cannot predict where the first shot will be fired should deterrence fail, but almost certainly the conflict will involve Europe. If war comes, we will move into the second phase of the strategy in which the navy will seize the initiative as far forward as possible. Naval forces will destroy Soviet forces in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and other forward areas, neutralize Soviet clients if required, and fight our way toward Soviet home waters....

The Soviets will probably focus their offensive on Central Europe, while attempting to maintain a defensive posture elsewhere. Instead, we must dilute their effort, divert their attention, and force them to divide their forces. We must control the type and tempo of conflict, making sure the Soviets understand that they can take no area for granted....

Phase III: Carrying the Fight to the Enemy: The tasks in this phase are similar to those of earlier phases, but must be more aggressively applied as we seek war termination on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Our goal would be to complete the destruction of all the Soviet fleets which was begun in Phase -I. This destruction allows us to threaten the bases and support structure of the Soviet Navy in all theaters, with
both air and amphibious power. Such threats are quite credible to the Soviets. At the same time, antisubmarine warfare forces would continue to destroy Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines, thus reducing the attractiveness of nuclear escalation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor.

During this final phase the United States and its allies would press home the initiative worldwide, while continuing to support air and land campaigns, maintaining sealift, and keeping sea lines of communication open....

The goal of the overall Maritime Strategy, particularly of Phase III, is to use maritime power, in combination with the efforts of our sister services and forces of our allies, to bring about war termination on favorable terms. 29

The authors of the strategy described by Admiral Watkins, had drawn it from national objectives and statements of national strategy, compared it carefully to joint documents and plans, checked it against the concepts of operations and war plans of the unified commanders, and ensured its faithfulness to the national intelligence estimates. Grounded in this way, and staffed and briefed extensively in and out of the Pentagon, the strategy enjoyed widespread acceptance. As has been demonstrated, moreover, it could rest on a foundation of strong historical precedent, which provided subtle but genuine intellectual integrity and cohesiveness.

A. THE 600-SHIP NAVY

With the roots of the conceptual features of the strategy firmly in mind, a few other topics can be swept from the agenda with some dispatch. First, the question of the 600-ship navy. It seems reasonable to assert that the
maritime strategy would not have enjoyed such widespread appeal and approval if it had been used as justification for a particular force level for the navy. Some have contended that the strategy was concocted specifically to rationalize what has become known as Secretary Lehman's 600-ship navy, but in fact the maritime strategy was developed apart from, without reference to, and with no intention of an explicit linkage to the 600-ship navy--or any other force level for that matter.

The roots of the 600-ship navy lead back to testimony before the congress and to public statements by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy. To quote the Secretary:

The Navy's solution to this critical issue is a balanced objective force level of 600 active ships...this active fleet is built around 13 to 15 aircraft carriers and 190 to 220 surface combatants.

The following considerations are relevant in determining the composition of a 600-ship force level:

1. With a balanced fleet of 600 active ships and their aircraft, supplemented by reserve forces, the U.S. Navy can with greater confidence carry out its most important tasks in the event of conflict with any potential adversary.

2. The U.S. Navy presently maintains four to five continually deployed task groups and Marine Amphibious Units required to support our overseas national policy. With the reduction of overseas base structures coupled with regional uncertainties, it is unlikely that the Navy's forward-deployment responsibilities will diminish.

3. The Navy must have the flexibility for operational fleet response to reinforce deployed ships and have the capability to meet--simultaneously--more than one situation of potential conflict.
According to the CNO: "Where about 500 ships provides us with a slim margin of superiority now, it is my opinion that we should have about 600 active ships...in order to maintain this slim margin of superiority." The footnotes affirm what the sharp-eyed have already observed: the Secretary and the CNO cited are not Lehman and Watkins in 1986, but, respectively, Middendorf and Holloway a decade earlier. Harking back to Figure 1, it is not difficult to reason that navy officials who have in the inventory about 480 ships would undoubtedly not be interested in arguing for a force level of, say, 500 ships—an increase of less than five percent. While almost any number between 480 and 600 might have been chosen, the appeal of round numbers must have played a part in their decision to opt for an ultimate goal of 600. Evidently, and for good reason, the number 600 as a fleet force goal had its genesis just about the time the fleet size dipped below 500, and, in point of fact, antedated the Reagan Administration rather than being a creature of it.

B. FIFTEEN CARRIER BATTLEGROUPS

Since the turn of the twentieth century, 20 or fewer has typically been the number of capital ships the major seapowers of the world have maintained in their inventories. More than 20 capital ships—battleships and aircraft carriers—has been rare in this century. As with the number
600, 15 seems to be one that has intrinsic appeal. Ten
seems anemic; 20, on the other hand, seems excessive.

Thus, at the outbreak of World War I the aggressor,
Germany, had 15 capital ships. The United States had 17
"first line" battleships; the British, 22. The Washington
Conference of 1922 resulted in a treaty under which the
United States would maintain 15 capital ships, i.e.,
battleships. The United States entered World War II with 15
battleships (and six aircraft carriers), the number of
battleships having been constant since 1931.

In the forward to the prestigious Jane's Fighting Ships,
1967-1968 edition, one finds the assertion that the United
States is building to a force level of 15 large carriers,
which is "long considered the minimum operational require-
ment." Soon after, the CNO reaffirmed the statement from
Jane's:

Fifteen aircraft carriers of modern design have been
determined as the minimum number needed for peacetime for
limited engagements since World War II....Whether 15
carriers is an adequate number under wartime conditions is
open to question.33

It is unusual to find a CNO for a particular force level
in order to satisfy peacetime operational demands. In
general, critics of the 15-carrier battlegroup force level
have tended to take the position that the navy needs 12 or
13, based on forward deployment of four carriers. This
would allow four battlegroups to be forward deployed in
peacetime, four having recently returned, and four working
up to replace the deployers.\textsuperscript{34} It is equally unusual, however, to hear navy officials claim that a force level of 15 carrier battlegroups would be sufficient in time of war.

In any event, the navy has over the past two and a half decades never been very far from a 15 carrier force level, as Figure 2 shows.

\textbf{Figure 2. U.S. Attack Aircraft Carriers}
C. DOES THE NAVY HAVE A PACIFIC BIAS?

Down until World War I the United States was about equally concerned with the threats presented by the Japanese and German navies. The fleet was kept concentrated on the Atlantic coast—this was the location of most of the shipyards and the Navy's most consistent public support—and the Isthmus canal was rushed to completion. With the destruction of German surface power the fleet was shifted to the Pacific, and throughout the following two decades American naval thought was oriented almost exclusively towards the possibility of a war with Japan.35

It has been a matter of "common knowledge" among defense analysts that the Navy has long had a love affair with the Pacific and that the Pacific strongly influences U.S. naval policy.36 While it is certainly true, as Professor Huntington observed in the quotation just above, that in the intrawar period the navy focused on the threat from Japan, once the second World War had been concluded the navy was quick to move back into the Atlantic in force. Ever since, moreover, the emphasis has been toward the Atlantic, not the Pacific.

Rather than following some irrational proclivity for a particular geographic area, the navy has, quite sensibly, looked most carefully to the area of the primary threat. The postwar concentration was in the Atlantic, where the strategic tasks to attack the Soviet Union and the Soviet navy lay. Professor Huntington, again, is right on the mark:

In the event of a major war with Russia, the Mediterranean would be the base from which the knock-out punch could be
launched into the heart of Russia: the industrial-agricultural Ukraine and the Caucasus oil fields. It is consequently hardly surprising to find that the Mediterranean has not replaced the Pacific as the geographical focus of attention for the American Navy.37

Aircraft carriers were first deployed to the Mediterranean in 1946, and acquired a nuclear strike capability in the Sixth Fleet in 1951. The Atlantic/Mediterranean bias, moreover, was not altered even by the war in Korea. For example, the battleships that were removed from mothballs were not assigned to the Pacific, and none of the navy's large-deck, newest, Midway-class carriers saw action in the Pacific.38

In 1959 the cruise missile submarines that had operated on patrol in the Atlantic since 1956 were reassigned to the Pacific, anticipating the deployment of the new Polaris-class submarines in the Atlantic. Although the strategic ballistic missile submarine inventory was 12 in 1963, the first Pacific patrol did not take place until 1964, at which time the Regulus, cruise-missile submarines were relieved of their primary responsibility in the strategic realm.

It is possible that those who fault the navy for a Pacific bias were unduly swayed by the navy's long, unbroken opposition to the so-called "swing" strategy, which called for carrier battlegroups to be rotated from the Pacific to the Atlantic in the event of a war in Europe. By almost any measure, however, it is very difficult to sustain an argument that there is a Pacific tilt to navy policy. Neither
total battle forces (as Figure 3 demonstrates), nor the percentage of battle forces (Figure 4), nor aircraft carriers (Figure 5) can be used to support such a contention.

Figure 3. Battle Forces--Atlantic & Pacific
Figure 4. Percentage of Battleforces in PacFleet

Figure 5. Attack Carrier LANT/PAC Split
V. CONCLUSIONS

The maritime strategy is not a fresh, original approach to the strategic employment of the navy, nor is it justification or rationale for navy force levels. Instead, its principles are rooted deeply in geopolitical realities and principles that have been recognized for decades. The strawman, for the most part, is incorrect.

To those who are concerned about what they perceive to be an independent, dangerous course being set and followed intransigently by the navy, it is important to note that the navy concedes that sea control has always been a central function. During those periods of time when the navy was clearly preponderant at sea, or when it was on the upswing, it has emphasized both forward offensive operations to secure control of the seas and power projection operations against enemy forces or territory. At times when international and budgetary climates were not favorable for sea power, the navy leadership retrenched. In those latter situations it appears that the navy has either been forced to adopt a less aggressive strategy, or the leadership decided that in view of the forces available and the prevailing threat the best it would be able to do would be to forego—or at least to de-emphasize—forward offensive operations. What is most striking, in the final analysis, is the similarity between the strategic visions of James
Watkins, Arleigh Burke, Forrest Sherman, and Alfred Mahan—not the differences.

The maritime strategy was conceived, and takes its place appropriately, as a planning document, not as an operational document. Clearly and correctly, the Unified Commanders shoulder the responsibility for operational planning. The maritime strategy in contrast, as it states, considers the ideal: that is, given the forces, given expectations about how those forces will perform, given alliances functioning as they were designed, given domestic political will, given Soviet force actions in accordance with intelligence estimates—in short, given that all the uncertainties will turn out not to be wholly unfavorable—the strategy still offers only the direction in which U.S. maritime forces should be guided.
ENDNOTES


2 The strawman is italicized throughout to decrease the possibility of its being inadvertently quoted out of context.

3 "The maritime strategy" is placed in quotation marks here to flag the necessity to identify the term. There are thousands of visions, hundreds of authors, and even several versions of "the maritime strategy." This essay employs the term to describe the particular construct of maritime strategy that originated in OP-603 in the 1981-82 time frame, that was first made public in testimony by Commodore Dudley Carlson in U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY 84, Part 4, 98th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), pp. 47-51. Testimony one year later by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy provided additional detail. (U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY 85, part 8, 98th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 3851-3900.) It was popularized by the January 1986 special supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings entitled "The Maritime Strategy." As a formal, internal document within the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, it has both classified and unclassified versions.

4 This subject has been treated at length for the first time in a highly original and provocative book, The Wartime Influence of Seapower on Landpower, by Colin S. Gray, forthcoming.

5 Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986).

6 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1905).


Mahan's genius on this point, expressed as it was before World War I, is worthy of note.


Top Secret, "Presentation To The President 14 January 1947 Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief Of Naval Operations (Operations)"); CNO Chronological File-Post 1946 Command File, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center. I am indebted to the research of my colleague, Jeffrey Barlow, for this series of quotations, and for the material cited in footnote 18 below.


Soviet presence in the Mediterranean was established in Albania by positioning of eight diesel submarines there. In 1961, however, this foothold and the submarines were lost when Albania broke away. The first Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean was in 1968; in the Caribbean Soviets made nine-ship visit to Havana, Martinique, and Barbados in the summer of 1969.


26Unclassified executive summary, mimeographed.


32The important exception to this generalization lies in an appreciation that the Soviet Union—for the past several decades, at least—has maintained more than 20 of its capital ship, the ballistic missile submarine. The West, and especially the United States, views ballistic missile submarines more as contributors to the strategic weapon force rather than as ships per se, much less as capital ships.


The first deployment to the Pacific by a Midway-class carrier was not until 1958. Three ships of the class had been commissioned in 1945.
It is generally agreed that the father of the Navy's 1980's Maritime Strategy, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, was heavily influenced by his experiences as CINCPAC in the post-Vietnam period. Searching for an approach to naval warfare which would reverse the 1970's decline of U.S. maritime strength, Admiral Hayward focused on power projection through carrier battle groups. These would capitalize on the Soviet Union's geostrategic weakness by bottling up their surface ships, SSNs and SSBNs in Soviet home waters before they were able to transit straits and other choke points to the open ocean.¹

Because the maritime strategy seems to require a concentration of forward deployed U.S. naval forces in the North Pacific and Sea of Japan, naval strategists have also emphasized the important role America's Pacific allies should play in implementing the strategy. That role would be twofold: (1) the provision of bases for American naval and air forces; and (2) direct cooperation through their own air and naval assets to monitor regions adjacent to their territories and, if need be, escort and fight alongside U.S. forces.
Therein lurks one of the unresolved issues of the maritime strategy. Although it requires allied cooperation to be fully effective in both deterrent and war-fighting modes, it is essentially unilateralist. Decisions ranging from probing Soviet defenses in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk to actual hostilities would be made by the United States. Allies would be expected to fall in line behind these decisions regardless of their own foreign and security policies. Exacerbating the prospect of differing policy interests for Washington's Asian allies was former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's concept of horizontal escalation. Because the Maritime Strategy is directed primarily to the central European front, Asia is seen as a secondary battlefield which would be opened to force the Soviets to contemplate a two-front war. U.S. allies presumably would provide bases and logistic centers in exchange for American protection and the maintenance of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

According to U.S. strategic thinking, horizontal escalation would not be as threatening to the Pacific allies as it initially appears. Because the Soviet navy would be primarily concerned with protecting its SSBNs, the bulk of its air and naval forces would be concentrated around Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. A prompt deployment of American anti-submarine (ASW) forces would also precipitate a Soviet submarine retreat to home waters to protect the SSBNs. This would leave only residual Soviet forces in Southeast Asia,
the eastern Indian Ocean, and the South pacific which could be neutralized at choke points such as the Strait of Malacca by American and allied forces.\textsuperscript{3} Besides, the navy argues, the enhanced threat of a two-front war strengthens deterrence and, therefore, reduces the probability of war's occurrence in the first place.\textsuperscript{4}

As Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, has stated: "The idea is to counter the launch platform. To shoot the archer before he releases the arrows is very important because that cuts down on the magnitude of the defensive problem."\textsuperscript{5} Where Admiral Watkins foresees the importance of a preemptive strike in a Soviet-American confrontation, Vice Admiral James A. Lyons, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, sees the role of U.S. Pacific Forces as sea control: to insure that Soviet forces in Asia cannot be shifted to Europe.\textsuperscript{6} Each of these strategies portends different roles for Asian allies--the former as passive supporter and provider of bases, the latter as active contributor to a conventional armada whose task is to constrain a Soviet breakout from its home bases or an attack on the U.S. fleet.

II. AMERICA'S ASIA STRATEGY AND CAPACITY

The importance of American air and sea power to Asian-Pacific security has been acknowledged since the end of World War II. Initially, they formed the basis for an
island cordon sanitaire approach to protect the chain of islands from Japan through the Philippines against continental-based Sino-Soviet power. Advocates of this strategy opposed efforts to fight on the mainland where U.S. manpower would be at a great comparative disadvantage against Asia's huge populations. The Vietnam War's outcome strengthened the argument behind the cordon sanitaire. It became the 1969 Guam Doctrine under which U.S. allies were expected to take primary responsibility for their own defense, but, if attacked, could expect American assistance through its air and sea power.

While the Seventh and Third Fleets combined deploy 220 combat ships and auxiliaries and the U.S. Pacific Air Force has approximately 500 bombers and fighters, they are all part of a global strategy, tasked with monitoring developments all the way from the Persian Gulf to the eastern Pacific. This wide dispersal means that in any given conflict situation, the U.S. must depend on the capabilities of allied and friendly states to augment American force projection.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger articulated the Reagan administration's approach to Pacific security in 1982 when he distinguished between the U.S. roles in the Northwest Pacific and the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean. For the former the United States would provide the nuclear umbrella, offensive force projection, and aid for the defense of South
Korea. For the latter, there would be the nuclear umbrella, projection forces, and sea lane protection. Missing, of course, was sea lane protection for the Northwest Pacific, a task the United States urged Japan to accept so that U.S. forces could be moved further south and west without exposing the sea lanes from Hawaii to Japan.

The need for allied ships and planes is further underscored by examining the kinds of ships the U.S. Navy is building to effect its surface and air strike missions. Shipbuilding plans through the remainder of this decade to safeguard the projected 12 to 15 carrier groups include enormously expensive Los Angeles-class attack submarines, 38 high-cost cruisers, and 14 destroyers. The high price of these ships means that they will not be produced in sufficient numbers to replace their predecessors unit for unit. The far-flung SLOCs will either be less frequently patrolled, or the United States must rely increasingly on other navies.

A. THE NEED FOR BURDEN-SHARING

High technology warfare has driven the costs of modern navies and air forces so high that alliances between major powers and smaller allies are being reassessed. The military guarantees of 20 years ago are no longer absolute. They have become limited and conditional, reflecting the economic burdens they entail. As Robert Scalapino has noted, it is more appropriate in the 1980s to speak of
alignments rather than alliances. The former are vastly more complex, the reciprocal benefits more fluid and open to regular renegotiation. "It requires a capacity for compromise, an acceptance of difference, and, above all, a willingness to consult and to develop genuinely collective policies." This means a shift away from unilateralism in the determination of alliance policies.

Critics of the U.S. defense burdens inherent in alliance arrangements point to this country's unprecedented global indebtedness which, by 1990, is expected to be half a trillion dollars. They note that by that time, Washington will be paying tens of billions to foreign creditors merely in servicing costs. Because these creditors are also U.S. allies (Japan and ROK), the following questions arise: (1) can the United States continue to lead allies to which it owes a huge debt? (2) If the United States tries to control the debt through protectionism, will the allies continue to rely on America for security when Washington is disrupting the economic system on which their prosperity is based? And finally, (3) will American public opinion support paying for the defense of countries richer than the United States? With respect to the last question, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations polls of over 2500 national respondents in 1978 and 1982 reveal diminishing support for expanded military spending even among those who were classified as military "hardliners" (from 47 to 34 percent).
The United States could afford the commitments it established along the Pacific rim in the 1950s and 1960s when domestic social programs absorbed a smaller percentage of U.S. national product and the American economy dominated the globe, producing over 40 percent of the world's goods and services. That era has passed. If containment is to remain viable, then the United States needs the assistance of allies and friends not only through passive provision of bases but also through positive cooperation in force deployments. Such cooperation, in turn, depends on a change in U.S. attitudes towards its Pacific partners from unilateralism to joint planning. If American protection is simply viewed by the allies as payment for services rendered rather than as a product of common interests, then the longevity and reliability of such arrangements are questionable.  

(This is one part of the problem in negotiating a new agreement for the Philippine bases.)

What roles can allies with limited navies perform in the Pacific? Are joint operations feasible? Have they been conducted in the past? Can they be improved in the future? The remainder of this chapter addresses these questions and, equally important, the compatibility of security interests in whose absence cooperation would be chimerical.

Allies, with even modest naval and air forces, could engage in defensive sea control. Indeed, with the declaration of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the 1982
Law of the Sea Treaty, most littoral states have begun to acquire ships for the purpose of enforcing their jurisdictions. These include attack submarines, land-based patrol aircraft, fast attack craft, destroyers, and frigates. These systems can engage in straits control, convoying, and ASW operations. The question arises--will states which are developing capabilities to defend their territorial waters and economic zones view cooperation with the U.S. Navy as a means of enhancing their own security? Or conversely and ominously for U.S. (and Soviet) naval strategies, will those states signing the Law of the Sea Treaty increasingly oppose the deployment of all warships as incompatible with the "peaceful purposes" language of the Treaty? While the latter interpretation need not inhibit U.S. deployments, it could still obstruct the kind of allied cooperation necessary for a truly effective U.S. naval strategy.

III. JAPAN: AMERICA'S MAJOR PACIFIC ALLY

Japan's strategic situation can only be understood in light of its close proximity to the Eurasian land mass. A series of islands enclosing the Sea of Japan, the country is only a short distance from the coasts of China, Korea, and the Soviet Union. The latter's major Pacific naval base, Vladivostok, lies only 1070 kilometers from Tokyo. Access to and from the Sea of Japan is controlled by three straits:
Tsushima which separates the Korean peninsula from Honshu, Tsugaru which separates the Japanese islands of Honshu and Hokkaido, and Soya which separates Hokkaido from the heavily fortified Soviet island of Sakhalin. The Soviets also occupy the Kurile islands which stretch from the northern tip of Hokkaido to the Kamchatka peninsula, forming a barrier between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific. Ships traveling to and from Vladivostok must transmit straits potentially controllable by U.S. allies: the ROK and Japan.

While the Japanese archipelago is a natural barrier constraining Soviet Pacific Fleet operations, Japan's cooperation is essential to control the apertures in that barrier in the event of a confrontation. Japanese military planners display a certain reticence, however, over the prospect of closing the straits. A Soviet belief that Japan was about to blockade or mine them could trigger a preemptive strike against Japanese bases and the occupation of northern Hokkaido. Indeed, until the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Japanese officials did not develop scenarios in which a military conflict would occur around the home islands. The 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) foresaw a low probability for Soviet-American conflict; a low probability for East Asian hostilities; and expressed confidence in the deterrent value of U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Nevertheless, Japanese planners realize that in a global or major East Asian confrontation,
Japan's involvement could not be avoided. The Japanese straits would be either blockaded by the Americans and Japanese or controlled by the Soviets. Thus, recent joint exercises have focused on repelling a Soviet attack on Hokkaido. *Keen Edge 87-1* was the largest American-Japanese exercise held to date with 10,000 personnel from all three services. Interestingly, *Keen Edge* included U.S. aircraft stationed in South Korea for the first time, implying Japanese acceptance of a security link among the three countries (discussed further below).  

Soviet intransigence over negotiations for return of the northern islands is related to its naval strategy. The archipelago north of Hokkaido (Habomai, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Etorofu) commands the most readily usable exits to the Pacific Ocean which, unlike the straits, could not be easily obstructed. By fortifying the two Kurile islands closest to Japan—Kunashiri and Etorofu—Moscow hopes to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into a Soviet lake for the protection of its SSBNs. Moreover, the Soviets have approximately one division deployed on the southernmost Kuriles, equipped with long-range artillery, Mi-24 helicopters, and some 40 Mig-23 fighters—a significant concentration of force if the goal is to seize northern Hokkaido.  

The 1987 Defense White Paper for the first time stresses "air defense on the mainland," a reference to preparation for the defense of northern Hokkaido from a Soviet invasion.
effort to secure the southern side of the Soya strait. Sea
defense is seen as an integral part of this new concen-
tration on northern Japan for the MSDF would be tasked with
securing a route for U.S. forces to come to Japan's aid.
The White Paper does not, however, outline any arrangement
for a readiness system under which U.S. forces would jointly
assist in Japan's defense. Nor has the United States
prepositioned supplies to Hokkaido to repel an invasion
force. Indeed, neither logistics, labor, land nor transpor-
tation are currently available to the U.S. military in
Hokkaido in the event of an emergency requiring a rapid
buildup.19

Washington's aims for Japan include: (1) the develop-
ment of a capability to control the sea lanes 1000 miles
from Honshu, in particular the area south to the Bashi
channel north of Taiwan and east of Guam. This would
require that the Maritime Self-Defense Force develop
capabilities against Soviet surface vessels and submarines
as well as long-range patrol aircraft; (2) mining and
blockading the straits discussed above; (3) the establish-
ment of an air defense screen around the home islands that
could inflict heavy losses on Soviet bombers and fighters
and therefore facilitate sea control.20

Japan possesses most of the systems necessary to imple-
ment these tasks, though it needs more of each (F-15
fighters, JE-2C ASWCs, P3-C ASW aircraft). It currently
lacks airborne refueling capacity (KC-135s), however, because the Diet has viewed these as potentially providing an offensive as distinct from defensive capability according to Article 9 of Japan's Constitution. This policy must change if Japan is to be able to sustain air combat and patrol over time and space. U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage has praised the JSDF Midterm Defense Plan which by the early 1990s will yield 60 destroyers--two with Aegis defense systems, 100 P-3Cs deployed in Hokkaido, 100 F-4s and 100 F-15s. These systems far outnumber their counterparts in the U.S. Seventh Fleet and Fifth Air Force. The United States has also pressed Japan to set up Over the Horizon Radar (OTH) which would provide early warning of aircraft flying from Siberian bases toward the Pacific. Washington would link a Japanese system into a planned chain of OTH sites stretching from Alaska to the Philippines.

America's hope, then, is not that Japan becomes an independent regional military power--anathema to such neighbors as China, the Philippines, and Korea--but that Tokyo develop the capacity to fulfill its pledge to defend the surrounding sea lanes "for 300 miles to the frigid north [and] to the south for over 1000 miles." Japan would not "stand in" for the United States in this region. Rather, its forces would augment the Seventh Fleet by subjecting Soviet naval and air movements to close surveillance. The
The concept of Japanese forces being additive to American implies, of course, that the United States has abandoned its "swing strategy" to Europe in the event of a crisis. Reassurance of America's Pacific allies, including Japan, that the ASDF and MSDF will not be primarily responsible for western Pacific defense is essential if an expanded role for these forces is to be politically acceptable in Asia.

U.S.-Japan joint exercises are increasing in scope and number with the biannual RIMPAC'86 also involving the Australian, Canadian, and British navies. Nevertheless, unlike NATO, the United States still has no joint command structure with Japan. Current plans state that in the event of imminent attack on Japan, the two governments will conduct closer liaison, but no joint command is planned—even for air defense where rapid task coordination would be essential. The reason for this anomaly is Article IX's prohibition on collective self-defense. Thus, joint defense beyond territorial waters and air space is problematical. Within Japanese air and sea space, however, the LDP government interprets the Constitution in a manner that permits Japan to respond to an attack on U.S. forces, arguing that such a response falls within individual or national self-defense. Thus, Japanese ships can protect U.S. ships within Japanese waters, though the chain of command would be through the MSDF and not the U.S. fleet.24
Basically, the JSDF, while desiring full participation with American forces in Japan, hopes to avoid having to justify that participation in the Diet. Hence, the ambiguity surrounding the Japanese commitment to defend U.S. forces and the insistence that Japanese and U.S. forces are not integrated. The JSDF has been more concerned with defusing joint defense as an issue in domestic politics than with devising more effective security arrangements.

Obstacles to sea lane defense for Japan include the deployment of some 80 TU-22N Backfire bombers in the Soviet Far East. With a combat radius of over 2000 miles unrefueled, these supersonic aircraft are believed to be tasked with attacking the Seventh Fleet. Backfires, Bears, and Badgers all regularly fly over the Sea of Japan testing ASDF defense systems. Neither the MSDF nor ASDF possess the capability to oppose the Backfires. Combined operations with the United States would be the only effective defense. Yet, at Japan's current rate of procurement, the MSDF capability to mount an effective SLOC defense will probably not be realized until the mid-1990s. At that time, Japan's new FSX fighter—an upscale version of the F-16—will be deployed. Capable of flying to the Kuriles and Vladivostok with state-of-the-art avionics, the FSX will give the ASDF a strike capability against the Soviet mainland.25
A. THE JAPAN-KOREA NEXUS

Because both South Korea and Japan have security treaties with the United States and each patrols its respective side of the Tsushima Straits, it is at least theoretically possible that three-way defense cooperation could emerge. The U.S. Fifth Air Force and Seventh Fleet treat South Korea and Japan as one region. For example, the Fifth Air Force has one air division in each country. Recent exercises in Japan included the deployment of U.S. F-16s from Korea. A JSDF official even offered an opinion in the Diet in 1980 that joint exercises with ROK forces would be legal. This idea was reinforced by Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle in 1983 when he urged tripartite exercises among Japan, South Korea and the United States to control the Tsushima Straits.26

Nevertheless, the ROK has displayed ambivalence toward Japan's military growth and rejected the idea of direct military cooperation with an historical enemy. On the one hand, Seoul has requested as much as $6 billion in aid from Japan on the grounds that ROK defense on the peninsula contributes to Japan's safety. Yet, at the same time, South Korea fears that too extensive a Japanese naval and air buildup will lead to a reduction of U.S. forces in the vicinity as well as a reactive Soviet buildup of North Korea. To a certain extent these concerns appear justified. The Soviets accelerated arms transfers to the DPRK in 1986,
including Mig-23s, though these were provided only after the United States sold F-16s to the ROK. More ominously, Soviet Pacific Fleet vessels are not calling at both Nampo on the west coast of the DPRK and Nanjin on the east coast. Though neither of these ports could remotely be termed a Soviet base such as Cam Ranh Bay, if the Soviets could deploy ships there permanently, blockade of the Tsushima strait would be more difficult.

The ROK has certainly developed the economic capacity to play a greater role in the maritime defense of its vicinity. It already provides offset payments of $1.2 billion annually to help defray the maintenance costs of 38,000 U.S. forces on the peninsula. Given Seoul's rapid economic growth rate and some $8 billion in foreign exchange reserves, Seoul could significantly increase its defense role without harming its economy. Additional frigates and minelaying capacity could make the ROK navy a formidable ally in defending and/or blockading its side of the Tsushima Straits while the MSDF performs the same role to the east. The Seventh Fleet could coordinate these efforts while maintaining the political and legal fiction that Seoul and Tokyo do not exercise together.

Overt defense cooperation may still be a decade away. Yet, its occurrence seems inevitable, especially given the continued up-grading of North Korea's armed forces and the prospect of the Soviet Union using northern harbors. Seoul
already acknowledges the vital importance of U.S. bases in Japan for the ROK's defense. At the same time, Japan should encourage North Korean economic and political reforms which emulate those of the PRC. A more economically outward-looking Pyongyang could well move the foreign policy of a successor regime in a more moderate direction. This, in turn, could lead to tension reduction around the peninsula and a greater willingness on the ROK's part to see Soviet military growth in East Asia as a primary concern. Unless the North Korean threat is reduced, however, problems of threat perception compatibility between Tokyo and Seoul will persist. Japan does not see Pyongyang so much as a threat than as an economic opportunity which Seoul continues to obstruct. Over the long run, both countries depend on maritime freedom and their security concerns are similar; but at present, Seoul's fear of the North precludes a broader regional view.

IV. SOUTHEAST ASIA: PHILIPPINE BASES AND ASEAN

Beginning well before World War II, the American naval presence in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean has depended on the base in Subic Bay in the Philippines. Unlike Japan and Korea whose armed forces provide an active contribution to the U.S. maritime presence, the Philippines is a politically more difficult situation. It is a passive provider of strategic location. Neither its small coastal
defense navy nor minimal air force possess a capacity for sustained sea lane patrol. The bulk of the country's military budget, moreover, is committed to the army to fight Southeast Asia's only significant communist and Moslem insurgencies. Because the Philippines is not actively involved in regional defense and because the bases are so important for both U.S. conventional and nuclear support, they have become a focus of controversy for the Aquino government and a rallying cry for those groups who see the bases as an affront to Philippine autonomy.29

U.S. officials insist that the bases are crucial for operations in three regions: the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. They demonstrate America's commitment to regional naval preeminence, particularly in light of Soviet deployments at Cam Ranh Bay, which, by 1987, totalled some 25-30 ships at seven docks, tripling the capacity the Americans had built during the Vietnam War. All other U.S. Pacific allies, the ASEAN states, and even China have indicated to U.S. authorities that they prefer to see the Seventh Fleet and 13th Air Force remain in the Philippines, though none has offered to provide substitute facilities should the U.S. be asked to leave.

The capabilities of Clark Airbase and Subic Bay are comprehensively detailed elsewhere.30 Suffice it to say that Subic performs 65 percent of the Seventh Fleet's repairs and that the nearest alternative facility is 1400
miles east in Guam, while Clark is the only regional staging point from which C-5As can fly nonstop to Diego Garcia, the U.S. Central Command's primary staging point for the Middle East.

The Aquino administration is keeping its options open with respect to the renewal of the bases agreement in 1991. It does not want to give the anti-bases opposition political grist during negotiations which begin in 1988. Nevertheless, most observers believe a new agreement will be reached because the economic benefits are so great. The bases employ 40,000 Filipinos and directly contribute over five percent to the country's GNP. This total is further enhanced by the spending of 60,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel and their 25,000 dependents.31

A new treaty will undoubtedly cost the United States considerably more than the current $900 million and will be subject to more stringent criteria of Philippines use to demonstrate that the bases are more than just nominally owned by Manila. In all probability a new treaty will be submitted to a popular referendum, the approval of which will serve to solidify U.S.-Philippine security ties. At the same time, the United States must be prepared to see the bases become targets for guerrilla attacks after 1991 if the Communist New Peoples Army can rally nationalist sentiment against this continued "imperialist encroachment."32
The bases have also become an issue in ASEAN diplomacy. In 1987, Philippine Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus attempted to solicit a formal statement of regional support for the bases in hopes of defusing their renewal as an issue in Philippine domestic politics. Affirmation of the bases importance for regional security could be used to appeal to the Philippine electorate that their renegotiation was not simply a manifestation of the country's subordination to U.S. strategic interests. Manglapus' appeal to ASEAN members was not accepted, however. Rather than relieving the Philippines of sole political responsibility for the bases, ASEAN members insisted that the bases' renewal was a bilateral issue between Manila and Washington. To endorse their continuation would be a particular affront to Indonesia and the logic of the Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), even though privately ASEAN members are eager to see U.S. forces remain in the region.

Even if the bases are renewed, problems concerning the presence of nuclear weapons could arise. As the Seventh Fleet deploys more vessels with such dual-capable missile systems as the Tomahawk, anti-nuclear concerns in the Philippines have become a political issue. The new Constitution, for example, declares the Philippines a nuclear-free territory "consistent with the national interest." This latter phrase could provide a loophole for the government if it decided the presence of nuclear weapons was necessary for
the country's security. A public statement to that effect would be unlikely, however.

Indonesia's desire for a more prominent role in Southeast Asian affairs was demonstrated during the 1987 Manila Summit in the ASEAN statement urging efforts toward the early establishment of a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANFZ). Modelled after the Treaty of Roratonga for the Southwest Pacific, Indonesia has argued that SEANFZ is a logical expansion of ZOPFAN. Its purpose, from Indonesia's perspective, would be to reduce regional dependence on external powers. As with the ZOPFAN declaration, however, ASEAN members realize that SEANFZ is also nonself-implementing. So long as Soviet and U.S. navies continue to ply the waters of the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, neither ZOPFAN nor SEANFZ will go beyond a rhetorical challenge. In contrast to the United States, though, the Soviet Union has endorsed SEANFZ. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze suggested to Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar that the USSR might be willing to open Cam Ranh Bay for inspection as an assurance that no nuclear weapons are deployed there. A Soviet offer of this nature could provide the anti-bases and anti-nuclear movements in the Philippines with political ammunition unless the Americans were willing to reciprocate. For Washington to do so seems improbable, however, since opening the bases for inspection would violate the longstanding American policy of neither
confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons at overseas locations.

Soviet concern about the Philippine bases is regularly expressed. General Secretary Gorbachev, in his wide-ranging July 1986 Vladivostok address, hinted at the possibility of reducing the size of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in exchange for an American military exist from the Philippines. That offer could resurface during the bases renegotiations. High level Soviet visitors to the Philippines have warned that the bases put the country at risk and could involve it in war.36

On balance, cautious optimism over the future of the bases appears warranted. Their continued importance for monitoring and protecting the sea lanes through the straits of Southeast Asia makes the facilities a net asset for regional security. That asset could be further enhanced, in the author's view, if the United States and the Philippines expanded the multilateral use of such facilities as the Crow Valley Gunnery Range for ASEAN navies and air forces. Joint use would facilitate the development of common doctrine among friendly armed services and help dissipate the negative image of the bases as exclusively in America's strategic interests.37
V. ASEAN AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY

Although ASEAN is not allied to the United States, two of its members have security treaties (Thailand and the Philippines) with the U.S. and three others (Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei) are linked to other U.S. allies (Britain and Australia). ASEAN defense activities could contribute to the maintenance of SLOC freedom in Southeast Asia and the eastern Indian Ocean.

ASEAN security cooperation with the United States is problematic, however. First and foremost, open collaboration would violate ASEAN's primary foreign policy goal: the creation of ZOPFAN. The Zone concept serves several political purposes: (a) it sustains ASEAN's credibility within the Nonaligned Movement despite most of its members' ties to Western powers; (b) it posits a long term goal for Southeast Asia free of all great power encroachments, including the American, Soviet, and potentially Chinese, and (c) it provides a politically acceptable way of satisfying Indonesia's desire to be the security policy leader for ASEAN without requiring that other Western-aligned members sacrifice their security links to outsiders. ZOPFAN, then, is a vague umbrella under which many different national security policies find shelter. They range from Indonesia's desire to establish an exclusionary zone to Singapore's belief that security lies in a balance of power, including a strong American presence and even that of Japan.
In fact, the Singaporean view most closely represents the prevailing situation (minus Japan) while the Indonesian preference would require evolution toward a future setting in which the major powers would mutually agree to withdraw their forces from the region. Given the current trends of both Soviet and American naval expansion, Indonesia's version of ZOPFAN seems further away than ever.

In general, the U.S. naval and air presence in Southeast Asia is welcomed by ASEAN. Not only does it counter the Soviet buildup in Vietnam but it also insures that Japanese rearmament will proceed slowly and in conjunction with American plans. A U.S. presence could also insure against any future Chinese designs for the region. Moreover, if Japan was to add its ships to those of the Seventh Fleet in Southeast Asia, some ASEAN officials fear the exacerbation of a Soviet-Western naval arms race in its vicinity.  

In fact, most ASEAN armed services currently engage in various kinds of cooperation with their U.S. counterparts. Singapore and Thailand provide access for U.S. ships and planes to ports and airbases in their countries. The Seventh Fleet conducts passing exercises with ASEAN states' ships. Officers from ASEAN states comprise 16 percent of all foreign military students at U.S. service colleges; and the USPACOM organizes annual maritime and logistics conferences attended by defense officials from ASEAN. Combined naval amphibious and air exercises between individual ASEAN
states and the Seventh Fleet were initiated in the early 1980s. Only Indonesia and Brunei have not participated. U.S. Navy P3 Orions regularly stop at U Tapao and Don Muong airports in Thailand on their way from the Philippines to Diego Garcia.

The ASEAN states are less concerned, however, about the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia than are the Americans. They foresee no direct threat to themselves from the USSR. Rather, the Soviet presence is seen as: (1) part of the global superpower confrontation; (2) the exertion of its role as an Asian power; (3) necessary both to support and exert leverage on Vietnam; (4) an effort to surround China; and (5) the deployment of sufficient capability to protect its own SLOCs to Vladivostok.

The United States should encourage the ASEAN states to develop greater security cooperation, particularly the ability to monitor and control their coastal seas. Some ASEAN military analysts have suggested a division of labor emphasizing each member's strengths. Thus, Singapore could stress air surveillance, the Malaysian navy could concentrate on mine countermeasures to keep the Strait of Malacca open, and Thailand would build up its armor and ground forces along the Indochina border. While such a degree of specialization may seem cost-effective, it is politically unacceptable. No ASEAN state is yet prepared to rely on its neighbors for important components of its own defense.
Moreover, an ASEAN formal military pact would violate the Association's hope that Southeast Asia will not be divided into two hostile blocs (ASEAn versus Indochina). An ASEAN military pact, they fear, would only encourage closer ties between Vietnam and the USSR.  

ASEAN could take a number of steps toward defense cooperation without entering a formal pact, however. Presently, all states (except for the Philippines and Malaysia because of the Sabah dispute) are willing to exercise with each other. These exercises could work toward the creation of standard C3 procedures. Singapore's purchase of E-2C AEW aircraft could be tied into ground radar systems in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, thus providing all with a significant regional surveillance capability.  

The ASEAN states are now responsible for their respective 200-mile EEZs. Joint patrol of these zones could be highly cost-effective, especially considering their overlapping jurisdictions, the presence of hundreds of offshore drilling sites, and the fact that the ASEAN maritime region encompasses some of the most vital SLOCs in the world. The Thai naval air wing, for example, because of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, is currently conducting intensive surveillance for PAVN naval craft along the Thai-Cambodian coast and into the Gulf of Thailand.
ASEAN MARITIME AIRCRAFT INVENTORY

Type: Boeing-737 C-130H/MP F-27M F-27M-2 Nomad

Country:

Indonesia* 3 1 - - 17
Malaysia - 1** - - -
Thailand - - 3 1 (+2) 8
Philippines - - 3 - -
Singapore (non-dedicated types, incl. 2 E-2C and C-130B/H) - - -
Brunei (non-dedicated types, incl. Bell 206/212 helos) - - -

* Indonesia ordered six IPTN CN-235 MPAs in mid-1986.
** Some sources indicate three (IISS); however, two are thought to be C-130H transport versions and not specialized C-130H/MP modified aircraft.

Source: Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1987

VI. AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. PACIFIC SECURITY

An Australian defense debate has persisted since the early 1970s. A vast country with armed services of less than 100,000 and 12,000 miles of nautical coastline, Australians have long asked themselves whether a continuation of the U.S.-oriented forward defense policy of the Korea and Vietnam War periods was either practical or affordable. The Dibb Report, tabled as an advisory to the Labor Government in 1986, suggested that the answer should be a qualified "no." That is, vital American defense ties should be maintained, but Australia should create a force structure designed not to fight alongside U.S. forces thousands of miles away from the continent but rather to defend against contingencies in its own vicinity.
Premised on land-based air defense, the strategy would be activated by an imminent invasion threat (an admittedly improbable contingency) and would apparently pose no deterrent to other challenges such as threats to SLOCs or attacks on allies. Strikes against a potential adversary's bases also seemed ruled out in favor of a strategy of attrition against enemy forces enroute to Australia. Sharing intelligence with friendly Southeast Asian states, such as Singapore and Malaysia, would provide Canberra with sufficient early warning of enemy moves. Along with over-the-horizon radar to be expanded in the north, Australia's F-111s and 75 newly acquired F/A18s would provide a formidable defense against surface vessels by the early 1990s.

While much of the Dibb Report's emphasis on airpower was incorporated in the Labor Government's 1987 Defense White paper, Dibb's "fortress Australia" emphasis was reduced. Defense Minister Kim Beazly chose to underline the importance of Australia's contribution to America's strategic strength. The White Paper also stressed the country's responsibilities for strengthening common interests in its regional environment—Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. For the latter, Canberra will increase air and naval deployments. For Southeast Asia, Australia will rotate F/A18 and F-111 aircraft to Butterworth as well as operate P3 surveillance flights over the eastern Indian Ocean and South China Sea.
From the perspective of U.S. naval strategy, the White Paper's plan to expand the RAN is particularly welcome. To a current complement of 12 major surface combatants and aging submarines, Australia will add a fleet of 17 surface vessels (guided-missile destroyers, guided-missile frigates, and destroyer escorts) and six new Australian-built submarines. Most interesting of all, for the first time in its history, the Navy will be split. Half will be based in New South Wales and half in Western Australia at Cockburn Sound to provide a Southeast Asia/Indian Ocean capability in addition to the traditional Southwest Pacific orientation. By 1990, two submarines and four destroyers would form the nucleus of the western fleet. The new frigates will have an operational range of 300 nautical miles, extending surface patrols well into the Indian Ocean and insular Southeast Asia.

The White Paper reaffirmed the importance of the American communications facilities at the Northwest Cape and Nurrangar for mutual security. To insure Australian knowledge about the facilities' use in communicating with American SSBNs, new links are being built between the joint facilities and Canberra. These links should help diffuse some of the arguments against the facilities as existing exclusively for American strategic needs.

Australia also plans to contribute to Southwest Pacific maritime security through a multi-million dollar defense
assistance program to the South Pacific islands. In addition to providing coastal patrol craft to Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomons, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, and the Cook islands, Canberra will increase its own ship visits in the region and deploy long-range patrol aircraft. In fact, the Australian government has chosen to emphasize its South Pacific role over its contribution to Southeast Asian defense, since the ASEAN states have not sufficiently matured to meet their own needs.44

Nevertheless, in some respects, Australian defense activities in Southeast Asia will actually be enhanced. A RAN submarine will deploy from Malaysia for continuous patrol of Southeast Asian waters. Combined exercises will now be held with Thailand as well as Malaysia and Singapore, although defense cooperation with Indonesia has been on the decline for over a decade because of Australian press criticism of the Suharto regime.45

With the break in U.S.-New Zealand defense ties over the Lange government's refusal to permit nuclear ship visits, Australia has stepped in to provide some supplementary assistance to partly compensate for the material and intelligence losses that will be suffered by Wellington. Australia will design and build frigates that will be used by both countries' navies, providing a greater range and endurance than New Zealand currently possesses.46 Australia has also increased binational naval exercises with New
Zealand, although these cannot substitute for the training previously provided in the RIMPAC exercises which had created a more realistic, and therefore, more expensive, combat environment.\textsuperscript{47}

One cloud on the U.S.-Australian naval security horizon is the Treaty of Raratonga which took effect in December 1986. This treaty, supported by both Canberra and Wellington, has declared a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone. Although Australia negotiated within the South Pacific Forum to insure that the treaty would not affect the movement of American ships and planes that might be nuclear-armed through the region, the United States has rejected it on the grounds that it only benefits Soviet global strategy.\textsuperscript{48} Unfortunately, the United States was caught in the backwash of a treaty that was directed primarily at France for its continued nuclear-testing program around New Caledonia. The Soviet Union and China have both signed the document.

\section*{VII. CONCLUSION}

At the beginning of this chapter a distinction was made between \textit{active} and \textit{passive} allied contributions to U.S. naval missions in the Pacific. Generally, it has been the latter which have created greater political difficulties in countries which are sensitive to nationalist strains and whose leaders do not want to be seen as subordinates to American command. Complaints about U.S. bases in the
Philippines and Korea fit this interpretation as does New Zealand's rejection of U.S. port calls.

The Soviets have attempted to play upon this combination of nationalist and anti-nuclear opinion. Both General Secretary Gorbachev's major address on Asia in July 1986 and his lengthy interview with Merdeka in July 1987 emphasized the need to denuclearize armed forces in the region. In his Merdeka interview, Gorbachev explicitly countered the Maritime Strategy by calling for a navigational limit on ships with nuclear weapons so that "they could not approach the coast of any side to within the range of operation of their on-board nuclear systems." This, of course, would remove the U.S. fleet from the northern Sea of Japan. In fact, it appears that the active cooperation of American and Japanese forces in the Sea of Japan where exercises emphasize choke point control may be keeping the Soviet Pacific Fleet closer to home. The U.S. Defense Department has noted a decline of Soviet deployments into the Indian Ocean.

Similarly, Japan's active 1000-mile sea lane defense plans have not disturbed ASEAN leaders. Philippine and Indonesian officials, who had earlier expressed concern about the movement of Japanese forces away from the home islands, now seem to accept Japan's need for limited SLOC protection.

Problems attendant upon the lease renewals for the Philippine bases are partly a product of a Filipino
indifference to the American argument that the bases are important for regional security. If the leases are renewed, the argument that will sell in Manila is their economic importance for the country's reconstruction. Even the former Philippine Defense Secretary, Rafael Ileto, argues for the bases' continuation on the grounds that the Philippines armed forces could not afford to maintain the facilities and spend more for external defense if the Americans left.\textsuperscript{52}

As an Asian-Pacific naval power, the United States relies more on its fleet to project power and cover vast ocean stretches than does the USSR which still essentially follows a continental strategy. Because the Soviet need for overseas bases is limited in the Asian-Pacific, Gorbachev can play to the nationalist predilections of the several countries in which the U.S. maintains base facilities. The Soviets can also support nuclear-free zone declarations since the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable ships is an integral part of the U.S. strategy, while the Soviets retain most of their SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk.

Frictions with allied and friendly countries along the Asian-Pacific rim will undoubtedly persist for Washington. Optimists, however, believe that the necessity for allied passive and active maritime cooperation with the United States against growing Soviet, Vietnamese, and North Korean navies will outweigh both anti-nuclear dispositions and the
belief that cooperation with a superpower means dependency upon it. The evidence suggests, however, that active cooperation leads to a more stable alliance relationship than the mere passive provision of facilities. An active relationship entails mutuality and joint planning. The United States should encourage a shift from passive to active cooperation where feasible if Asian-Pacific security is to be enhanced.
1 A useful panel discussion on the Maritime Strategy was held at the April 1987 meeting of the International Studies Association, Omni-Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C. Papers from that panel may be obtained from ISA headquarters at the University of South Carolina.


6 Hearings, p. 133.

7 The naval and air strategies for Pacific security are assessed by Robert Scalapino, Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America for The Asia Society, 1987), pp. 61-62.


9 Robert J. Hanks (Rear Admiral, USN, Ret.), American Sea-Power and Global Strategy (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), pp. 34, 51, 80.

These questions are raised by C. Fred Bergsten, "Economic Imbalances and World Politics," Foreign Affairs (65,4), Spring 1987, pp. 770-771.


The NDPO is discussed by Edward Ok Su Andrews, Japan's Emerging Role as an Asian-pacific Power (an M.S. thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1986), p. 43.


Address by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage to the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council, Honolulu, January 17, 1986, p. 3.


Author's interviews with Philippine government officials and academics, Manila, June 1984 and February 1986.


43Frank C. Langdon, "Challenges to the Old Order in the South Pacific" (forthcoming in Pacific Affairs, 1988).


51 Edward Ok Su Andrews, Japan's Emerging Role as an Asian-Pacific Power, p. 88.

The maritime interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region are of long standing. The purpose of this study is to survey the economic and strategic roots of those interests, with special reference to "The Maritime Strategy," and to assess the potential impact of the region's economic dynamism on the future of U.S. maritime interests and strategy. "The Maritime Strategy" is a well-known approach to U.S. strategy which has generated considerable controversy. Only some of that debate will be evaluated here. The primary foci of this analysis are the contemporary impact of The Maritime Strategy on the Western Pacific and the potential impact of the Pacific rim's economic dynamos on maritime strategy. Before addressing the realities and prospects of that strategic perspective's place in Asian-Pacific affairs, it is necessary to establish an analytical context by briefly reviewing the evolution of maritime strategic affairs from traditional to modern Asia.

*This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper prepared for the 1987 International Studies Association annual meeting entitled "The Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific." That earlier version was published in the Autumn, 1987 edition of the Naval War College Review.
The Western Pacific is a maritime zone that encompasses the coastal waters of two sub-regions of Asia that increasingly are recognized as dynamic areas of the world. Clearly, Northeast Asia fits this description. Japan, China, and the two Koreas loom large in Asian affairs by any measure. Japan’s economic power and China’s gargantuan proportions loom large in world affairs, though experts differ over whether both truly deserve the prominence they receive. The Korean peninsula is a nexus of international tensions. Further south, Southeast Asia—led by the ASEAN states—is being transformed into a new center of economic importance. Both subregions have earned strategic value in the eyes of major regional powers and the superpowers by virtue of the capabilities, potentials, and geographic configurations of its states. In addition, far offshore the Asian continent lay the large Oceanic states of Australia and New Zealand and numerous slowly developing island mini-states. Much of Oceania had, until the early 1980s, been widely considered utterly remote from world centers of power, but the changing nature of the larger Pacific rim economic and strategic balances has sharply boosted perceptions of this still distant and dispersed sub-region of the Western Pacific.

The concept of "maritime strategy" is not new in the Western Pacific whether considered indigenously or from external perspectives. Except for continental China, with
its broad cross-regional access (it borders Northeast, Southeast, Central, and South Asia), all the littoral states of Asia have relied to a considerable extent on seaborne communication. Though few of these states developed a major maritime tradition, most have been cognizant of its importance throughout their histories and have an appreciation for such traditions. While several ancient Asian kingdoms and dynasties cultivated the strategic aspects of maritime affairs for trade, colonial expansion, and exporting culture and religion, in only one--Japan--did that perspective remain viable into the modern era. As Western culture produced Mahan and other maritime-oriented geopolitical thinkers, the Japanese evolved independently their own counterparts--Sato Nobuhiro (1769-1850) being the most notable. However, with these exceptions, Asian strategic affairs remained over the ages primarily continental. Asia's martial and diplomatic traditions clearly are stronger than its naval traditions. Whether in the Sinic or Indic cultural realms, the intellectual descendents respectively of Sun Tzu and Kautilya had little to learn from Clausewitz, a decided latecomer from their perspective.

It was left to seafaring Western imperialists to remind the land-oriented Asians of their sea-borne vulnerabilities. Nearly all expansionist Europeans and Americans came to Asia by sea. Only the Czarist Russians traversed the broad Eurasian landmass overland to challenge Asia from the rear,
using seaborne avenues as a flanking approach and to compete with the other imperialists. The maritime assaults on Asia's largely unprepared nations produced an era of Western dominance. An important facet of that domination was its commercial roots. Initially most Western powers established a maritime presence in Asia for the sake of fostering and then preserving commercial ventures. The role of Western navies in such enterprises is well reflected in the infamous phrase "gunboat diplomacy." That clearly remained true of the United States and its maritime presence well into the pre-World War Two era. The American fleet routinely backed commercial national interests, making U.S. strategic interests derivative of those more mundane affairs.

Except for the Japanese, who speedily learned to play the imperialists' game by imperialists' rules, Asia succumbed to colonial subjugation or semi-colonial intimidation. Imperial Japan's rise to a position as prewar Asia's leading indigenous power and its disastrous fall in World War II, is the story of two successful but rivalrous services: the army and the navy. That story is important because it is symbolic of much of modern Asia's strategic dichotomy. Japan's army succeeded beyond the wildest hopes of most Japanese. Its navy was, if anything, even more successful. However, they could not cooperate very well strategically or politically. In effect, Japan had two strategies, one for land, one for sea. Had Japan's seaborne
strategy been able to dominate its continental strategy, especially in Tokyo's policymaking councils, a plausible argument can be made that Japan's prewar and wartime aggressive exploits would have had better prospects. Japan suffered from a lack of coordination, compounded by the army's tendency to rashness. While the details of Japan's successes and failures are not particularly pertinent to the experiences of other powers, the principles entailed are very relevant. Without knowing it, Japan was exemplifying, in Asia, the geopolitical principles and tensions embodied in Mackinder's heartland doctrine, Spykman's rimland doctrine, and Mahan's ideas of seapower as a controlling factor. The key question inherent in this mix of ideas is whether one approach can dominate another?

In the course of WWII the U.S. tacitly faced up to this question in the form of General MacArthur's leadership of a two-pronged campaign in the Central and Southwest Pacific. Partly as a result of U.S. Army and Marine Corps' early experiences with land combat in Asia (China, the Philippines, and Siberia) and partly as a result of Japan's bitter experiences in trying to conquer China in the 1930s, a deep-seated apprehension about, and aversion to, land wars in Asia entered into the U.S. military mindset. The longstanding interest of the U.S. Navy in Pacific affairs and logical naval arguments about the advantages of mobility reinforced Army views in Asia. Against this background the emergence
of the flexible island-hopping approach of MacArthur and the
Pacific Fleet underscored a lesson that contemporary
American strategic thinkers would do well to recall; namely
that the concept of maritime strategy is not synonymous with
naval strategy. At its best, maritime strategy should not
be considered parochially naval because it necessarily
includes naval, air, and ground combat and support forces
operating in a maritime context. For all of MacArthur's
reputation as a parochial glory-seeker, he nonetheless
produced in WWII and Korea a strong maritime paradigm of
flexible and far flung air, ground, amphibious and naval
operations. His approach to war in the Pacific set him
apart from most of his European theater contemporaries who
displayed less understanding of such combined operations.
In the Pacific the U.S. clearly came down on the side of the
Rimland-Seapower approaches to geopolitics and strategy.

In the postwar period the emergence of global superpower
bipolarity and decline of indigenous Asian seats of mili-
tary, political, and economic power reinforced those tenden-
cies. This juxtaposition contributed to a very different
U.S. orientation toward Asia. Commercial interests no
longer set the pace, requiring the fleet to protect them.
Instead, militarily-defined strategic interests became
dominant, calling upon commercial interests to reinvigorate
new regional allies so that they could bolster the United
States' strategic posture versus the Soviet Union. This was
a reversal of U.S. priorities in the region, leading to trade following the flag rather than the other way around. Despite the growth of strong continental commitments in Western Europe and Asia, the U.S. approach remained primarily one of control of, or influence over, the Eurasian rimland and the waters surrounding it. That is the essence of the whole exercise in postwar "containment" policy. The linkages and coordination between diverse global U.S. commitments since 1945 have been profoundly "maritime" in its best eclectic sense. Postwar U.S. strategic policy has been the joint legacy of Mahan and Spykman in response to fears that a Eurasian land power might achieve the continental dominance described by Mackinder. The fact that Soviet strategists had relocated the center of the "heartland" far to the east of Mackinder's locus is irrelevant, for the danger remained intact.

Gradually several changes occurred in U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking. Partly as a result of the juxtaposition of the U.S. Army's successes in Europe via deterring a war with the help of its NATO allies and its reverses in Asia (Korea and Vietnam), the ground elements of U.S. grand strategy began to dominate the European theater and to be reduced in the Asia-Pacific region. The result in the former was an entrenched continentalism and in the latter was a reinforcement of the aversion to Asian land wars. Except for the unique circumstances in South Korea, where
the continentalism of NATO doctrines are faintly echoed, the U.S. presence in the Western Pacific has intensified its maritime orientation. For a time in the mid-1970s that regional orientation assumed an even more fluid aspect as notions of a so-called "swing strategy" were bruited about as though the Asia-Pacific theater were merely a corollary of the Atlantic-European theater. Many Eurocentric Americans often have made such implicit assumptions, resulting in a renewal of the sorts of priorities with which MacArthur had to contend in WWII, though they supposedly had been obviated during the 1960s and 1970s by the growth of worldwide U.S. commitments. Two things altered this resurgence of such cavalier U.S. attitudes toward the Asia-Pacific region. Most basic was the belated recognition by the U.S. of the intrinsic importance of certain big countries in the region, notably Japan but increasingly the "new Japans," which clearly are as important as the United States' European allies. The shift in U.S. world trade patters from the Atlantic to the Pacific during the 1970s underscored the new realities. More narrowly, the U.S. found itself facing a newly reoriented Soviet Union that was shifting its emphasis economically and strategically toward Asia.

Despite the far more profound significance of the shift toward what many have taken to calling the birth of a "Paci-fic century," it was the Soviet responses to the emergent
realities that sparked a U.S. strategic reassessment. The wisdom of these U.S. priorities may have been questionable, but the results were positive nonetheless because they led the U.S. to pay proper attention to an increasingly crucial region of the world. Out of this larger U.S. response has grown "The Maritime Strategy" which is, in large part, the focus of this conference. But why "maritime?" Was it because of the long local antecedents cited above? In part it was, of course, but in equal measure the nature of the U.S. response in both the Pacific and world at large is attributable to the newly maritime nature of the Soviet strategic buildup in the region and globally. Under the leadership of the USSR's loose equivalent of Mahan, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Moscow had been building its own blue water navy with a vengeance. That buildup had been occurring for years.¹ Despite that lengthy development process, non-Soviet experts in the Soviet navy remained divided over its purposes. Uncertainties focused on whether Moscow had a clear-cut intention for its new naval forces and precisely how those forces related to Soviet grand strategy. Many U.S. specialists in the field remain doubtful whether it is proper to even speak of Soviet naval strategy in the way that phrase often is applied discretely to western navies. Complicating these uncertainties are the disputes among western Soviet watchers and defense analysts over the ability of the USSR to sustain a continued military buildup,
the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet economy in the midst of Gorbachev's "reformist" measures, and the extent to which such measures are true "reforms" or are merely window dressing. Security analysts should be prudent in evaluating these variables. Be that as it may, it remains clear that the Soviet Navy is a much more formidable force than it was in the past.

Most important for the Asia-Pacific region is the greatly increased presence of the Soviet Navy in the Western Pacific. Coming from virtually nowhere, relative to the postwar U.S. naval presence in the Pacific, Moscow has created a Pacific fleet with over 800 vessels of all types. This fleet, the USSR's largest, clearly has some purpose. Whether that purpose is a relatively benign effort to show the flag or a precursor of more ominous plans, it marks a major change in Soviet deployments. No longer largely a global ground and air power, the USSR—despite its limitations—is now a world class naval power. If it has not been Moscow's intention all along, it seems only a matter of time before the USSR will try to take simultaneous advantage of being the Eurasian continent's dominant land power and its largest naval power. The USSR inherited from Czarist Russia a fixation with the insecurity of its borders. This accounts for its almost paranoid preoccupation with security. If the Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific presages an active effort to secure its far flung interests
in that region of the world, the U.S. and its allies in the Western Pacific may be in for a new round of tensions. Clearly the Pacific is no longer an American "lake."

Characterization of the Pacific as a U.S. "lake" has been so widespread in the postwar period that Americans and our allies have grown accustomed to it. A large degree of complacency evolved in that era. All that was shocked severely in the wake of the Vietnam War. Within a decade the Soviet Navy mushroomed in numbers and access to bases. It now enjoys first-rate sovereign facilities on its Japan Sea, Okhotsk Sea, and Pacific coasts. It also enjoys substantial access to former U.S. facilities in Cam Ranh, Vietnam, that allow the USSR to engage in a limited version of a "swing strategy" by deploying to both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The still uncertain durability of U.S. access to its Philippine bases makes the USSR's Southeast Asian presence potentially that much more important. Moscow appears on the verge of obtaining new access in North Korea too. To date, however, the expanded Soviet naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region has not been used in an overt military fashion. At most it has been used as a relatively discreet form of gunboat diplomacy, hoping to influence states in the region in Moscow's favor. However, the naval potentials for active intimidation, intervention, and interdiction are very real. While all this has proved upsetting to U.S. strategists and helped cause a reappraisal of U.S.
policy, U.S. allies and non-aligned states have accepted the changes with greater equanimity. Unlike American leaders who often have short historical memories, most Asian leaders have never assumed that the USSR deserves no legitimate place in Asian affairs. That difference in perspective has some major implications for U.S. policy in Asia that shall be addressed below. For now, however, we shall examine what the U.S. response to the Soviet naval buildup means for the Western Pacific.

Many experts have dissected the specifics of "Maritime Strategy" and there is no need to reinvent that wheel here. Most important for a regional affairs analyst is that the approach remains controversial. Precisely what "The Maritime Strategy" is (and is not) remains remarkably ambiguous for something which has been around for some time now. As noted, the U.S. long has had a maritime strategy, but what is referred to as "The Maritime Strategy" is a product of the Reagan administration and its outspoken first Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. He was the most prominent proponent of this latest version of U.S. maritime strategy.\(^5\) Under Lehman's direction this version of the maritime strategy was brought to center stage and fleshed out considerably.\(^6\)

This strategy probably has generated more controversy for the administration's defense policies than anything except for its arms control policy. The controversy has
centered on critics' perceptions of The Maritime Strategy as either a unilateralist military manifestation of a more assertive "Reagan Doctrine" out to engage the "evil empire" or merely a rationale for the U.S. Navy to grow to a 600-ship abstraction and reassert its presence as the "senior service." Some critics have been extreme, while others are more balanced and judicious in their statements, but both have been critical. What most critics and even some proponents of the Maritime Strategy do not adequately convey in their writings is that this latest version and aspect of U.S. strategy is part of an evolving process. It has a strong past from which it is a lineal descendent. More important, in terms of countering premature criticism of the current version of U.S. maritime strategy, it is not a finished doctrine yet. As a strategy it is an evolutionary process, not a definitive document. Though it is often treated as a final product in the media, it remains in flux. There is no strategic cookbook labeled "The Maritime Strategy" on the bridge of every U.S. Navy warship that its captain can consult to tell him what to do in the event of war; nor is there likely to be one any time soon. This is important to bear in mind as one evaluates the role of critics and supporters alike. While the maritime strategy clearly has many supporters among the blue suiters who will carry on the naval cause long after the Reagan-Lehman team are history, it also has some blue suit doubters who share
some of the concerns of vocal civilian, army, and air force strategic kibitzers.

Actually, most of these concerns focus on the issue of the Maritime Strategy as an excessively "unilateralist" and excessively "naval" approach. Anyone who delves into the broad implications of The Maritime Strategy should be able to discover for themselves that such concerns need not be debilitating. As noted earlier, no maritime strategy can be solely naval. By definition it embodies all service branches. The key question causing difficulties seems to be one of inter-service rivalry. Though that may never be eliminated, it should not be insurmountable. After all, the various branches all serve the same national interests. As long as parochialism is sublimated for the national interest, there is no reason a (or "the") maritime strategy cannot be the coordinating core of U.S. strategy. Postulating such a role in no way diminishes the fundamental contributions of ground or air power, it merely admits the necessity of providing flexibility and speed in the United States' ability to respond to crises. Since the oceans of the world are the only continuous links operationally tying together far flung regions in which the U.S. has commitments (and some where it does not but where conflicts could emerge unexpectedly), it is not unreasonable to think of grand strategy in maritime terms. None of this impunes the
interdependence of all the U.S. services or the principle of "jointness."

The question of unilateralism is a serious one, but, in many cases, it should be seen as a straw-man. While U.S. rhetorical flourishes about "standing tall" in the face of aggressive Soviet behavior and its arms buildup has generated much criticism of the Reagan administration for allegedly aspiring to a "Rambo" style, macho unilateralism, any close examination of existing U.S. strategy, and the foreign policy behind it, clearly shows that U.S. "unilateralism" is profoundly dependent upon the collective security arrangements Washington has fostered since 1945. Regardless of what ostensibly unilateralist labels are attached to U.S. foreign and defense policies, Washington's options are sharply constrained by the willingness of friends, allies, and neutrals to behave the way U.S. planners and policymakers assume they will. While the U.S. can do, and has a perfect right to do, virtually whatever it wants in unilateral defense of the homeland, there is very little the U.S. can do in defense of overseas interests without the active cooperation of the country or countries whose territories are the locale of some proposed armed action. Absent such cooperation, the states concerned become either passive or active partners of the United States' adversary. Consequently, arguments over collective defense versus
unilateralism cannot have much meaning for other than very short term actions of a relatively small scale. Since the principle behind contemporary maritime strategy entails a forward deployment of U.S. forces ready to take the battle to the Soviet homeland and its offshore deployments, it is difficult to imagine this in terms of narrowly defined limited war. At the least, such a prospective armed engagement would tread near the threshold of a theater nuclear war, if not WWIII. The whole point of engaging in such forward deployments is to be capable of reacting in ways that would minimize having to cross that threshold. By no known definition can any conceivable resort to combat based on the maritime strategy as it is presently configured, qualify as "short term actions of a relatively small scale." Consequently, there are always some U.S. assumptions about the ability and willingness of allies to either lend a helping hand or not impede U.S. actions.

The probabilities of such maritime and political cooperation in the Atlantic, while somewhat more certain than those for Asia, are beyond the purview of this analysis. The naval capabilities of U.S. friends and allies in Asia are relatively easy to ascertain. No country in the Western Pacific possesses major naval forces yet. Japan's are the most important and its potential for creating truly major naval forces is enormous. However, unlike the Atlantic-NATO theatre, the U.S. does not have as much need,
yet, in the Pacific for overt assistance, though that, too, may change if the USSR manages to free itself from the constraints of the Japan and Okhotsk seas. If this occurs, the U.S. clearly will need overt assistance from Asia-Pacific supporters as it now does for the defense of Western Europe and the northeastern Atlantic. Because this strategic breakout by the USSR is a real possibility, U.S. allies ought to be encouraged to create such capabilities. The problem associated with getting allies to build such capabilities is the same problem that causes a political dilemma for forward deployed U.S. forces with an assertive strategic mission: U.S. and allied threat perceptions do not necessarily coincide or even overlap to a sufficient degree. Compounding this problem is the trouble caused by foreign confusion over precisely what an assertive strategy--such as the maritime strategy--really means.

Given the wide array of U.S. opinion about the maritime strategy, it is no surprise that allied and friendly states might not be certain about what the U.S. intends to do and what such actions might mean for them. Some U.S. observers have expressed concern about the inadequacies of U.S. preparations for third world contingencies in a strategic environment that focuses so heavily on the Soviet threat. I think that concern should be expanded to examine all contingencies because the role of potential supporting actors in U.S. actions against the USSR or any other state

142
is inadequately considered. It is my experience that strategic planners and war gamers often make decidedly shaky assumptions that allies will see adversaries the way Americans do and will react the way we expect them to. Their assumptions may be most seriously flawed in terms of unwarranted expectations about the automaticity of allies granting access to their territory for U.S. use or transit in actions against the Soviet Union. There are a number of examples of such divergence of views, but the case of Japan provides egregious instances of unrealistic assumptions. If countries like the PRC and ROK, which harbor strong reasons to follow anti-Soviet postures, do not actually pursue overtly such policies and cannot be counted on to automatically rally to the U.S.' side in armed struggle against the USSR, it does not take much imagination to discern that Japan—which is not disposed to pursue anti-Soviet policies--may be even less responsive.

As noted above, many Asian states are more willing than the U.S. to accept the USSR as a legitimate participant in Asian-Pacific affairs. That is profoundly true of Japan. This is not to suggest that Japan likes or desires a major Soviet role in the region. Most Japanese are well aware of the problems the USSR and its Czarist predecessor have caused for Japan. Similarly, most Japanese are even more aware than most Americans of a palpable offshore Soviet threat. There is a great deal if ill-will in Japan-Soviet
relations. Moreover, Japan has taken a number of concrete steps to build up its self-defense capabilities, largely in response to U.S. urging that Japan more squarely confront the Soviet challenge. Tokyo's latest defense white paper was more explicit in that regard than most of its predecessors. In the face of well-known opposition to SDI, Tokyo's decision to cooperate with the U.S. in SDI research sent a major signal to Moscow. Furthermore, the Gorbachev regime's decision to upgrade its diplomatic overtures to Tokyo in the wake of his July 1986 Vladivostok speech that attempted to put a new veneer on Soviet policy so far has received a lukewarm reception from most Japanese. Despite all this, Japan's view of the Soviet threat is very different from that of most Americans and not truly in harmony with the Reagan administration's worldview that gave birth to, and nurtures, the maritime strategy.

There is not intrinsic reason that the maritime strategy cannot obtain allied understanding and support, if it is properly explained to those allies. Much more effort should be expended in that regard. Moreover, that effort cannot be relegated solely to a strategic sales pitch by the U.S. because the product almost certainly would not sell if handled that way. The U.S. is engaged in a diversified competition with the USSR in the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. strategic message must be integrated into a broader context if it is to be believable and persuasive. If the
U.S. does not believably mesh its strategic message into a broader context, and the Soviet Union does so, Washington's policies may appear more threatening than Moscow's. As noted, the post-Vladivostok speech era in Asia has opened a new round of "peace offensives" from a more sophisticated Gorbachev regime. Sino-Soviet ties are improving in fits and starts, but the trends are upbeat. U.S. naval access to PRC ports, a graphic symbol of improved U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation, needs to be kept in perspective. None of that cooperation means that Beijing is necessarily in any greater harmony with Washington's views of the Soviet Union's threat potential than is Tokyo. We should not, as we are prone to, make premature assumptions about the existence of "common" security interests in U.S.-PRC strategic relations. They will not come into existence merely because they are logical or because some Americans desire them. Actually, a better case can be made for incremental U.S.-Japanese strategic convergence vis-a-vis a Soviet adversary than for any sort of U.S.-PRC convergence. The latter seems non-existent, with poor prospects. U.S.-PRC parallelism is a more appropriate way to conceptualize what exists and is likely to remain in our strategic relations.

If the U.S. has problems in convincing its major ally, Japan, and its major defacto quasi-ally, the PRC, that Washington's view of Soviet intentions in Asia and the Pacific is a sound and prudent viewpoint, it has even
greater problems in Southeast Asia and Oceania. When Washington tries to stress strategic affairs with East Asian states it gets a somewhat sympathetic hearing if one that is tinged with overt displays of tolerance for American ideological preoccupation with Moscow's sinister qualities. These states can grasp that the USSR might do what Washington suggests it is preparing to do, but they often do not see the threat as being quite so imminent. They clearly require much more convincing about the threat, before the U.S. can rely on them to respond as we often assume they will.

The non-communist states of Southeast Asia and Oceania generally are even less disposed to see the world as Washington does. In both sub-regions the U.S. is engaged in a far more complex, and nuanced, contest with the USSR. In Southeast Asia, Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington are all seen as major influences that need to be kept in rough balance. Most pointedly, Washington is not considered any more virtuous than Moscow. Both are seen in terms of assets and liabilities that should be balanced to local advantage. As much as Washington might like to portray Moscow's ambitions in the larger region in ways that would arouse support for U.S. positions, strengthen the durability of the U.S. presence in the Philippines, and bolster the ASEAN states' defense consciousness, that line is rarely persuasive. Consequently, the selling of the maritime strategy in
Southeast Asia is vastly complicated by inherent customer resistance on the part of the majority of Southeast Asians who seek non-alignment and freedom from superpower conflict.

What is true of Southeast Asian reluctance to be entangled can be multiplied for much of Oceania. This probably is the most vulnerable subregion in the Western Pacific. Since the area is the epitome of "maritime," being overwhelmingly water, the relevance of a maritime strategy is unquestioned. However, the maritime strategy as a forward deployed assertive display of U.S. armed forces represents something anathema to many people in these small states which harbor profoundly non-aligned sympathies. Clearly, their pace setter has become New Zealand. Wellington's anti-nuclear positions regarding the U.S. navy have seriously disrupted the once quintessential tranquility of the ANZUS pact. The Kiwi's policy may be a matter of "stop the world, I want to get off," but it remains intact despite U.S. pressures. Though Canberra has been far more supportive of ANZUS, Australia, too, has demonstrated serious doubts about the immediacy of the Vietnam-linked Soviet threat to Southeast Asia and Oceania and about the U.S. naval responses to that perceived threat. Against this background, there is little sympathy or readiness to understand the maritime strategy in those quarters. Hence, in an area essential for U.S. maritime operations, there is little willingness to sanction the longstanding notion that
the Pacific is some sort of American "lake" where U.S. forces can operate freely. As a result, the vast stretches of the central and south Pacific are increasingly attractive for Soviet activism of the post-Vladivostok speech variety. Washington, Tokyo, and other concerned Pacific rim states are concerned about these regional dynamics, but much remains to be done to bring this region even up to the limited levels of understanding displayed in East Asia much less to attain the degree of empathy and cooperation that are desirable region-wide.

Lest the levels of understanding of, and cooperation with, the maritime strategy among Asian-Pacific states be seen as uniquely poor, one should recall that West European enthusiasm for U.S. strategic assertiveness toward the USSR has been markedly restrained. The concept of "Atlanticism" has been shaken severely in recent years, putting NATO into some jeopardy from within. If it were not for post-Reykjavik fears among the NATO allies about a U.S. nuclear policy shift that could leave Western Europe less protected from the USSR than it is accustomed to being, NATO probably would be more troubled today than it is. Clearly, Atlanticism needs shoring up and U.S. explanations of the common interests served by the maritime strategy could help that process as well as aid understanding of U.S. purposes. In the Asia-Pacific region, however, Washington starts much further back. There is no Pacificism to equate to
Atlanticism. Even a weakened Atlanticism is way ahead of its Pacific counterpart. Hence the U.S. can only hope to explain its strategic purposes in the Western Pacific and Asia (via the maritime strategy or anything else) if it first builds a more cohesive set of common perceptions of shared interests and Soviet threats to those interests. Such perceptions are what are required for Pacificism to emerge. Without it, U.S. assumptions about allies, friends, and neutrals will remain flawed by a large degree of unreality and wishful thinking. The cultivation of such perceptions would not necessarily be difficult, but it would require more attention than now is paid to the problem. This task should be given a much higher priority than it now enjoys.

If the U.S. has problems today in fashioning a coordinated approach to Pacific defense with which its friends and allies can wholeheartedly subscribe, the future is even more uncertain. Americans tend to see the future of the Pacific region, and the U.S. role in that area, as on a linear continuum with the present. In terms of economic growth, political development, and the superpower rivalry, the future seems likely to be rather like today just more intense. This gives rise to U.S. calls for increased Asian-Pacific cooperation for the common good in the face of a growing Soviet-led presence in the region. For present purposes the marked growth of the Soviet naval presence in
the Pacific since the mid-1970s may be seen as a paradigm of
the tide most Americans seem intent upon reversing in the
Pacific. It is interesting to note Soviet responses to U.S.
warnings about this real and/or symbolic Soviet threat.
Soviet officials routinely dismiss U.S. warnings as paranoid
overreaction on the part of Americans, saying there is
nothing sinister about the Soviet Union as the other super-
power being in Asia just like the U.S. While Americans
can as easily dismiss alarmist Soviet counterreactions as a
form of paranoia, it is not so easy to discount the Soviet
Union--with its Asian landmass and population--as a legiti-
mate Asian power. Nonetheless, in many American writings on
the superpower confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region,
there are strong suggestions that the Soviet Union is an
interloper in the area whose presence must be minimized if
the U.S. and its friends/alleys are to retain the sort of
mutually beneficial relationships which have grown out of
the post-WWII era.

If the future of the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific
region is, indeed, one marked by confrontation and hostility
with the U.S. and the area's non-communist states, then much
of the contemporary prognostications about a more intense
version of the contemporary status quo are likely to be
realized. A quality of U.S.-Soviet self-fulfilling prophecy
may enhance that prospect, if both sides act on their
assumptions. However, because the intensification school of
lineal futurology has such a poor track record, it is worthwhile examining how the future of the region may differ from today and cause significant changes in the area's strategic equation. Though other factors (political, cultural, ideological, etc.) might be capable of inducing major changes in the area, the most likely candidates for bringing about changes are the economic factors.

Today it is easiest (and most comforting to Americans) to assume that economic growth and progress will bring the U.S. and its allies closer together and increase the chances that our allies will become more capable of assisting the U.S. as it copes with the Soviet Union. The country which looms largest in that regard is Asia's (and the world's) new economic superpower: Japan. It clearly has great geopolitical and military/naval potentials. Other Asian-Pacific states, notably the PRC and South Korea, are often seen as also possessing geopolitical growth potentials because of their economic accomplishments. If the strategic future does become a more intense version of the present, then the realization of those allied potentials will be part of the process. Changes of that sort almost certainly will have to be predicated on two things, the Soviet Union persisting as a threatening power and our allies sharing U.S. perceptions of that threat (or vice versa). If neither occurs, the intensity factor may be nullified. The economic progress now anticipated for the Asia-Pacific region clearly
would be affected by such an era of lessened tension, though forecasting precisely how would require a crystal ball. Far less problematical is an assertion that the renowned economic dynamism of Asia could create conditions drawing the Soviet Union into a non-threatening relationship with its Asia-Pacific neighbors.

The notion that the Soviet Union might become neighborly to the Asian states which encircle it undoubtedly is unsettling for Western lineal forecasters. Moreover, there are many issues that hinder these geographic and ethnic neighbors from behaving neighborly. Despite all that, the winds of reformist change that are blowing through the Soviet Union under Gorbachev make it far more likely today than a few years ago that Moscow is capable of improving its relations in the Asia-Pacific region. As signalled boldly in Gorbachev's July 1986 speech in Vladivostok, in which he expressed Moscow's desire to participate in the Pacific's economic dynamism, in his July 1987 "double zero" Asia-oriented nuclear arms control proposal, and by his domestic economic reforms, the Soviet Union seems ready to play the game by the rules of the Asia-Pacific players.

Judging from General Secretary Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech and double-zero overture almost exactly a year later, the Soviets are well disposed to such broadening of the competitive arena. Those approaches clearly were primarily designed to soften up Asian resistance to Soviet "peaceful"
overtures. As such, they are follow-ups to Gorbachev's past calls for an "All Asia Forum" and talks on nuclear and naval reductions in the Pacific. These have a history going back to 1969. Though pleasant sounding, they are somewhat deceptive and must be dealt with carefully. Clearly, there is no reason for the U.S. or its Asian allies to gratuitously provide the Soviet Union with a credible platform to expound its views and exert influence.

However, the Vladivostok speech's references to intensified economic and technological exchanges with advanced and newly industrializing Pacific states conveys several messages. To anti-Soviet hardliners in the West it will reinforce their notions of imminent economic problems in the Soviet Union that require outside solutions. To arch-hardliners any such cooperation would amount to a rescue of the Soviet Union from the dire fate that awaits it. Less severe critics of the USSR still will see danger signals in the Vladivostok speech, namely that the Soviet Union is trying to worm its way into a pro-Western system, benefit from it to the extent it can, and divide that system's loyalties as opportunities present themselves. Only the terminally naive can see such Soviet overtures as anything other than self-serving. Nonetheless, free world recognition of Soviet ulterior motives should not deter the U.S. or its Asian allies from cautiously responding to Moscow's moves.
An excellent way to coopt these moves would be to base Western responses on an assumption that the Soviet Union is playing "catch up" on two fronts with long range objectives. Moscow clearly is trying via Gorbachev's domestic exhortations and marginal reforms, plus external initiatives such as at Vladivostok, to shape up the Soviet economy. This would be valuable for Moscow intrinsically and for what it could mean for its military-industrial complex's ability to meet the strategic demands placed on it. If the West sincerely believed Moscow could succeed in this two-fold effort, arch-hardliners ought to be heeded. However, this view gives too much credence to Moscow's competence. The Soviet Union's ability to compete with the West is abysmal. The USSR is only truly competent in military affairs; it is inept in nearly everything else. The West--far from fearing Soviet entry into the larger competition for its own poorly concealed ulterior motives--should welcome the challenge because the USSR is unlikely to achieve the successes for which it hopes.

Anyone who is familiar with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan and compares them with the Soviet Union's nonmilitary accomplishments should readily realize that there is no contest. The Soviet Union is not a competitive state; it is not in the same league with the leading Western states other than in military terms. The risk that the USSR
might make some short run gains ought to be more than compensated for by the long run setbacks almost certainly in store for a Soviet Union thus engaged. Needless to say, the West should not engage the USSR blindly in such expanded activities. Were it feasible, we might consider borrowing the cautious phrase "constructive engagement" for application to the Soviet Union now that it will not be used much in Africa. In any event, strategic considerations must prevail in Western economic relations with the USSR. We do not want to sell the hangman the noose to slip around our necks. Moreover, we must remember that a USSR that tries and fails on a second catch-up front still will be a dangerous state possessing formidable weapons and an expansionist philosophy. In fact, as two Soviet-born specialists, Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, correctly and succinctly put it, in Russian history "expansion has always been a substitute for inner vigor." Whether or not Moscow is able to expand its second catch-up front, it ultimately promises to end up in approximately the same relative place: behind the West in military and economic terms precisely because it lacks an "inner vigor." In these circumstances the advantages for the West of a second front economic detour by the USSR are two-fold: it could underscore Soviet nonmilitary noncompetitiveness for all to see and it would allow more time for the West's various correlations of forces to strengthen their cooperation. This is likely to
be particularly important in Asia, especially in Northeast Asia, for this is the region which promises to be the most decisive in the direct and indirect competitive race between the superpowers and their associates.

Though prudence dictates waiting to see whether Gorbachev can deliver results to match his words, should this convergence actually happen, Moscow’s relations with the Asia-Pacific region may be in for a sea-change. One can imagine what goes through the minds of Kremlin leaders as they see the United States and Western Europe being challenged, and sometimes overtaken, by Asian economic leaders. Even as the USSR struggles to catch up to the West, the West is being outcompeted by the other “East.” If the USSR does not get its act together rapidly, it risks falling into third place among global centers of power. In economic terms it already is there.

As the Soviet Union faces its future in the Asia-Pacific, three basic alternatives loom. It can: (1) remain at arms length as a minimal participation, seen as an adversary of both the U.S. and many of its allies; (2) remain a strategic adversary of the U.S., but not its allies; and (3) become an important trade partner of the Asia-Pacific states (aside from the U.S.). The worst choice for it is the first one because it leaves the USSR essentially behind the curve of progress. Moscow hopes it can achieve the second option, implying a decoupling of the U.S. from its strategic ties in
Asia. The double-zero approach is partially aimed at that end. Achieving number two is dependent on how successful Moscow's diplomacy can be and, conversely, how inept the U.S. may be as it copes with Soviet diplomatic campaigns in Asia that have already begun in earnest. Achieving this goal will be difficult, but not impossible, for the Soviet Union because there exists a reservoir of sentiment in the region to treat the Soviet Union on a rough par with the United States. Least controllable by Washington is Moscow's prospects for ingratiating the Soviet Union into Pacific economic dynamism. The Soviet Union is nearby, has resources Asia needs, has market needs Asians could fulfill, and—under Gorbachev—appears ready to mesh all three criteria into a package that is sellable to Asia. If the leading states of Asia perceive the USSR as a willing and dependable trade partner, location for investment, and not necessarily a threat to the vital interests of Asian-Pacific states, there is little the U.S. could do to block such rapport without appearing to be disruptive to regional peace and harmony.

In short, no one in the West can safely assume the USSR will play into the United States' hands by perpetuating an ogre's image. On the contrary, Moscow is rapidly changing its image in the eyes of many third world states. If Soviet realities seriously start to converge with that softened image, the U.S. will confront a different superpower
challenge in the Asia-Pacific area. Notions of the region being an "American Lake" will become anachronistic. Under those circumstances the U.S. would be compelled to compete with the USSR under far more equal circumstances for influence in the region than it has had to since postwar superpower tensions emerged. As if that prospect were not troubling enough for Washington, Americans also need to reconsider the changing nature of U.S. relations with its Asian-Pacific trade partners. The once almost sacrosanct verities of those ties are being rapidly transformed before our eyes, threatening to do damage to U.S. prospects in the region.

American officials normally stress the positive side of greatly increased U.S. economic relations with Asia. Stemming from these relations, the American public is routinely told that U.S. economic, political, and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific area are ever more vital. While true, this does not tell the whole story. Trade frictions have become rampant. U.S. economic nationalism arises to question the wisdom of Asian financial, investment, and trade practices. Though U.S. economic interests in the region are much more important than formerly, the region also is seen as a competitive "threat." Also negatively, the danger of an economic downturn in Asia--possibly precipitated by a 1929-style crash of the Tokyo Stock Exchange--could be disastrous for the entire West. These two sides of
the coin also have implications for U.S. strategic policy toward the region. Persuasive arguments can be made that U.S. strategic interests which developed while the region was not very important in economic terms, are growing apace with its economic interests in the region, but a counter argument also holds that the wealthier states in the region no longer require as much armed assistance from the United States. Those states should be able to fend for themselves and help the U.S. preserve regional security. Is it wise for the U.S. to underwrite the economic competition from the region which threatens certain facets of U.S. economic well being by providing a defense subsidy to those same competitors? There is no easy answer to this dilemma, but posing it suggests the sorts of problems Washington must address in the future.

As Americans contemplate that future and the possible role we may ask our armed forces (and for present purposes, especially the Navy) to play in the Asia-Pacific region, we need to remain flexible and adaptable. The meaning of "security" in the region might well be altered by the changing relationships between the U.S., the USSR, and Asia --with Japan in the forefront. It is legitimate to ask whether the U.S. can adjust in time and effectively? If--over the long run--the economic dynamism of Asia makes the economic costs of the superpower arms race too high for either the U.S. or the USSR to bear and still keep up with
their Asian challengers, what policy mechanisms can be devised to compensate? Can the U.S. adapt while the USSR persists in adhering to older policies? Conversely, can the Soviet Union adapt while the U.S. does not? Clearly, continued Soviet "socialist imperialism" would perpetuate lineal thinking about the future and U.S. problems, but—if Moscow is able to adapt its brand of Marxism-Leninism to the future being shaped by Asian-Pacific economic dynamism—Soviet policy in the region will pose a very different style of much broader challenge to U.S. interests.

This does not mean that U.S. military forces will necessarily be scaled down, but—under those circumstances—they would play a much more symbolic and diplomatic role alongside the forces of other nations striving to maintain a more multi-laterally balances status quo. Should this future materialize, the nature of U.S. maritime strategy in the region could change significantly, tending toward the maritime orientations of the 19th century which were predicated on commercial interests. However, new stabilization maintenance roles necessarily will have to be devised for the U.S. and other major country navies to replace former "gunboat diplomacy" activities. The United States' strategic interests in the Pacific of the 1940s, 50s, 60s, and 70s—which were almost independent of economic interests—may well be overcome by the commercial factors of the 21st century, redefining why and how the U.S. will stay involved.
in the Asia-Pacific region. In these terms, the period from 1945 through the 1970s and 1980s, during which Asia quietly reemerged as the economic magnet and model it once was for earlier generations of Westerners, may be seen as an aberration in the long continuum in which the flag and fleet followed trade instead of setting the pace. Because the second wave of Western attraction to Asia (in the 19th century) proved to be such a disappointment, that legacy obscures the potential of today's third wave of Asian attractiveness for Westerners to be just as real and far more pervasive than the first wave was. Though contemporary Americans, who often have a poor understanding of the United States' earlier attraction to, and minor status in, the Asia-Pacific region, are likely to see the transition phase we now are entering as an unsettling setback, the U.S. actually may be on the verge of settling back into more normal conditions. If so, our most prudent option will be to develop mutually beneficial cooperative partnerships in Asia to secure U.S. economic, political, and strategic interests.


The writer addressed that buildup and its possible meaning for Soviet policy in his "Vietnamese, Cambodia and North Korean Navies" in George, *The Soviet and Other Communist Navies*, pp. 335-351.


The best overall public statement of this strategy's diverse facets is in a supplement prepared by the U.S. Naval Institute, *The Maritime Strategy*, January 1986.


11One readily available and condensed source for such data is the regional review of Far Eastern navies in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1986, pp. 64-69.

12This was the focus of "Security of the Japan Sea."

13For an example that examines the implications of this for the maritime strategy, see Michael Vlahos, "The Third World -- U.S. Naval Planning," *ORBIS*, Spring 1986, pp. 133-148.


20For a pointed example of this thesis, see John Lehman, "Successful Naval Strategy in the Pacific: How We Are Achieving It, How We Can Afford It," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1987, p. 23.

For interesting insights into the Sino-Soviet contest for Southeast Asian attention, see CSM, 10/14/86, p. 11 and 12/23/86, p. 9.

For an excellent rebuttal to New Zealand arguments, see U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand Paul Cleaveland's April 15, 1986 speech before the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs in the Department of State Bulletin, June 1986, pp. 74-78.

For coverage of Australian criticism of what is seen as a U.S. tendency to cry wolf, see FEER, 6/18/87, pp. 34-35.

See, for example, Japan's views in FEER, 10/2/86, pp. 26-28, and a Chilean view in Admiral Jose T. Merino, "Trouble in the Southern Pacific," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1986, pp. 77-82.

There have been many learned articles on this disruptive trend, but for a useful condensation of the key issues, see Michael G. Elliott, "The Greatest Threat to NATO Could Come From Our Friends," Washington Post Weekly, 9/22/86, p. 23.

For useful insights into European views, see CSM, 10/23/86, p. 9.

Calls for a Pacific alliance system, comparable to NATO, are illustrative of such wishful thinking. When based on existing circumstances such prescriptions are unrealistic because of seriously flawed assumption about shared threat perceptions. For example see the recommendations of Lt. Cdr. James Stavridis, USN, "An Alliance for the Pacific," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1987, pp. 77-82.


Cropsey's article, "Moscow in the Pacific," is an articulate example of that line of thinking.


CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY

June Teufel Dreyer

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Chinese government has no publicly articulated position on the Maritime Strategy. This is in itself remarkable, and it is worth speculating on the reasons why. Certainly neither lack of information nor reticence to comment on American actions can be factors. During January and February of 1986, while debate raged in the U.S. media on the Maritime Strategy and its implications, China

- chided the United States and Israel for threatening military action against a sovereign Arab state (Libya) "under the pretext of combating terrorism";

- commented on the progress of U.S./Soviet talks on chemical warfare;

- hinted that U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was exaggerating the threat of Soviet SS-25 missiles in order to justify a larger budget for his department;

- predicted that the protectionist trend in U.S. economic policy "could plunge the capitalist world trading system into jeopardy";

- advised the U.S. to thoroughly overhaul its fiscal and monetary policies;

- characterized a U.S.-Republic of Korea joint military exercise as "a frontal challenge to all Korean people";

- commemorated Martin Luther King's birthday with an essay on the disproportionate unemployment and income levels between whites and blacks; and
described Soviet-American relations as entering a new stage of "limited easing of tension while an increasingly multipolar world continued to develop."¹

Nor can lack of interest in matters strategic be a factor: Party and government have for the past several years sanctioned the existence of a military "salon" at which junior and mid-ranking officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA; includes navy, marine, and air force components as well as ground forces) are encouraged to freely discuss questions of strategy and tactics.² Several visiting U.S. delegations were asked by the military organizations that hosted them to discuss the AirLand Battle, whose details they were already well acquainted with.³ And the Chinese media have commented knowledgeably and at some length on the strategic implications of, for example, the deployment of the Midgetman missile and of various different arms reduction proposals being discussed by the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴

There has been an indication that at least one member of the PRC leadership has indeed considered the Maritime Strategy and considers it risky. A senior Chinese official, speaking with a staff member of the U.S. National Security Council, characterized the strategy's plans to pursue Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into the Sea of Okhotsk as dangerously provocative. He believed that such actions would certainly cause the war to escalate into a nuclear phase.⁵ On being told the arguments to the contrary--i.e.,
first, that the loss of a few SSBNs over a period of days or weeks would not strike the Soviet leadership as sufficient to warrant escalation to nuclear weapons, second, that Soviet leaders are aware of the practical difficulties of distinguishing between types of submarines in a wartime environment, and third, that the Soviet Union has long believed that SSBNs are militarily legitimate targets, he remained profoundly skeptical. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say whether this official's views are representative of a broader consensus within the PRC leadership. It is possible to speculate that one reason the Chinese have not spoken out is because there is no consensus within the leadership on the Maritime Strategy, though the probability of strongly opposed opinions on this issue does not seem high.

Consensus or dissensus, the Maritime Strategy, or at the very least the Pacific aspects of the Maritime Strategy, have to have been carefully considered by China's defense and foreign policy planners. Here we may find another reason for the PRC's failure to comment on the Maritime Strategy: it has not seemed necessary to do so, given the fact that the strategy's Asian aspects are mentioned only in very general terms—i.e., the Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay and the arc of Soviet exercises that passes by Japan. The classic statement of the Maritime Strategy by then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins does not mention...
China at all. As the managing editor of the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute commented in a recent interview with Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral James Lyons, "[d]espite a respectful tip of the hat to other theaters, most of the strategy discussion seems to center on the North Atlantic and the G-I-UK Gap." Admiral Lyons, while agreeing with the statement, pointed out that it is in the Pacific that the Maritime Strategy can make the greatest difference in the U.S.-Soviet confrontation because "we have the wherewithal in the Pacific to take the Soviets out of the equation."

Clearly the role that China plays in the Pacific while the United States attempts to take the Soviets out of the equation is of utmost importance, both to the PRC's planners and to our own. One must therefore address the matter of Chinese perceptions of what the Maritime Strategy means for China, and how this might affect the U.S. Navy's ability to pursue operations in the Pacific.

A fundamental consideration here is the state of Sino-Soviet relations: how close are the ties between the two, vis-a-vis Chinese ties with the United States, and what are the consequences apt to be should there be a U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Pacific.
II. CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY

Unquestionably Sino-Soviet relations have experienced a warming trend since 1981. Chinese motives for this rapprochement are believed to be:

1. a genuine desire to implement an independent foreign policy, based on perceptions that China had moved too close to the United States in the previous several years;

2. a strongly felt need for peace on the PRC's borders in order to effect China's principal goal of economic modernization.

The rapprochement is not believed to stem from any fundamental reevaluation of the Soviet Union as a benign or peace-loving power, nor is the USSR's attitude toward China considered to have undergone any basic change.

Pragmatic though the motivations may have been, there are numerous manifestations of the improvement in relations. Delegations of scientists, sports teams, and scholars have visited back and forth. Trade has risen each year by large percentages, though the apparently startling increases look less impressive when one notes that they are calculated from a very low base figure. Trade is conducted in barter, calculated in Swiss francs, and reportedly involves many substandard goods which each side knows it would have difficulty marketing elsewhere.\(^10\) Hence, economic relations between the two have been singularly free of the frictions that have troubled the PRC's relations with many other countries.
The relative politeness of Sino-Soviet relations notwithstanding, Chinese leaders are aware that the USSR is the only country presently capable of, and conceivably interested in, threatening the PRC. They are acutely conscious of the growth of Soviet strength in the Pacific over the past decade. Chinese media regularly report on the progress of the Soviet buildup at Cam Ranh Bay. Though the official position has been that the USSR's presence in Cam Ranh is a threat to the United States rather than to the PRC, even the most cursory glance at a globe would indicate otherwise. Moreover, a Soviet buildup directed against the United States would not exclude operations against China as well. Chinese leaders are aware that Soviet-Vietnamese naval maneuvers conducted from Cam Ranh have immediate applications against the PRC, and that they serve to strengthen Vietnam's ability to support its claim of sovereignty over the Spratley Islands vis-a-vis China's contention that the oil-rich area belongs to the PRC.

PRC publications also report in detail, and with thinly disguised apprehension, on Soviet activities in the South Pacific and on developments internal to that area that might facilitate Soviet penetration. China maintains important trade relations with both Australia and New Zealand. The former was the PRC's number one supplier of wheat for more than a decade, and continues to ship grain, other primary products, and farm machinery to China. Australia also
provides China with more tourists than any other country in the world save the United States and Japan. In 1986, China was Australia's third largest export market, and Australia regularly ranks approximately fifth as a source of China's imports. New Zealand sends much-needed meat and dairy products in China, which is its fifth largest market. The PRC's own navy would be powerless to prevent Soviet efforts to interdict this trade.

The progress of the New Zealand Labour Party's efforts to ban nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships from its ports received regular attention from the Chinese media. The tone was scrupulously neutral. While generally supportive of New Zealand's right as a sovereign state to take such actions, the Chinese were plainly not pleased with the disarray in the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Alliance that the ban caused.

To its credit, the PRC became interested in developments in the small island states of the South Pacific several years before the United States began to pay serious attention to the situation there. In April 1985 Hu Yaobang, then the highest-ranking person in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), accompanied by his protege Hu Qili, paid a visit to the area, stopping at Western Samoa, Fiji, and Papua-New Guinea as well as Australia and New Zealand. One of the PRC's most skilled diplomats, Ji Chaozhu, was posted to Suva, Fiji being generally considered the most important of
the South Pacific island states. Ji, Harvard-educated and a form
former interpreter for Mao Zedong, seemed such an unusual choice for what seemed a minor post that Western opinion at first vacillated between whether the appointment signalled his fall from grace for some still-secret offense, or whether it represented a growing Chinese interest in the South Pacific. Analysts soon concluded that it was the latter.

The PRC buys Fijian sugar at prices somewhat above world market rates, and purchases timber from Western Samoa and copper from Papua-New Guinea. It has given sports stadia and provided training programs of various sorts—for example, in paddy rice cultivation and rattan weaving—to various island states. China also maintains a small aid program in the South Pacific. Although the amounts involved are modest (Hu Yaobang, during his 1985 trip, gave US$ 800,000 each to Fiji and Papua-New Guinea, and US$ 500,000 to the substantially smaller Western Samoa14), they loom large in the budgets of these impoverished states. As a case in point, the US$ 1.7 million that the Soviet Union paid to Kiribati in 1985 in exchange for fishing rights represented an estimate 12% of that nation's gross national product (GNP). Additionally, of course, the money the Chinese spent on grants would have had important alternative uses in fostering the PRC's efforts to raise living standards for its own impoverished citizenry.
Chinese diplomats were active in warning leaders of the several Pacific states that had been approached by the USSR for various treaties—involving hydrographic research, fishing rights, port calls, and the like—of the dangers inherent therein. There were also rumors—unfortunately uncorroborated—that China was engaged in a bidding war with the Soviet Union to prevent the latter signing the above-mentioned treaty with Kiribati.

China, though expressing both public and private reservations about the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ), was generally supportive thereof. It would seem that the motivation was more to express solidarity with, and maintain the good will of, the South Pacific States than because the PRC felt that SPNFZ would strengthen the defenses of the area. China's official Xinhua news agency commented that,

Although it is not a perfect treaty, it does however express the Oceanian countries' and their peoples' desires for peace and their aversion to the use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear arms race, and the anti-nuclear movement.\(^{15}\)

In February 1987 China, in the person of Ji Chaozhu, signed protocols two and three of SPNFZ, though accompanying the signature with an official statement stipulating that,

...the Chinese government reserves its right to reconsider these obligations if other nuclear weapons states of the contracting parties to the treaty take any action in gross violation of the treaty and its attached protocols, thus changing the status of the nuclear free zone and endangering the security interests of China.\(^{16}\)
The PRC's 1985 decision to establish an Antarctic research station is also believed to have been guided by a desire to counteract growing Soviet interest in that area.\textsuperscript{17}

While professing a foreign policy of equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union, China appears to perceive the greater threat to its interests as coming from the Soviet Union. This perception has not been appreciably altered since Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's conciliatory speech at Vladivostok in July 1986. To the extent that America's Maritime Strategy can contain Soviet expansionism and keep the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) open for Chinese commerce, the PRC can only be in favor of it. To the extent that,

- its forward aspects seem provocative;
- its plans to pursue Soviet SSBNs into waters near the Chinese mainland seem apt to bring nuclear war to the PRC; and
- its specific scenarios threaten to involve China in a U.S.-Soviet confrontation;

the Chinese will be distrustful of the Maritime Strategy.

While triangular-power analyses of international behavior seem less popular in the West than was the case several years ago, the triangular methodology is alive and well among Chinese analysts, and the PRC, though reacting very sharply to any suggestions that it is playing an American or a Soviet "card,"\textsuperscript{18} has in fact managed with great skill to balance one side against the other to China's benefit. To the extent that the Maritime Strategy presents
opportunities to do this, the Chinese will favor it. To the extent that the PRC's own peace and stability may be compromised, they will distrust it.

In sum, the PRC's reticence to speak out on the Maritime Strategy may reflect the conviction that it is simply not necessary to take a stand in a situation where any position would be likely to provoke either the United States or the Soviet Union, and on a strategy which has, overtly, at least, little to say about Asia and nothing at all about China.

III. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY

Japan is the only other country in Asia besides the Soviet Union that the PRC has apprehensions about. Although perceptions of a threat from Japan are of a magnitude far below those of the threat from the USSR, there is a bitter legacy of past history and, many Chinese feel, disquieting signs that history may be about to repeat itself.

Japanese pirates terrorized coastal China during the Ming dynasty, and the forces of the Meiji Emperor easily bested Japan's much larger neighbor in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. China again proved no match for Japan during World War II. This latter war was prosecuted with great cruelty, including grisly medical experiments performed on Chinese prisoners and savage attacks on civilians, as epitomized in the infamous Rape of Nanjing. Recollections
of the Japanese occupation are vivid in the minds of the many Chinese leaders who lived through them.

While Japan is admired for its economic success and valued as a source of technical expertise and foreign investment, many Chinese also worry about a revival of Japanese militarism and/or a renewed Japanese desire to make China an economic colony in an updated version of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of World War II. These intertwined and mutually reinforcing fears were exacerbated by the increased defense role Japan began taking on in the 1980s, and by the increasingly larger imbalances in Sino-Japanese trade that characterized the same period.

Japan's agreement in principle to assume responsibility for the defense of an area 1000 miles from its home islands, and including the strategically important straits of Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima, was clearly aimed at containing the expansion of Soviet naval power. It is difficult to imagine any Japanese motivation at all with regard to the PRC. However, the decision aroused Chinese apprehensions nonetheless.

These apprehensions were increased by certain other events which happened at approximately the same time. The Japanese Ministry of Education had in 1981 quietly moved to revise history textbooks so as to portray the country's behavior during World War II in a better light, provoking protests from a number of Asian states. China's voice was
the loudest and its protest the most sustained. Another, similarly disquieting hint that Japanese militarism might be reviving was the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone and several members of his cabinet to the Yasukuni Shrine. Though it commemorates the souls of the Japanese soldiers who died in all wars, the shrine is the resting place of several of Japan's leading World War II militarists whose memories are particularly repugnant to the Chinese. As if calculated to underscore the insult, the Nakasone group made its visit on the fortieth anniversary of the end of that war.\(^\text{19}\)

Chinese annoyance over both trade issues and a perceived revival of militarism in Japan boiled over in a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations during the fall and early winter of 1985. Several Japanese businessmen were reportedly beaten in the northwestern city of Xian,\(^\text{20}\) and students in several different cities took to the streets protesting what they perceived as Japan's economic stranglehold over China as well as its rearmament.\(^\text{21}\) While allowing the demonstrations to take place, the government seemed to be trying to keep them within bounds. There was speculation that certain elements of the Chinese leadership had even colluded in the demonstrations, as a hint to the Nakasone government of what might happen if present trends continued.\(^\text{22}\)
Chinese protests have had some positive results. The textbooks were eventually reworded in a manner less offensive to the PRC, and Prime Minister Nakasone cancelled a planned return visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, though several of his ministers did not. From the PRC's point of view, these have been small victories which are far outweighed by more ominous developments.

Within the space of a few months in 1987, several events occurred that were enormously upsetting to Chinese leaders. The Osaka Higher Court handed down a decision which seemed to imply that Japan recognized the sovereignty of the PRC's archrival, the Republic of China on Taiwan. Tokyo refused the PRC's request to intervene, arguing that Japan's system of separation of powers precluded the executive branch of the government from telling the judiciary what it should do.23

China's remonstrations to Japan on these and other issues provoked an almost inevitable backlash. An anti-PRC demonstration was held in front of the Chinese embassy in Tokyo. Most unusual, and perhaps even unprecedented among Japanese demonstrations, the protestors represented both left-wing and right-wing causes.24 And in Kyoto, a monument inscribed with a poem by the late and much-loved Chinese premier Zhou Enlai was splashed with red paint and surrounded with handbills denouncing the PRC for interfering in Japan's internal affairs.25 Shortly thereafter, a senior
official in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Deng Ziaoping of, among other things, not understanding the real situation of Sino-Japanese relations and "having his head in the clouds."26

Worst of all from the PRC's point of view, Japan in 1987 abandoned its "traditional" practice of limiting defense spending to 1% of GNP. Renmin Ribao, official organ of the CCP, rejected arguments that the actual change, to 1.004% of GNP, was negligible, countering that "given the first 'break' [in the 1% limit] it is unavoidable that the second and third 'breaks' will follow, and the state of affairs will get out of control."27 This and many other statements in the Chinese press blamed the United States for unleashing forces which might have disastrous consequences. The Beijing-published bi-monthly Banyue Tan's comment is representative:

... Internationally, the United States, proceeding from its own interests and for the sake of carrying out its global strategy, as well as reducing its economic burden, has strongly demanded that Japan increase its defense spending in an attempt to expand its armaments without limit. Regarding the neighboring countries which suffered from Japanese military aggression, it is quite natural for them to feel anxious to be against their guard against Japan's increased defense spending.28

Thus, to the extent that the PRC's leaders perceive the Maritime Strategy as encouraging the growth of Japanese military capabilities—which they appear unwilling to distinguish from a growth in militarism—they will find the strategy distasteful. Though it is possible to argue, and
this author would agree, that the issue of strengthening Japanese defense capabilities is separate from that of the Maritime Strategy, Chinese leaders are apt to reject the argument. Indeed, they could point to Admiral Watkins' definition of the strategy as "emphasizing coalition warfare and the criticality of allies...naval forces [will] increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces and sister services."30

IV. CHINA'S MARITIME FORCES AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY

The Chinese navy (PLAN) has 350,000 members, including coast guard, marine, and naval air units.31 It is thus the world's third largest maritime force, after the United States and the Soviet Union. Until recently, however, the PLAN was exclusively a coastal defense force, with antiquated ships, little anti-submarine or electronic warfare capability, and outmoded shipboard command and control systems. Missiles and other naval ordnance also were generally behind the levels of capability of advanced navies.

This situation has begun to improve.32 A combination of indigenously developed and foreign technology has led to somewhat enhanced capabilities. In 1980, an 18-ship task force undertook a 35-day, 8000 nautical mile mission into the South Pacific to police the target zone for the PRC's intercontinental ballistic missile test. The flotilla also
recovered the rockets' instrument modules and, not incidentally, showed the flag. This deployment was made possible by the PLAN's acquisition of ocean-going supply ships to sustain its warships at sea. The successful completion of this mission led some observers to conclude that the PLAN would rapidly develop a blue-water capability.\(^3\)

Indeed there has been some progress in this direction, though it has proceeded very slowly. In November 1985, the PRC sent a guided missile destroyer and a supply ship on a two-month Indian Ocean "good-will voyage." Their calls in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka represented the first visits by Chinese Navy vessels to foreign ports since 1949.\(^4\) While the voyage unquestionably demonstrated the PLAN's increased capacity to operate, there have been no port calls since then.

A combination of limited funds and technological problems have interacted to impede the PLAN's development. China can justly take pride in having produced both nuclear ballistic missile (Xia class) and nuclear attack (Han class) submarines, but both have suffered from design and maintenance problems. Foreign procurements have been relatively few and beset by other problems. For example, the Chinese apparently entered into a co-production agreement with France for the Dauphine helicopter before realizing that the vehicle was too small for its intended purpose--i.e., carrying torpedoes as well as a dipping sonar. The PRC has
also purchased five (four and a spare) LM 2500 gas turbine engines from General Electric for what was supposed to be a new class of destroyers. It now appears that they will be used on the older Luda class instead. An agreement with the United States to produce the Mark 46 Mod 2 torpedo, many years in the process of negotiation, has apparently fallen through as well.

Even assuming the PRC wished to support the United States in a Soviet-American confrontation, its navy could do no more than inflict minimal losses on attacking Soviet naval forces. However, despite the disappointments mentioned elsewhere in this section, even the modest improvements in the PLAN's operational capabilities appreciably enhance China's ability to use its naval assets in various regional roles. As a case in point, the recent circumnavigation of the Spratleys by a Chinese naval task force aroused consternation and ire in Hanoi—as, no doubt, the mission's planners in Beijing intended that it should.

V. CONCLUSIONS

China has said nothing publicly about the Maritime Strategy, perhaps because its leadership has concluded that any statement might damage the PRC's carefully-crafted attempts at establishing a policy of nominal equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The
decision to avoid overt commentary on the strategy has been made easier by the fact that the Maritime Strategy seems to concentrate on the European theater, saying little explicitly about Asia and nothing at all about the PRC.

Implicitly, of course, Asia looms much larger in the Maritime Strategy, and one must assume that the Chinese leadership has thought very carefully about these aspects. The PRC has important and growing commercial interests in Asia and the Pacific as well as strategic concerns in the area. Its own navy is at present unable to defend these interests to any significant degree. Despite a force modernization program, this is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future.

To the extent that the Maritime Strategy keeps the SLOCs open for Chinese vessels and contains the growth of Soviet influence in Asia and the Pacific, the Chinese are likely to favor it. To the extent that they consider it provocative to the Soviet Union, likely to escalate into nuclear war in Asia, or lend encouragement to the growth of militarism in Japan, they will tend to oppose it.
FOOTNOTES

1See, for example, the coverage of the Chinese press for January and February 1986 contained in United States Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Vol. I: China (hereafter, FBIS-CHI) and Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter, JPRS).


5Author's conversation, 30 June, 1987, Washington, D.C.


8"Interview," Proceedings, July 1987, p. 87.


20Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), 1 November, 1985, in FBIS-CHI, 5 November, 1985, pp. W/1-3.


28Banyue Tan (Beijing), No. 7 (10 April, 1987), in FBIS-CHI, 28 April, 1987, p. D/2.


186


Lessons of War Plan Orange for Maritime Strategists

Edward S. Miller

War Plan Orange, the U.S. strategy to beat Japan, was the greatest war plan ever written. It was developed by the Navy during 35 years before Pearl Harbor and it won the war in the Pacific. Maritime Strategists of the 1980s can benefit from studying the experience.

I've researched the Orange Plan in formerly classified archives over 15 years for a forthcoming book. I relish the historian's advantage of knowing the outcome of the Plan. As to the Maritime Strategy, I'm aware only of what's in the press; I'm not an armchair expert on it.

Orange was the code name for Japan in the "color" plans of the first 40 years of this century. The U.S. was called Blue. World War II had so many players that the final pre-war strategies were called Rainbow Plans. I assume you're broadly familiar with the history of the war itself, which I'll discuss later to show how prewar plans were implemented.

This has been a neglected subject. There is no book about Plan Orange, just a few articles and chapters. (About a hundred books have been written on Pearl Harbor.) The supposedly definitive piece was written in 1959 by an Army historian who focused on the controversies between the Army
and Navy. They were important, but he missed the main story: the tremendous planning effort within the Navy.

Let's start at the beginning. As early as 1897 the Navy wrote some minor plans in case Japan tried to grab Hawaii before we did. But the real account begins with the San Francisco earthquake in the spring of 1906. Amidst the debris, bigots and vigilantes began to abuse, mistreat and segregate Oriental immigrants. The "yellow" press here and in Japan rattled the sabers. Japan seemed militarily invincible after trouncing Russia the year before. The flap unnerved Teddy Roosevelt, which is ironic because he had mediated the treaty ending the war, earning the gratitude of Japan and the Nobel Peace Prize.

Roosevelt turned to George Dewey, Admiral of the Navy, who headed the General Board, an advisory planning agency. Dewey was no strategic genius, but he had immense prestige and picked good subordinates. He also drew on the thinking of the six-man staff and some students of the Naval War College in Newport. There was also a Joint Board where the Army and navy considered plans together. It did little strategizing until a Planning Committee was formed in 1919; thereafter it sponsored spectacularly bad Orange Plans, at least until 1935. Also in 1919 a War Plans Division of about a dozen officers was formed in the office of the CNO. Known as OP-12, it directed naval planning until World War II. The U.S. Fleet, which contained nearly all the naval
combat forces, obtained a single war planning officer in 1935 and had only four in 1941.

Anyway, Dewey told the President he had a war plan. It was primitive, four pages long, but it launched the Navy on a quest for a winning Pacific strategy.

Let's jump about to March 1914. After eight years, the Navy had worked out the basics of a grand strategy to defeat Japan. The principles remained remarkably unchanged until the surrender in Tokyo Bay.

The saying, "Geography is the bones of strategy," was certainly true of a conflict that would span the widest ocean. The planners predicted the war would unfold in three geography-driven Phases. In Phase I Japan would take advantage of its remoteness to strike without warning, seize the Philippines and Guam and demolish Blue's weak forces in the Western Pacific. It might dare to carry the war to the Eastern Pacific—to occupy Hawaii or even strike at the mainland—but probably not.

In Phase II, the U.S. would transfer its battle fleet from the Atlantic, where it was always stationed to protect the Monroe Doctrine against European incursions. Advancing via the Straits of Magellan, California and Hawaii, it would conduct a 20,000 mile counterattack to regain the Philippines. The geographical problems of Phase II were immense: sheer distance, and an empty sea with only minor islands on the dangerous 5000 mile final leg. An Atlantic-Indian Ocean
route, though shorter, was rejected because of bad logistics, uncertain European amities, the shallowness of Suez, and continuous exposure of the Eastern Pacific to Orange depredations. The westbound route was validated by completion of the Panama Canal in 1914, transfer of the Fleet to the West Coast in the '20s, and its relocation to Hawaii in 1940.

Phase II was the heart of the Orange Plan. However, the timing, the route, the bases, and the resupply of the offensive were not resolved in the early years. The general scheme of 1914 was to advance via Guam to Manila, but other versions flowered over the years. (I'll return to them later.) Japan would respond with an attrition strategem of harassment with torpedoes, cruisers, mines, and later airplanes. Sometime during Phase II or II the navies would clash in a titanic gunnery battle, probably in the Philippines-Formosa-Ryukyus area, which the superior U.S. Fleet expected to win.

Phase III was to be an amphibious advance from Luzon up the stepladder of Japanese islands offshore Asia to Okinawa and beyond, ever closer to the Home Islands. The object was to gain bases for a tight blockade to strangle the Japanese economy. Geography would at last be a friend to Blue, for Japan was a resource-poor island group intensely vulnerable to blockade. This was a world-class insight, but familiar to a few aging admirals who had served in the Civil War.
blockade. Shelling of Orange seaports was investigated, but from the late 1920s, aerial bombing was deemed more effective. The finale of the war would thus be a siege of blockade and bombardment. Under no circumstances would a major ground campaign be fought, not on the mainland nor in Japan itself. Sea power would defeat the enemy's awesome land power.

My selection of the 1914 Plan as a baseline has been made for good reasons. Most of the strategic principles were fixed by then. We can judge the planners' foresightedness because the way lay far in the future. Finally, the years from 1914 to 1941 were an age of campaign planning. The grand strategy didn't vary much, after due allowance for political and technological changes.

The Maritime Strategy is also about eight years old, a wonderful coincidence that lets us compare two efforts of similar age. Some say its birthdate was Admiral Hayward's 1979 policy, or Secretary Lehman's adoption of it in 1981. It flowered in OP-06 in the early '80s and went public in 1986. Today it seems to be considered fairly mature, though still evolving.

CNO Watkins described the Maritime Strategy in three phases:

- Phase I. Deterrence, or the Transition to War. Mainly a deployment.

- Phase II. Seize the Initiative. This includes neutralizing the Soviet naval threat, gaining naval superiority and seizing advanced bases.
- Phase III. Carry the Fight to the Enemy. This includes a naval offensive and assaults on enemy territory and ports.

A three-act scenario may be inevitable for any situation where the bad guys strike first, the good guys recover, and then go on to win. The most controversial public aspect of the Maritime Strategy is the taking out of Soviet missile submarines in Phase II. In the Orange Plan, Phase II was also the most contentious and difficult.

Current strategic problems are vastly different than in 1914. Table 1 compares them, showing that nearly all aspects today are the opposite of the Orange situation. Of course, there were a few similarities, for example, surprise attack by the enemy, technologies untested in battle and the tyranny of geography. Still, differences dominate the comparison. Where, then, is the lesson for today? Not in Table 1, but in the evolution of the process of planning, where human behavior is more universal. For example, who planned? Why did they adopt or reject certain principles? Which were readily adopted, which were settled by debate and which were never resolved? There was an American way of naval planning. It worked then. It ought to work again.

Let's examine the early issues of Orange strategy, from fundamentals to specifics. The first question was, why would the two countries fight? They surely wouldn't take up arms over immigrant abuse, which soon cooled down anyway. The real clash of interest lay between Japan's desire to
## TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF ORANGE PLAN AND MARITIME STRATEGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORANGE PLAN, 1914</th>
<th>MARITIME STRATEGY, 1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GEOPOLITICAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 enemy</td>
<td>10 enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island enemy</td>
<td>Continental enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No allies</td>
<td>40 allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No nukes</td>
<td>Nukes assumed not used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. GRAND STRATEGY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total victory: &quot;impose our will&quot;</td>
<td>Negotiated peace, status quo ante</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long war: years</td>
<td>Short war: months (possibly evolving to protracted war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic offensive</td>
<td>Strategic defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval role primary</td>
<td>Naval role supporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ocean</td>
<td>7 seas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet concentrated</td>
<td>Fleet dispersed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial rearward deployment</td>
<td>Initial forward deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WAR PLANNING</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy, mostly</td>
<td>Multi-level: civilian, inter-allied, joint, four services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Gentleman amateurs&quot;</td>
<td>Professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low tech methods</td>
<td>High tech methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start-to-finish plans</td>
<td>Early operations plans (possibly more?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
control East Asia and America's foreign policy of the Open Door (free trade and the integrity of China) which required a balance of power in the Orient. The situation got unbalanced after Japan whipped Russia and European Navies went home for World War I. How could we block Japan's expansionism in Asia? The U.S. would never fight a land war in Manchuria. The Imperial Army was an awesome fighting machine, ours was a minor constabulary. Nor would we form an entangling alliance to conduct land warfare.

Naval officers first saw the answer. Captain James H. Oliver, at the War College in 1911, reckoned that Japan would some day try to expel us, the strongest power, from the Far East, and especially from the Philippines which blocked the sea route to conquest. That would be a blunder affording us an opportunity for naval war, a war we could win. It was very Mahanian. Sea power would beat land power. The Navy thus defined itself as the premier national military instrument and took control of war planning. No other agency, civilian or uniformed, ever proposed a viable alternative approach. The Army traditionally planned for mobilization and perhaps the opening battles, but never for the final outcome. The Navy felt the Army's function was to help procure bases, particularly in Phase III. Later, Air Corps planning was equally sparse.

Today grand strategy is set by higher authorities. The Navy, however, is faithful to tradition. By writing the
Maritime Strategy it has again formulated its own role. Even its function is roughly similar: frustration of continental expansion by sea power, although its role today must be supporting, not primary.

When the purpose and start of a war have been doped out, planners normally turn to its conclusion. War termination on satisfactory terms is the aim of strategy; planners work backward from the desired goal. Japan aimed to fight a limited war to gain territory, to weary us and settle by negotiation. The Blue Navy didn't buy this. It believed America's proper objective was total victory: "submission of Japan to our will," they phrased it, or "the overthrow of Japanese power." It wasn't exactly unconditional surrender, but neither was it limited war. American goals were to strip Japan of its conquests, annihilate its Fleet and merchant marine, inflict severe economic pain, and procure peace on our terms. A potent Navy could achieve these ends with modest Army support.

Nowadays the U.S. and its allies would probably seek a more confined outcome, say a rollback of Soviet conquest to the prewar status quo. Within such stringent political constraints the Navy's aggressive spirit lives on. The Maritime Strategy pursues the achievement of peace by inflicting serious pain through intensive offensive pressures, like destroying the Soviet Navy and its bases.
Usually strategists can be classified as offensivists or defensivists but the old Navy had no defensivists nor even advocates of limited war. Yet there were two schools of thought among the "blue suits." As Morris Janowitz has said,

The history of the modern military establishment can be described as a struggle between heroic leaders, who embody traditionalism and glory, and military "managers," who are concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war. One naval group, which I call the "thrusters," believed in a slashing counterattack in Phase II, an instantaneous charge across the Pacific in about 60 days to rescue the beleaguered garrison of Luzon, sink the Orange Navy, impose the blockade, and win a short war by gallantry and daring. Their plan was known as the Through Ticket to Manila. They pointed with pride to the round-the-world voyage of America's Great White Fleet, which fueled and maintained itself in excellent order. This proved, they said, that the Fleet could steam across the Pacific and clobber the enemy. In their scenario America's ten-fold industrial superiority counted for little since it took three years to build a capital ship. The old salts of the Navy were often thrusters; damn the torpedoes, and all that.

The other group, which I call the "cautionaries," advocated a gradual, step-by-step offensive by way of island bases while building strength for a long war. They drew dour comparisons to the Russian Baltic Squadron of 1905, the Black Fleet which cruised to destruction at Tsushima. It
was insane, they said, to rush straight across, suffering casualties en route, to meet the Orange Fleet fresh from home bases. The cautionaries tended to be younger, War College-trained officers, familiar with new attrition weapons like submarines and given to systematic homework on logistics.

The two schools should be thought of as hares vs. tortoises, not operators vs. intellectuals. All war planners achieved senior responsibility after full and active careers of command at sea and in shore billets. However, there was a rising tendency to recruit superior minds, for example a distinct upward tilt in the Academy class standings of planners as the war approached.

Plan Orange developed through an interplay between the two groups whose influence ebbed and flowed. The cautionaries had the better idea; they gradually came to dominate planning, especially in the 1930s when the intensity of modern was better appreciated.

A prime example of the thruster-vs.-cautionary hassle was the Far Eastern base argument. Early in the century thrusters lobbied for a great dockyard and arsenal at Olongapo to await the Fleet. The Army squelched it because Subic Bay was indefensible against overland attack; the troops could at best defend Bataan and Corregidor, terrible places for a naval base. Theodore Roosevelt wisely selected Pearl Harbor, the cautionaries' choice, as the main outlying
base. The thrusters tried for a grand base on Guam in the early 1920s and again in 1939 but failed because they misread the country's isolationist mood. Mahan called Guam the Gibraltar of the pacific but without improvement its harbor could hold a dozen ships. If the thrusters had gotten their base the Orange Plan might have evolved like the British Singapore strategy, with the same disastrous outcome. But the cautionaries won; the Fleet would carry mobile bases when it voyaged west of Hawaii.

On the other hand, the thrusters were more insightful about the security of the Eastern Pacific. Cautionaries worried that the U.S. or Panama might be attacked, but above all they feared losing Hawaii. In the end, despite the momentary disaster of 7 December, 1941, Hawaii remained the launching pad for the offensive. There may be a parallel attitude today since security of the American home bastion is a tenet of the Maritime Strategy. Incidentally, the General Board long ago predicted that an attack on Hawaii would arouse "a greater spirit of resentment" and determined prosecution of the war, a good prognosis since Yamamoto's attack fatally inflamed American passions.

The most long-lasting dispute raged over the campaign to reach the Far East. Early cautionaries preferred a safe route below the Equator, far from Japan, approaching Luzon from the south. Thrusters favored the direct advance from hawaii to Guam and Manila, sometimes modified by cautionary
insistence on secret coaling stops in neutral islands. Nobody cared for a movement via Alaska, with its atrocious weather and isolation from trade routes—except Mahan, who urged a devil-may-care descent from the Aleutians to the Ryukyus across the face of Japan with a coaling stop on the enemy coast!

Plans for the Phase II advance were plagued by logistical problems, especially the supply of coal. In 1898, coal was transferred in raw harbors by shovel and sack at the rate of ten tons an hour. To deal with Orange the Navy ordered giant colliers, bigger than battleships, spending 59% of its 1908 appropriations on them. By 1914 their mechanized rigs could load 1000 tons per hour. Later, of course, oil transfer on the move was a splendid improvement.

Since a Fleet couldn't coal in the open seas, the cautionaries jealously eyed the huge lagoons of Micronesia that could hold an entire Fleet. They belonged to Germany, but Japan seized them in World War I and retained them under a League of Nations Mandate prohibiting military use. The thrusters were dismayed, seeing a barrier that would derail a fast offensive. The cautionaries were delighted; they persuaded Wilson to support the Mandate award which afforded Blue an undefended ocean highway.

The following are a few post-1914 examples of thrusting and cautionary Phase II campaigns. After Guam was
demilitarized by the Washington Conference of 1922 (which also fixed battleship tonnages at a 5:3 ratio), Rear Admiral Clarance S. Williams, my favorite war planner, worked out a superb cautionary plan adapted from suggestions of Admiral William S. Sims, then President of the War College. The Fleet would advance to Eniwetok and Truk, positioning itself to descend on any target in a huge arc from the Philippines to Okinawa. To reach and develop a base at Truk required 18 months, dooming the Philippine garrison which could survive only six months. Williams was done dirty by General Leonard Wood, former Army Chief of Staff and political bigwig of the Harding administration. Wood sermonized that forfeiture of Manila would be an affront to American prestige, the white race and God Almighty. Admiral Robert E. Coontz dumped his planner and reestablished the Through Ticket to Manila as a wild non-stop "Rambo" thrust on Day 14, of 554 vessels with a huge army and air complement, steaming right under the enemy's nose.

The next chief of the War Plans Division, a logistics expert, couldn't dissuade the thrusters. Rear Admiral Frank Schofield, in 1928 managed to delay the sortie to Day 30 and aim it toward the Southern Philippines, a marginally saner gambit. In 1934 CNO William Standley and WPD Director Samuel Bryant linked William's cautionary approach to Schofield's destination into a march through the Mandated Islands to Mindanao, cheerfully dubbed "The Royal Road." As
refined over the next few years, it stressed island air-fields, amphibious assault tactics and the bypassing of unneeded strongholds.

New weapons were changing naval warfare. Evolution of the aircraft carrier is too well known to bear repeating. Often overlooked are long range patrol seaplanes, ideal for a Central Pacific War, which according to Rear Admiral Ernest J. King could also perform as a striking force. The thrusters encouraged the building of Clipper stations by Pan American Airways on American atolls like Midway and especially Wake island, and later military bases there, to provide air cover for a fast lunge into the Marshalls and Carolinas. The Army, however, fearing a war in Europe and perhaps a Nazi attack on Latin America, turned defensive in 1938. It urged the Navy not to venture beyond Hawaii lest it couldn't be recalled.

In 1940 and 1941 cautionaries rallied to the cause of wariness in the Pacific and a priority of beating Germany first. Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark and OP-12 Director "Terrible" Turner handed Pacific campaign planning back to the Fleet. Thus the final prewar plan was developed by the CINCPac, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, under the Rainbow 5 Plan. He was told to make a noisy diversion to distract Orange forces from Malaysia but not to invade the Mandate for six months. Officially, he planned a carrier raid on the Marshalls. There is a possibility, overlooked by
historians, that he and his rapidly thrusting war planner Captain "Soc" (for Socrates) McMorris were slyly setting the stage for a battleship slugfest in mid-Pacific when they got caught flatfooted at Pearl Harbor.

To return to the process of planning, a useful understanding can be reached by classifying elements of Plan Orange according to how decisions were made. There were three broad categories:

1. Concepts enjoying unanimous consensus, decided early and rarely revised: the three-Phase war, helplessness in Phase I, rebound in Phase II, reliance on superior naval power, the decisive battle, the Phase III siege, and the goal of total victory.

2. Issues resolved by debate, often acrimonious and sometimes extending over decades: the dream of a prepared Western Pacific base, the sanctity of Hawaii, the theater of attack, logistical requirements, mobile advanced bases, and gradual acknowledgment of a longer war stretching out from six or 12 months to two or three years.

3. Matters unresolved before the war, mainly the particulars of the offensive: the launch date, speed of advance, exact route, and destination. However, the many studies of Phase II provided wartime commanders a menu of choices from which to pick and choose.

World War II certainly differed from the anticipated conflict. To play devil's advocate, if the Orange Plan had been irrelevant or wrong it would have been replaced and historians could relegate it to a cemetery of curiosities or damn it as counterproductive. In truth, it met the test of war. I will argue that its principles were sound because they adapted flexibly to the real war and were not jettisoned for a contrary principle. Let's examine some of the
war's surprises and see whether the prewar strategies still fit.

The Orange planners, until 1939, figured on a two-party war. America had no alliances and Japan had always fought alone. World War II turned out to be a struggle of coalitions. However, the contributions of allies were relatively modest and their weight was more than offset by the commitment of U.S. power to Europe. The Pacific war remained, fundamentally, Blue vs. Orange and the Plan remained applicable.

How about the Eastern Pacific bastion? The old planners knew Hawaii was vulnerable to a raid but believed it would be held. Pearl Harbor was indeed the great launching pad of the Blue offensive. Japan's only other sallies across the international dateline ended in disaster at Midway. Even Kimmel's bootleg dream of a mid-Pacific engagement wasn't far off the mark.

The war spread to allied territory on the Asian mainland and in the South Pacific. The extended Japanese perimeter provided a second front for Blue, the MacArthur drive, which followed the route of some early Orange studies. The Japanese attrition campaign switched to the South Pacific for a while, but we overcame it as predicted. When the time was ripe, the main Blue advance was directed through the Central Pacific islands. The Orange route was supplemented, never displaced, by MacArthur's campaign.
Blue didn't open the Central Pacific offensive in two weeks or six months due to early setbacks and the Atlantic war. It waited two years. The delay underscores the genius of the choice, for there was plenty of time to devise a better alternative if one existed. The campaign seemed like running a movie backward. Nimitz leapfrogged through the Marshall Islands as in the 1930s Plans. Although he bypassed the Carolines, he arrived in the Southern Philippines as in the 1920s plans. Guam and the Marianas were strategically pivotal in the Orange Plans of 1911-1921; when they fell, the Tojo Government fell, and Japan began a desperate search for a way out. The seizure of Okinawa as the final siege position had been identified as early as 1906.

Did new weapons and tactics mesh with Plan Orange? Consider the submarine and the bomber. We had renounced unrestricted torpedoing of merchantmen, while city-bashing was unimaginable. Nevertheless, the siege was so firmly rooted in our military psyche that we unhesitatingly applied these weapons with deadly efficiency. (The Japanese, having no counterpart of the siege strategy, failed to develop either weapon effectively.) Aviation fit the Orange Plan in every way. The aircraft carrier and long-legged shore-based air were ideal for the open waters of the Pacific. They multiplied the effectiveness of the dominant side--Orange in Phase I, Blue in Phases II and III.
Logistical planners provided ample recognition of the need for mobile service bases, portable drydocks and fueling at sea.

The Plan called for storming defended beaches for which the Marine Corps developed amphibious doctrine and specialized craft. The General Board long ago predicted small islands would always fall to the force controlling the sea. The cautionary island-hopping advance allowed defeat in detail of small Orange ground units. The national armies never met en masse. The Japanese Army was intact at the end of the war.

What about the great fleet battle? The war wasn't decided in an afternoon by a gunnery Trafalgar. There were a dozen major battles in which the carrier was often the capital ship. But the strategic principle was sound: the Orange Navy had to be destroyed in battle. If it remained a fleet in being, the Plan would fail. The planners predicted Blue could win battles in waters favorable to the enemy. Japan did resort to attrition, including Kamikazes, but Blue was able to absorb the losses and win.

What about the atomic bomb? Truman said he dropped it to avoid the casualties of invading Japan. The Army persuaded him that invasion was necessary, for it had no institutional commitment to the siege concept. The Navy and Air Force maintained faith in the siege while going along with invasion planning. In the end, Truman validated the
Orange strategy by employing the ultimate siege weapon. (Roosevelt, I imagine, would have dropped the bomb, but in direct fulfillment of Plans he had studied since 1913.)

Was the potency of the Orange Plan due to genius or was it simply the obvious choice? There were, in fact, other proposals. The Army in the '30s advocated a cheap economic war: abandon the Orient, destroy Japan's credit and long range trade and hope for a negotiated peace. We might have built a Far Eastern base. We might have stationed the Fleet in Singapore as the British beseeched. We might have forged a coalition to fight on the mainland. A successful plan merely looks obvious in hindsight.

Von Moltke the elder said, "No plan survives contact with the enemy." Indeed, new plans were improvised after Pearl Harbor while old ones were rarely dug out of the files. But the concepts of Plan Orange were in the heads of the admirals. For example, Nimitz studied at the War College under Williams. King's determination to go for the Marianas in 1944 was prompted by a game he played there in 1933.

Peacetime plans are often criticized as ploys to get money for the service. The incredibly cautionary Admiral J.O. Richardson, Commander-in-Chief in 1940, despised the Orange Plan and called it "chiefly useful...for asking for appropriations...." A 600-ship Navy of the 1980s was presumably easier to obtain by linkage to a war plan. (The
ploy doesn't always work. During the depression the Navy was getting scarce dollars. The Army desperately cooked up War Plan Red, a conflict with the British Empire featuring a massive attack on Canada. War with Britain was far-fetched and, as the Navy pointed out, Canada would choose neutrality. Congress declined the funds.) The Orange Plan was indeed a framework for spending money on a Navy to fight a very specific and plausible war. When it came, the Navy was ready with doctrines and plans, even though not fully prepared materially.

To wrap up, the prewar Navy was extremely good at planning in the Pacific. The experience should offer Maritime Strategists comfort as they examine a more complex and dangerous situation. Here are ten observations about the old planners that are worth reflection.

1. They clearly articulated the goal of the war and the strategy for achieving it.

2. They analyzed what the enemy would do and devised a response flexible enough to survive setbacks and surprises.

3. They got the strategic principles right. That took about eight years. Later planners fine-tuned but didn't abandon them.

4. They structured the war in phases, a very useful concept.

5. They placed the decisive theater where the aggressor was strong: near his homeland.

6. They identified their own bastion and provided for its permanent security.
7. Although they didn't settle the contentious details of the Phase II offensive (except for the theater), they turned out a fine menu of campaign ideas.

8. They showed that good naval war plans are most likely to emanate from uniformed professionals, officers of high intellect and wide experience working dedicatedly over spans measured in years. Clever strategists and hard-headed logisticians supplemented each other. Good naval war plans did not emerge from a joint or civilian body.

9. They won service-wide commitment to the strategy, so the Navy was designed to implement it long after they were gone.

10. They demonstrated that an excellent plan can be so enduring as to be timeless. This is reassuring in a century of continuous change.

In closing, I offer observations by naval officers of three generations. First. Lieutenant Commander Clarence Williams in 1909 as he set in motion the first comprehensive Orange Plan:

Complete war plans must come from a national body and they require cooperation with the Army. But national policy is rather predictable, and the strategic situation reasonably clear, so we are able to outline the best Navy line of action. Preparing such naval plans of campaign is our most important duty. We must decide now, to save time at the outset of hostilities. The strategic plan should lay down general means to injure the enemy and prevent him injuring us. The questions to address are the probable theater of war, the enemy's objectives, our objectives, bases, advanced bases and actions to deny them, logistics, and the safe convoy of military strength overseas. The most critical question is, "Will our fleet be strong enough to [take] the offensive?" We can amend the plan later, if necessary. Alternative plans offer us good choices.

Chester Nimitz, who studied under Williams in 1923, said, "I was asked once how we were able to fight the war in the Pacific, and I said we fought it as we had fought it all on paper...."
Finally, CNO James D. Watkins understood that linkage of history with current planning provides valuable parallels and pride of institution:

The most far-reaching trend in recent years has been the emphasis on strategy as the focus of naval thought. Naval officers are again at the forefront of developing strategic concepts. I'm confident in the Maritime Strategy because it represents the collective judgment of the best thinkers. The competition of ideas has made for a robust strategy that recognizes the complexity of issues. The process may be untidy, but it is distinctly American. It works. The process represents a continuation of the customs of...the past. Continuity and stability are important to us. We depend on the legacy of our naval tradition to provide us perspective.
The strategic concept we term the Maritime Strategy was originally developed not in the early 1980s, nor in the late 1970s, but during the first postwar decade. The defeat of Japan in September 1945 marked the end of the Mahanian era, a half-century Samuel Huntington termed the "Oceanic" period—an age when nations constructed navies to engage and destroy enemy fleets in a quest for command of the sea. In the postwar world, the United States Navy no longer faced an "Oceanic" challenge; the Navy commanded the sea. The question became: how could that command be put to use in the geopolitical struggles being waged around the Eurasian periphery. The "Transoceanic" era had begun and the Navy, principally through the leadership of Admiral Forrest Percival Sherman, devised a new strategic concept that resembled today's Maritime Strategy. And just as one can find the immediate origins of the current Maritime Strategy in the Pacific—in Admiral Thomas Hayward's SEASTRIKE concept for CINCPACFLT—it was in that ocean that the Navy first reached a full conceptualization of its initial postwar strategy.

The Navy could very well consider 6 June 1946 the birth date of the Maritime Strategy. In the old Navy building in
Washington that day, the OP-30 Strategic Plans Division staff met with their boss, OP-03, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, for Operations, Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman.\(^3\) The topic of discussion that day was PINCHER planning, a series of studies initiated in December 1945 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) meant ultimately to support the development of a joint strategic plan for a war with the Soviet Union.\(^4\) Sherman considered that task OP-30's top priority. He was not there that day, however, to be updated on his planners' work. He was there to insure that they incorporated in the service plans, and the joint plans for which many of them were also responsible, Sherman's views on how a Soviet-American war would be fought.

Sherman expected that such a conflict would be a protracted, global, primarily conventional struggle. In the initial stages the United States would be on the strategic defensive. The Navy's missions would be many: supporting American occupation forces in Europe and Asia, that is covering the Dunkirk-like evacuations envisioned for American ground troops in Northwest and Southern Europe, North China, and South Korea; shielding American forward bases and allies--Iceland, the Azores, the British Isles, the Suez-Cairo area, and the island chain in the Western Pacific, the Aleutians, Japan, Ryukus, and the Philippines--from which our eventual counterattack would be launched; and keeping open the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) to
these bases by maintaining control of the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific.

To carry out such a variety of tasks with forces much reduced in the aftermath of World War II, Sherman called for forward, offensive operations, whatever the overall strategic posture of the United States and its allies. He circumnavigated the periphery of the Soviet Union for his planners. They were to resist getting "up into the ice," for Sherman believed the Navy's carrier and submarine forces were about three or four years short of being prepared to operate in Arctic conditions, and he ruled out operations in the Baltic. Sherman saw the Mediterranean as the major theater for naval operations, a sea passageway penetrating the Eurasian landmass. The Navy would have to cover the strategic Cairo-Suez area by conducting offensive strikes in the Eastern Mediterranean against Soviet forces attempting to move southward through the Balkan and Anatolian peninsulas.

Sherman's examination of the Pacific, a secondary theater, notes special attention. Only in the Far East could the Navy strike directly at the Soviet Union, unhindered by either climatic or geographical bulwarks. It is in Sherman's scheme for the Pacific that we see most clearly the direction he wanted Navy plans to take. The carrier task force in the Western Pacific, he expected, would "wipe up" Russian bases in short order, before
swinging, a strategy now passe of course, around to the Atlantic. Thus it was in the Pacific that Sherman and the Navy first contemplated direct attacks on Soviet bases, just as it was in the Pacific in the late 1970s that we saw the genesis of the Maritime Strategy in Admiral Hayward's SEASTRIKE!

Over the following year and a half, Sherman and OP-30 further developed and refined this strategic concept. In early 1947 Sherman began making presentations, first to President Truman in January, and later of revised versions to various Congressional committees and other official groups. These presentations, conducted by Sherman, not only resembled the Maritime Strategy in their content, but also took on its form. They relied increasingly on graphs and charts, with overlays showing critical lines of communications, the radii of Soviet air and subsurface operations, and the directions that an American naval offensive would follow. Carrier silhouettes, from which American radii of action extended, appeared in the Norwegian and Barents Seas, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the North Pacific off Japan. The effectiveness of the German U-Boat campaign of the Battle of the Atlantic was used as an example of what the Soviets might be able to accomplish, although OP-30 had yet to develop a graphic—a "Measles Chart"—to demonstrate the effect. The presentations read like the Maritime Strategy.
By early 1948, and Sherman's departure from Washington for command in the Mediterranean, the Navy had a fully developed strategic concept--a Maritime Strategy. In peacetime the Navy operated forward in support of American policy, offering a visible show of force for allies and enemies alike, inducing the former to resist Soviet threats, and to deter aggression by the latter and their allies. In the event of war the Navy would go on the offensive with the forces at hand, striking primarily in the Mediterranean, which would remain the primary operational area until the mid-1950s, with increasing attention paid to operations in the Barents and Norwegian Seas, and, with tertiary forces in the Pacific.

The strategic problems facing the United States in 1946-1948 differ, of course, from those facing the nation today. The United States in the late 1940s possessed a nuclear monopoly. No Soviet surface navy capable of contesting command of the sea existed. The United States had no NATO alliance, no pool of European manpower, to help fend off a Soviet ground attack and had little choice but to pursue a maritime-based strategy. Nevertheless, limited weapon availability made the American nuclear monopoly of little practical use. The nation's plans, even the Air Force's service plans for strategic air warfare, envisioned a primarily conventional conflict. And while we know now that no Soviet surface challenge then existed, at the time
intelligence on the Soviet Navy was scarce and there was constant speculation, and concern, that they possessed, or were building, both carriers and battleships. Moreover, in Sherman's view, American national strategy would be best served by a strong NATO. The prospects of a long war concerned Sherman. He favored policies intended to prevent the overrunning of Western Europe by the Soviets, for their use of the French Breton bases used by German's U-Waffe during the Second World War would undermine the Navy's strategy. To Sherman, the strategic dilemma facing him looked much like that facing the Navy's leaders in the 1970s and 1980s.10

*****

Many historians have addressed the changed circumstances facing the Navy in the post-1945 world.11 The Mahanian era was indeed over. But the Navy made a much more rapid and effective transition than the work of most historians would lead one to believe. When they wrote, of course, the Navy's strategy was secret; silence became confused with nescience. Critics assumed that the absence of a publicly stated strategic concept indicated the lack of one, which was far from the truth, and which is why it is so important that the Maritime Strategy be widely debated in public forums today.

The Navy's collective wartime experience and the personal background of Forrest Sherman enabled it to make
this relatively quick transition from Huntington's "Oceanic" to the "Transoceanic" period.

During the Second World War the Navy fought and won two great campaigns, the Battle of the Atlantic, and, for mere symmetry in terms, the Battle of the Pacific. Each of these tremendous campaigns could be divided into several major phases. Historians have tended to focus on the early and middle periods of both.

In the Atlantic, the early phases were distinguished by the struggle of the Allies to secure a technological advantage over the U-Boat, culminating in the sudden turn of the tide in the Atlantic in the Spring of 1943. But it was from the final stage of the Atlantic campaign, which generally receives cursory treatment, that the postwar Navy drew its lessons. German technological developments late in the war, the Schnorkel, the Type XXI boats, the Walter boats, all gave submarines the edge, one, thankfully, not translatable late in the war to operational success.

The Navy's comprehension of the lessons of the final stage of the Battle of the Atlantic is evident in the proceedings of the first ASW conference held in Washington in 1946, a conference attended by Forrest Sherman as DCNO.12

The Americans had received as reparations two Germany Type-XXIs and exercises indicated that the Navy possessed no counter. Since the Soviets also had received Type XXIs, and had overrun the yards and factories where the boats had been
produced and assembled, Americans expected that the Russians would manufacture similar boats themselves.

Sherman, after listening to this doleful testimony, interjected that the strategic counter to the Type XXI was to destroy it at its bases with forward, offensive carrier, submarine, and surface operations. Thus in June 1946, the Navy's ASW concerns drove it to plan offensive operations against Soviet submarine bases in the Kola, the Black Sea, and the Far East. Appropriate target lists were prepared.\textsuperscript{13}

In the Pacific, the great carrier battles such as the Coral Sea, Midway, and others characterized the early phases of the war. In these campaigns between 1942 and 1944 the Navy advanced across the Pacific seeking decisive battle with the Japanese fleet. By the end of 1944, and the successes of the Philippines campaign, that objective had been secured. The menace was no longer the Japanese fleet, the remnants of which were not holed up in Japanese ports, but perils emanating from Japan itself. The remaining Japanese threat took the form of land-based air attack and submarine operations.

The Pacific war entered its final phase: one epitomized by the Kamikaze, the first precision guided bomb, a cruise missile in which the Kamikaze volunteer's brain substituted for the yet to be developed silicon chip. In the Okinawa campaign the Navy took a beating, but learned that the proper way to deal with the suicide threat was not only to
establish early warning and interception capability for the
carrier task force, but also to conduct mobile offensive
operations: to strike at the source of the threat, the air
bases in Japan itself, and to destroy the Japanese planes on
the ground, where one always destroys an enemy air force.
In the final stage of the war, the Navy operated not against
the Japanese Navy, but against Japan itself, ranging along
the coast, knocking out thousands of planes on the ground,
and with light losses, compared to those suffered during the
Okinawa campaign.¹⁴

The man who planned many of these operations was
Nimitz's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Forrest Sherman.¹⁵
If anyone understood the lessons of the latter stages of the
Pacific was it was Sherman. His wartime experience
certainly prepared him for his role in the postwar Navy.
But his prewar thought also played an important part in
making him the right man, in the right place, at the right
time in OPNAV in 1946-47.

Writing in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings
between 1926 and 1934, Sherman addressed many issues that he
would later face in the postwar years, such as unification
and the establishment of an independent air force. Given
proper conditions, conditions met by 1946, Sherman favored
both. It was no accident that he became the Navy's
architect of unification.¹⁶
Of the most direct significance to this paper, however, is Sherman's June 1932 critical review of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond's *Economy and Naval Security*. Sherman saw Richmond as a hide-bound navalist, concerned primarily with the interests of Great Britain, rather than announcing any universal truths about sea power. He considered Richmond's discussion of aircraft carriers particularly weak.

With respect to aircraft carriers the author takes an attitude somewhat similar to that of the sailing-ship officers who deplored the advent of steam. He doubts the necessity for taking aircraft to sea and holds that "if both powers possess these vessels, neither is at an advantage over the other, and if neither has them, neither is at a disadvantage." He ignores the fact that fighting aircraft are an accepted part of the armament of nations and the fact that fleets must be able to operate within aircraft radius of enemy coasts, where if neither power has ship-based aircraft the enemy shore-based aircraft may dominate the situation. He ignores the ability of ship-based aircraft to operate against shore objectives with a degree of success which ships' guns could not possibly match.

One can find in Sherman's early writings in the *Proceedings* the origins of the strategic concepts he laid before his OP-30 planners in June 1946. His knowledge of naval history, particularly that of Great Britain, and his experience as a naval aviator, led Sherman to reject the notion that sea-borne air was unimportant for a naval power --Britain--facing a land power--Germany. One need only substitute the United States for Britain, and the Soviet Union for Germany in Sherman's equation, and one can see in outline form his strategic concept of the postwar period.
He believed that carriers could play a role in applying sea power ashore, with force far greater than that projected from the guns of dreadnoughts, and that the offensive was central to that mission. While as a professional naval officer Sherman's focus had been on the Pacific during the interwar years, Sherman the amateur historian had a European concentration that would stand him in good stead at the end of the Second World War and enable him to make a rapid transition from one ocean of destiny to another.

****

Strategic concepts, of course, must be tempered by the practical understandings of the operator who bases his own conceptions on experience. Exercises and staff studies conducted during 1948 and 1949 both in the Mediterranean and the Pacific qualified the Navy's strategic concept developed during 1946 and 1947.18

In the Pacific, a CINCPACFLT staff study--"Brightness--introduced a note of circumspection. The study called for forward offensive operations on the outbreak of hostilities "against Soviet air, submarine, and other important bases in the KURILES, southern KAMCHATKA, including PETROPAVLOSK, and southern SAKHALIN...." But far from Sherman's June 1946 estimate that the Navy's Pacific force could "wipe up" Soviet Far Eastern assets in a short time, "Brightness," like the CINCNELM study, was a cautious document. It
suggested that consideration be given to sending Eastern Pacific task groups earmarked to reinforce European forces (the swing strategy) "by way of Japan, assisting hard-pressed Far East Command forces by carrier strikes of several days duration." The study called for prudent, surprise strikes, in and out operations, against Russian bases to avoid allowing the Soviets to concentrate any land-based air against what would be a weak force of carriers. Thus as early as 1948 CINCPACFLT had begun to question the wisdom, and executability of the "swing strategy."

The CINCNELM study, completed late in 1948, concluded that a Mediterranean offensive against Soviet bases might have to be preceded by a preliminary stage of air-to-air defense. Convoys and the carrier task forces would act as "magnets" and draw upon themselves Soviet air attacks. Far from using the final stage of the war against Japan as its model, the CINCNELM study envisioned initial operations akin to the battle of the Philippine Sea--a "Turkey Shoot" in which the Soviets would destroy their air power in attacks against American carriers. The study concluded:

Since it is not envisaged that the supply of fast carriers, carrier aircraft, and pilots will increase as rapidly as the demand, it is necessary to avoid bulling our way into a shore-based air "hornets nest" until such time as we are confident we can do so and come out the winner. This can only be determined by experience. IN OTHER WORDS, INITIALLY PROBE: DETERMINE REACTION: AND THEN OPERATE ACCORDINGLY.
As an examination of Mediterranean operations, the study drew heavily on the experience of the American naval commander in that sea--Forrest Sherman. Having supplied the Navy with a strategic concept as a planner, Sherman now tempered that strategy based on his experience as an operator.

It was from the Mediterranean in November 1949 that Sherman was recalled to become Chief of Naval Operations. As CNO Sherman reiterated those principles he had first called for in his 6 June 1946 conference with his OP-30 planners and battled for and achieved increased force levels in both peacetime, and in the projected wartime force tabs.

Sherman, after reviewing the United States' emergency strategic war plan then in force--OFFTACKLE--addressed the JCS for the record, noting many deficiencies. He disliked the priority given the defense of Great Britain and Scandinavia, at the expense of offensive carrier operations in the Mediterranean. He also noted presciently, on the eve of the Korean War:

There is likely to be need for deployment of a small carrier task force in the Pacific. As a matter of fact I am concerned over the current situation in the Pacific where the FY 1951 force level will be inadequate to cope with situations which may develop very soon. The security of Alaska and the Japan-Okinawa-Philippine line requires naval support.19

Sherman consistently argued within the JCS and before Congress for an increase in naval forces, including a super-carrier, and a bolstering of forces committed to the
Pacific. At the time of his death, the Navy's carrier strength under the United States' emergency war plan had been increased at D-day plus 12 months from eight to 12, and the maximum to be mobilized from ten to 16. The four additional D+12 carriers were all to be employed in the Pacific. Construction of the *Forrestal* had been approved.

Sherman's consistency, and his preference for forward, offensive operations, is apparent in an interview he gave to *U.S. News & World Report* in February 1951. Asked about the air and submarine threats posed by the Soviets, Sherman responded:

> In that connection, the air-defense problem, and the anti-submarine problem have certain points of similarity. The worst place to protect a ship is where the ship is. The worst place to protect a convoy is at the convoy. The worst place to protect a city from air attack is at the city. The best place is at the bases from which the airplane or submarine comes. The next best place is en route -- the worst place is at the target.

****

During 1946 and 1947 the Navy developed a strategic concept that resembled the Maritime Strategy. The Navy would operate forward, in support of American national policy in peacetime, offensively in time of war. The Navy would fight what we term today the "come as you are war," taking the offensive with the forces at hand in what was expected to be a global, protracted conflict. Carrier task groups, built up to four carrier strength as soon as
possible, would move forward, ultimately applying their power against Soviet naval and air bases in the Kola, the Black Sea, and the Far East. Offensive mine warfare would be waged off the harbors of the Soviet Union. Killer submarines would hunt their Soviet opposite numbers off the North Cape and in the straits in the Northwestern Pacific. The Soviets would be led to disperse their forces around their enormous periphery. Amphibious forces would threaten and execute raids and invasions. And ultimately, the United States and its allies would wrest the initiative from Russian hands.

The Navy based its strategy on wartime experience and a faith, reinforced by postwar study after postwar study, in the survivability of the carrier task force employed in mobile, forward, offensive operations.

And it was Forrest Sherman who gave shape so quickly after the Second World War to the strategy for the post-Mahanian era. Perhaps Sherman should be considered "The Father of the Maritime Strategy" for his contributions to its development in the postwar world. For it is the legacy of Sherman that Admiral Trost saw as the "unwritten" strategy that he compares to the British Constitution; a strategy being lost, unfortunately, just as Admiral Trost graduated from the Naval Academy in 1953.23

The causes of that loss were many. The Navy's strategic concept, its Maritime Strategy if you will, existed only in
the joint and service plans, top secret documents seen by few even within the Navy. Lacking an existence of its own, unlike its modern-day counterpart, the Navy's postwar strategy met its demise when the format in which the plans had been prepared changed, following DOD and JCS reorganization in 1953. The Joint Staff "dictated" the adoption of a new format for plans, at all levels, a development that "screwed up," in Admiral Wylie's view, the very sensible planning structure developed by the Navy during the interwar years. A comparison of plans completed before 1951, such as DROPSHOT and OFFTACKLE, with those completed after 1954, reveals the impact of the format change on the presentation of the Navy's concept of naval warfare. References to service tasks yielded to those assigned unified commanders. The post-1953 generation of war plans "diluted" the Navy's vision of how it would fight a war, dispersing those elements of the Navy's concept of operations among myriad tasks to be performed by all three services. Service rolls and missions, evident in pre-1953 plans, gave way to tasks allocated unified commanders. The Navy's concept of operations became so diluted that it was unrecognizable. The preoccupation with nuclear warfare inherent in Eisenhower's "New Look" and "Massive Retaliation" eroded the importance of many principles central to Sherman's strategy. And the development of SOSUS led to the advance of a "SOSUS-mentality" that affects many today. SOSUS, as conceived,
was not intended to be a primary line of defense. Like most fixed defenses, it was meant to economize forces for forward operations north of the G-I-UK Gap. But throughout military history, walls once built became shields behind which nations gravitate.

And a final reason: the "loss" of China in 1949 tremendously expanded the area of potential operations for the Navy in the Pacific. Decades of crisis in Southeast Asia and fear of China prevented a naval focus on the Soviet Far East. Perhaps it is fitting that the renaissance of the Maritime Strategy came in the Pacific in the late 1970s, with our China relations restored, and the Navy able to focus once again, as it had in 1946 and 1947, on the Soviet Far East.
FOOTNOTES


3Washington, D.C., Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives Branch (hereafter OA), Strategic Plans Division Records, Subject Files, 1945-1946, Series V, A16-3(5), Box 107, Memorandum of 7 June 1946 on the 6 June 1946 OP-30 conference on war planning with OP-03.


5The Navy had begun operational exercises in Arctic regions in March 1946--OPERATION FROSTBITE--and had plans for further projects later in the year. FROSTBITE, the purpose of which had been "to test the capabilities and limitations of the CVB type under severe cold and heavy weather conditions," had proven a success. The report of the Commander, Carrier Division One, concluded that "Cold weather operations with aircraft carriers in the sub-arctic regions are feasible and can be conducted without major deviation from established procedures...[although] Limitations imposed by cold weather tend to restrict and slow down the tempo of operations." Clearly, further studies, and digesting of the many recommendations and lessons learned from FROSTBITE, remained to be done. For the moment, Sherman considered that carriers, especially the newest CVBs could be best used elsewhere. OA, Reports, Commander Carrier Division One, 13 April 1946, OPERATION FROSTBITE 1-28 March 1946, 3 vols.; OA, Command, Projects Letters, Memorandums, and Instructions for OPERATION NANOOK, June 1946. FROSTBITE centered around the operations of CVB-41, the Midway.

6The Soviets were more vulnerable to traditional applications of sea power in the Far East than they were anywhere else. As an example see OA, Command, SUBSPAC, Chronological File, COMSUBSPAC to CNO, 23 November 1948, enclosing COMSUBSPAC to CINCPACFLT, 19 November 1948, covering staff study "Initial Operations of Pacific Fleet Submarines in the Event of a General Emergency."

8Then Captain J.C. Wylie, at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island between 1950 and 1953 attempted to codify the Navy's postwar strategy. He saw the new program as a means to dispel the "confusion" and "internal contradictions" evident in the unification hearings concerning strategy and sea power. He hoped to "educate our own people" on why the United States had a Navy and how in the postwar period control of the sea had become not a goal, but a means to an end: the application of national power, be it military, political, economic, diplomatic, or psychological, ashore in both peacetime and wartime. Author's interview with Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, 20 July 1987.


9OA, Strategic Plans Division Records, Series XVI, 1953, Box 280, A4, Burke to list, 13 October 1953, enclosing a study of attack carrier force levels. The Mediterranean remained, however, a critically important theater as well in Navy plans, see ibid.


12OA, Command, Conferences, ASW, 17 June 1946.

13In a 9 April 1947 memorandum [signed on 11 April], OP-30 requested a JANAID (Joint Army Navy Air Intelligence Division) study of "Russian capabilities of launching air attacks against a U.S. carrier task force 100-200 miles"
from Murmansk, Archangel, Southern Kattegat, the Bosporus, Vladivostok, Port Arthur, Sovetskaya Gayan, Nikolaevsk, Paramushiro, Otamari, and Etorfu Shima. The first four mentioned were noted as "points particularly pertinent." OA, Strategic Plans Division Records, Series V, A-8, Box 111.

14 As an example see OA, Ralph A. Ofstie Papers, Box 9, staff presentation by Rear Admiral C.R. "Cat" Brown on "The Role of the Navy in Future Warfare," 20 April 1948, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

15 Sherman's importance to Nimitz during the Pacific War, and during his tenure as CNO, is evident in two photographs: Nimitz signing the instrument of surrender for the United States in Tokyo Bay with Halsey, whose flagship--Missouri--was the site of the proceedings, and Sherman standing beside him; and Nimitz's victory parade in Washington accompanied by Mrs. Nimitz and Sherman.


18 OA, Strategic Plans Division Records, Miscellaneous Plans and Studies, Series XVII, Box 481, No. 79 Misc., Carrier Task Group Operations in the Mediterranean: a CINCNELM Staff Study; and OA, Strategic Plans Division Records, Miscellaneous Plans and Studies, CINCPACFLT, 23 December 1948, Staff Study "Brightness."

19 OA, JCS 1944/46 file, Sherman to the JCS, 7 December 1949. Two days later Radford forwarded a study to Sherman that concluded that "the overall U.S. naval strength available in the Pacific on D-day in accordance with current directives, inactivation schedules and redeployment commitments is inadequate to perform the naval missions assigned." OA, OO, 1949, Box 1, A4-3, Radford to Sherman, 9 December 1949, enclosing CINCPACFLT Revised Staff Study of PACFLT Missions and Force Requirements. See also Sherman's testimony before Congress, 20 February 1950 in United States Congress, House, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Part 4, Department of the Navy, 81/2 (Washington, 1950), pp. 1744, 1754. The JCS's concession to Sherman allowing him to maintain a seven carrier fleet, rather than
six, enabled the Navy to maintain at least one carrier in
the Western Pacific.

20See Sherman's 27 April 1950 testimony in United States
Congress, House, Hearings before Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives on Sundry Legislation
Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 1950, 81/2

21JCS 1844/98, the Navy's force tabs revised.

22U.S. News and World Reports, 23 February 1951, pp. 33-35.

23Carlisle A.H. Trost, "Looking Beyond the Maritime Strate-
gy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 113 (January

24The Navy's failure between 1946 and 1953 to develop a
concept independent of service and joint plans ultimately
proved fatal to its postwar strategy. Eisenhower's April
1953 Reorganization Plan 6 for the Department of Defense
further strengthened the hands of the Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the joint staffs
themselves, and the unified commanders. Joint efforts less
and less represented compromise versions of separate plans
worked out at the service level and passed up to the JCS.
See Eisenhower's message to Congress transmitting Reorganiz-
ation Plan 6 of 1953 concerning the Department of Defense,
30 April 1953, in U.S. President, Public Papers of the
Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1953 (Washington, 1960),
225-238; United States Congress, United States Statutes at
Large, Vol. 67: 638-39; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study: Chronology
Functions and Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECTION C
TRANSCRIPT OF SESSIONS
Welcome: Rear Admiral Robert C. Austin, Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School

... in what portends for the future. And it is in this interest that the department had thought about this conference. And we have had the support of the CNO staff and the Secretariat in putting it together and so we are very pleased to do it. I guess if you are in Monterey, Monterey Bay, you'd like to think of yourself on the Pacific Rim and we can probably think of no area of the world in areas of economics, in terms of evolving political thought, in terms of military and national security implications that's any more important to the United States' interests. And putting all that together, it seemed very logical for this effort, for this department, for this period of time. I guess it's sort of like a polaroid picture. You take a picture, a snapshot, and you think you understand all that's in that picture. Add especially in an academic framework where you're going back and teaching and repeating your teaching. And you think that it's current and it's up to date and it really represents a now-instantaneous picture. But all of a sudden you take a look at it and you realize that the colors have faded a little bit. So in talking to Jim Tritten about what we were going to, I said, 'it's time to take a look at the wake. It's time to look at where the rudder is. It's time to look at how the head is falling--which way it's falling off--and are we making the course good. Or do we understand the track that we're trying to proceed on?' And I think that we have assembled here, in my estimation--from what I know in my experience--a very very fine body of thoughts on this. And we expect the school, and we hope you all as participants, will take away from these two days in Monterey a very fresh snapshot, a very fresh polaroid picture.
And even beyond that, maybe a little insight as to what the best thought is as to the future of our interests in the Pacific. So with that, Jim, let me turn over the podium and the discussants to you.
Well again, I'd like to second Admiral Austin, and welcome you to the Naval Postgraduate School. I've got a few administra-
tive details I've been asked to take care of. First of all, to
point out to you that there's a tour of the school--an optional
tour of the school--which will be available to you, commencing at
5 o'clock this afternoon for about half an hour. For those of
you who've never been to the Naval Postgraduate School, it would
be a good opportunity to see our historic site and would ask you
to meet in the lobby of Hermann Hall. Hermann Hall is the
tallest building on the campus, with the tower. There will be
someone there from the Public Affairs Office, to take you around.
Secondly, just so that everybody understands the seating here,
there's a lot of students who are going to be coming and going,
because they have to go to class and can't stay the whole time.
So the students will be moving in and out. Please don't be
distracted by that. The first two rows will be reserved for the
participants in the conference. Is there anything else you want
me to cover? I guess not. Well we'll get on with it.

The first panel this morning is 'The Evolution of the
Maritime Strategy.' We have some very distinguished panelists
here. The first that will be speaking is Dr. Michael Palmer,
from the Naval Historical Center. Michael completed his Ph.D.
from Temple University in 1981. He's published a number of
articles in historical magazines, journals, as well as a
forthcoming article on Lord Nelson in The Navy War College Review
and a forthcoming book from the Government Printing Office on The
Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the
First Post-War Decade.

To speak second will Dr. Roger Barnett, who completed his
Ph.D. from a rather small, obscure Southern California school
which I also attended--the University of Southern California.
He's a retired Navy Captain, who at the time when he was serving as OP-603, was responsible for the penning of the maritime strategy—a cooperative effort and we're going to learn more about that effort and very good to have Roger here. He's currently at National Security Research where he works with Colin Gray—the Director of Maritime Research there.

Third, we'll have Commander Cort Wagner, giving us a presentation on the views from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. He's one of the strategic planning officers that's attached to that command. And for the students in the audience, this is the billet that you're, hopefully, going to be occupying in the future when you complete our studies.

Fourth, we'll have Captain Peter Swartz, who is assigned—he's en route to the U.S. Mission at NATO. He just completed a year as a Federal Executive Fellow at CSIS at Georgetown University. It's very fortunate that we have both Roger Barnett and Peter Swartz here because, when Roger was the Branch Head, Peter was the Action Officer who put all of this to paper. We're most fortunate in having both of them here.

And finally, our discussant is from USCINCPAC, Colonel Robert Molyneaux, U.S. Marine Corps. He's going to give us the views on what we are about to say, from the perspective of the Joint CINC in Hawaii.

With that introduction, I'll turn it over to Mike Palmer to start out with the background.
Heard about thinking on one's feet so long, it's hard to speak sitting down. So if you don't mind, I'll use the podium. I'd like to begin by calling your attention to my topic—"The Maritime Strategy and the Pacific, 1946-1955," and asking you to note that I'm not just talking about maritime strategy, naval strategy in general—I'm talking about the maritime strategy. Because I think the strategic concept that today we label the maritime strategy was, in fact, developed 40 years ago in OPNAV in the years immediately following the Second World War.

And I'd like to begin on the 6th of June, 1946—2nd anniversary of D-Day certainly. But the day I think the Navy could very well consider the birthdate of the maritime strategy.

There was a conference in the All-Navy Building, with the OP-30 Strategic Plans Division staff and their boss, OP-03, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Vice Admiral Forrest Percival Sherman. The topic of discussion that day was 'Pincher Planning'—a series of studies initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December of 1945 aimed ultimately at the development of a Joint Strategic Plan for a U.S.-Soviet war. It was a task that Sherman considered the top priority of the OP-30 staff. He wasn't there, however, that day, to get an update on their work. He was there to ensure that they worked into the service plans and the joint plans for which they were responsible. Those elements that he considered essential to a U.S.-Soviet war plan.

In Sherman's mind, a U.S.-Soviet war would be a global war and it would be a protracted war. Initially the United States would find itself on the strategic defensive. The missions for the Navy would be many. They would have to support American Occupation Forces overseas—essentially that meant covering the Dunkirk-like withdrawals planned for American troops from Northwest Europe, Southern Europe, North China and South Korea. The Navy would have to cover the forward bases of operations in
the allied nations from which an American comeback would be staged—the Azores, Iceland, British Isles—what they called the strategic Cairo-Suez area at that point—and the Ion chains in the Pacific—the Aleutians, Japan, Ryukyu and the Philippines. The Navy would also have to maintain the sea lines of communications—the slots—to these bases. And essentially that meant that the Navy would have control of the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific—indeed the entire Pacific.

How was one to do that at a time when Congress and the President were cutting back the size of the Navy? Every year the Navy was getting smaller and smaller. To Sherman the solution was obvious. Conduct forward offensive operations and try to disrupt the Soviet offensive and eventually to seize the initiative—whatever the overall posture of the United States and its allies. He then proceeded to work his way around the periphery of the Soviet Union. He told his planners to resist efforts to get the Navy up into the ice—essentially operating in the Norwegian or Berent Sea. He considered that a long-term necessity. But in the short term he believed that the United States Navy's carrier and submarine forces weren't quite prepared. And in fact he was right—they wouldn't be for another three or four years.

The Baltic was an area that Sherman ruled out for major American Naval operations and as far as I know, it's still ruled out. The Mediterranean, to Sherman, was the major theater. He saw it as a seaway into the heart of Eurasia which the Navy could use to get at the heartland of the Soviet Union. To him, again, it was the principal and primary theater. The Pacific was a secondary theater. Nevertheless, it's interesting to note his view of the Pacific. Because it's there that you can first see Sherman coming to terms with what he wants to do with the Navy against the Soviet Union. That is, to apply naval power directly against the Soviet state. So even though the Pacific is a secondary theater, it's there that the Navy can operate unimpeded, by either climactic bulwarks that you would see in the
Arctic or the geographic bulwarks that you would have in the Eastern Mediterranean—the Balkan and Anatolian Peninsulas.

He tells his planners that he expects that the carrier task force in the Western Pacific at the outbreak of war could wipe up, to use his words, Soviet bases in the Far East before swinging around to the Atlantic, which makes also Sherman the Father of the Swing Strategy, something that's obviously now passe. But again, even though this is the secondary theater, it's in the Pacific that Sherman first comes to grips with how he's going to use the Navy against the Soviet Union. And I think that's interesting because it's in the Pacific in the later 1970's that the Navy first comes to grip in Admiral Heywood Seastripe with using the Navy in a conventional sense directly against the Soviet Union, leading to the development of what we today term 'The Maritime Strategy.'

In the following 18 months after this June 6 conference, Sherman and the OP-30 staff continued to develop more fully this strategic concept. January 1947 they take the show on the road, opening for President Truman in the White House. What you see, and they followed that with other presentations to various House committees and other interested parties—these were all top-secret presentations, which was a long-term problem because the word was simply not getting out. What you see in these conferences, again, is further refinement of 'The Strategic Concept.' It begins to read more and more like 'The Maritime Strategy' today. It also begins to look more and more like the maritime strategy. They start using, increasingly, graphs and charts, polar projections of the northern hemisphere which show major allied lines of communications in wartime, radii and area of operations of Soviet arm and submarine forces as an overlay, laid over this. Following that, another layer showing the directions of an American counter-strike in the early part of the war, with submarines, carrier task forces, and also eventually, ... strategic placed in the Beren Sea, Norwegian Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, North Pacific, with little lines stretching into
the Soviet Union, showing how far bombers can strike. These are midway-class sowats—had they been Nimitz class sowats, it would obviously pass for something that even looked identical to some of the presentations to the maritime strategy. So what you're getting is essentially, the maritime strategy—not only in content but in form.

How had all this come to pass? Now there's a great deal of literature out there which portrays the Navy as sort of stumbling around in the post-war period, searching for a new strategic concept for what Samuel Huntington terms, 'The Transoceanic Age.' The oceanic age, the age when navies fought navies having come to an end in 1945. Actually the problem with this literature is, it was written when all these things were top secret. The Navy very quickly developed a workable strategic concept. They had a maritime strategy as early as mid-1946 and certainly by mid-1947. This was done primarily because of the Navy's corporate experience during the Second World War and I believe the personal experience of Forrest Sherman.

For the corporate experience—the Navy had fought and won two great campaigns in the Second World War—the Battle of the Atlantic and what I'll term, for just mere symmetry—the Battle of the Pacific. Each of these were campaigns which had gone through various phases—early, middle, late. And historians tend to focus on the early and middle periods. It was from the last stages of each of these campaigns that the Navy had drawn its most important lessons. In the Atlantic, that lesson was the scare that the Navy had suffered with the shift in the technological balance to the Germans at the end of the war—with the Type 21 U-Boat, the Snorkel and other boats that were on the way. This was a technological shift that fortunately the Germans had not been able to translate into an operational shift. It had occurred too late in the war. Nevertheless you can see the extent to which the Navy was concerned about it, if you look at the minutes of the first ASW conference held in June 1946, which survive. It's really a doleful presentation—the Navy was trying
to absorb the lessons that it had gotten out of exercises with the two type 21's it had received as reparations. And the Navy simply had no technological counter to that.

Sherman, who attended the conference, was the senior officer there from the CNO's office--interjects during the conference and says--ok, the strategic counter to the type 21 is to destroy them at their bases and to destroy their bases, and to use a carrier task force to go and out, along with offensive mining and hunter-killer operations with submarines. And this, of course, leads to the development of the nautilus program which has other antecedents as well.

In the Pacific, the Navy had also drawn important lessons from the last stage of the war. Essentially the Okinawa Campaign and what had followed. It's nice to focus on the Coral Sea and Midway--but it's really the last stage of the war that the Navy draws its lessons. And the lessons were threefold: one, that the Navy needed better early warning to defeat the kamikaze and the Navy also needed better combat air patrol systems to defeat kamikaze, and the kamikaze was, after all, essentially a cruise missile. It's the first precision-guided munition with the kamikaze volunteers bring and substitutes for the silicon chip, the printed circuit--which guides guided bombs today. These are human cruise missiles.

The second lesson the Navy draws from this campaign is that the proper use of a carrier task force is not to tie it to an island--that is what makes it a sitting duck. And what you do is, you operate mobile--offensively and forward. And you see that.

And the third lesson--the way you do this--you go and you strike at the bases of the kamikazes where you destroy any air force--good air force--destroyed on the ground. And after Okinawa was secure, the Navy was able to cut loose with its carrier task forces--they start ranging up and down the coast of Japan, raiding the air bases--destroying hundreds--thousands of Japanese planes on the ground--without much loss to themselves,
compared to the Okinawa Campaign. These are the lessons of the Pacific Campaign. And these are the lessons that certainly nobody understood better than Forrest Sherman, who had been Nimitz’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and who had planned most of these campaigns, starting late in 1943.

As far as Sherman’s personal experience, I think, again, that’s important. Sherman was an amateur historian—probably the best-read CNO we’ve ever had as far as history goes, at the time he took office. Arley Burke may know more history now, but I don’t think he knew more in 1955. Sherman had no retirement to bone up on his history, having died in office in ’51. Sherman wrote quite a bit in The Naval Institute Proceedings 1926-about 1934. You can see here his view on issues on such as the independence of strategic air force and the unification—as early as the late 1920’s. But I would point to a review of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond’s Economy and Sea Power, which he wrote in 1932, I believe—in which he took Richmond to task, primarily for his lack of understanding of how to use aircraft carriers. Richmond had argued that a naval power like Great Britain, couldn’t make much use of aircraft carriers in a war against a land power like Germany. Sherman said that’s ridiculous. There’s lots of things you can do with an aircraft carrier in the hands of a sea power fighting a land power. And, in fact, you couldn’t operate naval forces in the vicinity of a land power unless you had carriers because their land-based air would dominate. All you need to do, looking at this review, is substitute United States for Great Britain and the Soviet Union for Germany, and you have Sherman’s position on the use of the Navy in the post-war world. Sherman had a very European orientation in his history. And Sherman is, I believe, in combination with his practical wartime experience and his own personal theoretical experience—that’s what makes him the right man at the right place at the right time as the CNO for Operations in 1946.

Now, any strategy needs to be tempered by experience. During 1948 and 1949 in both the Pacific and the Mediterranean,
the Navy conducts exercises and studies which sort of temper the strategy. And generally, it brings into the plans, or at least it tries to—caution. And you start seeing the possibility of an initial air-to-air phase where it's sort of like a Marianas turkey shoot—where American carrier task forces would act as magnets, drawing in Soviet air, where they'd be destroyed in the air like a Marianas turkey shoot—and then in which the carriers would start pushing in towards the Soviet bases.

The Mediterranean study called for, and this is a quote, 'in other words, initially, probe determined reaction and operate accordingly.' Now Sherman's in the Mediterranean at this time as Commander of 6th Task Fleet—and of course this is to a great extent as the operator, he's now tempering his own strategy. Nevertheless you see in that study, still, a call to get at Soviet bases. If you can't do it directly with the carriers, by developing bases in Turkey—the staging areas with pre-positioned supplies so they could fly off the carriers, land in Turkey, re-fuel, re-arm, and then go in and hit the Soviet Black Sea ports and then bounce their way back to the carrier. In the Pacific, you start getting challenges to the swing strategy. Staff Study Brightness starts asking—perhaps the carriers are swinging around from the West Coast around to Europe might be left in the Pacific for 90 days until the Pacific Fleet is able to complete its tasks. So, again, you start seeing erosion of the idea of a swing strategy as early as late 1947.

Sherman's in the Mediterranean of course when he's recalled as CNO in November 1949. He returns to Washington. And when he's in Washington, he continues to push for these types of policies. And there's a great consistency in Sherman as CNO in his ideas and his strategic concepts of Sherman as the CNO. Essentially now they're even more firm because he's been out there and he's been trying them out in the Mediterranean in certain studies and exercises. He pushes for more carriers. But what's interesting is the increase in carriers and the peacetime and the planned increase in carriers in wartime all go to the
Pacific, even though it's a secondary theater—there's no increase in the Atlantic allowances.

You can see Sherman's consistency in an interview he gave in February of 1951. And he was asked a question about the threat posed by the Soviets—the submarine threat and the air threat. And I think his response is interesting. It sorts of sums up his basic ideas. 'In that connection, the air defense problem and the anti-submarine problem at certain points a similarity. The worst place to protect a ship is where the ship is. The worst place to protect a convoy is at the convoy. The best place is at the bases from which the airplane or the submarine comes. The next best place is on route, the worst place is at the target.' Sherman dies in July of 1951. His strategic concept—what I think is basically a maritime strategy—was in place. It remained in place at least until 1953. Why it's lost is another question—maybe we can answer that in the question and answer period—I don't have time to go into that. But I think that if you look at the period of 1946-1953, the Navy has a post-war strategic concept—it's very well developed. It essentially resembles the maritime strategy and the man whose imprint is all over it, in the records and in the ideas and in the conceptions is Forrest Sherman, who I think perhaps we could very well consider the Father of The Maritime Strategy. Thank you.
Origins of the Maritime Strategy
Dr. Roger Barnett--National Security Research

Good morning. Thought I'd change the tempo a little bit and start you off with perhaps a little apocryphal story. It's a strawman and like all strawmen, it's also a bit of a caricature. It goes like this. The maritime strategy was first composed by some commanders and Lt. Commanders down in OP-603 in the fall and spring of 1981-82. Their effort was in response to a question of VCNO to write a strategic story for the Navy that would provide the necessary link between policy, plans and programs. The product, zero-based and woven from whole cloth, was designed to provide a justification for the 600 ship Navy and for a force level of 15 aircraft carrier battle groups. The intention was to articulate a new, aggressive, forward war-fighting policy that would be well received by the Reagan Administration and thereby capture a larger budget share for the Navy. Portions of the strategy in particular were targeted at the Reagan defense team, especially the emphasis on direct attacks on the Koala Peninsula from carriers, anti-ballistic missile submarine actions and the Navy's part in horizontal escalation. The time looked right to open as much distance as possible from the Eurocentric approach of the Carter Administration and part company boldly with the notion that all the Navy does is haul, ash and trash. That is, the Navy did not want to be stuck with the unglamorous solely of defending the sea lines to Europe, and some peacekeeping and crisis work. It had more interesting and risky tasks in mind for itself. Because this was essentially an in-the-Pentagon job because it was pointed at the budget process primarily and not toward establishing war planning guidance for the fleets and because it called for actions that were not in accordance with current guidance or with allied doctrine, the strategy had to be written without reference either to U.S. operating forces or to U.S. allies. In order to make the case it wanted to make, moreover, the strategy had to whitewash certain issues,
especially the questions of nuclear war at sea and Soviet strategy. Finally, the strategy was carefully crafted to ensure the Navy's historic Pacific bias would be perpetuated. The break with the Carterites would facilitate this and provide a subtle cover for it. The strategy succeeded in a way that surprised even its most enthusiastic supporters. It captured the administration, was used with great effort by a very vigorous and active Secretary of the Navy, to support and rationalize a large Navy program that included additional aircraft carriers, converted many critics to the Navy's point of view, captured a much larger budget share and for all these reasons, especially the last, outraged the other services.

Now I'm going to--from this point--proceed as George Will once said about one of his critics--"like a pyromaniac in a field of straw men." The facts of the situation are that the maritime strategy in all capital letters, as you see it in slick publication from the Naval Institute and in internal documents that was put down on paper about 1981, did in fact originate in OP-603 with a bunch of guys. And it was, in fact, in response to a request from the VCNO at the time, and unknown how much farther the up-the-request went--but it probably it was with Admiral Small and there most of the similarity with the strawman ends. Most of the rest of that is strictly strawman that I threw at you, that had a ring of something that seemed to make a lot of sense. And I can walk through and talk about each and every one of the things that were in the strawmen. But I'll be selective about it and I'll pick some, because my job here is to really trace the roots of the maritime strategy.

First of all, I think to trace the roots of the maritime strategy, you have to set forth its most important elements. And the most important elements of the maritime strategy, as it exists in people's heads--and let me say, as a digression, but a small and important digression--that what Pete Swartz and I set out to do was to put the maritime strategy in such a form and to publicize it in such a way that when someone said to a Naval
officer--maritime strategy--an image popped into his head and he said--yeah I know what that is. And that's all we intended to do. I understand now from my friends in the Pentagon and the Army that if you say maritime strategy to the Army, something pops into their head too. But that was a byproduct--it wasn't our intention. We wanted to standardize some thinking about maritime strategy and to have a common image throughout the uniform services.

So let me then set forth the things that I believe are necessary, to trace the roots of the strategy. It has to be forward strategy. It has to operate on the basis of a theater and tactical offensive, from seaward axis, in the context, at least initially, of a strategic defensive war. That is, offensive operations from the sea, but the war strategy, initially at least, has to be defensive, by the nature of our country and our coalitions. The Soviet Union is the enemy. And all sideshows ciphon effort from central objectives. This will be a coalition war in concert with allies abroad who help occupy land purchases or land anchors to operate maritime forces from and to increase the leverage of maritime forces. Coalitions are also necessary and important to share burdens and to allow some extent of specialization. And the strategy intends to use all parts of U.S. Naval service, to best advantage, in coordination with all U.S. sister services. And finally, that within the strategy, and with all strategies, uncertainties and risks are inherent and inevitable and the important thing to do about uncertainties and risks is that you make them as explicit as you possibly can, to demonstrate your recognition and understanding of them. Risks are absolutely necessary. I spend a lot of time in the Washington area and in talking with students and friends and people who don't themselves spend a lot of time thinking about these things--that there are no really important successful risk-free strategies. Strategies have to have elements of risk. And then the question is--how much risk do you want to accept?
Now, at this juncture, I'm going to part company—but really only briefly—with Mike Palmer's analysis of where the routes in the maritime strategy go. Because they really go back to Mahan—yes. Now I say Mahan—and I look out and I see yet amigo—my eyes glaze over—no, it's not all that bad because I'm talking about a different Mahon than most of you now. I'm talking about the Mahon who wrote The Problems of Asia. Now people say—but that's not his most important work. Well maybe it is his most important work because in a lot of ways the problems of Asia tends to satisfy and rebut many of Mahon's critics. And you can find lots and lots of the roots and the elements of the maritime strategy in Mahon's Problems of Asia, published in 1905.

Let me give you just a few excerpts because the flavor of them is very nice. These are quotes, and with some ellipses which I won't point out. But I haven't destroyed the sense by being elliptical—for anyone who has read The Problems of Asia—you have to be elliptical because it's almost impossible to read, but it certainly is, I think important for this conference to know, that Mahon is, I think, the genuine Father of the Maritime Strategy and was writing and thinking about the problem of Asia when he did so. And this is a conference on Asia. Of course, Mahon believed that the problem of Asia was Russia and he said, 'Russia is working geographically to the southward in Asia by both flanks—her center covered with the mountains of Afghanistan and the desserts of Eastern Turkistan and Mongolia. Nor is it possible, even if it were desired, to interfere with this extended line. For the Russian center cannot be broken. It is upon and from the flanks of this great line that restraint upon Russia, if needed, must come. It is the interests of Russia not merely to reach the sea at more points and more independently, but to acquire extensive maritime regions, the returns of which shall rebound to the general prosperity of the entire empire [that is, the Russian empire]. The struggle as a raid will be between land power and sea power. The recognition that these two are the primary constants does not ignore the circumstance that
the land power will try to reach the sea and utilize it for its own ends while the sea power must obtain support on land. Henson views solidarity of interest between Germany, Great Britain, Japan and the United States—this is in 1905 I need to remind you. Now why did he leave out France? France is explicitly excluded and he calls a conspicuous artificial exception because at the time she was allied with Russia. "Upon one flank of the Russian line lies the army of Japan. Upon the other 5000 miles away, that of Germany. The two extremes of the Russian line thus open to attack are most inadequately connected by rail. And finally, from the conditions, we must be an effective Naval force in the Pacific. We must similarly be an effective Naval force in the Atlantic—there's a global view. Not for the defense of our coast, primarily, but immediately as is commonly thought, for in warfare however, much in defense of right the Navy is not immediately an instrument of defense but of offense." Now this is Mahon's way of saying—you have to have allies, you have to have them on both sides of the Soviet Union, you have to have a forward strategy and it has to be offensive. Now where are the roots of the maritime strategy? They're in Mahon's Problems of Asia in straightforward. And I agree with Mike Palmer—I was brought on also to the Forrest Sherman works and particularly his briefing of President Truman in 1947, which is a classic and has all the various elements including breaking the war down into phases.

Now, to sort of hopscotch Mike Palmer's area and to say, for my part, I think that Mahon was really the Father—and Mahon also, you realize, writing in 1905, antedated McKinder in a very geopolitical vision and a very deep understanding of the offset between land power and sea power. He antedates McKinder's address before the World Geographic Society in Great Britain. And is really the Father of that geopolitical image as well.

Now I will bracket Mike Palmer's period and come up to the early 60's. By the early 60's, the Navy's missions were pretty
well defined. The fleet ballistic missile submarine force was coming into effect and was going to be responsible for a strategic deterrence. There were ASW carriers and escort ships and nuclear attack submarines that were primarily for the defense of the sea lanes from attack by Soviet submarines. And the attack carrying amphibious forces were to be the cutting edge in fighting limited wars and a principle agent for deterring the Soviets and their proxies from initiating conventional aggression. Burke, of course, was the first CNO to articulate great concern over the growing nature of the Soviet threat at sea. But he was basically unable to convince the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administrations or the Congress to support what he regarded as minimum essential funding for the Navy. The bulk of the ship-building funds went to the Polaris program and the new attack carriers. So in the case of CNO's McDonald and Moorer, funds were diverted primarily for large modern escorts for the carriers, that were required under Burke in the 50's, to complete the carrier replacement program and very importantly, to fight the war in Vietnam.

All the polaris submarines of course were constructed in the 1960's. The heavy aircraft carrier was relieved of its primary nuclear attack role in 1962 which freed the aircraft carriers for what the Navy might have called more agreeable tasks, since its strategic flanks were covered by the polaris force. But the language—even the language of the maritime strategy—you can extend back and find throughout—for example, Arley Burke wrote that the carriers and their aircraft are the backbone of our Naval striking power that can be projected overseas and carry the fight to the enemy. The same language that you find appearing in the maritime strategy. The same from Vice CNO Ricketts in the early 60's as well. But for the Navy, there was an important turning point in the 60's in which the carriers were at their zenith but phased out of the primary nuclear role. 1962 saw the Cuban Missile Crisis—the greater emergence of the Soviet Navy in Vietnam and so forth. But by the end of the decade of the 60's,
the focus was really very tightly laid on the obsolescence of the U.S. fleet. And about 2/3 of the ships toward the end of the 60's were approaching their 20th anniversary.

1968, the Navy numbered 957 battle forces. For 1978, it was 468—less than half. This has kind of a capturing effect on one's mind and you can see through this period—being preoccupied both by the Vietnam War and by the terrible shrinkage of the fleet. There's sort of a hole in at least articulated strategy. Now that period is just about coming to light in the declassified documents so the question of what was going on in the classified scene remains to be studied by the Navy Historical Center and others. But in the open literature which I've surveyed fairly carefully, there isn't an awful lot of discussion of strategy. There is a lot of discussion of force sizing, however, and while Admiral Zumwalt was in a very tight spot in the early 70's, he did change some of the priorities. And from his point of view, it certainly is explicable. He felt in the early 70's that the carrier force was pretty solid and would be for a while. The strategic side seemed to be in very good shape and so that he ought to devote his major emphasis on sea control and he argued very strongly that with the power projection mission, the strategic missions in pretty good shape, that the Navy ought to turn its attention and emphasis and he thought he could influence and get better support in the budgetary process by emphasizing the sea control side of the equation.

But the next important data point, I think, has to do with the question of the roots of the 600 ship Navy. And I have a pretty good quotation here. It says, 'where about 500 ships provides us with a slim margin of superiority now, it's my opinion that we should have about 600 active ships by the mid 1980's in order to maintain this slim margin of superiority.' This comes from testimony, not by Admiral Watkins but by Earle Halloway in 1975. And the Secretary of the Navy said, 'the Navy's solution to this critical issue of the size and the structure of the Navy is a balanced force objected level of 600
active ships in the Navy by the mid-1980's." This from the Secretary of the Navy--not Lehrman, but Mittendorf--and this was in a 1976 article.

And on the question of the 15 carrier groups--the 15 has kind of a magical quality actually as the number of capital ships. It's the number of capital ships we came out of the Washington Naval Conference with. Of course they were battleships, but the United States had 15 battleships. If you take a look at capital ships plotted over time, you find that for aircraft carriers, for example, for the last 25 years, the number has varied from 16 to 13 and it was only 13 for one year. The number mostly is 15--I have some graphic plots to demonstrate that. So 15 is not particularly an extraordinary or astounding number. The forward to Jane's Fighting Ships, 1967-68 says, "building to 15 aircraft carriers has long been considered the minimum operational requirement for the United States Navy." "Fifteen aircraft carriers, the modern design, has been determined as the minimum number needed for peacetime, for limited engagements since World War II. Whether 15 carriers is an adequate number under wartime conditions is open to question." This was Admiral Thomas Moorer in 1970.

So the point I'm making here is that neither the 600 ship Navy nor the 15 carrier battle group Navy nor any of the basic war-fighting principles came out of the setting forth of the maritime strategy in OPNAV in the early 60's. Now as far as the Pacific bias goes, this is a really tough one to prove, if you take a look at any of the indicators. During the Second World War and before the Second World War, it is absolutely clear that the Navy had a very strong Pacific bias. After all, that's where they figured that their primary enemy was going to be, in Japan. After the Second World War, the fleet was essentially located in the Atlantic. All the large aircraft carriers were located in the Atlantic. The Midway-class aircraft carriers were all in the Atlantic. As a matter of fact, we fought the entire Korean War with all our large aircraft carriers--our newest aircraft
carriers—in the Atlantic. They never went into the Pacific. When we fielded strategic forces—ballistic missile submarines—they went to the Atlantic. The Midway-class carrier made its first deployment in the Pacific in 1958. If you take a look at ship force levels, you will find that for the past 25 years, with the exception of a very small blip during the height of the Vietnam War, combatant ship force levels favor the Atlantic, all the way across the board. And the disparity is becoming larger over time. And so it’s very difficult to make the argument—if you take a look at what the Navy was doing with its ships. When the battleships were reactivated at the time of the Korean War—they didn’t go to Korea, they went in the Atlantic. And I have to be grateful for Pete Swartz for showing me some of these data points and making my search for them a little more pointed. So, you can wave your arms about the Navy’s always having this great Pacific focus. But if you take a look at what the Navy was doing and what it thought it was doing and where the forces were going, you’d find that they were not going to the Pacific.

I’d like to close by saying that the maritime strategy—again the maritime strategy—the thing that’s supposed to evoke something in your mind—was conceived and takes its place as a planning document—not an operational document. Clearly and correctly and very sensitively, from the point of the view of the people who worked on this and are working on it—in the Pentagon—the unified commanders shoulder the responsibility for operational planning. The maritime strategy, in contrast, as it states, considers the ideal—given the forces, given expectations about how those forces will perform, given alliances functioning as they were designed, given domestic political will, given Soviet force actions in accordance with intelligence estimates, in short, given that all the uncertainties that are specifically articulated in the strategy, will turn out not to be wholly unfavorable, the strategy still offers only the direction in which U.S. maritime forces should be guided. And while we do owe a great deal to Admiral Forrest Sherman, the strategy and how
it's come to pass and its roots exist, I think, quite a bit deeper.

Thank you.

J.T. There's at least one other person in the world who agrees with Roger, with the historical antecedents and that's a fellow named Ginrich Trufamienko--from the Institute for the U.S.A. and Canada--he's a Soviet academician and he has just recently published a book which is required reading for many of my students, called The U.S. Military Doctrine. He does cite the Mahon piece that Roger referred to--as the antecedent.

R.B. I don't quote from Trufamienko.
Well, good morning. I'm Commander Cort Wagner. I'm from CINCPACFLT, not from CINCPAC, and Colonel Molyneaux is here from CINCPAC—he'll be speaking later. I'd like to give you a real brief overview of CINCPACFLT concept of operations and a brief look at a war fighting strategy. This is real world now. I have no illusions to Mahon or Forrest Sherman. I'm going to have great difficulty in my memo to Admiral Lyons, to let him know that he is not the architect of the Pacific maritime strategy. I'm afraid this conference has put me in a great deal of jeopardy.

What I'd like to do is take a very brief look—understanding of course that the strategy and the concept that I'll be briefing derives both from considerations of geography and the Soviet threat. So I'd like to spend a few minutes this morning looking at the real world considerations of the Pacific theater, followed up with a brief overview of the Soviet threat. And of course we have Sovietologists here and experts who can comment on those later. And then looking briefly at the Pacific Fleet and the responsibilities of the fleet, a brief outline of a concept of operations to take the war to the Soviets in the Pacific. And then, finally, I hope to stimulate your interest with some slides of recent operations of the last year that we've conducted in the Pacific Fleet—focusing primarily on Exercise Colonel Potlatch, which was an amphibious operation in January of this year in the Aleutians.

We can look at the first slide, please. It's hard for me to see it—how everyone in the back see them alright? Good. First of all, the size of the Pacific of course—I'm preaching to the choir here, but it has a great deal of impact on the concept of operations in terms of the fact that we clearly can't have our forces back in San Diego or Pearl Harbor. If we have to take the war to the Soviets, we need to be forward placed. And I have
slides later that show that. Of particular importance is that red blotch down on the bottom—that’s the parking area that’s reserved for conference participants here in Monterey—no, it’s not. That’s what I felt like this morning when I left the parking lot. That’s the actual size of the Mediterranean—in its longitude in the Pacific—where it would fall. It gives you, a hope, an appreciation of the sheer size and the complexity of being able to support operations throughout the vastness of the Pacific theater.

Some other considerations on this graph should come to view right away. Number one of primary importance is the fact that we share a common border with the Soviet Union here in the Pacific—2,000 mile border stretching from the Northern Tip of Okaido to the Bering Strait. The Soviets are vulnerable and exposed along that border. It gives us a capability of being able to take the fight to the Soviets early and if we are able to achieve some offensive operations, make a strategic difference in terms of global war. Last, but not least, is the importance of the Pacific as reflected in the next viewgraph. These trade figures at the bottom are in open journals—they’re staggering to the imagination. By 1986, our trade with the Pacific—two-way trade is now 46% greater than it is with Europe. This should not reflect, necessarily, a refocus of strategy—only to point out that we cannot neglect the Pacific in considerations of global war.

Also depicted on here are those sea lines of communications—that’s just a few of them. One that is of increasing importance to us is that slot between Valdez and the west coast of the U.S.—one that is very critical for us to defend—as we now import far more oil from Valdez than we do from the Persian Gulf. Next graphic please.

The importance of the Pacific hasn’t been lost on the Soviets either. The bottom line figure of 719 total surface ships is readily acknowledged right up front—that the Soviets have—about 95 major surface combatants—frigate size and larger.
The 719 ships is only to point out that this is the largest of the 4 Soviet fleets now. And it also contains, as you can see, fully 100 ships in the Soviet Pacific Fleet alone than we'll have when we get to the 600 ship U.S. Navy. Also of significance in this graph—because the introduction since 1984—of 2 Kiev-class carriers. And since 1985, the Kirov cruiser—the Prunza—and also the Sobormeny and Utilod EDGs—so there's been not only a quantitative increase but a significant qualitative increase as well. Next slide.

Soviets aren't keeping these ships in Vladivostok or Petter—they're sortieing these ships—they're starting to use them quite frequently in large scale exercises. As you can see, there's been fully a 100% increase in out-of-area ship days between 1976 and 1985. There was a slight drop-off in '86—however the overall percentage in terms of Soviet Fleet worldwide operations—remain the same. And there was no drop off in that percentage in the Pacific.

Looking now at the next graphic—Soviet submarine threat—the Soviets have 125 or so submarines in the Pacific. It's the 100 tactical submarines depicted here that are of the greatest concern to us because these submarines represent the single greatest challenge to the execution of the CINCPACFLT warfighting strategy. Of course the Okula and the Kilo submarines are indigenous to the Pacific—built at Comomo shipyard and then floated down the river to Vladivostok. And it is, as I've said, these 100 submarines that we're vitally concerned about. Next slide.

Soviet air threat. As you can see, the Soviet Far East Commander can draw on 1750 aircraft—that's a very large number. And there's been a significant qualitative increase as well as this large number of aircraft that we have to deal with—with the introduction of Backfires, since 1981, and the upgrading of the Bear including the introduction of the Bear Hotel which routinely flies Alcam strike profile missions to the east of Dutch Harbor.
And with the Bear Gulf which flies many strike missions against Alaskan targets in the Northern Pacific. Next graph.

Showing here the effective combat radius of some of these aircraft. As you can see, from Anidear—which is way up in the north here, in the Bering Sea, Bear Hotels can fly the entire area and they can even reach targets in CONUS—from Anidear—and you can see that in Hawaii, we're vulnerable to that Bear Hotel as well—that's the Aqua-equipped—that's the Soviet long range air launch cruise missile, with a 1500 nautical mile range. Next one please.

Soviet Far East initiatives—the important of the Pacific hasn't been lost either. Starting first now, I'd like to briefly review what they've done politically, economically and militarily. I apologize for Foreign Minister Shevernadze's name being misspelled. On the political side, the Vladivostok speech of July 28, 1986 marked a benchmark. When Gorbachev announced the intentions and design of the Soviets to become a full Asian power. And what he's followed that up with was Foreign Minister's Shevernadze's mission significantly to Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and then into Vietnam, espousing the peacefulness of the intentions of the Soviet Union, to become an Asian power. They've also very cynically supported the nuclear free zone initiatives—both the South Pacific nuclear free zone, the Sean Fizz Southeast Asian nuclear free zone, and the zone of peace and freedom in navigation in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets, as you will recall, have signed the protocols—they have not yet ratified those protocols for Spin Fizz. The United States made its decision not to sign those protocols. The Soviets, in signing the protocols, very cynically said, however, that if any of the signatories to the South Pacific nuclear free zone, were to allow a nuclear armed or nuclear capable ship into their ports, the Soviets would reserve the right to refuse ratification. As of yet, they have not, as I've said.

Economically, the Soviets have been attempting to expand in numerous directions. Fishing agreements—they have signed two
fishing agreements with South Pacific island nations. The first one with the island nation of Kurabas—those of you who are not familiar with Kurabas, because it's not really a household name—Kurabas contains, among other places, the Gilbert Islands where we fought a very nasty battle in World War II at Terrawa, and Terrawa was the capital of that island nation. That treaty has since expired. However, the Soviets followed that up with a treaty with another non-household named nation of Boniwato. Boniwato—those of you will recall—was formerly the New Hebrides Islands where we had our largest fleet concentration in World War II. So there are some geopolitical considerations with those fishing agreements. That fishing agreement with Boniwato, by the way, permits the Soviets shore access. The Kurabas agreement did not. And the Soviets have exercised that shore access on numerous occasions this year.

The Soviets have also been attempting to expand their commercial contacts—not just with South Pacific nations—but also nations in general—targeting primarily on Indonesian and ASEAN countries. And they've attempted to establish merchant repairs with Fulsako shipyard which is right next to Subic Bay in Manila and they've come in to the Philippine government and said—we want to repair our merchants in Fulsako, which of course would give them an ideal intelligence collection platform against Subic Bay. As yet, Cory Aquino's government has refused that access.

Finally, militarily—the Soviet Pacific Fleet again—the largest of their four fleets—as you can see, the numbers of divisions of the potent Soviet air force and Soviet naval aviation that we've seen—and a growing and impressive power projection capabilities. So in all three elements, it's clear to us in the Pacific Fleet, that the Soviets are making great strides toward becoming that Asian power. Next slide.

This is one that Admiral Lyons likes to portray and in fact, used this particular slide in his Congressional testimony in March of this year to the Senate Armed Services Committee. And
he likes to point out that from the ordinarily what we think of in the Pacific or the Vladivostok and Petro...--the standard fleet operating bases--but what the Soviets have done over the last 10 or 15 years is--they've established a veritable ring of bases, giving them the wherewithal to interdict the essential sea lines of communications, stretching from Gaholik at the bottom and D... in Ethiopia, eastward across to Sucottra which they utilize as an anchorage--with fleet operations throughout the Indian Ocean--carrying on to Camp...song and then Cameron Bay. Cameron Bay in 1975 had two piers--now have 7--the Soviets are building the 8th. And the air facility at Cameron Bay, which is the finest runway in Southeast Asia--10,000 feet--the best runway probably that our air force and seabees built--now being utilized by squadrons of MIG-23's--also Bears and Badgers, routinely. There's also 20-25 Soviet combatants in 3-5 submarines on any given day, in Cameron Bay.

Continuing on, the fishing agreements there with Kurabas and with Boniwato--no Soviet fleet operations--however, their fishing fleets are known intelligence collectors. And the fishing fleet in Boniwato is operating with an oceanographic research vessel at all times. Continuing on to Hawaii--where the Soviets routinely station a Soviet intelligence collector--frequently operating just at the three miles from the channel entrance to Pearl Harbor--and then continuing on to the West Coast operations. So the Soviets, as you can see, have definitely expanded their military reach.

Turning now to the responsibilities of the Pacific Fleet. I think the first and foremost element is that we need to enhance deterrents. And so our operations are designed to do that. We are attempting to demonstrate to the Soviets that we have a capability of taking the fight to the Soviets early, if necessary, if deterrence should fail.

The second sub-bullet here is exceptionally to the Pacific war fighting strategy. And it is in close cooperation with our sister services and allies. We're working extremely close with
the air force, with the coast guard and the Marda Pact rule, and with our allies, particularly with Japan—to continue to enhance deterrents and make sure we don’t have to fight. And finally, however, if deterrence, to be prepared to engage the enemy and win.

Capabilities of the Pacific Fleet are growing. As you can see, 1981, we probably reached the bottom—227 ships. We’ve built up the force by 1986 to 278, building to 300. Significant numbers here to look at—first of all, we’ll get our 7th carrier by 1990 and then, as you can see, there’s a significant increase by 1986-1990 in the number of cruisers. That’ll be the introduction of 7 Aegis cruisers, which give us not only a force multiplier capability—significant protection for our carrier battle groups, allowing us to move closer to the Soviets, earlier. And last, but not least, an interesting fact—I think that a lot of people don’t realize or recognize about the Aegis cruisers. The standard missile shooter in the U.S. Navy—there’s about 1000 moving parts on that above-deck surface to air launcher—it takes 12 gunner’s mate and about $7,000,000 in spare parts to keep that missile launcher working. With the Bunker Hill, which is now introduced into the Pacific Fleet, there’s three moving parts on its vertical launch system—three gunner’s mates and about $300,000 worth of spare parts required to keep it functioning. So this is a significant enhancement to our ability to take the fight to the enemy. Next slide.

Concept of operations now—turning very briefly to it—fully in support of the CINCPAC war fighting strategy—and Colonel Molyneaux will be giving us some insights on that—it’s designed on the premise of taking the Soviets out of the Pacific. We feel very strongly at PACFLT, that on the political and economic side, the Soviets are going to strive very very hard and significantly, to increase their political and economical prestige in the Pacific. But it’s unlikely that they’re going to have much success. Given that fact, the Soviets have only one means of really projecting power—of influencing events in the Pacific—
and that's through their military--inherent in the Soviet Navy and Soviet Air Force. So we're going to take that out of the Pacific. We're going to remove that, if we go to war, and therefore in the post-war considerations, the Soviets are going to have no means of influencing events in that theater. By doing so, and going on the offensive, we're going to carry out the defense of the United States. It's the #1 priority of U.S. CINCPAC. And last, but not least, we're going to complement the capabilities of our fleet with our allies and our sister services.

Looking now at some initial actions. This has got a lot of arrows, but I think the point here is that we're trying to demonstrate that we're going to be in position early to take the fight to the Soviets, should deterrence fail. To do so, we need to move our submarines forward--we've only got 42 SSN's in the Pacific and two diesel subs--the Barbell and the Darter which both go out in 1990. And the Soviets, as you saw, have over 100. So we can't possibly count and track everyone of them. We must be in position to know what the Soviets are going to do with their submarines--whether they're going to operate in a bastion or whether they're going to flush them--so the speed and timing of the SSN deployments are critical. We're going to use some of the new elements such as Surtas--the Tago ships--civilian manned military sealift charters. These ships give us extremely good coverage against latest generation Soviet submarines. We're going to have our carrier battle forces in position--both ready to conduct strikes from the Northern Pacific if there happens to be a carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean--we're going to try to withdraw that after we're struck the Soviet Indian Ocean squadrons. So that we can take care of the Soviet facilities in Cameron Bay, because they lend our facilities in Subic and Clark, vulnerable. So we need to take them out early. And we're going to operate our carrier battle forces to secure our vital northern flank along the Aleutians and to secure the defense of the United States. Next slide.
I mentioned before that the CINCPACFLT war fighting strategy complements the capabilities of the fleet with our allies. This is a slide from PACAV—from the Pacific air forces. Their #1 priority objective, as you can see, is to blunt Soviet naval aviation bases and Soviet power projection capabilities, by striking those bases—both in Vietnam and Cameron Bay, Soviet mainland and along the Sakhalin Peninsula.

The third bullets—significant for U.S. Navy operations. They're going to support offensive and defensive operations with AWACs and RC-135 orbits. And the fourth one—sounds like a great game plan—I certainly would want to do the same thing—but it's important to note here that we need to convince the National Command Authority that we don't want to strike Vladivostok on Day 1, which is protected by 1000 fighters. That there are other Soviet bases and facilities in the Pacific that are far more vulnerable, and we're going to try to get them. So we're working very closely with PACAV to ensure that we can conduct these operations.

At the same time, looking at the Mardas Pact responsibilities, maritime defense zone, they have to provide the very important operations listed there in the block, of port defense and surveillance—mine countermeasures and port security, because we have to defend the United States. And so Mardas Pact, our Coast Guard and naval forces—we're working very closely with them to ensure those operations as well.

Turning now to brief considerations of Pacific ASW—I mentioned before that the Soviets have that 2:1 numerical advantages in submarines and we can't possibly track all of them. Also, we don't have that nice GIUK gap, with our fixed Sosa arrays, with lots of allied submarines, and our own, that are able to plug that gap. And you can see, from Petro-Pavlas, that the Soviets virtually can moved out in a fan-shaped fashion, anywhere in the Pacific. So the Pacific ASW problem is critical.

Turning to the next consideration—looking at allied ASW forces, counting whether we're looking at air assets, surface
assets, diesel or nuclear submarines, our allies bring more to
the fray in the Atlantic than they do in the Pacific. So the ASW
operations are critical. Ok.

What I'd like to do now is look very briefly at some of our
recent operations. And let you know what some of the Soviet
reactions were to these. And then perhaps Rich Haver, later,
will have some comments on these as well. Just about 13 months
ago--a little over 13 months--Long Beach was deployed in the
Western Pacific and we took her up to the Aleutians. We fired a
Tomahawk. This was the first Tomahawk ever launched off the
instrumented range. You can see the flight profile of the
Tomahawk shot--roughly 550 miles--71 nautical miles. And you can
also see the Soviet reaction--it was intense. We did this
operation overtly because we wanted the Soviets to see the
capability of the Tomahawk. It came in on Canag Island--just
west of Adak--as depicted here in the viewgraph--and the mission
was successful. Of particular significance again is the fact
that we demonstrated our capability of being able to launch
Tomahawk and the Tomahawk has demonstrated its capability of
doing the terrain contour matching profile.

Next operation, which is very significant, Vincent battle
group and deployment--she left as you can see--from the 12th of
August--made an overt transit for four days to the west coast of
the United States and then made a covert transit, starting with
the 16th--punched into the Bering Sea to become the first U.S.
carrier to operate in the Bering Sea--north of the Aleutians
since World War II--punched in on the 22nd and about 60 hours
later punched out--on the 23rd of August, she conducted two
mirror image strikes. These strikes would have been mirror
imaged against either Anadear or Petro-Pavlas--they were flown on
the same distance and contained the same amount of strike
aircraft as a normal strike profile would have been, against
either one of those targets--however, flown against Alaska. And
during that time, the Soviet surveillance effort was intense.
However, all of the Soviet surveillance effort was directed south
of the Aleutians and the Vincent battle group remained undetected throughout her entire transit until the 28th of August when she was picked up by Bear aircraft southeast of the Kurils. Next slide.

About two weeks later, we search-deployed the Ranger. She left the 22nd of August—made a covert transit on her rhumb line to the Segaro Straits. During that particular transit, until the 12th of September—so from the 22nd of August till the 12th of September—a period of roughly 17 days or so—she remained undetected. When she finally was detected on the 12th of September, she was 350 miles south of Beravesnik—which is a very important Soviet fighter base in the Kurils—one that we would want to take out as a high priority target early in the war.

These carrier operations are very important because it demonstrates to the Soviets that finding our carriers and locating them is not quite as easy. It should also demonstrate to us that the carriers are not nearly as vulnerable as one might read in the press. Next graphic.

This is very significant too, to note that in October of 1996, we had six battle groups deployed in the Pacific—four carrier battle groups, two battleship battle groups. The thing that's of importance to us was the fact that each one of these battle groups was fully furnished with weapons—with its beams, with its bullets—to conduct operations as required against the Soviets. And again, I just think if you contrasted this with our capability in 1981, you'll see that this is a significant enhancement of war fighting effectiveness. And perhaps more importantly, demonstrates to the Soviets that we have the capability of putting those battle groups to sea. The Missouri did go around the world. She set the nuclear movement back about 10 years when she went to Sydney and 250,000 people lined up a day, for three days, while she made her port visit there. The Vincent, as you can see—that's the same Vincent who had just finished its Bering Sea operations—is now headed into the Indian Ocean.
With the next viewgraph, you'll see Vincent again, coming back around for Colonel Potlatch. That was quite a deployment that Vincent had. During this particular exercise, the Vincent battle group made another covert transit, remained undetected and unlocated. And Arg-alpha sortied with those ships, as you can see--sortied from San Diego--made a covert transit north into the Bering Sea--the two of them met up and conducted Colonel Potlatch. We landed 800 marines over the period 23-28 January. And I've brought a few pictures this morning that I hope will whet your interest here and you can see what the situations were like. There were about six lows rolling through the area during this period--sea states were 4-6. Actually that slide [can you just flip that one over, right]--it's the same--but it was backwards--we conducted 307 tac air sorties for a total of 800 flight hours during this period, and that included the AB8's off Bellow Wood. Next picture.

These pictures are black and white, unretouched, day photos. These are not night photos. Next picture. The Soviet surveillance effort during this exercise was intense. Needless to say, they were very very concerned about what we were doing. And of course we have demonstrated now our capability of conducting an amphibious operation, in the dead of winter, in the Aleutians and that lesson cannot be lost on the Soviets. Thank you.

Just to summarize, then, the CINCPACFLT war fighting strategy--brief concept of ops and a look at our current campaigns, is designed to show that we are able to take the fight to the enemy in the Pacific and to seize and hold the initiative. Essential elements of the maritime strategy. What we're trying to do is influence the global war, and the simultaneous conduct of a global war--we're going to show the Soviets that we're going to cede no area by default and we're going to demonstrate to the Soviets that we have the capability of removing their Navy and Air Force--perhaps even seizing some Soviet territory through amphibious operations. By doing so we create a strong war
termination leveraged to the Soviets, compel them to reassess their global aspirations, and finally, in the last analysis, make a strategic difference. Thank you.
What I'm going to try to do is sort of give you an overview of where in the open literature, at least, I see we are, vis-a-vis the maritime strategy--and where we're going. And the primary audience--I mean, obviously the audience for this presentation is all of you--but the primary target that I was thinking of when I was scratching out the notes for this were those folks who are sitting in the backs. Officers of the United States Navy here in Monterey, studying in the National Security Affairs curriculum--listen up. You guys are about to embark, and you're in the process of embarking, in one of the most exciting and important aspects of your naval career. Without trying to take away anything from the absolutely fantastic fun and zest, as Admiral Zumwalt used to call it--of the operational Navy and the really tremendous things that you can accomplish at sea, I'm here to tell you that you're embarking in one of the finest sub-specialties of the United States Navy and one in which the world is going to be your oyster. You see, sitting up here in front of you, actual practicing warriors who are on their shore tours--like Commander Wagner--get involved in what you just saw and getting involved in. As you get older and more seasoned in the business, you can do such things as Roger Barnett when he was a captain and on active duty--which is spearhead the effort to rewrite the way the entire world thinks about maritime strategy. When you retire, after a full and successful Naval career, both operational billets and in strategic planning, you'll join the ranks of such illustrious people as Admiral Bob Hanks, who is sitting in front of you down in the first row--who never stopped for a minute, writing and speaking and thinking about new maritime strategy. A Mark Helgason, sitting in the audience, who is a graduate of your program, and who's had a full set of fine operational tours and who is heading out right now to be CO of a surface combatant--is also, when he's ashore, doing the same.
sorts of things that we've been talking about here. It's a wonderful aspect of being in the Navy and career--it's exciting. It's very important to the Navy and it's exceedingly important to the country. Well enough of that commercial on the political, military, strategic planning subspecialty.

The maritime strategy--where is it right now. Well, I'm going to talk about a variety of communities and where I see they are, vis-a-vis the maritime strategy and where it's going. First and foremost, I want to talk about the U.S. Navy. How's the Navy feel about the strategy in my view? Well the Navy is a pretty big place and it's a conglomerate and in any office and certainly in any O-Club in the Navy, and in the mess decks of the ships that are implementing the deterrent aspects of the maritime strategy that Commander Wagner talked about, there are some views of the maritime strategy. And you can probably find them all. But by and large, if you try and get your arms around the entire institution, and you tried to sum things up, I think you could say that the U.S. Navy is satisfied with the effort that it's made over the last half dozen years on maritime strategy. We're satisfied to the extent that we've developed that which needed to be developed, coalesced and brought together the various strains, both in terms of geography, in terms of the types of topics that needed to be covered, and in terms of the history of both the people that came before us in the dim past, like Mahon and in the not-so-dim past like Forrest Sherman and the people who came before us in the very, very recent past--like Admiral Heywood and Captain Jim Patton. That we've done justice to their vision and we've tried very hard to provide a common vision and a common vocabulary for the Navy to use today and tomorrow. We've managed to revitalized the internal strategic debate of the Navy, which is, as Dr. Barnett pointed out, one of the main reasons we were trying to put pen to paper. So that when maritime strategy was discussed, naval officers, be they lts in submarines or captains in surface ships or admirals of the civil engineer corps, would have a certain vision of what it was that their Navy was being
asked to do and how all of these different pieces related. And I think by and large the Navy is satisfied that we've accomplished that.

You know, if you picked up—as I hope you all did, because it was there and the most importantly, it was free—a copy of the July Proceedings, you can see that. You turn to the title page of the Proceedings and the lead article is 'Acoustic Showdown for the SSN's' by Lt. Kevin Pepy. Now Kevin Pepy never met Pete Swartz or Roger Barnett or Admiral Heywood or any of these people in white, and his world is bounded probably by things that are labeled either for presidents or for fish. And that's what he knows. And yet he wrote an article—never having met any of us—and it's called 'Acoustic Showdown for the SSN's'—about quieting in the future—and he wrote it and it's in the vocabulary of the maritime strategy. And it's in the vocabulary of the maritime strategy—thereby making it useful for Lt. Winfield, also writing in the same issue of the Proceedings, who was writing about the future of the F-14 as a Naval aircraft and where that's got to go, and the same vocabulary and the same concepts and the same images, that Lt. Pepy was conjuring up in dealing with and debating and so on—were the very same ones that Lt. Winfield, who's got a famous, illustrious family name and who has just stepped literally out of Top Gun—because that was his previous assignment according to the blurb in the Proceedings, he's using the same wording that he used.

And then when you get into the Pacific focus, which is the specific reason why this issue has been presented to this conference for perusal and attention, you see an interview with Admiral Lyons and you see something 'Special: The New Third Fleet' by Vice Admiral D.E. Hernandez. What has happened with the Third Fleet over the last few years—for those of us that have been in the Navy for a while—is exceedingly exciting and exceedingly important. We now have four battle ready fleets in the United States Navy. And one of them—the Third Fleet—which was for years either a fleet that was discussed with a slight
smirk, especially on the faces of the 7th Fleet mavens among us, and then/or with a great deal of hand-ringing as to—my God, what is it that we're going to do with the 3rd Fleet because—it's there and it's being used. And it is, in fact, our striking arm in the Northern Pacific. And you can read the interview with Admiral Hernandez as to how he and Admiral Lyons and others have brought this about.

What have we got? We've got rank from Lt to Admiral—you've got surface, submarine and aviators—community representatives—all writing in one issue and an issue of a journal that throughout all of our uniform career, it was always fashionable to deride as a journal that never had anything to do with anything you were really doing—that was nothing but the forum for the retired community and a few people like Jim Tritten who liked to write a lot. And it's relevant and it's important now and it relates to what we're doing in the active force. And it's showing the fact that all of us have got a vision that's helpful in enabling us to have internally, a strategic dialogue which can't help but help the Navy, the future of the Navy, the future of the country and can't help and I hope Mr. Haver will mention this later—can't help but drive the Soviets clear up a wall—which is certainly something we all had in mind also.

In addition to being satisfied, what else is the Navy? Well I think—internally in the Navy—the strategic debate is certainly continuing. Right now, as we speak, revision 4 of the internal maritime strategy documentation, which is a classified publication, is either on Admiral Muston's desk, which is the right place for it to be—it's not up with the Secretary of the Navy or up at the War College or whatever—all of those people had inputs certainly—but it's with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations for his perusal and forwarding. Or, he's sent it back down to the action officers—saying redo it again—it still doesn't accord with my vision. At any rate, it is being actively debated and revised in precisely the place where it ought to be—OPNAV—to come out again, in a
revised form. The internal debate is continuing. We're still trying to refine and hone it and make it relevant to the future.

It has certainly been helpful to the Navy on the hill—unquestionably. One of the foremost experts of that whole phenomenon is sitting in the audience here—Mr. Varner Ward, from the Congressional Research Service—and he can certainly comment on that—as to what has and hasn't happened. As a matter of fact, he's already done that in varied publications. And how and what ways has it helped us on the hill? It's helped us on the hill because, for years, the Navy was criticized as 'not having its act together'—of being this disparate, conglomerate of surface and sub-surface and aviators—of Pacific-oriented mavens and Atlantic-oriented people—marines that were doing their own things—this group—no more. What do you hear now? Oh, the Navy's a monolith—a juggernaut. Every time you turn around, some admiral wants to preach the maritime strategy at you. We're getting tired of this—all singing off the same sheet—what do you guys do—go to the same school—this is the same Navy that was berated not very long ago—certainly in the lifetime and every day of the tour that Admiral Heywood experienced as CNO, for not having its act together. Boy do we ever have our act together now.

So we're feeling satisfied and internally, we're nevertheless trying to pursue new directions up at the War College—as Dr. Bernstein and others of you know—the CNO's regularly and people south of the CNO—the recent ones—Admiral Watkins and Admiral Trout—regularly challenge CNA where Ken Weiss and the War College and other places—to shoot holes in the strategy—to find places where we haven't done it very well—find places where we can do things a little better. So the internal mechanisms to think about strategy, have been institutionalized. And externally I think the Navy is satisfied to a point where I don't think you're going to see a great deal of hub-thumping and white papers and big documents and speaker's bureaus fanning out to the four corners of the world on maritime strategy. We're there.
Well, how about the civilian navalists—the people like Bing West who's sitting in the rear and other people who have written a great deal about Navy and Naval power? Well, I think, my observation is that they're pretty happy too. Jean Bremmer, other people—I'm not trying to slight people—I'm just looking around—what's happened is—it's given them a way of actually contributing to the way the blue suit Navy really thinks about their own problems. In a way that enables them to actually influence the blue suit Navy. Because of the commonality of vision and because of the common vocabulary, a thoughtful civilian, writing in a journal such as the Institute Proceedings and Naval Forces, really can make, to coin a phrase, 'the strategic difference.' In terms of writing something that an active duty officer can then read and say, 'you know, he's right. We're not doing this particular end of it right. We've got to think more of it.' And of course that has precisely been the track record of Bing over the last of the years and certain other Naval writers as well—Colin Gray, Norman Friedman, Ronald Warp, certainly. I think, by and large, civilian navalists are happy because it's giving them a way of contributing to what the Navy is actually and really doing. And we're happy, of course, because we're able to better utilize their product.

Civilian anti-Navalists are absolutely aghast. You can read Meersheimer or Jack Beatty in the Atlantic—this month's Atlantic incidentally has got rebuttals to Beatty's article by Bing West, Norman Friedman, Dick Best and Colin Gray—among other people. You can read Bill Kauffman from Brookings, Homer—and if you've read them, you've read them, it's done. They haven't got much more to say. They just keep being aghast and keep recycling the same old stuff and the Navy that they used to have such fun shooting at—this faction-ridden Navy—just doesn't exist anymore. There isn't an awful lot going on out there that seems to me to be particularly new. Gee—carriers are vulnerable and threatened—it's all been done. I don't think there's anything going on that's very exciting in the anti-world right now. Even
though that may change with things that are happening with submarine warfare and some other areas where we're having technological change--the allies. Well given the time lag of how things kick in--serious writing on allied contributions to the maritime strategy is just starting to kick right about now. And if you look at the last two issues, for example, of *Naval Forces* --I commend the two issues ago to you, especially. Geoffrey Kell, who's the British writer and who's got probably today the standard textbook that most people use on naval strategy--has got an excellent article in which he talks about how the European navies all play in a global war with the Soviets. And this is not a guy that's spent an awful lot of time with all of us and yet he's got it just about right. And the complementarity of how the European navies would work with the U.S. Navy in a war with the Soviets--it's not by accident that he's got it right. We made sure that the maritime strategy discussed it in great length. We were self-consciously allied--as Eric Grove likes to say--and I think that bore fruit.

In the Far East and in the Pacific, a number of writers, in Australia, Canada and Japan in particular--because these three countries have had, over the last couple of years, very very important strategic debates of their own--internally. The strategic debates in Japan is certainly ongoing. And in Australia and in Canada, we've seen, over the last few months, the issuance of white papers in which the government has finally made it up its mind as to what it's going to do in terms of strategy and both of those papers complement the concepts of the maritime strategy quite nicely--especially the one in Australia which was a near thing because we didn't know how that was going to come out. And yet it does. So by and large, I think the allied literature--the open literature anyway--is quite supportive of the maritime strategy. In Norway, which is another country that can be cited where there's an ongoing and active debate on defense strategy--what we've got in essence--we've managed to tie together the way the whole allied world thinks of
maritime strategy in a way that's enhanced clearly the trans-Pacific dialogue and the trans-Atlantic dialogue. And who knows, maybe even the European-Japanese dialogue and the Japanese-European dialogue—and that certainly wouldn't be too shabby at all—if we've done that. I think that some really exciting writing on allied contributions to maritime strategy in general, and as Roger calls it, THE maritime strategy you're going to see over the next couple of years.

The Russians, like the civilian anti-navalists at home, are livid. The spleen-venting and ranting and raving in the open literature, anyway, is quite exciting to read—some of this stuff. We particularly like, of course, the characterization by Mr. Filene, who is a top-flight Soviet propagandist and one of the heavyweights of the current push—propaganda push of the Soviet Union right now—since he's a Gorbachev man—we loved his characterization of the maritime strategy as being highly dangerous and provocative and so on—the worst thing that could possibly happen—was a phrase that we particularly love. That certainly, and the phraseology that Dr. Barnett used when he opened his presentation, certainly exceeded our wildest expectations of what we were going to be able to accomplish. To have the Soviets feel that the maritime strategy is the worst thing that could possibly happen—is just about, from the standpoint of the uniformed officer corps, and we're thinking we're doing our bit and our job quite nicely right now, along those lines. But I'm not going to say very much more about it—an absolutely excellent conference on the subject here in Monterey very recently. And should the Institute ever, in its wisdom, get it out, you're going to be able to see the Proceedings of that and be able to write away and get the transcripts for that which was quite a good discussion. And of course, later on, Mr. Haver will be talking about the Soviets and you can direct your questions to him. Few people know much more about the subject than he.
Our sister services. Well, kind of a mixed bag. Certainly we've got acceptance of the existence of the maritime strategy. I mean, you don't have within the E-ring in the Pentagon, you don't have people pretending that it doesn't exist—discussing the fact that it hasn't been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We certainly have enough public statements now by Admiral Crowe praising the strategy—no ranting and raving about how Secretary Weinberger doesn't—Secretary Weinberger stated many times publicly, his support, interest and in fact direction concerning what he calls the President's Maritime Strategy. And so on.

But you do have still a little too much bitching—especially in the view of this officer, on the part of the Army. The maritime strategy, did not, in fact—and here I think Eric Grove's is instructive—was self-consciously not designed to take shots at any of the other services. I was present at a debate—a very meaningful debate because it was an internal debate—between the three star officers of the Navy on one of the wickets we were going through to approve the maritime strategy. And one of the protagonists or the protagonist to the debate at this particular moment was then Vice Admiral James Aloysius Lyons, Jr., who was then OP-06. And he was criticized by one of his colleagues for the fact that the strategy had too much air force in it. And Admiral Lyons stood up in his inimitable fashion—I will not quote him directly—this is a paraphrase—those of you who know Admiral Lyons will understand why the paraphrase. What he said was—you know, I spend every day in this job going up and down the passageways of the Pentagon—roving in, tying in, putting together the packages of Air Force and Army—to help influence this strategy—and explaining how the Navy ... ... and I really think that this is the way to go. ... ... ... the Navy has, in fact, been self-consciously in devising and figuring out how to integrate the other services, without denigrating ... in carrying out the global campaign against the Soviets and if you don't believe me ... ... ... go take a look at Admiral
Watkins white paper and then take a look at Field Manual 100-5, the Army Operations Manual that has gotten so much press—and then take a look at AFM-1 of the Air Force ... and then you tell me which document is more ......

That's a challenge there to you—obviously I've already done this drill and know the answer. Ok. So that’s kind--I think the Air Force and certain elements of the Air Force, have in fact, worked quite well with us over the last few years, both in the Pentagon and certainly in the fleet. And the kinds of operations that Commander Wagner described are now absolutely teamed--B-52's, Air Force tankers, Air Force fighters, Air Force AWACs, Air Force MAC-wing, is integral to Navy exercises today in a way that is just routine--it’s as routine as making sure that you’ve got surface forces for submarines now—that’s real—that’s how we exercise—it’s how we game. At Newport and at elsewhere. So if everything's so hunky-dory, except in some of the services and among the Russians and so on--what more remains to be done? Well there are a number of challenges to the maritime strategy as I see it.

The first challenge is one that’s most important, I think, and one that the critics have rightly pointed out. And that is that the strategy has got now dangers of having hardening of the arteries. That the Navy has got the danger of having something that rather than being the common vision, has now become the Schlieffen plan—something that is unchangeable, inflexible, inviolate and something that’s going to get us in a lot of trouble when the Russians, instead of doing all the things that we’ve all sat at the knee of Mr. Haber and heard this—when the Russians, who have also sat at the knee of Mr. Haber, decide instead to do that. And the answer—I really feel that there is very little danger of that. I think that the Navy understands that full well and in terms of the internal debate, there are a few things going on in the Navy more exciting right now than the examination of the Russian threat. Updating the strategy is as institutionalized as the strategy itself. A concept of
constantly reviewing it and updating it—the concept of constantly challenging and having a dialogue between OP-06 and OP-009, of the War College consistently coming in from all its disparate in and from the SSG that’s up at the War Colleges as well saying—well, we’ve been looking at this and we’ve been looking at that and we don’t think such and such is right. Of people occupying the chair of OP-06 who instinctively reach for the telephone to call CNA—the Center for Naval Analysis—or the War Colleges—they will, toward their own people in OP-06, seeking not only the school solution, but the non-school solution as well. And I don’t see the strategy—again, I may be wrong—but I don’t see it as achieving that hardening of the arteries—certainly not contemporaneously—because as I said—updating the strategy is as institutionalized as the strategy itself.

I do see some aspects of the external debate becoming fairly sterile. I think it’s one of the reasons why the Navy isn’t going to be fashioned around screaming and yelling externally about the strategy quite as much as it did before. I don’t know what more we’ve got to say? We’ve got the white paper on the street—I’m using the Naval Institute’s term, not the Navy’s term—that’s a shorthand, that’s not official. We’ve got, and I’ve commend it to you—in part because I had a hand in the drafting of it—but it’s an excellent commentary and elaboration of it—Admiral Pendley’s letters in response to John Collin’s questions that appeared subsequently in the Proceedings. We’ve got Linton Brook’s excellent article on international security on the strategy and we’ve got a few more items on the street. You’ve got the current CNO who said what needed to be said about continuity and the fact that he’s supported the strategy and so on—which is certainly obvious to any of us that worked it since for three years, he was one of the approving authorities of the drafts of the maritime strategy. And if you never got it through Vice Admiral Troust, it wouldn’t have gone forward to Admiral Watkins. And now he’s the CNO.
I don't see—with the exception of the sister services and the allies—very much that's going to be very new and novel, kicking around in the domestic literature. I may be wrong and I can be challenged on that by Dwight Bing or Ronald Work or people who, among other things, make a living in the external domestic literature—but that's how I see it.

Some problem areas. I see us being in danger of one thing in the maritime strategy that we've got to be careful of. The maritime strategy certainly does not slight the global war with the Soviets—after all, that's its centerpiece. And it doesn't slight peacetime operations vis-à-vis the Soviets and the rest of the world, either—both in the unclas and the classified versions, there's a very good, healthy—what we referred to in shorthand as the front end of the strategy—which deals with peacetime uses of the Navy. There's a pretty good understanding of the literature of how you use the Navy in peacetime. The Naval War College and CNA have been two institutions that have been in the forefront over the last dozen years of how we think of that.

But I think we are going to have to watch out, in the case of limited war—the thing that's in the middle. The maritime strategy was, in part, and Admiral Heywood and Captain Patton and others that worked in the late 70's on this problem—certainly understood full well the maritime strategy came about in an era in which the Navy came out of a limited war, in which at least militarily we were quite proud of the way we operated. We did what the country asked us to do with what we had at hand—and we did it, militarily anyway, quite well. We used carrier aviation, we sent units in-country and at the same time we didn't shirk our responsibilities elsewhere in the world. What we had shirked and what we had dropped, to some extent, was thinking about how the Navy is used in peacetime and in crises—but not limited war—and Admiral Zumwalt and Admiral Stan Turner did a great deal for changing that in the early 70's. And we had shirked thinking about how the Navy would be used in fighting against the
Russians, which you've got to keep your eye on the ball and that's the ball to keep your eye on--in the words of Roger Barnett. We had shirked that a bit. And that was the turnaround of the late 70's and the late 80's--the rediscovery of the same principles that motivated Forrestal and Forrest Sherman and that motivated Mahon when he was putting pen to paper in the problem of Asia. We've got to be sure now that the pendulum hasn't swung too far in both directions that we're proud of--keeping the peacetime emphasis but now readdressing the problems of global war and then forgetting the lessons of Vietnam or the lessons of Korea and so on--and finding the country once again, who knows, somewhere down the pike, engaged in a limited war again and having people that are all steeped in maritime strategy and peacetime presence. That's something to think about. It's something that I had not thought about until it was pointed out to me.

It may very well be that that's a false problem--that the one thing that the Navy can't do and wouldn't do--because it's the thing that the Navy does so well--that it's inarguable, it's not something that you have to discuss or preach or anything--is how we operate in limited war. The record is very clear for Korea and Vietnam, and it's not something that you need an awful lot of theory about. It's something that you just need to roll up your sleeves and do. And that may be the answer to that. But I throw that out to you as something to think about. And to those of you in the back as something to write about.

My concerns about what we think about the Russian threat and making sure we don't have hardening of the arteries there in terms of how we view the Russians--I've already thrown enough challenges at Rich Hager for later on, that I need not do that again.

And then finally, one thing that I think that in my smug, self-satisfied way that I've given this talk--one thing I don't think we've done very well--this is a personal view, not an official view of course--and it keys off something again--keying
off things that Roger Barnett has said ... ... ... and that
has to do with the ... When the maritime strategy was first
written or drafted in final form, second version, third version
and now in the fourth version, a very, very healthy part of ...
... ... would say that the most important part ... ... was the
section on research. One of the uncertainties inherent in
maritime strategy--uncertainties on the Soviet threat ... ...
what if they don't do what we think? What if they've got the
capability to ... What about warning time? What if we get lots
and lots and lots of warning time or what if we don't get any?
What if ... ... ... ... ... On the other hand, ... ...
... ... What about the reserves? We've made great strides in
the last half dozen years or so making the reserves a true
element of the pointed end of the sphere, not just in the Navy
but in the Army and the Air Force as well. What happens if, for
political or other reasons, the reserve callup don't have ... ...
Many of these uncertainties and things that we know about--we
knew about from the very start when we started. We knew how to
write the baseline and the strategy and we knew many of the
implications of some of these uncertainties. But we don't
understand others which is why of course we exercise, which is
why we game--to find out more. But the thing that we haven't
done very well as a Navy, I feel--is to explain to the outside
world that these uncertainties are an integral part of the way we
discuss the strategy ... ... so-called white paper ... and other
things--partly because of the audience that these things are
designed to influence--were not quite as forthcoming about all
the work that we've done on uncertainties as we have been on all
the work which was done on the baseline. Can I change that
scenario to ... ... ... just as it is on internal issues in a way
in which we've gotten the baseline across in the past.

So that's in summary--that's sort of my overview of where we
are now, where I think the dialogue--a polyogue, whatever the
heil the word is--is going globally on the maritime strategy. I
think we in the Navy are satisfied with what we've done over
time. I think the civilians who've worked with us so closely, so many of you who are in the audience have great reason to be satisfied with the contribution that you've made to us. And that the Navy and the country--in terms of maritime strategy--today in 1987, are in pretty damn good shape.
Discussant: Robert W. Molyneaux, Jr., USMC
USCINCPAC, Plans and Policy

What the maritime strategy has done within the services, the
joint services—he indicated that all ranks and all specialties
are writing but more importantly, thinking about maritime
strategy and what their particular contribution, be it from an
airplane cockpit, be it from a ship at sea, be it from a foxhole
on the ground, can be to that strategy, in the accomplishment of
the national objectives. He mentioned a polyogue—and that name
will go down quite well since there is a great deal of jointness
involved in burden-sharing and being able to do things. We’ve
talked about the Air Force aerial refuelers, providing the longer
ranges to TAC-air from carriers, to provide the kinds of things
that we need in the tactical venue. He also noticed a strategic
awareness, among allies and friends, and their supportive nature
of the maritime strategy. We can go back to Mike Palmer’s
mention of the “ocean of destiny”—I think an awful lot of people
have mentioned the Pacific being an ocean of destiny. Cort
Wagner’s facts and figures sheet shows where trade, Gorbachev’s
Vladivostok talk, Shevernadze’s visits, the increase in maritime
power by the Soviets kind of support that particular view. That,
with that increase in trade and the burgeoning nations, it’s
natural for our friends and allies within the Pacific to take a
harder look at what maritime strategy really is and what, if
anything, their contributions can be.

The jointness of maritime strategy can’t be overemphasized.
The Army’s reluctance to join in is simply a matter of economics.
All you have to do is break out the Air Force journal or any of
the other open publications and do a little calculated number of
percentage of TOA and you’re going to find out they’re going to
need something to substantiate what they need in order to
prosecute land war. The Navy and the Air Force have done quite
well as far as getting its share of the budget—and rightly so,
with an articulated strategy such as the maritime strategy.
I think some of the problems that we are looking at or that Pete brought up, will be overcome by the polyogue—by the fact that there are so many young folks with fresh thoughts on the subject—thinking about it, learning lessons from the past and doing something positively about it.

Let's turn to the other presenters. I think the debate as to where the maritime strategy started, could go on forever. The importance of the fact is that there is a maritime strategy. What are the most important elements of it? The fact that the Soviet Union has been recognized as the adversary, possibly from as early as 1905, to the current time, is significant. The fact as brought out, that the flanks provide the area that cause restraint. If we take a look at Cort Wagner's map, we've got a hell of a common border with the Soviet Union. We have sea ingress where we can influence what they do. The fact that if we have a confrontation with the Soviet Union, it is going to be global and protracted. If it is in fact global, the engagement in the Pacific and certainly to limit the activity of the Soviet Union from focus in Europe and to piecemeal it by choosing their advantage. We invoke then a comparative strategy.

Looking at the thread throughout these papers—the problem areas are ASW and air defense. It was stated in the '46-'55 time frame and just last year before Congress. Admiral Hayes brought that out as our two significant problems. We've got to concentrate on those particular areas—we've got to look at the technology and we also have to invest the monies and the thought as to what we're going to do, to overcome those two significant problems.

Without a great deal of time left, I think when people say—we are satisfied with the strategy—yes we're satisfied with the strategy as a point of focus. It is definitely a significant part of the PAYCOM's war fighting strategy, which simply put is to deter and should deterrence fail—fight to win so that we can conclude hostilities in a situation favorable to the United States. The maritime strategy in the Pacific is an integral
part, as Cort indicted--Admiral Lyons is working in his standard dynamic way out there, to ensure cooperation. And there's an on-going dialogue between PACAV and PACFLT to come up with the best ways to implement the resources out there for a complementary synergistic effect and contribution to our war fighting strategy. And I can guarantee you that with Cort's four-star action officer, the dialogue and debate on maritime strategy in the Pacific will be very very lively and very dynamic. That's all.
Let me make some closing comments then on the presentations, by reminding you of the parallels of the current debate over the maritime strategy and something that occurred in the inter-war years following the writings of Mahon and ending with the final revision to the war plan Orange on November 26, 1941. The Navy, in that time frame, took the lead in a dynamic, strategic concept for war in the Pacific. The Marine Corps, during those years, was part of that team and developed concepts of operations for amphibious warfare that were later to prove exceptionally successful. There was lots of internal debate within the Navy. War Plan Orange also was basically a three-phase operation. There was a consolidation of forces—the transition to war. At that time initially it was swinging forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and then, finally, accounting for the new deployed fleet in California and Hawaii.

A second phase was a decisive battle to defeat the enemy fleet in the Philippines area. And thirdly was the securing of bases to prosecute a successful conclusion of the war through the use of Naval power and blockade. There was lots of involvement during those years between war planners, the Naval War College, war gamers, varying concepts were tested, different force sizing was analyzed. It was very similar also today—there were complaints that War Plan Orange was merely a justification for a larger Navy budget. And there was similar opposition by the Army. Most importantly for the students who are listening to all of these papers, to understand that we have political goals and our objective is to find ways to apply military force to achieve those political goals. The war planning was done by active duty Navy officers. It was not done by contractors, by civilians—they were done by graduates of Naval War Colleges, they were done by people like yourselves—students who will be rethinking the maritime strategy in the future and preventing...
what Peter points out is a possible hardening of the arteries which I don’t think will ever happen.

Now, on that note, I’d like to take a break and reform here at 10:30 and get down to about an hour’s worth of discussion.
Question and Answer Session

I've got a few administrative things to announce first. For those of you who are giving papers and were invitational travel orders, would you please check with our secretary outside the door here, Brienda, she has to some things with your papers. The chairs of each of these panels should turn in copies of all the papers to Ed Olsen who, I think, all of you know.

There are a few things that are available to all of you for free up there. First is the addendum to the Maritime Strategy Bibliography by Captain Peter Swartz. Please feel free to take a number of them if you need to. Secondly, you'll find copies of the July Proceedings which were provided to you because they had so many things about the Pacific in there, as well as the May-June Defense '87. A number of you have asked about the book I referred to earlier--Trifumienko's U.S. Military Doctrine, so I'll hold it up here. It is written by a Soviet academic who the Russians did the translation. It's published by Progress publishers in Moscow. I believe that all of the copies at Victor Kempton's bookstore went about two months ago--Roger is that right? Did you buy them all? This one was purchased at the Stanford University Bookstore so I don't know where else to tell you to try to get it. Although this does have an imported agency in Chicago--you can try them--and I'll be glad to let anybody look at this if you want to get a copy.

I'd like to start out the question and answer session by first defining the terms. First we have microphones in three different places and we'd like the person who's speaking from the floor to use the microphones so that everyone can hear. Secondly, to get it started I'm going to ask the first question. And I'm going to do so by holding up something called the National Security Strategy of the United States, dated January 1937 and signed by someone named Ronald Reagan. Now this is not the maritime strategy--this is something that is the national strategy. And I'll read a little portion of a letter that was written to me from the fellow who sent it to me. 'You will also
notice some words on maritime superiority which, while not endorsing the military strategy, are generally consistent with it. We have in our audience a Naval officer who is attached to the Office of Secretary of Defense who's had to wrestle with it. He's been trying to figure out what is the relationship of our national strategy—and for years we were able to say at the Naval Postgraduate School that we don't have on in writing, that's unclassified that we can show you as students. Well we now have one. And it's not the maritime strategy. Gerry Burke has kindly agreed to take the first question. And if you would, Gerry, would you try to explain to us what is the relationship between maritime strategy and national security strategy?

Gerry Burke

This serves me right for walking over to your office with you and asking the question. There are many, many very well-qualified commentators in the audience who can wrestle with this issue. So I'm just going to pose it in a couple of questions which would hopefully serve as a point of departure for later discussion.

The real issue I might assert is the relationship of campaign plans and concepts of operations are to the maritime strategy as the maritime strategy may be to a national military strategy. In other words, I think we would all recognize the great value of the maritime strategy to things naval and to the larger issues. But that is also an inductive value of the maritime strategy as it focuses its thinking on the larger issues of national military strategy. Specifically, the question, however, while the maritime strategy might well commend itself say to the war plans and strategies of the Pacific Commander and the Atlantic Commander, how well does it apply itself to the war plans and strategies of the European Commander or the Central Commander? And that's a question. An assertion is that there are—just as the internal debate of the U.S. Navy on the maritime strategy focused itself on competition for resources, the roles of allies.
the danger of poring concrete on thinking, and the problems of jointness, similarly, the difficulties in the specification of a national military strategy elevate those concerns, difficulties to an even larger level. I think that the President's document as directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act to submit a national strategy to the Congress was useful in setting out some broad specifications but it did not generate, at least from my perspective, the very valuable internal debate and discussion that the maritime strategy did. Now why that was the case I would only submit is that it was generated at the level of the National Security Council who, at the time, might have been focused on other issues. But it was not done in a seemingly democratic fashion.

The alternative question for the group is--while the Navy has a high degree of self-discipline and cohesiveness and rigorness in the application of intellectual skills to the specification of the maritime strategy, the legislation on jointness notwithstanding, does the larger national security apparatus of the United States have the ability and internal discipline to be able to go about the specification of a national strategy? And I frankly am not sanguine that it does. But I'm not also certain whether, in the context of our national security objectives, that's necessary to have as specific specification as the maritime strategy does.

Roger Barnett

As to the question of--define for me precisely where the maritime strategy fits in with the national strategy, we could probably, several of us sitting up here and many in the audience, could write a book about that. I can give you an anecdote, a personal anecdote, that I think might be somewhat instructive in that regard. In 1983, I was invited to go the Army War College at Carlisle and present the Navy's maritime strategy to the benefit of those present in the audience. And a big semi-circular theater at Carlisle for those of you who have been up
there. The place was packed and I gave the Navy's version of the maritime strategy—the secret version I gave—with the assurance that everyone was cleared. And at the end of it, the first question—a fellow in the back of the audience stood up and he said—'Haven't had the blood coursing through my body since I worked in Pentagon. All you Navy guys want to do is try and defend your big deck carrier programs by going off and bashing up on the Russias up in the Northern parts of the world and going up to the GIUK gap and you're not going to defend the sea lanes or anything. And I'm just fed up with all this'—so when he was done I said—if I understand the question, I'd like to make an assertion in response to that. The United States Army is not defending Texas. What do you mean the Army's not defending Texas? Because it's in Germany, that's why.

The point being of course that the Navy intends to defend the sea lanes, not in the Central Atlantic—and it doesn't seem to be the best way to go. And it's historically war at sea and all the basic principles of war at sea are different from war on land. I mean, we've been taught—we have a very long history of learning from the land-based theorists—Clauswitz and others—who say that defense is the strongest form. That's never been true at sea. All the things that make defense the strongest form on land are absent at sea—terrain, the ability to dig in, entrenching, all this business about it takes an attacking of 3:1 or 4:1 or however many to one to overcome an entrenched, strong defense—all these things don't exist at sea. Historically the offensive has been the stronger form of warfare at sea. And it's especially true in such things as submarine warfare. And so, it has not made an awful lot of sense, nor does it seem to, in the near future at least, to do other than have a very forward strategy which in effect does, and the Navy seems to believe and analysis seems to support, is the better way to defend the sea lanes and ensure that the reinforcement and resupply will in fact take place. Or wherever else the United States is engaged in forward areas.
As somebody who's somebody, once said: Go find out what the national military strategy is and then write a naval strategy that implements the national strategy. And we actually had to do precisely the evolution that Gerry was talking about. We did it—my wife can attest—at hours that weren't quite as congenial as the one we're in right now. But in staying up all night, trying to figure out this, we discovered a few things. There is, in fact, a national military strategy. And one can write a maritime strategy to implement part of that national military strategy. Now, there's a very famous series of letters on this subject—this is going back a few years—and I've forgotten the journal—but I certainly remember the debate because I was in graduate school at the time—in which Admiral Hanks wrote an article or a letter saying that the problem is that we can't get the national command authority to state its goals clearly enough for the military planners can get about the business of planning correctly. And Tom Edsold, who was up at the Naval War College, wrote and said—this is an age-old problem with military planners. Military planners need as firm and as strong and as hard and as clear guidance as possible because of the nature of their problem and the things that they have to carry out. And the President never wants to do any of those things—he wants to play his cards very close to his chest. He didn't want to tell anybody what he was going to do until the last minute. And he would just as soon not have any strategy at all. And the arch-example of all of that would be Franklin Roosevelt. You know, a man who—I mean, you could never find out what he was thinking. And this was not by accident. It was how he wanted to handle his military planners. And he drove his military planners absolutely crazy. And since that time that's happened as well.

We're actually in much better shape as military planners, from that standpoint than the guys who worked for Franklin Roosevelt were—in that you can, in fact, discern aspects of the national military strategy which enable a Navy planner to do his
job. First of all, the national strategy does say—and it has been an advantage of more recent years compared to earlier years—the national strategy has in fact over the last few years been fairly points on some points. First of all, the enemy. It’s very clear that the high command of the United States government—that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, President Reagan, thinks that the Soviet Union is the major enemy of the United States. He doesn’t call it the enemy or the opposing power or forces inimicable to the country—he calls it Russia. And we military guys then can go to a map and figure out where the hell that place is and figure out how to go get them. So #1, the national military strategy does exist and tells us who the enemy is. First of all, it’s Russia. And second of it all, it’s those guys who are lined up with the Russians and we have to sort of figure out who they are and that becomes a subject of some debate. I mean, is it Syria or isn’t Syria—is Poland or isn’t Poland—you can go on and on like this. But it’s pretty clear who the central enemy is. And incidentally, you say well I have this big view—contrast that with the guidance of war planners of Ed Miller’s era in the interwar period when they were putting together War Plan Orange—well, who is the clearly identified nationally articulated enemy from the President of the United States? Well, the President of the United States was going to be damned if he was going to say it was Japan. That wasn’t the policy of the country. And that made it a lot harder for Forrest Sherman and other guys in the interwar period.

Contrast that with the period that the guy whose feet I sat at at Columbia University—Werner Shilling—when he was writing his dissertation—as to Navy war planning before World War I. The Navy war plans—it was the Black Plans—Orange was Japan, Black was Germany. Where was the clear national guidance as to how the Navy was supposed to plan for future war there? Well it was non-existent—that was one of the major findings of Shilling’s dissertation—it wasn’t. And so the Navy tried to
figure these things out for itself. And in one case we got things pretty right—and that was War Plan Orange. And the campaigns we planned in Pacific were the campaigns we carried out in World War II. In the other place, the Navy got it quite wrong, and War Plan Black—you have never read—you might have read in the histories and political science literature, but you've never read a history of how we fought the German Navy in the Caribbean. Things didn't pan out that way. But one of the major culprits of all of that wasn't the Navy—it was the National Command Authority that couldn't give the guidance because of the nature of the country at the time.

So there are some elements. First of all, we know—second of all, we've been given very very clear and explicit guidance that any war with the Soviets will be with allies. Again, you say—what's the big deal? Well, the big deal is then the war planner can sit and come up with divisions of labor vis-a-vis the allies when we've got things to talk about with the Europeans. This is a very topical issue today with mine warfare so everybody who's reading the newspapers knows about the division of labor is right, wrong, good, bad, we're planning for the right war, and so on. But that's real. The war planner is given that as something to do with—what are you going to do and what are they going to do? Again, contrast that with War Plan Orange and War Plan Black. The policy of the nation was very clear. We will do everything alone—we don't have entangling alliances and therefore you have to plan to do the whole thing by yourself. And so there is then an element then that we've got to work with. The enemy is the Russians and you're going to do this with allies.

Third, the Navy is well aware—boy, are we well aware—that we have to do things jointly—with the Air Force, with the Coast Guard, with the Navy Marine Corps team of course—with the Army. And so the Navy had to devise those ways in which we would all be playing together, in accordance with existing concepts that the Army and the Air Force had, as near as we could tell. The Navy
learned to fall in love with the Hawk battery. The Hawk battery is a wondrous creation that belongs to the United States Army and its air defense missiles. And those of you that think of the Army as being something that's infantry and that's something that has to be hauled across oceans unprotected by the Navy—should focus instead on what the Army can do for you. And the Army Hawk battery can do a lot for you in places like Iceland and the Azores and Aleutians and other places and I think Naval officers should become great officianados of the Hawk battery and its hopefully its improvements and things that are going to happen in the future. I certainly know Admiral Lyons is.

And we've been told that we might get involved in conflict across an entire spectrum from little bitty things to nuclear holocausts and that we've got to figure out a way to contribute all across that spectrum—boy, that keeps you busy. But that is national guidance. And so the maritime strategy had to come to grips with that. And of course the bottom line was—we had to protect not only the United States but because we are the United States of today and not the United States of 1900 or even of 1940, we are a global superpower with global interests damn near everywhere. And we had to figure out how to do this thing globally. And with that guidance of global, allied and U.S. interests and Russians are the enemies—spectrum of conflicts, the maritime strategy used those as building blocks to deal with the problem.

If they had been more specific, it would have been more helpful. It would be very nice to have a clear unequivocal statement from the National Command Authority that everybody in the country understands as to the role of China or the role of Israel or what date the reserves are going to mobile—and that of course was the frustrations of those of us that worked these problems in the 70's when things weren't anywhere near as clear then as they are now—you weren't getting that at all. But you're asking too much of the President to do some of these kinds of things.
But given where we are right now, and even given that document, you've got enough to go on and you can come up with a maritime strategy. And we did.

[If you'd direct your questions to some one person, otherwise I'll assign it.]

Research Service

I have a comment and then a question that I'll direct to, I guess, to three people. The first has to do with the external debate on the maritime strategy which is what Captain Swartz spoke about earlier. I think that Captain Swartz is right when he says that the external debate at this point is largely sterile. I think it has been for some time. There really aren't very many new ideas --I think one exception to that would be the quieting of Soviet submarines and what it may have to do for things like the strategic ASW component. But on the whole I think he's right. But, even if the arguments are old, that doesn't mean they're not going to have influence on the minds of people who read them and on the tenor of the external debate. And my perception is that from where I sit, judging the external debate--which is mostly I'm involved in--is that at this point I'm getting hints that the critics of the maritime strategy may be regaining control over the debate on the merits of the maritime strategy. I think the Navy published the white paper in part to regain what they may have felt was lost control and I think in 1986 they had some control over the debate. But I see the situation reverting back now to what it was prior to that time. And I see that really in two ways. First, there are hints that the Navy really wants to focus more internally within the Navy--in-house on developing the debate and not paying as much attention to the external debate. And secondly, for a lot of people, for good or bad, many people still associate the strategy very closely with Secretary Lehrman. And now that he's gone, and now that saying things critical of Lehrman is in fashion very much with many people, there is an atmosphere where you can throw
out what are perceived to be his things along with him. And the strategy, I think, will get caught up a little bit in that. And lastly, I think there's still some confusion externally over the--for lack of a better term--the reality of the maritime strategy, i.e., the question--is the Navy really going to do this? Is this a real strategy?

I just returned from a conference across the other side of the country where there were some people who, only a week ago, expressed some very strong doubts about whether the Navy really is going to go forward with the strategy--in this case in the North Atlantic. And this comment came up again and again in the course of this two-day strategy--particularly in regard to the amount of carrier days that are actually still not being spent in the Norwegian Sea. And they harped on that again and again, even though the Navy people present tried to explain why. And I can also see it in Congress, lastly, when earlier this year when the Senate Armed Services Committee held a series of very widely publicized hearings on the national strategy--Admiral Crowe appeared and Captain Swartz is right--Admiral Crowe has said things supportive of the strategy--but in the one hand, on this that took place before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he was asked about the reality of the maritime strategy. And he said, and this is either a direct quote or something close to it--he said--it is not a strategy at all. And this was in front of the Committee and in front of about 250 people packed into that room. And they said--well, what is it then if it's not a strategy? Well, he said, it's a concept for something or other. Now, you'll note that a strategy is a concept and you can resolve the discrepancy that way. But everybody in that room, I think, left that hearing much more confused about the reality of the maritime strategy than they entered. So, the one thing I get out of Peter Swartz's presentation is or, the one thing I would put forward in my comment--I would be not so sanguine about the status of the external debate.
My question is for Captain Swartz and for Dr. Barnett and to a lesser extent also for Dr. Palmer—which is to talk about how the allies were brought into the formation of the maritime strategy. At what stage were they brought in, what were the mechanisms that were used to get their views and to incorporate them into the formation of the strategy? And if you could talk in some detail about that, and Dr. Palmer, if you could put maybe an historical perspective on that, how good or bad was the Navy at doing this back in the 40's and 50's. And finally, if you had to do it again, would you have changed any of these mechanisms? How might you have done it differently?

Michael Palmer

Obviously in 1946-47, we're beginning to have allies. But other than Britain, they're allies without navies. Up through the mid-50's, which is how far I got, the allies as they rearm, say the Italians, and of course the British with their continually diminishing fleet, are part of the maritime strategy. And the few British documents read and sound just like our strategic documents. Now, whether they're simply parroting what we're going to do, whether they agreed with it in principle, I can't say. But from what I've seen in say for Royal Navy plans, forward offensive operations, there were joint U.S.-Royal Navy exercises in the Norwegian Sea, '1952 or 1953--is the first one that I found anyway--where they go up there with a carrier group and the British send some stuff up and they're operating carrying out an exercise, the assumption of which was that the Soviets had invaded Northern Norway as part of their attack on Europe and the Navy's up there then and the Royal Navy is up there with them with some Norwegian forces. So they're tied in right from the beginning. When Sherman's in the Mediterranean as Commander of 6th Task Fleet--having drawn up that strategic concept, '46-'47, he's in the Mediterranean '48-'49, he's working closely with the Italians and the Turks and the Greeks, and of course he was already laying the foundations of a connection with Spain through
his son-in-law who was naval attache in Madrid, who was already talking with Franco—that's a connection that doesn't come to full fruition until Sherman's CNO. And of course he's in the Mediterranean visiting Spain and then he's in Italy when he dies in July '51. So very early on, there's a connection with the allies, at least in Europe. Japan is a different story.

Roger Barnett

Ron, I think the best way to answer that is that way down deep in our heart of hearts—when we set down and took pencil and tried to put this thing down on paper—and our predecessors who did the same thing—we didn't feel like we were doing anything new. And we scoured the war plans, we scoured the concept of maritime operations, we both felt and believed and still believe, that there's nothing contrary in the maritime strategy to what any of the allied plans are. And for this reason, it didn't seem like any prior consultation was necessary.

On the back end of the process, I made a trip to France and briefed the French. And in every opportunity we got, and I'm divorced from the process now so I don't know whether it continues and Admiral Schmidt can talk to this—whenever there were visiting delegations from Navy to Navy staff talks, whenever visiting CNO from foreign navies came, they were always briefed on the current version of the maritime strategy. And there are two fundamental points that I want you to take away from that. First of all, we didn't then, and I still don't see, any real conflicts between the maritime strategy and the way the plans for conduct of war or in any other concepts, for the use of the U.S. Navy with allies—either the European or Pacific theaters—is in any kind of conflict. And secondly, in all the discussions that I had with the visiting delegations and the CNO from different navies, while they asked questions about the strategy, I still didn't hear any sharp disagreement from any of them. Now you have to appreciate also that we were talking primarily—except in a couple of cases—and the French is one—to military people.
And you get very very different perceptions and very different reactions when you talk to civilians, even civilian defense planners, than you do when you talk to purely military and especially when you talk to purely naval staffs from the allies. And I think Pete can probably embellish on that a bit.

Pete Swartz

Sort of following up on some points on what Roger had to say and then to follow up on some points that Mike had to say. This is in the area in which I personally and particularly probably was more deeply involved than any other in the maritime strategy—and that was relations with the allies. My background, probably largely thanks to the tasking that I got from Admiral Hanks when I worked for him a Lt Commander—listen up you guys in the back—this is how strategists develop—largely had to do with Navy to Navy talks and dealing with allies. My academic background, when I went to graduate school—again I hope in the back you're listening—had a lot to do with looking at the problems of history and allies so that the dissertation that I am perpetually writing is about relations between U.S. Navy and allied navies during the period that Dr. Palmer is talking about. And so it was an area that I was personally able to bring some expertise to bear. And that is not by accident. In other words, that was precisely why I was in the Office and it was precisely why Dr. Barnett put those kinds of things in front of me to work on. Just as, people like himself. Jim Tritten, Linton Brooks and others, who are far more capable and competent in dealing with the problems of global deterrents and nuclear equation and anti-SSBN operations and so on—played with that. I mean, we did, in fact, bring in those people who had expertise in certain areas. And it's my view, first of all, just to reiterate the fact that that's exactly what happened. We knew that what we had was something that was intermeshed very well with the allies already. There was simply no need to go check it out with the allies.
because we knew what the answer was. We knew. I knew. I mean we had been talking to the allies for years.

There are two myths about—there are several myths about the Navy—but there are two in particular that are very interesting. One is that the Navy is inherently Pacific-oriented and doesn't give a damn about Europe or the Atlantic. Dr. Barnett, I think, and Mike Palmer, have done enough today to at least demolishing in the minds of those of you who subscribe to that myth—any illusions you have in that regard.

But the other myth is that the Navy is a go-it-alone service and always has been. And the things that are cited are very selective—like the Pacific War with Japan—and it is also recited in the case of the alleged Pacific bias of the Navy—in which we largely fought the war ourselves, we resisted having the British come in with us—the British Pacific Fleet did come with us with Ernie King kicking and screaming about it—they did a good job at second-rate operations and evolutions. They had no logistics trail. They were designed as a short-legged navy to fight wars in the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea and in the Baltic and in the Mediterranean and they couldn't keep up with—and couldn't operate with the fast carrier task groups. They could not project power halfway around the world without an enormous base structure that did not exist in the reaches of the Pacific. There were very real reasons why we had problems dealing with the Royal Navy in the Pacific.

When you come to the road, however, today, dealing with the British and dealing with any of the allies—lots of those doctrinal problems of the 40's and the early 50's, have gone away. Logistically, communications-wise and a lot of other things, we're in much better shape—not only than we were with the other navies of those days. But then, if the truth be known, then the Army and the Air Force are in many cases in dealing with their counterpart organization on the ground and in the air.

We've had a standard Navy Signal Book for use by the allies since about 1950. And that was no mean feat to put together in
the late 40's--to get everybody just so that they knew what the
hell the signals were--we had different systems--one guy was
using mostly flashing light, the other guy was mostly using
semaphore and the other guy was using flags and we are now at a
point where we have interoperability--yes--and in some cases
they're hellacious. And they have a lot to do with technological
differences and with domestic industry and so on. But I would
submit to you that they're absolutely nothing like the problems
we had in World War II. You know, in World War II when the
British Pacific Fleet came out to work with the U.S. Fleet, they
could not operate unless there was U.S. Navy Lt on board each
ship of the British Pacific Fleet. And when we operated with the
British in the Med, there had to be a Royal Naval Detachment on
board each ship--we don't operate that way today--it isn't
necessary. So we have, in fact, been interoperable with the
allies both on the tactic level and at the strategic level in
terms of scrubbing the plans.

Now Dr. Barnett pointed out something interesting--his
example was off on the French--this is a comment by me on Admiral
Leinhard--and I'm certainly not pronouncing his name right--but
that's what happens when you've got a French CNO who's got a
Flemish name. He was the CNO of the French Navy in February-
March 1986 and did an article in NATO's 16 Nations--and my
comment on that which is in this bibliography is that--rowing to
the beat of a different drum. 'Authoritative statement by the
French CNO--heavy emphasis on nuclear deterrence, crisis
prevention and control and allied cooperation. Minimal
discussion relating to global or regional forward conventional
operations against the Soviets in contrast to U.S. maritime
strategy and other allied writers.' My experience was that we
were farthest apart in terms of thinking about large strategic
concepts of operations from the French than we were from any
other ally. That having been said, we had absolutely no problem
communicating, however, what it was we were trying to do, with
the French Navy--which is conceptually the one navy which worries
about concepts in a very different way than all the rest of us. And we had no problem talking to them. And, we got, as near as I can tell, and I’ve never any disagreement since—we got just about total agreement operating at the level that we were doing, that we were addressing things just about right. But from their viewpoint, we had things about right. But in view of their national policy, worrying about global conventional war with the Soviets just isn’t a core defense problem that drives French strategy or French programming, as it is with us. So, in dealing with the one ally who was farthest away from us conceptually, we were very close together and were able to conduct—we just didn’t see it as a problem.

Now we listened very closely to the comments of the allied CNC’s and the allied planners when we had Navy-to-Navy talks and CNO-to-CNO talk, but we never got comments as we would get from some other people—but we don’t intend to do that or, we wouldn’t do that—because we knew what they were going to do. And we had a whole history of it, going back to the kinds of things that Mike’s talking about. 1953, we had our first big colossal NATO of Navy—it was called Mainbreak. And it took place in the Norwegian Sea. And it consisted of the strike fleet being screened and shielded and protected by the forces in EASTLANT which is largely a British and Dutch command. And then the strike fleet, which is composed largely of U.S. elements with some British and Dutch and Canadian contingents. Remember, in those days, Canada was the third largest allied navy in the world—and the strike fleet practiced—guess what, making sure we didn’t lose Norway, making sure we were capable if the National Command Authority decided to do so, going around North Gate, making sure it was protecting the amphibious operations that were obviously going to take place in the area, making sure that we didn’t lose Iceland, bottling up the Soviet Baltic Fleet which at that time was the strong Soviet fleet, and making sure that it couldn’t break out of the Baltic ports. We’ve been doing this.
In terms of complementarity, my favorite point on complementarity of navies and how navies look at problems—Mike Palmer pointed this out in his—a plug for Mike Palmer's book—he, in addition to articles that he wrote—also wrote a book called Stoddard’s Work and as he pointed out on page 56, ‘when we went to war with France’—yes, we went to war with France once, in the quasi-war in the late 18th century with France—where did we fight the war with France? In the Chesapeake? Off the coast of the United States? No, we fought it forward—we fought it in the Caribbean. We fought it away from our shores. It was how we wanted to fight—forward. You know, we’ve been doing this for a while and part of it is because that’s how naval officers view problems—Mahon, 1905. It’s not just us and it’s not just that problem. The thing that I was going to commend to you was any discussion in the open literature by the Germans—on how they plan on fighting their end of the war which is the Baltic, which as we talked about. We don’t envision, except in the more far out of contingency planning that we have to do, or in the more far out of war gaming that we have to do. But it isn’t central and it isn’t core—I don’t think it’s any great secret to anybody that it isn’t a central part of the national strategy to operate carrier battle groups in the Baltic. But the German Navy sure as hell is going to operate in the Baltic. And they know how they’re going to operate in the Baltic and they know what their problem is in the Baltic. And in any article, in any quote, anywhere you come up with—here’s a quote from the German White Paper—this is a joint document, this is the German MOD—you know, the German Navy has already sanitized by the jointness that permeates the German hierarchy and that largely means army—and the German Ministry which is very attuned to their own political set of peculiar political problems. This is a direct quote from German White Paper 85 which I think is the latest German White Paper that’s been translated to English. And it says that the German concept is ‘forward defense at sea.’ In accordance with NATO Commanders, maritime concepts of operations, ‘countering the
threat far from friendly sea routes and shores. Interdiction of
enemy naval forces should be effective immediately in front of
their own bases. Sound familiar? We did not need to go, Ron,
to the allies and have them check out every chapter and verse and
everything because we've just been working with them for so long
and we knew what the concepts were. And, as naval officers, both
in terms of all of us together as allied naval officers working
the problem together and then looking back in time--all the way
back to Mahon--naval officers approach the world in a certain way
and we know how to fight--I mean that's how we fight wars.
Cort Wagner

I wanted to address Ron's questions from an operational standpoint as well. From the standpoint that what I briefed this morning as a concept as to whether it’s a strategy or not, I do wish to emphasize that it is a concept, above and beyond--it’s very threatened-scenario dependent. And the actual execution of course is going to depend on the tactical situation at the time. Having said that, I think it's important that we take away, from our perspective at CINCPACFLT, the fact that we are, in fact, training the way we expect to fight.

The focus is on the Northern Pacific, as it's never been before. Historically, starting with FLEETEX 83-1, which had three carrier battle groups operating in the Northern Pacific, continuing up through the Vincent operations in the Bering Sea, the Ranger Surge, the operations in October of '86, we've greatly advanced our experience level. This has been complemented by a number of recent exercises in the Aleutians, the details of which I can't go into in this forum--but to include land-based carrier tactical aviation in Adiak, operating with U.S. surface ships, and with Air Force F-15's, to intercept Soviet strike aircraft, Bear aircraft that have been coming off against the Alaskan mainland. So our experience is increasing, to a great extent. I can't quote you the number of ship days in the Northern Pacific, but last year alone it was over 100 in 1986. That's a lot, for us. Considering where we've been before.

Turning to the subject of allies--the allies in the Pacific are very heavily involved. I've been fortunate to have attended three staff talks in the last year as CINCPACFLT representative. I went to Tokyo, Paris and to Sydney for Navy-Navy staff talks with those three countries. And at each particular staff talks, the OPNAV representative gave the current version of the maritime strategy. And it was exceptionally well received by all three countries. They are heavily involved--they were involved in the formulation as we've heard and they are currently being briefed at those staff talks.
In addition, we're undertaking measures to increase the interoperability in the Pacific because we're really ally-sparse in the Pacific. We don't have a lot of allies. Basically we've got Australia, we've got Japan, we're tied by treaties with the Philippines and Thailand. At the same time, though, just sketching out some of the exercises, we do the RIMPAC series every other year--RIMPAC '86 was a banner exercise lasting six weeks and involved the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Regrettably, in 1988, the United Kingdom will not be participating. But the exercise in 1988 looks to be a banner exercise, spanning about six weeks with operations between Hawaii and the west coast, starting next summer.

With Japan, we undertake a number of bilateral exercises outside the context of RIMPAC, including a series involving the JMSTF and U.S. Navy operations only and also combined exercises. We conduct a number of significant exercises with Korea every year, including Team Spirit, in the March-April time frame. The Cobra Gold series with Thailand, and we're increasing our exercise capability with the ASEAN nations, for example, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. The net impact of all this is an increased operability with our friends and allies in the Pacific. And it enhances our war fighting effectiveness, but more importantly, in the execution of a war fighting strategy. If we can build up that expertise with those allies, it allies us, at CINCPACFLT, to focus on the Northern Pacific, where we feel the genuine threat is.

Don Daniel--Question

I'd like to see if you can relate two things together. One of the things that you all haven't had time to deal with, and I'm not sure you may have time--the amount which you have left--but we've talked in a sense about the fertile ground that may have been there for thinking about maritime strategy, going back even to Mahon, going back to what was going on in the 30's, what was going on in the late 40's and the early 50's. There was a
period, however, somewhere in the 60's and in the 70's that we haven't had a chance to really go into in much detail here. But I would guess that that was not a particularly--at that time--fertile ground, for thinking in terms of development of maritime strategy thinking. At least I'd like to see what you all have to say about it. In other words, I think that there were people, for instance, like Admiral Heywood over here, who were, in their position, doing their best let's say to try to spike Naval thinking, to try to spike Naval strategic thinking. But my impression is that, because of the Vietnam War, because of the drastic drawback of U.S. naval forces in the early 1970's, that the Navy just simply had other things on its mind. And then because also of the defense guidance that came out of the Carter Administration in terms of talking about let's call it defensive sea control, connotate a movement back in terms of what the Navy was going to be doing. That also, let's say, in terms of maritime strategy thinking, certainly cannot be considered to be fertile ground for what was come out to be the maritime strategy. So I was wondering if someone could comment on that. And I think there's a relation to that, if I've gotten my history right, and I'm willing to say that maybe I haven't gotten it completely right, so you can inform me on that. But I'm willing to say that there's a relation between that and how maybe the allies have reacted to the maritime strategy. Because while we can say that the maritime strategy is consistent with the NATO maritime concept of operations, that type of thing--I think that many of the allies were saying--sure, the NATO maritime concept of operations existed, but that's not what we saw you guys doing, and in terms of your national debate, that's not what we saw you people saying--for instance, in the period of the 70's. So that you may be telling me that you've got this maritime strategy that's going to do all of these things and it's consistent with the past, but I don't happen to see it as consistent, not with what you were saying, let's say in terms of a NATO doctrine, but what we saw you actually doing. And that then relates to the
process of consultation. Whereas I think we can say that we didn't have to consult with the allies in terms of the strategy because we already knew what they were saying--I mean, I just came back from the same meeting that Ronald Warp was at, and I've had a good number of meetings with various people who come from the Naval War College--and I think that they will argue that in terms of what the Navy maritime strategy was about, there was much there that took them by surprise. Partly because, again, of the framework they were coming from. You know, what we were saying in the strategy--not what we were doing--if I can put it that way. And it's a kind of pendulum effect kind of thing. As a matter of fact, I think when the maritime strategy came out, they were saying--my God, you're not only doing what you said you were going to do in Marcom ops and that kind of thing, but you're doing even more of it than what you said you were going to do or what we thought you were going to do, and you're causing us quite a bit of concern.

That relates to Pete--your point about being self-satisfied. I would think that from the perspective of the allies, you ought not to be. And I think that remains the case today. I think you're the one that made a very good point that is just coming on line in terms of the allies--you know, this kind of a lag-lead problem. You know, the debate started up in the United States. It takes a while let's say for it to flow across the oceans. I think it has flowed across the oceans--it's there. And I think actually that the more important debate, frankly, is not between you all and John Meersheimer, but I think it's between you all and the people who are running those particular countries. The Johan Holts of the world. I think those are the people you have to worry about. And I don't think you have any sense of being sanguine at all.

Tritten

That's a rather extensive and very thought-provoking question which will lead us into the sessions this afternoon and
tomorrow--where we are specifically going to discuss the regional perspectives. Admiral Heywood is listed as a discussant, was certainly a major player in that and there's a Jim Patton in the room somewhere--he's gone--who I certainly would have liked to address that. But Roger Barnett will try to give you the short answer in a few minutes.

Roger Barnett

First of all, Don, I think you're right. There was a long period of time and I alluded to that in my talk--just had an opportunity to flesh it out in any detail--we just became mesmerized with two very important fundamental things. One was the Vietnam War and the other was the terrible shrinkage of the fleet. And superimposed on that, we had the McNamara approach to strategy and budgeting. You know, McNamara is quoted as saying, 'in my mind, I equate planning and budgeting and consider the terms almost synonymous.' And so we had to play on those terms. And the Navy created a Systems Analysis Division--somewhat larger, Admiral Heywood hit it off. And it was in very severe problems. In the period, for example, between 1966 and 1971, which is a very important period of time. If you rank the U.S. services in terms of their budget share, the Navy was last, through that whole period. And that's the period of time when the fleet's going away. The Navy was 3 of 3, through that whole period. And prior to that, for a long period of time, it was second in its budget share. And then it reached a long period of time in which the Navy was first out of three. That extended from '72-'83 and interestingly enough, in '83, is the maritime strategy's star's rising--the Navy falls to second place. And so, the whole notion that this is strictly a budgetary publicizing kind of approach, I guess if you talk in terms of service shares, it failed. But I think you're right--there really were some serious problems here and it began to turn around in Admiral Hollaway's time when he ordered some re-looks and re-issuance of NMDP-1. And began to pull in the concepts,
the strategic concepts of the Navy and then this was further implemented, perpetuated—analytical work was done for a 15 carrier, 600 ship in SEAPLAN 2000 which was the so-called 'three percent solution.' Was a 15 carrier Navy. And all the principles were there in SEAPLAN 2000 but it was constrained and forced to talk in budget levels and in ship levels because that was the language that was very important to deal with in those times. And so, it dealt with 1%, 2%, 3% solutions in terms of risk and uncertainty and those sorts of things. But the 3% solution, which was clearly the preferred one, was roughly 600 ships and a 15 carrier Navy—Battle SEAPLAN 2000.

And then along came Admiral Heywood with the background of Sea Stripe and he explicitly sought—and I know I'll get corrected if I'm wrong on this one—explicitly sought to reverse the Zumwalt approach. The Zumwalt approach was—let's pull back and defend the sea lanes and use sea control ships and that sorts of thing and perhaps deploy logistics types of things. But he explicitly wanted to go back to all the old original principles that had driven the strategy from the time of Mahon through the 30's, through War Plan Orange, through and with the very serious time in the 60's when there were very some very flat spots in strategic thinking—we were thinking about other things, you're right Don—to get it back. And Admiral Heywood published, in his Posture Statements, and in his testimony before the Congress, and in articles, his fundamental principles for the Navy, which included all these things. The Global View, the offensive forward projection operations. I felt it was explicitly designed to get away from the McNamara, Carter, Zumwalt approach and to put things once again on a visionary strategic approach.

On the question of the allies, Don, I alluded to that also by saying that you've got to appreciate that we were talking to military people almost exclusively—very few exceptions. And the military people were quite comfortable with them. And I recognize the fact that the politicians are not nearly so comfortable with it and they may have been surprised because it
does seem to them to be a change because maybe they hadn't been keeping up with Admiral Heywood and things that had been said in the late '70's. The trends have been going that way since the end of the Carter Administration.

Question--back to Don--Conference

At the conference that you alluded to, were the people who were expressing this concern, were they dressed like you or were they dressed like me?

Don Daniel

I said there were no uniforms at the meeting. They were a combination of some military people and some civilian people. I had a very high ranking Norwegian officer who is now retired--but extremely high ranking person, say--hey, you all developed this maritime strategy and ... ... ... and that didn't help in terms of what I was up to. And the process of consultation is as important as anything else--at this particular conference--particularly when he's working in a system where he has to worry--he certainly has to. And I think that that was a real problem. So you can say--hey we thought the allies were really on board ... ... as I say, I think the significant point of it today, is that I would not at all feel self-satisfied. But I do think John Meersheimer is not the problem--that's not the part of the debate that you ought to be concerned about. Where you ought to feel not self-satisfied at all is in terms of people in other countries who have decision-making authority--who are accountable to their party.

Pete Swartz

Response unintelligible--
Audience Response

I think we've got to be careful, however, and what you say is obviously very significant—not to lay too much of a trip on the U.S. Navy and on us for what we can reasonably be expected to do. This was, in fact, something that was devised by blue suit naval officers, ably supported by civilians who worked for, with and among us—to further the Navy and maritime section of the total national picture. As such, we coordinated and continue to coordinate, largely with allied naval officers, because that's the level at which we do things. You cannot have it both ways. You cannot accuse the Navy—one—not you, but one cannot have it both ways. One cannot accuse the Navy of coming up with a concept which is trying to drive the entire defense problem of the nation, which we in fact are not trying to do. We have tried to show how naval forces and other forces, working with the Navy, carry out its piece of the total problem. And then, at the same time, berate the Navy for not having cut in the Minister of Defense of Norway or a high ranking Norwegian Army official. We have done what we do at our level and we've done it reasonably well. And my suggestion would be—he might have gone, whoever he was—to SACLANT which probably never occurred to him in a million flipping years—spending most of his time going to SINCEUR—whoever he was—and asked him what the hell his plans were for the strike fleet. And he might have gone to the Norwegian Navy—whoever it was that he ever would have deigned to talk to in the Navy, because if you think inter-service problems are interesting with the U.S., our brethren overseas have it—and he might have asked the Norwegian Navy on how they planned on dovetailing their operations with the Royal Navy, the Dutch Navy and eventually the U.S. Navy. That's why I asked about color of uniform because I thought it was significant. And if we, in fact, have helped trigger, which we feel we have, the global dialogue, not only among navies, which frankly wasn't a problem—but between navies and armies and navies and armies and MODs, then we've done a good thing. And among researchers too.
Jim Tritten

Let me just have one final comment from Michael Palmer and then that will it—we're only 10 minutes only.

Michael Palmer

I'd just like to just it at the higher level ... ... strategies are devised within a context. And the context for 1946-47, the environment, strategies, the solution to the problem posed by the environment. '46-'47, the war is going to be primarily conventional, basically because we have a shortage of nuclear weapons. China's an ally—that gives us, in the Pacific, a very narrow focus, relative to the Pacific Theater later on. What you see, after beginning in 1949 is an erosion of that environment. Atomic weapons are becoming more available, we lose China, the entire Pacific becomes a theater of operations, an immense expansion of the problem for the Navy—looking at and searching for a strategic solution in the Pacific. And you have the Korean War, Taiwan crises, continual problem in Indo-China which again, just dilutes the Navy's view. They can't focus in the Pacific and this is a Pacific Conference.

That changes again, after 1975. Vietnam War is over, China becomes re-opened—our ties with China—that's not an ally, it's at least the enemy of our enemy. The Navy is able to focus again on the Northern Pacific. And yes we have lots of nuclear weapons, but we are beginning to plan more and more for the possibility that we won't use them and that, at least in the initial war, hopefully the war will be conventional. So what you're getting after 1975, when Admiral Heywood is out in the Pacific, is a period where the environment begins to resemble more and more that of 1946-1947—so they come up with a similar solution. What I think is just simply a maritime strategy. As long as that environment stays the same, I think basically the strategy will stay intact. If the environment starts to erode, anything's likely. But even with technological problems—somebody mentioned breakthroughs in submarine technology—even
that, I see it far from weakening the maritime strategy, would reinforce the kind of maritime strategy approach because if we can't find Soviet submarines out in the open ocean, then you have to get them at their bases, which is where they were in 1946. They couldn't find them, they couldn't destroy them. So maybe I'm more sanguine like you.

Jim Tritten

Well, as always, the historians have the last word. We'll now break for lunch which will be in the La Novia Room of Hermann Hall at 12:00, reconvening here at 2 this afternoon to see if those carrier operations that were described by Cort Wagner, are really driving the Soviets up the wall. Thank you.
Navy in the Pacific
Afternoon Session--Day One
13 August 1987

MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Chair: Dr. Howard Hensel - Air War College

I trust everybody had a chance to have a good lunch. My name is Howard Hensel, reflecting the joint focus of the Naval Postgraduate School--I'm from the Air War College. In any case, I'll be your chair for today. And I've been asked to make a couple of announcements before we actually begin.

First of all, we have a signup sheet for the campus tours at the Registration Desk. Thus far--to use the Soviet term--we have underfulfilled the plan regarding the number of people who've signed up for the campus tour. So, if you are interested, please sign up during the break. Second, after the break, there'll be a list of all participants in the conference. That is, who they are, their institutional affiliation and so forth. So you may want to go ahead and pick that up.

My role as chair for this second panel, which of course as you can see from your program, is entitled, 'Maritime Strategy and the Asia-Pacific Theater of Operations,' is largely like that of a small tugboat. My job is to pull the big ships up to the dock, get them to unload their cargo as expeditiously as possible, pull them away from the dock when their time is up, thereby clearing the way for the next of our large ships to pull up. Well, the first of our large ships to deliver its goods, as it were, is Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin, from the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Tsypkin was born in Moscow, came to the United States in 1977, received his Master's and Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. And then, following that, he was a Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. He currently, as I mentioned, is Assistant Professor and Coordinator of Soviet Studies here at the Naval Postgraduate
School. The title of his presentation will be, 'The USSR and Its Pacific Allies: The Effectiveness of Their Maritime Correlation.' Dr. Tsypkin.
USSR and Its Pacific Allies: Effectiveness of Their Maritime Correlation

Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School

Well thank you very much. If you look at the Asian-Pacific region from Moscow, it's very easy to grasp the immense significance of the area for the Soviets. This is the area where the two greatest, from the Soviet standpoint, geopolitical shifts of the post World War II occur. First, the Sino-Soviet split, which changed from the Soviet standpoint the correlation of forces drastically. And secondly, the communist victory in the Indochina War which again changed the correlational forces, reduced American influence in the Asian-Pacific region and pushed the United States and communist China, closer together. The current leadership in the Kremlin, as represented by Mr. Gorbachev, obviously is interested in the Pacific Region. Last year Gorbachev went to the Far East and made a speech at the Vladivostok, where he said--the situation of the Far East as a whole in Asia and adjacent ocean spaces, where we have been long time permanent dwellers and seafarers, is of great national and state interest. If you look at what the military analysts are saying, they see increasing importance of the Asian part of the Soviet Union in light of the decisions of the 27th Party Congress to build more manufacturing industries in Asian part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military analysis is that that would allow for greater redundancy and survivability of the Soviet industrial base in case of war in Europe. The military significance of Asian part of the Soviet Union is increasing under Gorbachev.

I will not discuss, in any detail, the Soviet military deployments to the area, because this will be a job for another, eminently better qualified panelist here. One thing I would like to note is that apparently the Soviets, although we have some
talk to the contrary, are still committed to growth of the blue water Navy and an interesting political indicator here is that Admiral Gorschkov, whose name, rightly or wrongly, is associated with the growth of Soviet maritime interests and naval capabilities, has consented to retirement which is very honorable. It is unusual for the Soviet Union--his biography was published--he gets high profile interviews in newspapers and so on and so forth. If the Soviets, if the idea of Soviet maritime growth was coming under serious criticism, the first sign would have been the complete disappearance of Admiral Gorschkov's name from Soviet mass media.

Now, naturally relations with Soviet allies are very important for the Soviet maritime policy in the region. The naval base at Cameron Bay has enhanced Soviet naval capabilities in the area and the Soviets also recently reactivated their military cooperation with North Korea.

It's important to emphasize here the Soviets are seeking the style of politics it such that they're seeking more than just access to bases. They're seeking more than just real estate. They're looking for military alliances where cooperation will serve as a multiplier of individual allies contribution. The Soviets, indeed, as far as we know, conducted some joint exercises with North Vietnamese forces off communist Vietnam and with North Korean forces, in the last 3-4 years. Again, military cooperation is not enough for the Soviets. Soviet military doctrine holds the view that the political viability of an alliance is as important as concrete military arrangements. And in the final analysis, the role of Soviet allies in the Asian-Pacific region would depend on Soviet politics. The overall Soviet political strategy in the Pacific will determine the ends to which their naval power is to be used, and the Naval requirements, including cooperation with allies, and the Kremlin's ability to obtain the necessary degree of cooperation from their allies in the Asian-Pacific region.
One thing we've learned about Gorbachev is that we cannot any longer count on repetitive insistence on every foreign policy formula which the Soviets have used from the demise of Khrushchev until the demise of Brezhnev. That Gorbachev and his supporters seem to relish a certain intellectual and political confusion in the West, brought about by his frequent contempt for several operational sacred cows of Brezhnev's policy. For that reason, we should not be ashamed to ask some basic questions about political framework in which Soviet decision making on national security, including the Soviet security in Asian-Pacific, will be taken. What I could say only is that the basic strategic imperatives of Soviet foreign policy are still with us. Yes, the Soviets still believe that the world is split irreversibly in two camps--capitalism and socialism. That socialism should advance; capitalism should retreat. And at some point, socialism should have final victory. Gorbachev said those things publicly and he said them privately. We were lucky to learn about that, to confirm how sincere his belief in that dogma is.

Again, the Soviets are still committed to global military political presence. They just fine-tune their language. They no longer say, as did Mr. Gromyko--no important international issue can be decided without the Soviet Union. Now the language is that of global political interdependency. But if you scratch this interdependency, you recognize the old Soviet dictum--that Soviet interests are global and the Soviets have the right to protect them and the obligation to further them, whenever possible.

Another related question would be--how the Soviets look on the shift in correlation of forces which has occurred under Brezhnev, this immense military political expansion. A typical answer is provided by a Pravda editorial on the case of Brezhnev's 80th anniversary--which severely criticized his domestic politics, but had no bad words to say about Brezhnev's achievements in the international arena--particularly his achievement of military strategic parity. And, across the
spectrum of statements by various Soviet officials, from military to political branches, you can find that the commitment to defending those geopolitical gains of Brezhnev and to further them, is unwavering.

So the strategic imperatives of Soviet international conduct remained unchanged. Just like the Soviet system itself, and it's the realities of that system, which make the Soviet leadership believe, in an apt phrase of Adam...--the Soviet leadership's internal security is extricably bound up with advance of its external power and authority.

At the same time, the Soviets, and Gorbachev himself, say that they're in a very special period of their historical development. Again, if you look through the rhetoric, the basic issue is that the Soviets would like to have to rebuild much of their industry, particularly to retool their defense industry. For that, they need sort of a breathing space of unspecified duration. And Gorbachev's very difficult job is to provide that breathing space for Soviet economy, without giving up Soviet geopolitical gains and without foreclosing an opportunity for further advances. And this breathing space is to be achieved by a combination of arms control measures aimed at preserving the favorable correlation of forces--favorable from the Soviet point of view--achieved under Brezhnev, but perhaps at a lower level so the Soviets have to pay less without losing any of their geopolitical positions. And it also is to be achieved by very active diplomacy, aimed at weakening opposing alliance systems and strengthening Soviet alliances.

The Soviets are essentially looking for a different style of foreign policy. Again, as an authoritative piece in Pravda said, we have to learn the science of the art of being circumspect and reserved in international arena. And I would posit that it's easier to say than to do this, for the Soviets. There is a clear contradiction between this unchanged Soviet strategic imperative, and the attempts to gain a breathing space. This contradiction
will definitely be reflected in how the Soviets work on their relationship with their allies of Asian-Pacific region.

If you're Gorbachev and you're trying to gain breathing space in Asian-Pacific region, the first thing to do would be to defuse the tensions in Sino-Soviet relations. But it's still the basic conflict in the area and its novelty and explosiveness are gone. Trade and other contacts between the two communist powers are increasing. But ideological and geopolitical roots of the conflict remain. The Soviets still--action under Gorbachev, the Soviets have activated their attempts to relead the world communist movement again. And this has traditionally been a very considerable irritant, from the point of view of the Chinese, who have always suspected the Soviets of a desire to control the whole world communist movement.

Again, even closer to doorstep of China, the Soviets, as recently as last month, organized a conference of 21 Asian-Pacific communist and leftist parties. And organizes Mongolia, whose domination by the Soviet Union, has always been a thorn in the side of Beijing. And I would say that from the point of view of China, which is less susceptible to Soviet public relations gimmicks than the west, this type of classical Soviet behavior is much more important and speaks more about the real Soviet intentions--that all the talk about new talking which we hear from Gorbachev.

The Sino-Soviet conflict is directly related to the state of Soviet alliance with Vietnam. Because the most intractable problem in Asian-Pacific region, as far as Soviet interests are concerned, which poisons both Soviet relations with China and Soviet relations with non-communist nations in the Pacific area, is the Vietnam occupation of Cambodia. The Chinese, for one, have conditioned any serious improvement in Sino-Soviet relations on Vietnam's pulling out of Cambodia. The Soviets, on the one hand, seem to appreciate the sensitivity of this issue. But, under Gorbachev, with all the talk about relaxation of tensions and new thinking, the Soviets have been giving indications that
they're prepared to draw Cambodia into the socialist "commonwealth" whose defense and integrity the Soviet Union is committed. For several years under Brezhnev, the Soviets were reluctant Cambodia as a full-fledged socialist state. Now, under Gorbachev, they started doing that. First the Secretary of Central Committee, responsible for foreign policy, Anatoli Dobryin, ranked Cambodia with other communist nations. Then, General Secretary Gorbachev, speaking in Vladivostok, did the same thing. And most recently, last March, a joint Soviet-Cambodian communique, spoke about the relations between the two nations based on principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. This is a very clear signal as to where Cambodia is heading. So apparently we have hardening of Soviet position--Cambodia is consistently drawn into socialist commonwealth. And the Soviets must realize that the chances of improved relations with China and with non-communist Asian-Pacific nations will suffer. But the importance of solidifying an alliance, firmly controlled from Moscow, which is a traditional strategic imperative for the Soviets, appears to outweigh in practice the potential benefits of removing a major irritant like Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, in Sino-Soviet relations.

One reason the Soviets do it is the operational style of their foreign policy, which gives preference to a course of action certain to bring positive results, over any uncertain benefits. And given the turbulent history of Sino-Soviet relations, and the scale of differences between the two communist superpowers, the Soviets might suspect that if they make one concession to China, that'll be a prelude to more requests.

As far as the position of the United States and her friends on the Cambodian issue, the Soviets probably hope that if they resist the demands from the west and from the west's allies in the Pacific, to pull out from Cambodia, long enough, the United States and other critics of Soviet policy, would simply walk away.
from the issue, as has happened many times with examples of Soviet expansion.

Another important thing about Soviet-Vietnamese relations is the political significance that Vietnam has acquired for Gorbachev personally. It has become the unlikely laboratory for an attempt of Gorbachev's style restructuring outside the Soviet Union. Vietnam is the first pro-Soviet communist country, to undergo a top leadership change since Gorbachev came to power. And Gorbachev's restructuring has not been greeted too much anywhere among any of its allies. And now he's emphasizing how close the Soviet and Vietnamese communists are, how they have a common goal of restructuring and apparently what's happening in Vietnam is strengthening his domestic legitimacy which is important for him and reduces even further, any Soviet desire to press Vietnam to move out of Cambodia.

And the Soviet position on the Cambodian issue exemplifies this contradiction between Soviet strategic imperatives, when they need and the need to expand and to consolidate the expansion and to expand further and at the same time, to show flexibility to gain this breathing space. But that flexibility is mostly verbal. On one occasion they would drop the reference to protecting Vietnam's interests in any dealing with China. At another occasion, they'll resurrect the reference. But it doesn't go any further than that. As far as I'm concerned, the Soviet's relations with Vietnam will continue to move in the present direction to get closer. That, in its own turn, will increase tensions in the Asian-Pacific region and increase both requirements for Soviet naval presence there and will give the Soviets greater possibilities for their naval presence.

Relations with the other Soviet ally, North Korea, are quite different. North Korea has for years maneuvered between China and the Soviet Union. From 1984 on, the pendulum has swung into the direction of cooperation with the Soviet Union. There's military cooperation, there's increased economic aid from the Soviet Union, and the Soviets, interestingly, are building a
direct rail link between the Soviet Far East and North Korea, which will not go through China's territory. It's all quite interesting.

But there are certain problems in the effectiveness--certain obstacles toward the effectiveness of Soviet-Korean military cooperation. First of all, the Soviets do not share their concern about China, with North Korea. North Korea does not have a history of hostility with China. At the same time, the Soviets have no interest in any North Korean designs of military action against South Korea. For the time being, Gorbachev's policy is to avoid any major confrontation with the United States. And underwriting any North Korean ventures in that area would be very unlikely for the Soviets. So that, again, is another obstacle toward genuine military alliance.

The greatest opportunity for the Soviets will be once the North Korean leader, Kim el Sung, dies and there will be a succession struggle in Korea. And that is the moment when they will try to move in and to gain a firmer foothold in Korean policies. In the meanwhile, the Soviets will proceed to move cautious.

Now just let me discuss one last question and be over with. What about another option--Gorbachev's grand scheme in the Pacific? The one he proposed during his speech in Vladivostok. End to military alliances, pull out of foreign troops, naval arms control, creation of a system of common security. The problem with that proposal is that it's both unrealistic and self-serving. It's a classical combination characteristic of foreign policy. On the unrealistic side, it ignores the role of Sino-Soviet conflict and how profound it is. The Soviet leaders are intellectually unequipped because of the Marxist-Leninist dogma, to confront squarely the issue of a profound conflict between two communist states. And they're not going to address the roots of that conflict as long as they remain communist.

Another reality they ignore is that the Soviets--they'll try to ignore--is the reality that any regional security arrangement
requires political status quo and protection. As long as the Soviets are committed to promoting political change in the Asian-Pacific region, and benefitting from it—as long as they organize an affair such as this meeting of 21 communist and leftist parties from the region—as long as they serve as mentors to political forces, opposition political forces in other countries, any regional security arrangement would collapse sooner or later.

As for their naval arms control proposals, they're clearly self-serving. First of all, they serve to drive the wedge between the United States and China. Whipping up of China's fear of a superpower condominium at their expense. To do the same in the relations between the United States and her other friends and allies in the Pacific.

As for the Helsinki-type security system in the area, the Soviets would use it to manipulate American friends, again by whipping up their fears about their possible behind-the-back dealings with the United States. And secondly, the Soviets really have a considerable advantage because of the asymmetry in political systems. The West needs formal, legal structure for her alliances. The Soviets can do it quite well—for 7 years they controlled Warsaw Pact countries without any Warsaw Pact and controlled it very effectively. If we have a security arrangement like Gorbachev proposed in the Pacific, it will prevent the United States from activating its alliances and will not interfere with what the Soviets are doing.

Just to warp up—and I've taken too much time already—I'd like to say that the Soviets are working on their alliances to serve their maritime interests. That there is no reason to think that there is going to be any significant change which will suddenly reduce Soviet commitment to expanding their naval power in the Pacific and that we'll have to live and deal with it for the foreseeable future. Thank you.
Second of our large ships to unload here at our dock is Rear Admiral Robert Hanks. Admiral Hanks retired from the United States Navy in 1977, after 35 years of very distinguished service. Since then, he has served as senior political military analyst with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. He has written very extensively, as I'm sure a good many people in this audience knows. Admiral Hanks' topic will be 'U.S. and Pacific Allies: Maritime Interdependence.' Admiral Hanks.

U.S. and Its Pacific Allies: Maritime Interdependence
Rear Admiral Robert Hanks, USN (Ret.)

Admiral Heywood, Admiral Austin, distinguished guests, ladies and gentleman. Prior to the conference, all of the panelists were enjoyed by the director to think crisp, keep the remarks to a minimum and I want to assure them that I plan to do that. My wife complained at one time that I was the only fellow who ever went through flight training in Pensacola, Florida and got sunburned on the roof of my mouth. At that time, I decided to become to advocate of the school of public speaking, which I believe was reputed to have been originated by Abraham Lincoln in which he said there are three basic rules: stand up to be recognized, speak up to be heard, and shut up to be appreciated. That last injunction is going to be fairly easy to follow. Because the final remarks that Mike Palmer made just before lunch and Steve Jaurique's masterful presentation after lunch, to use a new buzz word that is very popular in Washington, essentially shredded my presentation. So as a result, I've had to put the rudder hard right, do a Williamson turn which all you sailors will understand, regroup and redo my notes. So I hope you'll bear with me if it appears to be a bit disjointed. I'll try not to repeat many of the things that were said and perhaps take some others with a little different point of view.

First of all I must say that in all of my service in the Navy and certainly in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has
convincing me that since 1945, the focus of U.S. national security planning has been essentially centered in Western Europe, with the Pacific being neglected. That has been true, administration after administration. However, in the past decade, certain new imperatives have emerged in the Pacific, primarily trade, which have attracted the attention of people in the United States. And I think have finally focused strategic attention on this part of the world that it so richly deserves. You saw the figures on trade this morning. I would add to them the fact that the two largest GNP's in the world today belong to the United States and Japan. And I would make one argument with the map that you see in front of you. And that is that it does not include the Indian Ocean. Those two great bodies of water are interconnected by the passages through Indonesia, Torus Strait which Steve Jaurique described to you at lunchtime, the passages around Australia. They are interconnected. The nations in the Far East are heavily dependent on trade with the Indian Ocean just as we are in the United States. And I think they have to be taken as an entity and they have to be viewed in strategic terms in that fashion.

In addition to trade, I think the other great factor that we have to keep in mind in the problem of mutual security. And here I would like to refer you to the Guam document which was enunciated by President Richard Nixon in 1969. After Henry Kissinger and his staff had energized the bureaucracy in Washington, they came to the conclusion that the commitments the United States had undertaken around the world, were far greater than the military wherewithal to underwrite them. As a result, the President said--from now on, as far as the United States was concerned, defense of individual nations will be an individual responsibility. You can no longer count on the United States to defend your country for you.

Primarily that meant the manpower that was required, would have to be provided by the country who felt itself imperiled. Then he went on to say that for those countries who could not afford to buy the necessary military equipment and training, the
United States would provide it, for free in many cases. And we have done so over the years. He further indicated that in the event a country in which the United States were involved, was imperiled by some external force, that the United States would consider committing the high technology end of the military, that is, naval forces and air forces, to give them a hand. And unspecified but certainly implied was the notion that ultimately if the stakes were high enough, we might introduce ground troops. That was the Guam Doctrine.

Despite the buildup in the United States Navy under the Reagan Administration, the modernization that's gone on in the other armed forces in the United States, the tenets of the Nixon Doctrine, as its come to be known, still obtain. The United States simply cannot police all the waters of the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. That means it's got to be a mutual effort.

Now I won't bore you with a review of the changes that have been made since 1945 because they were covered this morning. But I would like to highlight a couple. I think the first profound change was Mao Tse Tung's triumph on Mainland China. That produced a profound shift in the balance of power in the Pacific Far East. That was reversed, to an extent, following the infamous Cultural Revolution and the Sino-Soviet split to the point that China has now turned its face to the West and become, if you will, somewhat of a force for stability in the region.

The abject U.S. retreat from Vietnam was followed by immediate Soviet overtures to Vietnam and then the movement of Soviet forces into former American bases in that country. And that was also profound. For the first time, the Soviet Union has sizable military bases far from Soviet shores and believe me, as you've heard this morning, they're using them. From Cameron Bay, they can put all of Southeast Asia at risk. All you have to do is draw a few bomber range curves, take a look at the ships and submarines that they're operating out of those ports and you'll recognize the extent of the problem. Particularly when you place
them in proximity, as they are, to the major trade lines that connect the Indian Ocean with the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

So we've got a whole new ballgame. And that has been further complicated by what I choose to call an unraveling in traditional Western solidarity which has obtained since 1945. First of all, South Korea is presently undergoing serious turmoil which has two potential impacts in so far as the free world is concerned. First of all, it is bound to weaken the Korean defenses against their northern neighbor. And no one is quite sure what the aging Kim El Sung will do. Whether he, as one last gasp before he passes on to whatever reward he gets--he will try once again with military force, to reunify the peninsula. The second impact is that we don't know what kind of a government the South Koreans--what they want, nor what kind are they ultimately going to get. It could be one that is hostile to the west. And this, of course, would expose the western flank of Japan, which is a main linchpin, if you will, to mutual security in the Pacific.

And while we're talking about unraveling, I would move a little bit further south and talk about the Philippines for a minute. The rise to power of Corizano Aquino has cast a very, very large cloud over the status of our two major military bases in that part of the world--Subic Bay, of course, and Clark Field. I would argue respectfully, with Steve, that there are no viable alternatives to those two bases. Now, Ul.... is a hell of a big harbor. But the one thing he mentioned is not available there--it's not available in Guam, it's only available in Japan and that's the skilled work force. And I see no way at all of getting it even if you went in there and built the most enormous naval base and air base in the Western Pacific.

Further south of course we have our friends, the New Zealanders, who apparently forgotten the lessons of 1941 and 1945. At that time, as the Japanese juggernaut was rolling southward, reaching for Port Morris... within striking distance of Australia and New Zealand, the New Zealander's troops were
ghting in the western desert against Rommel and they were
ingering like bloody murder to please get their troops home to
defend them. Apparently, time erodes one’s memory. They have
forgotten that it was Japanese sea power which cordoned off the
entire Asian continent from the Arctic to the Indian subcontinent
and very nearly moved on south to take those lands down under.
The Soviet Union, with their move into Indochina, with a vastly
expanded reach and increased technology of their naval and air
forces today, have far more capability with the exception of the
amphibious landing capability, which the Japanese had, and was
present during those troublesome years. The Australians, still
adhering to the ANZA’s pact, apparently remember. Obviously the
New Zealanders do not and it may well be that we’ll have to
remind them of that. However, gently it be done, Steve.

So, where’s all this leave us? First of all, I think
there’s absolutely no question that this is a maritime region.
It’s as maritime as the North Atlantic from which NATO takes its
name. The distances are incredibly greater, the trade now is
much much greater, and that which is important to the economic
and political well-being of a country in peacetime, could well
become critically important in time of war. And if those sea
lanes which traverse those waters in that part of the world, were
to severed by the Soviet Union in its advanced reach, it could
mark the end of some of the countries in Southeast Asia. So
while I agree with Steve that we can do an awful lot with port
visits, with helping hands, with talking to our friends down
there, in the right manner, we have to realistic. We live in a
power-political world. And we must never forget that. We have
to convince the Australians and the New Zealanders and the
nations of ASEAN and the Philippines and the Japanese in
particular, that there is a threat, that the United States can
not be depended upon to go it alone, and that the only way that
we’re going to survive is to do it together. Now none of those
countries have navies that are capable of mounting the kinds of
defenses which are necessary. But they do have ports, they do
have air fields and they have other facilities which they can make available to countries who do have that power. And it's this kind of cooperation which can go a long way toward ensuring that deterrence of Soviet ambitions in that part of the world are continued.

At the signing of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Franklin told his cohorts--we all must hang together or surely we will hang separately. And I would suggest that that phrase ought to hang in the office of every political leader in the Pacific Far East. Thank you very much.
Dr. Hensel

The third speaker this afternoon will be Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Marshall received his advanced degree from the University of Chicago and served with Rand Corporation from 1949 to 1972. Following that, he was the National Security Council and, of course, since late 1973, he's been with the Office of Net Assessment. Mr. Marshall's topic today will "USSR vs. the United States Maritime Capabilities in the Pacific."

U.S. vs. USSR Maritime Capabilities in the Pacific
Mr. Andrew Marshall
Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense

What I wanted to talk to you about in some ways diverges a little bit from the announced topic. I want to come back to that. But I also, before doing that, wanted to talk about two other things. One is to talk some about the way in which you might try and structure a look at the comparative capabilities—just to highlight, I think, the complexity of that, and also how different the situation in the Pacific and Asia is from that in Europe, where most people have focused their attention. The second thing I really want to talk to you about is how different I think the future is going to be and therefore it also serves as a qualifier to what I am going to say about, I think, what one would currently assess the balance of forces there. But I think also raises questions about essentially everything you've heard thus far in the meeting in the following sense. Asia is probably going to remain the area of strongest economic growth—I mean the key countries there. And if you're looking 15 or 20 years ahead, the cumulative effect of these differential rates of growth can have—it's hard to say, will have—but could have just enormous effects. Admiral Hanks, I think, already mentioned that the Soviet Union is no longer the second biggest economy in the world. The Japanese are. According to some work that Charlie
Wolf and I--Charlie Wolf at Rand--and I are doing, looking at the future security environment, it seems likely that by the year 2010, the Soviet's will be the fourth with China probably surpassing them. And it's indeed plausibly be 40% bigger than them by that time. Now, there are a lot of uncertainties in this. Not only the projections, but in my view, we don't even know the relative size of the Soviet economy to U.S. economy at the current time, with any exactitude--I mean the CIA view is that it is about 55%. But speaking for myself, it's more like 40%. And if you speak to or have various emigre Soviet economists, a look at some of the things that have been coming out of the Soviet Union written by very good economists, going back over the historical record and correcting the past claims of growth, you find that if you believe them--and again talking to various Soviet emigres, who feel that these people are very very good, competent technical people in the Soviet Union--that basically the Soviet Union has not grown relative to the United States from 1950 to the present. And if you believe that, then it's much more credible that the real size of the Soviet economy may be about 40%, maybe as low as 35%. It's an economy that allocates its resources dramatically differently than we do, with a lot more going into the military area. So it doesn't mean that they're weak. What it means is that over time, the situation may change. And in any case, along with this matter that I mentioned to you about the Chinese probably passing them in the early part of the next century and beginning to grow significantly beyond them, if you assume that the Chinese beginning in the latter part of this century, follow what appears to be their strategy of moving finally to the modernization of the military establishment and moving back to putting say 10% of GNP into defense, I mean they quickly, sort of around 2000, are spending 45% as much as we and the Soviet Union are, on defenses. And by 2010, about 3/4 what the Soviets might be projected to be spending then. And that's just going to be a different world out there. One doesn't know what--if only in reaction to this Chinese growth, what the
Japanese might do, the Indians, I mean I think that we have to have real questions about what that region of the world is going to look like. And the potential for fairly sizable military capabilities.

Another, I think important thing, to think about—especially about the future, is if you read Soviet military literature at the moment, in fact you can trace it back to the late 70's—I mean, they are foreseeing essentially a revolution in military affairs that will take place in a serious way, beginning perhaps around '95, but in a more dramatic and fuller way in the early part of the next century, due to a wave of new technologies. Now the things they talk most about are the technologies that affect theater warfare. But presumably they are thinking also in the naval area and again, you know, I think that may have a dramatic effect on the kind of strategies and concepts of operations—they certainly feel that is what they are going to have to do and indeed, probably already are hard at work thinking about it in some of the areas they focus more on—such as theater warfare, ground force combined arms, warfare in that connection.

So I'm not sure what all the implications of this are. But I'm saying I have, in the background—I want you to have in the background of your thinking—I think the next 20 years or so is going to be a period of very, very significant change with the shifting of the rankings of various countries in terms of size, their GNP, perhaps military expenditures, this wave of technology that may transform things. Although it's very likely that while the world will be one where there appears to be movement of many more countries, moving into armament manufactures—for this new wave of technology, probably that will be much narrower. Probably only initially ourselves and the Soviet Union. The Japanese if they move in that direction.

So with those two kinds of things as forewords, let's go back and talk about the main subject of the talk. If you're thinking about the comparative U.S. capabilities in any region, it seems to me that you need to try to understand what the game
is in the region. And one of the things that's distinctive about the Pacific and Asia, that it's a kind of multi-player--more than two player--game. And again, if you're talking about these projections, it's going to be even more so. The other players are going to get stronger relative to the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

In Europe, where most people are accustomed to thinking about it, it's like two teams--I mean there's problems about whether the teams hang together and so on, but nonetheless it's sort of like two teams. Asia isn't like that. Right from the beginning, it's a much more complicated situation. And because of that, you can begin to look at the situation, the contingencies within which you want to assess the forces--into whether this is one of the fronts in a global war or whether there are regional conflicts into which the U.S. and the Soviet Union are drawn or have some influence on. And it makes a big difference in judging things. If you're looking at the second front, or seeing it as another front, it was suggested this morning by Michael Palmer, and others--they do a very fascinating history as to what that front looks like, to the Soviets, to ourselves, because of the changing nature of the situation. And you see it again on the Soviet side where you can only make rough estimates--but say around 1965, perhaps 15% of their military effort was going to Asia and the Pacific region. It's more like 25% now. If you remove the Vietnam bulge, ours has been almost in a steady decline and the issue is--I think before us--will be whether we turn up as Admiral Hanks was saying, because of the recognition of the trade and the general economic importance of the area.

I would add one other thing to that which people have tended to--or our country has tended to neglect--and that is, one of the byproducts of this rapid technological, economic growth in Asia, has been sort of a migration of part of the American technological base, supply of components for our military forces over to Asia. Now people haven't worried so much about it,
because I think in the past, because we've sort of gone out of the worrying about mobilizations that are fought with whatever you had. But now, it was suggested earlier, both we and the Soviets and very definitely in the Soviet view of things, are increasingly focusing on wars in which they either may never go nuclear, or that have a very extended—several weeks, several months—conventional phase, before there's some transition to nuclear warfare. In that circumstance, given stockpiles and so on, you're going to want to maintain your access to the supply of these components. How are you going to do that? That's going to have to interact very strongly with your war plans or you're going to have to have a different, better base here domestically that can be turned on in circumstances of this sort. So that poses a major problem.

So let me then run quickly over the situation in the Pacific. It's been mentioned by several of the speakers—the great transit distances, the size—Manchuria is the size of Western Europe—I mean, just the whole scale is big. And I think one of the reflections that I feel of the fact of this Europe-orientation has been that we've tended to build aircraft—much better tailored to the European theater than in the Pacific. And when you get out there, one of the other things you see is a kind of mismatch—one of the asymmetries between ourselves and the Soviet Union—that they have adequate range of their weapons to reach most targets. We have problems. And in order to bring to bear our forces, we have to fight our way in. Have a naval campaign—ASW campaign—to move and bring our forces in. We don't have, in our inventories, the medium-range type of bomber type of weaponry. What we have is really allocated to other theaters and CINCPAC has been trying to get some of the F-111's out there for a long time. But I mean, it's a big struggle. There's a kind of tendency to have a kind of mismatch.

Another major kind of asymmetry, the U.S. bases are on a few key islands widely separated. The Soviets are mainly continental bases, with much of the infrastructure dispersed well inland.
What I’m referring to here is obviously not the naval bases and so on, but bomber bases. One of the main instruments of the Soviets are pursuing in naval warfare are cruise missiles launched from long range land-based aircraft. So if we’re going to take them on there, you’ve got to go after those bases. And that’s one of the reasons or one of the things that leads to this problem of the requirement for range.

If you look at the key operations in a war, one is the air battle over Northeast Asia. Second—this naval campaign, which as I say, is an ASW effort and other naval operations, to move our carrier task forces close enough to use our weapons effectively against Soviet targets.

Another thing that we, at least, speculate about, is the likelihood given the nature of our basing system, and the limited number of headquarters—of a Soviet C²I campaign, probably being a good bet, as part of their operations there. The thing is, that the Soviets, on the C²I area, have a lot more sites—they’re hard, difficult to disrupt, probably as compared with ourselves. We have a number of opportunities for improvements. Things are already happening. The TLAM deployments provide more survivable capabilities, increase our conventional strike options, air defense upgrades, both we and the Japanese are doing some things in that area that are very helpful. And then, as we say, more longer range aircraft—I’ve already talked to that. We don’t have enough in our general inventory to deploy out there. Maybe to get some—something to thing about for the next generation of weaponry—I mean, how do we get longer range weaponry into that theater?

Let me close with just a few words which I think are very important, in making any assessment which really is on the Soviet perspective of the situation. My own guess, for the reasons that I mentioned earlier, about the differential economic growth, and the technological capabilities of a number of the Asian countries, I think they have to be very concerned over the longer run—as to how they’re going to manage that situation. It’s
clear that the Chinese and from '65, have become a focus of a lot of their military attention--movement of all the forces out there. And so I think that this is actually one of the parts of the world where, in an overall sense, the trends are fundamentally favorable. I mean, there are all these problems that have been talked about in terms of our own position and the difficulties of the diplomacy of the area and the maintenance of alliances. But the fundamental situation--I mean, if you see it fundamentally as a U.S.-Soviet competition in the region, probably the fundamental situation is going much more against them than against us.

Now because of the points I made at the beginning, I mean, the whole nature of what we think the problem out there is, might change. And people need begin thinking a little bit more about the longer term future and considering alternative worlds that might exist--situations that might exist--about 2010, 2020. Thank you.
The final speaker for the chaired portion of our panel here this afternoon is Mr. Richard Haver, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence. Mr. Haver received his degree from Johns Hopkins University, served with the Navy for five years, three of which were as a naval aviator. And since 1973, he has been with the Office of Naval Intelligence. Mr. Haver will be offering his comments on the remarks you've just heard, as well as hopefully adding his own twist to it all too.

Richard Haver
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence

Thank you. I'm not sure which briefing to give--either the one on these or the one that was promised in the morning session. I'm really just an intelligence analyst, which I find in the Washington area is as highly revered as lawyers, stockbrokers and accountants. And I'm reminded of the convention of intelligence analysts that went out on a fishing trip in the Atlantic a few weeks ago and sighted a school of sharks and rushed to see this group. One of the analysts fell overboard and was promptly thrown back aboard--professional courtesy being offered by the sharks. Of course, you can use that for lawyers or anybody else you hold in high esteem.

In trying to summarize what I heard from Misha and the Admiral and Andy Marshall, it seems to me that the first presentation tried to take a look at the Asian situation, the Pacific basin from the point of view of Moscow--being in Monterey perhaps. But still a lot closer to Moscow than most of us will ever get. And what I heard was essentially a series of problems, challenges, things that obviously, unless the Soviets try to take some specific action, could go against them. Whether it's their situation in Vietnam, fraught with opportunity but also peril, in terms of the Sino-Soviet situation, as well as their attempt to isolate the U.S.
And I heard almost the reverse of that from Admiral Hanks—that, if you will, the view from Alexandria, Virginia or Washington. Again fraught with problems, pitfalls, many conflicting objectives and a serious concern about whether our allies and those in the Pacific region, share our concerns and whether we can pull that coalition together.

And then I think, what Andy came across with, was an interesting view of many of these present problems are only going to grow significantly more complicated. And it seemed to me that Andy laid out what the complicating factors were, and admitted, as I'm sure almost all of us would, that we don't understand how those problems will turn out over the course of the next 20 years. Probably the one thing that's certain is that anything we estimate today, as to what will be the prevailing reality 20 years from now, is unlikely to be correct. There is more likely to be things unanticipated in terms of both the politics and economic situation, as well as perhaps the military balance in Asia than any other area. Europe seems to be reasonably stable, has been for 40 some odd years, and there seems to be a great deal of factors working in favor of stability—you could call it stagnation perhaps, if you're not a European interested individual. But the change that everyone seems to think will come over the course of the next two decades, is believed to focus here in Asia. There will be change in Africa and other locations, perhaps South America. But the most dynamic change, from just about everyone—not only here today, but many other folks who are not—seems to be a consensus that it will be in the Pacific region. Of course, presenting us all with a series of challenges.

It seems to me, also, hearing the comments this morning and then this afternoon—we really are talking, when we talk about our maritime strategy in relationship to this area, about four different conditions, all clearly interlocked, all difficult to concern, one from the other, at least as they begin to unfold, but distinctly different. One is the clear peace situation
that exists today--call it violent peace, whatever term you please--but obviously the open warfare on any large scale, is not presently evident in Pacific area. Of course, if you sweep in, and I agree with Admiral Hanks you should sweep in the Indian Ocean, the situation in the Persian Gulf is about as close to a major limited war as you'd like to get.

The next phase is clearly that limited war, whether it's another Vietnam, or another Korean War or a major open civil situation in the Philippines. Obviously, that's a stage of conflict that might not necessarily involve the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a direct confrontation, might not necessarily require those coalitions that we would, both sides seem to be striving to create, to be brought in their full weight to bear on the situation--but will obviously cause a realignment of the political situation.

The third one is one that Andy just alluded to and is clearly a major concern in the Washington area right now. And I assume, in one respect, it's a concern in Washington because it's been a concern in Moscow for perhaps even longer--is the notion that we could have, and in fact a belief perhaps that it is now the more likely of the serious consequences of the present East-West struggle, a third world war that does not necessarily go nuclear in a very short period of time, and is not decisively decided by conventional arms in a similarly short period of time. But is rather--as the Soviets would put it--a protracted struggle. One that turns more into the World War I or World War II conditions than is the one that was apparently prevalent in Soviet military thinking for about 30 years or so, and that is that the only way the West would compensate the Soviet conventional superiority was with nuclear weapons--and that's with retaliation, etc. And that would drive us. That the U.S. and its allies were deliberately allowing themselves to be conventionally weak, and sitting behind a cheaper nuclear hammer. The Soviets seem to believe, and this has been articulated in many forms by them, that nuclear parity and improvement in the
West's political and military solidarity makes it more likely that war will last longer, be more violent and more destructive in terms of conventional munitions, and not necessarily cause a nuclear trigger to be reached.

And then of course the last one, which, despite all that optimistic thinking—if you can talk about Third World War as an optimistic thought—of course is that it will not go into a nuclear phase. If it does, obviously everyone has to be prepared for that, because if one is not prepared, one invites it. It seems to me from what we've said there are at least three major factors that influence how these four various forms of conflict could manifest themselves. One is the basic economic strength of the member states of any particular coalition or those sitting on the sidelines, and how well those alliances and coalitions work.

The second is the military balance itself. You can't get away from the pure calculation of who has the upper hand. Despite Glasnost and all the rest of it, I, for one, firmly believe that the Soviets still go to bed each night weighing what the correlation of forces is in the world. Who does have the upper hand? If the situation obtains where military force has to be brought to bear, who is likely to prevail in that encounter? It still, it seems to me, drives a great deal of their procurement, drives the way resources are allocated within the Soviet State. I don't doubt that Mr. Gorbachev would like to alter it. Would like to, as Misha put it, defuse that--buy time--give the Soviet economy a chance to catch its breath and modernize and rebuild itself. But that doesn't change the imperative to be strong today and to continue to be strong.

And lastly, and it was discussed this morning, I think is the quality of the strategy. Not simply the quality of the armament, or even the training that the people receive—but whether the strategy is executable, whether it's sound and whether it can, in effect, be used to the other side's disadvantage. I, for one, believe that the Soviets are not lying in that little book that was held up today—the maritime strategy
or call it the U.S. military force and how it would be used does bother the Soviets. I, for one, believe the Soviets ascribe that strategy to us long before Roger articulated it and the CNO's backed it up. I believe that, in effect, the Soviets have always examined our capabilities first and then, in the absence of any clearcut strategy, took a look at what would be the worst thing that could be done with it and that became the strategy. I think that they view today as unfortunate, is that we are now verbalizing that openly and starting to address the issue of not only the procurement of weapon systems, but also, as was also touched on this morning, the arrangements of our alliances and coalitions, to fit in to a strategy more directly.

What bothers the Soviets in the Far East the most, I believe without question—the Soviets believe that their situation in the Far East is precarious. I believe that the Soviets hold that for three fundamental reasons. One is China and the fact that any major conflict in which the Chinese cannot be ruled out, in terms of a belligerent against the Soviet Union, will tie down Soviet resources. The Soviets cannot afford to denude themselves in the Far East, if the Chinese pose a present threat. And when I say China, I think from the Soviet viewpoint, they see China and Japan and Korea in almost the same sentence—not necessarily as a united alliance, not necessarily a group of people who are in love with one another, but people who may be united against the Soviet Union. And if you will, their more Western orientation in terms of the Far East. That is first and foremost. And as a result, anything that we do—and this was one of the essences of Admiral Heywood's sea strike issue some 10 years ago—anything that makes it appear as though the U.S. is going to stay in the Pacific, that the U.S. is going to fight in the Pacific, that the U.S. is going to back up whatever resolve exists in this loose correlate—coalition as Admiral Hanks put it—is bad for the Soviet Union.

The second major factor is that the Soviets themselves are weak in the Far East—not necessarily with troops in the field
and airplanes as was shown in Pacwheat's graphics which are absolutely correct—but it is a logistics nightmare in the Far East. It's a come-as-you-are party for the Soviet Union. There is no strong industrial base and it will take Mr. Gorbachev 20 years, if he really follows through on his Vladivostok pronouncements, to make the Pacific a viable economic entity that can support indigenous military forces. Otherwise, everything comes from the Western USSR and the more that influences the Soviets, the more it constrains their strategy. Particularly in a protracted struggle. If the Soviets truly believe that the war will not be over in a matter of weeks, but will last months or even years, this problem is compounded manyfold. In addition to that, the Soviets not only have a serious problem moving supplies from the west to the east, but then they have a colossal distribution problem once it gets to the Far East. Look at the Trans-Siberian railroad or BAM—that terminates basically in one area. You can count the number of railroad ties on the Kamchatka Peninsula, on the hands in this room. It is a logistics disaster, caused by huge distances and a lack of a base to establish anything else. If you want to put up a credible defense for Kamchatka Peninsula, if you want to defend the Kuril Islands, if you want to make your situation on Sakhalin Island viable, if you want to protect all of Siberia, you're going to have to have naval forces to protect your naval lines of communication. They are essential. A good deal of what you see out here on that list of hardware the Soviets have in the Far East, is very much defensive, in that sense.

I think the third problem is one that ties in all of the things that have been said, and it relates to how well the U.S. can manage its advantages. Admiral Hanks talked about the challenges, but he also mentioned the advantages. Misha talked about the problems, reverse them and see them as our advantage. In many respects, Japan is the world's largest aircraft carrier—stuck right underneath Ivan's nose. He can't move it, he really can't damage it severely unless he resorts to massive weapons, he
has a nation that is an economic colossus, and a military problem in terms of its potential--its military reality today is very limited, through Constitutional means and through the nation's own lack of interest in getting offensive. But it has incredible potential. I believe the Soviets see themselves as politically at the disadvantage in the Far East. And the trend is negative. I didn't hear anyone yet today talk about the economic miracle that is South Korea. I assume many of you have visited there. I was there during the riots a few months ago. It was upsetting, there is political disruption in South Korea. But there is also a population that is well-fed, well-clothed, driving around in Hyundai's. I believe that there are the ingredients for a tremendous amount of political stability in South Korea. And if I was sitting in Pyongyang, I'd be very nervous about my long term future. There is a situation developing where there will be a colossal power imbalance between the South and the North. A still agrarian, backward country pouring way too much into armament, and not nearly enough into an economy, switching back and forth between the Soviet Union and the PRC in terms of its political leaning, with no stable prospects for the replacement of Kim El Sung in terms of its political internal order, facing a country whose Gross National Product is increasing faster than any other nation in the world, to its south. Whether it's guns or butter or whatever, South Korea is developing into a major economic force in the Far East. And the Soviets, and their North Korean friends, are truly troubled by that.

I think these factors weigh on why our strategy, the U.S. national strategy, and why the Navy is an important part of this and why we have a Conference on the Navy in the Pacific, is so important. As has been said or implied in this morning's briefings and this afternoon, U.S. policy in the Pacific is essentially Navy. The Army and the Air Force are important. You've heard about Admiral Lyons efforts to include them and they clearly are--but they are an adjunct to the Navy. If the Navy runs t- Europe to fight the war, there is no Air Force or Army
presence in the Far East that will make any sense at all. It is essentially where the Navy holds the upper cards in terms of the U.S. establishment. And our maritime strategy has to be articulated in such a way as to defend and articulate why the Navy needs to stay in the Pacific and what its purpose is. And I believe what occurred this morning tells you that and tells you what the Soviet reaction is. Yes, they have come out looking for the Ranger, they're out looking for the Ranger today. Unless something's happened in the last 24 hours, they haven't found her again, despite flying all over the Philippine Sea in the last 72 hours with Bears, Bear-F's and G's--the Soviets have force deficiencies out here. If I could list what I believe are the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's principal force deficiencies, they are as follows: Inadequate attack submarines--he doesn't have enough attack submarines to put up a credible defense as well as a credible offensive. There aren't enough Victor-3's, there aren't enough Akula's, there isn't a sufficiency of offensive power to adopt anything but a defensive posture.

Secondly, he is terribly disadvantaged by tactical aviation. As I said, Japan, as a stationary aircraft carrier to its South, the Aleutians are a stationary carrier to the North, and then he has, depending on what the order of battle happens to be on any given afternoon, 4-6 carriers facing him across a broad range of opportunities. He is still wedded to land-based aviation. And as pointed out, that land-based aviation that the Soviets built, has the same range limitations, because it was built for the Central European campaign also. They can't cover the whole breadth of the Far East. First problem, attack submarines.

Second problem, tactical aviation. Third problem--he is faced with a serious ASW capability. I believe, if I was writing this brief in Vladivostok, the thing that I would be most bothered by over the last two years, is what was mentioned in very quick passing this morning--the resurgence of the third fleet--the resurgence of the capability in the Far East to
conduct credible far ranging anti-submarine warfare. The Soviets don't like that. You can see them pulling in their horns, you can see their exercises reflecting a concern for first and foremost, defeating our most forward naval arm. We have a tendency to view that, of course, in carrier terms. But if you were in Vladivostok, you would see it first in terms of the attack submarine fleet of COMSUBPAC— that's the first cutting edge. If you can't defeat that, he has no chance against the carriers. It turns into an air defense battle exclusively because the cutting edge against the carriers is his own submarine fleet. If he can't defeat our submarine fleet, his submarine fleet can't survive against ours. It's a pure and simple step by step basis. So in terms of Soviet deficiencies, which are governing their whole addressing their strategy, those are the three basic elements. You can go into the others in terms of logistics, but in terms of war fighting potential, those seem to be the three that are the most serious deficiencies we're facing. And with that, I'd like to turn it back to you, sir.

Dr. Hensel

Certainly ought to give everybody something to think about for the next 15 minutes because we're going to take a 15 minute break, get some coffee, come back at quarter to the hour and we'll begin the questions and answers.
Dr. Hensel

One quick announcement before we begin, regarding the campus tour. I'm tour that there is still only one person signed up for the campus tour. However, since that individual is a flag officer, the tour will definitely continue. Be sure and ask about the ghost of the Del Monte Hotel.

Ok, Harlan, I guess you're first.

Dr. Harlan Jencks
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School

... of National Security Affairs here at NPS, and I was sitting down here in a small gaggle of professional Asia watchers while Mr. Marshall was telling us about the growth of the Chinese economy and defense budget. And some very funny looks were exchanged down there, sir. And either we're all wrong or you're wrong. Let me just give you a few off-the-top-of-the-head figures.

China's population right now is a little over a billion. If the one family policy works, best possible scenario, it may stabilize around 1.2 billion by 2020. That means that the overwhelming majority of their effort is going to have to continue to be where it is right now—in agriculture. That will all count in a growing GNP, but it won't go into military spending.

Now the announced budget for 1978, and I recognize the problem with announced budgets, but they give us some basis for comparison—was about 20 billion Yuan, RNB. The next year, 1979, they went to war and it jumped all the war to 24 and the next year it dropped all the war down to 19. And since then, it's been gradually working its way back up. Today, in Remnen B figures, it's a little higher than it was in 1978. But the Chinese do have inflation, despite their controls. So that in real figures, it's actually less. Moreover, they're spending a small but significant portion of that now in foreign exchange—
hard currency—which means that it’s costing them even more. As a percentage of the gigantically expanding GNP, over the last few years, and the GNP’s been going up because of economic reform, military spending has dropped from around 15% of GNP to about 6. And the projections for the rest of the century are that it’s likely to continue that way. So overall, in terms of either percentage of GNP growing, it’s very unlikely and in terms of the Chinese GNP becoming the third in the world, I think that’s outrageously unlikely, although I suppose it’s barely conceivable simply because you’ve got all those people that have to be fed.

To change to another subject, I would like to underline and maybe go beyond some things that Richard Haver said, about the Soviet Far East. I had the occasion, about 7 months ago, to attend a Conference in Kuala Lumpur, and one of the Soviet representatives to that conference, was Henry Trofimienko, the author of the book that Jim Tritten held up earlier today. And we’d had a conversation going on—it was about Soviet-American competition in the Pacific, and after about an hour of discussion, Trofimienko being the official Soviet rapporteur and me holding up the American side, Trofimienko, somewhat agitated, interrupted—these are virtually his exact words in English—look, you people keep talking about these sea lanes of communications as though they’re some kind of an American highway. We depend on them too. We can’t keep the Soviet Far East going without those sea lanes through to Southeast Asia being open. And from everything I know from my studies, that is quite literally true. The Trans-Siberian railroad, even with the BAM completion, can’t support it—certainly not in time of war. The sea lane across the top through the Arctic is very chancy and seasonal and periodically they have a ship crushed because it gets caught there too late in the season. They need the sea lanes as much as we do. And all of this just goes to underline some of the things Mr. Haver was saying, about the vulnerability of the Soviet strategic establishment in the Far East. Thank you.
Andy Marshall

On the Chinese economy what I was reporting to you from what the people are doing, which involves first a review of the current GNP is in China and coming up with a significant upward adjustment by trying to put things on a purchasing power parity basis, which is the basis on which most of the better comparisons of GNPs are done, but previously has not been done for China. So there's some chance that the estimates that are currently around, what Chinese GNP is today, are significantly low.

The other thing is really the consequence of after talking ourselves with experts, assuming essentially a 4-5% rate of increase per year for Chinese GNP and I forget what they assume for the Soviets, but it's probably down around 2% and just that difference of rate of growth leads, over 20 years, to some very big shifts. Now, it's true that the Chinese--their allocation of resources and so on--but nonetheless--frankly I don't know the details of it--I'm just saying that people have done this and have come up with these kinds of numbers. We're still reviewing them. But the fact that the Chinese might pass the Russians sometime in the next century, is not at all, I think, incredible, personally. We'll see.

June Dreyer

My name is June Dreyer and I'm from the University of Miami and I would like to second what Harlan said. The Chinese, the proportion of the budget being devoted to the military, is actually declining, if you take inflation into account. And furthermore, I think it should be made more explicit, that although the Chinese GNP is growing, if it does surpass the Soviet GNP, which is problematical—that depends very much on a best case analysis ... and you will still have to divide that by whatever the Chinese population is in 2010. The one child policy which Harlan mentioned, has been running into a lot of problems. And in just the last couple of months, the government has come
out and publicly admitted that it is out of their grasp at this point. And they're now talking about 1.3 billion as opposed to 1.2 billion which is the figure that they had used earlier. Population growth has gone up by a significant percentage in the last couple of years.

The other comment is really a question for Professor Tsypkin. I found your remarks fascinating. If I could just give you a little perspective on the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet analysis and ask you whether you've noticed that in the Soviet sources too, I'd be very interested in your answer. Those of us who do deal with the Chinese have noticed--sort of a standing joke--that the Chinese are the ultimate triangular analysts. They spend a lot of time talking about playing--they don't talk about playing the Soviet card versus the United States card--but that is in essence what they are doing. And you mentioned the third and most important condition that the Chinese had set forth, which is the Cambodia issue. I think it is important to mention that only became the most important condition after Gorbachev, making concessions on the first two conditions. And so at that point, the Chinese said--uh uh, this is our bottom line, it's the most important condition, it's more important than Afghanistan, it's more important than true in Mongolia. And there are some China analysts who think that this is a balance of power, a political ploy by the Chinese. In other words, they say to the United States, don't worry about our bettering relations with the Soviet Union because they haven't given in on our conditions. And then to the Soviet Union, they're saying--don't worry about our relations with the United States, because we can't get the United States to give in on Taiwan. And so therefore, there's just no hope that we'll ever be truly friends with them. And I'm finally getting around to my question--have you noticed this kind of analysis of Chinese behavior, from the Soviet side and do they feel they've been manipulated in this way and if so, have they made any contingency plans about it?
I cannot guarantee that I've seen and read everything that the Soviets have said about China. But since Gorbachev came to power, they've been extremely reticent about saying anything negative about China whatsoever. All the members of the great triangle are courting each other, saying nice things, but not changing their basic position. At this point, the Chinese are saying that the main condition is Cambodia. But if I were sitting in Moscow, I'd never, as I said, the Soviets are probably very suspicious that if they settle one issue, then something else will come up. Because it's not a bargaining where the Chinese are saying, well we'll give up this if you move out of Cambodia. In essence, it's a precondition for further dialogue. And the Soviets are loath, ever, to give up an ounce of influence for promises of paradise in the future. Because they precisely know that this is their tactics in dealing with the West. For the last nearly 30 years, the Chinese have been doing on the Soviet Union—they've been playing that kind of a game and they know exactly what they suspect is in store for them if they force Vietnam out of Cambodia. And the basic problem I tried to underline and probably talked too much, is that the Soviets have a certain defense burden in the area—defense burden is to support certain missions, and missions are dictated and determined by political goals. The Soviets would definitely like to reduce their defense burden. But that's very theoretical. But you cannot reduce your defense burden without changing the missions. And you cannot change the missions without somehow rearranging the political goals those missions support. And the Soviets are in a way a trap—it's a threatening trap from our perspective. But in a sense, it's the same stalemate they have in their domestic politics. It's such a rigid system that you simply cannot as puts it—puzzle in your horns and concentrate on domestic affairs—as in The New York Times and other places. It's simply impossible. Because the realities of Soviet politics
are such that they cannot get out of it. But one thing they've
done--they've stopped talking and saying anything nasty about
China--practically anything. You do not even hear the old story
of the U.S.-Japan-China triangle any more. Now it's the U.S.-
Japan-South Korea triangle. Of course, the Soviets probably
think--God forbid, it might be a rectangle. But they're not
saying it any more.

? - Question

... the allocation of Chinese to military ... ... around '95
they switch back and begin to implement this postponed
modernization of the military forces.

Andy Marshall

I don't know--some various talks with some of the Chinese
suggests that that's what they have in mind. Whether it'll work
out. I think the other thing I would say

June Dreyer

... we might talk some more about this--this sounds crazy to
us--

Andy Marshall

Yes--alright--we need to talk some more. The other thing I
would just say--while the number I mentioned to you was sort of
like the base case people have been running, which assumes that
the Soviet Union economy is sort of relative to us and therefore
relative to the Chinese. You know, official current estimates
are, which put the Soviet Union at about 55% or so. I just want
to repeat again how uncertain I think that figure itself is.
That the Soviet Union's economy is probably significantly smaller
than that. And a lot of the stuff coming out of the Soviet Union
now suggests that that's right. So if it's confining it to the issue of who's going to be ahead—the Soviet Union or the Chinese in 2010—if you take these lower figures for the Russians, that becomes even more of the case. So I'm just telling you personally I wouldn't at all bet against it. In terms of GNP. How rapidly they move into—

June Dreyer

What about per capita GNP?

Andy Marshall

It's still, of course, low, but of course the Soviets remain low. I mean, the Soviets get stuck at about 6-8,000 per capital income and we and in the West and the Japanese, by that time, are up around 30. I forget, I don't have the figures I guess with me, but it's low—there's no doubt that it's low.

Admiral Hanks

Yes, I'd like to return to the comments that your Russian colleagues made to you about the vital dependence on merchant traffic through the Indian Ocean in order to sustain their forces in the Far East. Now let me preface that by saying that it's apparent to Western shipping operators around the world—the United States, Western European and Japan—that the Soviet Union has mounted a very very strong campaign to capture trade in the liner trades throughout the world. They've gone very heavily into container ships and they have managed through some of the tactics they have used, like grade cutting, with their fully subsidized ships and to put some American and some European shipping companies out of business. Now that's a preface to what I'm about to say.
If memory serves, not more than maybe 5-6-8% of the input to the Soviet Far Eastern forces comes through the Indian Ocean. At the same time, while they double-track the Trans-Siberian railroad and the other extensions they've got—they build a huge container port in the Soviet Pacific Far East. And the trains that are traveling across the USSR today, are heavily loaded with commercial containers that are loaded with their cargo in Western Europe, shipped across by railroad, put on Soviet container ships and then travel from there to the United States, Hawaii, South America and Central America, and thereby undercut each further not only the time but the cost of the European shipping. And they're terribly worried about it. And I would suggest that in view of the way the Soviet government works, in the event of a crisis, those containers would stop flowing immediately and that space would be taken up by military sustenance for their forces in the Far East. So I would treat those worries with a great deal of caution.

Mikhail Tsypkin

I want to make another—one more comment about Soviet perceptions or my perception of Soviet's perceptions of China's defense spending. I think that the Chinese relatively low defense spending or relatively low defense spending, is no cause for any relief in Moscow. Because they sit there, biting their nails, and getting mad that the Chinese have built for themselves a convenient, a comfortable geo-political reach in which they can protect their security and not spend too much on defense, relative to the Soviet Union. And what the Soviets have seen—and I'm sure although I have no proof of it whatsoever—that a lot of attempts by Gorbachev to revive Soviet economy, is related to what's been happening in China. God, they have economic growth there. Nevermind what it is per capita, but the picture from the Soviet Union is threatening. They think the Chinese are playing—trying to squeeze between the United States and the
Soviet Union--the Soviet Union exhausting itself in its defense efforts. The Chinese can cut their defense spending even more, it will favor modernization, to favor long term growth. While the Soviets cannot cut. And again, the Chinese always present those problems to the Soviets for which the Soviets don't know what to do. Because the Chinese start spending much on defense tomorrow, that's bad, that's an immediate threat. If they don't spend, that's threatful for 20 years from now. When it comes to China, the Soviets can't win either way.

Sheldon Simon

My name is Sheldon Simon ... ... ... your discussion of the Vietnam situation and Soviet policy with respect to that. The new General Secretary, Nhu von Lin, has reaffirmed Vietnam's target of 1990 for pulling its forces out of Cambodia. Now I realize that's a very controversial promise, and many analysts argue that by the time 1990 comes, Vietnam will find some loophole and not pull out. But for the sake of discussion, let's take General Secretary's Lin promise at his word and look at the implications of that. It's been identified as the primary obstacle in Sino-Soviet relations. It's also the primary obstacle in the Sino-Vietnamese relations. If the withdrawal occurs, it seems to me that there are interesting implications which may, in fact, be contradictory depending on which side you jump to. On the one hand, if the withdrawal occurred, the Vietnamese could then pressure the Soviets in such a way that there might be a withdrawal or reduction of Soviet forces in Vietnam unless the Soviets came through with certain political concessions or greater economic support for the Vietnamese.

On the other hand, there could be a Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese rapprochement as a result of these developments. #1. do you think the 1990 promise is realistic and #2. which projection do you see, if it is?
Mikhail Tsypkin

I hesitate to go too much into the intricacies of politics in the area of which I only know what I read about and in Pravda. So I look through Moscow's eyes. One thing I would say about that 1990 promise—that I would tend to interpret it as one of Gorbachev's steps to calm down the waters for the time being. There are still three years. One advantage that Gorbachev has is that he's relatively young, he's energetic, who knows what will happen in three years? He needs now some—the Chinese, the Americans, the Asian nations to get off his back, for the time being. He'll come up—he's a little bit like Khrushchev—by 1990, if they cannot pull up, he'll come up with something else. So you see, it's a style different than what we saw for the last 20 years. People in the Kremlin who, with their ultimatums, would drive themselves into a corner. This guy's not going to drag himself into a corner. A politician of that type is like a conjurer. He'll come up with a new trick. That's where his skill is. And for the time being, he wants to sound conciliatory on the issue. At the same time, he sees statements—the kind of statements which are not meant for Western consumption—that proletarian internationalism and that kind of stuff—the unshakable unity of the three and the Chinese nations. I think the Soviets are really to fool the West, because the West or the Asian nations do not read what the Soviets say to themselves. I don't think the Soviet camp, for one second, they can really fool the Chinese. For the Chinese know where to look for the answers and they definitely notice statements of that sort, from the Soviets. At least my limited contacts with Moscow watchers and in the Chinese Embassy in Washington, indicated to me that they really watch everything the Soviets say—not only what is packaged for consumption.

But, again, the world is unpredictable. You never know what could happen.
... ... couple of elements this afternoon. ... I've never needed a microphone in my life. Dealing with the subject of Cambodia and Southeast Asia and Trimifienko, etc., Trimifienko did a good job. I think that if I were Trimifienko right now, the knowledge of the fact that the seeds that I laid at a conference in Malaysia, had just gotten passed to the United States Navy—that there was something exceedingly important about the sea lines of communication in Southeast Asia. Not too bad Trimifienko, it was worth the TAD price of whatever it was that who paid it. If I could, in any way, ensure that even one U.S. warship, that was otherwise necessary, for prosecuting a war that really mattered, in some place like Northeast Asia, or Northwestern Europe or the Med or some place, was instead down around Lompoc, worrying about the Soviet PACFLT's swap—not too shabby. I'd love the U.S. Fleet to be down in Southeast Asia when the war started. Great place to be. ... can put up his time lines as to how long it takes to get around the vast distances of East Asia. I'm sure it's important. We must always, I think as strategists, recognize the fact that while ... of military, esoterica of the four corners of the world ... ..., we've got to look for baselines and base cases and focus on them. And then look at what happens if you change the subject. Kind of what we wound up doing with American strategy. Rather than chase will-o'-wisps all over the world and when the balloon goes up, have the capability then to focus on what's really important.

I would submit—not too far—Soviet Far East bloc—that's a ... ... ... there are lots of things to worry about in the world. But I am much more worried as is Commander Wagner and the boss, about Trimifienko—and then secondarily, but secondarily, about what's happening in Cameron.

The second is more of a question relating to Southeast Asia and has to do with the Vietnamese and Cambodia. Again, it comes from, however, this desire to make sure that I've got my base
case nailed down, before I go into the esoteric. To me, I don’t see anything in 2000 years of Vietnamese history to indicate that any Vietnamese in power--any North Vietnamese in power because that’s what’s in power--has gotten any desire, even thinks about or it even crosses his field of vision, that he would get out of Cambodia once he got in--for any particular reason whatsoever. I would say that the basic underlying dynamic of Vietnamese history is simply too strong. And I don’t care whether these Vietnamese are communists, republicans, democrats, monarchists, Wig--or excuse me--... ...--but that having been said, therefore, what possible capacity or leverage do the Soviets have to get the Vietnamese out of Cambodia? What could they do? My view is that they’re kind of stuck--they’ve got an ally. And it’s a good thing to have this ally because one of the things that it gives you is Cameron Bay--that has sort of tied all of us in knots since that happened. But what can they do to get them out? What can anybody do to get them out? The dynamic in Vietnamese history seems to be me to be pretty strong. And I don’t know what pressure the Soviets can bring to bear on the Vietnamese to get them out. That’s just an albatross around Soviet foreign policy necks, it would seem to me. So that’s my question for you.

Mikhail Tsypkin

Basically, it’s both an albatross and a useful output. As I said, it doesn’t look like they’re trying to get the Vietnamese out because even an attempt to do so would be very costly. They have a lot to lose and the Vietnamese still probably will not go out. As I said, again, all the dynamics of Soviet-Vietnamese relations now indicates that the Soviets are not even pressuring the Vietnamese. The only thing they’re doing--they’re trying to shut these Vietnamese up a little bit. Don’t talk about Chinese hegemony--just be quiet for the time being. At least when Nguyen Van Lin went to Moscow, he didn’t talk about the evil Chinese
designs as his predecessor did a year ago. So they got a little bit more quiet which is very much in line with the Soviet strategy. Well in theory the Soviets could cut off the military economic pipeline to Vietnam. But knowing what the Vietnamese are like, the Soviets would definitely ask—is it going to do the job with those guys? They'll still be stuck in Cambodia. And that's one of the reasons—probably the main reason—it'll be costly to the Soviets to try to dislodge Vietnam. I don't pretend I'm an expert on Vietnam, but from the Soviet standpoint, I don't see any serious effort going on, to get Vietnam out. What I see is a serious effort of papering it over with all kinds of nice words. And that's what the Soviets do very well when there is no serious action forthcoming.

- Question

I would like to give some support to the comment made by June Durea about the Chinese situation and ask a question in that connection. It seems to me that her question was what the Soviets are trying to tell us the Chinese are really not giving in on one point. And the Chinese tell us the Soviets are not giving in. So the issue is—to what degree can the two get together? And that is, to me, a very real possibility, at least what the Soviets want clearly. Not get together as a dependency or as a satellite or something like that—but get together in the larger communist framework and this is my question—China's economy after all is in disarray. And despite all that is said here—in agriculture, you have a temporary great relief by having giving up communism. And in industry, 90% is still government backed industry and is in poor shape. And the three types of industry—the government part of industry—is not interrelated with the joint enterprises nor with the Chinese small enterprises in the cities. So there is a problem. And it's a real problem. And if a crisis occurs in China, the possibility that the Chinese communist leadership will turn to Moscow, after all, is not to be
simply discarded out of hand. And the question there is, the question mentioned before, that the Soviets are to give in—but what do the Chinese have to offer? This is my question.

Mikhail Tsypkin

I think the problem with any rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China is—what course will it take? What the two have talked about are only adjustments of the current conflict. Probably get rid of this problem, get rid of that problem. But there is absolutely no framework which the Soviets, at least, have developed. How to deal with a communist power which is not directly subordinate to Moscow? It’s the same mental and intellectual and philosophical obstacle the Soviets have when they try to introduce freedom of expression. Yes we want to have freedom of expression under Glasnost. But when you start looking at how they define it, it’s not freedom of expression—it’s just a couple of screws made less tight. And it’s the same thing with their approach to dealing with China. Yes, we recognize that China is independent. It’s an independent socialist country. What this independence means—does it mean the Chinese have the right to resist Soviet policies anywhere? Does it mean they have the obligation to follow the Soviet Union? You see, the Soviets talk about all kinds of attractive, nice things and they don’t have the first idea of how to implement those things within the realities of their political system. And the Chinese know that. Both the Russians are nationalists and the Chinese are nationalists. And the way the Soviets deal with their allies is not very encouraging. The Chinese know it. The one objective of the Chinese, as far as I as a sovietologist, understand—and they’ve always had since the communists came to power—is not to let the Soviets meddle in their internal affairs. And this is exactly how the Soviets define their alliance with another communist power—ability to meddle in internal affairs—ability to control personnel—ability to
control the cadres there—communist obsession. The Chinese are not going to let them do that.

As for the possibility of economic collapse of China, China is not Vietnam, it’s not Cambodia, it’s not Poland. If it’s a collapse of China, what can the Soviets, who are notoriously stingy in economic aid—what can they do but occupy Beiminjury and Sinkiang or do one of those crazy military things and try to partition China. They’re not going to feed Chinese—there is no chance for that. That again underscores how difficult it is for the Soviets to deal with China. Whatever happens, they still don’t have a clue to dealing with China.

Dr. Hensel

One of the best parts about being a chair is, I get to come to Monterey and I don’t have to write a paper. The unpleasant part, however, is to have to gradually pull in the reins here regarding our discussion. I think we have time for one more question and then that’s going to have to be it. Yes sir.

Peter Door

I’m Peter Door, with ... Associates, one-time Admiral Foley’s strategist. I’d like to ask Rich Haver the question I’ve asked him time and time again—and never been answered yet—one of this morning’s speakers said that our strategy was basically a tactical offensive within strategic defenses. One of the things that Rich said this afternoon was that that is basically a Soviet Pacific strategy as well. I would like to ask Rich to elaborate a little bit on the range of Soviet actions in the Pacific that fit within a strategic defensive. How tactically offensive might they be?
I don't think there's any question that the Soviets will attempt—if the correlation of forces is correct—that's a major thing that has to be understood from the beginning. That they believe there is a possibility of gaining the specific objective they wish. If they weigh the correlation of forces and find that by any possible calculation, they'll come out losing, don't count on them doing this sort of thing. But if the calculation, the situation permits, I believe they will try to use certain elements of their submarine force in what we would describe as an aggressive, forward manner. Alright? I believe you can see the obvious locations where they would want to send those forces—into the Eastern North-Pacific, where they would sit astride (1) the Trident Patrol Zone, (2) the major path that any West Coast-based U.S. naval presence would have to transfer through, and lastly, astride the principal Valdez-U.S. on into the Western Pacific sea line of communications. Their objectives out there I believe would fall into those areas. They would be looking for an opportunity to interdict strategic forces that might be found there. I don't think they would hold that as a high probability of success of mission, but one that they might stumble into and wouldn't turn aside the opportunity. It would give them a forward position, at least from the point of view of monitoring, stalking if you will, the transshipment of major naval forces. And lastly, it would give them an opportunity to take on some form of, if not severing the sea lines of communications—because I don't believe there's sufficient assets to sever. Certainly disrupt—cause us to fall back. Anything that they can do that forces us to be defensive—clearly is to their advantage—since it detracts from our offensive capacity. And in many respects, that was the essence of this morning's discussion. We don't want to ignore the need to defend ourselves, but we believe the most productive way to defend ourselves is to be offensive. Well, if the Soviets can do anything that will necessitate a reexamination.
and a reallocation of resources toward the defense, that would be considered by them to be a major plus.

I also believe that Cameron Bay fits into the same sort of construction in their mind. Not in terms of its political influence versus the Chinese right now, and the leverage it gives them—that has all sorts of peacetime and even limited war application—but in the East-West-Third World War sort of situation, Cameron Bay, at least to us, appears though to constitute two things. One, there is sufficient firepower there, either in residence or probably intended to be in residence when the particular threshold is reached. So in effect, to successfully confront one major battle group element, opposing it. If we overwhelmed it with multiple battle groups, I believe the Soviets would, in effect, realize that Cameron Bay was an untenable position but then again, those battle groups would be down there instead of where they could do the greatest amount of damage to the Soviet interest, which is to the North. It would buy them time if nothing else. And if they were able either to get particularly fortunate in their attrition on our forces, or if our forces, in effect, were so tied up that it bought them more time—that would be advantageous. If we don't take that bait, if we move to the other side, then I think you can take a look at the map and then see the opportunity that would afford them in two ways. One, again, to go after those lines of communications so important to the stability of our Western Asian forces and allies and then secondly, in terms of movement—it does sit not far from the forces in the Philippines and if we're moving forces from the Philippines north, then can be moving forces from Vietnam into the Northern end of the Philippines Sea. And it's certainly the sort of exercise routine you see run through down there.

So I believe you would see two elements—you'd see that Cameron Bay element, either withdrawn or held there and try to tie us up and secondly, I think you'd see the submarine fleet. I also believe, personally, that the Soviets bifurcate their
planning into the initial action which is essentially a defensive one and then an examination of the situation. And I believe that the Soviets have a path towards more aggressive use of their forces or more defensive use. A consequence process. If they lose that initial battle—if they are decimated in the battle of the North-West Pacific, then obviously the next action for them is the battle for the Sea of Okask—the battle of the Northern Sea of Japan, the battle of the Western Bering Sea. If, on the other hand, they achieve striking success—unexpected success—in the battle of the Northwest Pacific, then I believe you would see them become more adventurous—using primarily submarine resources but whatever else could be mobilized and moved. They clearly need air field structure. Unless they get Leonid Brezhnev's and sufficient at-sea tactical air, where their surface fleet goes will be heavily dependent on how much tactical air they can bring to air. And of course the converse, how much tactical air they expect to be facing. I think that's how it will manifest itself. The initial action, submarines forward and that base structure that they have--stuck with forces in the Indian Ocean, etc., nuisance forces in many respects. And then the consequence process—falling out of the first phase of the campaign. And that could be quite aggressive, from our point of view.

Andy Marshall?

I'll give you two opinions. I believe that the Soviet general staff, alright, and the Soviet Far East Command, plans on Japan being an enemy. And they have sized their forces and structured their war plans and organized themselves on the presumption that Japan is a full-fledged partner in whatever mendacious activity their enemies are up to. Ok? I believe, on the other hand, the political masters of Moscow have a different approach to the problem—one of neutralizing Japan politically and economically in an attempt to, in effect, get a great force multiplier out of the resultant Japan, if nothing else.
neutrality. So I believe that what we see, visibly, are two entirely different things. We see a military process which is very heavily oriented along the lines of smashing Japan as quickly and as efficiently as they can. And you see over here a political process which is designed, in effect, to negate the necessity to take that military action, and to gain the advantage that force would allow. And I think that's the process that we see.

I'd like to ask Andy Marshall a question and a short follow up by Rich Haver. Going back to the issue on the Soviet Union and China, Andy, you were saying that you believe that China would become more militarily capable. From the Soviet and then again from the Chinese perspective, how much effort do you think the Chinese are going to put into acquiring a credible, survivable nuclear strike capability against the Soviet Union? And what systems should they be putting their money into? If they can choose between intermediate range missile systems, if they can choose long range Cruise missiles, if they could choose going to sea—they have a selection of a menu they can choose from. Where would they be well advised if they wanted to have a secure second strike capability? And a second follow-on question is, would you amplify for us—I think I know the answer—but why is it that the United States won't help with that kind of a capability? And Rich, from the Soviet point of view, at what point would the Soviets actually become worried against the Chinese, if they believe the Chinese had a secure second strike capability, what would they do to prevent that from taking the place in the foreseeable future?
Frankly, I don’t know what the Chinese—how much of the resources they’d put into that. I mean they clearly have put a lot in already, going down that road. What the next generation might look like—I think he’s right, there are lots of options they might have. I would think, given the way in which they’ve gone about it, things like Cruise missiles should have some real appeal for them, because of the flexibility in basing and possibilities for hiding, preventing in effect the target of those systems. As to whether we will help them or not, I don’t know. That’s something that would depend on some sort of strategic choice we would make later on and which is the kind of thing on the whole that we have not wanted to do thus far.

Richard Haver

As far as the Soviet response, my guess is that it will fall into probably three forms of action. The first will be decapitation—sever the central nervous system from the instruments that could be used in that second strike against them. In terms of it not slowing them down, certainly disrupting any coherent action it could take.

I think, depending on whether the Chinese achieve this second strike capability through mobility or through hardening—if it was hardening, I believe the Soviets would try the over-pressure approach—massive layout of weapons, well-targeted by superior intelligence and locating information. I believe if the force is dispersed through mobility, then once again excellent targeting information, but a combination of—I wouldn’t use the word surgical strikes, because that doesn’t really fit the Soviet model—but a more careful approach to it, using a combination of, if you will, retaliatory means. They love the concept of preemptive retaliation. They’d get good information that was going to be used, then they justify taking it out. I think their
biggest concern is the mobility process. China's a large nation, with plenty of room to get things like Cruise missiles and other weapons, lost inside of them. And I believe that will probably be the more serious of the two—if the Chinese dug it into the tundra, I think the Soviets could see their way clear to the over-pressure approach. I think the mobility one would be more vexing for them. Of course, if it was ballistic or Cruise would determine how the other part, the third part of the defense, would be and that would be to take it out on its way in. Once the actual executional launch occurred, as there has always been with Soviet air defense and the like, and to attempt to compensate through civil defense and other means, for the effect of it. And I think a lot of that would depend on the size of the Chinese threat. If it was small, I think the Soviets could work the numbers out, that an adequate defense could be constructed in that classic sense of defense, rather than preemptive offense. If it was a very large capability, my suspicion is that the Soviets would never come up with numbers that would make the defense satisfactory. Then it would be the combination of all three things that they would seek, to give themselves satisfaction that they handled the problem.

Dr. Hensel

One procedural note before we break up. For those students who are only interested in food for thought, but not food for the stomach, I would call their attention to the little note at the bottom of our program here which notes that if they don't want to attend the banquet, but do want to attend Dr. Buss' speech, there will be a row of seats in the back of the ballroom.

I'm going to take advantage of my prerogative as chairman to ask one last brief question. And that is directed to Dr. Tsypkin. Why did the Heritage Foundation select red for its tie?
Mikhail Tsypkin

I don't know. I think it's surprise and deception.
... the show on the road--I was going to say--the ship under way or whatever the appropriate phrase would be. I hope today is going to be a little less earth jerking than yesterday. For those of you who didn't know what that was yesterday morning--I didn't know it was an earthquake. I was on the phone to somebody else and they said it was Fort Ord shooting again. But it was an earthquake and evidently it was literally the Navy's fault. If you saw the paper this morning--I didn't know there was a fault called the Navy Fault. So there's a Navy Fault that runs under here and the Navy Fault shook yesterday. So I hope that San Andreas doesn't do anything to us today.

Two panelists today--both are likely to be as provocative as yesterday's--there may be a bit more. I'm not sure--we'll have to wait and see. The first panel is the most focused of the four on Asia. And I'm sure will stimulate some active debate. The second panel this afternoon, and I'll be back to see you then, focuses on alternatives in the future as they relate to the maritime strategy. And then later in the afternoon, we'll have a wrapup session and I wanted to encourage people, even though it is late in the afternoon because it's not as formal a wrapup session as you might think--we will have audience interaction. So we do want to have an audience--so don't cut out at the end of the second panel. Let me turn it over to Harlan Jencks, the chairman for the first panel.
Well this morning, we have a panel which is focused a little more closely on the regional actors. And we have a marvelously well qualified and diverse panel. One way of looking at it is that we have three Americans, one Japanese and one Australian. Or, another way to look at it is that we have two academics, two military men and one journalist. So any way you cut it, it should be a fairly lively exchange of ideas. I'm not going to spend a great deal of time introducing these individuals, because they have limited time to spend on their presentations.

I will simply say that our first speaker, Professor Sheldon Simon, is the Director of the Center for Asian Studies at Arizona State University and is a very well-known and widely noted author and observer on the Asian scene, especially security affairs. So, Shell--15 minutes and at minute 16 I start throwing things, I promise.

The Maritime Strategy: The Role of Pacific Alliances
Dr. Sheldon Simon
Director, Center for Asian Studies,
Arizona State University

Thank you, Harlan. You know, I was taken yesterday by the number of illusions to the technological developments that are going to occur in warfare in the next century. And it reminded me of a story I heard at a Conference on Soviet Security Policy--a story that a Soviet allegedly tells on the Soviet Union. And it goes on this. There's an American walking down the streets of Moscow. And he realizes that he forgot his watch, back in his hotel room. And he sees a Muscovite walking toward him, carrying two very heavy suitcases. He goes up to him and he says--excuse me, sir, do you have the time? The Muscovite puts down these heavy suitcases and says--of course--and he pulls out his watch. There's this beautiful chronometer on the man's wrist, with
multiple functions, and he says—do you want the time here in Moscow or in Vladivostok or perhaps wherever you come from—you're an American I presume. And he starts giving him the time in Washington, D.C., New York, Irkutsk—he punches up another display and it tells the weather forecast in these various locations. Oh, the American is absolutely flabbergasted and he says—that must be a Japanese watch. And the Russian gets very incensed. He says—absolutely not—that's not a Japanese watch—that's a Russian watch. We made that with our technology. The American says—you mean, you made that here in the Soviet Union. And the man says—absolutely. We have very modern watch making factories here. Now if we can only find a more efficient power source.

Well, that's to wake everybody up. Now to my topic. I feel that my role today is a little bit like Cassandra's in the famous classical drama. When she raised awkward questions in front of what could presumably be a hostile audience. That is, from the perspectives of America's friends and allies in the Pacific, there are problems that affect U.S. Naval strategy, which should be taken into account, because they impact upon our political relations with such important countries as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia—as well as the ASEAN states more generally. Dr. Jaurique raised these, to a certain extent, at his luncheon address yesterday, as did Admiral Hanks, and of course last evening, Professor Buss.

I propose to look in a little more detail at some of these problems, as well as the roles that America's friends and allies in the Pacific could perform, to facilitate coastal and sea lane protection and surveillance of the Soviet fleet, away from its home ports. Tasks that the maritime strategy appears to divulge upon allies.

Because the maritime strategy requires a concentration of forward deployed U.S. Naval forces in the North Pacific and Sea of Japan. Naval strategists have also emphasized the important role America's Pacific allies should play in implementing that
strategy. That role would be two-fold. First of all, the provision of bases for American Naval and Air Forces, and secondly, direct cooperation through their own Naval and air assets, to monitor regions adjacent to their territories, and if need be, escort and fight alongside U.S. forces. Therein lurks one of the unresolved issues of the maritime strategy. Although it requires allied cooperation to be fully effective, in both the deterrent and war fighting mode, it is essentially unilateralist. Decisions ranging from probing Soviet defenses in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Orkutsk to actual hostilities, would be made by the United States. Allies would be expected to fall in line behind these decisions, regardless of their own foreign and security policies.

Exacerbating the prospect of differing policy interests for Washington's Asian allies is former Secretary of the Navy Lehman's concept of horizontal escalation. Because the maritime strategy is directed primarily to the Central European front, Asia is seen as a secondary battlefield, which would be opened to force the Soviets to contemplate a two-front war. U.S. allies presumably would provide bases and logistics centers in exchange for American protection.

According to U.S. strategic thinking, horizontal escalation would be not be as threatening to the Pacific allies, as it initially appears, however. Because the Soviet Navy would be primarily concerned with protecting its SSBN's, the bulk of its air and naval forces would be concentrated around Vladivostok and Petro-Pavlik. A prompt deployment of American antisubmarine forces would also precipitate a Soviet submarine retreat to home waters to protect the SSBN's. This would leave only residual Soviet forces in Southeast Asia and the Eastern Indian Ocean, which could be neutralized at choke points such as the Strait of Malacca by American and allied forces. Besides, the Navy argues, the enhanced threat of a two-front war strengthens deterrence and thereby reduces the probability of war's occurrence in the first place.
Let's look a bit at the notion of this kind of burden-sharing. High technology warfare has driven the costs of modern navies and air forces so high that alliances between major powers and smaller allies, are in the process of being reassessed. The military guarantees of 20 years ago are no longer absolute. They have become limited and conditional, reflecting the economic burdens they entail. As Bob Scalapino has noted, it is more appropriate in the 1980's to speak of alignments rather than alliances. The former are vastly more complex. The reciprocal benefits more fluid and open to regular renegotiation. This means a shift away from unilaterism in the determination of alliance policies. Critics of U.S. defense burdens inherent in alliance arrangements, point to this country's unprecedented global indebtedness which, by 1990, is expected to be half a trillion dollars. They note that by that time, Washington will be paying tens of billions to foreign creditors merely in servicing costs. Because these creditors are also American allies--Japan and South Korea--the following questions arise.

1. Can the United States continue to lead allies to which it owes a huge debt?

2. If the United States tries to control that debt through protectionism, will the allies continue to rely on American for security when Washington is disrupting the economic system on which their prosperity is based? And,

3. Will American public opinion support paying for the defense of countries richer than the United States?

Allies with even modest naval and air forces, can assist the U.S. in the naval strategy. They can engage, for example, in defensive sea control, as distinct from offensive force projection. Indeed, with a declaration of 200 mile exclusive economic zones, the EEZ's in the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, most littoral states have begun to acquire ships for the purpose of enforcing their jurisdictions. In the Asian Pacific, these include attach submarines, land-based patrol aircraft, fast attack craft, destroyers and frigates. These systems can engage,
and are beginning to engage, in straits control, convoying, and ASW operations. The question arises: will states which are developing capabilities to defend their territorial waters and economic zones, view cooperation with the U.S. Navy as a means of enhancing their own security? Or conversely, and more ominously, for both the United States and interestingly, also, the Soviet Union--will those states which signed the Law of the Sea Treaty, increasingly oppose the deployment of all war ships as incompatible with the peaceful purposes language of that treaty? While the latter interpretation need not inhibit U.S. deployments, it could still obstruct the kind of allied cooperation necessary for a truly effective U.S. naval strategy.

What I'd like to do now in the small amount of time remaining to me--is to look briefly at Japan, Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines, and the Australia. While the Japanese Archipelago is a natural barrier constraining Soviet Pacific Fleet operations, Japan's cooperation is essential to control the apertures in that barrier in the event of a confrontation. Japanese military planners, however, display a certain reticence over the prospect of closing the straits. A Soviet belief that Japan was about to blockade or mine those straits, from Japan's point of view, could well trigger a preemptive strike against Japanese bases and the occupation of Northern Okaido. Indeed, until the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Japanese officials did not even develop scenarios in which a military conflict would occur around the home islands. That's less than 10 years ago.

The Japanese Straits, planners currently believe, in the event of a crisis, would be either blockaded by the Americans and the Japanese, or controlled by the Soviets. Thus recent U.S.-Japanese joint exercises have focused on repelling a Soviet attack on Okaido.

Washington's aims for Japan include the development of a capability to control the sea lanes 1000 miles from Konchu and in particular, the area south to the Boschi Channel and east to
Guam. This would require that the maritime self-defense force develop capabilities against Soviet surface vessels and submarines as well as long range patrol aircraft.

Secondly, the United States wants Japan to develop a mining and blockading capability for the Japanese Straits. And thirdly, the establishment of an air defense screen around the home islands that could inflict heavy losses on Soviet bombers and fighters and therefore facilitate Japanese-U.S. sea control. In fact, Japan possesses most of the systems necessary to implement these tasks, even though it doesn't possess enough of them. It currently lacks airborne refueling capability because the Diet has viewed the development of such capability as potentially providing an offensive, as distinct from a defensive, capacity, which, according to the government's current interpretation, would be in violation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. This policy must change if Japan is to truly be able to sustain air, combat and patrol over time and space.

The United States has also pressed Japan to set up over-the-horizon radars which could provide early warning of aircraft flying from Siberian bases toward the Pacific. Washington would link a Japanese system into a planned chain of O-T-H sites stretching from Alaska to the Philippines. America's hope, then, is not that Japan becomes an independent regional power, anathema to most of its neighbors—but that Tokyo develop the capacity to fulfill its pledge to defend the surrounding sea lanes. Japan would not then stand in for the United States in this region. Rather, its forces would augment the 7th Fleet by subjecting Soviet naval and air movements to close surveillance. Reassurance of America's Pacific allies, including Japan, that the ASDF and MSDF will not be primarily responsible for Western Pacific defense, is essential if an expanded role for these forces is to be politically acceptable in Asia.

Finally, one more point I wanted to make about Japan is that unlike NATO, the United States still has no joint command structure with Japan. Current plans state that in the even of an
imminent attack on Japan, the two governments will conduct closer liaison but no joint command, even for air defense, where rapid task coordination would be essential. The reason for this anomaly is, again, Article 9's prohibition on collective self-defense. Thus joint defense beyond territorial waters and airspace, is problematical. Within Japanese air and sea space, however, the government interprets the Constitution in a manner that permits Japan to respond to an attack on U.S. forces. Arguing that such a response falls within individual or national self-defense, and is not therefore, collective self-defense. A nice legal splitting of hairs, but that's what attorneys are paid for. Thus Japanese ships can protect U.S. ships within Japanese waters, though the chain of command would be through the MSDF and not through the U.S. Fleet.

I've been notified that I have only a minimal amount of time left--let me jump over to Southeast Asia very rapidly. Unlike Japan and Korea, whose armed forces provide an active contribution to the U.S. maritime presence, the Philippines is a politically more difficult situation. It is a passive provider of strategic location. Neither its small coastal defense navy nor minimal air force possess a capacity for sustained sea lane patrol. The bulk of the country's military budget is committed to the army in order to fight Southeast Asia's only significant communist and Muslim insurgencies. Because the Philippines is not actively involved in regional defense, and because the bases are so important for both U.S. conventional and nuclear support, they have become a focus of controversy for the Aquino government and a rallying cry for those groups who see the bases as an affront to Philippine autonomy. U.S. officials insist that the bases are crucial for operations in the Asian Pacific. They demonstrate America's commitment to regional naval preeminence, particularly in the light of Soviet deployments at Cameron Bay. All other U.S. Pacific allies, including the rest of the ASEAN states, and even China, have indicated to U.S. authorities, publicly and sometimes privately, that they would prefer to see
the 7th Fleet and 13th Air Force remain in the Philippines, though none of them has offered to provide substitute facilities, should the United States be asked to leave. The Aquino Government is keeping its options open with respect to the renewal of the bases agreement in 1991. It does not want to give the anti-bases opposition political grist before the negotiations begin next year. Nevertheless, most observers believe a new agreement will be reached because the economic benefits to the Philippines are so great. The bases employ 40,000 Filipinos directly and contribute directly over 5% of the Philippines GNP. This total is further enhanced by the spending of 60,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel and their 25,000 dependents.

A new treaty will undoubtedly cost the United States considerably more than the current $900 million and will be subject to more stringent criteria of Philippine use, to demonstrate that the bases are more than just nominally owned by Manila. In all probability, a new treaty will be submitted to a popular referendum—as Dr. Jaurique pointed out and also Professor Buss—the approval of which will serve to solidify U.S.-Philippine security ties. At the same time, the United States must be prepared to see the bases become targets for guerrilla attack after 1991. If the communists's New People's Army can rally nationalist sentiment against this continued "imperialist encroachment." Even if the bases are renewed—and as things now stand, I think they will be—problems concerning the presence of nuclear weapons could arise. As the 7th Fleet deploys, more vessels with such dual-capable systems as the Tomahawk, anti-nuclear concerns in the Philippines could become a political issue.

Soviet concern about Philippine bases is regularly expressed. General Secretary Gorbachev, in his wide-ranging Vladivostok speech of last year, hinted at the possibility of reducing the size of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in exchange for an American military exit from the Philippines. That offer will probably resurface when the bases negotiations begin next year.
Subsequent high level Soviet visitors to the Philippines have warned that the bases put the country at-risk, and could involve it in war. On balance, however, I think cautious optimism over the future of the bases appears warranted. Their continued importance for monitoring and protecting the sea lanes through the straits of Southeast Asia, makes the facilities a net asset for regional security. That asset could be further enhanced, in the author's view, if the United States and the Philippines expanded the multilateral use of these facilities--such as the Crow Valley Gunnery Range for ASEAN navies and air forces. Joint use would facilitate the development of common doctrine among friendly armed services and help dissipate the negative image of the bases as exclusively an American strategic interest.

I see I’ve run out of time so I won’t have the chance to look at Australia and the other sea lanes, but I know that my colleagues will have a chance to cover them, so I thank you.
Professor June Dreyer is one of a small co-fraternity with me of people who spend their time looking at the Chinese military. She is Director of the Department of Politics and Public Affairs at the University of Miami and will speak to us this morning on the Chinese perspective on the maritime strategy.

Chinese Perspectives on Maritime Strategy
Dr. June Teufel Dreyer
Department of Politics and Public Affairs
University of Miami

Thank you very much. When Ed Olsen first called me about this conference quite a months ago actually and asked me to give a paper on Chinese attitudes toward the maritime strategy, I did something unusual and that is--I did not wait until the last minute--it struck me as very interesting. And I was probably trying to put off grading final exams. And I thought--my God, that sounds interesting, so I went through my collection of the Liberation Army Daily and the Remner... People's Daily and JPRS and FBIS and so on, for January and February, the months of '85--the months where the maritime strategy was being vigorously debated in the United States. And I came up with the interesting conclusion that the Chinese had said nothing at all on the maritime strategy. Well I also asked some of the Chinese military attaches, who I occasionally see in Washington and New York, and I asked my friends who see them even more often--please talk to these people about this. And I got answers like--maritime strategy, what maritime strategy? Or, alternatively, maritime strategy--whose maritime strategy? And occasionally I got the all-purpose comment, which makes all of us grind our teeth--China's principal stand is non-interference in the affairs of other countries, and we believe in peaceful co-existence according to the Five Principals. And I thought--well, by the
way there was just one exception to that which I'll get to that in a minute or two. Well, after all, Chairman Olsen had told us to be crisp and concise in our comments. I've spent so long in graduate school that I can rationalize anything. So I had visions of standing up here--after Harlan had introduced me--and saying, ladies and gentlemen, the Chinese government has no position on the maritime strategy, and thank you for your attention and then, in the best principles of Abraham Lincoln's 3 rules of public speaking as enunciated by Admiral Hanks yesterday, I would then shut up in order to be appreciated.

Well, then of course, years of academic training took over and I began to think--my God, this is really very interesting. Why haven't the Chinese commented on the maritime strategy? Certainly it couldn't be because they lacked information about U.S. military activities, or because they were reluctant to comment. Because in those same two months I looked very carefully at, I noticed that the Chinese had lambasted the United States and Israel for threatening military action against this poor sovereign Arab country--Libya--under the pretext of combating terrorism. And they also accused Caspar Weinberger of exaggerating the threat from Soviet SS-25's in order to get a larger Defense Department budget. And they also commemorated Martin Luther King's birthday by presenting a lengthy commentary on the disparity between income levels and blacks and whites in the United States. So I figure lack of information or shyness about commenting about U.S. domestic affairs, is probably not the reason.

Obviously, if it's not shyness and it's not lack of information, could it be because they don't comment on strategy or they're not interested in it or something like that? And again, the answer is no. The Chinese have, for the last three years, enthusiastically encouraged the holding of a military salon where the up and coming--this is not for senior level officers--this is for the bright young men--the Cort Wagner's and the Peter Swartz's of the FLA--are supposed to get together and
comment on strategy. And not a word had come out of this. Then, again, we know for sure that they know about the air-land battle, because a number of delegations that have gone over, have been asked to comment in detail about the air-land battle. And clearly this is not for a bunch of people who don't know anything about it--it's for people who have read the standard sources and have intelligent questions to ask about it.

Well, then, let me come to the one exception I mentioned before. And that is--this is a senior Chinese official, commenting to an NSA staffer who, given the recent perceived need for greater secrecy at the NSC, does not want his name mentioned nor does he want the Chinese official's name mentioned. But at any rate, the Chinese official commented that he thought that the maritime strategy's plan to pursue SSBN's into the Sea of Okutsk was risky and dangerously provocative. It was likely to escalate into nuclear war and of course, more importantly, nuclear war in China's backyard. And he was told the various counter-arguments to this--I read Linton Brooks and so did you all--so you know what they are--and his reply was an elegant shrug of the shoulders and a look that said--and if you believe that, I have a nice bridge in Brooklyn that you might be interested in taking a look at.

Well, ok, now the question then arises--is this official's view standard for the Chinese leadership or is it simply his own expression of his own views? And I cannot give an answer to that. My hunch is that there is not a great deal of desensus in the Chinese leadership on this. But they do probably consider it risky.

Now, there is, of course, something that gets the Chinese off the hook on this. And that is--if you look at Admiral Watkins statement of the maritime strategy, it mentions Asia, I believe, twice and China not at all. And so why take a chance and comment on something that you don't really feel you have to?

I next turned my attention to thinking about what it is that the Chinese probably think about the maritime strategy. And
really, there are only two countries that the Chinese—in fact, only two countries in the world probably, that the Chinese have apprehensions about. The first is, obviously, the Soviet Union and the second is Japan. And clearly, they are more worried about the Soviet Union than they are about Japan.

China knows that it could not beat the Soviet Union in any reasonable scenario of confrontation. I think it's the standard line that you saw, for years—let them come, we'll drown them in a sea of people's war—is pretty much making a virtue out of necessity in a situation where they know they can't do anything much. The Soviets are unlikely to be stupid enough to allow the Chinese to engage in people's war.

It is also necessary to note that China has important and growing commercial and trade relations with Asia and the Pacific and of course also elsewhere. And it is very important to the Chinese that this locks be kept open. The People's Liberation Army's navy cannot do that and it will not be able to do it in the foreseeable future. The Chinese are worried about the expansion of Soviet power in the Pacific. They have commented on this privately or numerous occasions. They have commented on it publicly, although gently, numerous other occasions. The countries that Cort Wagner mentioned yesterday, which are not exactly household words, are indeed household words in the Chinese Foreign Ministry. They worry a lot about this. A couple of years ago, they assigned one of their very best diplomats—I won't go into his bio—as Ambassador to Fuji. And those of us who look carefully at diplomatic appointments in China, were quite surprised at this. And there were two currents of opinion at the time. One of them is that Chi Chou Jou had done something absolutely horrible and this was the Chinese equivalent of Siberia for him. And the other one is that the Chinese had decided to pay a lot more attention to the situation down there. And I think very shortly, people became convinced that it was the latter explanation rather than the former.
The Chinese, however, are concerned that they need peace and they want to buy time for their Four Modernizations program. They have no wish to pick fights with the Soviet Union. What they have chosen to do, recently, is a foreign policy of nominal equi-distance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Spiritually, I think they are quite a bit closer to the United States, but nonetheless they profess a policy of equi-distance.

Therefore, to the extent that the American maritime strategy can contain Soviet expansionism and keep the locks open for Chinese commerce, the PRC can only be in favor of it. But why comment when it will make the Soviets angry if you do. But to the extent that the maritime strategy's forward aspects seem provocative and that its plans to pursue Soviet SSBN's into waters near the Chinese mainland seem apt to bring nuclear war to the PRC, and to the extent that the maritime strategy's Pacific scenario threaten to involve China in a U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the Chinese will be profoundly distrustful of the maritime strategy.

Ok. What about Japan? Sino-Soviet relations have been quite poor lately. There are a lot of reasons for this, which I don't have time to go into. Some of this was, I think, preventable from the Japanese side. Prime Minister Nakasone probably didn't need to go to the Asa-Knie Shrine on the 40th Anniversary of the end of World War II. The other thing is, I don't think the Japanese Ministry of Education really did need to try to change those textbooks or to assert that it was really the Chinese that provoked the rape of Nanching--the Japanese had nothing to do with it, it was strictly retaliation. This, I feel, was provocative to the Chinese. Then, on the other hand, there are things that the Japanese certainly could not have helped. They didn't build one of the world's greatest machines by making silly investments. China is, in many reasons, not a very good place to invest. Americans have not been exactly hard-headed about it. The Japanese have proved more shrewd customers.
And the Chinese are annoyed. Why can't they get better terms from the Japanese.

Other things perhaps were not easily preventable by the Japanese either. They have been pushed for many years to break that 1% barrier of GNP in terms of defense spending. They have been pushed by the United States for many years to take a greater part in Northeast Asian security and defense. Chinese were very upset at the Japanese decision to spend more than 1% on defense spending and they were also very annoyed at the United States for pushing Japan into a more active military role.

Now, to the extent that the PRC's leaders perceive the maritime strategy as encouraging the growth of Japanese military capabilities—which at least publicly they appear unwilling to distinguish from a growth in Japanese militarism—in other words, there's military and militarism—they will find the strategy distasteful. And it is certainly possible to argue that the issue of the maritime strategy is quite separate from the issue of strengthening Japanese military capabilities. But the Chinese do not appear to accept this argument.

Well, to conclude—I've just been passed my 5 minute notice here—China has said nothing about the maritime strategy—perhaps because the Chinese leadership has concluded that any statement on it might damage China's carefully crafted attempts at establishing a policy of nominal equi-distance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The decision to avoid overt commentary on the strategy has been made easier by the fact that the maritime strategy seems to concentrate on the European theater, saying little, explicitly, about Asia. Obviously it says a great deal implicitly. And nothing at all about China.

Now implicitly, of course, Asia looms much larger in the maritime strategy and one must assume that the Chinese leadership has thought very carefully about these aspects. The Chinese have important commercial activities going on in Asia and the Pacific, as well as strategic concerns in the area. It's own navy is presently unable to defend these interests to any significant
degree. And despite a force modernization program, this is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future.

Now, to the extent that the maritime strategy keeps these locks open for Chinese vessels, and contains the growth of Soviet influence in Asia and the Pacific, the Chinese are likely to favor it. To the extent that they consider it provocative, it is likely to escalate into nuclear war in Asia or lend encouragement to the growth of militarism in Japan--they will tend to oppose it.

Thank you very much for your attention.
Dr. Jencks

Well, thank you June. We're slightly ahead of schedule. Every well-equipped chairman--I have a five minute note, a one minute note, a stop note and a water paper to throw--so I'm in good shape.

Our next speaker is Professor Yoshihisa Nakamura from the Japanese Defense Academy. He is a truly unique individual in that he is a professional official and a professional academic, teaches at the Japanese National Defense Academy. He has been a Research Fellow at Stanford and at the U.S. National Defense University and is currently a Research Fellow at the University of California at Berkeley. He is the author of two books in Japanese--one on their armed forces in society toward the 21st century. And another one due out in September called Strategic Thinking for a New Generation. He and one other individual within the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, are largely responsible for virtually the only deep thinking, it seems to this American, that's being done about strategy within the actual Japanese defense establishment. So we're very fortunate to have him with us. And he asked for three minutes in deference to his problems with English. My officer-students should only have such problems with English as well. Yoshi--18 minutes.

Japanese Perspectives on Maritime Strategy
Professor Yoshihisa Nakamura
Japanese Defense Academy

Before I forget, I'd like to mention about the Tosh...... There are many American people who think that Tosh...... and the Toshiba Electric Company is the same. But this is a big mistake. The Toshiba Electric Company is a completely different from the Toshiba .... Company. The custom was violated not by Toshiba Electric Company but by Toshiba .... Company. I would like to emphasize this fact because I bought several stock of the Toshiba Electric Company a few weeks ago.
Similarly, the Ground Self-Defense Force and the Maritime Self Defense Forces have a completely different view of the U.S. maritime strategy. And the purpose of my presentation is—if you're interested in the U.S. maritime strategy, you encourage the Ground Self Defense Force ideas and educate our navy's officers much more about the maritime strategy.

In the first several years, Japanese defense policy makers had a heated debate about the Japan defense forces in 1990's. This debate was provoked by the Ground Self Defense Force initiative in which the Ground Self Defense Force insisted that the Japan defense strategy in 1990's must be integrated with the U.S. maritime strategy. However, presently, this initiative are confronted with several difficulties. The first, the strategic thinking up between our national defense program outlined, established in 1976, and the U.S. maritime strategy.

The second, the different interpretation of the U.S. maritime strategy among our sister services. And finally, the Japanese public apprehension of so-called to be involved in the war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

So I will try to clarify those three difficulties in my presentation. What is the Ground Self Defense Force initiative? After the careful research on the U.S. maritime strategy, the Ground Self Defense Force decided to take an initiative of making the new military strategy in the 1990's, along with the maritime strategy. The first initiative is to get the consensus on the Soviet motives to attack Japan. The pending Ground Self Defense Force initiative estimated that Japanese island process political view and strategically threaten the Soviet Union. The initiative postulated that the Soviet strategics—so-called bashing for the bear—will leave Okaido to be a threat against the Soviet Union. The Soviets looked upon Okaido as an unsinkable aircraft carrier for the U.S. offensive operations in his home water—the Sea of Okutsk. Furthermore, they are stuck in and around the bashing, could be cut easily by the U.S.-Japan offensive operations after the ... Straits.
The second initiative was to draw the most likely international situation under which Japan would be attacked by the Soviet military forces. An initiative supported the global congressional war scenario. According to the initiative, once the war between the United States and the Soviet Union break out in other areas such as the NATO theater, European theater, or the Middle East theater, the Soviet Pacific Fleet would have two kinds of military goals. One is to secure the bashing for the SSBN--the Sea of Okutsk--and second, to interdict the slot between the U.S. content and the Middle East.

In order to achieve these two goals, it is very logical that the Soviets should be induced to occupy Okaido, at least the coastal area of Sawyer Strait and Togorro Strait and to ensure the free passage through these two straits.

And the final initiative was to emphasize the role of the Self Defense Forces under crisis situations. According to the Ground Self Defense Force initiatives, a war would arise out of the crisis rather than surprise attack. Although this role of the United States military force is a very important aspect of the maritime strategy, the Japanese Navy and Air Force would like to neglect those goals of crises. During the crisis, the Ground Self Defense Forces will change and develop a deployment of its forces from all over Japan into the northern part of Japan, especially at the south of the Sawyer and both sides of Togorro Straits. Two-thirds of all Japanese Ground Self Defense Force troops would be redeployed in the northern part of Japan, during a crisis. The initiative would expect that Japan's Self Defense Force would possess the capability of strait blockage, which would enable to button up the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the capability of escorting the U.S. 7th Fleet aircraft carriers, which would move rapidly to the forward position during a crisis, especially the escort of the U.S. carrier, would be more important than the so-called--the protection of 1000 miles sea lane, because such a movement of aircraft carrier battle group would enable at the crisis, to force the Soviets to move their
SSBN's into Bascham in the Sea of Okutsk and protect them with SSN and other conventional forces.

In addition to these defensive capabilities provided by ourselves and the offensive nature of the U.S. Pacific forces, will contribute toward a deterrent in the northern Pacific. Especially the Ground Self Defense Forces expect that the Soviet air power in the Far East will be defused by the amphibious operations and not only demonstrate but also further against the Kuril Islands and the Kamchatka Peninsula. Therefore, the Ground Self Defense Force can gain the air superiority, at least for a while, over the norther part of Japan, particularly over Okaido. It is often said that our Air Self Defense Force is planning to withdraw our base in Okaido to the Honchu when the Soviet Union initiates invasion of Japan.

The Japan Ground Self Defense Force initiatives were a bolt from the blue for the national defense program outlined proponents. Indeed, there were several strategic thinking between our national defense program outline and the maritime strategy. One of the gap is how to evaluate the strategic ratio between Japan and NATO. The national defense program outline is based upon the assumption that any Soviet attack would be carried out against Japan alone—nothing to do with conflict in other areas such as in the European theater.

On the contrary, the maritime strategy is based upon the global conventional war scenario. The second strategic thinking relates to the difference in perception of Soviet motives to attack Japan. According to our national defense program outline, the Soviet motives for attacking Japan may be political. That is, to crush Japan into restraining from the United States—for example, don't participate in the strategic defense initiative program. According to the scenario of the U.S. maritime strategy, the aim of Soviet conventional attack against Japan may be to establish geographic foothold with a guaranteed strategic advantage. If the Soviet Union could occupy Okaido, the Soviet Far East force could possess a free hand to develop its forces in
the Northern Pacific. The high maneuverability of its navy and air force in the northwest Pacific would strengthen the bashing for the bear in the Sea of Okutsk.

Second, maneuverability would also contribute to the interdiction of the slot between the United States content and the Middle East in wartime. The third strategic thinking is in respect to so-called 1000 nautical mile sea lane protection. When Japanese think about self-protection, they envision either the convoy protection such as escort of Japanese cargo ships or the protection of corridor within which merchant marine can safely and freely sail because of our navy's defend them from the Soviet submarine threat.

On the contrary, the U.S. looks upon the sea lanes protection strategy as a deterrent, rather than solely for war fighting. It is a deterrent strategy because the U.S. Navy tries to protect the slot through the military threat against the Soviet Navy. To attack the Soviet military bases, to blockade the strategic important straits and to detect, pursue and destroy the Soviet submarine. It is a deterrent strategy because the U.S. Navy plays a very important role during crisis. The movement of U.S. carrier battle group to the forward position during crisis, moves the Soviet SSN and other forces to the defensive position of Bashing.

Other difficulties which depends on the Self Defense Force initiatives have met, is a different interpretation of the U.S. maritime strategy among its sister services. Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force does not estimate the Soviet military strategy in the same way as you. The primary mission of the Soviet Navy in the Far East, according to its view, still may be to interdict the sea lanes of Japan, not to defend the Bashing Bear with other conventional services. Moreover, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces regard that maritime strategy as the traditional U.S. strategy, rather than a unique product of the Reagan Administration. In other words, the maritime strategy is to reassert the presence of the U.S. Navy as the senior service in
line with the ... As a result, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force insists that its primary mission is and will be the protection of the 1000 nautical miles sea lanes, not the Straits of ..., not the escort of the U.S. 7th Fleet. Even if the maritime strategy is not a maritime strategy which the U.S. has long had, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force want to be Japanese Navy, rather than anti-submarine forces which serves the 7th Fleet. Once the Soviet initiates attack on Okaido, our submarines pass through the Sawyer and Togorro Straits and Sushima Straits and assault the Soviet amphibious subs or even south of Vladivostok and other Soviet military bases and the maritime province. What will we do? They would like to have our aircraft carriers? No. They are going to have ship to ship missile like a bomb which will mount on the submarine. So they are going to have a very small ejection which will admit by the United States.

Furthermore, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces cannot declare that the escort of the U.S. aircraft carrier is its mission during crisis. Indeed, as Prime Minister Nakasone has said at the National Diet, that the escort of the U.S. fleet will be carrier out only at the wartime situation--such as a military attack against Japan territory and/or against Japanese sea lanes. As for the strategic blockade missions, if you want to control the straits with a combination of submarine and surface ships, rather than with laying the mines. It points out two reasons why our navy does not want the mine operations. One of them is that laying the mines at the strait is unrealistic operation. It is true that Japan could not lay the mines at the strait during crisis. Because it is a Japanese former policy that the strait blockade must be carrier out only after Japan would be invaded militarily. Therefore, our navy will lay the mines after all Soviet submarines pass through the strait and sink our subs.

The other reason is that once the mines are laid, the Japanese fleet cannot enter the Sea of Japan to assault the
Soviets amphibious ships and Vladivostok.

Also, three services, however, of Japan's Self Defense Forces support the U.S. global conventional war scenario. It is not surprising that Japanese public will be reluctant to accept a war scenario because of being involved into the war between the Soviet Union and the United States other than on Japanese soil. Since the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed in 1951, the Japanese public has been very sensitive to be involved in any type of U.S.-Soviet military confrontation which breaks out on the Japanese soil. The Japanese public is very sensitive to the second front strategy or its own strategy and so on. Therefore, they are afraid of the strategic integration with United States strategy, especially with regard to the global war scenario.

In addition to Japanese apprehension of horizontal escalation, I must mention the vertical escalation issue briefly. Although many U.S. security experts are criticizing the operation against Soviet SSBN's as a means of changing the nuclear balance through the conventional forces, conventional men, it is not a controversial issue among Japanese public and even defense policy matters so far in Japan. I don't have time to explain why. On the contrary, the issue of the straits blockage is very controversial. As long as the straits blockage is the pillar of the maritime strategy in the Pacific, it seems to the Japanese public that this strategy is too provocative to the Soviet Union, as my colleagues spoke already. The Japanese public seems to support the argument that the Soviet military commander will determine to invade Okaido mainly if his forces were to be buttoned up in the Sea of Japan.

There's another problem highlighted by a recent elaboration of their maritime strategy in the Pacific. That is, proposal to occupy the Kuril Islands and use them as a bargaining chip of wartime... These islands are not worth, even a part of Okaido, from the Japanese viewpoint. It is worth noting that most Japanese people have re-regarded General MacArthur's refusal of
the Soviet demand--Staring's demand--accession of the northern part of Okaido, as his greatest contribution to Japan.

The Japanese Ground Defense Force initiative vehemently and enthusiastically supports the integration between the Japanese defense strategy and the U.S. maritime strategy. It is not clear so far how much impact of these three difficulties which I spoke, will damage the Ground Self Defense Force initiative. It will not be surprising that the Japanese public demands to revise global conventional war scenario. Our navy all of a sudden may continue to exploit the public image about the sea lane protection, either as a convoy or courier protection, to get as large an appropriation as possible for its services. Therefore it regarded the Ground Self Defense Force initiative as more politically sound than the national defense program outline. Nevertheless, if the maritime strategy is appropriately explained to the Japanese public and Japanese defense experts, especially navy officers, its defense strategy in the 1990's must be strategically sound than 1980. Thank you very much.

Dr. Jencks

Admiral Hayward has a brief comment.

Admiral Tom Hayward

Mr. Chairman, if I might just point out that we have just been privileged to hear something that is extremely rare. .... in candor in expressing his point of view of the Japanese interpretation of their own strategy and keep the information sort of in-house--use it for our own benefit, but recognize where it's coming from and the sensitivity of it.
Our last paper presenter is Mr. Owen Harries, who is the Editor of The National Interest. He works in Washington but asked me to emphasize that he is, in fact, Australian and I think we’re going to get still another very different perspective on the maritime strategy. Owen--

Dr. Owen Harries
Editor, The National Interest

Thank you. I am going to use the time I have merely to talk about the Southwest Pacific. I shall have little or nothing to say about Southeast Asia. Yesterday the Southwest Pacific came up several times in discussion. And generally the situation there was described in very optimistic terms. We were told, for example, that Australia’s strategic posture complements the American maritime strategy very nicely. We were told that the visit of The Missouri to Sydney, recently, set back the anti-nuclear movement pretty decisively. We were told that the anti-nuclear movement pretty decisively. We were told at lunch yesterday that a little patience and politeness would get New Zealand back on track. Today I will try to spread a little compensatory pessimism and gloom. Since World War II, the United States has been the dominant military and political presence in the Southwest Pacific and this certainly continues to be true. However, the trends in the region, over the last 4-5 years, have been very adverse to the United States. Although it’s still in an advantageous position, the extent of this advantage or superiority has, I believe, seriously deteriorated in the 1980’s during Ronald Reagan’s watch. As recently as 5-6 years ago, this seemed a stable, trouble-free region. The backwater that represented no serious problems—that could be safely taken for granted. The sort of place you could send a Texas rancher or a
California cadillac dealer as ambassador in return for services
rendered. Whose pro-American orientation could simply be
assumed. This is no longer true.

In the space of a few years, the following had happened--and
I'll just mention them briefly--you know them. Several of them
have been talked about already. First, what seemed to the most
trouble-free American alliance, ANZAS, has come apart. The
American-New Zealand leg of it is no longer operative. The
Soviet Union, hitherto successfully excluded from the region, has
made quite significant progress in legitimizing its presence
there with these fisheries agreements. In addition, and this
hasn't been mentioned as much--both Cuba and Libya are quite
active in the region.

Third, the countries of the region have declared the South
Pacific to be a nuclear-free zone. And while some have claimed
this to be strategically innocuous and that it doesn't prevent
the passage of ships or basing, I think its symbolic significance
is clearly very considerable. Again, New Caledonia has become
sort of the festering sore in the region, involving continuouS
low-scale violence and becoming a focus for 'anti-imperialists'
that is, anti-Western sentiment throughout the region.

Events in Fiji earlier this year--first, the election of a
neutralist government, followed very quickly by a coup, show that
even what seemed the most stable and pro-Western country, is not
immune from what is happening.

I think it needs stressing that underlying all these
particular developments and contributing to many of them, there
is apparent throughout the region, I believe, a significant
strengthening of anti-American, neutralist sentiments,
particularly among the elites of the region. To some extent,
this is a spontaneous or natural thing. To some extent, it's
contrived and deliberate. Among its causes, there are such
things as generational changes in leadership, the fact that a
whole generation which is used to working with the United States
and remembers World War II in the past--I think insensitivity or,
the part of the United States and neglect have also contributed to this. But to some extent, it’s been very deliberately contrived. Since the late 1970’s, in particular, the Australian and New Zealand left have made very sustained efforts, both in their own countries and in the island states, to get their views accepted, to propagate those views among key groups, and to create organizations that reflect them. They concentrated particularly on labor, the media, church groups, and disaffected ethnic minorities—the aborigines in Australia, the Mowri’s in New Zealand and, to some extent, the indians in Fiji. In some cases they worked essentially on their own. In others, for example, in the case of New Zealand trade unionists, they’ve worked very closely with Moscow and this is well documented by now.

The causes they’ve been selling are peace, neutrality, anti-imperialism, and independence. And they’ve had considerable success. I think the model for what is happening—the most significant things that are happening in this region—are not Lenin or Marx but the Italian, Antonio Gramsci, who believed that the way to successful revolutionary movement was by preparing the way thoroughly by cultural penetration and preparation—leading to what he called a new cultural hegemony. And I think—I don’t want to exaggerate this—there’s been considerable among the elites of this region, including the elites of New Zealand and Australia—in creating a sort of successful counter-culture in this way.

If I can put it a different way, the saying associated with Richard Nixon, to the fact that if you have a firm grip on a certain part of a person’s anatomy, his heart and mind will follow. Gramsci reverses this and says—if you get control of a person’s heart and mind, he will follow you willingly and from conviction and the coercion involved in the anatomical imperative will not be necessary. And also, the danger involved in the Nixonian formula that once you let go, you might be thumped. On the whole, Gramsci’s view seems to me sounder than Nixon’s.
Now I turn to Australia--far and away the largest and most important country in the region. In my experience, among Americans, there's a widespread view that while New Zealand might have gone bad, there's not much to worry about in Australia--the state is essentially sound and reliable. And I guess Bob Hawkes comes close to being everybody's favorite socialist prime minister. Now there is something in all this. Australia is certainly in better state than New Zealand--which is a very strange state--a mixture of paranoia, delusions of importance and rampant moralism.

The Hawke insists on its faithfulness to the American alliance and its acceptance of deterrence. And Hawke certainly suffers no illusions personally, about the Soviet Union. But that having been said, I think it's also true that Australia is far from healthy politically. The left has made considerable progress in its attempt to establish the kind of cultural hegemony that I've spoken about. And while the ordinary Australian is still predominantly sound--the sort of Australian who went down to see The Missouri in large numbers--those of the intellectual community, I think, are much less so. And this, in turn, has its effect on the behavior of the community at large--the sort of trendy businessman and politician who wants to be with it--is affected by this atmosphere and so is Hawke himself. The way he reneged on his promise to help the U.S. with the testing of the MX, for example, the gratuitous criticism of American policy on SDI, on Central America--these reflect some of what I'm talking about.

Well, this is essentially background. I'd now like to turn to Australia's strategic outlook, particularly. Traditionally, Australia's strategic outlook has been dominated by two related themes. The first--dependence on a very close relationship with allies--with powerful allies. In the 1940's--Great Britain, since then, the United States. And second, a belief in forward defense. Defense as far from Australia's shores as feasible. These are constant themes in Australia's history. We've
proceeded on the assumption that her security as a large, rich, white country, with a small population, situated thousands of miles from the major Western powers—ultimately depends on the ability of those Western powers to retain a favorable balance of power in the world, generally, and in the region in particular. And that the most effective contribution Australia can make to its own security, is to assist, to the best of its capacity, in maintaining that balance. And consistent with this view, through the 1950's, 60's, as the Cold War developed, Australia committed itself to a forward defense policy.

Fundamental doubts as to the continuing viability of that strategy emerged in the late 1960's with the deterioration in the Vietnam War—Nixon's Grand Doctrine—and the withdrawal of the British from Eastern Suez. But the traditional Australian habits of thought were very deepset and not easily displaced. And throughout the 70's, there was great reluctance to shift away from traditional positions. And ironically, it wasn't until 1980's, when, under the Reagan Administration, the United States was starting to reassert itself in the Pacific, that Australians began to react seriously to the dilemmas of the 1970's.

Current Australian strategic thinking is set out in two documents. The Dibb Report, prepared for the Minister of Defense by Paul Dibb, a friend of mine, in March 1986 and the official Department of Defense White Paper, published earlier this year. The essential theme of both documents, in my view, and of the new strategic outlook—they represent the essential theme of withdrawal. Withdrawal from primary dependence on alliances and withdrawal from forward defense, to a more parochial perspective of Australia's defense needs.

The strength of the first theme is indicated by the fact that on the first page of text in the Defense White paper alone, the term self-reliance and self-reliant are used no less than 12 times. The other distinctive theme of both papers, on the restrictive nature of what the defense of Australia involves, is underpinned conceptually by something that hasn't been emphasized
ever before, in the case of Australia--a distinction between the area of primary strategic interest and the interest of direct military interest. The former--primary strategic interest--includes Southwest Asia, Eastern Indian Ocean, the Southwest Pacific--the wider area. The latter is a much more circumscribed area--essentially embracing only Australia itself, its offshore positions, and the sea and air approaches to a distance of roughly 1000 miles. And the message of both documents is that Australia's defense effort in the future should be heavily concentrated in this second, restricted area. It's the need to defend that immediate area that should determine the country's force structure and strategy--not, it is stated quite explicitly--not the prospect of involvement in the wider area, and not any obligation to render assistance to allies, either in that area or beyond it.

There are some important differences between Dibb and the White Paper. In the main, Dibb, as a sort of intellectual, is more honest and direct and doesn't measure the political effect of words as closely as The White Paper does. But I would say that the basic thrust of both documents is essentially similar and Mr. Beasley, the Minister of Defense, has really just proceeded with more caution.

As far as ANZAS is concerned, Dibb says this: 'There is no requirement for Australia to become involved in ANZAS contingency planning for global war. Neither this possibility nor other remote possibilities for calls of assistance under ANZAS should influence the structure and equipment of the Australian Defense Force, apart from the need to maintain a degree of interoperability in key areas such as common communication.' That is about a negative and grudging assessment of the Australia-U.S. relationship, I think, as has ever been contained in an official Australian document. Unfortunately, what The White Paper says is not all that better. Options will always be available, it says, to Australian governments, for assistance to allies--even though such assistance of itself will not be a force structure
determinant. Again, a very unenthusiastic interpretation of Australia's obligations under the ANZAS Treaty.

Last year in a speech that he gave to the Council on Foreign Relations, Minister Beasley recognized the possibilities of discordance between Australia and the U.S.--detected some concern in the U.S. about the directions of Australia's defense policy and some--what he called 'rather ongoing awkwardness.' However, he was at pains to reject the charges of isolationism and Fortress Australia. He insisted that Australia continued to be concerned about the stability of the wider region, though he could think of nothing more tangible and convincing that a Good Neighbor policy, a la Franklin Delano Roosevelt--to give expression to that concern.

If I can have one minute to make two final points. What's one to make of all this? It seems to me that Australia's position, is at present, extremely incoherent and that it reflects more a change in basic political orientation in an early stage, perhaps, than it does to strategic calculation.

On the one hand, the likelihood of direct threats to Australia is rated very low, but the force structure is to be shaped almost exclusively to meet such threats. Considerable concern is expressed about the wider area about Cameron Bay and the Philippines and so on. But nothing more substantive and concrete than a Good Neighbor Policy, is proposed to cope with those developments. Its insisted that Australia is a good ally of the United States, but at the same time, there's a conspicuous drawing back from traditional commitments to the alliance. It seems to me, however, that all this is dressed up what is happening in terms of Australia's strategic posture, marks a major break with its past. Whatever the protestations about continued loyalty to ANZAS, however sincere they may be, and whatever the qualifications attached to the new policy, I believe is consciously, or unconsciously, beginning to set itself on a new course--one for which there are no precedents in its history. Thank you.
We've all heard the words of our next speaker--needs no introduction. And that's usually followed by a long, flowery introduction. Admiral Hayward's name has come up in most of the discussions yesterday already. And he may wish to respond to that. But there's certainly nothing more that I really need to say to this audience than to say--ladies and gentlemen--please give your full attention to Admiral Tom Hayward. And he can't add anything to that.

Discussant--Admiral Tom Hayward, USN (Ret.)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman--but I knew this was going to happen. We have 10 minutes left and I've got two pages of notes from yesterday and I stopped taking great ideas to pass on to you, knowing that I would be squeezed out of opportunities for--well, I had a feeling that an Army Captain wouldn't throw spitballs at me, anyway. Major, I meant.

I was thinking of Bob Hanks' reference to Abe Lincoln and that doesn't apply to me, unfortunately. I think more of Cal Coolidge and what Will Rogers said about him--when asked, he said, said--Cal Coolidge, he don't say. But when he does talk, he don't say much. Actually he meant that in a flattering way. I won't say much, but it's going to take me a long time to do it. I really tried to filter down an awful lot that is of obvious interest to somebody like me. My position in life now is as a National Security Advisor to the Mayor of Pearl City. It's really been quite a while since I've had an opportunity to get this subject which is so dear to our hearts--and certainly to mine--and to see what your thinking is, where it's going, where it's been.

Yesterday I thought was very stimulating, certainly of tremendous interest to me, particularly in the morning--to listen to these hotshots get up here and really lay it out and excite us
all with the kind of thinking that's going on, the quality of the people that are involved, the dynamism of the process itself, the recognition of what's been accomplished. And I, for one, was very pleased with that and excited with that. And I congratulate you for what you've done to this point. And now let me shoot some holes in it. I'm not to shoot too much at the strategy itself, but the process that recognizes the process as a dynamic one and needs to be.

I wasn't too taken with the historical review of who invented the maritime strategy and so forth. I think that the principles of Mahon and Forrest Sherman and others, are well established and will stand long beyond all of us. I have somewhat of a concern as to how much we carry over from one generation to another. For instance, most of Forrest Sherman's post-World War II discussion yesterday as an environment when the power projection concepts and how to use the carrier forces and the like against the Soviets or against the Soviet Navy that didn't exist in any reasonable way. And I can distinctively Jim Halloway, when he was 7th Fleet, saying--the Soviet Navy, who the hell are they? And we fought the Vietnam War without any concern about a Soviet naval threat. And we established sea control instantly in the region by overwhelming power while the North Vietnamese had a Navy--they didn't use it for perfectly obvious reasons. I mean, they were completely overwhelmed. And our strategy was clearly unaffected by all of the major considerations we take into account today. So let's be somewhat careful about how much we poke in the past. Which then says--let's be awfully intuitive as we look into the future and how we apply those. And the lessons of Korea and Vietnam may be applicable and they also may be worth junking. So that's what I got out of yesterday and would simply pass on to you--I listened to Michael Barnett with great interest as he got his orders from the Vice Chief and the Commanders and Captains and raced off and wrote up the maritime strategy. That wasn't just an incidental question that came along from the Vice Chief. There had been at
least 2-3 years of continual dialogue among the 3 and 4 stars in the Navy—not that they are the font of all wisdom but that’s where the responsibility resides to pull together the strategic thinking and reviewing it and assessing it. And that was done in the late 70’s, looking back at a time when the Navy had pulled out of Vietnam and gone from 900 ships down through 500 and was still headed south. A Navy that didn’t have a retention rate worth a damn. Drugs were beginning to be serious; a minority problem that was upsetting the commands of ships in units enormously. We had a hell of a lot of trouble. And somebody invented a stinking 1200 pound steam plant that drove us wild. And that was the Navy that needed some fresh thinking. And going back to Mahon wasn’t one of the factors that entered our minds.

That was a Navy that had a whole new Soviet fleet come charging on the scene that had been built up in the 1960’s and early ’70s—with their money that had been set aside while we were blowing our money in Vietnam. And so the factors have to be taken into account that influenced naval strategy. And that’s what we tried to do and then said—hey, the staff’s got to help us. And they did a tremendous job. And the evolution of that over the last let’s say 5-10 years, has been certainly impressive if not spectacular. And the only admonition I would say is keep it dynamic. Keep it dynamic.

The second thought I would then go on, with respect to our discussion here of the maritime strategy in the Pacific—this particular panel I think has been very good at focusing on the maritime strategy as it affects some of our allies. But I haven’t heard yet what the maritime strategy of the Pacific is. I don’t think I’ve heard it. We had a super presentation of the Pacific concept of naval operations. Some of the problem is because it’s classified—should be classified. We can’t really discuss all the proper factors that need to be taken into account when we think about a maritime strategy, but I haven’t yet heard what today’s Pacific maritime strategy is. Somehow, the Japanese Ground Defense Force has a sense for it. The Japanese Maritime
Self Defense Force wants to know more about it. Mr. Dibb and Mr. Beasley didn't take it into account at all when they wrote up the new White Paper in Australia. And we didn't hear it. So it seems to me that maybe in this afternoon's session, we can somehow come to grips with a little better definition of what is today's maritime strategy and then how maybe it should be changed if it should be changed and what deficiencies do they have. I think that yesterday that Pete Swartz ended up his preliminary remarks by properly highlighting some of the obvious problems that remain and need to be focused on. And they do. So let me then drift into some of those.

Without myself trying to answer what is the maritime strategy of the Pacific, at least it is understood to be part of our global national strategy. It is a piece of, a function of, the national global requirements and it is focused on the Soviet Union and fundamentally nobody else. And just as in--when we look at the maritime strategy in the NATO area in the Atlantic, that maritime strategy is really oriented toward trying to make people recognize that the flanks of NATO are vital to a NATO land battle and that naval forces play a key role in that and don't forget it. But even that strategy has plenty of work to do because it's fundamentally focused almost entirely on the GIUK gap and north. And you don't really hear a whole lot of talk about the Mediterranean and the importance of a maritime strategy in the Med and the vitality of the southern flank of NATO and how that spills over into the Mid-East and the criticality of our national strategy in the Middle East which the Carter Document helped to focus us on. But where is the Carter Doctrine in this maritime strategy? It isn't in the Atlantic's maritime strategy. Which then says it really highlights one of the major deficiencies in our discussion so far. The maritime strategy of the Pacific is not the Pacific--it's the Pacific and the Indian Ocean and all of the other littorals around. And if we haven't taken that onboard, it's way overdue. Pulling in all of the Indian Ocean's problems into the Pacific--despite the fact that
we have a CENCOM--a CENCOM ain't to focus on a maritime strategy. It's going to be the Pacific Command and the Atlantic Command are going to pull these maritime strategies together and if we are witnessing anything of importance today--and I think we are--of what's going on in the Persian Gulf--it really highlights the importance of understanding the Indian Ocean's problems and the limited war aspects. If our maritime strategy has been focused on the Soviet Union, it's been focused on that because of the budgetary fight that goes on that is focused on the central funding of. And we have to be practical enough to recognize that. There are really two maritime strategies. There's the Washington maritime strategy that is essential to dealing with all the Washington pressures and then there's the real maritime strategy that's essential to the way naval officers and army officers and air force officers and senior politicians visualize the real way in which strategic forces are going to be applied. So we out here got to take limited wars into account and it's a major challenge to OP-06 and the rest of them, to stay on top of this issue because we aren't doing that very well. We certainly are not paying attention to--let's take the Pacific where we've fought two major limited wars. The longest war in our history and where we have totally failed to take into account the linkage between what's going on in the Middle East today and what is likely to happen somewhere in our theater of operations.

Why are we so insistent that Japan build up its military strength? It's more because of our concern that the naval forces will be somewhere else than because we're dissatisfied with Japanese military investment. The more likely war to start isn't going to be the Central Front of Europe, textbook Warsaw Pact-NATO--it's going to be some outgrowth of some other scenario. If our maritime strategy vis-a-vis the Soviets has meaning, it has meaning because of some derivative of the way in which the war starts elsewhere. And that war--I've thought about the last 2-3 weeks--if I were trying to write up a scenario for a war game right now, and I wrote up the present one, you'd all throw me out
of the room as being too wild. The potential of this situation drifting over into something out of control, is high. The potential still, of the Korean Peninsula causing an escalation of events that is significantly different than the war we've fought before—that would involve ourselves with the Soviets, not the Chinese. So the limited war aspects of our maritime strategy, are terribly important and it highlights some deficiencies, like mine warfare, which I really want to hammer to this crowd. We, the U.S. Navy are getting bludgeoned by the press and the congress. I don't even know if it's fair--because I've been out of it too long. I do know that when I became CNO, it was one of a half a dozen major priorities to try to get it spinning back up again because our kind of strategic thinking that is clearly evident in our maritime strategy, will continue to relegate mine warfare to the back alleys. We don't put money on it, we don't put emphasis on it, we are not experts in mine warfare. And the leverage of naval warfare that comes out of being experts in mine warfare is enormous. And I'm thinking of offensive mine warfare as well as defensive mine warfare. And the Japanese concern about our mining the straits is because they see us putting in a bunch of mines that we don't have any way of talking to—technology today gives us the ability to talk to mines. We aren't using that. We're not investing in it. ... maritime strategy.

So let me finish up then with thoughts about our major adversaries and the allies a little bit. Going first to Korea. Korea is different. It's different because we've got a huge navy in the Sea of Japan, owned by the Soviets. We still have the very significant problem of keeping the harbors open. Anybody that's looked at the war plans—we're not talking in a classified sense at all. The amount of war materials that has to flow into Korea to contain the adversary and to meet our own war plans, is enormous. We can not take any interdiction to that. And yet, our maritime strategy prevents us from thinking about the necessary investment into sensible harbor defense and real
control out to 50-100 miles or more so that we can keep that stuff flowing in there, against a North Korean adversary that now has 20 or so submarines that are pretty darn good, that now has a mine warfare capability that's pretty darn good and a Soviet force that, if they're willing to help the Iranians, they sure as hell are going to help the Koreans.

There's a linkage between limited wars and a maritime strategy that's being underemphasized. With respect to Japan, I don't think I have too much more to say. I think the Japanese, particularly the MSDF and the 7th Fleet--the maturing of their operating procedures is impressive, it's important, it's overcoming not only cultural differences but certainly structural differences. It is necessary for the Japanese to interact with the 7th Fleet, hopefully it is not necessary for them to escort our battle groups. They've got other problems. But it is important that they recognize--and they do--that the traditional 7th Fleet battle group presence just may not be there. But it's also important that they recognize the strategy, I hope, is one that is of the U.S.--it's one that's undertaken the initiative, it's on the offense, it's looking for ways to keep the Soviets on the defense, it's being employed that way and that we're thinking about how to use the Japanese capability--that includes the Japanese air capability--in a maritime context. If you're not going to do that, then give the navy some air capability.

With respect to China, I just want to highlight a point. It was brought out last night by Claude Buss and I really stress it--we have instituted a policy of normalization with China that has major strategic implications or foundations to it. They are probably irrefutable. I don't take issue with those. In the process of instituting all kinds of economic and political policies that enhance that relationship, we are also enhancing the military buildup. And that one needs constant assessment. And Claude pointed out--and I think properly so--China is still communist. China still has tens and thousands if not millions of well-trained guys who have not yet been convinced that Dung is
entirely correct. Dung Chou Ping is not young. We are foolish should we think that this situation is locked into place and will never change. Our policy should be reinforcing the current direction. But our investment into Chinese military buildup needs to be very intelligently applied. I don't believe the Soviets put their 54 divisions along the northern border because they were afraid of the U.S. 7th Fleet. And if I listened yesterday to the discussion, we made the case that the Soviets are really confused--they're perplexed about how to deal with China. The Chinese can draw down their military and they're still confused. So it isn't all that important that we help the Chinese get very strong very fast.

The third point is--there's another China--Taiwan--that has completely left the U.S. maritime strategy. We might as well erase it from the chart. And those of you who are involved in the strategic thinking--in the white suits and blue suits--hey, it's time to get them back in the act. If we're really concerned about the Soviets and how to deal with the slot control, we talk about Japan being an unsinkable aircraft carrier. I can guarantee you that that strategic location of Taiwan is every bit as important, if not more so, in the slot to Japan and Korea and China and can be employed very very intelligently, and we've cut them out. We've cut them out politically--we wiped them out of our strategic minds--they don't play. And that's wrong. We've totally forgotten about the patrol of the Bashing Channel. There're all kinds of ways that they should be brought in. And while I'm thinking of an island out there we've forgotten about, when you look at the Indian Ocean, we're to be congratulated for what we've done in Diego Garcia against everybody's better judgment. Tom Moore and Bud Zumwalt foresaw that and a lowly 2-star named Bill Crow understood the vitality of the U.S. getting involved in the Indian Ocean. But there's another island over there called Madagascar that used to be a linkup with the United States and the free world. And now is entrenched with the North Koreans and Russians--but is looking for a way out. Some
enlightened policies toward Madagascar would go a long way toward a maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean.

I'm not going to say anything about the Philippines. It is critical. It is vital. It is important to a maritime strategy. There's tons of things we have to do. I'm not happy with the words I hear about concern over rent and all that. We understand that issue left and right and up and down. And it is not a confusing point. If the United States does not have an obligation to see to it that Corey Aquino survives and that system comes up--by whatever investment is necessary--that's my position on the point. It is our vital interests. I understand--I was in Taiwan last week and read in the China news that the Chinese--the PRC Chinese--have just discovered a major find of gas and oil on the Sprattlee's. If somebody here can reinforce that, I'd sure like to know. It was in the open press. And if that's so, that's one of those kinds of unexpected things that comes along and what do we do next, guys? How do we integrate that into our maritime strategy?

The last thought is Indonesia. You just cannot look at that chart and not recognize the strategic importance of Indonesia to any Pacific strategy--any global or local or regional or whatever you have--Indonesia is vital to that. We are doing some intelligent things within Indonesia--navy to navy--Indonesia's navy is growing. It's growing as fast as it can afford it. It doesn't look anything like our navy. I don't think that there's a piece of gear on it that comes from the U.S. Navy. All the advice comes from someplace else. We're totally cut out of it largely because of our basic policies. Hopefully, our command of control and our strategic thinking will be such that at least the Indonesian Navy and our Navy are talking together, working together, overcoming the fact that the systems can't talk to each other, and they can't work together.

There are some challenges left on the table, it strikes me. Let me just list off 2-3 that I wrote down so that the guys in-60 can still have something to do next year. Tac nuks--we
haven't talked about tactical nuclear warfare. We've got to be able to survive for some period of time in tactical nuclear warfare. I think the U.S. Navy stinks in its understanding of it, its training in it, its integration of it in its thinking. We run up for a peek for a short period of time and it drifts back down again. I don't know why. It is too hard to whatever. But we really haven't got it. And it's badly required. Integrating the effects of SDI, CDI, potential arms control outcomes and space—that dimension, space—the U.S. Navy is employing space systems and doing a fair job of that—but integrating space into the maritime strategy strikes me as something that still requires some real expertise. We can use some people who really have a handle on that and bring new light. Thank you.

Dr. Jencks

By my watch we're at 10:30. So let's reassemble here at 10:45 after a break. Thank you.
Dr. Jencks

We certainly had some thought provoking ideas put forward during our session. So I'll now open the floor to questions or comments. Yes sir, Right here.

Ronald Rourke--Congressional Research Service

I have two comments and three questions—at least I outlined it. The first comment is about horizontal escalation, which came up a couple of times this morning, I think maybe also yesterday. I'm a little ill at ease when I hear references to horizontal escalation in the discussions of the maritime strategy. Because to a large extent, that's really a dead letter. That was kind of run up the flagpole by the administration about five years ago. It was rapidly shot full of holes and then about a year later, it was taken down the flagpole again. There may still be people who concepts of horizontal escalation in their thinking on the maritime strategy, but it's not really an actively articulated component of it. And I think the literature and thinking should catch up with that fact a little bit.

More to the point though. Even if the war starts elsewhere, it's not going to be so much horizontal escalation that's going to involve the Pacific and particularly Japan. There's a certain automaticity to it for three different reasons. The first is that you can't expect fleets to fight in one region and yet not in another where they're also intermixed.

The second is that even if the Soviets have their focus in Western Europe, they're still going to throw up a large defensive perimeter in East Asia that's going to include Japan. And the third is that if we're talking about a protracted conventional war, you have to start thinking about your mobilization base and your industrial base. And Japan is now part—a very important
part--of the Western industrial base. And if we're going to
fight a protracted conventional war in Europe, a lot of the help
for waging that war is going to have to come from Japan, which by
the way points up the importance of the trans-Pacific slots, not
going to Japan, but also going back to the United States. That's
my first comment.

Second comment has to do with Canada and the Canadian
defense review. We haven't heard much of Canada as a major actor
in the Pacific--perhaps it never will be. But, in listening to
the talk about the Australian defense review, it occurred to me
that the Canadians have also come up with something fairly
similar in the broad path to what the Australians have--a defense
review that was the first in 16-17 years and which also focused
very much more on self-defense. The implications of what was in
that review, for the Cass brigade and so forth, mostly or more
concerned the Atlantic, but I think we should also think about
the Canadian role in the Pacific, particularly next to the
Alaskan oil slots. Those are my two comments. My three
questions are the following.

The first is for Dr. Simon. You didn't quite have time to
go through the full outline of your presentation. So I wanted to
ask you is you needed to boil down the main points or the main
conclusions of your work here and in your paper--what would they
be?

And my second question is to Mr. Nakamura and it concerns
the issue of Japanese neutrality in a crisis. I've heard various
opinions on what the Japanese position will be in a crisis or in
the early stages of the war. And any comments you may have or
opinions of an equally frank nature from what you said earlier,
about the possibility of Japanese neutrality, would be very much
appreciated.

And the third question to Dr. Harries--I was going to ask
you on the similarities between the Dibb Report and the
Australian defense review, because I've heard various opinions.
You've hit that nail right on the head for me. But I still would
like to hear any other comments you might have, that you felt that you didn't have enough time to fully go into that issue during your presentation.

Dr. Sheldon Simon

I wanted to thank Dr. Rourke for giving me an opportunity to finish the conclusions of my paper. I promise that we did not consult together during the break. This was not a put-up job. But I would say one of the major things I tried to emphasize at the end of the paper, after reviewing the situation with respect to Japan's strategy, the ROV, the Antipodes and the ASEAN states—is to go back to the distinction, from an allied perspective and a friendly country perspective—the distinction between active and passive contributions to an alliance relationship. And we've heard throughout this conference, the concerns that are developing in various regions throughout the Pacific that reflect growing anti-American sentiment, growing neutralist or non-aligned sentiment. The fear of being drawn into a superpower conflict without a country's direct and voluntary assistance or agreement to this. And my conclusion, in this study, is that it's much more likely to get political voluntarism or political cooperation in U.S. alliance relationships in Asia if the contribution from the very beginning is active. If there are joint plans, if there is a feeling on the part of the allied state that it is contributing and hence its interests are being taken into account in U.S. naval strategy.

Where the nationalist and anti-American flag rises most, in my opinion, is in those countries and those regions where U.S. policy seems to be imposed and the contribution being made by the allies is essentially passive. That is logistics, bases, etc., rather than a direct contribution of forces and plans.

Professor Nakamura
Thank you. First of all, I would like to say today's situation in terms of Japanese neutrality is very improving. Its meanwhile once upon a time or several years ago, many people are afraid not to be involved in U.S.-Soviet conflict. But today some people insist--we should be involved into U.S. strategy and U.S. military defense commitments--we should be. However, to some extent, still the neutrality is very controversial. For example, if today you ask the Japanese government to blockade the strait, maybe our Prime Minister Nakasone, even Nakasone, ... much more safe--no. Because we're very afraid once we blockade the straits, the Soviet Union will attack Okaido and we'll lose Okaido before the United States comes to the defense of Japan--within a couple of weeks. Therefore, the Prime Minister will say no. That is neutrality if you mean--or, we are very afraid there's a high possibility. But in the 1990's, if we strengthen our defense capabilities according to the Ground Self Defense initiative, both initiatives, maybe we will sustain Okaido and therefore the next Prime Minister in the 1990's will say--ok, we'll follow your advice--we're going to blockade or we'll fight the Soviet Union--we are capable of blockade our straits--are you ok? We will say to Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. That is crisis management. So my answer is--now our situation in the respect of neutrality is improving but as for wartime military operations, especially the straits blockade operations, we are going to neutral operations now but in 1990 will be improving.

Dr. Harries

... ... White Paper ... already, but let me add a couple of others. Dibb emphasizes much more consistently the purely defensive nature of Australia's defense posture--strategic posture. And the need to, as he says, "shed or reduce those capabilities inherited from the era of forward defense that are no longer relevant." The White Paper, on the other hand, tends
to be rather more robust in speaking of possible retaliation and interdiction in the case of hostilities and rather less passive. Again, Dibb bruskly dismisses Austral’ a’ s military presence and commitments in Malaysia and Singapore under the Five Power Defense Agreement as reflecting ‘the concern of a previous era.’ The White Paper, on the other hand, commits Australia to the continuation of this presence and commitment and describes it as a significant contribution to the enhancement of Malaysia’s and Singapore’s air defense capability.

The main difference is probably in relation to ANZAS where Dibb is much less sympathetic to the commitments and responsibilities under the ANZAS Pact and just says flatly that they should not in any way be determinants of Australia’s force structure. There’s more hedging in The White Paper. It says more things of a traditional kind about Australia’s obligations to ANZAS but in the last resort, it too, comes down on that ANZAS should not determine Australia’s force structure. So the difference there is much more of the language of politicians as opposed to the language of an intellectual and academic as Dibb at least partly is.

Admiral Hayward

I would like to just make on two brief comments in relation to your question. It’s obvious that in Asia and the Pacific, the maritime forces are all U.S. Navy—in the context of our naval strategy. There isn’t an allied navy that can any longer go to sea and wherever we want and integrate itself—so we use them as intelligently as possible and integrate them with our strategy—the Japanese having the greatest role to play at the present time. The largest navies are Chinese—we’re nowhere near as ready to try to figure out how to deal with that. And our traditional ally—we’ve heard from Australia—we see a navy that’s declining in size. Its strategy is improving—that is to say, it’s now a two-ocean navy. That’s a major breakthrough and
maybe that'll bring force structure with it. But it takes bucks and that's the problem. But I would suggest that the Indian Ocean navy: India is one that is underemphasized and we're not paying enough attention to it and the Australians sure aren't paying enough attention to it. But by virtue of their finding themselves now really using the Coburn sound structure, why it leads me to some comfort that we're going to see better awareness of the maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean.

With respect to Japan's neutrality, when Jim Patton and I were working the problem together at the Pacific Fleet, that was one of the drivers behind our maritime strategy. I don't think that's changed. I think the concern over Japan's--of a realistic option for Japan to go neutral--is surely there today and I don't see it disappearing from the near term. We're moving in the right direction--there's more interlocking; there's a greater willingness to talk about these issues. But when we really get down to the kinds of tensions that are involved--when you really the potential threat that can be imposed upon Japan, there are plenty of reasons why Japan would think seriously about the option of going neutral. And our maritime strategy has got to contribute to a Pacific strategy that reinforces the resolve of Japan to stick with us. Because without it, it really changes the equation enormously. It sure affects our maritime strategy enormously. And the outcome of a war becomes very unfathomable.

My question is for Professor Nakamura. ... constitutional limits on your military, assume the defense responsibilities that should go along with having the second largest economy in the world?

Professor Nakamura

48
Well, more than 90% of Japanese people do not want to revise Article 9. We are going to choose another article, the so-called Flexible Interpretation—so it is ok ... supports now the Constitution. So, to the 21st Century, our Japanese Constitution will never revise—we are going under the Flexible Interpretations. However, as Jim Maurer says—yes that's a good idea. You should take the same line in respect with the national defense program outline—the Flexible Interpretation is a very good way. I totally disagree. In the case of the Constitution, Flexible Interpretation is ok, but the national defense program outline case is completely different. This is a good answer to you? I'm sorry, I'm not an economic expert—therefore I don't know what the relationship between the economic issue and Article 9 is.

If you have some questions to me, please speak more slowly.

Jim Patton

I'm Jim Patton and I think I'd be less than grateful if I didn't say how much I appreciated the opportunity to attend what is for me an emotional milestone. It's exactly 10 years ago that Admiral Hayward commissioned this undertaking in Pearl Harbor. And arrive now to find that this process is both alive and successful. Makes my heart leap. I know it's alive because brilliant young officers like the ones you've heard here, are nurturing it every day. Professional lawyers like Edmund Clutchin are practicing it every day and defense intellectuals and scholars are refining it all the time. And I know it's successful because it has passed at least my three criteria for success—it is not an orphan, it has now at least 100 fathers and more emerging all the time—all the right people hate it and all the right people love it. The scriveners and analysts of the defense department's PA&E hate it; the trendy armchair strategists hate it; most important, the Russians hate it. The
Fleet loves it, our friends, allies, would-be friends love it. That’s very important. But probably the best criterion is that it has retrieved a desperate situation. Those of you who weren’t in Pearl Harbor 10 years ago are simply unaware that we have a shambles on our hands. The admiral recognized that early on. Our dialogue with Japan was limited to polite ambiguity. We had absolutely no defense plan for the critical real estate in the Aleutians. Our Fleet’s ammunition and spare parts and other wherewithal were scattered east of the Mississippi River and our strategy, such as it was, would have neutralized half the United States Navy for the 1st 30 days of any war with the Soviet Union as it wound its way slowly around South America.

It’s now all completely retrieved—we’re not all there yet. But we’ve come a long way fast, in my view, in 10 years. I’m out of uniform now but I haven’t forgotten how to salute. Thank you, admiral, for everything you’ve done for us.

Jim ...--President’s former Chief Negotiator
for the Law of the Sea

I really want to address an observation to Professor Simon on a couple of observations that he made in his remarks. Because I don’t quite agree with them, although I can well see how he raised them. And that is in connection with the possible deleterious effect that some of the provisions of the treaty, which is of course is not in force and may never come into force --specifically the EEZ situation and the peaceful purposes situation on the high seas in Article 88—you didn’t refer to that but that’s what it is--would have on the maritime strategy. Now it is true, during the negotiations, that there were considerations about demilitarization. I think those were pretty well deflected. That language on peaceful purposes was put in--some cross references to the U.N. charter was put in--but what we got out of that was essentially, I think, a good situation with regard to navigational rights. And I don’t think that we are
going to be disadvantaged by states in the Pacific Basin really raising those issues, if we continue to do the following--and I think this is absolutely critical. If we keep an assertion of rights program going that will assert the rights that we think we have established--they are customary law rights--they're in the Law of the Sea Treaty but they're customary law rights. If we assert those vigorously, I think that we will essentially achieve our purpose there of keeping down the possible raising of questions by these countries with regard to the naval strategy as far as the navigational aspects are concerned. I do feel that we just must keep that program going and we must keep it going very vigorously because if we start to back away from that, we're going to have trouble. We haven't had trouble so far. We haven't had any real challenges to the navigational portions of the text. Lots of challenges to the sea-bed mining portions, and that's another question. And that's another issue. But I don't think probably that will be the case if we really look to our laurels with regard to our assertions program.

Professor Simon

My remarks on the Law of the Sea were drawn heavily from ... discussion of some of the political possibilities growing out of the EEZ and the peaceful purposes language in the draft treaty. But I also, and I didn't have a chance to get into this in the discussion, look at it in a way as kind of opportunity in terms of U.S. naval strategy--especially the EEZ's. Because, at least in Asia, a number of the littoral countries are now looking at their navies in terms of the EEZ. That is, what kinds of forces do they need to develop NEC protection and exploitation. And it seems to me that the United States might be able to work in collaboration with these navies for mutual benefit.

Followup comment - Jim?
I agree with your latter comment. I do not agree with the source that you draw your remarks from—because, although there’s been a lot of conjecture, just like there’s been a lot of conjecture that the United States is going to be in terrible trouble since we did not accept the whole ‘package’ as it were. But we haven’t gotten into that trouble. I don’t think we’re going to get into that trouble, if we are really vigorous on this thing. And I think it is going to be important to work closely with the navies in this area and it’s going to be absolutely fundamentally important because it falls to us, the United States, and really no one else, to assert those rights that are codified in the navigation portions of the text, to assure that we have these—because these, by customary international law, it’s by state practice that this develops and that’s the only way we can really do it. Thank you.

First of all, one of the things that you’ve seen in action over the last two days—those of you who haven’t worked in the Pentagon—is you’ve sort of seen a very good facsimile of how the maritime strategy was developed and reapproved and continues to be in Washington. You’ve heard action officers who are action officer equivalents, stand up and very enthusiastically peddle their wares. And then various illuminaries and people much smarter than the action officers in various areas—you yourselves—commented on all of that. And then when that was all over, in a very quiet, very deliberate statesman-like way, the statesman, the CNO gave about 150 scenarios as to how the thing now ought to happen and this all happened on a Friday. And that is, in fact, no doubt—I mean that literally be what’s happening today with maritime strategy revision 4 in the Pentagon. It is, and has been, a dynamic process, and it is very difficult—it is frankly impossible to take issue with any of the points that have been
raised—certainly today's panel—with regard to Australia, Japan and the various war fighting and other points that Admiral Hayward raised. A couple of comments on them though.

The problem of identifying where the war starts and the implications of that, for the maritime strategy, which has come up a couple of times today. This is one of those areas where some decisions had to be made when the maritime strategy was created and deliberately the maritime strategy does not tell you—in its classified or unclassified or whatever version—where the war starts. I mean it starts on the planet earth but it doesn’t tell you where the war starts. That is unfortunate in many ways because it prevents you from doing certain things but it was very fortunate in another sense in that it enabled you to get past that problem into the wherever the war starts—what is it that you're trying to do? And one of the things—those of you who have played war games, those of you who plan war games have an advantage here—one of the very very difficult things to do, nearly impossible—is to come up with scenarios that are credible as to the war starts. Anybody who's read Tom Clancy's book, Red Storm Rising, has got a view as to whether or not they find how is war started, credible or incredible. What was interesting in Clancy’s book is the first of couple of chapters on the actions in Central Asia but what then happened when the war finally started, in Clancy’s view. And so we did, in fact, deliberately, the we included people with several starts on their shoulders—not just action officers—deliberately down-played the role of where the war starts so that we could get into the how we would actually intend to use naval forces and other maritime forces—air forces in a maritime role and so on—in war fighting and eventually in war termination. Nevertheless, the problem of—what do you do if the war starts—Harlan’s point—what do you do if the war did start in Southeast Asia? What would you do if the fleet wound up starting off located in various straits in Southeast Asia or in the Indian Ocean—this is a very real problem that the war planners have to address and one that the
war colleges and other places are concern with. And maybe the Postgraduate School--I would hope most definitely.

Another point has to do with--Admiral Hayward raised--Taiwan and that's an important point, both in and of itself but also because of the larger principle. The maritime strategy, as the Navy enunciates it, and as the nation enunciates it, has to take national policy as a given. The national policy of the United States--it's hard to take issue with the way it was characterized by Admiral Hayward and therefore that's how the maritime strategy must treat Taiwan. Which is not to say that educational institutions or planners themselves, option papers, other things going on, everything that Admiral Smith's people do--may wind up doing things that are much different than what the national policy says--certainly our recommendation before that policy gets made may differ--but the strategy itself self-consciously took national policy as a given--in terms of allies, in terms of many other things.

Then the last was--and this is both a comment and a question. In terms of--and for Dr. Harries--in looking at the Dibb Report and looking at The White Paper, for a navy strategist in looking at problems of division of labor and working with allies, there was in fact a very big difference for us. I felt--Cort doesn't hold this as fondly as I do--between the Dibb Report and the Australian White Paper. To me, the Dibb Report explicitly rejected our continuation of the Radford-Collins Agreement The Radford-Collins Agreement is an agreement that was initially set up by Admiral Radford and Collins, American and Australian navy admirals, respectively, back in the early '50's on how we would divide up the navy control and protection of shipping responsibilities between Australia and the United States, in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean. That has become part of a global interlocking constantly--slightly shifting, but nevertheless very real, network of navy-controlled and protection of shipping responsibilities worldwide. So that never again, in time of war, do we have happen what happened on
the east coast of the United States in 1942 in which we were simply unready for all of the various things that had to take place in terms of protecting our shipping.

The White Paper clearly came out and favored the continuation of Radford-Collins, which meant that the major thing that we thought the Australian and American navies were going to do together, and division of labor as we understood them, was going to continue. And so, for that reason, I thought they were very different and that the White Paper came out very salutary.

The other thing that the White Paper said explicitly that the Dibb Report rejected was that Australia would develop naval forces which, if necessary, could keep up with and interoperate with and operate with, far forward U.S. Navy task groups. And that was very important because it meant, not in American terms but certainly in Australian terms—that Australia would continue a commitment to heimich ships in Australian terms that would be able to—should the situation arise—operate with U.S. forces and U.S. battle groups. And so for that reason, I thought it was very different from the Dibb Report.

Dr. Harries

I think ... level of generality which one looks at this. Certainly there are real differences between the two and the differences are, as I said, and as you've emphasized with the Radford-Collins Agreement, in the direction that the White Paper takes a somewhat more expansive view than the Dibb Report did. My point is, that if you compared both of them to Australia's traditional role and position and strategic posture, then they have much more in common with each other and much more in distinction to that traditional posture, than they have differences.

On the second point of difference about the operability, I think that's less of a difference than you make out, because both I think say that the force structure should be determined by this
restricted notion, but that this will result in a force structurer that will allow interoperability and cooperation if the decision should be taken to engage in that. But what worries me is the reluctance of both documents to go anywhere, even in the most general terms, to a commitment to such cooperation outside the sphere of the immediate defense of Australia and its environment, which is quite at variance with the traditional attitude that Australia's taken on these matters.

? - Dr. Hayward?

On how the war starts—as an aspect of whatever the Pacific policy is, of which the maritime strategy is obviously the key and it's been acknowledged that it's a maritime zone and the maritime strategy is bound to dominate the way you go at that. The real issue in a national strategy is deterrence of the war and how the war starts—is preventing it from starting. Up to now we have seen great reluctance on the part of both superpowers from getting involved in situations that even put us to where it could get out of control. Hopefully that situation will continue to prevail. But it's not altogether clear and it would be poor to plan that way. But the maritime strategy, as I understand the Pacific strategy—is designed to try to highlight the two-front prospect of the Soviets. And have that as a dominant feature of it to make sure that the Soviets acknowledge that they're entrapped in a two-front situation. Now if they want to withdraw and consider the Chinese to be no longer a threat and decommission 25-45 divisions and defuse the situation, maybe there'd be a change of our strategy. But for the present, it's in our best interest to make sure that whatever they're looking at is of concern. Therefore, when words like provocative—if U.S. mining great, let's make it as provocative in their perception as possible. Whether we do it or not is a different issue. But the strategy should present those kinds of problems to the Soviet planner and decision maker. And in that sense.
allied support is important. That's why it's so critical that we keep pressing Japan to keep modernizing--because the Soviets are looking at a tough Japan today that wasn't tough 10-15 years ago. And that's what's so bad about even little New Zealand backing away from ANZAS. Their contribution isn't all much but it's part of the perception issue that keeps that two-front problem in front of the Soviets.

Just a remark about the Australian Navy. It is of concern that the new combatant which they have an RFP out on the street and are getting responses back from--have no U.S. bitters and whatever it's going to be, it'll be smaller than the FFT-7. It might be as capable--whatever that means. The U.S.S. Stark is an FFT-7 and we bought it and built it and it's a low-mix ship--sure isn't a high-mix--and it's going to be tough to think that this ship is to interface very well with the 7th Fleet.

Professor Nakamura

I would like to comment on--where will the war start? Our colleague wrote up the Ground Self Defense Force initiative through the Undersecretary of Defense in the Defense Agency. And the Undersecretary asked my colleague where the war starts? He said--well, in Europe--European theater, that's first. And now Undersecretary said--oh, no, we cannot accept such kind of scenario? Why? It will to be involved with the U.S.-Soviet wars, so we cannot accept. How about if the war will occur at first in Asia, especially at first the Soviet Union attack Okaido and spillover effect in Europe or the Soviet Union and back to Europe--that's ok--but you need some kind of testimony from Washington. Now the .... to us is very critical to our strategy. He said--well, we cannot point where the war starts--it's very critical to the Ground Self Defense Force--we really such remarks. Thank you very much.

Dr. Jencks
If there are no questions, we have a couple of minutes left over.

Lt. Scott Sage--Space Systems Engineering Student
Naval Postgraduate School

Forgive me if I'm a little bit off your general area--this conference has been for me personally. But I've been used to looking, in the last year and a half, at building satellites and silicon and galimarsenite and things like that--and it's given me a pretty global view of the world. And my perception of our problems of the Navy in the Pacific is getting agreements to get everybody to realize just how interrelated we all are. And it's amazing to me to hear people talk about them focusing on their own borders. In today's technology, that just boggles me--I'm used to looking at a global level. In fact, I would each take issue with the captain assuming that the war starts on the planet earth. Accidental, on-purpose interruption of a space communications--I guess my comment and observation was--yesterday I noticed several times we were talking about the Russians and their kind of holding the olive branch to the Chinese and saying, maybe they can come to space with us. I still have a very vivid picture in my mind of the Syrians going up and millions of Syrians slaughtering sleep in front of their T.V. sets. Why couldn't we do something in getting our allies more involved in space. For one thing, as one of my students mentioned, they'd be a national hero in their own country. That's a big political gain in itself. As well as showing that country and the people in that country just how small this planet are and how interrelated we are. I'm not sure who that would be directed to, but some observations?

Dr. Jencks
I'd like to give Owen Harries just a few minutes to make a few comments on Southeast Asia which he had been forced to curtail because I was making threatening gestures here.

Dr. Owen Harries

... conference generally. I'd just like to make two very general points about Southeast Asia. First of all, it seems to me that to an unrealistic extent, one image of Southeast Asia has replaced another very quickly. Twenty years of age, it would as about the most volatile and most unstable region in the world, full of semi-fictitious states--full of conflict and very weak governments. To an extraordinary extent, and very quickly, the economic success of the ASEAN countries has replaced that image with one of countries that are a model for the Third World--which look very stable and extraordinarily prosperous. I think it's bearing in mind, to some extent, the earlier image and the possibility that should the prosperity falter or should a quite easily imaginable conjunction of political circumstances develop, we could, I think, very easily be back with the Southeast Asia of the early '60's. And I think this is particularly true of Indonesia which seems to me such a vast complicated country. If you superimpose Indonesia on Europe, it reaches from Ireland to the Caspian Sea. There's a New Zealand instability as well as a sort of darkness about Indonesian politics that could go wrong.

The other thing about the region as it currently is constituted--it consists of a number of countries which are equal economic success stories, but are militarily weak, existing alongside a country which is an economic disaster area but which is militarily very strong. And that is inherently a recipe for political instability. That's all I wanted to say.
Dr. Simon

Could I just reinforce Dr. Harries' comments by a couple of sentences on the political and economic situation. All of the ASEAN states have committed themselves over the past decade or more, to export-led growth. And they've achieved remarkable results with the exception of the Philippines and there's a great possibility that the Philippines, in the next 5 years, can turn around in a remarkable way--if internal stability develops within the country. If, however, the United States, Japan and Western Europe, institute protectionist policies, all of that could become unraveled within a matter of 3-4 years and the political implications would be devastating.

Dr. Jencks

I'm feeling a little guilty about Lt. Sage's comments which I think were very excellent and appreciated. We just didn't have any comments to make down here--didn't mean to give you short shrift. I too wondered about the assumption of it starting on planet earth.

Well I think our time is just about right. We will assemble here at 1:30. Lunch will be in the La Novia room which is the same place it was yesterday. Thank you for your attention.
Good afternoon. Thank you for your presence at our final session--The Navy in the Pacific Conference. I'm Tom Grassey from the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. Yesterday, you'll recall Professor Hensel from the Air War College likened the job of chairing one of these sessions to being a tugboat--pushing the big guys into the position to dump their cargo, pushing them out of the way so the next major figure could unload. This seems an amiable chore. However, I have also been assigned to be the discussant of this session. Which means that I am not your regular little tugboat. I'm an armed tugboat. After helping to push all these major figures to unload their ideas, I'm supposed to take a few shots at them.

Considering the composition of our panel, I know a kamikaze mission when I see one. And since a little tugboat--even an armed one--obviously can't actually harm these giants, but merely annoy them--I hope to do my nominal duty quickly and get out of the way, so our panelists can themselves discuss one another's ideas.

I'm very privileged to introduce three speakers for whom an introduction is unnecessary for most of you. John Collins, at my extreme right, your left, retired as a colonel in 1972 after 30 years of service in the army, including duty in Europe, Korea, and Vietnam. He continues to serve our country in the Congressional Research Service, where he's a senior analyst on
national defense and is best known for his authoritative annual study of the U.S.-USSR military balance. When John Collins posed a series of questions about the maritime strategy in the Naval Institute Proceedings, quite a few people realized that if the maritime strategy was worthy of John Collins' attention, it certainly was worthy of ours as well. His topic today is 'The Maritime Strategy Under Alternative Assumptions.'

Dr. Ed Olsen is a Professor and Associate Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. As you know, he is the coordinator and chief architect of this conference—the most impressive measure of its success, I think, is found in the roster of names of you who have attended our conference. Professor Olsen will address 'The Pacific Rim as an Economic Dynamo: Implications for the Maritime Strategy.'

Our third panelist, looking at the future of the maritime strategy in the Pacific, is Professor Al Bernstein, Chairman of the Department of Strategy at the Naval War College. A few summers ago, I was having lunch in Newport at the O-Club when I overheard many people at a nearby large table addressing this distinguished figure as Mr. President. I asked a person at the table, what country is he a president of? And at the same instant that this person replied—the United States—Bernstein exclaimed, 'But I want to go nuclear, let them fly.' Professor Bernstein will be speaking on 'Strategy in the Pacific: Offensive or Defensive.' And if his students in that war game a few years ago were right, I think I know which direction Crazy Al, or the Mad Bomber as he was known, will recommend.

We'll start with Mr. John Collins.
Present U.S. maritime strategy developed in a near vacuum for two reasons. The Navy's supervisors sat on the sidelines and the Navy excluded most outsiders. No national military strategy shows the Navy where it fits into the big picture, according to concepts of operation promulgated by the Secretary of Defense with advice and assistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have that responsibility by law. Guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the JCS was, and remains, too general to be very useful. The Navy's inner circle in those circumstances, concocted the strategy with little assistance of any sort. And The Naval Institute Proceedings published an unclassified product as a supplement in January, 1986. There have been a few refinements since then but no fundamental changes. Answers to the questions I have posed in The Proceedings apparently satisfied most of the Navy's leaders but they leave me a confirmed skeptic. And if you want to review the exchange of correspondence, it was in March, June and August of 1986 and in April of 1987. My mission, at this minute, is to point the finger very politely at prominent imperfections and to furnish a new framework of assumptions in 15 minutes or less—which I can tell you doesn't leave very much time for nuances.

Now, I'm not well-known for my humility. But I feel it right now, because my credentials on this subject are nearly nil. I never wore a Navy uniform, I never served as a Navy civilian. My only combat experience at sea was as a passenger aboard a troop transport under submarine attack in the North Atlantic in 1943. Certainly, I am not a maritime strategist or tactician. So, who do I have to offer? Fresh viewpoints I hope. As a friend of the Navy, as a friend of the Navy—and free advice—that you can accept or scuttle as you see fit.
Now the purposes of strategy are good starting points for praising the merits of the maritime strategy. Strategy is a form of intellectual judo, that makes the enemy the way you want him to move, whether he wants to go there or not. It matches ends with means—which is a measure of effectiveness—while minimizing waste—which is a measure of efficiency—despite threats and despite political, economic, social, geographic, technological, military constraints. Team play is very important. The U.S. maritime strategy falls short on every count. It is high risk, high cost, inflexible. It plays the enemy's game. We take on the Soviet Navy in its own backyard under circumstances most favorable to them and least favorable to us. It slights serious problems like nuclear combat and chemical warfare at sea, which could happen. You can't assume it away. It depends almost as much on deterrence as mutual assured destruction, which has bad-mouthed now for years and years.

Resources, in my opinion, are insufficient. Combatant ships insufficient for horizontal escalation, that we hear a lot about. Amphibious ships insufficient for forcible entry—we can't go anywhere without being invited. The Marine Corps has a forcible entry capability equivalent to about one Marine amphibious brigade, if you want to be real kind. And that's not going to improve a whole hell of a lot over the next 10 years. Mine warfare—it's a disgrace. We're making ourselves look like the Keystone Cops in the Persian Gulf. And the pity of it all is—if deterrence is the big name of the game, our performance in the Persian Gulf could undercut deterrence because other fifth rate powers are watching what's happening there and they're going to say—if Iran can get away with it, why can't we. Cargo ships—we just talked about them—we ain't got any.

Now my list of alternative assumptions that might improve the present maritime strategy, is limited to six, in the interests of time. But you could double or triple that number if you had 15 more minutes, I'm sure. All I'm going to talk about are very broad and very long-term. I'm leaving the short-term
tactical low-level strategy kind of stuff to the Navy planners. What am I going to talk about? I'm going to talk about team play, service priorities, flexibility, threat appraisals, education and research. Those are my topics.

Present assumption one. The Navy is a self-sufficient semi-autonomous service that has its own land, sea and air force. The Navy lives in its own world. It is not tolerant of outsiders who don't understand. It is not tolerant of participation in joint organizations. It never joined strike commands which were responsible for all of Africa south of the Sahara. Did not participate in readiness command, is not participating in the new special ops command just inaugurated on the 1st of June 1987, is marginally a participant with central commands. Navy leaders, with few exceptions, like Vice Admiral Thor Hansen, stood shoulder to shoulder to should and fought any kind of defense reform that was going to undercut their power and authority. Now, poor coordination of the maritime strategy is inevitable in that kind of an environment. We were told yesterday--don't talk to SACEUR, talk to SACLANT. I did--SACLANT was Wes McDonald who was a student at the National War College when I was on the faculty. I know him well. He was a speaker at Jacksonville, Florida, 29 May 1987--just a few days after he took off his suit. What did Wes McDonald say? He said--the maritime strategy had very, very limited input by other services, by the CINCS or by the allies. He said--he wasn't consulted anywhere near to his satisfaction.

So alternative assumption #1 is diametrically opposed. It postulates that the Navy is part of a joint U.S.-allied team. Admiral Hanks reminded us yesterday that we hang together or we hang separately. I've heard a lot of 'we' vs. 'they' right here in this auditorium over the last two days. Well, 'we' ought to be the United States vs. adversaries. It shouldn't be the Navy vs. everybody else. Maritime strategy architects should replace concurrence after the fact with prior consultation. Briefings to services and visiting dignitaries are no substitute at all for
opportunity by those services and by those allies to staff proposals completely before they reply.

    Present assumption two. What's good for the Navy is good for the United States. It sounds like Indian Charlie Wilson—what's good for General Motors is good for the United States. Clearly—clearly, if we lose a war at sea—a major war with the Soviet Union—or we're even stalemated, we lost the whole war. You can't even be stalemated at sea and win. But let me remind you—if you lose on land, you still lose the war. Now we've got a policy called forward deployment, which I think is just bully. We haven't fought a war on U.S. soil against a foreign foe since the War of 1812 and I don't know anybody who is anxious to do it again. But the forces on the far shores cannot even survive, much less accomplish assigned missions, unless they are reinforced rapidly and resupplied in a rush if we go to war with the Russians. Maritime strategy doesn't have any time line for controlling those slots. The best estimate that I can get is a matter of months and the poor bastards on the far shore are going to be in body bags long before then, because ends and means don't match. The maritime strategy does not mesh well at all with the needs of the Army and Air Force who are over there on the far shore. So my alternative assumption #2 is the flip side of that present assumption. What's good for the United States is good for the Navy. You can't put too many eggs in the Navy's budgetary basket because if you do, then you can't modernize the Army and the Air Force and repeat—if they lose the war ashore, we lost the whole war. We've got a balanced force problem that the Soviets don't share at all. And I would also suggest that it would be helpful if the Navy really got out front and fought for items that are not in the Navy's budget but which are essential to the success of the maritime strategy.

    For example, if I was a Soviet strategist, you'd never find me horsing around out in the middle of the Atlantic and the Pacific, trying to sink individual ships to control those slots. What I'd do is knock out the terminals. And it doesn't matter
any difference how good the U.S. Navy is at controlling the seas if those terminals are gone—the reinforcements and the resupplies never get where they're needed. And so, I'd love to see the Navy fight like hell for tactical ballistic missile defense and air defense. I'd like to see the Navy fighting in a way that it's not now—although, sir, I agree, it has improved—for the merchant marine, which has been a bastard stepchild on a downhill slide since World War II. It's in a disastrous condition.

Present assumption three. One strategy, like one size, fits all. I'm a real admirer of retired rear admiral J.C. Wiley, who wrote the little book on military strategy. And Wiley says—planning for certitude is the worst of all military mistakes. The maritime strategy stresses the least likely threat, which is a global war with the Soviet Union. It assumes that any regional war with the Soviets is going to go global—although I can give you 25 reasons why both sides might want to keep it limited. And the maritime strategy disregards low intensity conflict, although almost everybody I know agrees that that is the most likely threat. So my alternative assumption #3 is that a spectrum of strategies is essential. One size does not fit all. There can't be one maritime strategy any more than there can be one theater strategy that's useful for Europe and at the same time for East Asia. There is a requirement for separate strategies that deal with deterrence in combat—that's peacetime and wartime—nuclear and conventional—global and regional—high intensity conflict and low intensity conflict. And, finally, the maritime strategy—one of them, surely must prepare for the future. The world is changing like Andy Marshall said yesterday. The world that Michael Palmer described long since disappeared.

Present assumption four. Net assessment is dangerous. John Lehman disbanded the Navy Net Assessment early in tenure because it told him things he didn't want to hear, and because he was afraid that its findings would reach Capital Hill. So he sunk net assessment, which never amounted to a whole hell of a lot
anyway because there were about three copies of the Net Assessment published, and the man who was in charge of the operation, told me the reason for this—if I recall correctly, one went to the CNO—if I recall correctly, one went to the Vice Chief and one went to the guy who was handling the purse strings. They never showed the results to the staff that had to provide the input because they were afraid, if they did, and it said we don’t need this many submarines, we need more of something else—that the staff was going to start cooking the input. I was flabbergasted when I heard this, because all I could think of was—if I found somebody cooking that input, his head was going to roll down the E-Ring and so was everybody else’s who was involved with him. My alternative assumption #4—Net Assessment is indispensable. You can’t even start to prepare a sound strategy without full appreciation for the imminence and the intensity of threats. And you’re not going to get that out of Naval Intelligence, and you’re not going to get it out of DIA and you’re not going to get it out of CIA. They cannot give you the significance of enemy capabilities. They can only say—the enemy can attack with umpty-ump number of forces at a particular time at a particular place or they can defend or they can withdraw or they can do something else. But you don’t know what the significance of those capabilities are until you’re playing Blue against Red—that’s a Net Assessment process. The Soviets understand it. Apparently we don’t. We heard yesterday from Haver that these guys, everyday practically, are replaying the correlation of forces. And they’re doing that Blue against Red. I can tell you they ain’t doing it in any vacuum—playing one side by itself.

Present assumption five. Progressive education is too expensive for the Navy, in terms of time. The Navy is the only service I know that thinks so. The Naval War College is touted as the best of the senior service colleges in a lot of things I see in open print. My evaluation is that it is the poorest. What’s the problem? A time constraint. Has nothing to do with the quality of the faculty. It has nothing to do with the
facilities. It has to do with time. The Naval War College has
two schools--it has a lower half and it has an upper half. If
you go to the lower course, you do not go to the upper course.
If you go to the upper course as a Navy officer, all the Marines
and the Army and the Air Force in that class stand at parade rest
for six months while we try to bring the Navy officers up to
speed because they never through a command and staff college.
Now if time is the critical constraint to begin with, and you
arbitrarily cut it in half, there is no way in the world to even
passably introduce your student bodies to maritime strategy in
all of its multifold ramifications. So my alternative assumption
#5 is that progressive education has to underpin the maritime
strategy. The people coming out of those war colleges are the
future leaders of the U.S. Navy. And if you are not preparing
them to develop sensible maritime strategies that mesh well with
the other services, then we're never going to make it. And it's
not just bad for the Navy, it's bad for the United States. We
need to change the system and that cannot be done by the
President of the Naval War College. This is a job for the CNO.

Present assumption six--my last assumption--Naval research
is sufficiently rigorous. Basic Naval research in the field of
strategy is abysmal. There is no Center for Maritime Strategy in
the United States Navy. There are no giants anywhere like Alfred
Thayer Mahon. A few years ago I went up to the Naval War College
and I was invited to speak to a brandnew group of maritime
strategy researchers who had been handpicked by the CNO and I
said--when we sat down around the table--would you please
introduce yourselves. And the first guy said--I'm Captain
Whoever-the-hell and I just commanded an aircraft carrier. And
the next guy was a Marine colonel who had commanded an F-14 Wing
and I said--stop, come back to the head of the table and tell me
what is your expertise and experience in the field of maritime
strategy and there was a dead silence. And my comment to them
was--if you accomplish anything useful during your year here,
it's going to be an accident. They were handpicked by the CNO,
who had picked fast burners on their way to the top, who were going to be great. But they were totally unprepared and unsuited for the job they had been given, which was creative thinking. And you cannot command anybody to be a creative thinker. You’ve got to be very careful about who you pick. The Center for Naval Analyses responds to a Navy staff that knows what it wants but doesn’t know what it needs. They’re not tasked to tackle tough problems. Their output is not influential in this field. My alternative assumption #6--Navy research needs revitalization. The Navy needs to develop and retain new giants in the field of maritime strategy. The Navy needs to exploit the widest possible spectrum of opinion. Don’t be worried about Comer, don’t be worried about Weirsheimer. If you go clear out to the lunatic left or over to the radical right, you’ll find that nobody is all wrong. There’s something there for you if you will look through objective glasses at it. And nobody is all right. And that means certainly--self-satisfied Navy planners. They’re not all right. You need a spectrum of opinion. You should go out and solicit it. End of sermon.

My last comment. I couldn’t care less whether anybody, anywhere ever agrees with anything I have to say, because it’s not important. But it is critically important that you think for yourselves about maritime strategy—that you challenge all of the assumptions, all of the shibboleths and make up your own mind where common sense lies, because baby buddy, that’s where it ought to be. Thank you very much.

Tom Grassey

I sat next to John at lunch and he commented on how good the lunch was. I just wonder what would have happened if we hadn’t had a good lunch.
Let me give you a quick overview of what my paper deals with and then I’d like to present some of the key sections of the paper—much too long to try to present the whole thing.

The paper does three things. One is to give some background on the roles of what I kind of loosely call generic maritime strategy and the maritime strategy in Asia. I started to say—my paper does three things. One is to give some background on the roles of maritime strategy in a generic sense and of 'maritime strategy' in Asia, past and present. And how they differ. I’m not going to spend any time this afternoon on that because other people have dealt on that and there’s no need to elaborate.

The other two things my paper does is to assess Soviet purposes and options in the Pacific and how the U.S. and others perceive them. The third is to evaluate the potential impact of Asian economic dynamism on both of the superpowers and their strategic presence in the Pacific region.

The paper identifies two key problem areas with the U.S. One of them—which some people have touched on—is how to get allies to see threats the way we do or conversely, how to get Americans to accept the need to see the threats the way allies see them. You can go either direction. But something of that sort has to be done.

The second is, learning along with the Soviets—and I think that’s crucial, along with the Soviets—how to cope with an economically resurgent Asia that challenges both superpowers to compete. It’s not just the U.S.

In recent years two things have altered relatively cavalier U.S. attitudes towards the Asia-Pacific region. The most basic was a belated recognition by the U.S. of the intrinsic importance of certain countries in the region—notably Japan—but also the
New Japan or gangs of four—which clearly are as important as the U.S.'s European allies. The shift in U.S. world trade patterns from the Atlantic to the Pacific to the '70's, underscored these new realities. More narrowly, the U.S. found itself facing a newly reoriented Soviet Union that was shifting its emphasis economically and strategically toward Asia. Despite the far more profound significance of the shift towards a Pacific century, it was the Soviet response to these emergent realities that sparked the U.S. strategic reassessment. The wisdom of these U.S. priorities may have been questionable, but I think the results were positive nonetheless, because they lead the U.S. to pay—what I consider to be proper attention—to an increasingly crucial region of the world.

If the Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific produces an active effort to secure Soviet far-flung interests in that region of the world, the U.S. and its allies in the western Pacific may be in for a tough new round of tensions. Clearly the Pacific is no longer an American lake, if it ever really was. To date, the expanded Soviet naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region hasn't been used in an overt military fashion. At most, it's been used as a relatively discrete form of gunboat diplomacy, hoping to influence states in the region in Moscow's favor. However, the naval potentials for active intimidation, intervention, and interdiction are very real. While all of this has proved upsetting to U.S. strategists and helped cause a reappraisal of U.S. policy, U.S. allies and unaligned states have accepted the changes in the area with greater equanimity. Unlike American leaders, who often have short historical memories, most Asian leaders have never assumed that the Soviet Union deserves no legitimate place in Asian affairs. As the U.S. tries to cope with the Soviet Union in Asia, there are always some U.S. assumptions about the ability and willingness of allies to either lend a helping hand or at least not to impede U.S. actions.

The problem associated with getting allies to help is the same problem that causes a political dilemma for forward deployed
U.S. forces, with an assertive strategic mission, such as the maritime strategy. Namely, U.S. and allied threat perceptions do not necessarily coincide or even overlap, to a significant degree. Compounding this problem is the trouble caused by foreign confusion over precisely what an assertive strategy, such as the maritime strategy, really means. Given the wide array of U.S. opinion about the maritime strategy that's been partially reflected at this conference, it's no surprise that allied and friendly states might not be certain about what the U.S. intends to do and what such actions might mean to them. Consequently, U.S. strategic planners in war games, often make some decidedly shaky assumptions that allies will see adversaries the way Americans do and will react the way we expect them to. Their assumptions may be most seriously flawed in terms of unwarranted expectations that allies granting access to their territories for U.S. use or transit in actions against the Soviet Union. There are a number of examples of such divergence of views. But the case of Japan provides some egregious instances of unrealistic assumptions as Yoshi Nakamura candidly suggested this morning.

There's no intrinsic reason that the maritime strategy—whatever iteration of it—cannot obtain allied understanding and support if it is properly explained to those allies. Much more effort should be expended in that regard. However, that effort cannot be relegated solely to a strategic sales pitch by the U.S. because the product almost certainly would not sell, if handled that way. The U.S. is engaged in a diversified competition with the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region. And the U.S. strategic message must be integrated into a broader context if it is to be believable and persuasive. If the U.S. does not believably mess its strategic message into a broader context and the Soviet Union does so, Washington's policies may appear more threatening than Moscow's, to states in the region.

The post-Vladivostok speech era in Asia has opened a new round of peace offensives, from a more sophisticated Gorbachev regime. Tensi-Soviet ties are improving in fits and starts. But
the trends are upbeat. U.S. naval access to PRC ports—which in some circles seems the graphic symbol of improved U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation—really needs to be kept in perspective. None of that cooperation means that Beijing is necessarily in any greater harmony with Washington's views of the Soviet Union's threat potential, than is Tokyo. We should not—as we are prone to—make premature assumptions about the existence of 'common' security interests in the either the U.S.-PRC or U.S.-Japan strategic relations. They will not come into existence merely because they are logical or because some Americans desire them.

If the U.S. has problems in convincing its major ally, Japan, and its major de facto quasi-ally, the PRC, that Washington's view of Soviet intentions in Asia and the Pacific, is a sound and prudent viewpoint, that is even greater problems in southeast Asia and Oceania. When Washington tries to stress strategic affairs with east Asian states, it gets a somewhat sympathetic hearing—if one that is tinged with overt displays of tolerances for American ideological preoccupation with Moscow's sinister qualities. These states can grasp that the Soviet Union might do what Washington suggests it is preparing to do. But they often do not see the threat as quite so imminent. In effect, our allies often humor us.

The non-communist states of southeast Asia and Oceania, generally are even less disposed to see the world as Washington does. And both sub-regions—and I would throw in the Indian Ocean in that regard—the U.S. is engaged in a far more complex and nuance-contest with the Soviet Union. In southeast Asia, pointedly, Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo and Washington are all seen as major influences that need to be kept in some sort of rough balance. Most pointedly, Washington is not considered any more virtuous than Moscow. Both are seen in terms of assets and liabilities that should be balanced to local advantages.

That's what I've said about the levels of understanding and cooperation with the maritime strategy among the Asia-Pacific states—be seen as uniquely poor. One should recall that West
European enthusiasm for U.S. strategic assertiveness toward the Soviet Union has been markedly restrained. The concept of Atlanticism has been shaken severely in recent years, putting NATO into some jeopardy from within. In my opinion, if it wasn't for the full reach of the fears among the NATO allies about a U.S. policy shift that could leave Western Europe less protected from the Soviet Union than it is accustomed to being—NATO probably would be in more trouble today than it is.

In the Asia-Pacific region, however, Washington starts from much further back. There is no Pacificism to equate to Atlanticism. Even a weakened Atlanticism is way ahead of its Pacific counterpart. Hence the U.S. can only hope to explain its strategic purposes in the Western Pacific or Asia, whether it's via the maritime strategy or anything else, if it first builds a more cohesive set of common perceptions of shared interests and Soviet threats to those interests. Such perceptions are what are required for Pacificism to emerge. Without it, U.S. assumptions about allies, friends and neutrals will remain flawed by a large degree of unreality and wishful thinking.

If the U.S. has problems today in fashioning a coordinated approach to Pacific defense, with which its friends and allies can wholeheartedly subscribe, the future is even more uncertain. Americans tend to see the future of the Pacific region and the U.S. role in that area as on a linear continuum with the present. In terms of economic growth, political development and a superpower rivalry, the future seems likely to be rather like today, somehow just more intense. If the future of the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region is, indeed, one marked by confrontation and hostility with the U.S., and with the area's non-communist states, then much of the contemporary prognostications about a more intense version of the contemporary status quo, are likely to be realized.

Today it's easiest, and I think most comforting for Americans, to assume that economic growth and progress will bring the U.S. and its allies closer together and increase the chances
that our allies will become more capable of assisting the U.S. as it copes with the Soviet Union.

The country which looms largest in that regard is Asia's, and the world's, new economic superpower--Japan. It clearly has great geo-political potentials. Other Asian-Pacific states, notably the PRC and the RX, are often seen as also possessing geo-political growth potentials because of the economic accomplishments. If the strategic future does become a more intense version of the present, then the realization of those allied potentials will become part of the process. Changes of that sort almost certainly will have to be predicated on two things. One is the Soviet Union persisting as a threatening power and the other is on our allies' share U.S. perceptions of that threat or, as I suggested before, vice versa--we perceiving the threat as they see it. If neither thing occurs, the intensity factor could easily be nullifier. The economic progress now anticipated for the Asia-Pacific region clearly would be affected by such an error of less intention. Though forecasting precisely how would require a crystal ball which I don't have and I don't know anybody who does.

Far less problematical is an assertion that the renowned economic dynamism of Asia could create conditions drawing the Soviet Union into a non-threatening relationship with its Asia-Pacific neighbors. The notion that the Soviet Union might become neighborly to the Asian states which encircle it, undoubtedly is as unsettling for Western forecasters than a more linear bent. Moreover, there are many issues that hinder these geographic and ethnic neighbors from behaving neighborly. Despite all that, the winds of reformist change that are blowing through the Soviet Union under Gorbachev make it far more likely today than a few years ago, that Moscow is capable of improving its relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

The prudence dictates waiting to see whether Gorbachev can deliver results to match his words. Should this convergence actually happen, Moscow's relations with the Asia-Pacific region
may be in for a sea change. One can imagine what goes through the minds of Kremlin leaders as they see the United States and Western Europe being challenged, and often overtaken by Asian economic leaders. Even as the Soviet Union struggles to catch up to the West, the West is being outcompeted by the other East.

If the Soviet Union does not get its act together rapidly, it risks falling into third place among global centers of power. I think in economic terms, it's already there. If, as the Soviet Union faces its future in the Asia-Pacific region, I think there are three basic alternatives that loom. It can, one, remain at arm's length as a minimal participant, seen as an adversary of both the U.S. and many of its allies; two, remain a strategic adversary of the U.S., but not its allies—not the U.S. allies; or three, become an important trade partner of the Asia-Pacific states—probably excluding the U.S. The worst choice for the Soviet Union is the first one because it leaves the Soviet Union essentially behind the curve of progress. Moscow, I think, hopes it can achieve the second option—applying a decoupling of the U.S. from its strategic ties in Asia. The Double Zero approach that was announced last month is partially aimed at that end. Achieving the second option is dependent on how successful Moscow's diplomacy can be and, conversely, how inept the U.S. may be as it copes with Soviet diplomatic campaigns in Asia that have already begun in earnest.

Achieving this goal will be difficult but not impossible for the Soviet Union because there exists a reservoir of sentiment in the region to treat the Soviet Union on a rough par with the United States. Least controllable by Washington is Moscow's prospects for ingratiating the Soviet Union into Pacific economic dynamism. The Soviet Union is thereby, has resources Asia needs, has market needs Asia's could fulfill, and under Gorbachev, appears ready to mesh all three criteria into packages that are sellable to Asia. If the leading states of Asia perceive the Soviet Union as a willing and dependable trade partner, and not necessarily a threat to the vital interests of Asia-Pacific
In short, no one in the West can safely assume that the Soviet Union will play into the United States' hands by perpetuating an over-ogre-ous image. If Soviet reality seriously starts to converge with a softened image, the U.S. will confront a different superpower challenge in the Asia-Pacific area.

The U.S. would be compelled to compete with the Soviet Union under far more equal circumstances for influence in the region than it has to since post-War superpower tensions emerged. As if that prospect were not troubling enough for Washington, Americans also need to reconsider the changing nature of U.S. relations with its Asian Pacific trade partners. American officials routinely stress the positive side of greatly enhanced U.S. economic relations with Asia. Stemming from these relations, the American public is routinely told that U.S. economic, political and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific area are every more vital. While true, this doesn't tell the whole story. Trade frictions have become rampant. U.S. economic nationalism arises to question the wisdom of Asian financial, investment and trade practices. Though U.S. economic interests in the region are much more important than formerly, the region is also seen as a competitive threat.

Also in a negative regard, the danger of a 1920's style economic crash precipitated by events in Asia--most notably in Tokyo--could be disastrous for the entire West, including the U.S. These two sides of the coin also have implications for U.S. strategic policy toward the region. Persuasive arguments can be made that U.S. strategic interests, which developed while the region was not very important in economic terms, are growing apace with its economic interests in the region. But a counter argument also holds that the wealthy estates in the region no longer require as much armed assistance from the United States. Those states should be able to fend for themselves and to help the U.S. preserve regional security. Is it wise for the U.S. to
underwrite the economic competition from the region, which threatens certain facets of U.S. economic well-being—by providing a defense subsidy to those same competitors? There’s no easy answer to this dilemma. But posing it suggests the sorts of problems Washington must address in the future.

As Americans contemplate that future and the possible role we may ask our armed forces—and for present purposes, especially the Navy—to play in the Asia-Pacific region, we need to remain flexible and adaptable. The meaning of security in the region might well be altered by the changing relationships between the U.S., the Soviet Union and Asia, with Japan in the forefront. It is legitimate to ask whether the U.S. can adjust in time and effectively. If the economic dynamism of Asia makes the economic costs of the superpower arms race too high for either the U.S. or the Soviet Union to bear, and still keep up with the Asian challenges—that clause is crucial—what policy mechanisms can be devised to compensate? Can the U.S. adapt to Asia while the Soviet Union persists in adhering to older policies? Conversely, can the Soviet Union adapt to Asia while the U.S. does not?

Clearly, continued Soviet ‘socialist imperialism’ would perpetuate linear thinking about the future and U.S. problems. But if Moscow is able to adapt its brand of Marxist-Leninism to the future, being shaped by the Asian Pacific economic dynamism—in this regard, I think it’s important to note that collectivism, Soviet-style, may be better attuned to the group orientation of Confucian-based economic growth models than a lot of what individualistic-oriented Western value systems are. In any event, if the Soviet Union can integrate that into their system, Soviet policy in the region will pose a very different style of much broader challenge to U.S. interests. Should this future materialize, the nature of U.S. maritime strategy in the region could change significantly, tending toward the maritime orientations, interestingly enough, of the 19th century, which were predicated on commercial interests, not on strategic interests.
The United States' strategic interests in the Pacific, growing up in the late 40's and the 50's, 60's and 70's, which in many senses are almost independent of economic interests—may well be overcome by the commercial factors of the 21st century, redefining why and how the U.S. will stay involved in the Asia-Pacific region. In these terms, the period from 1945 through sometime in the 1970's or 80's—hard to put a date to this—during which Asia quietly reemerged as the economic magnet and model it once was for an earlier generation of Westerners—may be seen as an aberration in the long continuum in which the fleet and the flag follow trade instead of setting the pace. Because this second wave of Western attraction to Asia—this is a 19th century wave—proved to be such a disappointment, that historical legacy, I believe, tends to obscure the potential for today's third wave of Asian attraction for Westerners—to be just as real and far, far more pervasive than the first wave—this is the 16th century wave.

Though contemporary Americans, who often have a poor understanding of the United States' earlier attraction and minor status in the Asia-Pacific region, are likely to see this transition phase I think we're now entering as an unsettling setback. The U.S. actually may be on the verge on settling back into a normal condition—a more normal condition in its relationships with Asia. If so, I think our most prudent option will be to develop mutually beneficial and cooperative partnerships—I mean real partnerships, not just one-way partnerships—in Asia, to secure U.S. economic, political and strategic interests. Thank you.
I think better on my feet. When Dr. Olsen called me up about 3-4 days ago and informed me that Colin Gray wasn't going to be able to make it—at that stage incidentally, I was the discussant—I was meant to be a critic—and asked me if I could put together a paper—I had not idea that I was going to be treated to such a laudatory fulsome introduction. And that my reputation as the War College's 'Mad Bomber' was going to precede me.

I'm going to do something I've never done before—I'm going to charge you two minutes to do this. I'm going to tell you the real story about what Tom alluded to. I'd been at the War College for two years and the Operations Department, which runs the officer war games, called me in and asked me to be President and they informed me, after I'd already consented—they wanted the game to go nuclear. And they wanted the game to go nuclear very early on because they very quickly explained that what usually happens is that the game goes and goes and then at the very last stage it goes nuclear and everybody goes out and has a hamburger for lunch. They wanted the officers to—they wanted the War College's rigidly thinking officers to consider the implications of nuclear war. So on the second or third day—I forget which—I drove the war nuclear. I, in fact, dropped a little nuke on Cameron Bay. I had an enormous amount of resistance. And I'd never quite lived that down. Let me explain at least two unhappy things that happened to me as a result, that I know about. And I want only those of you, incidentally, who are cleared through interoffice gossip, to listen to what I'm about to say—because I've never told anybody at the Naval War College that I had been put up to this.
But about two weeks later the students did their normal annual roast—what they call The Gaieties of the Naval War College—and one of the skits was a Marine officer dressed up as Johnny Carson dressed up as whatever it is—Mandrake the Magician—with the envelopes—the answer was read out. The answer was—Ida Amin, Adolf Hitler and Al Bernstein—and the hermetically sealed envelope was opened. And the question was—name two liberals and a conservative. And one day there appeared mysteriously in my office—I've allowed it to continue to hang there—this plaque which was clearly made by the students. And on the plaque there was a very uncanny reproduction of a human eye. And on the other side of the plaque, there was—I learned later—a human molar—tooth—and at the top of the plaque, which was labeled 'Bernstein's Law' and underneath it was—'an eye for a tooth.'

Now I say that because the truth is—the reason I took that time to tell you the story—the truth is, I'm going to disappoint you, a little bit I think—in dealing with this question of—should the maritime strategy in the Pacific be offensive or defensive. Because I'm going to do a little fence sitting and argue on behalf of both. I was reminded of one of the better throw-away lines on the first morning by Captain Wagner—was that, indeed the maritime strategy is not ipso facto a strategy—if I get you wrong, you can correct me later. But it really is a broad concept of operations which is, again to use his phrase, good phrase, 'scenario dependent.' And I think, contrary to what we've heard, what the commander was saying was that the maritime strategy is in fact a flexible concept and it can adjust—indeed, it's designed to adjust to varying scenarios.

So what I'd like to do in the 20 minutes allotted to me this afternoon is to talk about possible scenarios and how the maritime strategy would play. I am also reminded of Admiral Hayward's remark this morning, that we haven't really spoken directly to the maritime strategy and what it would look like if it were exercised in the Pacific. Because I do think that it is
scenario dependent and there is a fundamental question about how war would come to the Pacific. And I think that we have to match the options of the maritime strategy to specific scenarios.

Let me say, broadly speaking, that I think that war between the United States and the Soviet Union could come to the Pacific in one of two forms: obviously, either a local conflict—not yet involving the superpowers would begin there and escalate the superpower confrontation—that's one possibility. And I think the other broad general possibility is that a war between the United States and the Soviet Union would originate some place else and then one or the other of the two superpowers, would decide for strategic reasons, to bring that war into the Pacific.

Now on the precinct level, there are any number of conflicts we could anticipate. We could envision breaking out in the Pacific, obviously, we could have a second iteration of the Korean War, in which the North had another crack at the South. I think that would be—well, let me go through all of them and then I'll come back. I think there is a vague possibility that there would be a Sino-Soviet confrontation; I think there's more than a vague possibility that Vietnam might go into Thailand; and I think there are possibilities that the NPA will grow stronger and stronger in the Philippines, and we may be tempted to become involved in the insurgency or in the counter-insurgency and the Soviets are already showing signs of indirectly trying to back the New People's Army there. And of course, there's also the possibility that an insurgency will arise some place else, perhaps in a place like Indonesia.

And I think in all of these cases, the probability of superpower confrontation is relatively low. Obviously, we would be directly involved in a Korean War, but I think the Soviets would keep their involvement, if indeed they had any, indirect. I think a Sino-Soviet war obviously would have direct Soviet involvement. I think at best our involvement would be very indirect. Vietnam-Thailand is hard to read—we certainly would become indirectly involved, perhaps directly involved. Again, I
think the Soviets would keep their involvement indirect. And, it's hard for me to envisage a serious insurgency in the Philippines leading to direct superpower confrontation. I don't want to suggest that these things couldn't happen, but I do want to suggest that I think the probabilities are low. And part of the reason I may this assessment—past Soviet behavior—we've fought two serious wars with Soviet surrogates in the past without a direct confrontation. Past history is only a partial guide to future contingencies, but I don't see anything that's changed that would alter that.

The Soviets, secondly I think, simply do not have the vital interests in any of these areas—with the possible exception of something on the Mainland itself—that would drive them to risk superpower confrontation over them. And if you look—as we did look very thoroughly—at the nature of the Soviet forces, yesterday morning—we find that those forces are fundamentally naval and nuclear. That is to say, they're intimidatory forces, they're not forces primarily designed for invasion, they're forces designed for coercive diplomacy, to coerce the regional powers. Certainly forces that, if they were used, would be used to keep us at bay. But as I say, they don't seem to me the sorts of forces the Soviets would use.

The only exception to that rule are the 57 divisions that the Soviets have sitting on the Chinese border. They seem to me to be primarily China's problem. I think they're not sufficient enough for a full-scale invasion of China. I think probably China would fight some version of a People's War into the Soviet Union, as they would understand it would turn into a kind of Afghanistan in spades. They're there for intimidatory purposes as well—unless they happen to be there for some kind of limited war with the Chinese—say... off of Manchuria.

That leaves the other alternative. That is to say, that a war between the Soviet Union and the United States begins some place else and the two some place elses that I think would be candidates for this would be Europe and more possibly, the
Persian Gulf. So that the superpowers are already at war and then the question--I think the essential question to ask is--under those circumstances, who would bring it to the Pacific? And again I think the answer is that the Soviets would be unlikely to do this--they might. But first of all, we have their historical and traditional distaste for involving themselves in a two-front war. I think the Soviets--and the logic of the power dynamics in the region--means that they would much prefer to sequence their operations. And as the maritime strategy makes clear, to defeat us in a single theater before turning their forces to take us on in yet another theater.

I think that part of their objective in a global war with us, would be to minimize the threat from China. And I think, for the most part, as regards both China and Japan, there would be a series of threats and blandishments to keep them out. And it's hard for me to see how initiating hostilities in the Pacific would serve those purposes. And it's worth pointing out that the Soviet Union really has no serious territorial claims, nor do they have the means to enforce those claims. They might, at some stage, I think into a war--which had already come to the Pacific--envisage as we've heard--an attack on Okaido. But that would be very, very risky and I think it's unlikely to be something that'll happen very early on.

But should the Soviets initiate hostilities in the Pacific, then I think we could expect them to take advantage of the impressive job that they've done in modernizing their tactical air and in using the Blackjacks which are currently being deployed into the theater. I think the targets would be obviously high value nuclear ones--carrier battle groups, strategic warning and C3I facilities and possibly American forces on Japanese and Korean territory, and possibly even Clark and Subic. The Navy, I think we understand, would stay in port and whatever operations it carried out, it would carry out those operations under the cover of land-based air. The submarines would flush the SSBN's to the Bastions. Some, if not all, of
their attack submarines, would go there for defensive purposes to defend the SSBN's. Again, some might—depending on circumstances—be used against U.S. naval forces for purposes of slot interdiction—I want to return to that in a minute.

The major question, I think, for U.S. strategic planners and even more so, for American politicians under those circumstances, would be—should we—what this talk is all about—should we initiate offensive operations or should we go on the defense in the Pacific? Should we, in effect, preempt or go on to some kind of high defensive alert—the latter which would have us avoid attacking, but tying down Soviet forces in the theater and have, as our major objective, the protection of our Asian allies. And there may be variations on these two themes. For example, I could envisage us in the Pacific, treating Soviet territory itself as sacrosanct—especially if we hadn't hit Russia in the European theater yet—but attacking Soviet air and naval forces which had already been deployed international water and airspace.

Let me talk a little bit about what offensive operations, under the rubric of the maritime strategy, might look like. I think we would use land- and sea-based tactical air against their air bases, against their ships, against submarines which were still in port, against their C3I facilities, against logistical supply depots, against land lines of communication, against POL, electrical generation equipment, their industrial infrastructure—with the highest priority being given to the destruction of their long range strike aircraft.

I think we would want to use naval forces against Soviet ships and subs caught outside home waters and especially not to return to a Zorro theme but I think especially to destroy their facilities in Vietnam.

I think the most valuable offensive campaign that we could carry out would, in fact be, to attack—to send our attack submarines against their SSBN's, almost half of which are deployed with the Pacific Fleet. A happy side-effect of doing
this, I think, and I think we want to think about this in the context of Mr. Collin's remarks--I think a happy side-effect of this would be to keep Soviet SSN's deep in Soviet waters, unable to carry out anti-carrier operations and slot interdiction. And there would be substantial operational advantages if we decided to employ an operational variation of the maritime strategy. We would not just tie down Soviet forces, but we would destroy Soviet air and naval forces. And I think it's better to destroy than to tie down--especially since when you destroy them, you really do keep them from being shifted--a temptation that I think for the Soviets, will grow stronger as the conventional protracted war proceeds. And as they begin to suffer attrition in other theaters in the Persian Gulf and in Europe.

I could envisage circumstances in which U.S. air power would simply strip bare Soviet air defenses in the Far East with a pre-emptive attack, expose their industrial infrastructure to conventional strategic bombardment. And I think the SSBN campaign is an excellent idea. I think it is, in fact, not all that dangerous. I think, to be frank--it's the wave of the future for war planners for World War III--the simple use of conventional forces to deplete the other side's nuclear arsenal. I think that under those circumstances the Soviets would do one of two things--frankly, I think they would either decide that their reserve force was in jeopardy and it was putting them in a bad position, in which case they would talk. Or, I think, depending on what was happening in Europe at the time, they would simply ignore what was happening to their SSBN's and continue to fight. I think that the least likely option would be for them to launch a nuclear attack, thereby committing suicide.

And I think that such early successes on our part would probably have a felicitous effect on the position of the PRC. I don't expect the PRC to come in on our side in any active way. But there are lots of ways that we could be helped out there and if it did as though we were making substantial progress in the Pacific, we would--I'll stand corrected on this--but we might
expect some indirect help. I think China will certainly, under these circumstances, sit and weigh alternatives and see the way the war is going. Indeed, if we're losing big, I can imagine them even being tempted to accommodate with Moscow, thereby freeing up divisions to use in other theaters.

And also, the Pacific really is the only theater where we could seize and hold any Soviet territory at all. I have in mind Sakhalin and the Kurils. Whatever strategic importance they have, they might be an important bargaining chip during war termination—especially if the Soviets came out of the war sitting on large chunks of Western Germany.

And those are the operational advantages to an offensive interpretation of the maritime strategy. But operations aren't the only thing we're about, as maybe someday Col. North will admit—extremely neat operational ideas can sometimes be politically catastrophic. And I think therefore it's worth us thinking very seriously about an alternate defensive strategy—how it could play. And what sorts of political pressures, what sorts of political direction the military can expect in the kinds of conflicts that I'm describing.

On a defensive strategy, presumably, we'd use tactical air along with the Japanese Air Self Defense Forces and the Republic of Korea's Air Forces to establish a kind of defensive barrier against Soviet strike aircraft over the Japanese archipelago and over South Korea itself. Apparently, what we would do would be to neutralize Soviet attack submarines by mining the three Japanese straits. This will depend, of course, largely on the Japanese and the success of it will depend on which side makes better use of strategic warning. And again, I think a defensive strategy would be designed not to destroy Soviet forces but to keep them in theater and to keep them from being shifted.

What are the pros and cons? Clearly, any military planner is going to prefer the offensive option—the chance to seize the initiative. The operational downside of that—and just the operational downside of that—is that these offensive operations
would require flying or sailing into some of the most heavily
defended of Soviet territory. But political priority, and
political authority, as I've suggested, may well push towards a
defensive variation of the maritime strategy. [ok, that's I need
is 5 minutes] If those political priorities are what I expect
them to be.

Assume a global war. Assume a global war which has not yet
come to the Pacific and assume a global war in which China has
remained neutral—all, I think, reasonable assumptions. I think
political authority will have five basic political objectives—to
defend U.S. territory and forces, to protect our NATO allies, to
protect our Asian allies, to end the war on as favorable terms as
possible, and despite our declared first-strike strategy, I think
to avoid going nuclear in the war.

Opening a second front in the Pacific under those
circumstances, while serving some of these objectives, would
certainly run counter to the third objective—namely, protecting
the Asian allies and might, under some circumstances, be seen as
running to four—namely, ending the war on a favorable footing.
Defending Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and our other Asian
allies, would in fact be best served with a defensive variation
of the maritime strategy. And of course, I don't need to go into
this in some detail, but we may want to discuss it during the
question and answer period—the allies will be extremely
reluctant to see us use based on their territory for attacks
against the Soviet Union. So, indeed, all of this will indeed be
scenario-dependent, as our allies weight the possibilities for
survival—of survival period—against the possibility of Soviet
hegemony in their region, on the other hand.

A lot will depend on their perceptions of Soviet intentions
and the origins of the war itself. If the war is clearly
perceived by the Asian allies as the product of Soviet
aggression, then I think our chances for using our defensive
strategy—for using an offensive option—will be much greater, at
least as far as they're concerned, then if those origins are
muddy, obscure and if they seem to be Eurocentric. And I think much of Washington's view of what it will authorize, will depend very much on what is happening in Europe.

Let me suggest there are three possibilities of what could be happening in Europe--to tell you how I think that would affect what does, in fact, get authorized and then bring this to an end. First possibility--not a happy possibility--but first possibility would be that the Warsaw Pact forces cut through our NATO forces as a knife cuts through butter. Under those circumstances, I think the Soviets will have very little incentive to swing forces into the Pacific theater. And we and our European allies, I think, will be knee-deep in a debate over nuclear first-use, and not be thinking very much about horizontal escalation.

The second possibility is that NATO holds. If NATO holds, the Soviets may then have some incentive to swing their forces, but will not need, will not require the leverage that opening a second front in the Pacific might give it.

The third possibility would be the following: a slow but steady Warsaw Pact advance. In that case, I think it might make some sense for us to bring war to the Pacific, but I think political pressure on the President will be, in fact, under those circumstances, to wind down the conflict. And he's unlikely--it's conceivable but I think he'll be unlikely to be searching for new ways of hurting the Soviets, by further escalating the war.

For all its drawbacks, then, I think that the safest strategy, the plan most likely to receive political authorization, would encompass attacks in the Pacific, probably only against Soviet-deployed forces--against the competence and aircraft on the high seas, against neutralizing the bases in Vietnam, and against a vigorous prosecution of the anti-Soviet SSBN campaign.

Let me just leave you with these concluding remarks, because again I want to return to where we began with the scenario dependence of our activities there. Let me just say that these
things are hard to gauge--this is not an exhaustive analysis. One of my favorite Scottish poets once told me that the best laid plans of mice and strategists may oft times go awry. But I would just leave you with Bismarck's wisdom, as he once advised Molke, that whatever strategy you eventually plan to execute, always plan on having at least two response. Thank you.

Tom Grassey - Discussant

As promised, I'd like to keep my comments to a minimum to allow the panelists to discuss among themselves the issues that they've raised, which are obvious, I think, to all of us. Several things, though, that I feel are worthy of our attention. The first, and I stole this from a person that I spoke to this morning--what are the United States' goals in the Pacific? We've heard relatively little about our national beginning orientation -how we began. Peter Swartz said that that is the fundamental responsibility of the military officer--making strategic plans for the United States--our national interest. I think we've gotten a much better appreciation of how the world looks from other latlons (?) but still, as military people, our fundamental responsibility is to our own country. That leads to interesting predicaments and problems in how you look at alliances, which Ed Olsen invited our attention to. Should we treat alliances as almost integral to our national interests? Or should we virtually ignore them? Two extremes. And where do we put the balance on alliances?

Second issue that I think is of interest is--where are the vital nodes at which the United States and other nations' interests diverge in ways that will be critical to the U.S. national and the United States Navy's maritime strategy? The mining, for instance, of straits in Japan--Al Bernstein has sketched in one scenario, would be critical. This morning the Japanese perspective on that suggests we may not get what we think is critical, if that scenario developed.
And the question I guess I would like to pose—to start the discussion—if anyone feels like picking this up, on the panelists—what is the most dangerous scenario for us? Where are we presently weakest in capabilities and what should we sacrifice in order to compensate for those weaknesses—that weakness or those weaknesses? People who work in Washington know that things are trade-offs. John Collins emphasized that for us this afternoon. That if you want to remedy a certain defect, you have to buy that from some place else. Where are our weaknesses and what are you willing to buy from somewhere else to remedy that? If we want to talk minesweepers, what should we buy less of in order to buy more minesweepers, for instance? If we're going to rely on allies for minesweepers, then what does that impose on us in terms of how we view the world and U.S. military action, in terms of unilateral activity.

But I now turn to the panelists to comment as they feel they wish to.

John Collins

You know what the biggest deficiency is—the biggest force deficiency in support of the strategy is the All Volunteer Force. If you listen to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they will all tell you that the All Volunteer Force is qualitatively better it's ever been in its history—which is absolutely correct and absolutely misses the whole point. Because the problem is not basically qualitative, it is basically quantitative. If you fill the All Volunteer Force to its authorized, legal limit, and everybody in there is a Ph.D. from M.I.T.—you've got exactly the quality you want—and you can retain them all because they all reenlist—you can't even remotely cover the objectives and the commitments that national leaders tell us are essential to the security of the United States of America.
Now you either take a look at those objectives and commitments and decide that some of them never made any sense to begin with—or that they've been overtaken by events, or that in some other way, you can shave requirements because if you can't, then it seems to me that there is an obligation on the part of the top leaders in the Department of Defense, to notify the President and the Congress and the American people that there is a serious requirement to restore conscription. You can't begin to support the maritime strategy that's on paper now with the force you've got. And by the time you have all the ships that you want, the problem is going to get worse. So I would say that that's a fundamental force defect, in relationship to the strategic requirements of the maritime strategy.

Ed Olsen

... ... ... ... somebody look out with 20-20--I hope I did it with something close to 20-20 vision. But in any event, I do think there's a two-way partnership. The only other comment I had--maybe it'll stimulate some discussion in the question and answer session--your comments about U.S. national interests. And somebody looks at this. One phrase that we ought to borrow, I think, from Major ... from Japan is ... ... I don't think you can have one without the other. You can't have strong forces if you don't have a good, healthy strong country and a strong economy. And the kind of directions we're going today, I'm not sure we can do both.

Al Bernstein

What the Soviet Union has been doing there since the fall of Saigon is taking that one theater in which we traditionally have had a substantial military advantage and closing the gap as much as possible. So widely outgunned in Europe, we don't have very much in the Persian Gulf—the one theater of traditional
advantage has, in fact, been the Pacific and I think a lot of their activity there is simply designed to neutralize those forces. The long term would be, in fact, deprive them of any sort of strategic response or at least to make those who are contemplating a military response, in the United States, ever more reluctant to do anything, because they would feel ever more constrained. And I think, from the point of view of people like us, it's to sculpt the forces and shape the strategies to deprive the Soviets from gaining military superiority in the Pacific. I take that as our prime interest.

Tom Grassey

Let's take as brief a 15 minute break as we have taken thus far in the conference so that we can nudge back toward—I know that many of you have travel plans that require that—

[Break]

... at one of the microphones before we call on you and to identify yourself when you ask your question. I'm just going to bounce to each of the different microphones—whoever happens to be up at one of them. So, Professor Jaurika please.

Steve Jaurika

My name is Steve Jaurika—I have three points I'd like to make. For those of you who may not have been around when this book came out, there is an American Assembly book, a paperback, called *The National Interest*. In my lexicon, it's the finest book that's ever been put together on that single subject. Second, I'm asking the panel if they can find a relationship between the Truman Doctrine and what happened in Europe? The Eisenhower Doctrine and the emergence of the Soviets into the Med? And the Nixon Doctrine and the emergence of the Soviets
into the Pacific? Lastly, I have a comment on the maritime strategy. And if there are any of the real authors here, please forgive me. I have read it at least 150 times. I've got 19 copies of it. I find it ambiguous; I find it wordy; and I find buzz words and jargon used and the same words don't mean the same things in the same context all the way through. And I think there should be a consistency.

I have about 5 JCS dictionaries of terms. And I don't find half the terms in this--they're missing from the JCS I. And I'd like very much to have a later copy of this, and if anybody is really interested--of those 19, I've edited 3. I happen to be an editor. I'm not saying in my edition of it is any better, but it certainly gets rid of a great many 900 words--in the first 4 pages. Would anybody care to comment on the relationship between the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Nixon Doctrine and the emergence of the Soviets into those particular areas?

Al Bernstein

By the Nixon Doctrine, I assume you mean the substitution of regional surrogates for failing U.S. power after the Vietnam War. Well, as far as Soviet progress in the Pacific and the Nixon Doctrine and what the Soviets have done since the fall of Saigon, is a great tribute to the failure of the Nixon Doctrine--at least in Southeast Asia. I'm not quite sure how the other two would fit into that. But it does seem fairly clear that, with the possible exception of the China card, which I think has been overplayed, that regional powers are not going to contain the Soviet forces in the Pacific without us.
Let me give you a partial answer. Probably the worst document ever published by the Department of Defense is the JCS Dictionary of terms. If you're down at the Ensign level, you can find all kinds of useful things in that document. Almost without exception, when I pick it up and look for a definition of a term that I need at the national strategy level, it's not there. There's no definition of net assessment, for example. Part of the problem--I guess most of the problem is--that in order to add a definition or change a definition is an interminable process that goes through all of the services and it's just almost impossible to make changes. And so that document, if it were revised properly, could serve a very useful purpose. And this is one of the reasons, incidentally, that every single thing I write for Congress ends up with a glossary so that at least for that document, everybody's on the same sheet of music and they know what we're talking about. They may not agree with it but at least they know what the terms mean in that document.

Tom Grassey

I'd like our two--and perhaps one of them is still in uniform and can therefore be tasked to respond--about the pleasantries of ambiguities in the maritime strategy--The maritime strategy.

Peter Swartz

I guess my only comment is that the maritime strategy document that appeared as a supplement in The Naval Institute Proceedings--and again ... not an expert--if it comes out that way I apologize. ... was in fact written by a group of operators--since it was written by Naval officers--many of them were engineers and trained as engineers initially ...
and it was in fact contributed to by political scientists, intelligence analysts, historians and other folks in uniform—and there’s a lot better stuff written than that supplement. It was polished, it was smooth, it was refined and rewritten several times by the Chief of Naval Operations—Admiral Watkins. And Admiral Watkins wasn’t an English major either. So, in part, the response is—it didn’t go through the kind of smooth, slick, polished editing job that The Flight of the Intruder or Red Storm Rising were. It was simply the best we could do, under the circumstances, given the fact that we were a bunch of naval officers working with the kind of knowledge and kinds of conditions that we work in—trying to get something out to help the CNO get his word out—largely to other naval officers, most of whom frankly could figure out what the hell was meant when he said—war fighting instead of fighting or combat instead of war fighting.

Tom Grassev

Peter, this is the first time I’ve heard somebody recently saying—the buck stops—there.

Steve Jaurika

Unfortunately I have to defend this in public in large audiences of civilians—and not find myself wondering about its use.
And I'm replying now to the maritime strategy as perhaps an historian. I would like to address my comments to Col. Collins. Listening to his comments, it's sort of obvious to me that ... was right--maybe the Navy ought to come up with a new name for maritime strategy, if they ever want to get it accepted by other services. And probably something German like ... ... or something along those lines--pardon my German. It just seems somewhat incredible to me that someone who's from a service like the Army, would dismiss an approach that uses history only 40 years old--obviously my presentation yesterday. And to try to find something in that for the Navy today in situations that I don't think are all that much different--we still have an ASW problem, we still have an air threat--when that service itself worships at the feet of Germans, dead for centuries, who managed to lose two world wars--what's wrong with Forrest Sherman who's not even dead--he died the year I was born--his 35 years dead. What I should have done was, I guess, use Turpin's or Clauswitz or something like that.

Also, you mentioned Admiral Wiley. I happened to talk with Admiral Wiley about three weeks ago--he's still alive and well. He was listening to the Iran Hearings when I called. He was kind enough to talk to me for about 20 minutes. And in addition to the book on strategy that he wrote, he also wrote several articles, two--one of which was an honorable mention in The Naval Institute Prize Essay contests in 1953, which was termed appropriately enough, 'On Maritime Strategy,' in which he outlines essentially the maritime strategy. And then in 1957, there was 'Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor,' in which he again outlined the maritime strategy--how you use the Navy in war and peace against a land power. How you apply naval power--war and peace assured diplomatic forms, economic forms and that was the Navy's strategy 40 years ago. Wiley was a Captain then. Wiley
was doing the kinds of things then that I assume that Captain Swartz has been doing today. Wiley was up at the Naval War College between 1950-1953, running a strategy and policy force in which he was trying to enunciate what the Navy's policy was then in some type of form that could be passed out to naval officers--like the maritime strategy document--not the Naval Institute press thing--but that little blue book that's floating around which we have in our files at the Center. Those are the kinds of things Wiley was doing. And to use Wiley as an example to attack the maritime strategy I think is absurd. Because if he were here, I'm sure that he'd be standing up here right now, because Wiley was a maritime strategist--he was one of the proponents of the maritime strategy, if you will. You could even say he coined the term in 1953. And that's a comment certainly, not a question.

John Collins

I got a message out of your presentation yesterday which I enjoyed a great deal. The message, to me, was that the world has changed a whole lot since Admiral Sherman was around. We had gross nuclear superiority at that time. The Soviet Navy was still a coastal defense force. The options open to the United States, in terms of a maritime strategy, were immensely broader than they are in the 1980's, and so the message to me was--that understand that you can't take a strategy out of that context and transpose it intact into the 1980's because it's not going to work. That was the message that I got, which you, as a historian, helped me think the problem through very well. So I don't understand what your differences with me now, on that.

As far as Wiley is concerned, I have no idea what Admiral Wiley's views of the maritime strategy as presently promulgated, are. What I do know is that I really agree with a lot of the things that he said in his little book. And that if he applied the quote out of his book that I used, which says that 'planning
for certitude is the worst of all military mistakes," that he might possibly have some second thoughts himself. I wrote a couple of notes down here a little while ago--just before the break--I've heard several times during the last two days, that the present strategy is flexible enough that you don't need optional strategies which I was suggesting. I really don't believe that. I believe that if you look at a high intensity, perhaps nuclear, maritime conflict and compare it with a low intensity conflict, your objectives can't be the same, the policy guidelines can't be the same, the forces that suit one are not suitable in many instances for another. And therefore, I have a lot of trouble trying to digest that if I take the strategy as written, that I can use that as the benchmark from which to adjust, because the adjustments are enormous. This is where I'm coming from.

Captain, Naval Reserve, Ret.
Planning Research Corporation

I want to subscribe to what John Collins is saying. He said so much about what's been a burden on what I've been listening to for the last two days--it's been on my mind--I think that the maritime strategy, as it is stated, is defective and it does not address the full spectrum of the conflict. And therefore that the force structure of the United States Navy of today, cannot support that maritime strategy, if it is spelled out in its full dimensions. By this, I mean our force structure is based upon 15 carrier battle groups. It does not address those points that Mr. Collins brought out. So I think it should be changed.

I would like to talk to the authors of this strategy and advise them--don't shoot the messenger, he made some very critical and, I think, very pertinent points and so you should think very seriously about that.

The point that Dr. Kresey made was--what do you do to meet this full spectrum? In 1960 I believe it was, we had a big
conference here at the PG School and it was called "The Advanced Deterrence(?) Study." The result of that conference was to recommend that the number of Polaris boats be cut in half because of the ANZA advent of technology and that we should go to torpedo-tube launched ballistic missiles. You know what happened? That was thrown out as a recommendation. So there are ways, if we just took one carrier battle group, and converted it, and spent some money on some other ships. We've got 15 carrier battle groups and 3 minesweepers.

Tom Grassey

Who would like to respond to that? I'm almost tempted to invite Peter or both of the authors that we have present on the maritime strategy, to join us on the front, because there seems to be so many arrows going in their direction. They're getting it in the back right now.

John Collins

Incidentally, let me make it clear to everybody here that I applaud the Navy effort to put together a maritime strategy. I was asked, as the only individual to come to this conference and criticize it. And so I did so in a very straightforward fashion. Does this mean that we should take the baby and throw it out with the bath? Of course not. All I'm doing is suggesting to the people in this auditorium that there are possible ways to improve the product that we started with. And that maybe these are some things that we ought to think about seriously as we go downstream.
Admiral Hayward

Let me just take on that question ... I won't belabor it a lot. ... and that applies to some of your criticism and I know that you are serving a role. It would be a waste of our time if we are here ... maritime strategy is great. In fact I had my turn at telling these guys about all the things that have to be done--and I don't think I told them anything they didn't know. There's a lot of work to be done on this maritime strategy. What is missing is a framework in which it is going to be applied. And the framework is at least two-fold--it's got to be three-fold or four-fold or five-fold. One of them that's terribly important is that the operators are guys out there who are going to fight. And that's the most important, by a long shot, you would think.

But at the other end is the House and Senate Appropriation Committee and that's where the rubber really meets the road. And between the two of those, there are all kinds of iterations that take place. Now we've all heard the term--strategy force mismatch--till we're sick of hearing it. And there is a strategy force mismatch today and there will be tomorrow and it'll be forever. This country is never going to pay enough money to meet the objectives of the service chiefs--I don't care how you restructure the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You can create a general staff guide there and whatever else--what he thinks he needs to meet the obligations that are specifically laid out in clear-cut English by the President of the United States--that force structure will never be applicable. Sam Nunn says change the strategy--he's said it over and over again. If we don't have enough, then let's change the strategy. If Sam Nunn were President, I'd guarantee you he won't change the strategy. It's easy to sit over there where he is and take potshots at the Secretary of Defense who may not be of his party or whatever. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a documentary system--I don't happen to think it's perfect by a long shot--but it provides for
all the ... to make an input. It gets assessed every year thoroughly and it comes up with 28 carriers. You don't like 15. It says--it used to say, at least 28. I fought it down to 18 and believe me that was hard.

Getting it from 12 to 15 was also hard. The tradeoffs that go on day in and day out among the services to try to meet the national strategy, are intolerable. And there's one hell of a lot of super civilians and Navy guys who work the tradeoffs over and over again and do a super job of it. And I'll bet you that if I took boatswains among the blue suiters, you'd get more than 50% that want 15 battle groups ... ...

I haven't seen very many submarines play any role at all in limited war. I know they're not going to help us in Central America. And there are all kinds of balances that we have to make at this game--and they're tough. And this kind of a session is excellent, to force us to keep going over and over again to assess the threat--we're now talking about the Pacific--the focus is on the Pacific, and all the obligations we have. We've heard a lot of criticism about whether the national strategy is evident. That document that somebody held up yesterday--the President's--that's a disgrace. Not that it's written wrong or anything else--it's a disgrace that he has to do that--for whom? Not for the Joint Chiefs. There are national decision documents that are very, very clear--that have been worked very hard. The Chiefs don't have any trouble--the CINCs don't have any trouble understanding what their objectives are. That damn thing is out there for the public, not you and me--I mean for the media and the Congress and, regrettably, all the rest of the world will look at us tear ourselves apart--we're going to criticize ourselves over what a lousy strategy the President has--most of the Democrats are going to say--the next time around, the Republicans will say how lousy it is. The best thing we ought to is junk it. And it's unfortunate we have so much argument over what the maritime strategy says. The guys that are working this thing know what the hell they're doing.
And I'm very proud of what they're doing—as long as they keep it
dynamic and they're bound to, because you guys are going to see
to it.

Rich Haver--ONI

I'd like to ask Col. Collins if he could expound a little
bit more about what I thought you said about the risks implied in
executing this and if you will--the do-ability of it. What are
the major features that you think drive the risks to an
unacceptable level in terms of the other side's capabilities

Colonel John Collins

Somebody said yesterday that there is no such thing as a
strategy without risk. And of course that's true. There are
degrees of risk. And I prefaced my comments today by saying that
a basic purpose of strategy is to play intellectual judo with the
opponent. And if you take your power and place it directly
against his power, that's not judo, that's a head-on collision
that is a higher risk strategy for a nation which does not have
the forces that it needs to implement the concept and the Admiral
is absolutely true that the JCS consistently comes up with at
least 10 more carriers than we have in the plans. But if you are
in a force posture like that, where you cannot tolerate attrition, and where according to the strategy, if you have 15
carrier battle groups or 15 carriers, that in fact it is
certainly desirable that those carriers operate as pairs.
Suddenly you're down to seven pairs floating around in two
oceans. And if by any chance the other side does conduct a
surprise attack, and go nuclear with its cruise missiles and so
forth, and you do start losing aircraft carriers, you got a
really serious problem. And so what I'm suggesting is—that from
my standpoint, going up into their sanctuaries where they have
land-based air and they have their power already concentrated, is
a dangerous high risk strategy that at least in my judgment, would require some reevaluation to determine whether or not there are alternative ways of doing this that might be less costly and less risky. And this is why I'm a real believer that there is a requirement for much more effective strategic research than there is at the present time.

Let me give you an example. Everywhere I go as a speaker, I tell people that strategy—whether it's maritime strategy or military strategy—is like research and development. It's got a basic side and it's got an applied side. Now, in the R&D field, I can't imagine any technologist doing very well unless there was an enormous and solid scientific base behind them feeding them new intellectual ideas, theories and concepts to work with. Everybody I know in the Pentagon who believes that he or she is a strategist, is on the applied side and they're working with theories and concepts that were developed in many cases 15-20-25 years ago to suit an environment that's disappeared. And so in order to reduce the risk, I would like to see some additional realistic options. And the options aren't going to show up very easily without an improved research capability to ferret them out. Am I going through to you at all?

Rich Haver

I'd like to make one point about that. I certainly agree with you that any amount of scientific research that can be added to the process, is ... I would say, however—at least from where I sit in the Pentagon ... that the Navy appears to be somewhat unique in comparison to its sister services in that we are in a semi-engaged status with the Soviets all the time. We don't have to ops research to figure out how you move carriers across the Northern Pacific and stay away from ... we go out and do it. We get a taste of Soviet anti-submarine every afternoon, every morning, every night—in terms of ... operating against his submarines and vice versa. So in effect, we have the best
scientific research training area that exists. We have the real world. Now that doesn't mean that we should be overconfident about that. It doesn't mean that today's lessons apply to 1995. But I do believe that there's more behind this than your remarks would necessarily indicate, in terms of the people who wrote these words and those who are working on these alternatives in the real world, like Admiral Lyons and Admiral Kelso. They have more than just the RAND Corporation to work with--they have the crucible of how they conduct fleet operations today. Whether the Russians intercepted us when we flew a strike against a particular Soviet group--when they reacted--how they reacted--and a far amount of decent evidence of that.

What I was looking for and I guess I got it in a sense of--if we throw the carriers directly into the teeth of the Soviet defense system, we run a high risk of losing them. I think we would agree, if we go to the Soviet party the way they've set the table, that's true. And I've never sensed that anyone who was taking the documents that Roger and others drafted--enough to go out and write the plan--are just stupidly going to send a message--we'll be off the Laflotins on the 15th day--come to the party--sort of tactics. Most of our routine is to apply pressure to them, but apply pressure to them in a way that their forces are not of the advantage state.

I guess the other thing I would say is that you project a somewhat pessimistic view of what I would call the do-ability, to put it in very simple terms. Yet I find in watching the Soviets that they aren't nearly so confident about their ability to knock us out. In fact, I sense, in watching the Soviets, that they are very concerned that this is entirely executable. And that it is a--if you will--a strategy or a concept or whatever term suits the particular speaker--it is something that is not only do-able but entirely within the realm of the possible--in terms of this force being used successfully against them. So I guess my only response to your remarks is--and while--and I agree that all strategies have to have a risk in order to be worthwhile--I'm not
so sure it's quite as pessimistic or as unaccomplishable as your remarks indicated. That's all.

Col. Collins

I guess we're talking about the two personalities ... ... I really consider myself to be in the real world--although I'm not in the Navy, I think I'm in the real world. I have 30 years in ... in the Army and I have been 15 years fighting these kinds of problems on Capital Hill, which is part of the real world. It may not be aboard an aircraft carrier or a cruiser or a submarine, but it's still part of the real world. And so we're looking at two personalities that have different views of what the risk happens to be. I'm seeing a risk that I believe is higher than I would like to accept, if there were alternatives. Since I have never seen any alternatives, these were not addressing the strategy--I don't know what the pros and cons were of the options that were discarded. And so whether or not this is the ultimate, best option is beyond my ability to identify. But given it in the context I have of nothing to the right or the left of it, it gives me a queasy feeling in the pit of my stomach.

Professor Nakamura

Yoshi Nakamura from Japan National Defense Security. I would like to ask Dr. Bernstein--my question is a little bit long but I would like to have a yes or no type answer right away--rather than long and careful answer. Before I left Japan, I was asked by my ... who's actually going to implement the Ground Self Defense Force Initiative. He said--well, we are very worried about the Bastion for the Bear alternative to the Sea of Okutsk. That is the ... Sea of Japan. The reason is--as I mentioned in my speech--2/3 of the Army will go to the north part of Japan. It means that the southern part of Japan, there are no soldiers
during crisis. So his worry is very natural. He worried about the northern part of the Sea of Japan which becomes the Bastion for the Bear. So my question is--do you have such a kind of scenario in your list?

Dr. Bernstein

Yes.

Professor Nakamura

Thank you very much.

AI ... - long time planner for PACFLT

I would like to address Mr. Collins' comments about the extent to which we are scientific and systematic in the way that this kind of effort's been taking place. What PACFLT does in this particular area is it ties together an annual net assessment--both dynamic and static--of the entire position in the Pacific--Soviet and American and allied. It games out alternative campaign plans in-house. It conducts twice annually a major wargame to test specific subsets of the plan. It ensures that every single fleet exercise involving more than 2-3 ships, is involved in testing certain specific aspects of the various campaign plans which are, in turn, various subsets of the overall maritime strategy. It exposes these to the critique of people up the hill in CINCPAC--the people down the hill at Hickom. It exposes them to the critique of some fairly strong critics in the Naval War College who have different views on how the Pacific might go sometimes than the PACFLT has. It exposes them to the views of the CNO and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other people, during a wide variety of subsequent games and conferences which are held--all of which strike me as being the kind of applied science that strategy is. As opposed to a
theoretical science, which is what you seem to apply. And I think, quite frankly, that if there's anything systematic about the way this strategy has been developed and about the way in which the CINCS--Lanfit as well and Eucom--although I can't speak for Eucom--there have been a lot of systematic, reasonably scientific and fairly rigorous efforts to validate many aspects of it, including when and how and under what circumstances what forces will do what. Questions of pace, questions of relative application of force, questions of dispersion vs. concentration, avenues of attack--whether they should be from the north or from the south. At what point you make an offensive push, how long an offensive push can last, how much you have to depend upon the deception and electronic warfare and how much you have to depend upon speed--innumerable, uncounted I guess would be an easy word--ways of doing things differently, are tested everyday by the Fleet CINCS. And that's, to me, not unscientific, not unsystematic and includes hundreds of options, not just one or two.

Col. Collins

We specialize in the United States in what I call the either/or syndrome. We will either do this or we will do that. We apply this to a lot of different things. The Navy, for example, went through a period where it got rid of all of its anti-aircraft guns and it went missiles. The Army got rid of all its anti-tank guns, and it went missiles. And we got rid of all the anti-aircraft guns and we went missiles. And the Soviets don't have this syndrome. They say--we won't have either/or--we'll have both. We won't have quality or quantity, we'll have both, and so forth. And so I can apply that directly to what you're talking about--do I believe that there is enormous benefit from the operational type research that you're talking about? Of course. Would I dispense? Of course I would not. Is there also a requirement for--and I shouldn't sneer at this--for the
scientific research? I think that there's a need for both. I
scratched some things out on my notes before I delivered my
prepared comments. But I had a few representative topics that I
thought, perhaps, naval research could undertake with some
profit. One of them would be strategic centers of gravity for
the maritime strategy. What is a strategic center of gravity?
That, according to Clausewitz, who's got a bad name in this room,
is the point of decision. That's the point of decision—that's
where you want to put your primary emphasis.

Now there is no such thing as a strategic center of gravity.
There are national centers of gravity, there are regional centers
of gravity, and there are functional centers of gravity.
Wouldn't it be nice for naval research to be doing some basic
examination of centers of gravity to determine what they are for
the Soviet Union and how we can best manipulate those in
peacetime and in war? Does this replace the operational research
you're talking about? Of course it does not. I would like to
see another topic—I would like to see an objective evaluation of
the value of peacetime naval presence for the crises deep inland.
Now, we've worn out ships and we've worn out people, running task
forces in and out of the Indian Ocean. And some of the crises
that they were supposed to influence in my mind, probably were
influenced. But there were some others where my guess is that
the value of those naval task forces was about as close to zero
as you could possibly get. Would I like to see some basic research
on the guidelines for using naval presence in these sorts of
circumstances? Now I could sit here for a long time, ticking off
scientific research that would provide intellectual tools for the
practical planner to use as he sees fit. That's all I would say.

Tom Grassey

I'm going to keep Roger for last. And he will be our last.
I'd like to direct my question to Ed Olsen. Ed, you mentioned something I found intriguing. Through much of this conference, when allies have been discussed, they've been discussed in terms of a problem for the United States with respect to convincing allies to come on board our strategy. In effect, you turned that on its head and said that one alternative possibility would be for the United States to associate itself with the strategy of allies. Yet, at least in terms of my research in the Asia-Pacific, and I'm thinking back to the trip that you and I took together under USIA auspices, when we talked with allies, with the exception of Japan—the general response was that the Soviets are your problem, not ours. How do you reconcile that with the idea of associating ourselves with allied strategy?

Ed Olsen

In the case of Japan, . . . . . . . if they don't see the Soviet Union as a threat to them in Asia—is it possible for us to scale down our threat perception of the Soviet Union—seeing the Asian stake as being primary, not the U.S. stake. Obviously this is a two-track relationship. Our relationship with the Soviet Union is independent. It doesn't mean we change our view of the Soviet Union, we just change our view of the Soviet Union as it applies in Asia. If that's possible, I don't see any great movement to do it in this country. But it's possible. And you could build a stronger relationship with allies and get allies to do more for themselves in that.

Since I don't think anybody else can ask me a question, let me expound on one thing that Col. Collins said, and I think it's related to yours. Col. Collins alleged, among several things, that the Navy intends to inform other services and cause a consultation—or informs them after the fact. You referred to
the antagonism this arouses in the other services. I'm not a
Navy officer--I'm not any kind of military officer--so I can't
really comment on that knowledgeably--even if I could, I'm not
sure I would.

But in any event, I do know that the U.S. does tend to treat
allies in that manner--consults with allies in that manner often
--not always, but often. Kind of tells people what we expect.
Here's the U.S. game plan or the U.S. blueprint--here's what you
should do and here's what you should do. The reaction often--
certainly in Asia frequently--why? That's precisely the problem.
The Soviets are not a threat to us Asians, it's a threat to you.
So don't ask us to do what you can't do. You do it yourself.
But if you change your perception of this and start to view the
Soviet Union in Asia more the way some of the Asian states do--
and certainly in the case of a country like Japan, which is
becoming rapidly and probably will stay the #1 economic power in
the world. Shouldn't their views of the Soviet Union be heavily
factored into the joint strategy with Japan? I think so. I'm
probably in the minority on this. I find more empathy in Japan
than I do in this country--in terms of support for that, for
obvious reasons.

I think it's a legitimate thing for the future and probably
will be more legitimate 10-20 years down the road--as these
economic factors in Asia begin to dominate. I made a trip--I'll
just take one more minute--last July, had a trip to Soviet Union.
Talking with some Soviet analyst on Japan and Korea and to me it
was an eye-opener. Have to be careful how I phrase this--it's
not that I learned--I don't want to sound like Jimmy Carter--it
wasn't that I learned something about the Soviet Union that I
didn't know, it's just that I learned the depths of their feeling
on this. There's a great deal of fear of Japan on the part of
the Soviet academic analysts and Soviet researchers. Wasn't fear
of military things at all. And they talk about that--but they
didn't seem to fear that. But they did fear the Japanese
economic power. And they were wondering--in private
conversations—not in the conference settings—why are Americans so cavalier about the Japanese economic challenge. If we Soviets faced what you people face, we'd be much more upset about the Japanese. I'm not upset about the Japanese. I think this is great. I think we ought to have competition with the Japanese. We ought to open up and trade with them. The Soviets couldn't understand that. And I think that puts them at a real disadvantage dealing with the Japanese in the future. It's a mistake for us not to see how they see the Japanese and see the Japanese view of the Soviets—I'd love to see us integrate our strategy with the Japanese and accept some of the Japanese ideas in it as they would accept some of our ideas. But it's not easy to do.

Tom Grassey

Our final question is from Captain Roger Barnett.

Roger Barnett

I'd first of all like to thank my friend, John Collins, for being a stimulating foil for us. And also for refreshing my memory on who it was George Will was referring when he talked about pyromaniacs in fields of straw men. And I'd like to make three observations, primarily in the interest of setting the record straight. I'd like to extend on Rich Haver's remarks about the fact that the Navy actually does work against Soviet forces. Which is unlike what the other services do. And on Pete Door's remark that the Navy exercises, continuously, in both Atlantic and Pacific, and refines and works options and thinks about—what happens if? But the Navy also has the best wargaming capability in the entire United States. Where the maritime strategy and various pieces of it have been played hundreds of times by thousands of people. Now, if this isn't net assessment, I really don't know—and I recognize that JCS Pub 1 doesn't have
a definition of it--that is the quintessential net assessment--the best you can do short of war, it seems to me. And if John has something else in mind, I'd like to hear that.

The second point is that he's left us with the impression that SACLANT was not consulted in the preparation for the maritime strategy because of something that Admiral MacDonald said when he was SACLANT, that he was not consulted. In fact, when the strategy was put together, Admiral MacDonald was Op-05 and Admiral Train was SACLANT and we did work very closely with Admiral Train and his staff. And Admiral MacDonald, in the normal course of events, would have been briefed because the strategy was a CNO program analysis memorandum and would have been briefed frequently on it ... and at meetings with the CNO. So it's true that Admiral MacDonald was not consulted as SACLANT. But SACLANT was, throughout the process, as was CINPAC, allies, other services, and so forth.

The third point that I want to clarify and make absolutely clear is that the United States Navy has continuously had anti-aircraft guns on its ships but only since there were aircraft.

Tom Grassey

Professor Franz Michael, you were standing there--

Franz Michael

Let me just make one comment ... which perhaps I take up in person? I mean time is over--

John Collins

About two sentences. Wargames are heavily dependent on scenarios, loss ratios, a lot of other variables that depend on who's making the input. Is there value from wargames? Yes there is. Are they a substitute for net assessment? I think not.
Apparently successive Secretaries of Defense think not also or Andy Marshall would have been out of a job years ago.

But John, wargaming is the dynamic form of net assessment. ... static form in order then to go into the dynamic form and Andy does a lot of wargaming--

John Collins

I understand. My faith in the outcome of wargames is something less than complete, let's put it that way.

Tom Grassey

Nobody believes in the outcome of war games. That's not why you war game. I mean, it's like a mule's sex life. It might be fun, it might be pleasurable, enjoyable, but there's no output. Don't look at outcomes, look at the process--that's what's they're really doing in war games.

All sorts of thoughts cross my mind as to how now to introduce my chairman. I know you want to break, but I've got something better. I've got Cmdr Jim Tritten for you.
We will not have time to take a break. Our goal is to have a wrap up completed by between 5 and 5:15. So if you could all stand down from the podium here, I'll introduce our wrap up speaker.

Dr. Don Daniel earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University. He is a former naval person. He joined the Naval Postgraduate School faculty in 1972. He's currently on leave from the Naval Postgraduate School as the Chairman of the Campaign and Strategy Department at the Naval War College. He's the author of a recent book on Strategic ASW and articles in Survival Magazine on Tactical Nuclear War at Sea. Forthcoming for the International Institute on Strategic Studies will be a small volume on naval power and European Security. Don.

Thank you Jim. Admiral Hayward, Ladies and Gentlemen--I rather feel like having to wrap up a conference that's been, I think, a very excellent conference--a very good conference over two days with lots and lots of issues. And I rather feel like the Hungarian who is on a train together with a Brit, a Cuban and a Russian. And as they're all sitting in the same compartment as they were going along in the train, the Russian gets up, reaches into his bag and pulls out a bottle of Stolyshnaya, pours himself a shot, shoots it down and throws the rest of the bottle out the window. And everybody says--my gosh, how can you do that, that's just wonderful vodka, how can you just do that? He says--nah, don't worry about it, I've got lots of that back home. Train
rolls down the tracks a little bit longer—the Cuban gets up, reaches into his bag, pulls out a box of wonderful cigars—lights one up, you know, the aroma fills the room—everybody just kind of salivating, smelling this, takes a few more puffs, takes that cigar and the rest of the box and throws them out the window. And again, they say, my God, how can you do that—those are just wonderful cigars. And he said—no, don't worry about it, I've got lots of those back home. The train keeps going down the road again a while longer. As you can imagine, the Brit gets up, reaches into his kit, pulls out a bottle of single malt liquor, pours himself a shot, throws the rest of the bottle out the window. Same reaction and same answer. Of course, now the Hungarian is really under pressure to come up something. He's also worried that the train is about to reach its destination and they're all going to get off and his honor will never have been upheld. So he sat down on the train and thought for a few seconds. But a smile broke across his face. He walked about the compartment, picked up the Russian and threw him out the window.

Is there a Russian in the audience? Ok. Oh, my goodness. Misha, I didn't mean it—where is he.

I just want to start off by saying again—I want to commend the Naval Postgraduate School for what I thought was an outstanding conference, as a matter of fact. I hope it's the first of many and I think that you did a great job. Now I am speaking here for myself, I'm not speaking as a representative of the Naval War College or the Navy or anything else. I'm going to try to provocative and to some extent, try to offer some hypotheses. I'm also going to try to be short because that was the dictum that I was given before I came up here.

So I'm going to deal with just one point about a question that we've dealing with in terms of history and then I want to deal a little bit with some questions about the development of the maritime strategy in general and then get into offering maybe one hypothesis about how we can think about the use of the Navy in the Pacific, at least in a war with the Soviets. To some
extent to pick up Admiral Hayward's point that—hey, we haven't really heard what strategy in the Pacific is going to be. And this is not to overshadow what Al Bernstein was saying in a sense that it's going to be scenario dependent. It's just simply going to try to develop some of those points a little bit more.

In terms of history, I really just want to make a couple of points. One is that I think history was the right place to start, in terms of what we did. I think you need some sense of historical perspective in terms of what you're about. My only concern is—and this is the second time at a conference that I've closed out a conference where I said the same thing about historians, and when I did it the last time, I got even poison letters from historians in the mail as a result of it. But I do have a problem then which I have a problem now. And that is—if you use history to make yourself feel good, then you deserve what you're going to get. By that I mean, just because someone advocated something in the past or just because somebody thought that something was a good idea in the past—doesn't mean that it's a good idea today. I have never read Albert Thayer Mahon. I have read Gilmany or those people. I don't find it particularly relevant to do so, to be perfectly frank. Maybe that's going to be a little bit too provocative in terms of some of you that are here, but my goodness—in other words, we ought to be worried about the parallels between what goes on in the past and what goes on today. And if the parallels are there such that there's something to be learned, we ought to learn it. But we ought not to just simply go back to history so we can feel good—so we can say, gee, I advocate something today and that must be right because Mahon advocated it in 1905. Somehow or other, that argument strikes me as turning history on its head, in terms of what history ought to be about. So let me just get on with that. And I'll give my address to those of you who don't want to send me poison pen letters.

Let's look at the question of the maritime strategy in terms of its development. I thought that both Roger Barnett's point
and Pete Swartz's point about the aim of what was going on in terms of the development of this thing called a maritime strategy, was kind of to help revitalize some thinking that was going on in the Navy. As a matter of fact, I find that kind of interesting. Just one aside on that. But those of you who are familiar with the writings of Admiral Gorshkov know that he published in '72-'73 a series of 11 articles in *Navy's At War and Peace*. What some of you may not remember--I'm certain that Rich probably does--at the beginning of those articles, before he got into the substance of the articles themselves, there was a short, kind of little two sentence or three sentence paragraph that essentially said that he was publishing these things in order to encourage a unity of views among people in the Navy. And I find that kind of interesting that 5-6 years later, the U.S. Navy or maybe it was a little bit later than that--starts to embark on a process or at least to start to generate how you think about naval warfare--that it seems to be happening in both navies. I'm not sure what there is to get out of that, but I just simply find it an interesting parallel set of developments.

Within that particular context, I want to emphasize is that as far as I'm concerned--again, I am speaking personally--process is much more important than substance in terms of this. And by that, I mean in terms of getting people to think strategically--is much more important than actually the substance of the maritime strategy itself. I would argue the case though--as a matter of fact as a young naval officer in the 1970's and watching young naval officers after that--is that there was very little strategic thinking going on among many people. I think even among very, very senior people, in terms of the Navy. And I think that the great thing about the maritime strategy is--whether people agreed with it or not--was it got them thinking about strategy. It said--think about something else other than what's going on in the engineroom or think about something else other than what you're going to have to face in the Congress in terms of justifying this very specific program. There's more to
the world than that. You guys might actually have to fight a war one of these days. And you ought to think about that. And the nice thing about the maritime strategy is that it has gotten people to do exactly that.

I was really surprised by Mr. Collins today who argued about rigorous research and so forth. Particularly in terms of his comments about the Naval War College and talking about the strategic studies group. I mean, he said he asked them, where do you come from—and one of them said I was a CO of an aircraft carrier and the other one was the—I don't know what—the CAG for the F-14 group or whatever it was that they were. And he was appalled at the prospect that these guys were here and that they didn't seem to know anything about strategy. The purpose of the Strategic Studies Group was to bring these people—to put them through a process of a year so that at the end of the process they might know something about strategy. Collins happened to talk to them at the beginning of the year. And it doesn't surprise me that they didn't know anything about strategy. Up to that point, most of them had horizons that didn't extend very far beyond the decks of a ship. He caught those people at the beginning of the process, not at the end of the process. What did he expect? For someone who talks about rigorous research, one would have thought that he would have thought about that particular ... before throwing the point out.

I do have another issue in terms of—I don't think it ought to be called maritime strategy. I do have a real problem with the name. And as a matter of fact, I seem to remember a while ago when we were told to come to this conference or asked to come to this conference, that I think it had something to do with maritime strategy in the Pacific—that was the name of the conference. That has since changed to 'The Navy in the Pacific,' which I think is a better name for a number of reasons. Because I have a problem with the term 'strategy.' Strategy implies that somehow or other, there is some kind of a program—in other words, we talk about the application of resources to objectives
in terms of strategy, as if somehow or other you have a program that's worked out. And maybe 'cookbook' is almost too hard a term. But you get—at least to my mind—the term strategy implies something more concrete than what the maritime strategy was, if I can put it that way. But that was wrapped up in a couple of things.

Let me try to tell you what I mean. I would have called it more like maybe a concept of operations or framework for thinking about how navies ought to be used. And it might have gotten us around some of the problems that have arisen as a result of the publication of the maritime strategy. And that is the identification of options mentioned in the strategy, with the strategy itself. When I think the Navy has been wrapped around that particular axle and has been buffeted about by people who have identified options within the strategy—with the strategy itself. And I can understand why that should be the case because I think—and as a matter of fact, I would argue however that what has been called the maritime strategy, has been caricatured, I would argue, by some of the very same people who pushed the strategy. And in this particular case, I think maybe on the one hand, among other people, you had a very forceful Secretary of the Navy in terms of John Lehman. But Lehman, in terms of his forcefulness, did go out—and to my mind, did say things that suggested that the Navy had a strategy to go out, let’s say and bash the koala—on day one of the war. And that’s the strategy that John Collins is saying he doesn’t particularly like. And I would argue that even John Lehman backed off from that after he thought about it. And other people in the Navy backed off from that.

I would also argue that the Naval War College—you know, John Collins talked about naval research—he’s never been to the Naval War College and talked to me, at least, in terms of the money and research department out there. I don’t think you know what we’re about—I don’t think you know what we do. And within the context of strategy and strategy development, the war gaming
department, I think, has been terribly important here because I've seen some box kicking admirals come in there and after about 3-4 war games where they thought the maritime strategy forced them to bash the koala--and after about 3-4 war games they came back and said--you know, I'm not sure I want to do that any more. That sounded like a great idea because I thought it was consistent with the strategy. And now I happen to think that that's a pretty dumb idea. And there are still some of those box kicking admirals around in the Navy right now. There are some hard charging aggressive kind of admirals. But you ask them--would you do this--and they came back and said--hey, I'm not sure I want to do that. I'm not sure I like the idea of committing suicide or sending a lot of good A-6 pilots to die at the face of Soviet air defense without having properly prepared myself to do it. Now that doesn't mean that at some particular point in the war, if there were to be a war, that they wouldn't want to do that kind of thing and that they wouldn't do it. But they're not going to do it automatically. These guys are not spring-loaded to go out and see a lot of good people die. And I think the caricature of the maritime strategy, to my mind, has been criticized more than what the strategy really ought to be about, which is more of a process. And I've been surprised at some of the ... that thought it should have been better than that--in terms of characterizing it that way.

What I am willing to say is that people who are involved with the maritime strategy are more willing to entertain options which may or may not be executed--and those options may seem too offensive for some--but at least one can argue that they're looking at it--I think today at least--within the context of a philosophy that says be offensive where you can, but don't be stupid. And I think that's what we have to be keeping in mind.

I was going to say more about the Naval War College but I'll just leave it at that--except to say that I think we have contributed to the revitalization of the strategy to an emphasis on option and we've done more than our share to bring about all
sorts of people over at the Naval War College, both critics and
the non-critics—well obviously the non-critics are going to be
there because they own the War College—but critics as well as
non-critics alike over at the War College.

That being said, let me spend a few minutes—let me skip
that—let me spend a few minutes on some questions about thinking
about maybe about the question of strategy in the Pacific. And
let me just start too with a number of things that I think you
ought to keep in mind when you’re thinking about strategy in the
Pacific. At least if you’re going to deal with the issue of a
war with the Soviet Union—maybe the least probable case—but I
think if you’re going to develop a strategy, that’s where you
want to start. I would argue—at least, that’s where you want to
start. You want to move off from that base case and you want to
start dealing with other things. But I do think that that’s the
proper place to start.

In terms of time lines—in terms of one issue which is that
of time lines—time lines in the Pacific are very different than
those in other areas of the world. If you have a war that starts
off in Europe, I would argue that that war is going to proceed
fairly far down before maybe you have much of a war almost that
you have in the Pacific. At least certainly from the point of
view of the Navy as it was well shown by that chart that Cort
Wagner put on—about that picture of the Mediterranean—that
picture of our parking lot in the midst of the Pacific here.
Just those distances involved means that things are probably
going to go ahead more slowly.

Also, and I’ll develop this in a little bit more detail in a
few seconds, there are very good political reasons why war in the
Pacific is probably going to occur more slowly. And certainly
one of the major ones—which I’ll talk about in a few minutes—
happens to be with the fact that if can’t play with the Japanese
in the Pacific—or if they’re not involved—your options are very
severely restricted. And I would think—for very good and
sufficient reasons—if I were Japanese, I would not be on the
front lines on Day One, depending upon the circumstances. And I
don't think the Japanese are going to be. That's my own personal
opinion, but I don't think they are going to be. I think they
have very good and sufficient reasons not to be. That means
whatever you want to do in the Pacific is probably going to
proceed a heck of a lot more slowly than what's going on in the
other side of the world. As a matter of fact, Europe is going to
dominate it, and we're going to be sucked in to just simply a
focus, in terms of being dominated by Europe, I would argue.
Because you're going to be trying probably to save your tail in
Europe; thinking about the Pacific is definitely going to be
secondary. By the time the Pacific really cranks up for you to
do something, you're going to have to start wondering about
whether or not it's almost going to make any difference—or at
least you're going to have to start thinking about that
particular option.

Let's look at a couple of other things. In terms of the
U.S. Navy—in terms of thinking about what you ought to be doing
in the Pacific. I would argue within this particular case,
relative to the overall expenditure of U.S. Naval resources, the
U.S. Navy is probably in pretty good shape in the Pacific. Half,
or roughly more than half of the Navy, is out here. And I find
that particularly interesting since at least—and maybe some of
the people in the audience can correct me—but I don't think that
the division of resources in terms of the Navy as you find it
today, is based on any type of strategic thinking at all. I
think it's partly based on bureaucratic politics—you divide them
up roughly half in the Atlantic, roughly in the Pacific; I think
it's based partly on historical precedent. But I have never seen
anybody come down and say—we've got a strategy here and it says
that you ought to have roughly this much in the Atlantic and
roughly this much in the Pacific, if you're going to have a war
with the Soviet Union. That's not what it was based on. I would
argue that the U.S. Navy in the Pacific is probably, relative to
dealing with the Soviet Union, and again it depends upon all
sorts of other factors which I can't deal with now, including Japan, but it's probably in relatively better shape than the U.S. Navy in the Atlantic, in terms of dealing with the threat that's going to be faced there. So that has to be a factor in mind when you think about what you want to do in the Pacific.

Essentially you may want to think in terms of the Pacific, to some extent, being a source of forces that will be swung to the Atlantic. Or you may want to think of the Pacific, at least, as being a source of forces that may serve as some kind of a strategic reserve. And we'll get to that in a second. Now, you are going to face a problem if you do that. I suspect that Pacific commanders will want to kind of get their forces engaged before some of them are transferred out. That's going to be a problem that's going to have to be dealt with. But let them at least argue the case. If they've got a good case, that they can really make a difference--then my God, let them make a difference. If they don't have a case, if they can't argue the case that they can make a difference, then my God, don't let them. Don't let them throw the forces away.

Within that particular context, I would argue that things are probably going to get worse rather than get better. In other words, we've see a fair amount of budgetary successes in terms of the last several years. And I think to say that the U.S. Navy, somehow or other because of its maritime strategy, has achieved budgetary success and it ought to be flogged for that--I find that to be a very strange argument indeed. But that's a separate issue. The U.S. Navy has had budgetary successes over the course of the last few years. I think, however, it's going to run into some very, very serious problems in the future. And I think we're going to have to be thinking about that. And to my mind, hopefully though--that is going to drive some thinking about a national strategy--which I think is actually going on right now. In terms of how you think about the division of the forces that you have and how they're going to be developed and so forth.
Within that particular context, there are some other factors going on which I think do need to be kept in mind—at least in the long term. One could make a case—at least it is not impossible—one could make a case that sometime in the foreseeable future, you’re probably going to be drawing down in terms of ground forces from Europe, and drawing down in terms of ground forces in Korea. That may actually be the case. And if that were true, you’re going to want to think about strategic lift—in other words, you’re going to want to think about how you’re going to apply your resources. And the Navy and other mobile forces, may turn out looking more important than they do today. And I can’t predict what’s going to happen there. But it’s at least worth thinking about, that within the context of the fact that we’re talking about 350,000 troops in Europe and 40,000 troops in Korea, what if we were to draw down seriously in terms of the number of troops in Europe, what if we were to draw out all the ground troops in Korea? What would the world look like then? And what does that mean in terms of what the budgetary expenditures would look like? And what would the arguments be then?

I suspect one of the arguments would be—you’d have to even possibly build a stronger Navy rather than a less strong Navy, if that were to be the case.

Let’s look very quickly in terms of another factor in terms of the USSR. We’ve seen a fairly significant buildup of Soviet and naval and other military forces in the Soviet Union. But I think Andy Marshall brought us very nicely to a nice point when he said that hey—at least in terms of his predictions—we’ve seen this buildup. If you look at it long term, things don’t look so good for the Soviet Union. And I think that needs to be the case. I am sympathetic with Paul Dibb’s description of the Soviet Union as the incomplete superpower. I think that is the problem that the Soviet Union does have—not only in the Pacific but in others. And I found particularly interesting, actually, Ed Olsen’s point was that maybe what we’re more afraid of in the
Pacific is not another buildup of Soviet military forces, but actually if the Soviets become more friendly in the Pacific. If the Soviets actually try to maintain the level of forces or whatever—get closer to the Japanese, get closer to the Chinese or whatever. Don’t know if it’ll all happen or not.

Rich Haver, I think, painted a picture where he talked about the Soviets having a number of force deficiencies in the Pacific, in terms of modern submarines, in terms of tactical aviation—that they were going to face serious ASW problems. We’ve seen, in terms of Cort Wagner’s presentation, about some difficulties that they may have in terms of finding aircraft carriers. I think that Rich made an excellent point just a few minutes ago about dealing with the Soviets on a day to day basis and having some sense of what their strengths are and what their weaknesses are. So I guess when I add it all up, I have a sense that maybe I don’t happen to think that the world is going to hell in a handbag in the Pacific, at least from a military perspective. In other words, I think we can at least for the near future, certainly hold our own and probably do pretty well.

Now within that context, there are going to be some uncertainties in terms of what the Soviets are going to do which may make a difference in terms of what we want to think about doing. I think probably or possibly one of the major uncertainties has to do with this question of pro-SSBN. We’ve talked a lot today, and yesterday also, about the fact that much of the Soviet general purpose navy would be devoted to protecting their ballistic missile submarines. And that may probably continue to be true in the future, but if the Soviets, let’s say, move to put in their ballistic missile submarines very far back, behind mining barriers, underneath ice and so forth, are they going to start to feel that maybe they can better protect some of their ballistic missile submarines without having to devote such a large proportion of the general purpose forces? That I don’t know. You might say that if they were to do that, that might free up some general purpose forces which will then go out and
raise havoc in some other places. That may be true. That would be reinforced with the idea of the SS-24's and the SS-25's, if you believe that the SSBN's are the strategic reserves. If the Soviets build up a strategic reserve on land, it may make the strategic reserve at sea relatively less important—not absolutely less important—but relatively less important for the Soviets. So again, they might think about—well, gee, what are some of the things that we can do.

I would argue, however, that possibly offsetting that would be a Start Agreement and an INF Agreement, if they occur. If you do away with a lot of your INF, all of your INF systems as a matter of fact, the Soviets may be looking to the systems that are in the submarines, to help make up for that—partially in the old Golfs and Yankees. If you also have a Start Agreement where the Start Agreement, at least in terms of the baseline numbers that are being discussed now—6,000, 1600, if you get down to those baseline figures, that'd be kind of interesting—in terms of the Soviets having roughly on a one-time strike right now—roughly let's say 10,000 warheads and you're talking about bringing it down to 6000. My question there would be—and I don't have an answer—I mean it's just really much more of a question—does that make the ballistic missile submarine that much more important again? Because now you have less baskets in which to put your eggs, so what happens on that? There's a Soviet tendency to want to protect those submarines—actually increase rather than decrease.

Also, if you did have an excess of forces—such that you didn't feel that you needed to protect your ballistic missile submarines and so forth, quite as much—what would you do with them? Would you go after the Slots, for instance, is that what you would do, if you were the Soviets? And that I'm not sure. We seem to, I think there's a sense in which the Soviets are really defensive minded. They'd probably want to build. I think, a defensive perimeter in and around the homeland, anyway—to keep us out. And I suspect though, they must see that defense
perimeter being—when someone talks about a bastion, I think of a solid wall—something that you'd have to kind of climb over or break your way through. I suspect they see the maritime defense perimeter around the Soviet homeland more like swiss cheese. So that if you have additional forces, that might be freed up for the pro-SSBN task, do you try to use them to plug up holes instead, as opposed to going out and raising havoc. Again, I don't know what the answer is to that—I'm just raising the question, not providing an answer to that.

All those things being considered, I guess to my mind—and again I am trying to be provocative here in terms of wanting to end this thing on a bang, rather than a whimper—and that is, I don't think that in a war with the Soviet Union, there's probably much you can do if there is a heavy war going on in Central Europe, that is really going to significantly affect them. I think the Soviet attitude will very much be—we'll get to that later. In other words, we have a big war going on in Europe, and you can try to do things and you can hurt them, and they may realize they're being hurt. It's not that they're going to accept being hurt. But maybe they're going to very much adopt the attitude of—we'll get to that later—kind of thing. They may have set up a series of priorities in their minds.

Another factor—again when you think about the use of the Navy then in the Pacific—would be the question of the allies. And I think Claude Buss, Steve Jurika, and Ed Olsen and others, have really done, I think, an excellent job of sensitizing us to the question of the allies. And within that particular problem, also it is something we need to think about—I'm not sure how much we can do about it—I would argue that public manifestations of the maritime strategy, while they may serve to deter the Soviets or cause them concern—which I happen to think is a good thing. Also, however, the down side of that—they seem to have caused concern also among your allies. And there's a tradeoff there and you have to think about that. You want to tell certain things to the Soviets because you want to enhance deterrence.
And I think that makes a lot of sense—to mind at least, it does. But what you tell the Soviets in order to deter, does not always reassure your allies. And may cause your allies to rethink, sometimes—kind of where you’re taking them or where you’re drawing them. Does that say something about your public articulations of maritime strategy, I don’t know. I happen to think that Admiral Tross is right on when he says—hey, maybe we’ve been too much oriented to options in previous discussions of the maritime strategy. Maybe we need to make it more a discussion of more general philosophical points. And I think there may be some sense to that, from the point of view when we think about the allies here.

Here within this particular context, I would think that one ally that you’d just have to deal with, you have to look at—is the question of Japan. And again, just speaking personally, I would argue—let me make a general point. Having had the occasion to travel some throughout Asia, and having gone on a couple of USIA tours there among other things—one of the things that really concerns me is—I see, to my mind, a real generational gap in terms of the people in Asia. You speak to the older people, you speak to what is called the establishment people, and they’re really very much, I think, generally pro-U.S. and generally with you, if I can put it that way. You go speak to classrooms, to college classrooms for instance—and that kind of thing. Boy, you find they’re extremely skeptical. They’re not of the same generation. I mean I remember even just last year when I was in Korea, when I was on a bus going up the DMZ, and there was actually a very nice tour guide—about as nice a tour guide as you can get—but on this bus, he really made it a point where he was talking about going up to the DMZ and the country was divided and so forth and he said—the reason why the country is divided—it’s not our fault, it’s the superpowers fault and he made a point of saying—including the United States. It’s really her fault, you know, that we’re doing this. And there were really a good number of Americans on the bus. And I
thought, in a sense, this guy has got some brass—to kind of just lay it out. But here was a young man, I don’t know—about 25. I don’t know exactly what his age was and so forth—very articulate and I think as a matter of fact it was because the Americans were on the bus that he was really kind of making the point. Here we are going up to the DMZ and it’s all your fault—kind of thing. Whereas if you talked to other Koreans, they would have a completely different point of view. So within that general context of saying—I think things are going to get worse rather than better—I would argue in terms of the allies. And here I think Japan is the linch-pin—Japan is the key.

And I’m going to be very pessimistic about Japan. My scenario is that—should there be the prospect of a major war, not that the Soviet Union wants a major war. As a matter of fact, I would argue she definitely does not. But if she somehow or other reaches the conclusion that war is the lesser evil than whatever it is that’s driving her to war—if she reaches that particular conclusion, I suspect that one of the things that the Soviets would do would be to send the Japanese a letter—look, this is it, this is really serious, we’re not playing games here. We’re being driven to this—again, think of it from the Soviet perspective now. It’s not that they want war, they probably very much don’t want. It’s just that, for whatever reason, they feel they’re on a slippery slope going to war. This could be really be it. Within that particular context, I would think that I were the Soviet Union, I would send the Japanese a letter that says—hey, I don’t want you to my ally in a way—but I simply cannot stomach the idea of the Americans operating out of Japan, should there be a major war. That I cannot stomach. I’ll get to you now or I’ll get to you later, but I’ll get to you. And you’d better think about that. And the vaguer the threat the better. And again, if I were the Japanese—the Japanese it seems to me—would have to think about it in two ways. What’s the prospect if I join up with the Americans now or don’t join up with the Americans now. And what’s the prospect if the Soviets win in the
long run. In other ways, maybe it's better for me to join up with the Americans now, to help the Soviets not win in the long run. Possibly that may be better, if I were Japanese. But I don't see how they can make those kinds of predictions. I would think we really have a serious problem then.

I was going to make it longer—but let me cut it off there, and just say that that leads me to offer, as a conclusion here, the description that actually Rich Haver gave, of Soviet strategy in the Pacific. If I understood Rich correctly—Rich said that in the initial period of the war, the Soviets might very well go defensive and then after the initial period was over, sit down and decide what was best to do—whether you go offensive, whether you continue to remain defensive, or whatever. And it seems to me, in the light of the factors that I just presented—particularly in terms of the division of the U.S. naval resources, and marine resources and that kind of thing, maybe a defensive strategy on the part of the U.S. ought to be the way to go.

Within the context of an overall defensive—well, ok, an offense defense strategy—an offensive submarine strategy but not. I should argue, not one that says—I'm going to take all of whatever it is—my 40 SSBN's and send them up there. I think you can send a small number—doesn't have to be all of your SSN's, and you want the Soviets to know that there is some up there so that they don't get a free ride on that. But other than that, I think we need to obviously worry about maintaining the sea lines of communications through the continent of Asia including to Japan, as much as the sea lines coming back, as well as the sea lines going to. And I think we can do that—I think we can secure those. And I think for Russ to think about doing much more—particularly in terms of let's say—forward offensive power projection strikes against the Soviet homeland—I don't happen to think, myself, that that is necessarily a good idea. You risk losing a lot of good aircraft and you risk losing possibly even aircraft carriers, depending upon the circumstances.
Again, it's a question if you do it right and do you do it at the right time and so forth. But you do face the risk. And I think that you might want to take that risk, actually, some time in the war, you might want to take that risk. And my point is, why do it on Day One? In other words, wait to see if you really need to do it. Because, in the end, having those aircraft carriers in this case, having them in reserve, having them exist, having them in the palm of your hand, on Day 20 of a war, Day 30 of a war, may be much more important than what you can accomplish in terms of early offensive strikes against the Soviet homeland in a way where the Soviets are really much more concerned about what's going on in Europe frankly than what's going on in the Pacific.

Finally, just one thing—and I don't think we'll have time to discuss it—one of the things which we didn't discuss in the conference, which might have been interesting for us to discuss—and that's the question of the eastern Pacific. We basically talked about the western Pacific. We really didn't talk about Central America, South American or, that matter, moving out towards the Indian Ocean—some of those areas. We didn't talk about that very much. But I happen to think, for instance, that again if we look in the long term—Andy was thinking in a long term in terms of kind of how the Soviets were going to be operating or how they were going to feel in the year 2010. I keep asking myself in my worst nightmares—what is South America and Central America going to look like in the year 2010? Where's the U.S. Navy going to be and what's the U.S. Navy going to be doing then? Thank you very much.

Jim Tritten

I guess there is enough summing up for Don and everybody else when you come to the end of a conference. Let me just summarize my thought in terms of the value to the school and extend, which I think is considerable—I wanted to express it the
other day to Admiral Hayward and it's a fresh step for the National Security Affairs—and I think we have the freshness of that step.

To the participants, without naming all, I want to pass on to you my very, very sincerest appreciation for a very stimulating time, a very good time and I hope it was of as much value to the participants as it was to us. Thank you very much.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name and Position</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Seth Cropsey</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special OPS &amp; LIC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PNT Room 2E252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washington, D.C. 20301-2500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Director, Net Assessment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSD/NA Room 3A930</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washington, D.C. 20501</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Dudley Knox Library</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, CA 93943-5100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Director or Research (Code 012)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, CA 93943-5100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Professor Thomas Bruneau</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of National Security Affairs (56)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, CA 93943-5100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Associate Professor James J. Tritten</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of National Security Affairs (56Tr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, CA 93943-5100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Professor Edward A. Olsen</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of National Security Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, CA 93943-5100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval War College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newport, RI 02841</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Defense Technical Information Center  
   Cameron Station  
   Alexandria, VA 22314

10. Center for Naval Analyses  
    4401 Ford Avenue  
    Alexandria, VA 22302

11. CAPT Michael Mains, USN  
    Chief, Strategic Concepts Branch  
    OP-603 PNT Room 4E486  
    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
    Washington, D. C. 20350

12. CAPT Michael A. McDevitt  
    Executive Director, CNO Executive Panel  
    OP-00K  
    4401 Ford Avenue  
    Alexandria, VA 22302

13. CINCPAC  
    Commander In Chief Pacific  
    Camp H. M. Smith  
    Honolulu, HAWAII 96861-5025

14. CAPT Peter Swartz, USN  
    USNATO/DOD Box 102  
    APO New York, NY 09667-5028

15. Deputy, Chief of Naval Operations (OP-60)  
    Plans, Policy & Operations  
    Strategy, Plans & Policy Division  
    PNT, Room 4E566  
    Washington, D. C. 20350

16. Head, East Asia/Pacific Plan & Policy Branch  
    OP-612  
    PNT, Room 4E475  
    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
    Washington, DC 20350
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City, State, Zip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Deputy CNO (Plans, Policy &amp; Opers)</td>
<td>OP-06, PNT, Room 4E592, Washington, D. C. 20350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>RADM J. F. Smith</td>
<td>OP-61, PNT, Room 4E572, Washington, D. C. 20350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Adjunct Professor Claude Buss</td>
<td>1234 Pitman Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Dr. Stephen Jurika</td>
<td>7927 Caledonia Drive, San Jose, CA 95135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>