DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE BATTLE OF BUNA:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

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Defense of the Philippines to the Battle of Buna: A Critical Analysis of General Douglas MacArthur

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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While General MacArthur's accomplishments during World War II have been widely acclaimed, the fact is that during the first 13 months of the war his actions were not only less than heroic but in several instances self defeating. This paper analyzes General MacArthur's contributions to the allied effort in the first 13 months of World War II, looking at only two campaigns: the first campaign in the Philippines, and the initial fighting in New Guinea culminating with the battle of Buna. In numerous biographies MacArthur has been hailed as the "Hero of Bataan" and the "Fighting General", leading his troops through the jungles of New Guinea. In simple fact he was neither. Instead he was a slave to his own ego and self promotion, and was seldom concerned with his men who carried the brunt of battle in some of the worst combat conditions of World War II.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Laurence M. Jones attended Texas A&M University, graduating with a BBA in May, 1970. Concurrently, he was commissioned in the US Air Force and entered active duty immediately. He since received a Master of Science degree from the University of Southern California and is also a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and Staff College. He has a varied background having served as a personnel officer, a navigator in FB-111s, an executive officer, and a maintenance officer. In his last three assignments, he was Commander of the 380th Avionics Maintenance Squadron and the 4007th Combat Crew Training Squadron at Plattsburgh AFB NY, and was Division Chief of the Strategic Systems Division, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command at Offutt AFB, NE. Lieutenant Colonel Jones is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1989.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"For the researcher, analysis of General MacArthur's personality is complicated by the host of myths that grew about him, many of which have never been separated from reality...."

D. Clayton James

It is still a task to separate General Douglas MacArthur "the man" from Douglas MacArthur "the myth," and in fact, the "myth" often outweighs the man. This study attempts to distinguish between MacArthur's real achievements during the early World War II period and that which has been attributed to him by a host of adoring admirers. This study examines only the first campaigns in which he participated, (the first battle for the Philippines and initial fighting in New Guinea) since this period has been exaggerated greatly by subsequent biographers. There is a need to balance MacArthur's much heralded positive attributes with a brief account and analysis of his negative qualities -- a need which this study addresses.

MACARTHUR THE MYTH:

After the Japanese surprised the world with their attack on Pearl Harbor, America was a nation starving for
heroes. Even if he had been a reluctant participant, General Douglas MacArthur was tailor made for that role. Though his previous accomplishments were tremendous, there was still a need for a hero of even greater proportion. Thus, "MacArthur the myth" was manufactured and nurtured. The myth started with our national leadership who "used it unsparingly to prop up sagging morale." (32:118) The myth was perpetuated by the various arms of the media, anxious to publish stories of American valor. In their exuberance, the media was led on by a "public starved for good news" following the initial Allied reversals in World War II. (32:118) In fact, one writer went so far as to describe MacArthur's army as a force of Tarzans, literally swinging from vines "150 feet in the air". (23:237) Even 25 years after World War II the MacArthur myth persisted among highly respected biographers -- the most notable being Edgar R. Puryear, who in Nineteen Stars fails to mention a single shortcoming of MacArthur. (29:all) The myth was masterfully perpetuated by MacArthur's staff, mainly the "Bataan Gang", who departed the Philippines with General MacArthur and for the most part stayed with him throughout the war. Accordingly, "Some of them acted like men who had personally lifted him down from the cross after he had been crucified...and they determined that nothing again should ever hurt him." (18:282) But if his
staff was bad, MacArthur himself was worse, contributing often to his own exaggeration verbally, visually, and in writing. (22:321, 17:321) According to cameramen of that era, "he liked to be snapped with a framed quotation from Lincoln in the background, thus inviting interesting comparisons." (18:282) According to another observer, "that he was a born actor seems beyond dispute." (22:231) In this fashion, probably more than any other, MacArthur contributed to his own legend.

MACARTHUR THE MAN:

One biographer describes "MacArthur the man" as follows:

He was first in his class at West Point; his performance there was the most brilliant in many years, and in some details has never been surpassed. His overall scholastic record for four years was 98.14 per cent, and in several courses he was the only cadet ever to have entered the Academy who made perfect marks—a flat 100 per cent.

He was the youngest division commander in France in World War I, the youngest superintendent West Point ever had, the youngest active major general in the Army, the youngest Chief of Staff, and the youngest man ever to become a full general. He is the only soldier in American history whose father was also Chief of Staff, and the first full general ever to win the Congressional Medal of Honor—his father won it too. He is the first American ever to become a field marshal in another nation's army, and the first American commander to fly the flag of the United Nations. (9:31)

Beyond that he commanded the Rainbow Division in
World War I, a unit he conceived of himself (30:25). He revitalized the military academy at West Point with "new standards of excellence." (5:677). He was allegedly the only dissenting vote at General Billy Mitchell's court martial. (22:137) He also chaired the United States Olympic Team in 1928, "racking up 131 points to lead the field of competitors." (30:27) Certainly, there are few, if any, who could match such an impressive list of achievements. Given these accomplishments, it is a sad commentary that so many people, including MacArthur himself, felt it was necessary to embellish them.
CHAPTER II
26 JULY 1941 TO 7 DECEMBER 1941
DEFENSE PLANS FOR THE PHILIPPINES

"These islands must and will be defended. I am here by the Grace of God. This is my destiny." (10:133)
General Douglas MacArthur

MACARTHUR IS RECALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY:

Having already served a distinguished career in the U.S. Army, culminating with his appointment as Chief of Staff, MacArthur retired in 1934 and accepted a position with the Philippine Commonwealth as Field Marshal of the Philippine Army. (24:150-151) On 26 July 1941, President Roosevelt signed an order calling the Philippine Army into the service of the United States, and on that same day the War Department recalled MacArthur to active duty and appointed him Commander, United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) with the rank of Major General, U.S. Army. (13:590) (30:30) The next day he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. (9:38) It was not until December 1941 that he was promoted to General. (31:72) MacArthur's USAFFE headquarters were established in Manila, and his forces included both U.S. Army and Philippine Army units. (13:590)
WAR PLAN ORANGE VERSUS THE MACART!!UR DEFENSE PLAN:

Since 1921 U.S. military strategy for war in the Pacific had remained basically unchanged. It was generally expected that a major war in the Pacific would begin with acts of aggression by Japan. It was assumed that the Philippine Islands, the only bastion of American strength west of Hawaii would probably be a target in such a war. The defense of the islands would fall on U.S. Army and Philippine Army forces with the main objective being to deny the enemy access to Manila Bay. (24:150) Therefore, it was assumed that all else failing, U.S. and Philippine forces would withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula (and Corregidor Island which commands Manila Bay) and hold out until reinforcements could be sent. (24:150) This was the basic strategy incorporated in War Plan Orange (the color "orange" designated plans for war with Japan). The 1928 version of War Plan Orange began to cast severe doubt on its own validity, however, as it assumed the Japanese attack could be predicated on as many as 300,000 troops versus combined U.S. and Philippine forces of fewer than 20,000. (35:246) In spite of growing pessimism about War Plan Orange, it remained virtually intact as it was incorporated into the RAINBOW set of U.S. war plans. (35:346, 10:24-26) RAINBOW-5 which most closely approximated pre-World War II conditions was sent to...
MacArthur in October 1941. (10:25, 13:595) Since his recall to active duty MacArthur had envisioned a much more far-reaching defense plan which would preserve the Philippines intact, not limiting the defense to Bataan and Corregidor. (10:155) His plan would include a rapid expansion of Filipino forces to 200,000 men by early 1942 and envisioned the defense of the entire Philippines. (13:595)

MacArthur was furious when he received the RAINBOW-5 plan in October and began an immediate campaign to have the plan changed to his much more aggressive plan. (27:200) His overly optimistic assessments of USAFFE strength centered on his growing Air Force, one regular and ten reserve divisions of the Filipino Army, and the U.S. Army garrison stationed in the Philippines. (10:155)

In late November, only weeks before the outbreak of World War II, MacArthur received permission to proceed with his own defense plan as opposed to the Orange/RAINBOW Plan. (27:200) This was an error of enormous magnitude for which thousands of men would later starve.

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES FAR EAST:

"That MacArthur's plan was so utterly unrealistic seems obvious in hindsight. It was not so in 1941."

(32:74) At that time, MacArthur was the leading military
authority on the Philippines. (32:74) Describing the Filipino Army he was once quoted, "I know a fighting army when I see one." (26:155) This exuberance only served to mask the actual facts. According to D. Clayton James, noted historian and MacArthur biographer, "With decreased funds for 1940 and 1941, the Philippine defense program, which had always been 'operated on a shoestring' now existed on a severely skeletonized basis." (13:581) In July 1941 MacArthur had approximately 100,000 troops assigned including both U.S. and Filipino forces; however, this was really a misleading figure as at least 75,000 were untrained Filipinos assigned to newly raised reserve divisions. (13:594, 24:153) Moreover, they were ill-equipped, many lacking essentials such as shoes and guns. (32:73-74) In reality, MacArthur's forces included only about 25,000 trained troops -- only one-eighth of the 200,000 troops required by his defense plan. MacArthur subsequently divided his forces into three groups: the North Luzon Force, the South Luzon Force and the Visayan-Mindanao Force. (The North Luzon Force, which was closest to Manila and would bear the brunt of the fighting, was commanded by Jonathan Wainwright and contained only three divisions. (34:10)) Thus MacArthur's army was poorly trained, poorly equipped, lacking in number, and now divided. It is worth noting that this
paper army would be responsible for defending a coastline longer than that of the continental United States. Although there would be numerous attempts to "bolster" the army from both the U.S. and from within, little was accomplished. (27:201)

Although his army was in sad shape, MacArthur's air and naval forces were not. The air forces under Major General Louis Brereton included 107 modern P-40s and 35 B-17s in addition to various other aircraft. (31:72) With a total of 277 aircraft this was reputed to be the "strongest American Air Force outside the United States". (32:108) Naval forces, under Admiral Thomas C. Hart, while not assigned directly to MacArthur, nonetheless represented a potent force for defense of the Philippines. Although Hart's surface force was small, it was supported by 26 submarines. (24:158) Unfortunately, neither Brereton's nor Hart's forces contributed significantly to the defense of the Philippines.

WARNINGS OF WAR:

In late November 1941 U.S. Army and Navy concerns about war with Japan resulted in warnings sent to their Pacific field commanders. On 24 November the Navy alerted its forces that Japanese actions could include "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack
on the Philippines or Guam." (10:117) The Army's message on 27 November was even stronger: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning, and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." (10:117) On 29 and 30 November U.S. patrol planes spotted large Japanese ship movements in the South China Sea. On 2 December a Japanese patrol plane was seen over Clark Field in the Philippines. (22:201, 13:617) Subsequently, Brereton's patrol planes spotted several other Japanese aircraft including one formation of 27 bombers within 20 miles of the Philippines. (22:201) It is also worth noting that both Hart and MacArthur had access to an American-made Japanese decoding machine at the Navy facility on Corregidor which might have been used to their advantage. (12:222)

MacArthur, who had previously held steadfast in his belief that a Japanese attack could not occur until April 1942, (18:137) now began to wake up to reality. On 3 December he notified his field commanders that the "beaches must be held at all costs." (13:603) This was however, only a hollow cry by a man who had deluded himself and misled his superiors in Washington, for it was an impossible plan. (32:73, 37:165) Nonetheless, in late November, MacArthur had radioed Washington that his command was ready "for any eventuality". (13:609) In all
likelihood MacArthur was not aware of the condition of his troops in the field. According to one account, MacArthur's life in the Philippines was one of "seclusion in hotel suites and carefully managed offices" apart from the "conscription Filipino Army that was to stand up to the Japanese if war ever came." (7:38)
CHAPTER III

8 DECEMBER 1941 TO 31 DECEMBER 1941
THE JAPANESE ATTACK THE PHILIPPINES

"In some armies a general who allowed his air force to be destroyed on the ground after nine hours' warning time and who led his army into an area he had neglected to stock (after having failed to honor his promise of defeating the enemy) would have been shot. MacArthur, in fact, became a national hero...." (36:396)

H.P. Willmott

THE ALARM SOUNDS:

In the early morning, around 0330 hours on 8 December MacArthur received notification of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (22:207) (Note: 8 December in Manila corresponds with 7 December in Honolulu.) Subsequently radar picked up Japanese aircraft approximately 30 miles from the Philippine coast, but the "blips" then vanished. Confusion abounded, and many thought the attack on Pearl Harbor was a hoax. (32:209) Even MacArthur was dubious as he later stated that he was "under the impression the Japanese had suffered a setback at Pearl Harbor". (22:207) In any event MacArthur did not take immediate action. (27:202) Instead the entire morning hours were spent in indecision. (27:202) Following the war when asked why he did not take action sooner, MacArthur replied that his orders were explicit that he should not initiate
hostilities, rather he should wait for the Japanese to make the first overt move. (12:227)

THE AIR FORCE IS CAUGHT ON THE GROUND:

At approximately 0830 hours a general alarm sounded at Clark Field. All available aircraft took off, but following an "all clear" at 1000 they landed to refuel. Crews went to lunch and in general the field returned to its routine. This was the state of affairs when a strong Japanese force attacked Clark, Iba, and other airfields near Manila at 1245 hours on December 8th. (24:170) Disaster ensued. According to various accounts, approximately half of MacArthur's air forces were destroyed on the ground. (12:225, 24:170) Other accounts claim that virtually all were lost in the first several hours. (27:202, 22:212) In any event it is generally agreed that most of the aircraft were destroyed by the end of the day. (12:225) What remains unclear is how U.S. planes could be surprised on the ground at least nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Even General George C. Marshall, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff and strong MacArthur supporter, was in doubt. About two weeks after the attack he was quoted as saying, "It's all clear to me now except one thing. I just don't know how MacArthur happened to let his planes get caught on the
Concerning the B-17s at Clark Field, there was much finger pointing after the fact. As a precautionary measure several days prior to the outbreak of war, MacArthur had ordered his B-17s to be removed from Clark and sent south to Del Monte Field in Mindanao. Confusion and delay unaccountably followed, and only 18 aircraft were sent to Del Monte, the other 17 remaining at Clark. All of the bombers remaining at Clark were destroyed in the initial attack. The most plausible explanation as to why all B-17s were not removed from Clark is that there was not enough room at Del Monte to hold all of the Clark B-17s and other B-17s recently directed to Del Monte from other bases. Brereton states that MacArthur's chief of staff, General Richard Sutherland was aware of the situation since Sutherland had given "permission" to allow half the B-17s to go to Del Monte on 5 December. Sutherland for his part denies this, stating that he "ordered" all of the B-17s to Del Monte but then acknowledges that he was aware that only half were sent, ostensibly for lack of space at Del Monte.

Controversy continued to plague MacArthur's staff regarding B-17 employment. In this instance, Brereton claims that he wanted to send the B-17s remaining at Clark
on a bombing mission against Japanese bases in Formosa. According to Brereton he proposed this to Sutherland on the morning of the 8th. (31:74) Brereton further stated that he requested to see MacArthur, but that Sutherland denied him saying MacArthur was too busy. (22:207) This was most likely the case as Sutherland had an infamous reputation of interfering between MacArthur and his subordinates and of making decisions in MacArthur's name. (14:13, 15:83) In his memoirs MacArthur denies any knowledge of Brereton's plans for the B-17s. (21:120) MacArthur rarely even acknowledges the controversy or the disposition of his force. In several instances he cryptically states that "the losses were due entirely to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy force." (29:129, 21:117) In any case the responsibility for the disaster lies with all three, particularly Brereton and MacArthur as commanders. Further, to allow discussion to center solely on the bomber force does not adequately address the problem. After all, it was not just bombers that were caught on the ground; it should be remembered that the entire fighter force was caught on the ground as well. (18:141)
THE U.S. NAVY WITHDRAWS:

That the Army and Navy remained divided commands was evident at the very onset of World War II. Nowhere was this so evident as in the Philippines in December 1941. (34:14) In fact, MacArthur had numerous disagreements with Admiral Hart, Commander of the Asiatic Fleet. (14:20) Hart and the U.S. Navy in Washington felt that the Philippines were doomed from the start. Hart had taken defensive precautions prior to 8 December and (much like removing B-17s to Del Monte) had ordered most of his surface fleet south, out of harm's way. In a near-criminal omission however, he failed to notify MacArthur that his fleet had been removed and therefore was not providing covering patrol in Philippine waters. (34:14)

Subsequent conversations between the two men were unproductive, as they never agreed on basic strategy. (14:21) MacArthur was committed to the defense of all of the Philippines as laid out in his own plan. Hart was committed to the survival of his fleet in lieu of what he saw as a lost cause. Hart never vigorously supported MacArthur and subsequently departed the Philippines on Christmas Day. MacArthur never forgot this act, forever feeling that the Navy had run out on him. (31:77) This is not entirely true, as Hart did leave his formidable
submarine fleet behind. However, due to a variety of reasons, they were never used effectively. In fact, they barely missed intercepting the main Japanese landing fleet just off the Philippines. Even MacArthur realized what a tremendous opportunity had been lost as he commented, "What an enormous target this would have been for the submarines."

THE ARMY COLLAPSES:

On 22 December, General Homma and the Japanese 14th Army (two divisions) came ashore at Lingayen Gulf in Northern Luzon. Homma's force was 40,000 troops although MacArthur's intelligence office estimated it to be twice that size. (10:161-163) Nonetheless, Wainwright took immediate action to attempt to oppose the Japanese "on the beaches" as directed. But the Filipino defenders were gradually pushed back, and the Japanese successfully expanded their beachhead. (34:16) Two days later another Japanese force landed at Lamon Bay in Southern Luzon south of Manila. It became apparent that Japanese strategy entailed a giant pincer movement which would crush the USAFFE divisions between them. (21:124)

At this point MacArthur's plan unraveled as the poorly trained and equipped Filipino divisions began to disintegrate. According to several accounts they broke
and ran in their first encounter with the Japanese. (10:161) It is hardly fair to criticize their performance—some of their regiments had been activated a scant two weeks prior to engaging the Japanese. (31:73) Some apologists attribute this failure to being overwhelmed by a numerically superior, combat-worthy Japanese force. (14:28) This is not true. In the first place, MacArthur's forces on Luzon were nearly equal numerically to Homma's two divisions even without counting the newly raised Filipino reserve divisions. (10:163) In the second place, far from being "combat worthy", one of Homma's divisions had a poor combat reputation in China; the other had never seen combat. (31:73)

The simple fact which MacArthur never accepted was that the Philippine Army was not capable of stopping the Japanese on the beaches. Many American officers realized this, but could not convince MacArthur until it was too late. (14:27) "For forty long and critical hours after Homma's troops came ashore at Lingayen Gulf, MacArthur stubbornly clung to his beach defense scheme." (14:28) Belatedly, as the Philippine Army was collapsing, MacArthur decided to retreat to Bataan and revert to the original plan for defense of the Philippines under War Plan Orange. (14:28)
RETREAT TO BATAAN:

MacArthur, in spite of his commitment to defending all of the Philippines, may have realized his error early on. As early as 12 December MacArthur knew he might have to revert to War Plan Orange and confided as much to Philippine President Quezon. (19:66) But MacArthur waited until 23 December to put the Orange plan into effect. (14:26) He subsequently declared Manila an "open city" in order to spare it from damage. (22:217) In what has been described as "one of the greatest moves in all military history", MacArthur's forces began a fighting retreat to the Bataan Peninsula. (34:19) Because it caught them completely by surprise, the retreat to Bataan was regarded as a "great strategic move" by the Japanese. As it turned out, it was a near thing. General Wainwright's forces holding the Calumpit bridge were waiting for the last of the USAFFE units to cross the Pampanga River and withdraw to Bataan. His engineers blew the bridge just as the first Japanese elements arrived. It was 31 December 1941. (34:19)

While MacArthur has been justifiably accused of misleading his superiors in Washington, he was in turn misled by them. As late as 22 December 1941 he was receiving messages from General Marshall promising equipment and support. (3:17) The fact is that upon his
arrival with the War Plans Division on 14 December, Eisenhower had advised Marshall that the Philippines would not be able to hold out without massive assistance. Thus the conclusion was reached that nothing could be done to save the Philippines (3:15, 19:74) Meanwhile the "Pensacola" convoy, destined for the Philippines, was diverted to Brisbane for its own safety (19:65) Although MacArthur would subsequently send numerous requests for assistance it would appear that his fate was already determined. On 31 December 1941, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (in conjunction with the Combined Chiefs of Staff) formally accepted the American-British Plan which proclaimed the "Germany First" strategy. (11:13) As it turned out only token assistance was sent to MacArthur's USAFFE command.
CHAPTER IV
1 JANUARY 1942 TO 16 MARCH 1942
BATAAN AND CORREGIDOR

"MacArthur delayed a definite decision to withdraw into Bataan until the day after the main Japanese landings, and it was only then that the transfer of supplies began. This indecision and the loss of time it entailed was to exact heavy penalties. Throughout this period MacArthur behaved like an old-time fighter, recalled from retirement and suddenly thrust into the ring against a young and hard-hitting opponent whose lightning reflexes left him dazzled." (19:67)

Gavin Long

WITHDRAWAL COMPLETE:

On the first day of 1942, MacArthur found himself stranded on Bataan and Corregidor with remnants of the North Luzon and South Luzon Forces (14:36) which various estimates put at 75,000 to 100,000 men, not including refugees. (10:6, 18:143, 22:220) The Bataan Peninsula was ready-made for defense being only 15 miles wide and 30 miles long. Its hills and valleys were covered with dense vegetation. These facts were to known MacArthur since he had surveyed part of the peninsula in 1903 as a U.S. Army engineer. (34:21)

The withdrawal to Bataan was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, MacArthur should be credited for a courageous decision when he reverted to the Orange plan, thus saving his force from immediate destruction. On the
other hand, his delay in making that decision resulted in the loss of critical provisions required to sustain the Bataan defenders. This was one of his most "tragic errors", and one for which his men paid dearly. (14:36)

THE SITUATION ON BATAAN:

When MacArthur had committed his troops to "defending the beaches", many supplies earmarked for Bataan under the Orange plan were instead scattered to depots across Luzon near the beaches. (14:30) Moreover, in the rush to evacuate Manila and surrounding military posts, thousands of tons of equipment, munitions, and rations were abandoned to the Japanese. (14:31) The shortage of ammunition from January to April was made worse because much of what remained had been stored on Bataan and Corregidor since World War I and was grossly unreliable. (14:59) Further, local Filipino law hampered efforts at garnering provisions. In one instance, over 10 million tons of rice were left at the Cabanatuan rice plant north of Manila since Filipino law prohibited movement of rice and food from one province to another. (32:111) President Quezon himself contributed to the problem by insisting that Hq USAFFE abide by such laws. (14:33) Not a single grain of rice reached Bataan from Cabanatuan where enough rice was stored to have fed the Bataan defenders for
several years. (14:33, 22:215) As if the situation was not bad enough, there were now some 26,000 refugees on Bataan which further contributed to ration shortages. (14:35)

Drastic measures had to be taken. On 5 January, after less than a week on Bataan, the defenders were placed on half rations. (2:64, 32:111) Malnutrition, dysentery, and malaria soon began to take their toll. After two months General Wainwright reported that "75 percent of the command was incapacitated to some extent." (14:63)

While many thought that those on Corregidor (where MacArthur and his headquarters were located) were suffering the same disabilities from lack of food, this was not true. (12:249) There was an inequitable distribution of food from the start, as Corregidor was inexplicably given a higher priority. (14:30) MacArthur further exacerbated the problem on 24 January when he ordered removal of food stocks from Bataan to Corregidor. (14:64) The Bataan garrison soon learned the truth; the food ration for the troops on Corregidor and nearby harbor garrisons was 48-55 ounces per day, while the Bataan defenders were receiving only 14-17 ounces per day. One Bataan veteran observed first hand that "it was only a few days before the end of the war (on Bataan) that they ran
out of ice cream at Mariveles (the harbor at the southern
tip of Bataan)." (14:63-64) Inequities of this type
created deep resentment among the starving Bataan
defenders. (14:64) The U.S. Army official history
concluded that "lack of food probably more than any other
single factor forced the end of resistance on Bataan".
(14:37)

DUGOUT DOUG MACARTHUR:

In World War I one of MacArthur's trademarks was his
forays to the front, leading small units of men into
combat. (29:110, 30:25) And during World War II there are
numerous accounts of his personal bravery which bordered
on foolhardiness. (2:67, 25:125) Nonetheless, in his
early days on Corregidor he earned the nickname "Dugout
Doug", and whole songs were invented by soldiers on
Bataan. One begins as follows: "Dugout Doug MacArthur
lies a shaking on the Rock. Safe from all the bombers and
from any sudden shock." (19:82)

As it turned out, such derisive comments, while
unfair, pointed out a major shortcoming that would dog
MacArthur throughout World War II -- he failed to visit
the front-line soldiers and to observe firsthand the awful
combat conditions typical of the Pacific war. (19:82) When
it was suggested to him that his presence on Bataan would
"stimulate sagging morale", (22:235) he responded. On 10 January 1941 (some say 9 January), he made his first and only visit to the beleaguered Bataan defenders. (32:111, 14:54) It is a sad commentary that in the seventy-seven days spent on Corregidor he never again attempted to visit his men. (22:235)

Still worse, his own staff made it appear that he was commonly at the front. Major General Courtney Whitney, one of MacArthur's staff, wrote: "The sight of him suddenly in the jungle gave his troops the lift they needed, and MacArthur knew it. His flair for mixing the dramatic appearance with the dignity of command was never so effective as on Bataan." (34:25) This was simply not true. Another author commented on General Whitney's description: "The Lad [truth] was a MacArthur whose real self could not match this description, whose hopes had proved illusory, whose poor planning had brought them [his troops] there so badly supplied, and whose sense of his own flawed image made him uncomfortable in their presence." (17:319)

MACARTHUR'S COMMUNICATIONS:

While MacArthur always had a flair for creating controversy through his communications, messages, and press releases, his communiques during this period are
particularly disturbing. Of 142 messages emanating from Corregidor between December and March, 109 mentioned only MacArthur. The language used would refer to "MacArthur's troops" or "MacArthur's men" but seldom were specific units named. (14:89, 32:118) While some have blamed an overzealous public relations office for these communiques, Col "Pick" Diller, head of USAFFE public relations, attributes the wording of them directly to MacArthur. (14:90)

One of the most controversial incidents of this period concerns a message from MacArthur to his own troops. On 15 January 1942, in a poorly conceived attempt to bolster his beleaguered army, MacArthur sent a message to his commanders in the field to be read to the troops:

Help is on the way from the United States. Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched. The exact time of arrival of reinforcements is unknown as they will have to fight their way through....It is imperative our troops hold until these reinforcements arrive. No further retreat is possible. We have more troops on Bataan than the Japanese have thrown against us. Our supplies are ample. A determined defense will defeat the enemy's attack. (32:113)

It was later determined that MacArthur's message was based on optimistic hopes and not on any specific promise from Washington, even though the message implied otherwise. (18:147) The fact was that no such effort was being planned, and when the truth of the matter was
learned on Bataan the message became "the subject of much fear and ridicule." (32:113-114)

If MacArthur was affected by this, his communiques never reflected it; if anything, they got worse. On 29 January 1942 General Eisenhower (assigned to the War Plans Office in Washington) wrote in his diary, "MacArthur has started a flood of communications that seem to indicate a refusal on his part to look facts in the face, an old trait of his." (7:41) One particularly disgusting and self-ingratiating message was sent from MacArthur to President Roosevelt on the President's birthday:

Today, January 30, your birth anniversary, smoke-begrimed men covered with the muck of battle rise from the foxholes of Bataan and the batteries of Corregidor, to pray reverently that God may bless immeasurably the President of the United States. (22:230)

Although this message was quoted in seriousness by early biographers (23:234) it would surely have gotten a cynical reception on Bataan. One must certainly wonder how MacArthur knew what these "smoke-begrimed men" looked like, since he had seen only a few of them but once.

Still the fabricated communiques continued. Some mentioned battles which never occurred. Others spoke of MacArthur's forces being greatly outnumbered. One reported the sinking of the battleship Haruna, and one of the most famous reported General Homma's suicide. (22:232, 14:90) Even when these reports were later proven false
they continued to appear in MacArthur biographies, ever perpetuating the myth that was MacArthur. (26:159)

GENERAL MACARTHUR AND PRESIDENT QUEZON:

During this time two events occurred concerning MacArthur's dealings with President Quezon. The first centered on Quezon's controversial proposal to declare the Philippines neutral before the Japanese conquered the islands by force. Supposedly Quezon entertained neutrality to alleviate the suffering of his people. (27:208) Unfortunately, such action would diminish the Bataan and Corregidor forces considerably since the Filipino soldiers therein would be required to quit MacArthur's belligerent army. In a strange message to Washington, MacArthur appeared to endorse the plan, "if that was what was desired". The reply from Washington was clear that under no circumstances would such a proposal be approved. (18:150-151) When he was later asked why he seemingly endorsed Quezon's plan, MacArthur was emphatic that he had not done so. Instead he was merely passing on Quezon's idea as a means of bringing pressure on Washington. (18:150-151)

The second incident was less well known, and in fact, remained a secret until published in 1979 by Carol M. Petillo, then a doctoral student at Rutgers. (17:315) As
it came to light, on 3 January 1942 on Corregidor, President Quezon presented MacArthur with an executive order "expressing the gratitude of the Filipino people to MacArthur and his staff for 'their magnificent defense' of the islands...." (32:115-116) The citation was to include financial reward as well, and after message traffic between MacArthur and the War Department, on 19 February, Quezon bestowed a gift of $500,000 to MacArthur. Additional gifts of $75,000 went to General Sutherland, $45,000 to Sutherland's assistant, and $20,000 to MacArthur's aide. (27:208) Although U.S. Army regulations expressly forbade acceptance such of gifts, this was apparently overlooked by all concerned. (27:209) Additionally, such gifts cast a poor light on MacArthur's erratic behavior when dealing with Quezon. As Petillo asserts, "Perhaps MacArthur's 'personal ties and devotion' were reinforced by the half million dollars given him by Quezon." (32:116)

MACARTHUR DEPARTS THE PHILIPPINES:

It was becoming increasingly apparent that the defense of Bataan would fail and that MacArthur would have to either be evacuated or be captured. Regardless of MacArthur's plans, Washington had no intention of allowing him to fall into Japanese hands. On 22 February President
Roosevelt ended all discussion by sending MacArthur a direct order to leave Corregidor. Ever conscious of the public image, MacArthur radioed back that he was prepared to comply but requested that he "be allowed to choose the right psychological time for departure." (14:97-98) Prior to his departure he turned over command of Bataan to Wainwright. MacArthur assumed that he would continue as USAFFE commander from Australia. (4:66, 31:83) As it turned out, this would not be the case, and it would later force Wainwright into surrendering more forces than just those on Corregidor. (31:83)

With a lull in fighting and having reorganized his forces into what he felt was a more workable command, on the evening of 11 March 1942 MacArthur departed Corregidor in one of four PT boats. Accompanying him were his wife and son, his son's Chinese nursemaid, and members of MacArthur's immediate staff; 21 people in addition to MacArthur. (14:100) The group reached Northern Mindanao on the morning of 14 March and proceeded to the Del Monte airfield. (19:81) A flight of four B-17s was supposed to fly them to Australia but only one of the planes was airworthy. Four newer B-17s flew into Del Monte and on 16 March MacArthur and his party departed for Darwin. (18:159)
CHAPTER V

17 MARCH 1942 TO 5 NOVEMBER 1942
AUSTRALIA

"I came through and I shall return."
(34:53)

General Douglas MacArthur

"A foul trick of deception has been played on a large group of Americans by a Commander in Chief and a small staff, who are now eating steak and eggs in Australia. God damn them!"
(32:119)

General William E. Brougher, U.S.A.
Commander 7th Div., Bataan

MACARTHUR ARRIVES IN AUSTRALIA:

If General MacArthur was nothing, he was inspired, and from the very moment of his arrival in Australia he passed this on to the Australian people. From the first day his famous "I shall return" statement became a rallying cry, and he was hailed as a hero. (34:52,53) He outlined his mission to the press and told them that the President had directed him to proceed to Australia and to organize an offensive against Japan, "a primary object of which is the relief of the Philippines". (34:52) From that moment, relief of the Philippines became increasingly entwined with Allied strategy in the Pacific. With General MacArthur, it became an obsession. (27:216)

Approximately one month after his arrival in

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Australia, MacArthur, now a four-star general, was appointed Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). As the SWPA Commander, MacArthur's mission was primarily defensive: to hold key areas of Australia; and to slow the Japanese advance by destroying Japanese shipping, aircraft, and bases in the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, and the Solomons. Further, he was to attempt to hold in the Philippines and protect other allied interests in the South Pacific and Indian Oceans. (34:67) Unfortunately, MacArthur had slim means at hand to carry out these tasks and was forced to delay several months before setting plans in motion. (27:216)

While many have credited MacArthur with the idea of defending Australia from forward basing in New Guinea, this is apparently not true. The Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, states that it was some time before MacArthur could be convinced to commit to a defensive line down the Owen Stanley Mountains of New Guinea. Nonetheless, it is to MacArthur's credit that once convinced, he was the leading advocate for such a policy. Unfortunately, the Japanese made it to the north shores of New Guinea in July 1942, leaving Allied forces with positions in Port Moresby and Milne Bay on the south shore and eastern tip, respectively. (17:321)
PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESS:

It was during the restless months in Australia, that problems with the press began in earnest. As is generally agreed, MacArthur was much to blame for his troubles, although his staff certainly contributed. Sutherland had always been noted as a disagreeable, assuming individual. (28:165) In addition, the staff which had accompanied MacArthur from the Philippines, now known as the "Bataan Gang", was troublesome as well as resentful and suspecting of outsiders. (14:195) In one instance, immediately after MacArthur's arrival in Australia, members of the press were cautioned to use the expression "He or Him" in referring to MacArthur, implying a sense of divinity. (22:307) Col "Pick" Diller, still chief of public relations, censored any criticism of MacArthur from all press releases. Diller also would play favorites with correspondents; those who portrayed the SWPA chief favorably were given "exclusive interviews and tips on what to watch for in future operations." (22:311) If this was not enough, other correspondents were alienated by MacArthur's statements to the press which were often found to be untruthful. (9:65)

Press releases from MacArthur's headquarters were disturbing to the Navy and to Washington as well. A press release on 27 April 1942 revealed details about Japanese
operations at their naval base in Rabaul. It contained enough detailed information, in fact, that the Japanese could have deduced that their codes had been broken. Further, continued careless releases might warn the Japanese of impending Allied military operations. (14:165) General Marshall subsequently admonished MacArthur: "This together with previous incidents indicates that censorship of news emanating from Australia, including that from your headquarters, is in need of complete revision." (14:165) Nevertheless, MacArthur's headquarters continued to dispatch numerous leaks, untruths and misstatements. (14:215, 227, 277)

THE FALL OF BATAAN AND CORREGIDOR:

Upon MacArthur's departure from the Philippines, General Marshall named Wainwright Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. forces in the Philippines. (34:55) This put Wainwright immediately in charge of day-to-day operations in the Philippines. Unlike MacArthur, Wainwright was painfully aware of the food situation on Bataan from two months of first-hand experience. One of his first acts was to eliminate the inequities in food distribution by transferring food from Corregidor to Bataan. (14:143) Simultaneously, he notified the War Department that without resupply, food rations would be exhausted by 15
April. Upon learning this, MacArthur responded with extreme pettiness, cabling Marshall that there had been adequate rations when he had departed, but that "it is of course possible that with my departure the vigor of application of conservation may have been relaxed." (22:289) This was not only an unwarranted and self-seeking response, but it was grossly unfair to Wainwright and the men MacArthur left behind. (22:289)

Conditions on Bataan grew steadily worse. Disease and starvation had so debilitated the Bataan defenders that when the Japanese launched a new offensive on 3 April, the defense collapsed. The situation was desperate when MacArthur devised another of his wholly unrealistic plans. On 4 April he instructed Wainwright not to surrender under any circumstances. Further, "If food fails, you will prepare and execute an attack upon the enemy." (14:145) MacArthur's memoirs contain a detailed account of his plan which included an "ostentatious artillery preparation, a feint, a sudden surprise attack, a frontal attack, and a reverse envelopment of the Japanese positions". (21:146) It is obvious that MacArthur clearly misunderstood the entire situation on Bataan; the troops on Bataan simply could not comply with MacArthur's orders. Yet, Wainwright now had orders from both the President and MacArthur not to surrender. (19:97)
Regardless, on 9 April General King, commander on Bataan, surrendered his forces without consulting Wainwright, thereby sparing him a share of the guilt. In this move 78,000 men were surrendered. (19:97) Meantime, Roosevelt notified MacArthur that he was retracting his "no surrender" policy, but MacArthur delayed forwarding the message to Wainwright until after the 9 April surrender. (14:146-147)

This was of course the beginning of the end for Corregidor. On the night of 5 May a Japanese force landed on the island, and by noon on the 6th, Wainwright was negotiating a surrender. (31:84) At this point, the Japanese General Homma demanded that Wainwright must surrender all forces in the Philippines and not just those on Corregidor. Although Wainwright insisted he had no authority for such a move, Homma threatened to execute the entire Corregidor force if Wainwright did not comply with his instructions. (31:84) After intense negotiations with other commanders in the islands, Wainwright effected a surrender of all forces in the Philippines. With a pettiness that was now becoming all too characteristic, MacArthur informed the War Department that he did not believe the surrender messages recently broadcast by Wainwright. He further stated, "I believe that Wainwright has temporarily become unbalanced and that his condition
renders him susceptible of enemy use." (14:148-149)

In an interesting footnote to this episode, General Eisenhower upon hearing of the surrender, wrote in his diary:

"Corregidor surrendered last night. Poor Wainwright! He did the fighting in the Philippine Islands and another got such glory as the public could find in the operation. General MacArthur's tirades, to which T.J. [the aide] and I so often listened in Manila, would now sound as silly to the public as they then did to us. But he's a hero! Yah. (7:54)"

A MEDAL FOR MACARTHUR BUT NOT FOR WAINWRIGHT:

Immediately following MacArthur's departure from Corregidor, The Japanese Times and Advertiser in Tokyo proclaimed that MacArthur "fled from his post". Mussolini accused him of cowardice and Goebbels named him the "fleeing general". (22:275) This in part prompted General Marshall to devise a brilliant propaganda counterstroke. He proposed to award the Medal of Honor to MacArthur for his actions in defending the Philippines. (14:132) The award was subsequently approved and the accompanying citation read:

"For conspicuous leadership in preparing the Philippine Islands to resist conquest, for gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action against invading Japanese forces, and for the heroic conduct of defensive and offensive operations on the Bataan Peninsula. He mobilized, trained, and led an army which has received world acclaim for its gallant defense against tremendous superiority"
of enemy forces in men and arms. His utter disregard of personal danger, and under heavy fire and aerial bombardment, his calm judgment in each crisis inspired his troops, galvanized the spirit of resistance of the Filipino people, and confirmed the faith of the American people in their armed forces. (14:132)

In a similar move, following the fall of Corregidor, it was proposed to award the Medal of Honor to Wainwright. But MacArthur, when broached on the matter, was hostile. One author suggests that he was antagonized because the citation was drawn up without consulting him; MacArthur "did not think Wainwright deserved the award and argued that if it were given to him, an injustice would be done to other USAFFE soldiers who were more deserving". (14:150-151) Evidently, MacArthur felt that he was "more deserving" since he had accepted his own medal. To their credit though, Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson -- who both supported the Medal for Wainwright -- saw to it that the Medal of Honor was awarded to Wainwright immediately following the war. (14:151) It is also to Wainwright's credit, that in spite of the shabby treatment from MacArthur, Wainwright continued to hold him in high esteem. Later, when discussing MacArthur, Wainwright was quoted as saying "I'd follow that man anywhere, blindfolded." (20:11)
CHAPTER VI

21 JULY 1942 TO 22 JANUARY 1943
PORT MORESBY AND THE BATTLE OF BUNA

"Bob, I want you to go take Buna, or not come back alive. And that goes for your Chief of Staff, too. Do you understand?" (1:109)

General Douglas MacArthur

PLANS FOR NEW GUINEA:

With his meager forces growing, General MacArthur began planning his attack on the Japanese, one result of which would end up being his triumphant return to the Philippines. His initial plan was to lay hold of all of southeastern New Guinea, including not only the Australian base at Port Moresby on the southern coast, but to establish advance bases on the northern coast as well. Accordingly, a force of two Australian brigades moved into Milne Bay on the eastern tip of New Guinea, and a token force of Australians was sent toward Buna on the northern coast. (19:103)

FIGHTING ON THE KOKODA TRAIL AND AT MILNE BAY:

The plan to invest all of southeast New Guinea was untracked by the Japanese, however, when they landed in force in the Buna-Gona area on the night of 21 July 1942. (19:103) This Japanese force was directly across the
island from Port Moresby, separated by the Owen Stanley Mountains which ran down the center of New Guinea like a huge backbone. The Kokoda trail, which traversed the mountains connecting Port Moresby to Buna, quickly became the focus of both the Japanese and Allied forces.

At that point, MacArthur turned to a three-phased attack plan. The first phase was to engage the Japanese along the Kokoda trail. The second phase would be a flanking movement toward Milne Bay, to disrupt any Japanese forces in that area. And finally, the third phase would be to attack the Japanese left from Milne Bay with all three Allied forces to converge on the Buna-Gona-Sanananda area on the north coast. (21:162) Unfortunately, the Japanese plan entailed a similar design. The Japanese forces in Buna began a strong push south along the Kokoda trail, while an additional force of about 2,000 Japanese marines attempted to invest Milne Bay on 25 August 1942. (19:103) The Japanese achieved tremendous success along the Kokoda trail against the Australians, causing "amazement and consternation at MacArthur's headquarters". (32:190) As it turned out, the Japanese had landed about 14,000 men in the Buna-Gona area, but Allied intelligence had grossly underestimated their strength. (19:103, 32:190) This led MacArthur to the conclusion that the Australians "simply would not
fight." (32:190) The attitude that the Australians were poor fighters pervaded thinking at MacArthur's headquarters, and as events proved that attitude was totally unjustified. (32:190) Within 10 days of their landings at Milne Bay, the Japanese marines were soundly defeated by the Australians. In fact, of the initial force of 2,000 Japanese, only about 600 escaped with their lives. (19:103) This was not enough, however, to convince MacArthur of the fighting spirit of the Australians as the Japanese advance along the Kokoda trail continued in spite of Allied efforts. Between 21 July and 17 September 1942, the Japanese General Horii and his forces progressed steadily, finally halting about 20 miles short of Port Moresby. (14:204-206) Having received orders to go on the defensive, Horii surveyed his now exhausted force and decided to withdraw on 24 September. Thus began a fighting retreat for the Japanese with Allied forces in pursuit -- a pursuit which would continue through November 1942, when the Japanese reached their strongholds in Buna, Gona, and Sanananda, where they proposed to make a final stand. (14:206-225)

It was during this drawn out, running battle that MacArthur again became agitated with the Australians. In his initial timetable, he had allowed three weeks for the completion of all three phases of his plan. (14:208)
MacArthur had already sent Sutherland and Kenney (his new air corps chief) to New Guinea to observe the situation. They returned with a negative view of the Australian efforts, further reinforcing MacArthur's views about their lack of fighting spirit. (14:209) It is indeed unfortunate that MacArthur had not taken time to fly to New Guinea to observe conditions first hand. In fact, MacArthur remained in Australia during most of this period, paying only one brief visit to New Guinea in October and then returning to Australia. It wasn't until 6 November, 1942 that he finally moved his headquarters to Port Moresby. (19:105)

The conditions on New Guinea were some of the worst encountered anywhere in the Pacific. The climate was hot and humid with torrential rains. The terrain was extremely mountainous. A number of diseases were prevalent among soldiers on both sides including "typhus, malaria, dysentery, dengue fever, and jungle rot, among others." (14:239) Conditions were further aggravated by the lack of proper equipment, including basics such as machetes and insect repellent. Both MacArthur and his staff were unaware of the situation. (17:375) According to one source, "no senior officer had come forward along the Kokoda trail farther than where the motor road ended...about ten miles short of the point of the farthest
Japanese advance. " (17:325) It is to MacArthur's credit that once he did learn of the situation, an aggressive program of resupply through air drops was initiated, and conditions did improve. (14:231, 15:56)

GENERAL EICHBERGER COMES TO NEW GUINEA:

With the Japanese "holed up" in the villages of Buna, Gona, and Sanananda, MacArthur now transmitted his new plan of attack on 14 November 1942. Ostensibly, the Australians were assigned against Gona to the west and Sanananda in the center, while the Americans were to attack Buna to the east. (14:237)

The Japanese positions were much stronger than initial estimates predicted. Both Australian and American intelligence units estimated no more than 1500 - 2000 Japanese were in the Buna-Gona area. In truth, the well-equipped Japanese force totaled as many as 8,000. (14:240) Additionally, the defenders had constructed fortified bunkers and blockhouses, with connecting trenches and interlocking fields of fire. (17:326) The American division, the 32nd, was short of equipment of all sorts and was on one-third rations. (14:241) Anxious for a victory MacArthur nonetheless directed that "all columns will be driven through to objectives, regardless of losses." (17:326) Still, the fighting continued.
Exasperated with the lack of progress and upon Sutherland's recommendation, MacArthur relieved the 32nd division commander. Subsequently on 30 November, he summoned Lieutenant General Bob Eichelberger, who had been the I Corps commander in Australia, to Port Moresby, along with his chief of staff, Brigadier General Clovis Byers. Upon their arrival they had a meeting with General MacArthur, which included Generals Kenney and Sutherland. Eichelberger was directed to proceed to the Buna area and take command of the American force. At that point, General MacArthur stated the mission in no uncertain terms: "Bob, I want you to go out there and take Buna or not come back alive. And that goes for your chief of staff too. Do you understand?" (1:109, 19:115, 32:216)

Eichelberger took charge immediately. He launched an attack on 5 December 1942 but was repulsed with heavy casualties. In contrast, the Australians were off to a good start. With fresh troops and additional artillery ammunition they overran Gona on 9 December. This was the first substantial Allied victory of the Pacific since the previous Australian victory at Milne Bay. (32:216) MacArthur continued to prod Eichelberger as the fight was renewed for Buna, but it took three more weeks of difficult fighting before the Japanese finally succumbed on 2 January 1943. (19:115, 14:270)
General MacArthur chose the occasion to issue another of his now famous and inaccurate communiques by announcing that "there was nothing left in Papua (New Guinea) but some mopping up in Sanananda." (22:326) This was, of course, sheer nonsense, as the Japanese were still firmly entrenched at Sanananda. According to General Eichelberger, MacArthur's announcement that the campaign was over was just an excuse to get back home, as at that time there was no indication of any crackup of the Japs at Sanananda...." (22:326) As events proved, Eichelberger's cynicism was more than justified; Sanananda cost 3,500 Allied casualties, more than either Buna or Gona. (32:217)

In a final note, after the war was over, Eisenhower told a group of New Guinea veterans that he had never heard of Sanananda. As William Manchester remarked, this was no real wonder given the lack of emphasis in MacArthur's communiques. (22:327)

THE CONTROVERSIAL AFTERMATH OF BUNA:

Because it was the first land victory of Allied forces over the Japanese Imperial Army, the Buna-Gona-Sanananda campaign was of landmark importance to the Allied cause. It was also an opportunity for MacArthur the consummate publicist. He "stunned his victorious troops by announcing that the utmost care was
taken for the conservation of our forces, with the result
that no campaign in history...produced such complete and
decisive results with so low an expenditure of lives and
resources." (22:327) This is an absurdity and an outright
lie. The battle of Buna (commonly referring to the
Buna-Gona-Sanananda area) was one of the bloodiest battles
of World War II. (1:108) The fighting at Buna, Gona, and
Sanananda cost the Allies 3,300 killed and 5,500 wounded
as compared to the six-month Guadalcanal campaign in which
American ground forces suffered 1,100 killed and 4,350
wounded. (22:328) According to D. Clayton James, "the
deepest resentment felt by the veterans of the Papuan
Campaign was probably reserved for MacArthur's audacity in
depicting the casualty rate as relatively light." (14:279)
These men were, James continued, the same veterans urged
to "take all objectives regardless of cost." (14:279)
Surely, the same irony was not lost with Eichelberger. It
should also be noted that during MacArthur's stay in New
Guinea between 6 November 1942 and 9 January 1943 he never
once went to the front. (32:217) In fact, he never left
Port Moresby. (17:327)
That he never left Port Moresby certainly didn't
phase General MacArthur when it came to publicity. In one
case, a photograph of General MacArthur in a jeep with
Eichelberger was given to the press with the caption
"Generals MacArthur and Eichelberger at the front in New Guinea." Unfortunately the picture also showed a Packard automobile in one corner, and as it turned out the photograph was made at a training camp in Australia. (22:306) MacArthur also permitted his staff to release communiques that implied he was actually leading the troops in jungle campaigns. This was totally untrue, but survives in print nonetheless. (22:306, 25:131) MacArthur himself persisted in perpetuating the myth that he led troops in the field. On one occasion, during an interview, he commented to Eichelberger: "Bob, those were great days when you and I were fighting at Buna, weren't they?" Accordingly, Eichelberger took this as a warning that he should not reveal otherwise. (22:327, 17:327)

On another occasion, there appeared very flattering articles about Eichelberger and the fighting in New Guinea in several leading American magazines. In this instance, MacArthur called in Eichelberger and threatened him with, "Do you realize that I could reduce you to the grade of Colonel tomorrow and send you home?" Again, for Eichelberger the meaning and intent were clear. There was room for only one hero, and Eichelberger was not it. (14:272)

This fact was driven home to Eichelberger in another way as well. After the fighting in Buna was over, Byers,
Eichelberger's chief of staff, had submitted all the necessary papers recommending Eichelberger for the Medal of Honor. However, this paperwork was "lost" at headquarters. Subsequently, duplicates were made and sent directly to the War Department in Washington. The War Department was agreeable to the award, but it was later disclosed that when they consulted MacArthur he replied that award of the medal was not warranted. (14:272)

In brief, MacArthur's strategy in New Guinea through the Buna campaign was unimaginative. He was still pressing for an assault on the Japanese stronghold at Rabaul (22:337-338) and his tactics at Buna, Gona, and Sanananda were nothing more than frontal assaults on well prepared Japanese positions. Had MacArthur persisted with these types of frontal attacks, his later rapid advances would have bogged down (similar to the Buna campaign) with resulting high casualties. (35:279) It is fortunate for MacArthur and his soldiers, that Buna was the last of the frontal assaults, for soon after that campaign he became one of the leading proponents of bypassing strongholds and thus "leapfrogging" to the next objective. (22:338)
CHAPTER VII
A COMMENTARY ON LEADERSHIP

THE ATTRIBUTES OF A LEADER:

During his tenure as West Point superintendent General MacArthur's deputy was William A. Ganoe. Ganoe was one of MacArthur's greatest admirers during that period and later as well. Impressed by MacArthur's treatment of subordinates, Ganoe was "inspired to tabulate the cardinal features of his leadership" as follows:

The MacArthur Tenets

Do I heckle my subordinates or strengthen and encourage them?

Do I use moral courage in getting rid of subordinates who have proven themselves beyond doubt to be unfit?

Have I done all in my power by encouragement, incentive, and spur to salvage the weak and erring?

Do I know by NAME and CHARACTER a maximum number of subordinates for whom I am responsible? Do I know them intimately?

Am I thoroughly familiar with the technique, necessities, objectives, and administration of my job?

Do I lose my temper at individuals?

Do I act in such a way as to make my subordinates WANT to follow me?

Do I delegate tasks which should be mine?

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Do I arrogate everything to myself and delegate nothing?

Do I develop my subordinates by placing on each one as much responsibility as he can stand?

Am I interested in the personal welfare of each of my subordinates, as if he were a member of my family?

Have I the calmness of voice and manner to inspire confidence, or am I inclined to irascibility and excitability?

Am I a constant example to my subordinates in character, dress, deportment, and courtesy?

Am I inclined to be nice to my superiors and mean to my subordinates?

Is my door open to my subordinates?

Do I think more of POSITION than JOB?

Do I correct a subordinate in the presence of others? (8:170-171)

These tenets were not General MacArthur's work and there is no direct evidence that he was aware they existed, even though they were widely published and attributed to him. (8:170) Further, to compare MacArthur's leadership style in the opening months of World War II with this list of tenets would be unfair to an officer who achieved greatness before, during, and after World War II.

LESSONS LEARNED:

Nonetheless an analytical examination of General
MacArthur's shortcomings during this period would highlight three major failures in his leadership style: he misused his staff, he continually put himself ahead of the mission, and he never got out from behind his desk to see what his subordinates were having to put up with. A brief discussion of each of these failures is worthwhile.

In the first case, MacArthur not only intimidated his subordinates, but he surrounded himself to a large degree with sycophants on his immediate staff. Sutherland, ever protective of his boss and his own position, epitomized this. In fact this was a primary contributing cause to the loss of the USAFFE air forces on 8 December 1941. To critique the USAFFE staff harshly would be unfair, after all many of them were awed by the mere presence of General MacArthur. Nevertheless, it is MacArthur's responsibility to overcome such fine distinctions between awe or intimidation. Simply put, if the staff (or other subordinates) were not providing adequate support, they should have been replaced. As it turned out the "Bataan Gang" served both MacArthur and USAFFE soldiers poorly. That the USAFFE command was led to Bataan without provisions is a major failing of the staff function; but the failure of the staff function is a responsibility that must rest squarely with the commander.

General MacArthur's second major failure, putting
himself ahead of the mission, was evidenced on numerous occasions throughout the period. Witness his prideful determination to stick with the "MacArthur defense plan," acceptance of the $500,000 "gift," the numerous self-serving messages, and his even haughty deceit of the news media. In the aftermath of battles, General MacArthur became engrossed in either laying blame for the disaster or accepting glory for the allied victory. In many cases, whether disaster or victory, men were still dying while the General was working on such nonsense as the "right psychological moment for his departure" as in Bataan or even Buna.

Last of all, and probably the most serious of General MacArthur's failings, he never got out from behind the desk to find out what was going on. On more than one occasion this failing was a life-or-death error for the troops at the front. Had MacArthur bothered to visit the Philippine Army in the field prior to the war he would have known they could not oppose the Japanese on the beaches. Had he regularly visited his troops on Bataan he would have realized that his troops were literally starving to death. Had he gone to the front in New Guinea, he would have seen the horrible combat conditions under which he directed his units forward "regardless of cost."
In short, General Douglas MacArthur is universally recognized as a brilliant officer and a talented leader; unfortunately neither of these characterized his initial contributions in World War II. Instead, General MacArthur fell into traps he created for himself. Unfortunately, other men paid the price for his failings during this period.
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<th>Author(s)</th>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Kenney, George C.</td>
<td>The MacArthur I Know</td>
<td>New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1951</td>
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<td>16.</td>
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<td>Reports of the Pacific War</td>
<td>New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949</td>
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