REAR BATTLE DOCTRINE
A TIME FOR CHANGE

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REAR BATTLE DOCTRINE
A TIME FOR CHANGE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Rear Battle Doctrine: A Time for Change

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A review of current Rear Battle Doctrine which discusses the Soviet - Warsaw Pact threat to the rear areas of the U.S. Forces in Europe. Discussion of the TAACOM Rear Area Operations Center and the need to reorganize into a Joint organization to effectively conduct rear battle operations. Some new initiatives are being studied to revise current rear battle operations and doctrine which will enhance protection and defense of critical facilities normally located in rear areas. The lack of joint rear area operations and the absence of a dedicated combat response force indicate a void in operational planning for all services with assets in the rear area. (STO1)
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Wilmer D. Snell has served in the Military Police Corps since 1979 and has been interested in the Rear Battle doctrine since he commanded the 13th Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigations), the first Criminal Investigations unit in Europe organized with a tactical mission. The area of responsibility of the unit involved the rear area of forward deployed forces in Europe and encompassed a majority of combat support and combat service support facilities, POMCUS sites, and port facilities security. In previous assignments, Colonel Snell has served as Commander, Fort Stewart District, United States Army Criminal Investigations Command and as Deputy Provost Marshal, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart, Georgia. He is a graduate of the United States Army Command and General Staff College and a graduate of the Air War College Class of 1989.
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Introduction

It has been historically noted that in any war or conflict scenario that combat operations in the rear areas on some scale is inevitable. U.S. Army Field Manual 90-14, dated 10 June 1985, provides three, more notable examples that occurred during World War II:

(1) "In Burma during World War II, a regiment of Merrill's Marauders with three indigenous brigades, tied down seven Japanese divisions in a rear battle mission."

(2) "In that same war, the Soviet Army employed partisan forces against the German Army's rear area. In 1944 some 370,000 men and women of Byelorussia kept 13 German divisions involved in the rear area."

(3) "The Germans also conducted rear attacks against US. forces and one of their strongest offensives was designed to disrupt the Allied Forces rear area during the famous Battle of the Bulge.

A recent article in Military Review entitled "Soviet Military Doctrine and Conventional Arms Control", describes a particular concept involving a large combined arms force designed for deep raiding and exploitation in the enemy's rear area which appears to represent a further expansion of
Soviet operational art. (4:3;4) The article goes on to say that although Soviet theory and practice since the 1930s has emphasized the use of mobile groups to conduct deep operations, that in the early 1980s this theory was expanded when the Soviets demonstrated incorporation of rotary wing aircraft and air assault forces to support division sized raiding forces. (4:3;4)

Clearly, the Soviets and Warsaw Pact forces currently have the capability and intent to conduct rear area operations should conventional war become a reality in Europe. As in the past, the U.S. and NATO doctrine must seriously consider the immense capacity of the opposing forces to operate in rear areas and then revise doctrine and restructure forces to enable a viable counter-strategy to be successful. In my opinion current rear battle doctrine of the U.S. Forces is not appropriate to counter deep, well coordinated attacks upon vulnerable, lightly defended facilities located in the rear area. Loss of the battle in the rear area, or even major or continued disruption of the combat support and combat service support functions due to shifting of priorities to defense will degrade the frontline commander's ability to fight.

This study will discuss the current rear battle concept, doctrine, threat and new initiatives that must seriously be considered in preparing for the defense of the
vital facilities and operations in the rear area. One of the more pressing issues is Joint Rear Area Operations and the U.S. Forces need for mutual support in fighting the rear battle. The doctrinal void in this area of the overall AirLand Battle is potentially a weakness, which if not attended to could unnecessarily cost assets vital to the success of the main battle.
CHAPTER II

ENEMY THREAT

The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Forces have amassed an immense capability to initiate and to successfully conduct combat operations in the rear areas of NATO Forces in Europe. The Communist Forces have organized and have intensively trained special units for specific rear area operations. (2:1079) Their continued expansion and development of these special units make clear their intent to conduct covert, unconventional and conventional combat in rear areas against vulnerable and lightly defended targets of tactical, strategic, and political significance, cause disruptions to communications and logistical centers, and to neutralize nuclear weapons sites and delivery means.

The following paragraphs will briefly discuss the Soviet threat as assessed in current doctrinal military service publications and published and unpublished articles.

The United States Army Military Police Center, Fort McClellan, Alabama, has produced a Fact Sheet that addresses in unclassified detail, the threat to the rear area. (9) This Fact Sheet parallels and supports threat force assessments found in other authoritative service publications later referenced in this paper, and is from
Levels of Enemy Threat

In brief, the threat forces are categorized into three threat levels, generally depending upon size, capabilities, and location. The three categories are:

**Level I—**
- Agents
- Terrorists
- Sympathizers

**Level II—**
- Special Purpose Forces (Spetznatz)
- Long Range Reconnaissance Groups
- Troop Reconnaissance Groups

**Level III—**
- Airborne Forces
- Air Assault Forces
- Airmobile Assault Forces
- Amphibious Forces
- Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG)
The Warsaw Pact and particularly the Soviet Union have continued to upgrade their capabilities to conduct deep operations and consider these operations essential to their overall combat success. Of major significance has been the upgrading of Airborne, Air Assault, Air Mobile and Special Purpose Forces. These forces pose the greatest threat to rear areas, particularly in the initial stages of military buildup and early stages of armed conflict. These forces can be deployed rapidly, with equipment, over long distances through the use of modern aircraft such as the Il-76 "Candid" and the An-124 "Condor". These aircraft have increased the payload by twice that of the older An-12 "Cub" and have quadrupled the Airborne Forces' range of possible employment. (2:1079;1080)

The Soviets began to test a concept during the 1960s which would provide secondary mobility to its airborne forces once landed. Soviet military authors have written "Troops constituting the airborne force need the same qualities as those inherent in the troops attacking from the front: a high degree of maneuverability and the possession of all types of weapons and materials necessary for the conduct of long range military operations." (2:1079)

After several iterations of lesser capable ground mobility support vehicles for airborne units, the Soviets developed the Bovaia Mashina Desantaia (BMD) or Airborne
Assault Vehicle. (2:1079) The BMD allows airborne forces to land some distance from their objectives, gain a measure of security and surprise through maneuver and attack multiple targets during raiding operations. (2:1080;1236) The implications of this added dimension to the rear area threat forces is clear: They will be able to strike deeply, swiftly, and with overwhelming force to achieve objectives.

The Soviet and Warsaw Pact Air Assault Forces present as formidable threat as the pure airborne units. The Air Assault/Air-mobile Forces are supported with medium and heavy lift helicopters such as the Mi-8 "Hip", Mi-6 "Hook", and the latest edition heavy lift helicopter, the Mi-26 "Halo". These helicopters can accommodate respectively 28, 65, or 85 fully equipped troops and can be employed in groups as large as 40 at Army level. (2:1263) These helicopter lifts are doctrinally supported by Mi-24 "Hind" helicopter gunships which with its onboard firepower allows operations beyond normal artillery range support, allowing deeper penetration into enemy territory. (2:1079)

These kinds of forces, rapidly deployed near key rear area targets have the potential to markedly disrupt rear area operations essential to sustaining the main battle effort. It is because of the capacity of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Forces to present substantial forces tactically and well behind the forward deployed forces, that U.S. and
NATO rear area doctrine must be revisited and adjusted to enable them to prevent or defeat the insertion of such forces into rear areas. To sustain needed support from those combat support and combat service support units located there, they must be free to perform their primary functions. This cannot be done by these units with continuity if they are in direct combat or have fewer facilities from which to support due to enemy action.
CHAPTER III

REAR BATTLE ORGANIZATION

Rear Area Operations Center

The Rear Area Operations Center is a tactical operations center whose organization and size will vary depending upon the geographical responsibility and the echelon it supports and the number of units in the support area. (6:3-4) In this study, operations centers below Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) are not addressed. The TAACOM Rear Area Operations Center is located within the TAACOM area and is responsible for rear battle throughout the TAACOM; ensures mutual support of Area Support Groups within the TAACOM; and coordinates with the Military Police Brigade supporting the TAACOM area. (6:3-9) Under the TAACOM organization, military units are organized into bases and base clusters, with the senior officer at each appointed as the base or base cluster commander. Each commander is required to establish base defense operations centers that report to the TAACOM Rear Operations Center for the tactical chain of command for rear battle. (6:3-13)
The TAACOM Rear Area Operations Center is currently designed to support the Army. Likewise, U.S. Army Field Manual 90-14 does not provide for dedicated support to other military services nor to bases of other services located in the rear area. It does, however, place a mission upon the Base Defense Liaison Teams, organic to the Rear Area Operations Center to coordinate with adjacent headquarters and other services located in the rear area. (6:3-12) No command relationships exist among the Army and the other services with regard to rear battle operation. As the primary controller of tactical combat forces that may be assigned to the rear area, the Rear Area Operations Center should be responsive via doctrine, throughout its area of responsibility, to other services with available fire support and tactical combat forces as the rear battle situation dictates. This could require at times, for example, placing U.S. Army combat forces under the command or operational control of a supported Air Force Base Commander, or his Air Base Ground Forces Commander for a particular threat situation. The close coordination required to support the rear battle under the total Rear Area Operations Center umbrella, exceeds liaison requirements and must involve detailed joint planning and prioritization of critical facilities that must be protected across the entire area regardless of service.
The Rear Area Operations Center does provide for Host Nation Support coordination. However, that aspect will not be discussed in depth in this study. Suffice it to say that some Host Nation Support can be expected depending upon the national agreements with the United States, existing local laws and security interests of the U.S.
Bases and Base Clusters

U.S. Army Field Manual 90-14 emphasizes that the cornerstone of the rear area battle mission is the base commander's capability to defend the base against all Level I threats. (5:3-20) Rear bases and base clusters are normally occupied by combat service and combat service support units. By mission they are not equipped nor as tactically capable as tactical combat forces are to defend against the Level I and II threat forces which they could face in the rear battle. Additionally, these units' major support role to the main battle effort and to supporting units passing through the area, preclude them from effectively performing both missions with expectations of success. Because of the type units located in the bases and base clusters, the commanders are not likely to have combat arms background and combat experience among them will be rare. However, they are required to operate a base defense operations center 24 hours a day in support of a tactical chain of command of the Rear Area Operations Center. Base commanders are also required to prepare a base defense plan and develop a reaction force to augment the defense posture of the base. This reaction force will not normally be committed outside the base perimeter, however those assets that he must commit to the defense of the base
are assets that cannot perform their primary functions and combat missions simultaneously. (5:3-19) The bases and base clusters rely heavily upon Military Police response forces for protection outside the base perimeter and must integrate this support into the base defense plans, and communications nets. They must coordinate with Military Police forces to ensure that mutual plans are compatible.

Army Rear Battle Doctrine is virtually one service oriented and is questionably viable based on the ambitious plans for the Military Police to be the major force of contention for Level I and Level II threats in the rear area. It needs not to be reiterated here that Military Police in Europe are not great numbers and will be heavily tasked to perform their primary functions of combat support to major parent organizations. While U.S. Army Field Manual 90-14 does an otherwise good job of delineating Army specific defense procedures through the Rear Area Operations Centers, the Centers should be reorganized and tasked with total Rear Area Operations jointly with other services located within the TAACOM Area of Responsibility. There is a definite requirement to support the U.S. Air Force in its Air Base Ground Defense mission with sufficient response forces to secure the vital assets assigned to them.
Air Base Ground Defense

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, dated 5 May 1986, which spells out the AirLand Battle doctrine, devotes only three paragraphs in describing Rear Operations doctrine, then refers the reader to U.S. Army Field Manual 90-14, *Rear Battle*, dated 10 June 1985, for more detailed discussion. (7:149;150) I believe that this slights the importance of Rear Operations in the AirLand Battle scheme of doctrine and its relevance in securing victory in its supporting role of the main battle effort. Further, other uniformed services, particularly the U.S. Air Force, with its multitude of air bases located in rear areas, have a vested interest in the protection of the vital air assets and facilities which support the AirLand Battle doctrine. The defense of those Air Force assets are currently only loosely meshed with Army doctrine in the rear area. Unquestionably, there needs to be a close link among all rear area elements for coordination and mutual support in fighting the rear battle.

The Air Force already has a well prepared, detailed document, Air Force Regulation 206-2, *Air Base Ground Defense*, dated 22 September 1983, which organizes and places the responsibility for employing the base defense forces upon specially trained Security Police Forces and under the
direct command of an Air Force Security Police
Officer. (8:15:16)

Outside the base perimeter, however, the Air Force
bases must rely upon the same assets as the U.S. Army to
respond to threats which are beyond their capability to
defeat. Additionally, the Air Base Ground Defenses Forces
are neither organized nor equipped to project themselves
more than a few hundred meters beyond the perimeter of a
typical air base in Europe. Currently, the only immediate
response forces available to respond to threat level forces
beyond their capability to engage successfully (Level II and
III) are the U.S. Army Military Police.
U.S. Military Police Missions

Similarly to the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. doctrine calls for the Military Police to respond to Level I and Level II threat attacks upon U.S. Army facilities. (6:3-19; -3-24) Military Police have historically performed direct combat missions and are generally located in rear areas at division, corps and echelons above corps, performing normal tasks and functions. Because of their locations it appears logical to use their combat capabilities as a response force for the rear battle. The Military Police provide the combat link to the rear battle. Their employment throughout the rear area provides a light, mobile force with which the controlling commander can respond. (6:3-1)
CHAPTER IV

INITIATIVES FOR NEW REAR BATTLE DOCTRINE

Joint Air Base Ground Defense

A recent article published in the AirLand Bulletin, discusses Joint Operations in rear battle and specifically Jointness in Air Base Ground Defense. It goes on to state that two of the thirty-one Joint Force Development Issues (JFDI) signed by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force in 1984 were related to Air Base Ground Defense issue. (3:4)

Initiative number 8 of the JFDI instructed the Air Force and Army to develop a Joint Service Agreement for Army units to provide Air Base Ground Defense outside the perimeters of Air Force Air Bases and for operational control of those units be given to the appropriate Air Component Commander. (3:4) Additionally, the Air Force committed to transfer Reserve Component manpower spaces to the Army if Air Force requirements for Air Base Ground Defense exceeded Army capabilities. (3:5)

Initiative number 9 of the JFDI pledged the two Services to execute a Joint Agreement for the Army to provide initial and follow-on training for Air Force on-site Air Base Ground Defense Squadrons. (3:5) This training,
according to the article, resulted in immediate savings for
the Air Force as they were able to cancel plans for
development of a dozen Regional Training Areas for its Air
Base Ground Defense Flights. (3:5) Though these initiatives
were general and not specifically directed toward the rear
battle issues in the European Wartime Scenario, the concept
has merits for that section of the world most of all.
Recent manpower reductions referred to in the article
reemphasizes the lessened ability of the Army to provide
dedicated combat units for protection of Air bases. The
Military Police unit's capability to respond based on its
already overloaded mission list has also been discussed
earlier in this study and expansion here would be redundant.

The AirLand Bulletin article surfaces the absence of
adequate defense ability in the rear area and notes that
changes need to be made in the current doctrine. Training
is required for Airmen in Army tactics and defensive
doctrine as well as training in basic warfighting and
survival skills. Air Force leaders who would be in charge
of Army ground forces need to be trained in the doctrine and
employment of ground forces utilized in rear area or base
defense. Protection of Air Bases and other critical
facilities must extend well beyond the perimeter and be
closely coordinated with other rear area elements and units
passing through.
Joint Rear Area Operations Center

A study completed in 1986, *Concept of Operation for the Rear Area Operations Center in the Joint Rear Battle* advocates the concept of a Joint Rear Operations Center which would include both Army and Air Force defense forces in a coordinated effort in fighting the rear battle and providing for Air Base Ground Defense. (1:chap 4) The Rear Area Operations Center as the primary tactical tanker of units assigned according to Army rear battle doctrine, may support the Air Force Security Forces in Air Base Ground Defense but other than coordination by the Air Bases with nearby Army bases or base clusters, no firm commitment is clear as to the support of the Air Force. (6:6-4)

The study points out that the Rear Area Operations Center should support each base in its area, regardless of Service and that is should be prepared to place Army forces under operational control of an Air Force Base Commander or Air Base Ground Defense Commander. (1:chap 3)

The Joint Rear Operations Center concept is an excellent start to Joint Rear Battle doctrine essential in securing the rear areas. The diversity of capabilities of the Services concerned and the clear need for dedicated rear area combat forces requires mutual and joint commitment to realize a well coordinated overall plan for the defense of
the rear area. Reorganization of the Rear Area Operations Center to include Air Force and Air Base Defense planners and the Center's Army staff is an essential step.
An article published in the October issue of *Military Review* titled: "Attack Helicopter Operations in the AirLand Battle: Rear Operations" describes a concept in the employment of attack helicopter forces in the rear battle, specifically to respond to and counter Level III enemy attacks. (5:2:3) Because of speed, mobility, firepower and the ability to operate on all spectrums of the battlefield, day and night, makes the attack helicopter an excellent option as a rear area response force. Their ability to respond quickly, fix and hold or destroy an enemy force would add the vertical dimension needed in the rear area. It is imperative, I believe, to integrate these forces into Rear Area Operations plans as a dedicated force in support of Rear Battle doctrine.

Also the authors point out that "When committed to a rear operation, especially at night, the attack helicopter regiment or the aviation brigade is the most effective headquarters for the control and integration of the attack helicopter units, air assault forces, close air support and artillery committed to that fight." (5-8)

Although the article was written with primarily corps rear operations as the level of employment, the concept also applies at echelons above corps. The ability to
quickly respond with massive firepower as the attack helicopters are capable of doing, is probably the best solution to the rear area combat response needs and the flexibility of the aviation units allows them to be committed to more than a single aspect of the overall combat effort.
CHAPTER V

Conclusions

There is a need for change in the current U.S. rear battle doctrine. Combat in rear areas is almost a certainty in an extended conflict and like any other facet of the AirLand Battle concept, rear battle forces must be provided doctrine, structured, equipped and trained to fight and win when the time comes.

First, I believe, that rear battle doctrine should provide for a dedicated combat force, capable of responding effectively to Level II and Level III enemy threats to the rear areas. The absence of adequate forces to protect and defend critical facilities and combat support activities places at risk the capabilities of the front line commander to fight the main battle. The use of combat reserves for the mission of fighting the rear battle denies the combat commander flexibility to influence the action at critical times if these forces are committed elsewhere.

Secondly, rear battle doctrine should be jointly applied and include those services with facilities located in the rear area. This could be accomplished by jointly organizing the Rear Area Operations Center and the formulation of joint rear battle plans for coordinated
protection and defense of the bases and base clusters of each service. The Air Force, for example, with its lightly defended bases have no dedicated, sizeable combat force to defend against a major ground assault by Level II or Level III enemy threat forces and must rely upon army ground combat forces, if available, to provide defense against enemy ground force attacks. A highly mobile and capable combat force, centrally located, could respond to bases and base clusters in a given rear area or be prepositioned based upon criticality and vulnerability of the bases and facilities.

The Military Police are the current mainstay as the combat response force of the Rear Area Operations Center. They are lightly armed, mobile and capable of responding to Level I and Level II threats, however, limited firepower and available forces reduce their effectiveness. Like other combat support and combat service support units, the Military Police have essential functions and missions to perform in support of parent organizations in sustaining the main battle. Their use simply becomes a matter of priority as lack of adequate force structure precludes their accomplishing day to day functions and reacting as a combat response force simultaneously. As an integral player in the Rear Area Operations Center scheme, Military Police should be increased in numbers in order to be a viable force.
against rear area threats.

Rear Area Operations Centers in echelons above corps are reserve component units which must be mobilized, then deployed which adds to the fog of the rear battle doctrine. There should be a basic active component Rear Area Operations Center cell, not fully manned but able to provide continuity and ease of transition for the mobilized Centers arriving in the combat zone later. The Rear Area Operations cell could also be tasked with a planning and coordination function for elements to be supported by the Center. The cell should also be jointly staffed.

Winning the rear battle is a key ingredient to winning the war. Adapting a doctrine which provides maximum use of available forces and dedicated forces to protect and defend those critical assets essential to the operational commanders is paramount to the overall AirLand Battle concept.
APPENDIX

Rear Area Threat Forces

1. Agents
2. Terrorists
3. Sympathizers
4. Special Purpose Forces
5. Long Range Reconnaissance Teams
6. Troop Reconnaissance Groups
7. Airborne Forces
8. Air Assault Forces
9. Amphibious Forces
10. Operational Maneuver groups

U.S. Army Field Manual 90-14, Rear Battle, categorizes the above threat forces into three levels which are summarized below:

Level I:

1) Enemy controlled agents - There is an estimated 9,000 Soviet Agents and 20,000 Warsaw Pact agents in the European NATO countries. When fully activated, these agents are capable of conducting espionage, interdiction, and
subversive activities on a significant scale.

2) **Terrorists** - Terrorists have already demonstrated their ability to cunningly commit criminal acts and violence as evidenced by the numerous incidents that have occurred in the NATO countries. The level of terrorists activities can be expected to escalate just prior to and during continued hostilities. The NATO countries have proven themselves vulnerable to acts of terrorism and remain vulnerable even with the additional security measures that will be in place during war.

3) **Sympathizers** - These are primarily indigent civilians who are sympathetic to the enemy. They are not part of the agent structure, are loosely organized but capable of random and unpredictable activities which could include arson, assassination, sabotage, political demonstrations, and theft and diversion of supplies.

**LEVEL II**

1) **Special Purpose Forces (SPETZNAZ)** - SPETZNAZ units are comprised of highly trained Special Purpose Forces which will be introduced into the rear areas prior to actual breakout of hostilities to conduct diversionary and
sabotage operations by employing unconventional warfare tactics. These forces are deployable by paratroop, heliborne landings, by foot, vehicle or sea. Their missions and capabilities include reconnaissance, disruption and/or destruction of critical military targets, with destruction of nuclear weapons sites high on their list of priority targets. They are also capable of disrupting command and control facilities and logistical facilities.

2) Long Range Reconnaissance Teams - These teams are capable of operations up to 100 kilometers forward of parent divisions. They are normally airdropped or airlanded into rear areas to collect intelligence information for future operations planned in the rear area and to facilitate planned operations of parent combat divisions. These units area additionally capable of engaging targets of opportunity, harassment and small scale deliberate attacks on key facilities.

3) Troop Reconnaissance Groups - These groups are resources of tank and motorized divisions and regiments and may operate at ranges of 30 to 50 kilometers forward of their organic elements. They are highly mobile and their equipment includes armored and infantry fighting vehicles and weaponry may include portable surface to air missiles.
and anti-tank guided missiles. Troop Reconnaissance Groups primary missions are ground reconnaissance and targets of opportunity.

LEVEL III:

1) Airborne Forces - These forces present the most significant threat to the rear area. They have typically been employed ahead of Soviet main forces to remove obstacles that prevent rapid advancement and are a key ingredient to Soviet doctrine. As strategic forces, their depth of operation can be expanded considerably. A recent article published in the International Defense Review indicates graphically that these forces can be employed in various sized elements ranging from 0 - 200 kilometers at the tactical/operational level and can be employed in company size through division size. (2) Vertical application of these forces enhances the speed of Soviet advances and the quick victory they are seeking. Airborne forces' characteristic objectives are capture of major political centers, airfields, industrial centers and engaging forces normally available to the main war effort.

2) Air Assault Forces - Air Assault Forces are operational forces which can be employed from 50 - 100
kilometers beyond the forward line of troops. They can be employed in brigade sized elements but more typically would be airdropped by fixed wing aircraft or by helicopter in battalion size or smaller, primarily to secure river crossing sites, or to seize or destroy key terrain features, key activities or reserve forces. This well equipped force has organic field artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and engineer support to conduct its missions.

3) Airmobile Assault Forces - These forces are heliborne deployed. The airmobile Assault brigade is assigned to each Soviet Front. Normally in mountainous terrain. Airmobile Forces may operate from 50 - 100 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area and typically act as a quick reaction force.

4) Amphibious Operations - These operations are conducted by Naval Infantrymen (Marines) and can conduct commando type raids in coastal areas using the same tactics as airborne forces and can be deployed as tactical, operational, or strategical elements. Their targets are mainly of coastal and naval significance.

5) Operational Manuever Groups - (OMG)
The OMG normally consists of a reinforced division at army level and can be up to three divisions when employed at Soviet Front level. It normally has attached airborne or air assault forces and is equipped depending upon its mission. It is primarily intended to exploit deeply through gaps in defenses to seize critical objectives in the enemy's operational area. Critical targets include nuclear delivery means, command and control installations and airfields.
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