SECURITY ASSISTANCE: 
WHAT IS ITS PROPER ROLE IN THE LOW-INTENSITY 
CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA

COL JERRY L. HARVILLE, USA

AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC 
RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION 
UNLIMITED

1989
AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY

SECURITY ASSISTANCE
WHAT IS ITS PROPER ROLE IN THE LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA

by
Jerry L. Harville
Colonel, USA

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Colonel Graham George

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
May 1989
DISCLAIMER

This study represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is the property of the US Government.

Loan copies of this document may be obtained through the interlibrary loan desk of Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5564 (Telephone: [205] 293-7223 or AUTOVON 875-7223).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Availability Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Security Assistance, What is its Proper Role in the Low-Intensity Conflicts in Latin America

AUTHOR: Jerry L. Harville, Colonel, US Army

This study offers a basic outline of what security assistance is and who the major players are. It then identifies what the US objectives are in Latin America and briefly looks at the history of Security Assistance in Latin America.

The paper addresses the CINC's use of security assistance in Latin America. It discusses how security assistance should be used, who should control it, plus how much and what type should be provided.

The study then examines specific recommendations relating to improving the security assistance program. Conclusions and recommendations follow to complete the author's views regarding security assistance roles in Latin America.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Jerry L. Harville, US Army is a Quartermaster Officer with extensive security assistance experience. He received a B.A. from Oklahoma University and a M.S. from Florida Institute of Technology. As a Quartermaster Officer, Colonel Harville has commanded a non-divisional Supply and Service Company in CONUS and a divisional Forward Support Battalion in Germany. He has served on battalion, group, division, and unified command level staffs as well as the Department of Army Staff where he served as the Executive Officer for the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (Security Assistance). He has also served in MAAG assignments in Korea, Vietnam, and Iran. He served two combat tours in the Republic of Vietnam. Colonel Harville is a 1978 graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and a graduate of the Air War College, Class of 1989.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I INTRODUCTION.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions, Components, Players, and Purpose</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Players.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch: The President.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of the Program.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The President.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Secretary of State.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Secretary of Defense.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CINC SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II REGIONAL OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III HISTORY OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN LATIN AMERICA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CINC's USE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY.</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iv
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the "security assistance program" in Latin America and determine; first, if it is meeting its stated objectives and has it enhanced the warfighting capability of CINCSOUTH; and second, identify the role of CINCSOUTH in the program and suggest changes to that role to improve the program's effectiveness.

Definitions, Components, Players, and Purpose

In order to properly examine the program, it is required that we first define what the program is, look at its components, identify the players in the program, and examine its stated purpose.

Definition

Security assistance, provides a "definitional dilemma;" i.e., when asked, various managers in the program will provide a slightly different definition, each being partially correct, but none covering the entire spectrum. The Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management, in its text The Management of Security Assistance, defines it from various perspectives. (2:2.1-2.5)

From a legislative perspective it is:

a. assistance under Chapter II (Military Assistance), Chapter 4 (Economic Support Fund), Chapter 5 (Military Education and Training), or Chapter 6 (Peacekeeping Operations) of Section 502 B, Foreign Assistance Act;
b. sales of defense articles and services, extensions of
credits (including participation in credits and guarantees
of loans under the Arms Export Control Act); and

c. any license in effect, with respect to the export of
defense articles or defense services, to or for the Armed
Forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security
forces of a foreign country under Section 38 of the Arms
Export Control Act.

From a budgetary perspective, it is international
security assistance programs consisting of military assistance,
security related economic assistance and peacekeeping
operations. It is a part of the "International Affairs:
Foreign Aid" budget category.

From a Department of Defense (DOD) perspective, it is a
group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as
amended, or other related statutes by which the United States
(US) provides defense articles and services, by grant, credit,
or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and
objectives.

Rolling all of these together, I would define security
assistance simply as the provision of articles and services to
specific countries to enhance their ability to provide for their
own security. The recipient countries are those with a valid
requirement, whose security serves the national objectives and
security needs of the United States.

Components

The security assistance program consists of seven major
program components, five of which require US Government (USG)
funding. (2:2.11-2.17)
The first component is the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The program requires funding by the USG, and provides defense articles and services (except for training) to eligible foreign governments on a grant basis. During the 25-year period, from 1950-1975, this component was by far the largest part of the program amounting to over $52.6 billion. From 1966-1975, this included the Military Assistance Service Funded Program, which supported activities in Southeast Asia. MAP's dominance in the program began to change after the Vietnam War, when more emphasis was put on sales instead of grants in aid.

The second component of the security assistance program is a small, but powerful segment known as the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). This program provides training for international military personnel and related civilian personnel in the United States, US installations overseas, or through mobile training teams on a grant basis. This program, while small ($52.5 million for FY89) can have enormous impact on achieving many of the national strategic objectives of the United States. This program promotes weapons and doctrine standardization and increased access to future key military leaders in foreign countries. The program also improves significantly relations, and operations between the United States and the countries participating in the program. In addition, it provides the participating students with firsthand experience in the American society and institutions. That alone is invaluable in terms of future influence. This
program has trained over 550,000 students since 1950, many of whom have gone on to the highest levels of their respective defense departments and governments.

The third component of the security assistance program is one that is not managed by the DOD, but rather by the Agency for International Development of the State Department. It is the Economic Support Fund. (ESF). The ESF provides economic support on a grant or loan basis for economic purposes such as balance of payment support and technical development projects, as well as health, education, agriculture, and family planning programs. The FY89 ESF request is for $3.28 billion.

The fourth component, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) supports the Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO), the US contribution to the United Nations Forces in Cyprus, as well as other programs designed specifically for peacekeeping operations. A total of $31.7 million has been requested for FY89.

The fifth and last component of the security assistance program requiring funding by the USG is the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Financing Program. Under this program, the United States provides credits and loan repayment guarantees to foreign governments to enable them to purchase defense articles and services. This program provides direct credit to Egypt and Israel, the repayment of which is waived, and guaranteed loans to some 30 other countries. The administration has requested an "all forgiven" FMS Credit Program for FY89 in the amount of $4.46 billion. This is essentially grant-aid like the MAP
Program, but unlike the MAP Program, the money can be spent to procure defense articles through commercial sources instead of only through the US DOD as is required under MAP.

The sixth component of the security assistance program is the FMS and Foreign Military Construction Sales Program (FMCS). Under the FMS Program, eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services and training from the USG on a cash basis; under Foreign Military Construction Sales, the USG sells design and construction services to eligible foreign governments.

The FMS Program, since 1950, has amounted to $163.37 billion. Literally all of the FMCS has been with Saudi Arabia who has purchased more than $16.9 billion through FY87. Less than $100 million has gone to other countries worldwide.

The seventh and final component of the security assistance program is the Commercial Sales Program licensed under Arms Export Control Act. These sales are not government to government, but are handled by US commercial firms under licenses issued by the State Department. Even though these sales do not involve the DOD directly, they are closely monitored to prevent conflicts with US requirements and to prevent unauthorized technology transfer.

Players

I would now like to briefly identify some players in the security assistance program, and outline their roles and functions. The major players in the security assistance program
are of course the Executive Branch and Congress. While the Judicial Branch does play a role in the security assistance program, it is very limited and not pertinent to this paper.

**Executive Branch: The President**

As the chief executive of the United States, the President is principally responsible for implementation of its foreign policy. Since the security assistance program is an instrument of foreign policy, he has the overall responsibility for its planning and execution. The principal departments responsible for the planning, organizing, and controlling the program are the State Department and the DOD.\(^{(2:5.1)}\)

**State Department**

The Secretary of State has the statutory responsibility for overall supervision and direction of the entire security assistance program. The overall responsibility for the program lies with the State Department and the Secretary of State. The security assistance program is an instrument of foreign policy. The Secretary of State has an Under Secretary for Security Assistance Science and Technology as his principal advisor for security assistance matters.\(^{(2:5.6-5.9)}\) He has several bureaus, offices, and agencies that perform the management and supervisory functions, the most significant of which is the Bureau of Politico - Military Affairs. This bureau has four principal functions: (1) advising the Secretary of State on issues where foreign policy and defense policy impinge on one another; (2) it is the channel of liaison and contact.
between defense and state; (3) it has the lead in developing State positions on politico-military questions for the National Security Council; and, (4) it assists the Secretary in carrying out his responsibilities for supervision of the security assistance program, and licensing the export of military equipment.

Two of the bureaus' six offices are specifically concerned with security assistance:

1. The Office of Munitions Control is responsible for licensing the export of military equipment.

2. The Office of Security Assistance and Sales is responsible for the day-to-day direction of the security assistance program, and is the focal point for the security assistance budget preparation and submission. (2:5.9)

The State Department also has Regional/Geographic Bureaus that play a direct role in security assistance budget formulation process and other day-to-day security assistance matters. (2:5.9-5.10)

The "agency" within State that has the greatest role in the security assistance program is the Agency for International Development (AID). AID administers two types of foreign assistance, developmental assistance, and ESF. ESF is that part of the security assistance program that is designed to promote economic and political stability in countries designated to receive such assistance. (2:5.10)

Another element of the State Department that is vital to a quality security assistance program, and to whom the
security assistance program is vital, is the U.S. Diplomatic Mission. Diplomatic Missions are located in the recipient countries and are a part of the State Department. The ambassador, the President's representative, is therefore located in the country to ensure that our efforts and programs are adequate, and that they are being properly administered to maximize their contributions to achievement of the national objectives.

While other elements of State Department do have roles in the security assistance program, their roles are not significant enough to warrant description for purposes of this study. (2:5.12-5.13)

Department of Defense

I would now like to move to the element, or player, that has the largest role in the United States' Security Assistance Program—the DOD. Both in terms of personnel involved and funds managed by the DOD, has responsibility for the largest portion of the program by far.

Section 623 of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 42 of the Arms Export Control Act designates the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) with the following primary responsibilities in the security assistance program:

1. The determination of military end-item requirements.

2. The procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its integration with service programs.
3. The supervision of end-item use by recipient countries.

4. The supervision of the training of foreign military and related civilian personnel.

5. The movement and delivery of military end-items.

6. The establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery, and allocation of military equipment.

7. Within the DOD, the performance of any other functions with respect to the furnishing of military assistance, education, training, sales, and guarantees.\(^{(2:5.7)}\)

The principal advisor and assistant to the Secretary of Defense, on security assistance matters, is the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He is assisted in this function by the various assistant secretaries that have responsibilities in the program, and he exercises direction, authority, and control over the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).

DSAA is a separate agency and is the principal agency within DOD responsible for the security assistance program. Its prescribed functions include:

1. Administration and supervision of security assistance planning and programs.

2. Coordination of the formulation and execution of security assistance programs with other governmental agencies.

3. Conducting international logistics and sales negotiations with foreign countries.

4. Serving as the DOD focal point for liaison with US industry with regard to security assistance activities.
5. Managing the Credit Financing Program.

6. Developing and promulgating security assistance procedures.

7. Developing and operating the data processing system and maintaining the data base for the security assistance program.

8. Making determinations with respect to the allocation of FMS administrative funds.

9. Providing guidance to the Security Assistance Accounting Center which performs the accounting function for the security assistance program. (2:5.20-5.28)

Other elements with significant duties and responsibilities regarding the program are the various Military Departments (MILDEP) under the control of their respective secretaries. Each MILDEP has a unique organization for implementation of the program, but each operates under the guidance and direction of the Defense Security Assistance Agency in executing the various programs. (2:5.14-5.16)

A vital element in the planning and execution of the program is the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the various unified commands, and overseas activities. The JCS coordinates the various security assistance programs and advises the SECDEF on those programs to include:

1. Recommending weapons systems for the recipient countries.
2. Recommending force objective, requirements, and priorities for recipients.

3. Recommendations on Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Security Assistance Offices (SAO) organization and manning. (2:5.16-5.17)

The unified commands have responsibilities for the conduct of the US Security Assistance Program within their region. These responsibilities currently include:

1. Making recommendations to the JCS and SECDEF on any aspect of the program.

2. Staying informed on all security assistance matters to include programs, projections, and activities.

3. Commanding and supervising the MAAGs and other SAOs.

4. Coordinating and assisting DOD components in the conduct of regional security assistance programs.

5. Coordinating and assisting DOD components in the conduct of regional security assistance programs.

6. Recommending to JCS the staffing and organization of the MAAG and SAO.

7. Ensuring coordination of regional security assistance programs with US diplomatic missions and DOD components as appropriate.

8. Evaluating the effectiveness of the MAAG and SAO. (2:25.9-25.10)
The final player within DOD that I want to address is the "man on the ground" in country, the MAAG or the SAO. This element is a part of the country team with the mission and is the primary element responsible for the security assistance program in country.

It's duties and responsibilities have been severely curtailed since 1977. Prior to 1977, the MAAG and SAO were allowed to advise and train, as well as, manage the security assistance program.

Today, SAOs are in effect prohibited from advising and training in the countries where located. Congress has stated that such activities should be kept to an absolute minimum. The SAOs are responsible for and their duties are limited to:

a. FMS case management;
b. training management;
c. program monitoring;
d. evaluation and planning of the host government's military capabilities and requirements;
e. administrative support;
f. promoting standardization with NATO, Japan, and Australia; and,
g. liaison activities exclusive of advice and training. (2:5.3-5.4)

Expansion of these duties will be discussed latter.

Congress

The other major player in the US Security Assistance Program is Congress. As with all such programs of the USG,
Congress is responsible to develop, consider, and enact the basic authorization acts for the program, and to enact the required appropriations to provide funding for the program. They are also empowered to conduct special reviews and investigations into the program as required. Finally, Congress is responsible to ratify treaties that may well have security assistance implications.

In doing this, both houses of Congress are involved with specific committees and subcommittees. Those primarily involved:

1. House of Representatives
   a. Committee on Foreign Affairs
      (1) Regional Subcommittees
      (2) Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs
      (3) Subcommittee on International Operations
      (4) Subcommittee on International Organizations

2. Senate
   a. Committee on Foreign Relations
      (1) Regional Subcommittees
      (2) Subcommittee on International Economic Policy
      (3) Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment
Additionally, there are several special congressional offices that are involved in the security assistance program. These include:

1. The General Accounting Office
2. The Congressional Budget Office
4. The Cost Accounting Standard Board

Explaining the specific involvement in the program of each of these committees and offices would require too much time, and is not pertinent to this paper. Suffice it to say, that Congress has considerable involvement in the program and considerable assets devoted to that involvement.

**Purpose of the Program**

I would now like to explore the purpose of the security assistance program. Earlier in the paper, I defined security assistance from the various perspectives. I will not be redundant and define the program again, but I would like to list the program's purpose or objectives as outlined by the major players in the program.

**The President**

The President has stated that "by helping friends and allies acquire the means to defend themselves, we complement the rebuilding of our own military strengths, and increase the human
and material resources available for the defense of free world interests. In the process, we reduce the likelihood of direct American involvement in political conflicts. Security assistance is a key instrument in our national security strategies, a productive and highly leveraged investment that promotes our security interest at bargain prices. (9:8)

The Secretary of State

Secretary Schultz stated that security assistance supports our National Security objectives by providing our friends and allies with enhanced capabilities, which contribute directly to the common defense. It promotes prosperity and development by assisting other countries in development of their own economies using the economic support fund. The program promotes democratic and humanitarian values, as well as, assisting in combating international narcotics trafficking and terrorism. (13:33-34)

The Secretary of Defense

Secretary Carlucci felt that security assistance was an essential element of our coalition strategy. He felt it helped establish productive relationships with foreign political and military leaders, and was instrumental preserving access to foreign political and military facilities. He also felt it bolstered the contribution of our friends and allies to the deterrence of threats to our mutual interests. It gives countries very tangible incentives to support US policy, and demonstrates that we have an interest that goes beyond rhetoric.
It also helps countries achieve the security they need to develop successful economic and open political systems. Moreover it is cost effective; i.e., by enlisting the support of friends and allies, it achieves real security objectives at less expense than could be achieved by the United States on its own. (17:44)

The Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency

Lieutenant General Brown says that our security assistance programs are a vital element of our national security policy, an essential investment in US defense. They establish productive relationships with foreign political and military leaders, and are instrumental to obtaining and preserving access to strategic foreign military facilities. They enable foreign forces to handle threats to US interests. They give countries very tangible incentives to support US policy and demonstrate that we have an interest that goes beyond rhetoric. He also states that the programs are cost effective in that they achieve real security objectives at a far less cost than could be achieved by US forces alone. This point is particularly important in light of the decline in real US defense spending. (15:50)

The CINC SOUTHCOM

With the upper levels of the government referring to security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy, a key instrument in our national strategy, an essential element of our
coalition strategy, a means to establish productive relationships, etc., how does the unified commander view it?

CINCSOUTHCOM sees it as the most important arrow in his quiver. (16) When other unified commanders whose focus is conflicts in the mid-intensity to high-intensity level speak of units and organizations, the CINCSOUTH talks about security assistance and supporting friends and allies. These then become his maneuver elements.

As can be seen from the previous discussion, the United States Security Assistance Program is a multifaceted and multifunction program that the National Command Authority, State Department, DOD, and the military chain of command consider critical to attainment of our national objectives, to include the security of our nation and preservation of our way of life.

In the next chapter, I will look at those national objectives and how they translate into regional objectives in Latin America.
CHAPTER II
REGIONAL OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA

In order to properly determine how security assistance can best be used to achieve the national objectives in the region, we must first outline what those objectives are.

First, let me state the national security objectives as put forth by the President in the White House Paper on National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1988. Our principal national security objectives are:

1. To maintain the security of our nation and our allies. The United States, in cooperation with its allies, must seek to deter any aggression that could threaten that security and, should deterrence fail, must be prepared to repel or defeat any military attack and end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interest, and its allies.

2. To respond to the challenges of the global economy our national security and economic strength are indivisible. As the global economy evolves in increasingly interdependent ways, we must be aware of economic factors that may affect our national security, now or in the future. Since our dependence on foreign sources of supply has grown in many critical areas, the potential vulnerability of our supply lines is a matter of concern. Additionally, the threat of a global spiral of protectionism must be combatted, and the problem of debt in the developing world is a burden on international prosperity.
3. To defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom, and human rights throughout the world. To ignore the fate of millions around the world who seek freedom, betrays our national heritage and over time would endanger our own freedom and that of our allies.

4. To resolve peacefully disputes which affect US interests in troubled regions of the world. Regional conflicts which involve allies or friends of the United States may threaten US interests, and frequently pose the risk of escalation to wider conflagration. Conflicts, or attempts to subvert friendly governments, which are instigated or supported by the Soviets and their client states, represent a particular serious threat to the international system and thereby to US interests.

5. To build effective and friendly relations with all nations with whom there is a basis of shared concern. In the world today, there are over 150 nations. Not one of them is equal to the United States in total power or wealth, but each is sovereign, and most if not all, touch US interests directly or indirectly. (9:1-3)

The National Security Strategy paper further breaks down that strategy and objectives on a regional basis. It states that our territorial security is inextricably linked with the security of our hemispheric neighbors; the Latin American region is a region of great strategic importance to our national security. Our objectives in the region are to promote democracy and economic progress, provide a strong deterrent using
collective security arrangements, and to strengthen the ability of our Central American and Caribbean neighbors to resist outside aggression and subversion, thereby facilitating the transition to democracy in the region. We remain deeply committed to the interdependent regional objectives of democracy and freedom, peace, and economic progress. Critical national security interests in Latin America are based on long-standing US policy that there be no Soviet, Cuban, or other Communist bloc beachhead on the mainland of the Western Hemisphere, or that of any regional country that upset the regional balance and poses a serious military threat to its neighbors. Additionally, we are fighting the menace of drug trafficking and production, which threatens not only the integrity and stability of regional countries but also the very social fabric of the United States. (9:25-26)

The White House paper specifically points out that the greatest threats we face in Latin America are low-intensity conflicts and the increasing linkages between international terrorists and narcotics traffickers.

The Secretary of State succinctly pointed out the regional objectives in his prepared statement to the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee in March 1988, by stating that Central America is of vital importance to the United States because of its geographic proximity and strategic position. He went on to say that we have long recognized that the best way to protect our interests
In the region is to pursue a multifaceted policy aimed at promoting regional security, democratization, and social and economic development. (8:35)

The security arrangements in Latin America are predicated on what has been termed the "four Ds": democracy, development, diplomacy, and defense. (10:57)

Fragile democratic governments exist in Latin America and we must ensure that these are strengthened and not subverted by outside elements or social and economic problems. The best methodology for doing that is expressed by the second "D"—development. That is principally economic development, but also social development. These are vital for a stable society and government. The third "D"—diplomacy—is almost self-explanatory, but of particular note is that it is required to be "public diplomacy." Our policy and objectives in Latin America have been characterized by unsuccessful covert actions and it is time we made sure our objectives will stand the test of public scrutiny, and then pursue those objectives tenaciously. The final "D"—defense—is one with which the US Southern Command is primarily concerned. The defense in Latin America is key to the mission of the US Southern Command. That mission, as recently expressed by its Commander, is to defend the southern flank of the United States and advance US national interests in Latin America. (16:5) This mission includes seven tasks:
1. Maintain the security of the United States and its' southern approaches.
2. Support counter-insurgency operations in El Salvador; and help support other Latin American militaries combat insurgency, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking.
3. Reverse Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan influences and their attempts to destabilize democratic processes in Latin America.
4. Defend the Panama Canal.
5. Plan for contingencies in the theater and be prepared to conduct operations in consonance with US interests.
6. Advance US foreign policy objectives.
7. Enhance US military influence in the theater, and strengthen cohesion with and among allies.

After looking at the players and purposes of security assistance in Chapter I, and comparing them with the strategy and objectives in Latin America, it becomes clear why the Commander of US Southern Command considers security assistance the "most important arrow in his quiver." In the subsequent chapters, I will look at the history of security assistance in Latin America, look at how the CINC should use security assistance in fighting the low-intensity conflicts, and finally, look at shortfalls in the system and recommend fixes to those shortfalls.
CHAPTER III
HISTORY OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
IN LATIN AMERICA

The US Security Assistance Program really came into being in 1947 with the Truman doctrine, which provided aid to Greece and Turkey to combat communist insurgencies there. That is recognized as the genesis of the program even though the United States exported more than $2 billion in war materials to Europe in World War I, and the Lend-Lease programs initiated in 1941 provided over $50 billion to our allies in World War II. In 1948, what is now known as security assistance really became important with the implementation of the Marshall Plan (the European Recovery Plan) which provided over $15 billion to 16 nations of western Europe between 1948 and 1952. (2:1.16-1.18)

In 1947, the Truman administration also began to pay attention to Latin America and provided assistance to the region. However, these agreements soon fell into relative disuse because our focus was Europe and Japan.

The program was given new life under the Kennedy administration, which began to provide military and economic aid to the region under the "Alliance for Progress." The program continued to expand after 1961, but then it began to be unevenly funded. In the late 1960s, the "Alliance for Progress" died from inactivity as the United States turned its focus elsewhere (Vietnam).
As the requirements in the region began to become more obvious during the Ford administration, Congress began to inject new requirements for eligibility into the program. These requirements, reflected in such things as human rights certification, nuclear non-proliferation acceptance, etc., became preconditions for receipt of such assistance. The associated legislation became very restrictive and impinged on the Executive Branch's security assistance as a foreign policy instrument. This was felt worldwide, but especially in Latin America.

Under the Reagan administration, emphasis again was placed in the Latin American region under such programs as the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which sought to prevent economic collapse in several key countries by development of the kind of security environment where progress and economic growth could take place. Additionally, it was stated that additional grant military assistance was required to counter Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan adventurism in the area. (2:1.35-1.36) Unfortunately, this emphasis was beset with problems of legislative restrictions and improprieties, creating an inconsistent program.

A single word to describe our security assistance program in Latin America is inconsistency. This would lead one to believe that the security assistance program in Latin America was a failure. That is not the case. With two prominent exceptions (Cuba and Nicaragua) the United States currently
enjoys good relations in the region and the goals established at any given time were met. As was pointed out in a recent article in the DISAM Journal, when containment of Communism was the goal, it was contained, when economic growth was the goal the region experienced unprecedented growth, and when democracy and human rights supplanted previous goals, the region's nations became democratic and observers of human rights. (10:58) That is not to say that security assistance or even the United States was solely responsible for these successes. However, the program at least played a key role in the successes. Another success story that can be more specifically attributed to the security assistance program, in the area is the success in El Salvador. There we have denied victory to the insurgents and fostered the evolution of democratic institutions there. (8:6-7) El Salvador is truly a success, but that success is fragile and to experience total success, we must follow through and continue the program to accomplish the long-range goals. What is really needed is an economic success story such as the one in Korea, which for many years survived on US assistance programs and is now emerging as an economic power in the world.

As will be noted in subsequent chapters, what is needed in Latin America is a long-range, objective oriented, consistent security assistance program. The following table shows the program's inconsistency and is very limited in resources for the last decade.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
LATIN AMERICA(21)
(Dollars in Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>FY78</th>
<th>FY79</th>
<th>FY80</th>
<th>FY81</th>
<th>FY82</th>
<th>FY83</th>
<th>FY84</th>
<th>FY85</th>
<th>FY86</th>
<th>FY87</th>
<th>FY88 estimated</th>
<th>FY89 request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FMS Agreements*</td>
<td>$73342</td>
<td>27222</td>
<td>25684</td>
<td>188792</td>
<td>681561</td>
<td>156810</td>
<td>219088</td>
<td>332866</td>
<td>307053</td>
<td>332221</td>
<td>249900</td>
<td>TBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS Credit**</td>
<td>$72000</td>
<td>27200</td>
<td>18430</td>
<td>31287</td>
<td>64800</td>
<td>73800</td>
<td>66500</td>
<td>25000</td>
<td>7656</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP***</td>
<td>$ 207</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>24415</td>
<td>70032</td>
<td>67850</td>
<td>285200</td>
<td>235211</td>
<td>218149</td>
<td>201400</td>
<td>132000</td>
<td>185500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET****</td>
<td>$ 6291</td>
<td>3106</td>
<td>2384</td>
<td>3529</td>
<td>9107</td>
<td>9454</td>
<td>9670</td>
<td>8588</td>
<td>8201</td>
<td>9050</td>
<td>10075</td>
<td>11621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of Students  | 1856    | 1778    | 1671    | 2144    | 2923    | 3954    | 2193    | 2743    | 2558    | 2569    | 2580          | TBC          |

* FMS Agreements - Total dollar value of defense articles and services purchased with cash, credit, and MAP merger funds by a foreign government in any fiscal year.

** FMS Credit - The amount of credit extended to a foreign government in any fiscal year for procurement of defense articles and services. These procurements may be from military departments or may be negotiated directly with commercial suppliers following the approval of DOD.

*** Military Assistance Program (MAP) - The dollar amount of materiel and services (other than training) programmed for any fiscal year for which the USG receives no monetary reimbursement. The figures include MAP merger funds, which are transferred to the FMS trust fund and merged with countries' FMS funds. These MAP merger funds are not available to finance procurements from US commercial suppliers.

**** Industrial Military Education & Training (IMET) - The dollar value allocated in any fiscal year for the training of foreign military students both overseas and in the continental United States for which the USG receives no monetary reimbursement.
CHAPTER IV
CINC's USE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
IN LATIN AMERICA

The regional CINC is responsible for all military activities in his area of responsibility. He is responsible for prosecuting the military activities in the area whether it involves the use of US forces, as is predominately the case in EUCOM, or the use of security assistance as is predominately the case in SOUTHCOM. In SOUTHCOM (Latin America) security assistance is a means of prosecuting the wars; i.e., the low-intensity conflicts that are currently going on in that region. It is virtually the only means CINCSOUTH has for furthering US interests in the area. As was stated earlier, the current SOUTHCOM Commander considers it "the most important arrow in his quiver." Using that analogy, the US Security Assistance Program becomes the most important weapon in the US arsenal for fighting the low-intensity conflict(s) or "high probability wars" as CINCSOUTH prefers to call them.

How then should this weapon be used? Who should use and control it? What is the optimum amount of this weapon that should be used? These are questions that need answering. The answers will change, but the questions remain the same.

To the first question, how should the weapon be used, it is given that this is not the only weapon that should be used
in the low-intensity conflicts in Latin America, but as we stated earlier, it may well be the most important. Its use must be a part of an integrated package that includes diplomatic and economic actions as well. These must be well planned and coordinated, and effectively executed to gain the synergistic effect possible under such a program. Security assistance must support a campaign plan for these wars. This campaign plan is not one that involves high-tech equipment, one that is marked with the maneuvering of divisions to attack salients or weak spots in the front line or lines of communications in the rear. It is rather a campaign plan that is "time intensive and requires a credible consistency over the long haul." (24:22)

Security assistance must be applied to reinforce the Armed Forces' in their legitimate role in a democracy. If we provide this assistance early, and with consistency and perseverance the cost can be substantially lower than it would be if we don't become involved until the armed conflict has already broken-out. That is one of the reasons that the problem in El Salvador has continued and the cost has been so high. We did not get involved early, and the consistency of our effort left much to be desired.

The type security assistance provided will also dictate how it is used. To provide FMS credit to a region that is already reeling under a $40 billion plus debt is ridiculous. The assistance provided must be either grant aid (MAP) or US service funded assistance. The amount of funding requested for
the region amounts to less than 3 percent of the total US security assistance budget, and one-tenth of one percent of the total DOD budget. That amount merely continues the FY89 levels at the FY88 levels.

As an adjunct to security assistance, the CINC can put to good use US service funded activities such as US military exercises in the region. The funding of the exercises, if they are considered to be security assistance in another form, can run afoul of the statutes as they are currently interpreted (a point that will be discussed later). However, such exercises can provide invaluable training for US forces (training that would never be available otherwise) as well as provide economic, humanitarian, and military assistance to friends and allies in Latin America. An example of such an exercise, has been the deployment of US military medical units to Central America for combined training exercises. These exercises provide US medical personnel the training opportunity to deploy overseas, employ and operate in an austere environment, work with foreign medical personnel, and see and treat diseases that are not common in the United States. For the host country, the opportunity is to work with US personnel, get hands-on experience with US equipment, and better develop the skills and techniques required to carry out their combat service support and nation-building mission. Moreover, such exercises help to demonstrate the proper role of the military in a democratic society.
When discussing security assistance, we must always remember there is one part of the program that is not administered by the DOD, and that is the ESF. Its general purpose was defined earlier, but its specific objectives in Latin America are to improve the administration of justice and human rights in the region, expand the Peace Scholarship Programs for training in the United States, support health, nutrition, and population training and techniques, promote development of private sector agriculture and agribusiness products for export, and provide assistance to strengthen labor programs through training and technical assistance. (8:216) One only needs to read the objectives to understand the importance of this part of the program in combating a low-intensity conflict. That is why, once again the long-term vision, total program integration, coupled with program consistency is so vital for this segment as well.

The ESF which is administered by the AID of the State Department must be totally integrated with the rest of the security assistance program. It must also be integrated with the rest of the foreign aid program to ensure proper targeting in the low-intensity conflict campaign plan.

Now I will turn to the question of who should use and control the security assistance program.

Without a doubt, the only individual that can do that on a regional basis for the DOD portion of the program is the CINC, for he is responsible for all US military activities in
the region. He is responsible for all US operational plans, and he is responsible for integrating all the campaign plans to pursue the strategy laid out to win the low-intensity conflicts in Latin America. As the CINCSOUTH has pointed out, the CINCs already have the war plans and intelligence at their disposal to aid them in security assistance planning and crisis response. The regional CINCs also need to have direct and formal input into security assistance budget allocations and long-range planning. It is at the Unified Command where the DOD portion and the State Department portion of the security assistance program need to be coordinated and integrated to ensure a balanced regional effort in both planning and execution of the program.

The program has been administered in this fashion in the past, but in recent years the CINCs have been cut out of the program planning and execution. To see the effectiveness of having the Unified Command controlling the program, one only has to look at the success of Korea. In the 1960s and early 1970s in Korea, the Military Assistance Program (as the Security Assistance Program was known then) was instrumental in keeping the situation in that country stable and ensuring the economic growth potential was achieved. The program at that time was controlled by CINCPAC who was able to ensure the programs were integrated with the war plans and the economic recovery plans.

Without doubt, since the Unified Command is the regional focal point in DOD, and the CINC is responsible for
prosecuting the war in the region, it is there the direction and
control of security assistance must be. That is especially true
in Latin America since CINCSOUTH considers it the most important
weapon in his arsenal for fighting the low-intensity conflicts
there. It would be ludicrous to deprive a fighting CINC of the
control of his most potent weapon.

What then is the optimum amount of security assistance?
That is probably the most difficult question to answer. It is
difficult because it is so situational dependent. It is so
difficult to determine that staffs must spend months developing
the requirements. Instead of trying to be specific as to
levels, I would simply state categorically that the program for
Latin America is too low and further cuts would be tantamount to
eliminating the program altogether in the region. As I stated
earlier, the FY88 Latin America program amounted to only 3
percent of the total security assistance program and .1 percent
of the total DOD budget. That amount, $604.5 million, has been
stated to be the absolute bottom line for anything resembling an
adequate program. A total of $744.6 million was requested in
FY89. I feel that that level is inadequate, but what is most
important is that it not be cut further or promises for higher
levels made and then not lived up to. As General Woerner has
stated, "We must have the courage to pay the price for as long
as it takes. If our enemies become convinced they can wait us
out, then no amount of short-term effort will work, and our
strategy for the region will be undermined. The threat to our
national security interest in Latin America is every bit as real as those posed by the Warsaw Pact in Europe."(24:28)

What is required in security assistance to effectively prosecute the low-intensity conflicts in Latin America is a program that is adequately funded, objective oriented, and properly integrated with other programs. It must have the CINC's input, use him as the regional focal point for execution, and above all it must be consistent for the long haul.

It has been stated the security assistance program is "broken." In the next chapter, I will review what some of those problems are and what is recommended to fix the problems.
CHAPTER V
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

The security assistance program has been called "the most important means to preserve free people against violence that could imperil a fledgling democracy (as in El Salvador), increase pressure for large scale migration to the United States (as in Central American wars) jeopardize important American bases (as in the Philippines), threaten vital sea lanes (as in the Persian Gulf), or provide strategic opportunities for the Soviet Union and its proxies." (7:1)

It is also said that "it is terribly broken" (16:18) and that it is "so encumbered with legal and administrative tendrils as to deprive it of credibility either here or abroad." (7:2)

If the program is such an important means of preserving free people against violence. And if it is broken, it follows then that significant efforts need to be initiated to effect such repairs. Such an effort was initiated in 1988 under the Commission or Integrated Long Term Strategy. That commission, using its Working Group or Regional Conflict, studied security assistance and in its report, "Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World" outlined a plan of action to fix the program. In this chapter, I will review the excellent recommendations made in that plan and comment on the efficacy of each of those recommendations.
The plan starts off by stating, "U.S. foreign aid speaks powerfully to developing countries. In the Third World, U.S. Security Assistance is widely perceived as a commitment of the United States to preserving national independence, and to protecting the aided people from threatened violence. It is that perception of commitment, not the kind and amount that truly counts."(7:29) While I concur in that basic premise, I feel that the amount must be above a minimum level for that commitment to have credibility. Adequate aid levels and program reforms are required to attain established objectives. Presented below are the 12 specific recommendations(7:30-54) for those reforms.

1. Provide for Multiyear Appropriations.

Experience has established that a consistent long-range plan for the nation receiving such aid is the single most important factor in efficient use of those funds. In order to create such a plan, the country must be able to count on what it will receive from the United States for more than just one year, two years is a minimum, three to five years is optimum. In this time of austere budgets, it is imperative that funds be appropriated for two or three years to provide such stability. I would recommend that the program be addressed in terms of a current year, a budget year, a program year, and two out years. The current year, budget year, and program year must be funded with each yearly funding of the program year. Such year-to-year funding would provide clear evidence of our commitment, and
with assurance of US backing, developing countries may experience a stiffening of resolve and a willingness to assume risk. (7:31) This may not be possible with the countries having larger programs; i.e., Israel and Egypt, but with the small size of the programs in Latin America it is not only possible, but would seem logical.

2. Prioritize by Strategic Objective.

The funding of security assistance programs for countries other than Israel, Egypt, and base-rights countries are too low. So low in fact, that in some cases the program is meaningless. The programs for those countries that have low-intensity conflict going, which includes most Latin American recipients, should be treated separately from Israel, Egypt, and base-rights countries. The objectives are different and the funding requirements are not significant when compared to those programs. The programs for countries with low-intensity conflicts should be funded separately based on their strategic merits.


Current laws governing security assistance pricing require "no loss" on the item(s) sold. That requires each item be priced at a price that includes administration charges, and research and development reimbursement. This causes US equipment to be priced an average of 9% higher that the US military actually pays for the item. (7:33) In effect, the
United States is pricing itself right out of the market. While it is true that US equipment is highly desired, countries will often out of necessity turn to cheaper suppliers.

We need to consider the value received from the effect of stabilizing countries besieged with low-intensity conflicts. We need to establish standardized prices for equipment provided aid recipients with on-going low-intensity conflicts. This price should be a favorable fixed price. There is a precedence for that type of pricing as that was the method used for programing equipment for the MAP recipients in the 1960s and 1970s. The prices were contained in a Military Article and Services Listing (MASL). It is recommended that the United States return to such a system for LIC threatened countries and price based on gain for national strategy vice "no loss."

4. Permit Leasing of Equipment.

The study recommended this as an "alternative to FMS or grant aid that would often be in the interest of both the recipient country and the United States."(7:35) This is an option that must be approached very carefully with extreme care being taken to ensure that such an arrangement is in the best interest of both parties. A lease in which clear requirements for return of the equipment (when, where, and in what condition) are not laid out and agreed to in detail, can often be counter-productive to the maintenance of good relations. A far better alternative is a reduced price sale with extended terms of
payment using grant aid funds. Having said that there may be
times when leasing is the best approach and the option should be
available in the interest of flexibility. The leases, however,
should not be used as an expedient to allow for rapid delivery
because often poor drafting of the terms of the lease, often
associated with rapid processing, creates problems on both
sides.

5. Authorize Trade-In Allowances.

This recommendation by the study is one which would in
essence refurbish the repair and return system by providing what
would be tantamount to a float asset for an unserviceable
repairable piece of equipment owned by the country.

While this would be good for the country, I cannot
really envision any use the United States could make of the
trade-in except to provide it to another security assistance
customer. More than likely, if the piece of equipment is in
good enough condition to allow refurbishment and transfer to
another country, then the original owner would more than likely
want it back. I think a better alternative to the trade-in
system proposed is a streamlining of the repair and return
system to make it more responsive; and, if a replacement is
needed until repair and return could be effected, then that may
be good reason for a lease.

6. Reconstitute the Security Assistance Offices.

This is probably the most powerful recommendation made
by the study. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the United States
had an excellent system of MAAGs and other advisory elements throughout the world. In the late 1970s, the MAAGs were gutted and crippled by the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. In spite of the fact that "help in long-term military planning is one of the main benefits the United States can provide to developing countries." (7:36) Congress passed these acts making the security assistance system merely a logistical system to deliver equipment to recipients who were financially solvent and had well-established military. These acts limited the SAO's duties to:

-- case management of equipment and services,
-- training management,
-- program monitoring,
-- administrative support,
-- promoting rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (in NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand), and
-- liaison function exclusive of advisory and training assistance.

As can be seen by examining the permitted functions, the SAO is prohibited from providing advice and planning help to the country. In the Latin American countries facing low-intensity conflicts advice and help can be as vital as the equipment provided. It certainly produces a synergistic effect when coupled with the equipment. That advice cannot be totally provided by teams sent into the country on temporary duty. TDY teams are not attuned to in-country requirements and pitfalls,
therefore, valuable time is lost while the team gains confidence in itself and gains the confidence of the people they came to advise and train. Because these are TDY teams, there is a lack of continuity because rarely does the same team conduct any follow-on training, therefore, mistakes are repeated and lessons are learned over again.

The United States should return to a system of permanent MAAGs and advisory offices. Ones that are adequately staffed to provide the necessary advice and assistance especially to the LIC besieged countries in our hemisphere and the Latin American countries.

7. Involve the Regional CINCs.

As was discussed earlier, the regional CINCs are responsible for all US military activities in their area of responsibility. In most countries in Latin America, security assistance is the only means to further US interest. It only follows then, that the CINC must have a pivotal role in planning and executing the security assistance programs for his regions' countries. CINCSOUTH recently expressed his views as follows:

Planning should be based on objectives not administrative expedience. The objectives, in this case, are to enhance defense cooperation and strengthen military relations with our friends and allies.

Planning requirements should flow from line agencies: SAOs, Unified Commands, and the JCS. Although the Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance (AIASA) process currently takes these steps, it really serves as a tool for requesting funds from Congress; the majority of day-to-day planning functions are actually managed at the DSAA level. Knowledge and pre-planning of U.S. security assistance efforts serve the CINC as an important source of
information into the allied state of preparedness. The CINCs already have war plans and intelligence at their disposal to aid them in security assistance planning and crisis response. The regional CINCs also need to have direct and formal input into security assistance budget allocation and long-range planning. (7:40)

The CINCs must be put back in the security assistance business. The CINC's staff and the SAO must work "hand in glove" in planning and executing the program for the country. The SAO is the link between the CINC and the Ambassador. The Unified Command is the chain through which it is ensured that country's program is integrated regionally while the embassy is the channel through which the program is integrated with other foreign aid programs intra-country. That system will work well; it did in the 1960s and early 1970s, and it is worth returning to. The CINC's must again be the in-theater master of the security assistance program on a regional basis.

8. Use DOD Exercises to Help Friends and Allies.

"U.S. military exercises are a cost effective way to provide economic, humanitarian, and military assistance to allies and friends among the developing nations." (7:42) This cost effective means of providing security assistance also is an irreplaceable means of training US soldiers, in everything from deployment to a foreign nation to field medical procedures. The problem with exercises such as this is that when they are viewed as security assistance, the laws require the USG must be reimbursed for the assistance. This is a source for many disputes as to what security assistance is and what is a valid
US training exercise. It would appear, as suggested by the report, that if the exercise was sound and valid training for US forces which enhanced their readiness, and it was an exercise that contributed to US regional strategy, then any benefit that accrued to the country should not be charged to the security assistance. As have been shown time and again, the US services have gained invaluable experience in these exercises. Experience that would be impossible to obtain in any other fashion. Additionally, the military services of the developing countries have learned a great deal from these combined exercises with US troops. Training that helps solidify the proper place for the military in a democratic government. The exercise should not be discouraged, but rather encouraged and promoted as an opportunity for US forces to gain valuable training, while providing valuable training. The exercises should be totally funded by the United States except for the direct costs incurred by the host country; i.e., rations, pay, consumables, etc.


This critically important program is a low-cost, high-visibility means of passing the American way of life and the principles on which our country is founded, to our friends and allies. This program, as discussed earlier, has provided professional military education to almost 600,000 military men and women, since its inception with over 1,500 attaining positions of prominence in their respective governments ranging.
from general officer to cabinet minister to chief of a military service. The IMET Program, which amounts to a mere $11.6 million in FY89 for Latin America, is besieged with legislative sanctions by Congress. These sanctions prevent the United States from providing IMET funding training to many countries who badly need such training and to whom the export of such information would be invaluable to the United States. The unfortunate result is that the sanctions prevent the United States from communicating with just the people we need to communicate with to obtain the charges we desire. This program needs to be fully funded and the sanctions removed.

Additionally, we need to examine the training available under the IMET Program to ensure our service schools are teaching subjects that are pertinent to the LICs in Latin America. We need to be certain that courses taught meet the requirements and are professionally administered. To do less is to waste precious resources and valuable opportunities.

10. Authorize Security Assistance for Police Training.

The importance of this recommendation becomes self-evident when one realizes that in many Latin American countries, the police department is subordinate to the defense department. In some cases, such as in Costa Rica, there is no military, making the police department the only defense force the country has. However, the Foreign Assistance Act "prohibits against providing training, advice, or financial support to foreign police forces." (7:47) This prohibition is ludicrous,
there is no reason to deny aid and training to police forces who are not guilty of human rights violations, and the law should be changed to reflect that. We are currently able to obtain exceptions to the law, but it remains a restriction that must be worked around and one that should be changed.

11. Tailor Support for Countries Fighting Insurgency.

When it comes to what improvements can be made in the security assistance program, to use it properly in combating LIC in Latin America, this is one of the most significant recommendations of the entire study. The inventory of materiel in the US armed services does not contain much of the equipment required to combat insurgencies on LICs. Pure logic tells you that the equipment used to fight a sophisticated enemy on the plains of Europe, is not the same equipment that is required to fight a LIC in the jungles of Central America. The doctrine and training for the European theater is not relevant to a low-intensity conflict either.

The study lists 10 needs of developing countries in conducting a counterinsurgency campaign. They are:

a. intensive help with intelligence,
b. cheap, reliable, and secure intelligence,
c. transportation that is affordable,
d. help with their logistics systems,
e. help in informing their people,
f. medical support and training,
g. help with civic action and civil engineering projects,
h. help in organizing local enterprises that can manufacture military goods,
i. aid in finding non-US sources of materiel, and
j. military training. (7:49)

In each of these, security assistance can provide immense help and the program must be altered to provide that help. For example, communication equipment is vital to the prosecution of a LIC campaign, however, the countries do not need the sophisticated costly equipment found in the US military inventory. Less expensive equipment will often do the job just as well if not better.

We need to create the flexibility in the program to allow the acquisition of these less sophisticated radios. This same situation applies to all commodities. The program must allow the acquisition of what is referred to as LIC-relevant military goods and services for those Latin American countries that require them. These must be acquired from the least costly source to make the program go as far as possible. This should even include off-the-shelf equipment from other countries.

In this chapter, I reviewed some problems with the security assistance program and some recommended solutions that could make the program much more effective in Latin America. One might even go so far as to say, if some of these improvements are not implemented, then the security assistance program in Latin America may cease to exist as a true instrument of foreign policy and a weapon in the arsenal of the regional CINC.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the previous chapters, I have discussed in general what the security assistance program is, who the players are, what its history in Latin America has been, how it should be used by the CINC, and finally, evaluation of some very specific recommendations. In the next few paragraphs, I would like to conclude with some observations and recommendations.

First, let me say I do feel the security assistance program has some serious problems, but it is not fatally flawed. Having said that, I will say that it will take a major overhaul of the program to fix it. The Defense Department has been of that opinion for quite some time, but despite legislative initiatives put forth, the congressional interference in the program continued. Now Congress itself is calling for massive revision of the program. The Task Force on Foreign Assistance from the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House recently reported that economic and military aid programs should be scrapped and reconstituted from scratch to fundamentally alter the way the United States sells arms abroad and disperses military aid. The report went on to recommend that Congress reduce its involvement in the aid program. It recommended a totally new Economic Cooperation Act to take the place of the existing Foreign Assistance Act, and stated that a
fresh start is unlikely if Congress simply revises and adds yet more amendments to an already cluttered act. (23:1)

This same sentiment of limiting congressional involvement was echoed to some degree by Representative Ike Skelton in a recent article for Army Magazine in which he said, "While Congress is not institutionally equipped to manage any program--either in domestic or foreign policy--it certainly can torpedo one. If, however, you can convince the public about the rightness of your cause, Congress will listen." (11:24)

This is some of the smartest thinking Congress has ever shown regarding the program. Since this indicates the receptive mood of Congress on revising the program, the DOD and State need to capitalize on that mood and do just that--revise the program and help Congress rewrite the enabling legislation. That legislation must untie the hands of the CINC in planning and executing the program, it must recognize secure friends and allies have a value of their own, and that a "no profit, no loss" basis is the wrong basis for the program. The program must be based and funded from a strategic objective standpoint, and it must be well integrated with the other foreign aid and defense programs.

DOD must then revise its regulations and operating procedures to put the regional CINC back in his proper place in planning, executing, and controlling the program on a regional, I say again, a regional basis. He must be provided, especially
in Latin America, the authority to use this weapon in his arsenal in a manner to accomplish his mission and achieve his objectives.

A good starting point on just how to do this would be to examine just how the program was planned, executed, and controlled during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s. During those periods, the program was a success and the regional CINC was involved totally and completely.
NOTES


3. Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Maldonado, "The Arms Transfer Issue: A Latin America Perspective" (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1982).


8. United States of America Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, (Fiscal Year 1989).


BIBLIOGRAPHY


