ARMY AND FRONTIER IN RUSSIA

SOVIET ARMY STUDIES OFFICE

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AD-A216 372

SOVIETS OFFICE Approved for public release: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

90 01 10 012
**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form Approved</th>
<th>OMB No. 0704-0188</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>Unclassified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT</td>
<td>Unclassified/Unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>Soviet Army Studies Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)</td>
<td>ATZL: SAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)</td>
<td>HQ CAC ATZL: SAS FT. Leavenworth, KS 66027-5015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>Combined Arms Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)</td>
<td>CAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS</td>
<td>Program Element No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)</td>
<td>ARM AND FRONTIER IN RUSSIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>MEYLING, BRUCE W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13a. TYPE OF REPORT</td>
<td>Final</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13b. TIME COVERED</td>
<td>From TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)</td>
<td>1986 OCTOBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. PAGE COUNT</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. COSATI CODES</td>
<td>FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)</td>
<td>IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ARMY, FRONTIER WARFARE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)</td>
<td>THE STUDY DESCRIBES HOW THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ARMY ADAPTED ITS TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN A FRONTIER ENVIRONMENT AND EXPLAINS WHY SOME CHANGES PERSISTED AND OTHERS DID NOT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</td>
<td>Unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL</td>
<td>Tim Meyling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)</td>
<td>913 684-4337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22c. OFFICE SYMBOL</td>
<td>ATZL: SAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Form 1473, JUN 86
- Previous editions are obsolete.
ARMY AND FRONTIER IN RUSSIA

by

Dr. Bruce W. Menning
Soviet Army Studies Office
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The views expressed here are those of the
Soviet Army Studies Office. They should not
necessarily be construed as validated threat doctrine.
Precedent and focus render this an appropriate forum for a discussion of the impact of the frontier on the Imperial Russian Army. The presentations of two Harmon Memorial lecturers, Robert Utley on the frontier and the American military tradition (1977) and Peter Paret on innovation and reform in warfare (1966), testify to an interest in two broad subject areas which have often been both prominent and related in Russian history.¹ The theme of this year's symposium, transformation in Russian and Soviet military history, implies a willingness to view Russian and Soviet military development in broad perspective, of which the frontier and its military legacy remain important parts.

Historians of Russia have long acknowledged a direct though sometimes imprecise link between the frontier in various guises and military-related change. Nearly a century ago, V. O. Kliuchevskii saw in the twin burdens of territorial expansion and frontier defense the origins of the autocratic Russian state and its military landowning gentry. He saw these same burdens, which flowed in large part from the Eastern Slavs' historic impulse toward colonization, dictating the reforms of Peter the Great. In brief, over long periods of time, resettlement opened new frontiers for the Eastern Slavs, confronting them with novel circumstances and peoples and imposing on them new military exigencies.² Subsequent observers, including western historians as diverse as B. H. Sumner, William H. McNeill, Joseph L. Wieczynski, and Richard Hellie, have at times estimated the
impact of the frontier on various Russian institutions, including the military. However, for reasons of intent and focus, their and other treatments usually concentrate more on consequence within social context than on persistent reciprocal impact between frontier circumstance and fighting institution. This remains particularly true for the imperial period, for which only scattered accounts exist to trace Russian military evolution against a background of nearly two centuries of incessant warfare in varying degrees of intensity on the periphery. Still less attention has been devoted to an assessment of how these experiences might have made themselves felt either in the Tsarist or Soviet armies.

Both Utley's work on the U.S. Army and Paret's study of innovation and military reform suggest categories of investigation, analysis, interpretation, and comparison. In light of their precedent, a primary objective of this essay is to identify and assess the impact of frontier-style enemy and environment on the evolution of the Imperial Russian Army and related military institutions. A second objective is to trace the enduring effect of frontier-inspired change on longer-term military innovation and reform. The Russian experience suggests similarities and differences with the American frontier and European reform experiences. Whatever the circumstances and consequences, at stake is a fundamental issue: how military organizations assimilate experience and then either apply,
misapply or fail to apply "lessons learned" in order to accommodate challenge and change.

As preface to discussion, a few definitions and delimitations are in order. In his study of military frontiersmanship, Robin Higham has suggested that the scholar might discern at least eight different kinds of frontiers. In the interests of simplification, the present study borrows from Frederick Jackson Turner by way of the venerable B. H. Sumner to define the frontier more generically as an area --or advancing line-- of "struggle for the mastering of the natural resources of an untamed country." For the purposes of this essay, we are concerned primarily --but not wholly-- with the military aspects of this struggle. This study also limits its chronological scope to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and its geographical scope to the frontiers of the steppe, mountain, and desert, or the area stretching east from the Danube across the northern littoral of the Black Sea through the Caucasus and on into central Asia. Finally, the present treatment acknowledges that during the eighteenth century, issues of force composition and style of warfare argue compellingly that Turkey be numbered among Russia's frontier adversaries.

Two centuries of armed struggle over this unfolding frontier established the southern and southeastern limits of Russia and helped endow the original Tsarist patrimony with the assets of empire. Frontier conflict also confronted the Russian Army with challenges of enemy and environment quite different from the more
conventional circumstances of the north and west. Distances were often vast, the dangers of outside intervention real, material and population resources frequently few, and the enemies usually numerous and unconventional. For long intervals, including at least three decades in the eighteenth century and three or four decades in the nineteenth, the struggle for frontier mastery devoured a major share of the military's resources and played an important -- but often ill-defined -- role in determining the very nature of the evolving Imperial Russian Army. The same struggle in many respects also determined the character of Russia's southern expansion effort, endowing it with a quasi-military character that has not escaped the scrutiny of various commentators.

Apart from organizational and operational considerations, one of the Russian frontier's more enduring legacies lay in the mind, where it might alternately liberate, captivate, terrify, or simply bore. For writers such as Pushkin, Lermontov, and Tolstoy, frontier service became a literary vehicle for depicting important rites of passage in several senses of the phrase. For others, the frontier provided an environment in which they might slip the bonds of convention "to kill like a Cossack." For more than a few others, alternating periods of combat and tiresome garrison duty juxtaposed fear and routine, and exhilaration and boredom in strange ways which seemed to encourage bizarre diversions: Lermontov's Pechorin shot flies off his walls, while a subsequent generation's officers shot at the sound of each
others' voices in darkened rooms. For the more serious-minded, including apostles of military change ranging from G. A. Potemkin to D. A. Miliutin, the harsh necessities of frontier service were inspiration for innovation. In a word, frontier service held something for nearly everyone, whether author, adventurer, soldier, or reformer.

On the frontier, one learned not only to think, but also how to fight, and sometimes how to die. Over the span of two centuries of intermittent fighting, nearly every campaign held its Russian equivalent of a Custer horror story. In 1717, Peter the Great sent Prince A. Bekovich-Cherkasskii with a 3,600-man detachment to Khiva in search of conquest and gold, and thanks to treachery the Tsar's troops were almost to a man either butchered or sold into slavery. In 1773, the entire rearguard (three officers and 153 rank-and-file) of the Apsheronskii infantry regiment perished south of the Danube covering the withdrawal of an unsuccessful raiding force. In 1839, the Orenburg Governor-General, V. A. Perovskii, in another futile march against Khiva, lost two-thirds of a 5,000-men detachment to cold and disease in the wintry steppe south of the Urals. In 1840, the garrison of Mikhailovskoe fortress in the Caucasus held off repeated Cherkess assaults until the situation became hopeless, then retreated to the inner citadel to earn collective immortality when one of their number ignited the powder magazine. In 1864, 57 of Captain V. R. Serov's 112 Cossacks died in a Kokandian encirclement outside Russian-held Tashkent before the remainder broke through.
their tormentors in a last desperate charge to the city gates. ¹³ The more heroic of these and similar events became the stuff of legend and celebration in regimental messes.

They were also the substance of a little-understood military culture's "lessons learned." To avoid repetition of disaster or to achieve success with greater efficiency and less pain and loss, adaptation and change were crucial to Russian military institutions as they confronted new circumstances, technologies and enemies. In 1894, A. N. Petrov, a Russian general officer and military historian, succinctly summed up his Army's responses, especially its tactical innovations, to a century of warfare in the south steppe by asserting that, "They were in complete accordance with the circumstances of the situation." More recently and in more general terms, Peter Paret has reminded us that military institutions remain both responsive and responsible to the world around them. ¹⁴ Within the Russian context, the Imperial Army both reacted to and acted upon the frontier in diverse ways that affected how the Russians waged war and how they thought about waging war. Some innovations were persistent, many were not.

Within the larger picture, the issue of interaction between frontier warfare and technology can be dismissed with relative ease. This was in large part because military technology remained static for more than three quarters of the period under discussion. When breechloaders and smokeless powder finally appeared, they multiplied with telling effect the firepower of
conventional military forces. However, just as in the American case, artillery --except for light artillery-- and weapons capable of more rapid fire --except for breechloaders-- were usually frowned upon because of weight and difficulty of supply. Only in the Caucasus, where the Murids came into early possession of rifles, did rapid armament of Russian forces after 1856 with corresponding weapons seem to have immediate tactical impact. Otherwise, frontier warfare re-emphasized traditional tools, including chiefly the settler's old allies, the ax and pick-ax, both in fortifying positions and depriving the enemy of cover. Only in the later stages of frontier conflict did the gradual appearance of the telegraph and steam-driven transport produce limited impact. Steam shipping rendered operations more predictable in areas close to water. Although rail lines reduced time required for transit to theater, they were rarely sufficiently developed to affect operations within the theater itself. The telegraph had important tactical and operational implications, but with few exceptions, Russian tacticians failed to perceive the decisive importance of more sophisticated communications until after the Russo-Japanese War. In contrast, military engineering was an important consideration during the entire Imperial period for a variety of reasons ranging from field fortification to road building.

The limited impact of technology meant that the conventional triumphed over the unconventional chiefly through tactical, organizational, and intellectual innovation. As General Petrov so
well understood, confrontations on the frontier encouraged daring departures from accepted practice simply because frontier-style circumstances and enemies changed the relationship among primary components within the calculus of combat power. Or, to put it another way, the relative emphasis among the elements of J.F.C. Fuller's "hit, move, protect" formula for calculating combat power fell on the first two elements.\(^1\) Enemies usually moved fast and struck unexpectedly, trusting to mass, speed, knowledge of the terrain, and surprise to carry the day. They rarely waited for conventional foes to bring up their forces and firepower for deployment in accordance with accepted military practice. Rather, enemies from the mountains and steppe, whether Nogai, Kalmyk, or Cherkess, preferred to harass, fade into the distance, bide their time, then fall unexpectedly in overwhelming numbers on poorly led, inexperienced, and tired soldiers.\(^1\)

Answers to these and other challenges frequently came in the form of tactical and organizational flexibility and fluidity. From the second half of the eighteenth century, the Russians began to accumulate sufficient expertise, experience, and confidence to improvise new tactics and formations for confrontations in the steppe with Tatar cavalry and Turkish infantry. Under the pressure of horde-formation attacks, the Russians adopted or refashioned tactical formations which capitalized on flexibility and discipline both in the approach march and the assault. A re-emphasis on training and spirit imparted the confidence and expertise necessary to develop both
facility in battle drill and trust in the tactical integrity of even small formations. This enabled commanders such as P. A. Rumiantsev and A. V. Suvorov to march more rapidly to contact over parallel routes in smaller formations. It also enabled them to engage in the articulated attack, which meant they could anticipate battles of annihilation using hammer-and-anvil style tactics. At the same time, Prince G. A. Potemkin's innovative reforms in uniforms and equipment facilitated readiness and rapidity of movement. However, novel approaches failed to resolve the dilemmas of siege warfare, which continued to be a thorn in the side of Russian commanders until they learned to resolve it either by storm or by ignoring the fortresses to concentrate on their covering field forces.

The campaigns of Rumiantsev and Suvorov also revealed the limitations of frontier-inspired innovation. Although their exploits inspired emulation and envy, too often contemporary and subsequent interpretors ignored context, thus obscuring the frontier origins of departures from convention during a period of relatively static military practice. The exigencies of frontier warfare helped explain why field commanders sought original answers to tactical problems which, although limited in scope, either anticipated or accompanied military changes often associated with the innovations of the French Revolution. Yet, Russian changes were not always persistent because they were written into field regulations only in general terms; therefore, much was left to the caprice of individual commanders in training.
and application for specific circumstances. Except for the occasional military commission, innovators lacked either the systematic interpreters or the educational institutions which would distill wisdom from successful practice and inculcate it as accepted method within the officer corps. Finally, the commanders themselves often failed to translate tactics from the realm of the unconventional to the conventional. In 1778, Suvorov himself prescribed the following tactical formations to the Crimean and Kuban Corps: "against regular forces the linear order as in the Prussian war; against irregulars as in the last Turkish war."²¹

Less eye-catching than novel tactics — although in certain ways more persistent— were changes in force structure and organizational emphasis associated with frontier warfare. Unlike the American frontier, where the U. S. Army scarcely ever exceeded 30,000 men, the frontier wars in Russia devoured manpower: the Turkish wars of the eighteenth century were instrumental in raising the complement of the Imperial Russian Army to 300,000, while the Caucasian wars of the nineteenth century eventually engaged the efforts of 200,000 men. Although densities in central Asia were lower, a chain of forts and related force requirements for active military campaign regularly engaged 50,000 troops concentrated in several frontier military districts. These considerations, plus the necessity to maintain additional conventional forces in the event of simultaneous war in Europe, were jointly responsible for the tremendous growth of the Russian Army between 1750 and 1881.²²
The same requirements in large part also determined the mix of components. Speed and maneuverability were assets on the frontier, and corresponding emphasis fell upon light troops, including jaegers and Cossacks, whose numbers multiplied geometrically during the earlier phases of frontier warfare. By the 1790s, the organizational innovations of Prince Potemkin had left the Imperial Army with a jaeger force of 50,000 men, a number equivalent to or larger than a number of standing European armies. However, differentiation tended to disappear as infantry became more homogeneous in the Napoleonic era and as frontier fighting establishments such as the Caucasian Corps achieved an identity separate from the rest of the Russian Army. Indeed, isolation meant that the Caucasian Corps trained and fought differently, and that only in exceptional instances did frontier regular (or irregular) communicate with establishment regular. This prompted the historian P. A. Zaionchkovskii to note that on the eve of the Crimean War there were in effect two Russian armies: a frontier army in the Caucasus and a regular army deployed elsewhere. He very directly associated the former with the innovating spirit of Suvorov and his spiritual heirs and the latter with the dead hand of military formalism.

In ways unperceived and probably unintended the Cossack forces of Imperial Russia became a curious bridge between the frontier army and the more conventional military establishment. In the American West, Robert Utley has speculated how the U. S. military tradition might have been altered had the U. S. Army
consciously chosen to fight a larger proportion of its battles with auxiliaries. The Cossacks of Imperial Russia afford something of an answer to that speculation. As sometime military auxiliaries of the Tsar, the Cossacks had performed various kinds of frontier service since the days of the formation of Muscovy. During the Imperial period, as the number of frontier enemies multiplied, Cossacks came increasingly to be relied upon to fill an organizational gap created by a shortage of adequate numbers of regular cavalry and a tactical and operational gap created by the regulars' inadequate speed, flexibility, and lightness. Thanks to reforms initiated and perpetuated by Prince Potemkin, the number of Cossack hosts proliferated, and they became an important part of the conquest and settlement of the steppe and the Caucasus.

By the first decades of the nineteenth century, Cossacks increasingly supplemented the forces of the regular army cavalry, and many of their attributes which had been necessities on the frontier came to be viewed as virtues in a new vision for the utility of mobile forces which flowed from the experiences of the Napoleonic wars. In addition to their frontier functions, the Cossacks came to inherit a number of other missions, ranging from providing security and engaging in the "little war" to composing the nucleus for long-range mobile strike forces and fielding main battle mounted combatants. The Cossacks' continued usefulness was a vision supported by A. I. Chernyshev, who became Nicholas I's Minister of War, and shared by other leading military figures of
the period, including the Emperor himself. It was this proliferation of missions that accounted for the burst of reform activity which completed the regularization of Cossack military service and that prompted multiplication of Cossack hosts in the 1830s and 1840s, even as the Caucasian wars raged and central Asia levied new frontier requirements. Despite the military reforms of the liberal era, the Cossacks remained important and persistent fixtures within the Russian Army, albeit increasingly regularized and increasingly integrated into the formal military establishment. They were destined both to live on the frontier and to outlive it.

This was in part because warfare across vast distances on the frontier encouraged commanders and theoreticians to seek rapid decision through concerted application of mass and mobility. Christopher Duffy has already pointed out that one of Peter the Great's contributions to Imperial Russian military organization was his employment of the corps volant, or "flying corps," a large, all-arms mobile force designed to undertake missions either independently or in conjunction with regular forces within a theater of operations. Although the frontier in itself did not figure prominently in Peter's original calculations, forces and experiences drawn from the frontier ensured that the conception would not die with its originator. As Cossack service became increasingly regularized under Peter's successors, light horsemen from the steppe frontier made up a larger proportion of successive flying corps, real and
theoretical. In 1760, five Cossack regiments contributed to the advance guard of G. K. Totleben's raid on Berlin. In 1785, Prince Potemkin seriously proposed sending a huge Cossack raiding corps into the Prussian rear in the event that Frederick II decided to invade Russian Poland while the majority of the Imperial Russian Army occupied itself with operations on the southern frontier. The mission of the corps would have been chiefly to operate against Prussian logistics and lines of communication. The idea was that such a mass of cavalry swarming in the Prussian rear would divert Frederick's attention and arrest his advance until additional Russian forces could be transferred to the theater to augment the customary Observation Army.

Potemkin's vision became limited reality during the Napoleonic era, when a new generation of cavalry leaders would benefit from the frontier organizational legacy of Catherine's one-eyed reformer. Between 1812 and 1815, a number of officers, including not only A. I. Chernyshev, but also V. V. Orlov-Denisov and M. I. Platov, would either build or stake military reputations on their ability to launch flying corps in daring thrusts along enemy flanks and deep into the rear. Their versions of flying corps were usually --but not always-- of mixed composition, with a majority of Cossacks and other light auxiliaries accompanied by smaller detachments of infantry and horse artillery. During 1813 and 1814, these formations struck out for enemy objectives deep in rear areas, sowing panic and
securing information, key population centers, and road junctions for the allied cause.  

From the time of Alexander I, therefore, the vision of using mobile forces --often Cossack in composition-- on a large scale to achieve what we now might call operational results within a theater of war remained a permanent fixture in Russian military thinking. In addition to Cossack forces, for example, Nicholas I retained a 12,000-man dragoon corps to support independent mobile operations. During the period following the American Civil War, Russian officers such as I. V. Gurko and N. N. Sukhotin saw in the experiences of Jeb Stuart and Nathan Bedford Forrest an affirmation of earlier Russian thinking about the mass use of cavalry even in an era of new weaponry. P. I. Mishchenko's raid against Inkou in early 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War was testimony to the faith in this vision. So also was V. A. Sukhomlinov's scheme of 1912, which resurrected Potemkin's eighteenth-century plan to insert a large mobile raiding force into Prussia in the event of war with Germany. After World War I, the fluid conditions of the Russian Civil War encouraged the fielding of mobile formations on a scale which might be termed a latter-day reincarnation of a vision originally born on Russia's frontier steppes.

The Cossack experience and mobile strikes aside, frontier circumstances also revealed the limits of traditional order-of-battle style structures in both prosecuting a war and mobilizing the forces and resources necessary for supporting war. In fact,
the contemporary Soviet military district owes its origins to organizational departures associated with the names of Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, Viceroy of the Caucasus, and D. A. Miliutin, his chief-of-staff. While serving together in the Caucasus between 1856 and 1860, the two sought a novel approach to army organizational dilemmas required by centralized orchestration of tighter resources and decentralized tactical execution. From the early nineteenth century, the Imperial Russian Army in times of war and peace had been typically administered, supported, and quartered in a manner reflecting corps- and even army-size order of battle dispositions. Within the sprawling Caucasian theater of frontier warfare, the difficulty with such traditional organizational mechanisms was that centralized command and staff institutions proved inadequate simultaneously to control far-flung operations and to manage spare logistical and administrative support.\(^3\)

On the grounds at least in part of previous Caucasian experience, Miliutin and Bariatinskii devised a territorially-based system of military administration which balanced the requirements of centralized command and supervision with the necessity for decentralized tactical execution.\(^3\) They created within the Caucasus a system of five military districts, the boundaries of which roughly corresponded with natural geographic divisions. Each district was assigned its own commander and headquarters staff to coordinate with central administration and to plan and control local military operations. At the same time,
the Commander of the Caucasus retained overall supervision of military operations and centralized control of logistics. In a word, the new design left overall responsibility with the Caucasus commander while freeing the hands of his district subordinates to prosecute the war in a manner suitable to the peculiarities of geography and enemy within each district. Thus, the system embodied a calculated decentralization for flexibility and effectiveness which came to be a hallmark of Miliutin's subsequent military reforms. Less than a decade later, Miliutin as War Minister, with appropriate modifications, imposed his system of military districts on the remainder of the Russian Empire.

As the evolution of the military district indicated, frontier fighting encouraged commanders to weigh the totality of their military missions against the totality of their assets. Because of the nature of various theaters, this calculus naturally included naval assets. Early Cossacks had understood the benefits conferred by ability to take to the water; they had devoted substantial energy to expeditions on the river systems of the steppe and the seas into which they emptied. Circumstances caused subsequent conquerors and rulers to imitate Cossack example. Thus, from the time of Peter the Great, naval concerns figured prominently in most military campaigns on the southern and southeastern periphery. River flotillas moved troops and supplies and provided badly-needed firepower. Modest fleets on the Black Sea and Caspian were to a considerable extent dedicated
to support shore operations in the steppe, mountains, and desert. During the Caucasian wars, only support from the sea enabled the beleaguered network of shoreline fortresses to survive repeated Murid onslaughts. Even in central Asia, river flotillas played an important part supporting ground operations. Officers from the time of P. V. Chichagov to S. O. Makarev owed some or all of their early careers to operations on the frontier, which became a kind of leadership laboratory in which successive generations of young naval officers received early experience in independent command. Indeed, one might plausibly argue that some of the first Russian equivalent in joint operations occurred against the Tatars of the steppe and mountaineers of the Caucasus.¹³

In other ways that we do not completely understand, the frontier also helped condition the very manner in which the Russians conceived of waging war within one or more theaters by taking into account overall problems and the resources available for the resolution of those problems. The Russian military historian D. F. Maslovskii has noted that during the Russo-Turkish War of 1787-1791, Prince Potemkin had been the first officer in the history of Russian military art to wield the authority of a commander-in-chief over operations in several theaters.¹⁴ In the nineteenth century, it was no coincidence that D. A. Miliutin pioneered in modern military statistical studies of various areas and resources within and without theaters of operations. These and subsequent compilations would figure prominently in the reshaping of Russian military institutions to
confront the far-flung military problems of empire. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, these statistical and geographical studies went hand-in-hand with theoretical developments associated with G. A. Leer and others at the Academy of the General Staff who sought answers to contemporary military challenges in the undying principles of strategy as embodied in contemporary interpretations of Napoleonic warfare. The problem was that Leer and his disciples tended to view the mid-century innovations associated with the wars of German unification from a purely Napoleonic perspective. Nonetheless, the prospect of war against both conventional and unconventional adversaries within specific theaters heavily influenced Russian military thinking about assets, probable enemies, and issues of command, operations, and tactics. This was the legacy inherited by subsequent theoreticians as diverse as N. P. Mikhnevich and V. K. Triandafillov. They, in turn, would serve as intellectual midwives in the birth of military theories that would eventually culminate in modern Soviet operational art.

The catalytic effect of the frontier on military intellectual development in Russia thus varied somewhat from the American experience. However, in at least one area the Russian and American experiences were similar: the way that Utley saw frontier war presaging twentieth-century total war. By definition, frontier warfare involves a clash of cultures, and it just might be that in most cases such a fundamental clash eventually culminates in the death of one or the other of the
protagonists. Those who are horrified by Custer’s tactics on the Washita have not read of Suvorov in the steppe against the Nogai Tatars and Kalmyks. Those who are horrified by contemporary Soviet operations in Afghanistan have not read of Russian military operations in the Caucasus. With the rise of Muridism, the Caucasian wars assumed an ever more total character, so that by the 1850s, extermination and deportation had become regular features of the Russian way of war against the mountain peoples. By 1864, one contemporary calculated that 450,000 mountaineers had been forced to resettle. Meanwhile, thanks to pacification operations, entire tribes had been decimated and relocated to assure Russian military control of key areas, routes, and shorelines.

Numbers were not so obvious in Central Asia, but the population --perhaps because it seemed more Asiatic-- evoked what amounted to be racist responses from Russian commanders. The English observer George Curzon, for example, remained much impressed by the Russian penchant to apply massive force in the face of native resistance to military penetration. The British. Curzon believed, struck gingerly "a series of taps, rather than a downright blow." In contrast, M. D. Skobelev, hero of 1877-78, asserted, "I hold it as a principle that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. The harder you hit them, the longer they will remain quiet afterwards." As Skobelev’s own actions suggested, this approach did not exclude inflicting mass slaughter on a broad
cross-section of the population to further Russian interests and subordination of the peoples in question. Central Asia, a locale into which Russia was far less capable of injecting manpower and resources than either the south steppe or the Caucasus, seemed to breed its own peculiar kind of wars of annihilation. In this respect, the frontier wars were sad precursors of twentieth-century wars of annihilation.

The Russian military frontier also had other negative aspects. To borrow a phrase from the contemporary American novelist Reynolds Price, certain segments of the legacy might unexpectedly assume the character of an "unlucky heirloom." Some experiences would always remain valid and could be transferred into other military circumstances. Others, like Price's heirloom, were better left on the frontier. This is precisely what Suvorov had acknowledged in the tactical realm when he advised his Crimean and Kuban Corps to fight in the steppe as against irregulars and in the north as in the last war against Prussia. In this century, the Russian military scholar A. A. Svechin has pointed out the pitfalls of transferring too much of the frontier legacy. He claimed that A. N. Kuropatkin in fighting against the Japanese in the Far East had brought with him habits he had learned on the military frontier in Turkestan, and that in part this fact accounted for the Russian commander's inability to deal with the realities of fighting a modern enemy.42 Always there is the problem of analyzing the conventional and unconventional experiences and extracting the useful while discarding the
useless, and for this reason modern armies have sometimes devised institutions to sift experiences to determine the appropriateness of their lessons to changed circumstance over time.

In conclusion, let us return to Utley and Paret. Various references to Utley have indicated the degree to which the Russian military experience on the frontier corresponded with the American. For reasons which merit further examination, frontier fighting appears to have affected Russian military institutions more profoundly than was the case in the United States. Within the Russian context, the Imperial Army both reacted to and acted upon the frontier in ways that affected Russian military art from tactics through strategy, that affected methods of mobilizing forces and resources for war, that influenced important conceptions about waging war, and that helped determine the means that Russians deemed necessary to achieve decision in war.

At the same time, the historian must always temper his comparisons and judgments with reference to intensity, longevity, and frequency. In light of Paret's analysis of innovation and military reform within other contexts, one might hazard to observe why some of Russia's frontier-inspired innovations were translated into reform and others were not. In the Russian experience, persistence was usually a function of organization and structure. Those changes which were institutionalized early and which demonstrated usefulness beyond the frontier tended to endure. Others which demonstrated unexpected utility under different circumstances at different times also endured. Some
innovations were also capable of transcending time and place to appear under altered guise when circumstances caused a reversion to frontier-style combat. Thus, the Russian Civil War saw the rebirth of cavalry armies and theoretical discussions of warfare in near-frontier-style circumstances under Svechin's rubric, "undeveloped theaters of war" [malokul'turnye teatry voiny].43
ENDNOTES


7. Sumner, A Short History of Russia, 1; see also, Dietrich Gerhard, "The Frontier in Comparative View," Comparative Studies in Society and History, I, No. 3 (Mar. 1959), 205-207.


14. A. N. Petrov, Vliianie turetskich voin s poloviny proshlogo stoletiia na razvitie russkogo voennogo iskusstva, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1893-1894), II, 335 (the italics are Petrov's); Paret, "Innovation and Reform in Warfare," 2.

15. See, for example, L. G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX v. (Moscow, 1974), 321.


30. See, for example, "Dokumenty, otnosiashchiesa k voennoi deiatel'nosti A. I. Chernysheva v 1812, 1813, i 1814 godakh," Sbornik ImperatorskogoRusskogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva, CXI, 230-236.


34. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia, 30-31; how Caucasian change related to the larger military establishment is described by E. Willis Brooks, "Reform and the Russian Army, 1856-1861," Slavic Review, XL, No. 1 (Spring 1984), 80-81.

35. See, for example, A. A. Samarov (ed.), P. S. Nakhimov: Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow, 1954), 135-136, 144, 146, and 150-153.


41. Quoted in Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917, 45.


43. R. R. Tsiffer, "Zametki o voine v malokul'turnykh teatrakh i metode ee izucheniiia," Voina i revoliutsiia, No. 11 (Nov. 1928), 132-139.