The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History 1959-1987
The Harmon Memorial Lectures In
Military History
1959-1987

Military history is no longer a compartmentalized area of study with a myopic focus on battlefield tactics and outcomes that pays little heed to societal influences. The "new military history," born in the 1960s, recognizes that military history is as much a product of social factors—such as politics and economics—as a shaping influence on society. Lt. Gen. Hubert R. Harmon, first superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy, was a strong advocate of the study of military history to both understand the world we live in and to shape its destiny. As a tribute to his distinguished career, the Academy started a military history lecture series named after him in 1959. This volume consolidates all the Harmon Lectures through 1987, grouping them by theme. The lectures cover a wide range of topics and eras from revolutionary America and tsarist Russia to contemporary problems in twentieth century warfare and U.S. Air Force doctrine.

The Cover
Featured is a six-ship delta formation of F-16A Fighting Falcon aircraft that belong to the 35th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kusan Air Base, Republic of Korea. (Official U.S. Air Force photo.)
The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959–1987

A Collection of the First Thirty Harmon Lectures Given at the United States Air Force Academy

Edited by Lieutenant Colonel Harry R. Borowski

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited

Office Of Air Force History
United States Air Force
Washington, D.C., 1988
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

628 p. 24 cm.—(Special Studies)
Includes index.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the policies of the United States Air Force or the Department of Defense.

To Those Who Study War

To Assure Freedom and Liberty
Lieutenant General Hubert Reilly Harmon
Lieutenant General Hubert Reilly Harmon

Lt. Gen. Hubert R. Harmon was one of several distinguished Army officers to come from the Harmon family. His father graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1880 and later served as Commandant of Cadets at the Pennsylvania Military Academy. Two older brothers, Kenneth and Millard, were members of the West Point classes of 1910 and 1912, respectively. The former served as Chief of the San Francisco Ordnance District during World War II; the latter reached flag rank and was lost over the Pacific during World War II while serving as Commander of the Pacific Area Army Air Forces. Hubert Harmon, born on April 3, 1882, in Chester, Pennsylvania, followed in their footsteps and graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1915. Dwight D. Eisenhower also graduated in this class, and nearly forty years later the two worked together to create the new United States Air Force Academy.

Harmon left West Point with a commission in the Coast Artillery Corps, but he was able to enter the new Army air branch the next year. He won his pilot's wings in 1917 at the Army flying school in San Diego. After several training assignments, he went to France in September 1918 as a pursuit pilot. Between World Wars I and II, Harmon, who was a major during most of this time, was among that small group of Army air officers who urged Americans to develop a modern, strong air arm.

At the outbreak of World War II, Brig. Gen. Hubert Harmon was commanding the Gulf Coast Training Center at Randolph Field, Texas. In late 1942 he became a major general and head of the 6th Air Force in the Caribbean. The following year General Harmon was appointed Deputy Commander for Air in the South Pacific under Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and in January 1944 he assumed command of the 13th Air Force fighting in that theater. After the war General Harmon held a series of top positions with the Air Force and was promoted to lieutenant general in 1948.

In December 1949 the Air Force established the Office of Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters and appointed General Harmon its head. For more than four years Harmon directed all efforts at securing legislative approval for a U.S. Air Force Academy, planned for its building and operation, and served on two commissions that finally selected Colorado Springs, Colorado, as the site for the new institution. On August 14, 1954, he was appointed first Superintendent of the Air Force Academy.

Upon General Harmon's retirement on July 31, 1956, the Secretary of the Air Force presented him with his third Distinguished Service Medal for
work in planning and launching the new service academy and setting its high standards. In a moving, informal talk to the cadets before leaving the Academy, General Harmon told the young airmen that the most important requirement for success in their military careers was integrity. Next to that, he placed loyalty to subordinates as well as superiors. “Take your duties seriously, but not yourself,” he told the cadets.

General Harmon passed away on February 22, 1957, just months before his son Kendrick graduated from West Point. The general’s ashes were interred at the Air Force Academy cemetery on September 28, 1958. In his memory, the Academy’s new administration building was named Harmon Hall at its dedication on May 31, 1959.
Foreword

In 1959 the United States Air Force Academy's Department of History began the Harmon Memorial Lecture Series on Military History in memory of Lt. Gen. Hubert R. Harmon, first superintendent and "father" of the Academy. The series supported two goals: to further encourage the awakened interest in military history that evolved after World War II and to stimulate cadets to develop a lifelong interest in the history of the military profession. Each year thereafter, a committee of nationally known civilian historians and Academy representatives selected an outstanding military historian to be the annual lecturer. Beginning in 1970, the Harmon Lecture also served as the keynote address for the Academy's biennial Military History Symposium. This collection of the first thirty Harmon Memorial Lectures reflects the evolution in scholarship of prominent scholars working in military history over the past three decades.

In keeping with the purpose of the series, the Academy publishes and distributes each lecture to Air Force and Department of Defense agencies, university libraries, and scholars throughout the United States and abroad. A number of lectures are used in courses at the Academy, and we receive many requests for them from civilian scholars and military personnel. Consequently, the Academy's Department of History and the Office of Air Force History have decided to publish the first thirty lectures under one cover, thereby making them more available. In this way, we continue to honor the memory of General Harmon, who during his lifetime developed a deep and abiding interest in military history and contributed so much to establishing the United States Air Force Academy.

WINFIELD W. SCOTT, Lieutenant General, USAF
Superintendent, USAF Academy
United States Air Force
Historical Advisory Committee
(As of December 1, 1987)

Anne N. Foreman
*The General Counsel, USAF*

Haskell M. Monroe, Jr.
University of Missouri-Columbia
*(Chairman)*

Norman A. Graebner
The University of Virginia

John H. Morrow, Jr.
The University of Tennessee at Knoxville

Dominick Graham
Royal Military College of Canada

Thomas M. Ryan, Jr.
General, USAF (Retired)

Ira D. Gruber
Rice University

Truman Spangrud
Lieutenant General, USAF
*Commander, Air University*

Charles R. Hamm
Lieutenant General, USAF
*Superintendent, USAF Academy*

Gerhard L. Weinberg
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Preface

Before acknowledging the many individuals who have made this volume possible, it is appropriate to present a brief history of the Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, the oldest lecture series at the Air Force Academy. The lectures originated with Lt. Gen. Hubert R. Harmon, long a student of history and the Academy's first superintendent (1954-56). Harmon strongly believed that history should play a vital role in the new Air Force Academy curriculum. Meeting with the Department of History on one occasion, he described Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.'s visit to the West Point Library before departing for the North African campaign. In a flurry of activity Patton and the librarians combed the West Point holdings for historical works that might be useful to him in the coming months. Impressed by Patton's regard for history and personally convinced of its great value, General Harmon believed cadets should study the subject during each of their four years at the Academy.

Harmon fell ill with cancer soon after launching the Air Force Academy at Lowry Air Force Base, Denver, Colorado, in 1954, and he passed away in February 1957. He had completed a monumental task over the preceding decade as the chief planner for the new service academy and as its first superintendent. Because of his leadership and the developing cold war, Congress strongly supported the development of a first-rate school and gave generous appropriations to build and staff the institution. The Academy's leadership felt greatly indebted to General Harmon and sought to memorialize his accomplishments in some way.

Following General Harmon's death, the Department of History considered launching a lecture series to commemorate him. In 1958, Capt. Alfred E. Hurley, a new faculty member, was tasked with developing the concept and preparing a formal proposal. Captain Hurley's suggestions were forwarded to Brig. Gen. Robert F. McDermott, Dean of the USAF Academy. The general quickly approved the concept early in 1959, and the annual series was named the Harmon Memorial Lecture Series in Military History.

Finding a speaker on short notice for that year posed a major problem, but Wesley Frank Craven quickly came to mind. He had served in the Army Air Forces during World War II and was well known to military historians as coeditor, with James Lea Cate, of the official, seven-volume work *The Army Air Forces in World War II*. Craven was also familiar to the Academy community because he had served on an early advisory committee
PREFACE

for Academy curriculum. He applauded the idea of the lecture series and delivered the first address in Fairchild Hall on April 27, 1959.

Although the Harmon Lectures enjoyed success from the beginning, they almost came to an early end. In 1963 discussion arose over the series' usefulness, and a senior department member suggested the lectures be terminated. General McDermott, however, judged the Harmon Lectures too important to military historians and the Academy to suspend, and he insisted they be continued. During this time, Col. George Fagan, dual hatted as Director of Libraries and Professor of History, assumed principal responsibility for continuing the series. In 1966, when Major Hurley was appointed head of the Department of History, principal responsibility for supervision of the series returned to the Department. Concurrently, the library, under Colonel Fagan's guidance, continued to edit and print the Harmon Series until 1975, when the Department assumed those functions as well. In summary, the Harmon Lectures became a permanent part of the Academy's academic curriculum through the efforts of General McDermott, Colonel Fagan, and Colonel Hurley.

As the Academy library printed the Harmon Lectures the Department of History began distributing them to military schools and college libraries throughout the United States. Over the years requests for single lectures mounted, and in the early 1970s Maj. David Maclsaac, Deputy for Military History in the Department of History, proposed that a commercial or university press publish the first fifteen lectures in a single volume for use by cadets and the academic and military communities. Several obstacles put the proposal on the shelf for nearly a decade. In early 1982 the idea was revived, although now there were an additional ten lectures involved. The concept was finally put into motion, and the publication effort began in 1986 with thirty lectures to be included.

Organizing the volume posed several challenges. Despite the wide variety of topics addressed by the authors, arrangement by subject held the greatest promise. Therefore, the thirty lectures were grouped into six sections prefaced with short introductions. (For a chronological listing of the lectures see the Appendix.) Each Harmon Lecture is presented as originally printed, with the exception of minor stylistic changes, editorial corrections, where necessary, and the condensing of biographical author information (appears at the end of each lecture) to satisfy space limitations. The various lectures addressed topics not commonly developed in contemporary monographs or textbooks. To enhance the lectures' usefulness to cadets, photographs and other illustrations not included in the original printed Harmon Lectures appear in this volume.

In summary, a caveat for the reader concerning the historical perspective of these lectures is in order. The context in which an author interpreted an event in the past is necessarily different than the context in which the
PREFACE

Although recent scholarship may disconfirm some of the historical interpretation in these essays, the kernel of historical fact they contain remains unchanged and should be read with this understanding.

HARRY R. BOROWSKI, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Department of History, USAF Academy
Acknowledgements

On behalf of the Department of History and the United States Air Force Academy, I have many people to thank and recognize, beginning with the lecturers. With the full support of these leading scholars in military history over the past three decades, the Harmon Memorial Lecture Series has become the foremost lecture series of its kind in the United States.

The leadership of the Department of History since 1959 also deserves recognition. The Department started with Lt. Col. J. Robert Sala in 1959 and was subsequently headed by Colonels Wilbert H. Ruenheck, Alfred F. Hurley, and Carl W. Reddel. Colonels Elliott L. Johnson, Philip D. Caine, and John F. Shiner also served as acting heads during this period. Department heads always worked with a committee of civilian scholars and selected members of the Department of History to assure the best historians were invited to present the annual Harmon Lecture. Civilian committee members have included in chronological order of service: W. Frank Craven, Armin Rappaport, William R. Emerson, Gordon A. Craig, Kent R. Greenfield, T. Harry Williams, Maurice Matloff, Ernest R. May, Forrest C. Pogue, Theodore Ropp, Louis Morton, Stetson Conn, Thomas G. Belden, Richard D. Challener, Michael Howard, Gerald E. Wheeler, Arthur J. Marder, Frank E. Vandiver, Sydney F. Wise, Stanley L. Falk, Don Higginbotham, John W. Shy, Russell F. Weigley, Martin Blumenson, Edward M. Coffman, Peter Paret, Philip A. Croll, I. B. Holley, Jr., D. Clayton James, Richard H. Kohn, Harold C. Deutsch, and John F. Guilmartin, Jr.

Senior department members responsible for the Academy’s military history program also played key roles in organizing and executing the Harmon Lectures. Known by various titles over the years, including deputy or director of military history, they are in chronological order of service: Lieutenant Colonels John Schlogl, John A. Kerig, Jr., Thomas A. Phillips, Ray L. Bowers, John Schlight, and Monte D. Wright; Maj. Alan L. Gropman; and Lieutenant Colonels David MacIsaac, Jon Reynolds, John F. Shiner, Harry R. Borowski, David A. Tretler, and Phillip S. Meilinger.

The executive secretary for each lecture handled much of the detailed work and editing. Again in order of service executive secretaries have included: Captains Alfred F. Huley, Jr., W. M. Crabbe, Jr., and Charles M. Cooke, Jr.; Maj. Philip M. Flammer; Lt. Col. Dan C. Allen; Capt. John F. Guilmartin, Jr.; Maj. Charles W. Specht; Captains Phillip S. Meilinger, David A. Tretler, Richard S. Rauschkolb, Andrew W. Smoak, Michael W. Paul, Allen W. Howey, and Robert C. Owen; Majors Dean C. Rice and
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Michael L. Wolfert; and Capt. Lorry M. Fenner. Finally, I must acknowledge the great support provided to me by the Department of History and Colonel Reddel, who shares my belief in the value of this volume.

It goes without saying that hundreds of officers who served in the Department of History since 1959 helped in some way with the Harmon Lectures, as did the many secretaries who prepared the manuscripts for publication. In particular, special thanks go to Mrs. Christy Franzen Whale, who handled all typing, administration, and mailing related to producing the Harmon Lectures from 1981 to 1986.

Many others associated with the Department of History not already mentioned have advised me on the volume's organization and revised drafts. For editorial advice, I thank Lieutenant Colonels James Titus, Roger B. Fosdick, and Elliott V. Converse; Royal Air Force Squadron Leader Michael W. Brumage; Majors Steve D. Chiabotti and Gary P. Cox; Donald J. Barrett, Director of the Academy Library; Dr. Elizabeth A. Muenger, the Academy Command Historian; and Duane J. Reed, Academy Archivist. Lastly, every member of the Department of History faculty assisted in the editorial review of this volume.

In addition, special thanks go to Dr. Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History, and his editorial staff, particularly, Dr. Alfred Beck and Ms. Maureen A. Darmody who spent many hours selecting appropriate photographs and illustrations for this work and assuring it was published in the form we intended. Without their help this volume and its wide distribution would not have been possible.

The editor assumes full and final responsibility for any errors and shortcomings in this work.

HARRY R. BOROWSKI, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Department of History, USAF Academy
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General Hubert Reilly Harmon</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part I. Military History</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to Part I</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why Military History?</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Frank Craven</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Influence of Air Power Upon Historians</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noel. F. Parrish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part II. Biography and Leadership</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to Part II</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military Leadership of the North and the South</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Harry Williams</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John. J. Pershing and the Anatomy of Leadership</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank E. Vandiver</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership in the Old Air Force: A Postgraduate Assignment</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David MacIsaac</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars: FDR as War Leader</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice Matloff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command: A Study in Interservice Relations</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Morton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Higginbotham</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George C. Marshall: Global Commander</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forrest C. Pogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Many Faces of George S. Patton, Jr.</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Blumenson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Korean War</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Clayton James</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part III. Soldiers and Armies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to Part III</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiering in Tsarist Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John L.H. Keep</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Young Officer in the Old Army</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward M. Coffman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CONTENTS

Perspectives in the History of Military Education and Professionalism  
*Richard A. Preston*  
Page 269

### Part IV. Strategy and Tactics

Introduction to Part IV  
Page 305

Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare  
*Steven T. Ross*  
Page 309

Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance Against Napoleon, 1813–1814  
*Gordon A. Craig*  
Page 325

Strategy and Policy in Twentieth-Century Warfare  
*Michael Howard*  
Page 347

The Historical Development of Contemporary Strategy  
*Theodore Ropp*  
Page 359

The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers  
*Philip A. Crowl*  
Page 377

### Part V. Military Thought and Reform

Introduction to Part V  
Page 391

Innovation and Reform in Warfare  
*Peter Paret*  
Page 395

The War of Ideas: The United States Navy, 1870–1890  
*Elting E. Morison*  
Page 411

An Enduring Challenge: The Problem of Air Force Doctrine  
*I.B. Holley, Jr.*  
Page 425

Operation POINTBLANK: A Tale of Bombers and Fighters  
*William R. Emerson*  
Page 441

The American Revolution Today  
*John W. Shy*  
Page 473

Western Perceptions and Asian Realities  
*Akira Iriye*  
Page 489

### Part VI. The Military and Society

Introduction to Part VI  
Page 505

The Military in the Service of the State  
*General Sir John Winthrop Hackett*  
Page 509

The Contribution of the Frontier to the American Military Tradition  
*Robert M. Utley*  
Page 525

The End of Militarism  
*Russell F. Weigley*  
Page 539

Military Planning and National Policy: German Overtures to Two World Wars  
*Harold C. Deutsch*  
Page 553
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Against: American Culture and Society During World War II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John M. Blum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: Harmon Memorial Lectures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illustrations

Photographs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustration</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt. Gen. Hubert Reilly Harmon</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Adm. Samuel Eliot Morison</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Wesley Frank Craven</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell and Will Rogers</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Futrell</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Robert E. Lee</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Ulysses S. Grant</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. William T. Sherman</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abraham Lincoln</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson Davis</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt. John J. Pershing</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. John J. Pershing</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Henry H. Arnold</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl A. Spaatz</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Ira C. Eaker</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Curtis E. LeMay</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and British and American combined chiefs of staff at Quebec conference</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Franklin D. Roosevelt's concept of postwar occupation zones for Germany</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier Josef Stalin, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Teheran conference</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Premier Josef Stalin at Yalta conference</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Douglas MacArthur</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm. Chester W. Nimitz</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. George Washington presides over training at Valley Forge</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. George C. Marshall with 56th Division Command Post troops</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. George C. Marshall, 1945</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. George S. Patton</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. George S. Patton</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Douglas MacArthur delivers farewell address to Congress</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xviii
CONTENTS

President Harry S Truman and Gen. Douglas MacArthur meet at Wak Island ............................................. 221
Dress uniforms for Russian marine regimental units, 1826–1828 ......................................................... 240
Garrison duty at Battery Rodgers, Potomac River, during Civil War .................................................. 256
St. Cyr, French military academy ........................................... 280
Royal Military College at Sandhurst, Great Britain ................................................................. 284
West Point library, chapel, and barracks circa 1855 .............................................................. 291
Naval Academy, including commodore's house and officer's row, circa 1873 ........................................ 294
Napoleon as mounted commander .......................................................................................... 316
Alexander I, Emperor of Russia ........................................................................................ 329
Austrian Chancellor Klemens Metternich ......................................................... 329
Capt. Thomas R. Robinson examines a Vietnamese patient .................................................... 356
Soviet ship Amosov leaves Cuba during Cuban missile crisis .................................................. 370
Members of 6th Infantry inspect "Wall of Shame" ........................................................................ 370
Kaiser Wilhelm II, German Emperor ......................................................................................... 381
Otto von Bismarck, German First Chancellor ........................................................................ 383
Prussian general Gerhard von Scharnhorst ............................................................................. 400
Prussian general and strategist Karl von Clausewitz ................................................................. 403
USS Essex at dressed ship ........................................................................................................ 415
Lehigh patrols James River during Civil War ........................................................................ 416
Alfred Thayer Mahan .................................................................................................................. 418
Air Corps Tactical School of 1930s ............................................................................................ 427
Atlas missile launch at Vandenburg Air Force Base, California ............................................. 433
B-17 ............................................................................................................................................. 444
YB 40 and P-63s .......................................................................................................................... 462
P-47D ....................................................................................................................................... 464
P-51D ....................................................................................................................................... 466
Gen. Sir William Howe ............................................................................................................. 479
Gen. George Washington at Dorchester Heights ................................................................... 479
Gen. Douglas MacArthur and other officers salute flag over American Embassy in Tokyo ................................................................................................................................. 495
2d Lt. Henry Arbeeny briefs Korean Air Capt. Chun Hyung during training by 6157th Operations Squadron .......................................................................................................................... 496
Korean locomotive repair center destroyed by U.S. B-29 Superforts ........................................ 517
Engineers of the 8th New York State Militia, 1861 ......................................................................... 528
10th Cavalry troops in training at Fort Robinson, Nebraska ....................................................... 534
Coyotero Apache Scouts escort members of the Wheeler Expedition of 1873 ......................... 534

xix
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count Alfred von Schlieffen</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussian Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Chancellor Adolf Hitler confers with General Staff</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II propaganda posters</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil workers union strike, 1939</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Charts and Graphs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart/Graph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command: November 1941</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command Organization: July 1942</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command Organization: August 1945</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical and Contemporary Strategy</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puzzle-Solving and Paradigm-Testing from Mid-Eighteenth to Mid-Twentieth Century</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trends in World Involvement in War</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Maps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major World War II Conferences</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Theater Commands: World War II</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napoleonic Campaigns in 1813</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Campaign in France in 1814</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Air Force Targets</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tables

Lethality, Dispersion, and Mobility Indices, 1801–1970 .................. 366
Eighth Air Force Combat Availabilities, 1943 ............................. 456
Eighth Air Force Heavy Bomber Availability: Daily Average by
Month (1943) ........................................................................ 457
Part I. Military History
Introduction to Part I

Military history enjoyed little prominence in the United States before World War II. Even after 1945 many scholars working in this field believed it was necessary to justify their efforts and reaffirm the usefulness of writing on the subject. This stepchild syndrome was very much in evidence in 1959 when Professor Wesley Frank Craven chose the topic “Why Military History?” for the first Harmon Lecture. Scholars have suggested several explanations for the low stature traditionally assigned to military history in the United States, and their validity remains a matter of interpretation.

In a landmark study of American attitudes on military institutions entitled *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel P. Huntington argued that classical liberalism underpins much of the American view of war. Though our republic emerged from colonial conflicts against other European powers and a violent revolution that marked its independence, Americans perceive themselves as holding a more enlightened view of warfare than their European cousins, who resorted to arms as a natural instrument of policy. In principle, Americans reject war as a failure of statecraft and prefer to clothe their military ventures—except for the conquest of native American Indians—in the guise of popular crusades against immoral foes. Often suspect as a rationale for American interventions outside the national territory in the nineteenth century, this ideal view of war as retribution for the misdeeds of others certainly prevailed in the mobilizations of the last sixty years, including the attempt to rescue the Republic of Vietnam, and provides much of the justification for continued American presence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization today. If this mentality has served those who preferred to ignore the violent episodes in America’s past, it has also led many to reject the study of military history as condoning or encouraging the use of the sword.

Before the Civil War untrained authors who tended to glorify America’s origins, its Revolution, and the development of U.S. nationalism dominated the interpretation of American history. While military efforts were important, they were secondary to the story. Late in the nineteenth century historians became more concerned with the quality of their research and tried to be more scientific in their approach. They painted a less romantic picture of American nationalism, stressing instead its conservative nature. Until this time the military part of historical writing was largely left to former generals and commanders who took the trouble to write about campaigns or pen their memoirs—men such as Harry and James Lee after the Revolution and
Ulysses S. Grant and William Sherman following the Civil War. Often their views of warfare and history hardly extended beyond the battlefield. As authors and researchers they lacked the scientific training and approach to writing history that appeared in the 1870s and 1880s when the first professional historians made their appearance.

These scholars were educated during the Progressive Period, and the social movement of that age greatly affected them. Influenced by a dramatic economic revolution, German graduate schools, and the development of new social science disciplines (economics, political science, and sociology), they, along with most Americans, came to believe that progress was available to those societies willing to integrate academic disciplines, scientific methods, and public action. From this belief emerged the economic histories of Charles Beard, the political volumes of Carl Becker, and later, the intellectual writings of Vernon Parrington.

These progressive historians found little to interest them in military history; how to better fight wars did not fit into their concept of employing history and the social sciences for progress and the good of mankind. Most likely they looked upon earlier military history, written by military men, as too narrow and of little value to the new generation of Americans. In fact, only a handful of military men were writing military history and examining warfare in depth—Alfred Thayer Mahan and Emory Upton to name the most prominent—and they were more widely appreciated in Europe and Japan than in their own countries. In his cultural history of the pre-World War I period Henry F. May appropriately called this era the age of innocence. His description also matched American attitudes toward the study of warfare.

The Great War did little to enhance the subject of military history. The horrible conflict represented a classic example of man’s failure to resolve his disputes peacefully, and despite millions of lives lost and dollars expended, the war worsened rather than improved mankind’s lot. The Western world in general recoiled at the thought of war for two decades, and disarmament occupied center stage in the military affairs arena. In the United States and Europe, pacifism and disdain for studying warfare played no small part in the events to come. Within twenty years the Versailles truce ended, and the world was again engulfed in total war.

The great tragedy of World War II prompted a return to the serious study of warfare. Since 1945 it has been one of the most extensively recorded activities in the West and the Soviet Union. Acting on the advice of others and on his own conviction, President Franklin D. Roosevelt put in motion the machinery to assure this conflict would be accurately and comprehensively documented and described. He directed the various services to create their own history programs and to hire trained historians who would prop-
erly record the events as they unfolded and preserve the documents necessary for complete histories.

Roosevelt commissioned Samuel Eliot Morison, America's foremost naval historian and a lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve, to write a history of the Navy's role in World War II. Morison served on eight different ships during the war and later completed the semi-official, fifteen-volume series *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II*. Similarly, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army Air Forces, and the U.S. Marine Corps launched their own programs, from which came the famed Army green series *United States Army in World War II*. Wesley Frank Craven and James L. Cate collaborated in editing the seven-volume work *The Army Air Forces in World War II*. The *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II* took its place with these official works.

From such military history programs came a quality of historical writing and analysis already found in other fields of history for the past fifty years. Amateur authors and former commanders no longer dominated the writing of military history. While many traditional and colorful military accounts and volumes emerged after America's great success in World War II, official and other professional historians, often in uniform, also began to focus on efforts and events well beyond the battlefield, including mobilization, industrialization for war, decision making, and strategy formulation, to name a few. Still the long-sought respectability was slow in coming.

That recognition began to appear with what was called "new military history." This approach, which dawned in the 1960s, placed military history in a broader perspective. The total nature of World War II and the role of the home front forced scholars to view warfare within the context of society as a whole, its values, and culture. Society and its military community needed to be studied as one entity versus two separate entities. The new military history was less concerned about specific details of weaponry or maneuvers—tactics and operations—and more interested in grand strategy, the impact of society on the conduct of war, and the influence of warfare on societies. In line with this new emphasis the core military history course at the United States Air Force Academy was named "Modern Warfare and Society" in 1971.

The new nature of peace also gave a different impetus to studying military history. The cold war soon emerged after the Axis surrender in 1945, and peace in the traditional sense did not follow. In the nuclear age the distinction between war and peace, at least for the superpowers, seemed to disappear. The cold war placed the nation on a semi-wartime footing, and the need to deter nuclear conflicts made the study of war more imperative. As the necessity for military history became clearer, the subject became increasingly acceptable to the scholarly community and general public alike. Ironically, military men began losing their dominant position in writing the
nation's military history to trained civilian scholars who provided analysis for the nation's decision makers. The integration of military and society, often talked about by the new military historians, was becoming a reality within the profession.

While the start of official history programs gave military history a much-needed boost after World War II, the subject did not begin to expand in civilian institutions until the 1960s. Before 1942 few schools offered courses in military history. As more professional scholars in the 1960s began researching military history and amalgamating their findings with diplomatic, political, economic, and social histories, the importance of this area of study became more evident in civilian institutions. Hence, its respectability grew.

In Russell S. Weigley's anthology *New Dimensions in Military History*, Maurice Matloff noted that more than one hundred colleges and universities were teaching some military history courses, exclusive of ROTC offerings, by the end of the Vietnam War. A recently formed nonprofit group, the Project on the Vietnam Generation, reported that one hundred colleges and universities throughout the nation were offering a course on the Vietnam War by the mid-1980s. Panels on military history were presented more frequently at annual meetings of the major historical associations, and each U.S. service academy and several other service schools featured conferences on military history. The Air Force Academy's Military History Symposium series inaugurated in 1967, for example, remains the oldest continuous conference on military history in the United States.
Despite the growing respectability of military history, Professor Craven, who worked for the Army Air Forces' official history program during World War II, still felt the need to address the old question of the necessity to study military history. In his Harmon Lecture, Craven noted that many past historians believed warfare represented no central theme in the story of the American people, and therefore Americans had no great interest in it. The Revolutionary War was celebrated for its break with Europe, not for the conflict itself. Isolationist sentiment has always been strong in this country. Applauding the new military history being written, he acknowledged the contributions of Walter Millis, among the first historians to undertake this approach. Craven encouraged the cadets to study history more diligently than anyone else in the past and to read it with a sophisticated understanding of what history can teach and what it cannot teach. Although study will not qualify anyone to be a prophet, constants in history do exist and can be beneficially identified and observed. On the other hand, he warned, "History has a way of not repeating itself. Each generation faces a new combination of circumstances governing its needs and its opportunities."

Craven concluded with a discussion of deep interest to cadets, the life of Billy Mitchell. He encouraged them to view Mitchell from differing viewpoints and to recognize both his strengths and weaknesses. Craven looked to the day when a serious treatment of Mitchell would become
available. He ended by offering a number of questions for historians to pursue for the benefit of the Air Force.

In 1978 Brig. Gen. Noel F. Parrish, USAF Ret., delivered his Harmon Lecture as the keynote address for the Eighth Military History Symposium, which addressed air power and warfare. Parrish looked at the quality of air power history to date and judged it disappointing. Borrowing from the title of Alfred Thayer Mahan's classic work *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, he examined the impact air power had made on historians and concluded the influence was largely negative.

Mahan, Parrish explained, was a career naval officer with great depth of thought and the skill to expound his theories. Unfortunately, too much recent air power history had been written by journalists; quality and quantity were not lacking, Parrish noted, but rather significance in interpretation. While the new military history called for the integration of many factors, Parrish believed that technological factors—an area in which air power historians should have an edge—had not been successfully incorporated into historical narratives. Worse was the sad lack of synthesis. Somehow the new integrated history had not found its way into air power works. Moreover, there were weaknesses in biography, and quality works on key Air Corps and Air Force leaders were few. It is no wonder, Parrish concluded, that our national defense leaders have seldom sought enlightenment from historians. Parrish, who earned a doctorate in history after his retirement, was one of only two Harmon lecturers to have served as a flag officer. He made a plea for better air power history by military and civilian historians.

These two Harmon Lectures give the reader some sense of the status and nature of military history in modern America and the quality of air power historical works. While new volumes on Air Force leadership appeared in the early 1980s, the amount of first-rate, scholarly military history in the area of air power remains scant by comparison.
Why Military History?

W. Frank Craven

I deeply appreciate the honor that comes with your invitation to deliver the first of the Harmon Lectures on Military History. The establishment of this series of lectures is a fitting tribute to the Academy's first Superintendent, who wisely recognized the place belonging to history and other social studies in the training of officers for a modern armed service and whose own distinguished career makes a bright chapter in the history of the United States Air Force.

I appreciate too the opportunity this invitation has afforded me for another visit to the Air Force Academy. I visited the Academy during its first year, when there was but one class and the physical plant was somewhat less impressive than what I have seen today. Let me congratulate you on the magnificent setting in which you are now privileged to study. For me it is a special privilege to meet again with old friends, and to make new friends, in your Department of History. Perhaps it is the high quality of the young officers the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy now regularly send to Princeton for postgraduate study that persuades me that I have also a special privilege in speaking this evening to so many members of the Cadet Wing. Perhaps it is truly that no other educational institution has ever provided so large an audience to hear me lecture. In any case, I am flattered.

The Harmon Lectureship offers fresh testimony to the active interest in military history that has developed in this country during the course of the past twenty years or more. For this development the Second World War has been no doubt largely responsible. A war does not necessarily have such an influence, as may be noted simply by observing the quite different influence of World War I. Indeed, the experience the American people had in that war encouraged among us a marked indifference, perhaps I should say hostility, to most things military, including military history. The great historical question that challenged the post-war generation of that era was the question of how the war got started in the first place. When I was in college during the 1920's there were few courses in the curriculum that were so exciting as the course on European diplomatic history from 1870 to 1914. One took the course in the belief that he might find an explanation for one of the greatest tragedies in human history. I have often thought since then that it must have been an easy course to teach, if only because of the students' very great interest in the problem which dominated the last weeks of the term—the
problem of "war guilt." To the issues discussed in that course, our instructors in American history added a question no less challenging. Why, and how, had the United States become involved in this European war? A number of answers from time to time knew favor—such as President Wilson's idealism, the interest of Wall Street bankers who were understood to have underwritten the Allied cause, or the skill of the British as propagandists. No historian worth his salt would ignore today any one of the points I have mentioned, but he would deal with each of them in a mood quite different from that I knew as a college student in the 1920's. It was a mood that encouraged drastic revision of the basic assumptions which had guided the American people during the course of the war, a state of mind which stimulated little interest in the actual conduct of the war except for the purpose of condemning the whole venture.

That mood carried over into the 1930's, as the nation struggled with problems of economic and social dislocation that were frequently charged to the great war. It was often suggested, in other forms of literature as in our histories, that it was not a very bright thing to get involved in war. Our history texts continued to carry the conventional accounts of the many wars the American people had fought, but these accounts seemed to be there very largely for the sake of chronological completeness, and the instructor (I was teaching by then) might even suggest that they required no such close reading as did other chapters in our history. Perhaps we were guided too much, in our rejection of the most recent of our war experiences, by a fond desire to believe that the American people had won a dominant position on this continent by methods essentially peaceful. Certainly, there were many reputable historians who argued that warfare represented no central theme in the story of the American people. Perhaps our thinking was too much influenced by a deterministic view of history, a view that encouraged us to see the outcome of any battle as something rather largely predetermined by the superior force belonging to the victor. The battle might still be the payoff, but it was only the payoff.

Our attitude toward the great wars of our history showed some variation and at the same time a certain consistency. The wonderful narratives in which Francis Parkman recorded the long conflict between an English and a French type of civilization for dominance on this continent collected dust on our library shelves. The War of Independence remained a good thing, as it has always been in the minds of the American people, but at this time very largely perhaps because it marked the break in our history with Europe. Isolationist sentiment was strong, and so the wisdom of the Revolutionary fathers was once more confirmed. But we had little real concern for the way in which our independence had been established, except for a certain interest in the diplomacy of the Revolutionary years. If I may group the smaller wars together, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War
held interest primarily for the deplorable examples they afforded of imperialism, or of the martial spirit. Such attention as was given these wars served chiefly as a means for continuing the attack on war itself.

It is always necessary to make some sort of exception for the Civil War, in which we have been perennially interested. Possibly it is because of the continuing fascination we find in the question of how a people who had so much in common could have fought so bitter a conflict. The 1930's saw the publication of Douglas Freeman's four-volume biography of *R. E. Lee*, one of the truly great biographies in American literature. But Freeman's approach to the problem of Lee was altogether conventional, and for a time at least the work stirred little interest in a major re-exploration of the military history of the Civil War. Lee remained, as he had been for some time past, a worthy representative of the Lost Cause, a great captain in whom the entire nation properly took pride. Much more exciting to students in the 1930's was the chapter Charles and Mary Beard had written a few years back in their *Rise of American Civilization*, a chapter entitled "The Second American Revolution." In this brilliant discussion the Beards invited us to see the Civil War as a contest between the superior power of an industrialized North and the outworn agrarianism of the Old South and as a conflict which established the dominance in American society of the finance and industrial type of capitalism which presumably still controlled it. In such a contest, Lee could be important only as the heroic symbol of outworn values; even Grant and Sherman were robbed of the credit they might have received from an other view of the war. Except for the entertainment on an evening that Freeman's *Lee* might provide, and except, of course, for the real "buffs"—few of us in the 1930's were inclined to explore the great campaigns of the Civil War. Our really serious interest in the Civil War was engaged by books which undertook to answer the same questions we had about the First World War. How had it happened? Who was responsible? Who was guilty?

And then came the Second World War. Its coming had been foretold in a sequence of military and diplomatic maneuvers which persuaded many of us that here were issues on which men properly staked their lives. The story is too complex to justify any attempt at a quick summary here. The point is this: when we found ourselves involved for a second time within a generation in a major war, we began to take a different view of military history.

One of the more remarkable evidences of the new attitude was the effort by the military services themselves to record the history of this new war as it was made. In different ways and at different times, but in every instance reasonably early in the war, each of the services, including the Army Air Forces, established some kind of historical office. It may be that President Roosevelt deserves the chief credit, for in the spring of 1942 he expressed his desire that all of the war agencies keep a historical record of their administrative experience. I have sometimes wondered if the decisions
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

by the several armed forces to include combat operations as well as administrative experience in their historical records may have been prompted in part by the military man's regard for what was then known as public relations. But if this be the case, our military leaders had the wisdom to turn the job over to professionally trained historians and to support these historians in their effort to record the history of the war in accordance with the highest standards of historical scholarship. (On this last point I am glad to be able, in this place, to offer testimony based on my own personal experience as to the especially enlightened policy of the Air Force.) As a result, the Second World War became, if I may use the phrase becoming now somewhat hackneyed through much use, the best recorded war in our history.

Fortunately, the new interest in military history that came with the war was not restricted to the immediate war. For the time being so many of our historians were committed to war service of one kind or another that individual research and writing tended very largely to be suspended for the duration of hostilities. But thereafter, and very promptly, a new awareness of the significance of our military history began to show in many works of great interest and high quality. Recently, and for the first time in decades, we have had a study of King Philip's War of the seventeenth century, an excellent book which appeared under the imprint of one of our leading commercial publishers. It could be demonstrated by reference to the bibliography of almost any period of American history, including those periods in which there were no wars whose names you would readily recognize, that we have been much inclined in recent years to restore warfare to its rightful place in our national history.

The significance of much of the work done in these post-war years is attributable to the broader view we have come to take of military history, a view for which we may owe some debt to the historians of the pre-war era. The battle itself is no more than a part of the story. The central problem is man's continuing dependence on force as an instrument of policy, and we have come to see that every aspect of his social, economic, and political order which has some bearing on the force he can command is pertinent to military history. We thus have gained a broader view of our military experience, and in so doing we have added greatly to our understanding of many of the more significant chapters in our national history. For example, we have read with new interest so familiar a story as that of Alexander Hamilton's proposals on the bank, the tariff, and the excise simply by considering them as being in part an attempt to give a new country at a troubled time in the world's history the substance of military power. We have gained too a new appreciation of the principles for which men are willing to fight. Read the latest books on our Revolution and our Civil War and you will find that there were great issues at stake, the kind of issues on which men are willing to stake their lives. I think it can be said that we are no less aware than
MILITARY HISTORY

formerly of the role that propaganda may play in the mobilization of war sentiment, and no less conscious of the conflicting interests that have so frequently divided men and nations, but have we not gained a more balanced view of history by recognizing that wars also have been fought about issues that mattered?

One hesitates to use our continuing concern with the problems of the Civil War as an example of any trend other than an increasing tendency among us to be fascinated by that general subject. And yet, one or two points may be worth noting. It is beginning to look as though intelligence, and skillful generalship, had something to do with the victory won by the North. Grant, it has been suggested, was a superior general to Lee; Sherman was the equal of Jackson; and quite possibly Phil Sheridan outrove Jeb Stuart. On these questions I can speak with no special competence. I seek only to suggest some of the ways in which our postwar interest in military history promises a better perspective on our entire national experience.

With so much of gain from this new interest in military history, you may well be wondering why I put the topic for this evening's discussion in the form of a question. Walter Millis, a good historian and partly for that reason an especially well informed commentator on military affairs, is perhaps chiefly responsible. In the reading I undertook by way of preparation for this occasion, I noted again an observation he made in the foreword to his very valuable Arms and Men, a book he published in 1956. After commenting there on the new and broader interest Americans had come to take in military history, and after mentioning specifically the voluminous histories of the Second World War that have been published under the sponsorship of the several armed forces, he added this: "Unfortunately, parallel with this newer attitude toward the history of war, there has come the contemporary transformation in the whole character of war itself. The advent of the nuclear arsenals has at least seemed to render most of the military history of the Second War as outdated and inapplicable as the history of the War with Mexico."

This proposition naturally gave me some pause. I have devoted a good deal of my professional time over the course of several years to a voluminous history of The Army Air Forces in World War II—a work published, if you will permit the plug, by the University of Chicago Press. And so it is perhaps understandable that I should be reluctant to have the Second World War dismissed in terms suggesting that its extraordinary history has no more value for us today than does the history of President Polk's War with Mexico. My reluctance was reinforced by a suspicion that Mr. Millis may have intended to say more, that he possibly was going as far as he could in a study that was basically historical in character to call into question the historical approach to the current dilemmas of our military policy. I played with the idea of attempting here some rejoinder, but on second thought I decided
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

there was no need to do so. I may have misread Mr. Millis' intent, and if not, his own book carries as good a rejoinder as could be given by me. I do not agree with all of its conclusions, but I consider the work nevertheless to be an admirable example of the modern approach to military history, an approach that emphasizes the interrelationship of war and society, an approach that reflects the current difficulty we find in defining any military problem as a purely military problem. In short, there is so much good history here, and it is so helpful, as to make nonsense of any suggestion that in our present military situation history itself has lost its meaning. Obviously, history still retains one advantage at least: if only by pointing up the contrast with past experience, it can help to clarify even the most revolutionary of developments.

Perhaps Mr. Millis meant only to comment on what may be possibly described as an unusually high rate of obsolescence attaching to modern military history. If so, I think I know what he means. When we began to publish The Army Air Forces In World War II, one worked, or at least I did, with a strong sense of dealing with the contemporary scene, of having something to say that had a direct relation to issues immediately before the public for decision. It was a rather intriguing experience for me, as a historian who never before had bothered to comment, outside the classroom, on any part of our history of later date than the seventeenth century. The experience helped me to see something of the excitement that challenges some historians to study twentieth-century history, and it gave me a new sympathy for some of their problems—especially the problem arising from the amount of paper a modern society insists upon accumulating for the historian's investigation. I have since then returned quite happily to the seventeenth century, when people wrote less and kept fewer copies of what they wrote, a time far enough back to allow for a few fires and a few wars, which always have had a way of reducing the bulk of the historical record, often most regrettably so. But my point was this: when we came to the end of the Air Force history it was unmistakably history, with little or none of the quality of a commentary on the contemporary scene. I think the change that time had wrought—and a remarkably short span of time it is—came home to me most forcibly in the selection of pictures for the illustrations. We tried to include a picture of all the planes used by the Army Air Forces, and with the passage of time the great planes of World War II—the B-17, the B-24, and the B-29, the P-38 or the P-51—began to take on a look somewhat reminiscent of the old "Jenny" or the DH-4 of World War I.

This is indeed an age of extraordinarily rapid change, especially when one considers the weapons modern science and technology can place in your hands. They are weapons of such terrifying force as to make the question of whether you can ever be permitted to use the full power that may be at your command a subject of the gravest public discussion, in part because they are
MILITARY HISTORY

weapons held also by our adversary. They are weapons that tend to call into question every jurisdictional line upon which our military organization depends. They are weapons that leave no room whatsoever for assuming that a textbook based on the tactics employed in World War II could enjoy the long life belonging to the famous text Jomini based on the campaigns of Napoleon, a text that was closely studied by the leading generals on both sides in our own Civil War. Let it be admitted that the modern technological revolution has confronted us with military problems of unprecedented complexity, problems made all the more difficult because of the social and political turbulence of the age in which we live. But precisely because of these revolutionary developments, let me suggest that you had better study military history, indeed all history, as no generation of military men has studied it before. And let me also suggest that in the reading of history you need to read it with a sophisticated understanding of what history can teach and what it cannot teach.

Perhaps because history rests upon a solid content of fact, and because the writing of it is subject to a severe discipline that insists upon honest regard for established facts, one is easily led to expect more of history than it can tell. It can tell us much, but the lessons of history are rarely, if ever, so exact as to permit their adoption as unfailing principles for the guidance of future action. There has been in time past some effort among professional historians to discover what might be regarded as the laws of history. One such effort, undertaken by a distinguished scholar in the middle of the 1920's, led to the suggestion that a trend toward democratic and representative forms of government could be viewed as one of the laws of history. Possibly time may yet prove him to have been right, but for the moment we must conclude that even the closest study does not qualify the historian to become a prophet.

I do not mean to suggest that there are no constants in history. For one thing, history is always concerned with the human race, and human nature has a way of being much the same wherever one chances to meet it. There are also constants that may be observed in the habitual usages and customs of a particular people. The American people, for example, have a way of depending heavily upon some kind of constitution or fundamental charter as their guide for any organized activity into which they may enter. This inclination is by no means restricted to our political life. Whether we are engaged in establishing some undergraduate organization for an extracurricular activity on the college campus, a faculty club, or a woman's book club in some small town, the first order of business is the adoption of a constitution and of such by-laws and ordinances as may be deemed appropriate. The constitution and the by-laws may be thereafter lost to sight, even lost quite literally without seriously impairing the effectiveness of the organization, but we all understand that this is the way in which an organization properly
begins to function. If the local society intends to be associated with other organizations of like interest or purpose, it expects first of all to qualify for a charter defining its rights and fixing its obligations. Some of our British allies who served during the Second World War on combined staff committees, and who thus assumed important obligations for their government in an area lying outside the well-defined limits of established authority, were a little bothered to understand the delay in getting down to business that so often resulted from the concern of their American colleagues to establish first the charter by which the committee was to be guided. Had the British officers been more familiar with American history than most of them were, they more easily would have understood this evidence of a national trait. Similarly, had the Americans been better versed in English constitutional history than most of them were, they could have comprehended more readily the Englishman's impatience to get down to work with a minimum of fuss about the charter.

Other examples readily come to mind, some of them especially pertinent to the interest of those who may be charged with heavy responsibilities for the administration of the nation's military affairs—such as the marked tendency a people may show to judge public policy by some moral standard, the inclination of one people through long experience to accept war and the burdens of a military establishment as a normal part of national life, or the disinclination of another people, quite irrationally if you wish, to view war as anything more than a deplorable disruption in the normal course of their history. If I may add one more example, there is the marked tendency the American has shown to view a problem as something to be solved, to assume that a right solution to the problem properly has some element of finality, and to reject as a basic assumption in his thinking any possibility that there may be problems for which there are no solutions—problems that men can only learn to live with, as mankind so often has had to do in the past. To study the history of a people is somewhat like reading their literature. One can gain from the reading knowledge and understanding that may make him wiser, but in history, as in literature, there is no blueprint to guide him. History has a way of not repeating itself. Each generation faces a new combination of circumstances governing its need and its opportunities. We can draw upon history as a source of courage and of wisdom. We can use history to lengthen the experience on which we base our judgment of contemporary problems, but the course ahead is our own to chart.

I have wondered if I might find some chapter of our history, one chosen with a view to your own particular interest in the history of the Air Force, that might be used to illustrate the generalization. My hope, of course, is that I may be able to suggest to you the pertinence of the history of your own service to the responsibilities you will soon assume as officers in the United States Air Force. So let me try this.
The far-reaching influence of the modern technological revolution is no new thing in the history of the Air Force. Even the extremely rapid acceleration of developments within that revolution which is so disturbing today is impressively evident from a very early date, together with the influence political forces have so largely played in stimulating the acceleration of which I speak. It was man's conquest of flight, one of the truly great breakthroughs of the modern age, that opened the way for the early experiments in the employment of the airplane for military purposes to which you properly trace the beginnings of your service's history.

The first chapters of that history have been viewed by your predecessors in the service with an understandable fondness and an active interest in the full antiquarian detail. Forgive me for speaking of antiquarianism in connection with so modern a subject as the history of the United States Air Force, but as one who considers himself perforce, being a colonial historian, something of an authority on antiquarianism, I feel inclined to say that I have never read anything more antiquarian than are some of the books that have been published on the history of military aviation in this country. Please understand that I have no objection to antiquarianism. It feeds upon a natural interest that men have in their past, and it often serves to record useful data for the historian. But the antiquarian interest should not be allowed to obscure history, as I think may have been the case in this instance. The historical point that may have been lost, in the sense that its full meaning may have been missed, is the obvious fact that in little more than a decade after the beginnings of military aviation in this country the American people found themselves involved because of the airplane in the most heated and prolonged debate of their entire history on a question of military policy. I refer, of course, to the protracted dispute that is associated primarily with the name of Billy Mitchell.

We had not been a people notably inclined to debate questions of military policy, except in time of war. This debate was staged after the war, a victorious war, and at a time, as I have suggested, when we were much inclined to believe that we would not become involved in another war, unless attacked in our own hemisphere. And yet everyone involved in the debate seemed to get mad, so much so as to suggest that the issue was a critical one, and certainly so much so as to make it very difficult to find in the whole bibliography of works that give notice to the dispute a truly dispassionate account of it, whether the account be long or short. Perhaps we have lacked perspective. Perhaps we need to view the debate as significantly representative of the difficulties the American people and their armed services have faced in making an adjustment to this new and frightening age of ours.

At the heart of the debate was the question of the airplane and of how best it might be fitted into the nation's military organization. In earlier years there had been no problem. The primitive airplane, it could be generally
agreed, was useful chiefly for the purpose of extending the reach of intelligence and communications services, but the First World War brought a great change. The war was fought between the leading industrial powers of Europe, and these states soon found themselves caught, despite the best laid plans of their general staffs, in a bloody stalemate on the western front. As a result, the full energies of the most technologically advanced peoples in the world were poured into an effort to break the stalemate. There is no reason to believe that their hopes ever came to be pinned primarily on the airplane—it was too new and too primitive for that. Nevertheless, in a war so desperate that no bet could be ignored, the airplanes received the closest attention from highly sophisticated technicians on both sides of the conflict. 

At the war's end, the airplane was still a very primitive instrument of warfare by any standard we know today, but an astonishingly modern weapon by any standard known to men only four years before. Indeed, its rate of development had been such as to invite a correspondingly rapid development of thought as to how it might be independently employed as a weapon. At the close of hostilities in 1918, plans had been drafted and adopted for the employment by the Allied powers of an Independent Air Force in the campaign of 1919.

In these extraordinary developments the United States, though it had given the airplane to the world, played a minor part. But in no other country did the postwar debate over the military role of the airplane achieve the intensity of the debate which opened here immediately after the war, and which continued with varying degrees of intensity from 1919 to the enactment of the Air Corps Act of 1926.

Let us not be guilty of simplifying the issues at stake in this long and bitter dispute by clinging to the loyalties and the prejudices that the debate itself did so much to awaken. Let us dismiss any inclination we may feel to view the contest as basically an intra-service conflict between a few far-sighted pioneers of the air age and a somewhat unimaginative General Staff. Let us dismiss also the view that it was essentially a row with the Navy, in which the airplane was pitted against the battleship to the latter's embarrassment. Finally, let us dismiss the popular notion that the whole story can be explained in terms of a one-man crusade by Billy Mitchell, a prophet deprived in his own way of the honor he deserved from his country. All these views, of course, have some basis in historical fact. Mitchell was the leader, the catalyst whose energy and imagination determined very largely the public conception of the issues in debate. I think it high time that we take him seriously as a significant figure in twentieth century American history, and I am looking forward to the completion of a study of his ideas, their sources and their development, that has been undertaken by a member of your own Department of History. Mitchell was shrewd enough to recognize the special advantages belonging to the Navy at that time as the first line of national
defense. And the Navy in a very real sense became the target in his most
dramatic attempt to publicize the military potential of the airplane. I have
no desire to reopen old sores, but I think it may be worth suggesting that in
so doing Mitchell helped to make our Navy the most airminded in the world,
with results that are written large in the brilliant achievements of the United
States Navy in World War II. And Mitchell fought the General Staff, even to
the point of demanding the martyrdom he was awarded by his court-martial.
But do any of these frequently popular interpretations get really to the heart
of the question?

Briefly stated, the proposal after 1918 was that we recognize the air-
plane's capacity to assume its own special role in warfare, and that we adjust
our military organizations accordingly by the establishment of a separate air
force on terms more or less of equality with the Army and the Navy. I hope I
have not been guilty of serious oversimplification by thus stating the issue.
There are difficulties in answering the question of just what kind of war was
uppermost in the minds of those who made the proposals which came into debate, and these difficulties must remain unresolved until further studies have been completed. Meanwhile, I believe that my statement of the basic issue is close enough to the fact. In making the statement, I want chiefly to emphasize that this proposal raised for the American people a serious and difficult question of national policy. It is no easy task even today to resolve with full logic the jurisdictional problems that have arisen from the employment of the airplane as a weapon, as may be well enough established by a glance at our present organization of national defense. The question in the 1920’s had a complexity comparable to that belonging today to the issue of control in the development and employment of missiles, perhaps an even greater complexity.

For advocates of a separate air force the critical task was to establish the airplane’s capacity to undertake an independent military mission. The difficulty lay partly in the fact that the plane’s military potential, though well enough understood by those close to its development, lacked as yet any clear demonstration in combat. Had the war lasted another year, the operations of the Independent Air Force might have given the demonstration that was needed, for the plan called for the bombing of targets far enough beyond the lines of battle to have been unmistakably different from any attempt to render immediate support to a ground assault. It is pertinent also to note that the proposed operations were to have been directed by a single air commander directly responsible to the Allied Commander in Chief. But all this remained on paper at the war’s end.

As a result, the American public was left with a somewhat misleading impression of the military potential the plane actually had acquired during the war years. What had captured the imagination of the people was a type of personal combat in the air that was destined to be limited largely to this particular war—a type of combat, reminiscent in some of its qualities of the more chivalric ages, that seemed to offer a welcome contrast with the highly impersonal slaughter which marked the struggle on the ground. It is true, of course, that the Zeppelin raids on London had also left their impression, so much so as to lend a dreadful reality to the predictions soon made by the advocates of strategic bombardment as to the destruction that could be accomplished in another war. But this new doctrine could be viewed, and not without justification, as a European doctrine that was especially applicable to the conditions of a European war. Given the short distances of the compactly settled continent of Europe, London and Paris might become highly vulnerable, but New York was differently situated. Measured by the range of any plane that man had yet built, three thousand miles of water seemed to offer protection enough, and for some time to come.

In this connection, mention belongs perhaps to the effect of the war’s end on the extraordinary rate of technical progress that had marked the
development of aviation during the preceding four years. Except for the United States, all of the belligerents reached the end of the war in a state of exhaustion, and the Americans were determined to return to a state of “normalcy.” Military budgets were drastically cut at a time when yet we had no commercial aviation capable of supporting any substantial part of the war-sponsored aviation industry. Indeed, the hopes for development of commercial aviation depended so largely upon the aid that could be given the industry in the form of military contracts as to make this consideration, I assume, a factor of no small importance to an understanding of the debate which followed. The technical achievements of the 1920’s were by no means insignificant, but the airplane observed at first hand by the American public remained a craft of marked limitations. More commonly than not one saw it at the fair grounds, state or county, and was chiefly impressed by the daredevil quality of the man who risked his neck to fly it. The claims advanced for its destructive power tended to be discounted, and the advocates of a drastic reorganization of our armed services to be dismissed as over-zealous enthusiasts. It may be worth noting that Lindbergh’s celebrated flight to Paris, which caused so many of us to reconsider the airplane’s potential, came only in the year after the enactment of the Air Corps Act.

For the military aviators the provisions of that act were most disappointing, and out of this disappointment have come charges of a decision unfairly taken. It is possible so to interpret some of the evidence, but it would be difficult to document the point beyond dispute. Between 1918 and 1926 no less than six special hearings, commissions, or committees conducted investigations of the problem for the guidance of the legislative or executive branches of the government. At times some prejudgment of the issue may have shaped the proceedings, but certainly the aviator had his hearing, not only through testimony before public agencies but through a press that freely opened its columns to Mitchell and other protagonists. Indeed, Mitchell’s adroit exploitation of the opportunities offered by the more popular part of the press constitutes one of the most interesting chapters in the whole story. The final judgment of history may well be that the American people showed wisdom in debating the issue for so long as they did before deciding on a compromise with which the aviator was able to live until the Second World War.

If the traditional Air Force view becomes thus open to question, how then are we to explain the failure to win more than the corps status granted in 1926? There is always the possibility, as I have just suggested, that the decision reached in that year was for the time the right decision. But let us proceed on the assumption that the advocates of a separate air force had a good case that they failed to make good. Wherein did they fail? It is possible, I think, that the failure was one of communication, if I may use a term that has grown very popular in this modern age.
In suggesting this I have no thought of directing your attention to any peculiar problem that a military organization may face under our system of government in making its needs known. Indeed, I think we have been too much inclined to think of the pioneers of your service as military men. That they obviously were, and some of them had the full qualification for membership in the military order that comes with graduation at West Point. But there were many others, including some of the more important, who entered your history by a quite different route. Some of them had enlisted in the Army during World War I, had learned to fly, and after the war had broken with the normal American pattern by staying in the Army in order that they might continue to fly, as later others would join the Army for no reason except that of learning to fly. I suggest that it may be profitable to discount the military associations they shared, and to think of them as men joined together primarily by the common bond of flying. I have been told that West Point graduates enjoyed certain advantages in the old Air Corps, comparable to those which probably await you in the Air Force, but it has been my observation that full enjoyment of any such advantages has depended on being able also to fly a plane. Certainly, the developing air arm in this country has built its structure and its caste system around the pilot—possibly too much so.

Through this interest in flying the military aviator found a common tie with all other men who flew and with the engineers who designed and built the planes. One has but to look into traditional Air Force policies of development and procurement to appreciate the broad community of interest binding together the leaders of military aviation, aeronautical engineering, and the aviation industry in a great experimental venture. Together they knew the challenge and the excitement of experimentation on one of the more rapidly moving frontiers of the technological revolution. They shared the achievements, as they shared the disappointments. Shared too were the limitations so often experienced by the technical specialist in our society in the effort to communicate his enthusiasm, his knowledge, his understanding to the layman.

Was not this perhaps a basic cause for the failure of Billy Mitchell and his colleagues? The aviator in his own special way lives for the future. His experience encourages him always to think ahead. He knows that the plane he flies today will soon be obsolescent, soon even obsolete. He has been taught by the technical achievements of the past to give free rein to his imagination in estimating the possibilities of the future, and so in his thinking he easily can get ahead of the rest of us. Billy Mitchell was an acute observer of the rapid development of the military plane in World War I. His mind, though probably not especially original, was highly receptive to the new ideas of Trenchard and other European leaders. He had great gifts as a publicist, and he brought to his task the enthusiasm of a late convert to the
cause of aviation, but he failed to bridge the gap between his own thinking and the thinking of the American people. Was it because he had to talk too much in terms of wars that could only be fought by planes not yet built, not yet to be found even on the drawing board? Was it because he had to persuade a people, traditionally proud of their hardheadedness and as yet not so accustomed to the technological miracle as they have since become, who insisted on judging the question with due regard for the limitations of existing aircraft?

I have purposely brought these comments to a close with a question, for my remarks are based more upon reflection than upon close study of the pertinent record. They are offered as suggestions rather than as fixed conclusions, partly in the hope that they may open some fruitful line of further investigation. I would be hard put to say just what lesson or lessons, immediately applicable to the present world situation or to the current problems of the United States Air Force, could be drawn from these comments, and I suspect that such an effort would be highly unprofitable. My purpose has been to suggest that history can give depth to our understanding—even of the extraordinary age in which we live.

Professor W. Frank Craven is a distinguished colonial historian and Edwards Professor of American History at Princeton University, an honor he has held since 1950. He was a former member of the History Department of New York University for twenty-two years. During World War II, Dr. Craven served in the Army Air Forces and attained the rank of lieutenant colonel. He received the Legion of Merit. With Dr. James Lea Cate, he served as editor of the seven-volume official history entitled The Army Air Forces in World War II. He is the author of Southern Colonies in the 17th Century, 1607-1689 (1949) and Legend of the Founding Fathers (1956). In 1956, Dr. Craven served as Consultant to the Department of History of the United States Air Force Academy.
The Influence of Air Power upon Historians

Noel F. Parrish

Friends, seniors, juniors, countrypersons from near and far, we come here not to praise the history of air power, nor yet to bury it, but rather to revive it if we may. We who are about to try salute you innocent but entangled spectators. In the arena, tomorrow and after, the lions will appear: the great lionized leaders and writers of air power who represent its teeth and its roar. As your speaker tonight, I represent the rest of us, the anonymous Christians who furnish the meat of the spectacle.

Even among Christians there must be an opening gun, a little gun, firing blanks. So, as Horatio said to Daniel at Saratoga, “Let us begin the game.” At this point ahead of time I announce a footnote, hoping to create at the outset a scholarly and professional illusion. Further footnotes will be provided later for any who read.

This lightweight prelude has been presented so that veterans of open cockpit aircraft, and recent victims of hard rock music, may carefully adjust their hearing aids for what is to come. Please be assured, and warned, that within half an hour this discourse will become as heavy and as tragic as any you have ever heard.

I beg your further indulgence to reminisce for a moment. Some of you may recall another gathering of historians here just eight years ago. It was my privilege then to comment on a fine paper entitled “John Foster Dulles: The Moralist Armed.” My simple comment was that a moralist should, by all means, be armed. This followed Sir John Hackett’s splendid lecture to the effect that a leader in arms should, above all others, be moral. I hope that my minor comments established a precedent for harmony and simplicity.

Our purpose in meeting here, as I understand it, is to enjoy the living elements of air power history, to mourn for the missing, the departed, and the ill-conceived, and to speculate hopefully on those elements yet unborn. Since the influence of air power upon most historians is largely negative, I will also discuss the influence of historians on air power which, by contrast, is practically non-existent.

Before we enter into this purgatorial situation, let us adopt, like Dante, a classic guide. He could be no other than the great Alfred Thayer Mahan, who once ventured into global concepts then unknown and emerged in glory. Doubtless you noticed that the title of his classic history book resem-
bles the title of our non-book here tonight. Since The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 was translated and published in eight other nations and was highly influential in Britain, France, Germany and Japan, he is perhaps our best known historian. Global strategists admit their debt to him. Yet most American historians, other than the small military minority, blame him for America’s past expansion and strength, which they have happily helped reduce.

Since Mahan also found American strength in relative decline, he is an appropriate companion for our brief journey. Except for his original dependence on two great sponsors, Mahan made it almost entirely on his own. The two sponsors were Adm. Stephen B. Luce, founder of America’s first war college, and Theodore Roosevelt.

Military history, except during and right after wars, is not a subject of wide popular appeal in our country. Military historians have seldom gained distinction without faithful sponsors and supporters, as you well know. Though lucky in some respects, Mahan suffered the wisdom pangs of most normal historians. Not only did he suffer with the past but also in the present. The depth of his insight into the past prevented him from accepting the shallow pretensions of most political administrations. He felt it his duty to say as much, from the very beginning, yet he survived. He enjoyed the freedom of military speech that flourished in America until the early 1960s, and he took full advantage of it, as we shall see.

Let us consider, then, the slow but sure influence of sea power upon two — yes, two — persistent historians.

This is their early story. Nearly ninety years ago, Capt. Mahan, Professor at the Naval War College, urged by his wife, edited and expanded his War College lectures. Mrs. Mahan bought a secondhand typewriter, taught herself to use it, and typed the five hundred and fifty pages. No publisher would accept them.

A “vanity press” offered to publish the book at a cost of two thousand dollars. Mahan invited two men of wealth to finance the book and keep all returns. Both declined, but J. P. Morgan offered to advance two hundred dollars. The Captain, tired of asking, gave up. Not so his wife. Finally, Little, Brown and Company agreed to take the risk. So great was the book’s success, though mostly abroad, that Mahan eventually wrote nineteen more books and many magazine articles. He had no more problems of publication.

None of the later books reached the stature of the first. It was like Herman Kahn and his great book, On Thermonuclear War. A friend said: “We should learn from Herman’s experience and never put the most important things we know all into one book.” And yet, a full generation after Mahan, Secretary of War Henry Stimson could refer to the United States Navy as “a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, and Mahan his
prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church." So much for
the influence of sea power upon two historians, Captain and Mrs. Mahan.

For reasons we have not time to examine here, historians had tradition-
ally included, in general history, the history of warfare on land. Yet the great
general and military historians, even those most admired by Mahan—
Arnold, Creasy, Mommsen, and Jomini—had tended "to slight the bearing
of maritime power on events." This was due, said Mahan, to their having
"neither special interest nor special knowledge" concerning the sea. This
reasoning is, of course, even more applicable to air and space.

Naval historians, on the other hand, Mahan saw as having "troubled
themselves little about the connection between general history and their own
particular topic, limiting themselves generally to the duty of simple chronic-
lers of naval occurrences." This is perhaps less true of air power histo-
rians. We are often accused of limiting our knowledge of other histories, but
not of limiting our opinions.

It is surprising that time has changed little since Mahan's observation.
Recently military historian Peter Paret has commented on the striking lack
of interpretive synthesis in military history. Military historian Allan R. Mil-
lett has called for works "that would link the writings of American military
history to questions of lasting historiographical significance." More important,
perhaps, is Millett's opinion that American military historians can work in the mainstream of research without "abandoning the
historian's skepticism about quantification and models of predictable be-
havior." This is very encouraging. Would that military historians could
spread their distrust of these tricks to our puzzled press, our bewildered
Congress, and our disarming civilian controllers.

No history before Mahan's, military, naval or general, had proposed to
"estimate the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosper-
ity of nations." Prosperity, in the nineteenth century, and doubtless in the
future, often meant survival. Remembering that sea power is as old as civiliza-
tion itself, we must regard this oversight, which Mahan rectified, as the most
amazing oversight in all the history of history. We have now endured but a tiny
fraction of so long a delay in convincingly relating air power to the fate of
nations. Yet our failure to define and to apply the lessons of air power history
no longer threatens to bring our civilization to an end. Why are we so slow?

No one but a historian can understand the tardiness of historians. Some-
Mahan had no early illusions as to the depth of his wisdom. When he wrote his book, he was almost over-qualified, with thirty-three years of naval service and an even longer period of study in European and American history. While acknowledging his debt to many historians, he gave full credit to Jomini as the inventor of military "science" and of certain principles equally appropriate to war at sea. One idea alone Mahan claimed as his own: that control of the sea as a factor in history should be "systematically appreciated and expounded."

The true secrets of Mahan's success lie in the depth of his thought and the persuasive skill of his expounding. It was his ability to make naval history an indispensable and sometimes dominant feature of national histories that did the trick. Question: How many historians have tried to do as much for air power? Who has introduced air power into general history?

The question of decreasing breadth in historical research and writing is a serious one. It exists even within the special field of military history, where we find experts concentrating on just one war, one service, and even one type of weapon. Some have attributed this increasing trend to the circumstances of graduate study, government employment, and teaching duties. Many of us are aware of these pressures from experience, yet there are means of resistance. Biography relates military men to other elements of society. Other studies, involving military and race relations, civil-military relations, military education, the critical interdependence of military and commercial aviation, the military in politics, air power as a political issue, and similar subjects, may help penetrate the vast domain of general history.

At a session during the 1977 meeting of the American Historical Association, a successful publisher of military magazines explained the lure of pictures displaying such renowned weapon carriers as the B-29. Two well-bearded young professors rose to challenge the usefulness of attracting readers with such objects as B-29s. In the manner of oracles, they announced that "history is not history unless it has social significance." It was obvious that they meant political significance. They were true believers in the great historical forces conjured up by their chosen prophet; they could never see the pilots, the designers, the commanders of B-29s, as anything but pawns in an evil charade.

Is it not strange that the ideologues are as impersonal as the technology zealots who see us only as the robot operators of their favorite machines?

Technology is an indispensable ingredient of military history. Air power historians, as well as naval historians, have recognized its importance. The Army, forever plagued with manpower problems, is more inclined to treat it as a separate subject. As a result, the technology portion of the U.S. Army's eighty volume history of World War II is seldom used at the Army War College.
In the words of Benjamin Cooling, it is possible for historians to be “captives of technology as well as captives of ignorance about technology.” Many of us resist the constant implications that technology is our master, and we tend to avoid the subject. Knowledge of the trends and effects of technology is valuable, but we need not accept the pretense that it is some kind of supernatural juggernaut, whose predestined machinations will destroy us, which is conceivable, or control us forever, which is inconceivable.

Air power historians now face, or refuse to face, a serious problem similar to one surprisingly solved by Mahan. A present solution, if one is achieved, must necessarily resemble his in some degree. The similarity is that we have witnessed the end of complete dependence on wings as he had witnessed the end of complete dependence on sail. Steam power had been used only sporadically in major wars, as missiles and rockets were used in World War II. If we are not to depend entirely on the artificial pre-calculations of total human and weapon behavior that most historians despise, then we must discover in past experience lessons applicable to the changing technology of the future. Mahan went about it in a surprising way.

His first great book began with an honest recognition that “steamships have as yet made no history which can be quoted as decisive in its teaching.” He said, “I will not excogitate a system of my own.” That would be unreliable. So he retreated two hundred years to begin his story and closed it in 1783, a full one hundred years before the time of his writing. He had determined, as he put it, “To wrest something out of the old woodensides and twenty-four pounders that will throw some light on the combinations to be used with ironclads, rifled guns and torpedoes.”

How did he do it? Not by ignoring current technology, for he was an ordnance officer. Instead, he bypassed technology into the past rather than into the future. His insight was that while the behavior of ships may vary, the behavior of people who direct them changes but little. As he put it: “Finally, it must be remembered that, among all changes, the nature of man remains much the same; the personal equation, though uncertain in quantity and quality in the particular instance, is sure always to be found.”

Not even those cool technicians the Wright Brothers were motivated entirely by the challenge of experimentation. As our colleague Charles Gibbs-Smith is doubtless aware, they were inspired by the story of the first truly scientific martyr to the control of wings, Lilienthal. He, in turn, had been inspired to master the air by reading the story of Count Zambeccari, a truly adventurous Italian balloonist.

Mahan made yet another useful contribution when he showed us that the burden of advocacy is not so overpowering when it rests upon a broad historical base rather than a narrow one. Mahan wrote of the rise and fall of
nations over periods of centuries. Yet he introduced a new factor. He said: “Writing as a naval officer in full sympathy with his profession, the author has not hesitated to digress freely on questions of naval policy, strategy, and tactics.”

He did indeed speak his mind without hesitation and with the usual results that plague all men who do so. Most American naval officers did not, at first, agree with him. The British, French, German, and Japanese navies accepted his recommendations before his own navy did. He was immediately ordered to sea by an admiral who said: “It is not the business of a naval officer to write books.” Another admiral placed several cages of canaries near his cabin while at sea and announced that he wanted to drown out the scratching of Mahan’s pen.

As sometimes happens to historians today, Mahan had much less trouble with his civilian controllers. The disturbed admirals had no thought of silencing him, but tried, instead, to close his beloved War College. Two successive Secretaries of the Navy saved it. This despite the fact that, in mid-career, young Comdr. Mahan had written numerous letters to influential congressmen and others concerning political corruption at the Boston Navy Yard. He recommended “a thorough investigation of the Secretary of the Navy,” which he predicted would result in the Secretary’s removal.

Mahan expressed his views completely and openly, regardless of their popularity. Senior officers were not then required to speak only in agreement and thus help re-elect each incumbent administration. Theodore Roosevelt wrote: “It is important for you to write just what you think.” Other presidents adopted policies that were strongly criticized by Mahan, but they did not deny him the protection of the First Amendment just because he was a naval officer. Only Woodrow Wilson, in his neutralist-pacifist phase, caused any trouble, and that was an aberration. The currently touted notion that American tradition silences military opinion, is, of course, quite false.

From the beginning, Mahan proposed “to draw from the lessons of history inferences applicable to one’s own country.” It was proper, he said, in case of national danger “to call for action on the part of the government,” and that was what he did. He saw the United States as “weak in a confessed unpreparedness for war” and lacking defenses to gain time for belated preparation. In less than a generation he was proven correct as far as the Army was concerned, but the Navy had prepared just in time for the Spanish-American War.

Three generations later, free speech for military leaders was still the American practice. Just before the so-called surprise of the Korean War, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg sounded very much like Mahan. He said bluntly: “I have freedom to speak in one area and that is the military point of view, while our secretaries have to take the view of both the military
MILITARY HISTORY

and economic area, insofar as they can."

In a prepared public speech just before the Korean War he made a statement which is again uncannily appropriate:

It is always pleasant to be cheerful and reassuring. But I must ask you, as responsible citizens, to face some facts from which I can find no escape. I know of no military calculations which indicate that the risk we take is decreasing ... to speculate upon whether Russia would attack us after building forces capable of defeating us is the most fateful speculation in all history ... the time to begin our preparation is now.\(^9\)

Nevertheless, the Truman administration continued to reduce American military forces until the Korean explosion, but Truman overruled Secretary of the Air Force Finletter to keep Vandenberg in office beyond the normal four year tour. All this was considered to be in the American tradition. So was President Eisenhower's forbearance two years later in granting Vandenberg complete and uncensored freedom to make public attacks on the new Eisenhower force levels for the Air Force.\(^2\)

These events and many others belie the current myth that American history justifies gagging its military leaders and its official historians. Distortions of history often are used to conceal present truths. The number of such distortions concerning air power and its leaders are too numerous even to mention, yet few corrections have been written. Here are a few of the still popular myths: The Douhet Myth, the Bombing of Dresden Myth, the Claude Eatherly Myth, the B-36-Was-Useless Myth, the Foulois Air Mail Disaster Myth, the Dien Bien Phu Intervention Myth, the Bay of Pigs Myth, the Cuban Missile Crisis Myth, the “Linebacker-II” Losses Myth, the Myth of Superior Historiographical Wisdom in the Higher Grades, and finally the Myth of Ineffective Air Power in World War I.

An especially persistent myth is that of the Air Force's position on the nuclear weapon. Far from being elated at the gift of the atomic bomb, Air Force leaders were long reluctant to accept it and even more reluctant to depend upon it. Gen. Spaatz, who received the first order to drop the bomb, demanded a written order and even asked to be allowed to drop it near, rather than on, a city.\(^2\) He was overruled by the scientists, who wanted a “virgin target,” an unbombed city, for testing the effects of their bomb.\(^2\) As years passed and military budgets were further reduced, it became apparent that our “shoestring” Air Force would have to depend upon our few big bombs. Even then, Gen. Earle Partridge, in a letter here in the Academy collection, wrote Gen. Mair Fairchild at the War College to ask why only one hour of the curriculum in an entire year was devoted to the atomic bomb.

Earlier, Gen. Arnold had written that he hoped for United Nations
control of the bomb. In any case, he said, “There is historic precedent for withholding destruction in wars. The case of gas in Europe is an example . . . other instances of non-destruction are . . . the open cities of Paris and Rome.”

Gen. Vandenberg, who had to face the question repeatedly, stated many times the now traditional Air Force position. Asked whether he would bomb a city in retaliation, he said, “No.” World War II experience had shown him that civilian killing tended to unite the survivors. He said, “We do not believe in indiscriminate bombing of cities.” On another occasion he said that after absorbing an attack, our strategic force would be deployed for defense. He said: “It must be employed to insure that air attacks against us cannot be repeated. This is more important than mere retaliation. Our principal aim is not to destroy another nation but to save this nation. We cannot waste our forces on mere revenge.”

Gen. Nathan Twining, as Chief of Staff, announced that the Air Force would not bomb cities. Gen. Thomas D. White officially adopted the term “counterforce” in contrast to counter-city.

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, who was once pictured as an airborne Genghis Khan, continued the Air Force tradition on targeting in October of 1964. He explained that some cities were targeted in the early days of meager forces and few bombs as a possible way to check the advance of massive Soviet ground forces into Europe. The early 1950s brought us both the means and the necessity to “place Soviet air bases and bombers at the top of the target list. This was the first step toward the Air Force’s concept of strategic counterforce.” General LeMay expressed what has proved to be misplaced confidence in the nation’s top-level leadership:

Today we are not hearing as many proposals for the adoption of bargain basement alternatives to a counterforce posture. There was a time not so long ago when some people seemed to think that all we needed as a deterrent was the ability to destroy a few Russian cities. Almost everyone who has thought this problem through has rejected that proposal for a posture based on strategic advantage.

The Vietnam War, engineered by Mr. McNamara’s “Charles River School of Strategy,” soon began to cost so much that our ability to challenge Russian military strength was abandoned. We were reduced to mutual assured destruction or the “MAD” plan. Since we did not wish to pay the price necessary to overcome Russian military power, we offered our population, undefended, as a hostage against our use of nuclear weapons. Yet nuclear weapons are necessary in our NATO defense plan. The old, desperate expedient of launching missiles against cities on warning of a Russian attack, without knowing the Russian targets, was considered briefly after
the Russians launched Sputnik. This suicidal proposal was abandoned as quickly as our protective silos could be built. According to Edward Teller, inventor of the H-bomb, the mere suggestion of such a murderous plan was the most immoral idea in history. Now that our silos are vulnerable, the amazing (cheap) answer for high defense officials has been to revive such a plan again, as what they call a viable option. It may be suicidal, but it is cheap.

As long as we builders and operators of air power allow ourselves to be branded with potentially self-destructive “bargain basement” strategies, the population we offer as hostages will scarcely regard us as worthy of confidence and respect. The first requirement for the salvation of our pride is establishing clearly that a strategy of civilian slaughter, involving necessarily our own people, is not military in any sense. Until we can divest ourselves of the albatross of false blame for such a horrible evasion of human and military responsibility, we shall be regarded, increasingly, as heralds of the Apocalypse.

The only way out, of course, is up. Most of us have failed to understand the basis of the once great enthusiasm for sea power and later for air power. That enthusiasm rested on the hope that each offered an escape from the devastation and the civilian casualties of land warfare. We forget, for instance, that air warfare in World War II, by preventing a deadlock, saved more casualties than it caused. We forget that the fascination of Star Trek, and especially of Star Wars, is based on warfare far away in the sky, with no threat to anyone but the distant participants. Such a reaction is not foolish at all.

A decision in space is the only possibility now for evading a holocaust on our already polluted globe. Yet the official attitude toward space is that it is some kind of semi-religious and sacred sanctuary, while our cities, crowded with humans, are fair game. This foolish notion, as our colleague Eugene Emme will probably testify, is the result of our lassitude in getting our heads up far enough to see where the thrust of our future effort should be. Established land, sea, and air power remain the basis for such a thrust. But up and out is the only departure from the booby-trapped cage of options our politicized, computerized, and richly vocabularied civilian controllers have built for us.

The widening gap in our history, which means the gap in our understanding of the past and our planning for the future, lies between our airborne achievements of World War II with its two sequels and our space potential of the present and of the future. Unless we awaken and bridge this gap, we may not earn for ourselves a future. Only a bold, thorough, and uncensored treatment of history can suggest for us such a bridge.

Unfortunately, recent history is being written almost entirely by our slowly awakening journalists. Official histories are slow to appear, and most
are deliberately non-controversial, with no lessons drawn or implied that might be applicable to our present crises. Other historians tend to follow the popular anti-military myths. In fact, some two decades ago, a deputy chief of military history, moving ahead of the tide, observed, “Serious dangers attend any historian who wishes to prophesy, or to get into the realm of what he thinks should not have happened.”

Prophecy should indeed be restrained. But as for judgments of the past, who can be so hypocritical as to deny them? Does spreading timidity have to ignore all that should not have happened? Where is the spirit of the great historians of the past?

A long generation ago, John Cuneo, one of the best early historians of air power, was critical of most air power histories. “Besides presenting an obviously incomplete picture,” said Cuneo, “they unfortunately are written by authors who are advocates rather than historians.”

Recently, Robin Higham, our most active editor and publisher of air power history, explained that “the history of air power has been much confused . . . by a lack of historical perspective on the part of its exponents.”

Mahan’s long labors in the salt mines of previously non-significant naval history were inspired entirely by the conviction that his effort was necessary. It was his response to a revelation of general history that, as he expressed it, “The United States in her turn may have the rude awakening of those who have abandoned their share in the common birthright of all people, the sea.” Indeed, before he died, another and greater sea began to become navigable.

Long ago another prophet, Sir Charles Cayley, had seen the new sea as “an uninterrupted navigable ocean, that comes to the threshold of every man's door,” and that “ought not to be neglected.” To extend Mahan's basic concept into the present we need only to add the still controversial words “air” and “space” or their equivalent. It would come as no surprise to the departed admiral that his principles are expandable to infinity. To all seamen from the unrecorded beginnings to the nineteenth and into our present century, the sea was infinity.

The basis for sea power and air power development was the historically demonstrated requirement of all great nations for access to the sea, and later, by extension, the power to use the sky. It was seen that nations lose their chance for survival as great nations if they lose the power to use sea and air space and to prevent others from using this space effectively against them.

Concepts of warfare expand, eventually, as human activity expands. Areas of warfare often expand ahead of concepts, as new capabilities of navigation reach out, first across the seas, then into the air, and ultimately into space. The first great expansion left the narrow limits of traversable land to cross the global oceans. From there, curiously, progress extended up
and down at the same time and established a peculiar commonality between aircraft and submarines. Each operates in only one medium, yet in its medium each is supreme and each operates there alone. Naval historian Theodore Roscoe has noted that in the last great war Japan was drowned in the third dimension, losing most of its vital shipping to aircraft and submarines. But the third dimension is limited on the way down and has no limit on the way up. This means that whether we like it or not, the zone of war can no longer be limited.

Sea power expanded, very slowly, beyond the limits of land power. As global strategy followed the spread of warfare in the age of sail, it set the pattern for air power as the range of aircraft extended. As the age of globe-ranging air power was launched from land and sea, the age of space is now being launched from land and sea, but also through and from the air. Whether we speak of aerospace power or just air power extended makes little difference.

Since we now are long past all hope for deceptively simple answers to questions raised by our topic tonight, we should admit that we are now considering the impact of recent air power historians on air power. This is not the moment for blanket self-decoration, despite Ken Whiting's demonstrated understanding of Russian strategy which exceeds anybody's understanding of our own strategy; despite the timely social work of Alan Osur and Alan Gropman; despite some useful and partially available monographs which have been said to "smack of interservice rivalry;" despite the readable and much appreciated Schweinfurt story by Thomas Coffey.

It has been said that a major problem of military history is significance rather than quality or quantity, since there are more than half a hundred dissertations annually in American military history alone, nearly a hundred academic military historians and half again as many university courses, and hundreds of military historians in defense agencies. Undoubtedly, air power history comes up short in all these categories, partly because air power history is short and partly because air power leaders, with notable exceptions, are short of interest in the subject. We were off to a bad start when we were funded for just seven volumes of World War II history, which were excellent, while the Army alone was funded for ten times that number and at last report was still typing away.

Nevertheless, despite handicaps and fluctuating support, some excellent products have appeared. Al Goring's outstanding brief history of the Air Force was readable, yet sound, and appropriately embellished with nostalgic pictures. I.B. Holley's unique synthesis of policy, technology, and industry is out of print and disappearing from some libraries. Eugene Emme has produced NASA history that reads better than reports of its present delayed capabilities. One phrase alone is worth an anthology: "The unknown will, as always, yield up many yet-undreamed-of-rewards."
principle was accepted for Mahan's sea and Mitchell's air but for whose space? Perhaps the Russians' space.

On that sad note we may now consider our deficiencies. According to army historians, who seem more capable of self-criticism than we have been lately, the major deficiencies are common to all types of military history: army, navy, and air. They are: a dearth of successful integration of technological factors into narrative, an area where air power historians have an edge, though not in major works. Worse is our sad lack of synthesis, or "putting it all together," and, finally, our weakness in biography. In both the latter, air power is down, well down.

Of the digesting and interpretation of massive research into a major work we have just three examples at the moment. Most recent is David Macisaac's definitive work on the much abused and misused strategic bombing survey report.9 The other two are the work of the most dedicated and productive Air Force historian now living, though he is not well. Frank Futrell's history of Air Force doctrine will be indispensable long after the otherwise unused sources are forgotten and destroyed. His United States Air Force in Korea gained better treatment and has been used constantly. No other accounts are available. It was admitted by Air University officials that the massive Vietnam history project known as "Coror Harvest" should be greatly reduced unless people capable of helping Futrell distill it and put it together could be found. No one was found, and Frank's health was failing. The massive effort now lies overclassified and unused, while other historians, poorly informed, go on writing histories that, loaded with error, will become fixed in tradition. The military lessons of the Vietnam war, freely spoken by colonels, may not please all above them, and in any case may never be declassified and presented in usable form.

Our weakness in biography is almost equally damaging. While the Army and Navy have biographical works on some eight generals and admirals of World War II and after, we have only an interesting and somewhat underrated autobiographical work on General Hap Arnold,4 and a well-written though discursive biography of General LeMay by distinguished novelist MacKinley Kantor.42

Fortunately, we are seriously rocking the cradles of elementary aviation and of military aviation. Charles Gibbs-Smith, following Fred Kelley, is doing an in-depth study of how powered flight, like powerless balloons, was born of two brothers. Col. Al Hurley has studied Billy Mitchell's overactive mind as he stood alone against slings and arrows and got himself reduced to half-dip retired pay, which he refused.43 Hurley is now digging a deep trap for Air Force history, which has been almost as elusive as Air Force doctrine. We are painfully missing the impressive story of General Carl Spaatz, the George Washington of Air Force independence; of General Hoyt Vandenberg, the most spirited and determined chief; and of durable General Nate
Frank Futrell ranks among the best air power historians (Courtesy Harper and Row).

Twining, the great stabilizer and the last survivor of the period when chiefs were allowed to talk and to act like chiefs. Finally, we need an account of Gen. Thomas White, the gentleman diplomat who formally clarified Air Force strategy and doctrine only to see it mangled by aeronautically illiterate think-tank forces from the north and west.

Lack of biography may be our most crippling weakness. It may have encouraged such aberrations as a recent dictum from a history administrator warning that “we are interested in issues, not personalities.”

There was no understanding of systematic war until the story of Napoleon was written. Mahan recognized that he had not created an understanding of sea power until he had written a biography of Nelson. It became his most difficult but in some respects his most successful effort. Not until you read Forrest Pogue’s story of George Marshall’s heroic struggle to avoid a drain on American manpower near the close of World War II can you understand the chronic problem of our manpower limitations in war. As Emerson said: “Perhaps there is no history, only biography.”

We may agree with Benjamin Cooling that we “need to spend less time administering pedantic programs and more time pondering the great issues raised by the material they hoard.” It is scarcely possible to understand issues without knowledge of the men who created them.
Having painfully reviewed our deficiencies, let us note with dubious comfort that sea and land power historians, despite their achievements, share the same basic problem. As Benjamin Cooling of the Army War College put it, "Somehow, historians and particularly military historians have failed to convey the utility of their discipline to those charged with national defense today." Also, uniformed historians of live issues, such as Mahan, could not survive today, and neither could the Vandenbergs, or even civilians on government sponsored payrolls. The journalists had to take over the serious and timely issues.

It was not easy to use the whip on journalists, but there were other methods, such as the golden carrot. In the early 1960's journalist Richard Fryklund was the principal historian of how we developed and debated the strategy of targeting populations, a strategy which guaranteed the sacrifice of our own. His book **100 Million Lives** is still the best historical account of that strange happening. On the last page he wrote: "A final obstacle to the adoption of a rational strategy was the unfortunate effort by Mr. McNamara to cut off authoritative discussion of strategy... Even conversations about abstract theory of strategy were banned... Fortunately for us all, his rule could not be enforced."

It could, of course, be enforced on everyone or anyone paid by Mr. McNamara's Department of Defense but not on journalists. Eventually, Fryklund and a journalist friend were appointed to Mr. McNamara's staff as the senior officials in his Directorate of Public Information. Other journalists, too numerous to mention, were influenced in a similar manner, either by accepting political appointments or suffering restrictions by publishers responding to political pressures.

With journalists alone capable of digging beneath the surface and not always succeeding, it is scarcely surprising that "those charged with national defense today" seldom seek enlightenment from historians. Nevertheless, there are ways of bringing reality to light, as Gen. Eaker and a few others have demonstrated. One way is the writing of recent history by influential participants. Here again, air power has not fared too well. At least four army generals in recent years have written histories of the Korean and Vietnam wars, with considerable assistance, quite properly, from army historians. We have none from the air leaders except for Gen. Momyer's recent *Air Power in Three Wars* and Adm. Sharp's *Strategy for Defeat*.

Official military histories have long been denigrated, not always with sound reason. Alfred Vagts, sympathetic but critical, said, "If confession is one test of truthfulness, then there is little of reality in military memoirs." The history of warfare, he said, is "dependent to a large extent on the writers' desire to preserve reputations, their tendency to clichés,..."

Obviously, there has been improvement in recent years, but iconoclastic historians, such as Peter Karsten, have revived the old derogatory theme.
Less dogmatic historians admit that the split between “official” and “counter-official” military historians has damaged both.51

The introduction of oral history into military history has helped to make military history more believable. From the time Adm. Eller encouraged Navy cooperation with the Columbia program, this breeze of fresh air has produced more convincing truth than many times its weight in documents. Anyone who has attended a training course at Maxwell AFB, supervised by Dr. Hasdorff and Col. Dick, has witnessed in these sessions a revival of the old spirit, when air power history was considered a revelation and not just an officially supervised chore. The introduction of active veterans of recent actions into all our history programs is also inspiring.

Only in recent years have air power historians begun to exploit the greatest advantage of their field: that so many important participants and their associates are still alive. Ardant du Picq, a long time ago, wrote a passage which expresses a truth that many historians have found too great a challenge: “No one is willing to acknowledge that it is necessary to understand yesterday in order to know tomorrow, for the things of yesterday are nowhere plainly written. The lessons of yesterday exist solely in the memory of those who know how to remember because they have known how to see, and those individuals have never spoken.”52

In the air age some have spoken and spoken well, but not enough. As Frank Futrell discovered in writing his last book, “Men who believed and thought and lived in terms of air power were the makers of the modern air force.” Their thinking was not limited by the current military policy or by the national policy of the moment. It was not even limited by the prevailing state of technology. Their perspectives, their awareness of history, taught them how these things change. Had they been awed by the national policy of isolation in the 1930’s, a lack of advanced air power in Europe and the Pacific would have drained American manpower before the decisions there could be reached.53 There are young men today, necessarily silent, who believe and work with the same dedication as the air power pioneers. They see the same need, or an even more urgent need, to be able to operate in upper space as effectively as we have in the lower space. It is this spirit that must prevail, though machines and circumstances change.

In the past our great problem was our rate of loss of leaders. Gen. Doolittle recently named four men as leading air power thinkers: Mitchell, Arnold, Hickam and Andrews.54 Many of us can remember the last three, but all are gone. Mitchell and Arnold died early; Hickam and Andrews crashed in their planes before or during World War II. Spaatz, Vandenberg, White and many others of similar significance are gone. Despite the commendable efforts of many, our traditions and the memories that made them have been neglected, our costly lessons from the recent past are in danger of being forgotten before they are really learned. That is why we are here.
Gen. Noel I. Parrish is both an aviator and a scholar. His long and distinguished career in the United States Air Force began in 1930. After flying with attack and air transport squadrons during the 1930s, he became Commander of the Tuskegee Army Flying School during World War II. After the war he served in various positions, including Deputy Secretary of the Air Staff; Special Assistant to the Vice Chief of Staff; Air Deputy to the NATO Defense College, Paris; and finally, Director of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, the position he held until his retirement in 1964. General Parrish received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from Rice University and is presently an Assistant Professor of History at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. He has written more than a dozen articles and reviews, which have appeared in Aerospace Historian, Journal of Southern History, and Air University Review.
Notes

11. Mahan, op. cit., p. 89.
15. Ibid., p. 151.
16. Ibid., p. 270.
19. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Armed Forces Day address, Detroit, Michigan, May 19, 1950, author's file, also Office of the Chief Historian, Department of Defense.
20. Author's notes.
24. Vandenberg briefing, op. cit.
33. Alan M. Osnat, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II (Washington,
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

47. Ibid., p. 13.
51. Millet, op. cit., pp. 4, 5.
Part II. Biography and Leadership
Introduction to Part II

In the first Harmon Lecture W. Frank Craven appealed to his colleagues for more biographical treatment of military figures. Coincidentally, a wide variety of military biographies appeared in the United States after his 1959 address. Nine of the next twenty-nine Harmon Lectures would follow this oldest approach to writing history, most with a focus on leadership abilities.

Historians have long used biography as a means of understanding history and the development of cultures and civilizations. Homer's epic the Iliad, for example, used a biographical approach to recount the deeds of men important to early Greek culture and gave them hero status. Plutarch, the most remembered of ancient biographers, focused on individual men and their characters, believing that their virtues served as a sort of looking glass in which one could see how to adjust and adorn one's own life. Naturally, many of his works centered around leaders, such as Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar, who earned their stature by military accomplishments. The practice of biographical writing continued into medieval times; stories of warrior kings and knightly exploits played a prominent role in the period's histories. Even in the nineteenth century when scientific history came to the fore, biographical treatments remained popular. While history in this century has become far more sophisticated in its appreciation and integration of social, political, and economic factors, biography still remains a favorite of those who read and write history.

As leadership has always been a central concern of military services and their academies, it is not surprising that so many Harmon lecturers have used the biographical approach to explain the leadership abilities of key historical figures. This section examines generals and presidents for their strengths and virtues of leadership with the hope, like that of Plutarch, their strengths and qualities might serve as timeless guides to aspiring officers. While each figure had his own special personality, all shared common strengths and abilities. Most demonstrated a deep appreciation of history as a valuable aid and tool for command.

T. Harry Williams's 1960 lecture, given on the eve of the Civil War's centennial, opens this section on biography and leadership. Arguing that "it is the general who is the decisive factor in battle," Williams concluded that character—mainly mental strength and moral power—was the key element of a successful general. With this standard in mind he evaluated a number of Civil War generals, especially Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, William T.
Sherman, and George B. McClellan, and the respective commanders-in-chief Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis. The performance of Civil War generals, he noted, was influenced by the writings of the Swiss general of the Napoleonic era Antoine Jomini. These writings were taught at West Point before the war by Dennis Hart Mahan. The most successful Civil War generals, however, were not encumbered by all of Jomini’s teachings, they were possessed of strong will and political appreciation, and they were capable of growing in leadership as the war progressed.

Frank E. Vandiver’s Harmon Lecture in 1963 focused on Gen. John J. Pershing, who served as a transitional figure for the Army entering the twentieth century. Pershing appreciated life and history. Contrary to some hard depictions of the general, he was most humane and believed that understanding people was the essence of leadership. He demonstrated these abilities in the Philippines when dealing with the Moros, as the top U.S. commander in Europe during World War I, and as the Army chief of staff who laid the groundwork for the reorganization and modernization of the Army that would fight World War II. Pershing, Vandiver argued, had the capability to learn from experience and to practice what he learned. He had no limits to his ability to grow and deserved high praise as a modern general.

David MacIsaac took a special approach to biography in his 1987 Harmon Lecture. Noting that people risk serious error when trying to draw lessons from history, he reminded the audience that history does not repeat itself, people do. What man can best learn from history is the ability to ask the right questions at the right times. MacIsaac felt the ability to do this came not from studying events, trends, or factors but from reading about people. He further noted it is not wise to “isolate our great leaders in their moments of triumph, seemingly forgetting that each was a product of both experience...and example.” Instead, he believed that looking at the formative years of military leaders held greater promise for future officers, and he chose to examine the early careers of Generals Hal Arnold, Carl Spaatz, and Ira Eaker.

Two of the three (both West Pointers) were fortunate to be commissioned, and the third joined up only because it seemed the right thing to do after America declared war in 1917. Each, while very young, miraculously survived the hazards of flight and of holding steadfastly to views unpopular among his seniors. How they survived the multiple challenges of their early careers, MacIsaac suggested, should be of particular interest to today’s young officers who, whether they yet realize it or not, face many similar challenges. The rapid, almost chaotic rate of technological change we worry about today is no different—save only in its particulars—from that faced by aviators in the 1920s and 1930s.

World War II continues to hold a dominant position in the minds of military scholars and professional soldiers alike. Six Harmon Lectures fo-
cused on the military leadership of the Second World War, starting with the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Franklin D. Roosevelt. As with his domestic policies, much disagreement continues over Roosevelt's wartime leadership, but in 1964 Maurice Matloff argued that the President was a most effective leader. His principal problem lay in maintaining a strong Allied coalition. He often disagreed with and overruled his military advisors, supported Churchill's positions, and took steps to cultivate the well-being of the alliance. Often decisions were made with the idea of securing long-term cooperation. While Roosevelt often made life difficult for his staff, he was successful in organizing and propelling wartime planning and keeping the coalition leaders in the harness together. Both elements were fundamental for winning the war.

As did Woodrow Wilson before him, Roosevelt acted as his own State Department, coming to his position on unconditional surrender at Casablanca in 1943 without discussing the matter with his Secretary of State or his military leaders. Matloff concluded that Roosevelt was a highly successful commander-in-chief and politician-in-chief. His greatness lay not in strategy or statesmanship but in rallying and mobilizing his country and the free world for war and in articulating the hopes of the common man for peace. He held the alliance together and without his drive the United Nations may not have emerged.

Appropriately, Roosevelt gave his military leaders great latitude in planning, but he failed to act decisively in appointing a single commander for the Pacific Theater. Louis Morton argued in his 1960 lecture that the United States failed to establish a supreme commander in the Pacific for one simple reason: no one was available who was acceptable to everyone concerned. The major obstacle to the unified command was the individuality of each service and its distinctive point of view, an inevitable problem given the lifelong dedication of senior commanders to their respective services. When the war came to an end in the Pacific, there were three organized commands: the Navy under Adm. Chester Nimitz; the Army led by Gen. Douglas MacArthur; and the Twentieth Air Force, headed by Gen. Hap Arnold. All efforts to establish a single command for the theater failed, and even the unified commands that were established in 1942 were abandoned under the pressure of events. Only on the battlefield did unity of command prevail. This is perhaps the only possible place it can occur, Morton concluded.

A universally admired figure from World War II was Gen. George C. Marshall, the subject of two Harmon Lectures. In 1984 Don Higginbotham focused on General Marshall and Gen. George Washington as two key figures in the American military tradition with great similarities. While much remains unknown about Washington's military experience, Higginbotham stressed the first president's strong commitment to civilian control of the military. Washington also took military education seriously, used every op-
Both leaders encouraged subordinates to be independent and creative; neither appreciated having yes-men around. Both understood the value of military training and that American servicemen were not simply soldiers but products of a free and open society where restraints upon individual actions and expression were minimal compared to those of other nations. Both wanted to avoid large standing armies; neither was enamored of war. No other officers of their position ever equalled Marshall and Washington in effectively bridging the gap between the civilian and the military sectors.

Forrest C. Pogue's 1968 lecture on General Marshall focused on his performance as a global commander during World War II, the first time a U.S. general ever exercised such a responsibility. In addition to his directing influence over more than eight million men, Marshall successfully aligned the U.S. business community with President Roosevelt's war effort. His virtues were many. He was a good soldier who had a burning desire to understand problems in their entirety, and he was generous to a fault in helping the Allies with supplies, often at the expense of American units. A commander who fully understood the importance of training and cooperation, he had little patience with those who were not team players. For these reasons and many others General Marshall has often been regarded as the best example of a twentieth century commander.

Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., ranks as one of the best known World War II leaders. Martin Blumenson's 1972 lecture looked at the many faces of this renowned commander. He was a likable human being with great charm, and many have considered him a Renaissance man who came to command one of history's greatest fighting forces. Influenced heavily by Pershing, Patton set the highest standards for his own performance. A serious student of history, he continually worked to improve his professionalism. He too understood the importance of training and was a solid planner who appreciated good staff work and the essential part it played in successful operations. As a student of technology and its contributions to weaponry, Patton never forgot that wars were ultimately fought and won by men.

The last lecture in this section, given by D. Clayton James in 1981, reviewed several fundamental differences between General Douglas MacArthur and President Harry S Truman. After discarding several myths about their controversial relationship, James argued that the primary problem was in fact a crisis in command, stemming from failures in communication and coordination within the chain of command and exacerbated by McCarthyism, 'a heightened' fear of communism in the early 1950s. Each man incorrectly judged the other's motivation and erroneously estimated the impact of his own actions upon the other's perception of his intentions. Even at the
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

highest levels, the importance of good communication and understanding between leaders remains fundamental to successful operations.

These nine Harmon Lectures used biography in several different ways to present history. Complimentary yet critical, analytical and discerning, they do much to remind the reader that in the last analysis man is the basis for all history and is ultimately responsible for the successes and failures of society and its institutions, particularly in the military. For these reasons, military biography has been and will continue to be a vital element of military history.
The Military Leadership of the North and the South

T. Harry Williams

Generals and their art and their accomplishments have not been universally admired throughout the course of history. Indeed, there have been some who have thrown the sneer at even the successful captains of their time. Four centuries before Christ, Sophocles, as aware of the tragedy of war as he was of the tragedy of life, observed: “It is the merit of a general to impart good news, and to conceal the bad.” And the Duke of Wellington, who knew from experience whereof he spoke, deprecated victory with the bitter opinion: “Nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won.” It is unnecessary to remind this audience that in our Civil War generals were not considered sacrosanct but were, in fact, regarded as legitimate targets of criticism for anyone who had a gibe to fling. Senator Wigfall was exercising his not inconsiderable talent for savage humor, usually reserved for the Davis administration, on the military when he said of John B. Hood: “That young man had a fine career before him until Davis undertook to make of him what the good Lord had not done—to make a great general of him.” One can understand Assistant Secretary of War P. H. Watson’s irritation when the War Department could not locate so important an officer as Joe Hooker on the eve of Second Manassas, while also noting Watson’s patronizing attitude toward all generals in a letter to Transportation Director Haupt stating that an intensive search for Hooker was being conducted in Willard’s bar. “Be patient as possible with the Generals,” Watson added, “some of them will trouble you more than they will the enemy.”

And yet, in the final analysis, as those who have fought or studied war know, it is the general who is the decisive factor in battle. (At least this has been true up to our own time, when war has become so big and dispersed that it may be said it is managed rather than commanded.) Napoleon put it well when he said, perhaps with some exaggeration: “The personality of the general is indispensable, he is the head, he is the all of an army. The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman legions but by Caesar. It was not before the Carthaginian soldiers that Rome was made to tremble but before Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx which penetrated to India but Alexander. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne. Prussia was not defended for seven years against the
three most formidable European Powers by the Prussian soldiers but by
Frederick the Great." This quotation may serve to remind us of another
truth about war and generals that is often forgotten. That is that tactics
is often a more decisive factor than strategy. The commander who has suffered
a strategic reverse, Cyril Falls emphasizes, may remedy everything by a
tactical success, whereas for a tactical reverse there may be no remedy what-
ever. Falls adds: "It is remarkable how many people exert themselves and go
through contortions to prove that battles and wars are won by any means
except that by which they are most commonly won, which is by fighting.
And those are often the people who are accorded the most attention."

If, then, the general is so important in war, we are justified in asking,
what are the qualities that make a general great or even just good? We may
with reason look for clues to the answer in the writings of some of the great
captains. But first of all, it may be helpful to list some qualities that,
although they may be highly meritorious and desirable, are not sufficient in
themselves to produce greatness. Experience alone is not enough. "A mule,"
said Frederick the Great, "may have made twenty campaigns under Prince
Eugene and not be a better tactician for all that." Nor are education and
intelligence the touchstones to measure a great general. Marshal Saxe went
so far as to say: "Unless a man is born with a talent for war, he will never be
other than a mediocre general." And Marmont, while noting that all the
great soldiers had possessed "the highest faculties of mind," emphasized
that they also had had something that was more important, namely, charac-
ter.

What these last two commentators were trying to say was that a com-
mander has to have in his make-up a mental strength and a moral power that
enable him to dominate whatever event of crisis may emerge on the field of
battle. Napoleon stated the case explicitly: "The first quality of a General-
in-Chief is to have a cool head which receives exact impressions of things,
which never gets heated, which never allows itself to be dazzled, or intoxi-
cated, by good or bad news." Anyone who knows the Civil War can easily
tick off a number of generals who fit exactly the pattern described next by
Napoleon: "There are certain men, who, on account of their moral and
physical constitution, paint mental pictures out of everything; however ex
alted be their reason, their will, their courage, and whatever good qualities
they may possess, nature has not fitted them to command armies, nor to
direct great operations of war." Clausewitz said the same thing in a slightly
different context. There are decisive moments in war, the German pointed
out, when things no longer move of themselves, when "the machine
itself"--the general's own army--begins to offer resistance. To overcome
this resistance the commander must have "a great force of will." The whole
inertia of the war comes to rest on his will, and only the spark of his own
purpose and spirit can throw it off. This natural quality of toughness of
fiber is especially important in measuring Civil War generalship because the rival generals were products of the same educational system and the same military background. As far as technique was concerned, they started equally and differed only in matters of mind and character. It has been well said: "To achieve a Cannae, a Hannibal is needed on the one side and a Terentius Varro on the other." And one may add, to achieve a Second Manassas, a Lee is needed on the one side and a John Pope on the other.

When Marshal Saxe enumerated the attributes of a general, he named the usual qualities of intelligence and courage and then added another not commonly considered in military evaluations, health. It is a factor that deserves more attention than it has received. Clifford Dowdey has recently reminded us of the effects of physical and mental illness on the actions of the Confederate command at Gettysburg. A comparison of the age levels of leading Southern and Northern officers in 1861 is instructive. Although there are no significant differences in the ages of the men who rose to division and corps generalships, we note that of the officers who came to command armies for the South, Albert Sidney Johnston was 58, Joseph E. Johnston and Lee were 54, Pemberton was 47, Bragg was 44, and Beauregard was 43. Of the Union army commanders, Hooker was 47, Halleck and Meade were 46, Thomas was 45, Buell was 43, Rosecrans was 42, Sherman was 41, Grant was 39, Burnside was 37, and McClellan was 34. Hood and Sheridan at 30 represent the lowest age brackets. Youth was clearly on the side of the Union, but obviously it cannot be said, with any accuracy or finality, that the generals in one particular age group did any better than those in another. Nevertheless, when Grant thought about the war in the years after, he inclined to place a high premium on the qualities of youth, health, and energy and doubted that a general over 50 should be given field command. He recalled that during the war he had had "the power to endure" anything. In this connection, it may be worthy of mention that during the Virginia campaign of 1864, Lee was sick eleven of forty-four days, while Grant was not indisposed for one.

The Civil War was preeminently a West Pointers' fight. Of the sixty biggest battles, West Point graduates commanded both armies in fifty-five, and in the remaining five a West Pointer commanded one of the opposing armies. What were they like in 1861, the men who would direct the blue and gray armies? How well trained were they for war? What intellectual influences had formed their concepts of war and battle? A glance at the West Point curriculum reveals that it was heavy on the side of engineering, tactics, and administration. The products of the Academy came out with a good grounding in what may be termed the routine of military science. They knew how to train and administer a force of troops; or, to put it more accurately and to apply it specifically to the Civil War, they had the technical knowledge that enabled them to take over the administration of a large force.
without imposing too much strain on them or their men. It should be emphasized, however, that none of the West Pointers had had before 1861 any actual experience in directing troops in numbers. Not a one had controlled as large a unit as a brigade, and only a few had handled a regiment. Except for a handful of officers who had visited Europe, the men who would lead the Civil War hosts had never seen an army larger than the 14,000 men of Scott or Taylor in the Mexican War.

One subject was not emphasized at West Point, and that was strategy or the study of the higher art of war. The comparative subordination of strategy may be explained by the youth of the cadets and the feeling of the school's directors that it was more important to impart a basic knowledge of tactics and techniques to the boys. Nevertheless, strategy was taught at the Academy, and many of the graduates enlarged their knowledge of the topic by reading books on military history while stationed at army posts. The strategy that was presented at the Point and that was studied by interested graduates came from a common source and had a common pattern. It was the product of the brilliant Swiss officer who had served with Napoleon, Antoine Henri Jomini, universally regarded as the foremost writer on the theory of war in the first half of the nineteenth century. Every West Point general in the war had been exposed to Jomini's ideas, either directly by reading Jomini's writings or abridgments or expositions of them or indirectly by hearing them in the classroom or by perusing the works of Jomini's American disciples, of whom more will be said later. The influence of Jomini on the Civil War was profound, and this influence must be taken into account in any evaluation of Civil War generalship. There is little exaggeration in Gen. J. D. Hittle's statement that "many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini's Summary of the Art of War in the other."

Obviously, in a paper of this space it is impossible to attempt more than a summary of Jomini's ideas and writings. Essentially his purpose was to introduce a rationality and system into the study of war. He believed that in war rules prevailed as much as in other areas of human activity and that generals should follow these rules. He sought to formulate a set of basic principles of strategy for commanders, using as his principal examples the campaigns and techniques of Napoleon. We may approach Jomini by looking at the four strategic principles that he emphasized most, the four principles that many Civil War generals had memorized and could recite:

1. The commander should endeavor by strategic measures to bring the major part of his forces successively to bear on the decisive areas of the theater of war, while menacing the enemy's communications without endangering his own.

2. He should maneuver in such a way as to engage the masses of his forces against fractions of the enemy.
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

(3) He should endeavor by tactical measures to bring his masses to bear on the decisive area of the battlefield or on the part of the enemy's line it was important to overwhelm.

(4) He should not only bring his masses to bear on the decisive point of the field but should also put them into battle speedily and together in a simultaneous effort.

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to remark that much of this was not new. Xenophon had said about the same thing to the Greeks, and the definition of strategy as the art of bringing most of the strength of an army to bear on the decisive point has been fairly constant in the history of war. But it should be noted that Jomini envisioned the decisive point as the point where the enemy was weakest. This is often true but not always. There are occasions in war when the decisive point may be the strongest one, as Epaminondas demonstrated at Leuctra and the American strategists in the cross-Channel attack of World War II.

To explain how his principles should be applied in war Jomini worked out an elaborate doctrine based on geometrical formations. He loved diagrams, and devised twelve model plans of battle; some Civil War generals actually tried to reproduce on the field some of these neat paper exercises. In all Jomini's plans there were a theater of operations, a base of operations, a zone of operations, and so forth. The smart commander chose a line of operations that would enable him to dominate three sides of the rectangular zone; this accomplished, the enemy would have to retire or face certain defeat. Jomini talked much of concentric and eccentric maneuver and interior and exterior lines, being the first theorist to emphasize the advantage of the former over the latter.

At times, especially when he discussed the advantage of the offensive—and he always stressed the offensive—Jomini seemed to come close to Clausewitz's strategy of annihilation. But a closer reading of his writings reveals that he and the German were far apart. Although Jomini spoke admiringly of the hard blow followed by the energetic pursuit, his line of operation strategy allowed the enemy the option of retiring. In reality Jomini thought that the primary objectives in war were places rather than armies; the occupation of territory or the seizure of such "decisive strategic points" as capitals. He affected to be the advocate of the new Napoleonic ways of war, but actually he looked back instead of forward. It has been rightly said of him: "By his emphasis on lines of operation Jomini, in effect, returned to the eighteenth-century method of approaching the study of war as a geometric exercise. . . . In emphasizing the continuance of traditional features he missed the things that were new. There can be no doubt that this interpreter of Napoleonic warfare actually set military thought back into the eighteenth century, an approach which the professional soldiers of the early nineteenth century found comfortable and safe."
Jomini confessed that he disliked the destructiveness of the warfare of his time. "I acknowledge," he wrote, "that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English guards courteously invited each other to fire first at Fontenoy..." He said that he preferred "chivalric war" to "organized assassination," and he especially deplored as particularly cruel and terrible what he called wars of "opinion," or as we would say today, of "ideas." War was, as it should be, most proper and polite when it was directed by professional soldiers and fought by professional armies for limited objectives. All this, of course, readily recognizable as good eighteenth-century doctrine. This could be Marshal Saxe saying: "I do not favor pitched battles...and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one." Eighteenth-century warfare was leisurely and its ends were limited. It stressed maneuver rather than battle, as was natural in an age when professional armies were so expensive to raise and maintain that they could not be risked unless victory was reasonably certain. It was conducted with a measure of humanity that caused Chesterfield to say: "War is pusillanimously carried on in this degenerate age; quarter is given; towns are taken and people spared; even in a storm, a woman can hardly hope for the benefit of a rape." Most important of all, war was regarded as a kind of exercise or game to be conducted by soldiers. For the kings, war might have a dynastic objective, but in the thinking of many military men it had little if any relationship to society or politics or statecraft.

Many West Pointers—McClellan, Lee, Sherman, and Beauregard, among others—expressed their admiration of Jomini and usually in extravagant terms. Halleck devoted years to translating Jomini's works, and his own book on the elements of war was only a rehash of Jomini, in fact, in parts a direct steal. Hardee's manual on tactics reflected Jominian ideas. But the American who did more than any other to popularize Jomini was Dennis Hart Mahan, who began teaching at West Point in 1824 and who influenced a whole generation of soldiers. He interpreted Jomini both in the classroom and in his writings. At one time Jomini's own works had been used at the Academy but had been dropped in favor of abridgements by other writers. In 1848, Mahan's book on war, usually known by the short title of Outpost, became an official text. Most of the Civil War generals had been Mahan's pupils, and those older ones who had not, like Lee, were exposed to his ideas through personal relationships or through his book. Probably no one man had a more direct and formative impact on the thinking of the war's commanders.

Mahan, of course, did little more than to reproduce Jomini's ideas. He talked much of the principle of mass, of defeating the enemy's fractions in succession, and of interior lines. But it should be emphasized that his big point, the one he dwelt on most, was the offensive executed by celerity of
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

movement. Mahan never tired of stressing the advantage of rapidity in war—or of excoriating “the slow and over-prudent” general who was afraid to grasp victory. “By rapidity of movement we can . . . make war feed war,” he wrote. “We disemarrass ourselves of those immense trains. . . .” There was one operation that could change the face of a war, he said. When one’s territory was invaded, the commander should invade the territory of the enemy; this was the mark of “true genius.” (This passage makes us think immediately of Lee and Jackson.) Jominian strategy as interpreted by Mahan then was the mass offensive waged on the battlefield, perhaps with utmost violence, but only on the battlefield. It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that Mahan, like his master, made no connection between war and technology and national life and political objectives. War was still an exercise carried on by professionals. War and statecraft were still separate things.

The Jominian influence on Civil War military leadership was obviously profound and pervasive. But before we proceed to consider its manifestations, it may be helpful, in clearing the way, to dispose of a number of generals who do not meet the criteria of greatness or even of acceptable competence. This perhaps too brutal disposal will be performed by means of some undoubtedly too sweeping generalizations. These generals fell short of the mark partly because, as will be developed later, they were too thorough Jominians, and partly because they lacked the qualities of mind and character found in the great captains of war. Of the generals who commanded armies we can say that the following had such grave shortcomings that either they were not qualified to command or that they can be classified as no better than average soldiers: on the Union side, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, Buell, Halleck and Rosecrans; on the Confederate, Albert Sidney Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg, Joe Johnston, and Kirby Smith.

McClellan will be discussed later, but here we may anticipate by saying that he did not have the temperament required for command. Burnside did not have the mentality. Hooker was a fair strategist, but he lacked iron and also the imagination to control troops not within his physical vision. Meade was a good routine soldier but no more, and was afflicted with a defensive psychosis. Buell was a duplicate of McClellan without any color. Halleck was an unoriginal scholar and an excellent staff officer who should never have taken the field. Rosecrans had strategic ability but no poise or balance; his crack-up at Chickamauga is a perfect example of Napoleon’s general who paints the wrong kind of mental picture. A. S. Johnston died before he could prove himself, but nothing that he did before his death makes us think that he was anything but a gallant troop leader. Beauregard probably was developing into a competent commander by the time of Shiloh, but his failure to win that battle plus his personality faults caused him to be exiled to comparatively minor posts for the rest of the war. Bragg, the general of the lost opportunity, was a good deal like Hooker. He created favorable
situations but lacked the determination to carry through his purpose; he did not have the will to overcome the inertia of war. Kirby Smith made a promising start but seemed to shrink under the responsibility of command and finally disappeared into the backwash of the Trans-Mississippi theater. The stature of Joe Johnston probably will be argued as long as there are Civil War fans to talk. But surely we can take his measure by his decision in the Georgia campaign to withdraw from a position near Cassville that he termed the “best that I saw occupied during the war” merely because his corps generals advised retiring. A great general, we feel, would have delivered the attack that Johnston originally planned to make. Johnston undoubtedly had real ability, but he never did much with it. It is reasonable to expect that a general who has sustained opportunities will sometime, once, achieve something decisive. Certainly Johnston had the opportunities, but there is no decisive success on his record.

Of the lesser generals, it is fair to say that Longstreet and Jackson were outstanding corps leaders, probably the best in the war, but that neither gave much evidence of being able to go higher. Longstreet failed in independent command. Jackson performed brilliantly as commander of a small army but probably lacked the administrative ability to handle a large one. In addition, he was never fairly tested against first-rate opposition. Thomas and Hancock stand out among Union corps generals. Thomas also commanded an army, but his skills were of a particular order and could be exercised only in a particular situation. He excelled in the counterattack delivered from strength. Stuart, Sheridan, Forrest, and Wilson were fine cavalry leaders, but we cannot say with surety that they could have been anything else. On the one occasion when Sheridan directed an army he displayed unusual ability to handle combined arms (infantry, cavalry, artillery), but he enjoyed such a preponderant advantage in numbers over his opponent as to be almost decisive. He was never really subjected to the inertia of war. In the last analysis, the only Civil War generals who deserve to be ranked as great are Lee for the South and Grant and Sherman for the North.

We can now turn to an examination of the influence of Jominian eighteenth-century military thought on Civil War generalship, first directing our attention to the first Northern generals with whom Abraham Lincoln had to deal. It is immediately and painfully evident that in the first of the world’s modern wars these men were ruled by traditional concepts of warfare. The Civil War was a war of ideas, and, inasmuch as neither side could compromise its political purposes, it was a war of unlimited objectives. Such a war was bound to be a rough, no-holds-barred affair, a bloody and brutal struggle. Yet Lincoln’s generals proposed to conduct it in accordance with the standards and the strategy of an earlier and easier military age. They saw cities and territory as their objectives rather than the armies of the enemy.
They hoped to accomplish their objectives by maneuvering rather than by fighting. McClellan boasted that the “brightest chapters” in his history were Manassas and Yorktown, both occupied after the Confederates had departed, because he had seized them by “pure military skill” and without the loss of life. When he had to lose lives, McClellan was almost undone. The “sickening sight” of the battlefield, he told his wife after Fair Oaks, took all the charms from victory. McClellan’s mooning around the field anguishing over the dead may seem strange to the modern mind, but Jomini would have understood his reactions. Buell argued, in the spirit of Marshal Saxe, that campaigns could be carried out and won without engaging in a single big battle. Only when success was reasonably certain should a general risk battle, Buell said, adding: “War has a higher object than that of mere bloodshed.” After the Confederates retired from Corinth, Halleck instructed his subordinates: “There is no object in bringing on a battle if this object can be obtained without one. I think by showing a bold front for a day or two the enemy will continue his retreat, which is all I desire.” Meade, who confessed shame for his cause when he was ordered to seize the property of a Confederate sympathizer, thought that the North should prosecute the war “like the afflicted parent who is compelled to chastise his erring child, and who performs the duty with a sad heart.”

With an almost arrogant assurance, Lincoln’s first generals believed that war was a business to be carried on by professionals without interference from civilians and without political objectives. It is no exaggeration to say that some of the officers saw the war as a kind of game played by experts off in some private sphere that had no connection with the government or society. Rosecrans gave a typical expression of this viewpoint when he resisted pressure from Washington to advance before the battle of Stone’s River: “I will not move until I am ready! . . . War is a business to be conducted systematically. I believe I understand my business. . . . I will not budge until I am ready.” But, as might be expected, the classic example is McClellan. He refused to retain General Hamilton in his army when Lincoln requested him to, even after, or more accurately, especially after, the President emphasized that there were weighty political reasons for assigning Hamilton a minor position. When McClellan conceived his Urbana plan, he did not seem to know that it was his job to counsel his political superior on his plans; in fact, he did not seem to know that there was any relationship between war and politics. In the winter of 1861–62, Lincoln implored McClellan to make a move, even a small or diversionary one, to inspire public opinion with the belief that more decisive action was contemplated later. McClellan refused on the grounds that he was not yet completely prepared. That the public might become so discouraged that it would abandon the war impressed McClellan not at all.
With him the only question was when the professionals would be ready to start the game.

Lincoln's early generals also accepted blindly the Jominian doctrine of concentration. As they interpreted it, it meant one big effort at a time in one theater. McClellan's proposal to mass 273,000 troops in the eastern department in 1861, a physical and military impossibility at that time, was a typical piece of Jominian thinking. Of course, each commander was convinced that the one big push should be made by him, and each one demanded that other departments be stripped of troops to strengthen his own army. It would be possible to argue that the apparent caution of every Union general in the first years of the war, and the consequent inaction of Union armies, was the result of each commander's conviction that he did not possess enough strength to undertake the movements recommended by Jomini. But this feeling of the generals brought them into conflict with their commander-in-chief, who was no Jominian in his strategic notions, and their differences with Lincoln will be discussed later.

When we examine the psychology of the Northern generals, the thought immediately occurs that the Southern generals are not like this, and inevitably we ask, why not? Had the Southerners freed themselves from Jomini's dogma? Were they developing new ways of war? The answer to both questions is no. The Confederates were, if possible, more Jominian than the Federals. They simply gave a different emphasis to the traditional pattern of strategic thought. Whereas the Federals borrowed from Jomini the idea of places as objectives, the Confederates took from him the principle of the offensive. Moreover, the Southern generals were fortunate in being able to make enemy armies the object of their offensives because Confederate policy did not look to the acquisition of enemy territory. The influence of Mahan, with his doctrine of celerity and the headlong attack, is also apparent in Confederate strategy, especially as it was employed by Lee. In addition, the poverty of Southern resources had the effect of forcing Southern generals to think in aggressive terms. They could not afford to wait for a big build-up in men and equipment, but had to act when they could with what they had. Paradoxically, the Industrial Revolution, which would have so much to do with bringing about the advent of total war with all its destructiveness, had the immediate consequence of making the Northern generals less inclined to deal out instruction. They could secure material so easily that they refused to move until they had received more than they needed—after which they were often so heavily laden they could not move.

Far from departing from Jomini, the Confederates were the most brilliant practitioners of his doctrine. If we look for successful applications of the principles that Jomini emphasized—the objective, the offensive, mass, economy of force, interior lines, and unity of command—we find them most frequently in the Confederate campaigns and most particularly in the
Virginia theater. Lee, the Confederacy's best general, was also its greatest Jominian. Probably it is because Lee embodies so precisely the spirit of traditional warfare that he has been ranked so high by students of war. Military historians are likely to be as conservative as generals. The English writers, who have done so much to form our image of the war, have been especially lavish in their praise. It may be suspected that their attitude stems in part from a feeling that Lee was a gentleman, English style, although for long the British, when they faced a possible combination of superior continental powers, studied Lee's strategy because of its application of the principle of interior lines. Cyril Falls said that Lee was a master combination of "strategist, tactical genius, leader of the highest inspiration, and technician in the arts of hastily fortifying defensive positions superbly chosen." Falls added: "He must stand as the supreme figure of this survey of a hundred years of war." Colonel Burne was more restrained, but spoke admiringly of

Gen. Robert E. Lee, the Confederacy's most acclaimed general (National Archives).
Lee's audacity, his use of the offensive, and his skill at concentration. Earlier, Henderson and Wolseley had said much the same thing and in the same terms.

Let us concede that many of the tributes to Lee are deserved. He was not all that his admirers have said of him, but he was a large part of it. But let us also note that even his most fervent admirers, when they come to evaluate him as a strategist, have to admit that his abilities were never demonstrated on a larger scale than a theater. Cyril Falls, after his extravagant eulogy of Lee, falls on his face in attempting to attribute to his subject gifts for “large-scale strategy”: the only example he can find is Lee's redeployment of forces between the Shenandoah Valley and Richmond during the Peninsula campaign! Lee was preeminently a field or a theater strategist, and a great one, but it remains unproven that he was anything more or wanted to be anything more. “In spite of all his ability, his heroism, and the heroic efforts of his army,” writes General Fuller, “because he would think and work in a corner, taking no notice of the whole, taking no interest in forming policy or in the economic side of the war, he was ultimately cornered and his cause lost.” For his preoccupation with the war in Virginia, Lee is not to be criticized. He was a product of his culture, and that culture, permeated in its every part by the spirit of localism, dictated that his outlook on war should be local. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that his restricted view constituted a tragic command limitation in a modern war. The same limitation applied to Southern generalship as a whole. The Confederates, brilliant and bold in executing Jominian strategy on the battlefield, never succeeded in lifting their gifts above the theater level.

In many respects Lee was not a modern-minded general. He probably did not understand the real function of a staff and certainly failed to put together an adequate staff for his army. Although he had an excellent eye for terrain, his use of maps was almost primitive. He does not seem to have appreciated the impact of railroads on warfare or to have realized that railroads made Jomini's principle of interior lines largely obsolete. His mastery of logistics did not extend beyond departmental limits. In February 1865, he said that he could not believe Sherman would be able to move into North Carolina. The evidence of Sherman's great march was before him, and yet he was not quite sure it had really happened.

But the most striking lack of modernity in Lee was his failure to grasp the vital relationship between war and statecraft. Here the great Virginian was truly a Jominian. Almost as much as McClellan, he thought of war as a professional exercise. One of his officers said admiringly that Lee was too thorough a soldier to attempt to advise the government on such matters as the defense of Richmond. When late in the war a Cabinet member asked Lee for his opinion on the advisability of moving the capital farther south, the General replied: “That is a political question . . . and you politicians must
determine it. I shall endeavor to take care of the army, and you must make
the laws and control the Government." And yet what could be a more
strategic question than the safety of the capital? Lee attained a position in
the Confederacy held by no other man, either in civil or military life. There
was little exaggeration in the statement Gen. Mahone made to him: "You are
the State." But Lee could not accept the role that his eminence demanded.
He could never have said as Pitt did: "I know that I can save the country and
that no one else can." It has been said that Lee never tried to impose his will
on the government because of his humility of character, and this may well be
true. But it would also seem to be true that he did not know that a com-
mmander had any political responsibility.

Lincoln's first generals did not understand that war and statecraft were
parts of the same piece. But none of the Confederate generals, first or last,
ever grasped this fact about modern war. The most distinguishing feature of
Southern generalship is that it did not grow. Lee and the other Confederate
commanders were pretty much the same men in 1865 that they had been in
1861. They were good, within certain limits, at the beginning, and they were
good at the end, but still within the original limits. They never freed them-
selves from the influence of traditional doctrine. The probable explanation,
David Donald has suggested, is that the Confederates won their first battles
with Jominian strategy and saw no reason to change and that the Southern
mind, civil and military, was unreceptive to new ideas. The North, on the
other hand, finally brought forward generals who were able to grow and
who could employ new ways of war. Even so doctrinaire a Jominian as
Halleck reached the point where he could approve techniques of total war
that would have horrified the master. But the most outstanding examples of
growth and originality among the Northern generals are Grant and
Sherman.

The qualities of Grant's generalship deserve more analysis than those of
Lee, partly because they have not been sufficiently emphasized but largely
because Grant was a more modern soldier than his rival. First, we note that
Grant had that quality of character or will exhibited by all the great cap-
tains. (Lee had it, too.) Perhaps the first military writer to emphasize this
trait in Grant was C. F. Atkinson in 1908. Grant's distinguishing feature as a
general, said Atkinson, was his character, which was controlled by a tremen-
dous will; with Grant, action was translated from thought to deed by all the
force of a tremendous personality. This moral strength of Grant's may be
news to some present-day historians, but it was overpoweringly apparent to
all who were thrown into close association with him. Charles Francis Ad-
ams, Jr., like all his family not disposed to easy praise, said that Grant was
really an extraordinary person, although he did not look it. In a crisis,
Adams added, all would instinctively lean on Grant. Lincoln saw this qual-
ity in Grant clearly: "The great thing about Grant, I take it, is his perfect
coolness and persistency of purpose. I judge he is not easily excited,—which
is a great element in an officer. . . .” But the best tribute to Grant’s charac-
ter was paid by the general who knew him best. In a typical explosive
comment to J. H. Wilson, Sherman said: “Wilson, I am a damn sight
smarter than Grant. I know a great deal more about war, military history,
strategy, and administration, and about everything else than he does. But I
tell you where he beats me, and where he beats the world. He don’t care a
damn for what the enemy does out of his sight, but it scares me like hell.”
On the eve of the great campaigns of 1864, Sherman wrote to Grant that he
considered Grant’s strongest feature was his ability to go into battle without
hesitation, doubts, or reserve. Characteristically Sherman added: “. . . it
was this that made me act with confidence.”

In this same letter Sherman confessed to a reservation that he had had
about Grant: “My only points of doubt were as to your knowledge of grand

Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, master-
mind of the Union Army and
later eighteenth president of the
United States from 1869 to 1877
(National Archives).
strategy, and of books of science and history; but I confess your common sense seems to have supplied all this." Common sense Grant had, and it enabled him to deal with such un-Jominiian phenomena as army correspondents and political generals. Unlike Sherman, Grant accepted the reporters—but he rendered them harmless. "General Grant informs us correspondents that he will willingly facilitate us in obtaining all proper information," Junius Browne wrote S. H. Gay, then added significantly that Grant was "not very communicative." Unlike McClellan, who would not accept Gen. Hamilton for political considerations urged by Lincoln, Grant took McClelland at the President's request. He could not imagine why Lincoln wanted a command for McClelland but assumed that there must be some reason important to his civil superior. He put up with McClelland until he found a way to strike him down to which Lincoln could not object. In this whole affair Grant showed that he realized the vital relation between politics and modern war.

It was Grant's common sense that enabled him to rise above the dogmas of traditional warfare. On one occasion a young officer, thinking to flatter Grant, asked his opinion of Jomini. Grant replied that he had never read the master. He then expressed his own theory of strategy: "The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on." After the war Grant discussed more fully his opinion of the value of doctrine. He conceded that military knowledge was highly desirable in a commander. But he added: "...if men make war in slavish observance of rules, they will fail. No rules will apply to conditions of war as different as those which exist in Europe and America..." War is progressive, because all the instruments and elements of war are progressive." He then referred to the movement that had been his most striking departure from the rules, the Vicksburg campaign. To take Vicksburg by rules would have required a withdrawal to Memphis, the opening of a new line of operations, in fact, a whole new strategic design. But Grant believed that the discouraged condition of Northern opinion would not permit such a conformity to Jominiian practice. "In a popular war we had to consider political exigencies." It was this ability of Grant's to grasp the political nature of modern war that marks him as the first of the great modern generals.

The question of where to rank Sherman among Civil War generals has always troubled military writers. He is obviously not a Jominiian, and just as obviously he is not a great battle captain like Grant or Lee. Col. Burne points out that never once did Sherman command in a battle where he engaged his whole force and that he never won a resounding victory. Conceding that in the Georgia campaign Sherman displayed imagination, resource, versatility, breadth of conception, and genuine powers of leadership, all fundamental traits of a great commander, Burne still con-
tends that Sherman exhibited two serious failings: that of pursuing a geographical rather than a military objective and that of avoiding risk. Liddell Hart, on the other hand, depicts Sherman as the greatest general of the war because more than any other commander he came to see that the object of strategy is to minimize fighting. Part of this evaluation can be written off as an attempt by Liddell Hart to glorify through Sherman the British strategy of the "indirect approach." And yet he is right in saying that Sherman had the most nearly complete grasp of the truth that the resisting power of a modern democracy depends heavily on the popular will and that in turn this will depends on economic and social security. Sherman, a typical Jominian at the beginning of the war, became its greatest exponent of economic and psychological warfare. Nobody realized more clearly than Sherman the significance of the techniques he introduced. Describing to Grant what he meant to do on his destructive march, he said: "This may not be war but rather statesmanship." At the same time we must recognize that Sherman's strategy by itself would not have brought the Confederacy down. That end called for a Grant who at the decisive moment would attack the enemy's armed forces. As Burne puts it: "Sherman might help to prepare the ground, but it was Grant who struck the blow." The North was fortunate in finding two generals who between them executed Clausewitz's three objectives of war: to conquer and destroy the enemy's armed forces, to get possession of the material elements of aggression and other sources of existence of the
enemy, and to gain public opinion by winning victories that depress the enemy's morale.

It remains to touch on the military leadership of the North and the South at the highest levels where strategy was determined—at the rival Presidents and the command systems they headed. In supreme leadership the Union was clearly superior. Lincoln was an abler and a stronger man than Davis. The Northern President illustrated perfectly the truth of Clausewitz's dictum that "a ren-eriable, superior mind and strength of character" are the primary qualifications of a director of war. The North developed at an early date an over-all plan of strategy, and it finally devised a unified command system for the entire military machine. The South was unable to accomplish either one of these objectives. But its failure should not be set down as the result of a shortage of brains among its leaders. Here again we need to remind ourselves that ways of making war are always the product of cultures. For the nationalistic North it was comparatively easy to achieve a broad view of war. Conversely, it was natural for the localistic South to adopt a narrow view and to fight a conservative war. Confederate strategy was almost wholly defensive and was designed to guard the whole circumference of the country. In military jargon, it was a cordon defense. Probably the South's best chance to win its independence by a military decision was to attempt on a grand strategic scale the movement its generals were so good at on specific battlefields—the concentrated mass offensive. But the restrictions of Southern culture prevented any national application of the one Jomini principle that might have brought success.

Just as cordon defense was the worst strategy for the South, a cordon offense was the best strategy for the North. This was the strategy that Lincoln had pressed upon his generals almost from the beginning of the war—to make enemy armies their objective and to move all Federal forces against the enemy line simultaneously. An offensive along the entire circumference of the Confederacy would prevent the enemy from moving troops from the threatened point to another and would inevitably achieve a breakthrough. It was an eminently sensible strategy for the side with the greater numbers and the superior lines of transportation and for a war fought over such a vast theater. When Lincoln proposed his plan to general after general, it met with polite scorn. It violated the Jomini principle of concentration in one theater for one big effort. It was the product of a mind that did not know the rules of war. Not until he found Grant did Lincoln find a general who was original enough to employ his strategy. Grant's master design for 1864 called for an advance of Federal armies all along the line. It was, incidentally, the operation that broke the back of the Confederacy. When Grant explained his plan to the President, he remarked that even the smaller Federal forces not fighting would help the fighting by advancing and engaging the attention of the enemy. We have dealt much with maxims in this
Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederacy (National Archives).

Abraham Lincoln, president of the Union (National Archives).

paper, and we may fittingly conclude with one. Lincoln grasped Grant's point immediately and uttered a maxim of his own. At least for the Civil War it had more validity than anything written by Baron Jomini. "Those not skinning can hold a leg," said the Commander in Chief.

Professor T. Harry Williams is Boyd Professor of History at Louisiana State University. Few historians in this country can match his record of achievement in the study of the Civil War. His Lincoln and the Radicals, Lincoln and his Generals, and P.G.T. Beauregard are internationally recognized standard works. In the fall of 1960, this lecture will be published by the Louisiana State University Press in the work Why the North Won. After getting his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin, Professor Williams taught at that university, the University of West Virginia, and the University of Omaha. In 1941, he joined the Louisiana State University faculty where he was awarded the Boyd Professorship in 1953. Dr. Williams served as a lecturer at the Air War College and Air University, and in 1957 he held a Guggenheim Fellowship.
John J. Pershing and the Anatomy of Leadership

Frank E. Vandiver

It is a pleasure to be at the Air Force Academy and an honor to participate in the distinguished series of Harmon Memorial Lectures. And it is a privilege to address you gentlemen of the Cadet Wing, future military leaders of the United States.

Particularly is it a pleasure to talk to you about a former American military leader who deserves the rank of soldier's soldier, a man much maligned and mostly misunderstood, whose active career spanned sixty years and bridged two epochs in the evolution of the United States Army—General of the Armies John J. Pershing.

Pershing seems to me a particularly fitting subject for certain obvious reasons: first, I'm especially concerned with his biography and have been for several years; second, he looms from history as the AEF's Commander who stepped coolly into various Allied crises in World War I and saved the Great Crusade for Our Side. There are other more legitimate reasons for talking to you about this forceful and effective leader. For instance, his career shows him a professional soldier who avoided becoming either a fool or a fascist. He is uncommon, too, in that he put to good practice the theory he learned at West Point and became a sensitive man of culture who found appreciation of life and history most valuable to a modern officer.

Unusual is the word which perhaps best describes him—unusual in background, in personal ambition and drive, in perception, in zest, most unusual in experience. And it may well be that his career best illustrates the change from the Old to the New Army.

The New Army, the one we know and have known since 1917, demands of its leaders much not expected in earlier times, much not taught in service academies, and much that the public never notes. I suspect that most people have cherished a nineteenth-century image of military leaders, especially generals, as tough, Shermanesque types, forceful, skilled in engineering, tactics, and sometimes in strategy. Mostly they think of generals as personal leaders whose Hell for Leather bravery inspires atrocities but whose professional skill counts for little beyond dress parades. (Scientists are replacing everybody!)

History has a way of changing things, even public images. Gradually, during the last years of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth centuries, the world grew more complex, more organized and impersonal.
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

So did the army. And so, too, and perhaps remarkably, did the United States. Imperialism represented a phase of this world urge toward Leviathan. And this country caught the spirit. By the end of the last century Americans began to assume the burdens of the world. Expansion, the glittering rewards of empire in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, cost us some political innocence and with sophistication came myriad complexities.

Complex societies brought complex wars. True, the “little wars” in South Africa, India, Egypt, Cuba, the Philippines seemed almost dainty compared with Napoleon's efforts, with the American Civil War, with the hellish Crimea. But in point of fact, these little wars claimed more lives, wasted more treasure, eroded more humanity than the great conflicts. Dirty, grim combats they were, replete with piteous patriotism, with shining heroism, with hard dying, with cruelty spilling finally into the bestiality of Calcutta’s Black Hole and our own Filipino concentration camps. Small conflicts tend to be nastier than big ones, to get down to refinements in inhumanity.

Mean wars of this type working scars on the nations that fight them—and the United States proved no exception. Americans had to learn to fight dirty and to keep what they won. Harsh as it seemed to many, this appeared the way of modern times. If America would be a world power, she had to have the stomach for the task.

American soldiers had to do the winning of empire and for a time the keeping. These were strange and uncharted duties for the United States Army; they demanded traits and skills unanticipated and, in fact, abhorred by most military men. Essentially the problem faced by the army at the turn of the century was this: how could the traditions of “honor, duty, country” be reconciled with wars against weak nations and plucky natives?

To the lasting credit of the army a type of reconciliation came and largely through the efforts of American officers of a new breed.

There is no need to draw the obvious parallel between America's problems in Cuba and the Philippines sixty-five years ago and America's problems in Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam today. Certainly there are differences in the two situations, for history does not truly repeat itself. Still, the similarities are striking and it may be that lessons learned in the earlier troubles can be useful in the present ones. American military men pitted against the Viet Cong, against Chinese "volunteers," or missile-waving Castroites may well need the same special qualities which stood their bygone counterparts in such good stead. For it seems to me that today's fundamental problem is much like yesterday's: how can American ideals be reconciled with 'brushfire' wars in remote outposts of the globe?

General Pershing's career, I think, has much importance in light of present circumstances. He represents the finest of the "new breed" of offi-
cens developed in response to imperialism. A “new breed” is doubtless needed now.

Biography is a quicksilver art. Setting the task to know men from the past, it forces its practitioners to find their subjects from a cold trail, to revive ideas from documents, to bring life from shadows. Whether this proves easy or hard depends on the subject. Great men, men who bestride their times and shape them by their presence, appear easy to portray—but appearances are often deceiving. Great men usually create copious records, leave many trails, and generate a personal mythology. And in that very bulk of evidence lies a pitfall of plenty to trap the biographer.

Pershing is one of these mystifying greats of history. Massive amounts of material exist to trace him in detail. He kept diaries, wrote memoirs, penned thousands of letters and documents. Many contemporaries wrote to him and about him. And yet he comes to the present more a myth than a man.

The mythical Pershing is hardly appealing: a spit and polish horse soldier, he tolerated no nonsense, brooked opposition never, dealt discipline with relish, and was, obviously, a majestic martinet. This picture is reinforced by photographs showing a stony faced, grim man in immaculate tunic and by many subordinates who remember his searing displeasure. According to mythology, Pershing may have been efficient but at too high a cost in spirit.

Generals probably cannot avoid this sort of afterimage. They tend to become so exalted, perhaps even in their own minds, that they spawn envy, resentment, hatred even. Mortality is easily forgotten amid a galaxy of stars. Yet generals, to use the Roman figure, “are but mortal,” and have their human sides. Pershing did, notwithstanding.

Along with humanness, earthy human, cultivated thirst, Pershing had the professionalism of a dedicated soldier. This professionalism found expression in his affection for the army but especially in careful training of himself for leadership.

West Point taught the elements of leadership and made them part of Pershing’s life. But he expanded on these elements, shaped them with experience and used them as a basis for a philosophy of command which he developed slowly and with great care. To a degree, of course, this philosophy was the sum of his life.

He was not born a leader; he was born a farmer in Missouri the year before the Civil War began. And although exciting Confederate raids occurred near his native Laclede he remembered none of them with martial zest—only that they scared him! Early years passed in learning the ways of land and mules, in running his father’s farm, in harsh poverty, and in a ceaseless struggle for education. From an early age, John set himself to
learn. He had to read, to learn, to ponder, and he wanted to be a school teacher—in those halcyon days an honored calling.

Chance took him to West Point, chance in the form of a news item announcing entrance examinations not far from the normal school he attended. He passed the exams and entered the Military Academy—older than most at 21. But age worked for him, apparently, since he became a non commissioned officer of his class, was later elevated to First Captain and finally became class president—a lifetime distinction.

Cadets at the Academy in the 1880's and 1890's enjoyed something of army tradition which later generations missed—direct contact with Civil War greats. Pershing appreciated this association and remembered always that General Wesley Merritt had been Superintendent of the Academy in his time, that General William S. Rosecrans served on the Board of Visitors his senior year, and that General Sherman gave the commencement address. Once Pershing saw Grant, his personal hero, the man he ranked as America's greatest general. He never admitted consciously copying Grant, probably didn't, but the two had much in common.

After graduation from the Point in 1886 Pershing chose the cavalry as his arm of the service—in those days it had the glamor later reserved for the Air Force! He soon found himself posted to the Sixth Regiment on the Indian frontier. So began a military life which would see him travel farther than Marco Polo, meet more world figures than Henry M. Stanley, fight more of his country's enemies than Kitchener of Khartoum.

From the beginning of active service he had several advantages working for him. Tall, straight, well-built, he had a square-jawed, striking face accented by piercing eyes, tight lips and cropped moustache—almost every woman he met remembered him as the "handsomest man I've ever seen." Combine with these winning looks a friendly manner, smooth talk, personal charm, and Pershing's possibilities are obvious. They might have been wasted, though, had he been nothing more than a dashing Adonis. Fortunately he had character along with the saving graces of wit, open mind, sympathetic eye, and careful tongue.

Because he had character and human understanding, Pershing learned from every experience and turned knowledge to good purpose. Service in the west taught him the tedium of frontier duty but taught him, too, the lasting romance of army life, the trust of comrades, the excitement of combat—and also, because he was John Pershing, the virtues of the American Indian. A brief stint in command of a company of Indian Scouts shattered any prejudice lingering from Southern birth and opened his eyes to the power of other races.

Understanding people seemed to Pershing the essence of leadership; the essence of understanding, education. Early yearning for ideas and books left a lasting impression on him and when he had a chance to become
John J. Pershing as a first lieutenant in the 10th Cavalry (U.S. Army).

Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the University of Nebraska in 1891 he quickly accepted.

Pershing's years in Lincoln may have been among the most influential in his life. In retrospect Lincoln seems an unlikely place to mould a Great Captain. Prairie-locked, stuck off at the tail end of nowhere, the town and the university stood as lonely outposts of culture on the fringes of civilization. But what outposts! Chancellor James Canfield, who presided over the university, proved an "unusually able, far-seeing, vigorous man, with a delightful personality;" one of the local attorneys, William Jennings Bryan, boasted fame beyond the prairies; and one of J.J. Pershing's particular friends was a struggling young lawyer named Charles G. Dawes.

In the company of stimulating friends the new Professor of Military Science made radical changes in the cadet corps of the university. Receiving the full support of Chancellor Canfield and the faculty, Pershing bore down with West Point discipline and worked to build an *esprit* to replace inertia. Out of all this hard work came a crack drill team—one that set records and took trophies and would be known thereafter as the famed Pershing Rifles. Working with these boys added another chapter in the education for leadership. Later Pershing remembered his problems and cast the value of what he learned:

"The psychology of the citizen as a cadet was that of the citizen soldier. Under training by one who understands him he can be quickly developed into a loyal and efficient fighting man. It would be an excellent thing if
every officer in the army could have contact in this way with the youth which forms our citizenship in peace and our armies in war. It would broaden the officer's outlook and better fit him for his duties.

Surrounded by faculty, students, intellectual curiosity, the young officer gave in to temptation, studied law, was graduated with the class of 1893 and was admitted to the bar. But that still did not quench his urge toward academic affairs, and he managed to teach regular college mathematics two hours a day.

Good years in Lincoln had to end. When they finally did in 1895, Pershing went back to frontier duty and to the beginning of a long and happy association with the Negro 10th Cavalry—one of the best colored outfits in the Army. A short stay in Montana and the northwest gave just enough time to take part in the roundup of Cree Indians and to see the fighting qualities of the American Negro.

Negroes made good soldiers, contrary to army mythology. Pershing looked behind the myth at the men and remembered what he saw. "It was a radical change," he said, "to go from the command of a corps of cadets of the caliber from which are drawn the leaders of the nation to a company of regulars composed of citizens who have always had only limited advantages and restricted ambitions." But he worked at making the switch. "My attitude toward the Negro," he would write in later years, "was that of one brought up among them. I had always felt kindly and sympathetic toward them and knew that fairness, justice, and due consideration of their welfare would make the same appeal to them as to any other body of men. Most men, of whatever race, creed, or color, want to do the proper thing and they respect the man above them whose motive is the same. I therefore had no more trouble with the negroes [sic] than with any other troops I ever commanded." As this philosophy was applied in subsequent campaigns at different times and distant places it proved sound and won loyalty.

An unexpected dividend came from service on the northwestern frontier. The Commanding General of the Army, Nelson A. Miles, made a hunting tour through country patrolled by Pershing's command and the two officers became acquainted. As a result, Miles called the young cavalryman to duty in Washington as his aide in December 1896.

Aides do all sorts of chores, mostly social ones. Pershing's appearance, graceful manners, bachelorhood, made him an especially likely aide for a general with an unmarried daughter! And although Pershing loved dancing, found beautiful girls almost fatally fascinating, he finally grew bored with the constant round of parties and state dinners. In fact he became so bored and so discouraged over slow promotion in the army that he seriously considered resigning his commission.

Friends talked him out of this aberration, happily, and he talked him
self into an appointment as Assistant Instructor of Tactics at the Military Academy, beginning in June 1897. Some things had changed at the Academy in the eleven years since he left. But all schools are loathe to change. So a good deal he found wrong with the curriculum during his cadet days, he still found wrong.

Displaying commendable initiative and no little intestinal fortitude, Pershing sought to modify some of the tactical training. “After my experience in the army,” he said, “I felt that practical instruction should begin early to include simple exercises in minor tactics in order better to prepare young graduates for active field service. It seemed to me that graduates of West Point should be given a course both theoretical and practical in the kind of service they would have as commanders of platoons and companies and even higher units in battle.” Suggestions along these lines, a few tentative lessons, a firm argument, brought stony hostility from the Commandant of Cadets. Pershing got the message—avoid original ideas and above all do not interrupt the even flow of lethargy.

Years later, when writing his memoirs, he could not avoid a thrust at the lazy commandant: “Tactical officers under him had little encouragement to extend the scope of their instruction, which continued to remain somewhat monotonous for officers and cadets alike instead of being, as it should be, a stimulus for thought and study of the basic principles of combat and the development of leadership in their application.”

Stifling under the ossified idiocy of his narrow superior, Pershing sought a way out. It came in the unexpected and exciting form of war with Spain. This first major conflict since the Civil War dwarfed the fierce but small operations against the Indians, posed gigantic problems of mass organization, mass logistics, army and navy coordination, overseas combat and tropical tactics, and would test every lesson every soldier had learned. Especially would it test young line officers. It might also offer boundless opportunities for distinction, recognition, and advancement.

But a man shunted off up the Hudson, doing daily drudgery, lost to his command, hardly could hope for much from the war. Pershing had to get back to the 10th Cavalry. Nobody seemed willing to help. His application to be relieved of duty at the Point and assigned to his regiment went to Washington with a disapproving note from the Superintendent and was rejected by the Adjutant General. Adding insult to injury, and incidentally costing himself the man he wanted to keep, the Superintendent published the rejection in orders for the moral instruction of all officers at the Academy.

People could push him pretty hard without making Pershing mad, but once he got mad, he stayed mad. Public ridicule of the kind indulged by the Superintendent started a smoldering resentment in the Instructor of Tactics. He planned his personal tactics with care. Somehow, someway, he was leaving West Point.
By great good fortune, and with what might even seem malice aforethought, he had helped Assistant Secretary of War G. D. Meiklejohn get his job. Conceivably he could ask a favor of his friend. But would this be right? From the standpoint of channels the answer was obvious: No. But the country was at war and so was he. This brought his problem down to an age-old question: At what point does worship of regulations cease being a virtue and become a vice? Many soldiers answer this by almost Calvinistic adherence to rules and so are protected whatever happens; others risk official displeasure, bend the rules, make opportunities and sometimes become generals.

Pershing decided to do a little bending, took leave, went down to Washington and put his case to Meiklejohn. The Assistant Secretary offered to aid in finding a staff assignment for his impetuous friend—but nothing less than line duty would satisfy. Failing that, warned Pershing, he would resign the regular army and take a volunteer appointment at the head of troops. Meiklejohn conceded, waited for his chance, and when a day came during which he functioned as Acting Secretary of War he ordered Pershing to return to his command near Chickamauga, Georgia.

Things actually worked out to be a little less tidy than the eager lieutenant hoped. Although back with his command, he found himself detailed as regimental quartermaster. Housekeeping duties, essential as may be, bored Pershing. But at least he would be with a unit in whatever fighting developed—and personal chances always lurked in action.

Supply service at least proved educational, particularly after the regiment reached Tampa, Florida, port of embarkation for Cuba. Normally a lazy little town basking in sun and retirement, Tampa suddenly burgeoned with masses of troops, wandering animals, martial equipment of all sorts—and the town simply was not ready. Such rapid expansion, despite the brave proclamations of entrepreneur Morton F. Plant, overtaxed everything in the city. First confusion, then incipient disorganization followed by chaos and virtual anarchy wracked the town.

The expeditionary force, commanded by nimble corpulent Gen. William R. Shafter, required ample harbor and loading facilities and abundant trackage—all were inadequate. Army officers seem to have taken the expansive Mr. Plant at his word; nobody bothered to examine Tampa's conveniences. An unbelievable bottleneck developed. The jam of men, horses, mules, guns, wagons, all crowding the single track feeding the paltry dock area made a lasting impression on Quartermaster Pershing and made him acutely conscious of logistical planning.

Matters hardly improved when the army reached Cuba, and had the Spaniards offered resistance to the American landing an extremely sticky situation would surely have resulted. As it was, American troops spilled ashore poorly equipped, many armed but without ammunition. Only the
hardy dedication to war displayed by ex-Confederate Gen. Joseph Wheeler saved the initial landing from utter disgrace.

Wheeler, who commanded the division to which the 10th Cavalry belonged, pressed forward to attack as soon as possible and won the first victory at the Battle of Las Guasimas. And Wheeler taught an invaluable lesson in personal leadership and devotion to duty—a lesson to stay with Pershing in the Philippines, in Mexico and in France.

During the bloody crossing of the Aguadones River just before the attack on Kettle and San Juan Hills, Pershing found himself searching the battle area for the absent 2nd Squadron of the 10th Cavalry. As he retraced the route to the river, he came on a lone horseman calmly watching the fighting from a vantage point in midstream. Spanish bullets flicked the trees around him, an occasional splashing geyser marked enemy shells, but the man sat quietly, gaze fixed to the front. The watcher was none other than "Little Joe" Wheeler, a fact which amazed Pershing since the general had been on sick call earlier in the day and unable to mount his horse. Wheeler spoke pleasantly to the young lieutenant and noted that the shelling "seemed quite lively." Pershing's protestations for the general's safety brought reassuring comment and the observations that he could not stay behind the lines when his division faced the enemy. Pershing remembered.

After fighting ended in Cuba, Pershing received orders to report for duty in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Victory in Cuba and the acquisition of the Philippines bought problems unexpected by the government. The toughest questions centered around administering new colonial possessions. Since resistance continued in the Philippines, where rebels led by Emilio Aguinaldo fought for independence, the army had to devise a system of military government. Within the War Department a Bureau of Customs and Insular Affairs appeared in March 1899, with Maj. (temporary) Pershing as Chief. His description of the task facing him has a curiously modern ring:

The problems that arose involved readjustments in government and the determination of policies to be followed in the complicated business of ruling peoples as distant from each other geographically as Porto Rico and Mindanao and as different in character as West Indian negroes [sic] are from Mohammedan Asiatics. Over the original code of laws of these peoples Spanish laws and customs had been superimposed. Our application of the rules of military occupation to the different alien groups frequently brought up questions which only the War Department could decide.

Though he could act like one on occasion, Pershing was no bureaucrat. Doing his desk jobs efficiently became a good soldier, but it also became a
good soldier to get away from the desk and back to the field. Over loud protests from friend Meiklejohn, Pershing wormed an assignment to the Philippines in September 1899.

Desk duty served him well, though, for few officers had comparable legal and administrative understanding of insular problems. True, initial tasks as adjutant general of the District of Zamboanga and later of the District of Mindanao hardly gave him a chance to display his knowledge. But when he could he offered careful advice, showed interest in the Moro natives, and slowly impressed the brass. A man of his obvious talents could be useful in command capacity and in October 1901 Capt. Pershing (he finally made it in February 1901) took charge of Camp Vicars, an important Mindanao outpost.

For the first time he had a chance to practice some of his ideas of leadership and military government. The main task of Camp Vicars' commander focused on the Moro population. Few American soldiers either knew or cared much about these strange Mohammedan folk who decked themselves in turbans, wildly colorful clothes, practiced polygamy, took slaves, and brandished razor-edged krises, campilans, and barongs. About all known of them was their warlike nature, their unending desire to kill Christians, and their resistance to all forms of law and order.

Many Americans felt about Moros as they did about Indians: the good ones were dead. Standard operating procedure seemed to be shoot first and chat later. Obviously this sort of treatment bred equal enmity, and by the time Pershing took command at Camp Vicars relations between Americans and Moros were about as bad as they had been between Spaniards and Moros—which is to say impossible.

The new Yankee leader acted like none before him. Instead of sending out patrols to round up hostiles, he sent out letters written in Arabic, letters which talked of friendship and mutual assistance. A few Moro dattos and sultans tried the novel ways of peace and grew to trust Pershing. Working with this small nucleus, he tried to win over all the barrios of Mindanao. But this attempt failed. Fierce, proud people, the Moros tended to see weakness in peace talk and most could not forget the Mohammedan duty to rid the world of infidels.

Lake Lanao, landlocked deep in the interior of the Island of Mindanao, served several barrios as fishery, avenue of commerce, route of retreat. Two especially fearless bands of Moros hugged the shores of the lake and made it their own sea—the Lake Lanao and Maciu Moros. Their dattos treated every friendly overture with contempt, and Pershing finally knew he must fight them or lose the respect of the Moros who had accepted him.

By the time he led his first expedition into Mindanao's interior he knew much Moro lore. Hard fighting, he understood, conferred religious virtue; those Moros who died well, especially when warring against Christians,
went immediately to Mohammedan paradise—noble death, then, formed
the threshold of bliss. To an old Indian fighter this warrior philosophy had
chilling similarity to the Ghost Dance frenzy which drove the red men to
t heir desperate last stands.

Pershing understood a soldier's desire to die well—this ambition was
not, after all, the exclusive property of Moros or Indians. And he respected
those who achieved this goal. But he knew that somehow he must soil death
for the Moros, somehow rob it of its hallow. This achieved, and discretion
might have a chance over valor. Knowledge of the Koran and its teachings
offered a simple, if repelling solution: bury dead Moros with dead pigs. This
practice, which guaranteed perdition to Mohammedans, reduced the power
of the war dattos and fighting slowly subsided.

But Pershing knew that he must give something valuable in return for
such shabby guile: what he gave was mettle for mettle. He treated the Moro
soldier as a worthy foeman whose strength demanded both strength and
artifice in response. When he fought Moros he stormed their cottas with
fury and when he carried their forts he spared the survivors the weakness of
mercy.

Slowly but inexorably the Lake Lanao and Maciu Moros, then the
fearsome Jolo and Sulu bands, yielded to this strange Yankee—this noble
warrior who talked so softly. When at last they came to know he meant to
help rather than humiliate them they, too, trusted. And when they did, they
gave him their hearts. He became the first American soldier admitted to the
exalted station of Moro datto in a mystic ceremony reminiscent of the Arabian Nights. Other Americans less sensitive to humanity, less understanding,
less learned, might have spurned the strange rites and ridiculed the honor.
Not Pershing. And the important thing is that none of the Moros expected
he would.

Tenure in the Philippines was interrupted in 1903 by a call to duty with
the nascent general staff. While in Washington tending this important desk
job, the captain met and married Frances Warren, daughter of Senator
Warren of Wyoming. Their marriage glittered as the capital's social event of
1905—everybody came, including President and Mrs. Roosevelt and members
of the Senate.

No sooner was Pershing married than he was shipped—this time to
Tokyo as U.S. Attache with the special assignment of observing the Mikado's armies in the Russo-Japanese War. And so began Pershing's first acquaintance with Japan. He fell in love with the country, took his family there often, and developed an admiration for the formal determination of
the people. He also came to appreciate the efficiency of the army, an appreci-
cation which grew as he followed Japanese operations at Dalny, Liaoyang,
and Mukden. A keen professional eye caught the strength of Russian posi-
tions at Mukden, laced with wire, entrenched, supported by concentrations
of artillery and machine guns. That same cold eye, like it or not, recognized
the terrible power of the machine gun against masses of cavalry. And again
war taught logistical lessons. Even the efficient Japanese could not solve the
problems of masses of men, animals, guns, refugees, and prisoners. Disci-
plined trains broke into herds of vehicles, people, guns, equipment, all
hopelessly stalled in chaotic masses to dwarf memories of Tampa. Again
modern armies ran afoul of war's ancient enemy—disorganization.

The large corps of foreign observers, with the Japanese, all friends of
Pershing, rejoiced at his spectacular promotion in mid-September 1906. The
lowly captain of heroic duration in grade had been elevated by President
Roosevelt to the rank of brigadier general! A reward for Moro service, the
promotion put Pershing ahead of 862 senior officers and posed endless
problems in jealousy and protocol.

But training and observation steadied him for increased responsibility,
prepared him for wider opportunities, and tempered him for high com-
mand.

The new brigadier at last received the assignment he most wanted: back
to the Philippines as Commander of the Department of Mindanao and
Governor of the Moro Province. This dual military and civil role had all
kinds of possibilities. As military commander of the Department of Minda-
nao, he had charge of U.S. forces in the area and responsibility for
operations—this meant, of course, he had power to enforce his decisions as
civil governor of the province.

Had he been less experienced, less sympathetic with the Moros, power
might have corrupted his administration into the petty tyranny known in
other parts of the Philippines But power he used to dignify his friends and
chastise his foes; so justly did he use it that the Moro Province became a
model of American military government. Civic advances could be glimpsed
from Zamboanga to Iligan, from Tawi Tawi throughout the Sulu Archipel-
ago. And at last leave-taking in 1914 both Pershings and Moros mourned the
parting.

Still, long tropical service takes its toll, and the entire Pershing clan—
grown to six by 1914—needed a change. Assignment to San Francisco prom-
ised a pleasant post, and the family settled comfortably in the Presidio.
None realized it, of course, but the brief months of happy life at the Presidio
were to be the last. While Pershing was away on the Mexican border in
August 1915 his quarters burned. Frances and the three girls were killed;
only son Warren survived.

Something died in Pershing himself. He still could be good company at
parties, still played rugged polo, still enjoyed ribald jokes—but the richness
went from life and left a parching void. If later he seemed cold and stern to
many, he had reasons.

Sorrow sometimes brings a type of discipline. It did to Pershing. Re-
tired within himself, he became increasingly the aloof, dedicated soldier. Desperate devotion to work seemed to ease the loneliness, and he lavished attention on his post in Texas.

Things might have been impossible for a bereaved general lost at a remote outpost with nothing but routine to drain his suffering. But Fort Bliss had close contact with people of El Paso and also had special problems to relieve the monotony. Throughout 1915 trouble along the Mexican border flared with increasing violence; roving packs of banditos raided on either side of the Rio Grande and mounting loss of life and property brought alarm in Washington.

By the end of 1915 the border crisis threatened war between the United States and Mexico. And suddenly on this chancy scene burst the hulking figure of Pancho Villa, villain extraordinary. On March 9, 1916, his bandits hit Columbus, New Mexico, in a lightning raid, killed a good many people, and almost started the war.

President Wilson directed a large United States force to enter the State of Chihuahua in pursuit of the “Wraith of the Desert.” Pershing was picked to lead the Punitive Expedition.

In some ways this looked to be his toughest assignment. Orders stood his first problem, orders which were complicated by the world situation. Wilson urgently wanted to avoid war with Mexico because it seemed certain that the European conflict would soon involve the United States. Whatever was done about Villa must be done in such a way as to keep peace with President Carranza’s government. Consequently a delicate kind of deal resulted: Carranza agreed to permit a Yankee expedition in northern Mexico but placed harsh restrictions on its activities. Pershing could use only northsouth routes, railroads were off limits, no Mexican town could be entered without Carranzista permission, scrupulous care must be taken of private property.

Pershing’s second problem he could see around him—terrain. North Chihuahua spread below New Mexico and Texas a vast alkali waste, dotted here and there with cactus, agave, arroyos, poor villages. Water was scarce, roads few, fodder non-existent.

Opposition constituted another problem. Pancho Villa rode this country cloaked in a hero’s mantle. Every hovel offered refuge, every peon offered help. His banditos, excellent light cavalry, roamed the countryside at will and when chased, broke into small bands and melted away until time to pillage once again. The myth of Villa the Benevolent brought cold hostility to pursuers, and the Punitive Expedition felt the chill everywhere.

All these problems Pershing understood well enough, but he appreciated the dual importance of his mission. Not only must he break up Villa’s brigands and restore order to the border but also carry out a field test of United States arms and equipment under modern campaign conditions.
Modern tactics, new weapons, communications, transportation all remained untried in a war of massive proportions. Mexico might serve as a proving ground for the American army.

Once again Pershing had to train himself for unique responsibility. His own experience in mass war was limited. Lessons in small unit action so well learned in the Indian campaigns, in Cuba and the Philippines, would have only limited value in the new style warfare evolving abroad. In Mexico Pershing might still rely on semi-guerilla tactics, but he must try out the new army.

He had a good deal of unfamiliar equipment to learn and control. His 15,000-man force, which crossed into Mexico on March 15, 1916, consisted of the usual arms but with interesting additions. A motorized truck company aided the ancient mule trains in carrying supplies; a field radio unit attempted to keep track of the ranging cavalry scouts; machine gun companies were sprinkled through the infantry to increase firepower; eight JN-4 aeroplanes, the famed Flying Jennies, hovered above the American columns to provide reconnaissance and courier service. Pershing had charge of the most modern expedition ever put in the field by the United States.

The Punitive Expedition fought several battles, countless skirmishes, missed Villa but broke up his force, and emerged from Mexico in February 1917, tattered and tested.

Invaluable lessons were learned in the Villa venture. Coordination of the innovations in communication, observation, and firepower came hard, but came—and proved highly valuable. The militia system, called into operation when reinforcements went to the border in case full-scale war erupted, failed and showed clearly that new mobilization methods must be found. Mexico helped convince Congress of the need to expand and modernize the entire United States military structure. The vital National Defense Act of 1916 was passed largely because of Pershing's experiences south of the border.

What of the new major general himself? What did Pershing learn in Mexico? First, of course, he gained practice in handling a large number of troops in expeditionary action; then, too, he learned something of the way to combine old and new weapons and equipment in modern war; something more of the qualities of those citizen soldiers he met first in Nebraska; and finally he learned the wisdom of civilian control of military affairs. This last lesson came the hard way—by direct conflict with the Secretary of War and the President. A good soldier, schooled in the principles of war and bloodied in hard combat, Pershing wanted no muddling around in Mexico. Nothing less than general invasion and all out pursuit of Villa made sense; partial wars, “police actions” fought under wraps, denied logic by forfeiting victory. But since being a good soldier also usually involved sticking to orders, Pershing did as he was told. And in later time he came to see reasons for Wilson's quasi-war with Mexico.
BIography AND LEADERSHIP

Despite his personal feelings Pershing did a splendid job of avoiding war through nimble diplomacy and careful use of force—and by keeping strictly to his orders. Such unwavering discipline marked him an officer to watch, and did much to win him command of the American Expeditionary Force in May 1917.

Who else had his experience in modern warfare, with combined arms, with protracted operations of all kinds; who else showed his loyalty, wisdom, patience, character? These questions Wilson and Secretary of War Newton Baker pondered, and both concluded none other than Pershing could be trusted with the greatest assignment ever given an American commander.

Along with this unprecedented honor went awesome responsibility. Although fighting had raged in France since 1914 and America drifted inexorably toward involvement, pitifully little had been done to ready the United States for total war. The National Defense Act, the "Plattsburg Movement," Teddy Roosevelt's loud calls for mobilization—all these resulted in a few more militiamen and general public concern. But what of the army? Beyond the regular and volunteer units which served on the Mexican border and the few garrisons scattered around the country, the army existed only on paper. And the paper legions looked woefully outdated. American ideas of war had a distance to go to catch up with the scope of conflict abroad. Not only were plans inadequate, supplies and equipment simply did not exist. The United States could put only one military plane in the air and boasted almost no aircraft factories. Although the fantastic artillery barrages on the Western Front were recounted daily in the news, virtually no preparations had been made to produce guns or shells. And while British, French, and German armies relied on machine guns by the thousands to cover their lines, American ordnance officers struggled in 1917 to decide on a gun for official adoption.

Clearly Pershing led a phantom force which could have no impact on the war for some time. And something else loomed clearly to the AEF's commander: again he would have to train himself for the job, alter his attitudes and ideas to meet changed conditions. Obviously his major task would be one of organization and supply. Like his hero General Grant, he must become an executive, a general presiding over a gigantic business enterprise. War had burst the bounds of armies and now consumed nations and peoples. Divisions and corps still were commanded, but armies were managed. In this enlarged role Pershing's local training and experience as Governor of the Moro Province would serve him well.

History pretty much recalls Pershing the Chaumont bureaucrat, the stubborn member of the Supreme Allied War Council, the remote dictator. He became a model of administrative efficiency, the prototype of modern military leaders, the best of the "new breed." Administrative and opera-
tional details he handled with the practiced ease of years, but he kept a keen perspective on life and death through frequent looks at the Western Front.

And by 1917 the Western Front was a sight to make cynics of saints. From the Swiss border to the English channel, over four hundred miles of trenches twisted across France. Some parts of the line were marked "quiet sectors," where only an occasional artillery duel churned the Augean mud and casualties were few. On active parts of the line the story could be told only in lights and darks, in flashes, in terrible cacophonies, in the pulsing chatter of machine guns, in screams of men and shells, in the looming silence of a waiting field.

The worst mistake of the war, to Pershing's mind, was the acceptance of a trench stalemate. Convinced that getting out of the trenches gave the only chance for victory, he drilled his men in Mexico in open tactics, kept them marching to build stamina and confidence—just in case they go to France. And these men came at last as part of the American First Army to form the core of Pershing's striking force. He knew, of course, that he could not change allied strategy or tactics, but he clung to his own.

When Pershing and his staff first arrived in Europe in June 1917, the Allied cause was all but lost. Wastage of men and treasure sapped the vitality of Britain and France, mutiny smouldered in over fifty French divisions, and across the grim ditches fresh German armies were mustering. Marshal Foch put it plainly—one million Americans must come quickly or the game was up.

Where were these Americans coming from, and when? Pershing kept his usual tight-lipped counsel but pondered these questions with alarm. American combat troops would arrive late in 1917, but when they came, they would be short of machine guns and would have to borrow artillery from the French. The thing that most bothered him, though, was Allied insistence on filtering American units into spent Allied divisions. Pershing rejected the idea and in this rejection received the vital assistance of President Wilson. Wilson gave him specific instructions before he left for Europe: the American Army must remain the American Army—under no circumstances, save utter disaster, would doughboys be abandoned to British and French control.

Not only would this practice fritter away American strength and prevent the building of an army, it would also impose on Pershing's men the defeatist philosophy of the Allies and squander training in open warfare. Pershing kept to the idea of open attack through all of 1917—and it so happened that the same tactical notion occurred to Field Marshall Ludendorff as he plotted a German offensive for the summer of the next year.

Most Allied generals had little regard for Pershing—one described him as "very commonplace, without real war experience, and already overwhelmed by the initial difficulties of a job too big for him"—or for his
tactical ideas. But when Ludendorff's divisions specially trained in open maneuver cracked the Western Front wide open in the summer of 1918 and Allied divisions were driven from their trenches to wander helplessly without cover, it looked as though the tough Yankee had something.

Doughboys proved their general right at Cantigny, Belleau Wood, St. Mihiel, and in the Argonne. Pershing's dedication to his own ideas of organization and operations got the best out of the citizen soldiers he so admired.

In the last analysis, American strength—physical and material—turned the tide of war in 1918. But the "Stillness at Compiegne" came at an awkward time—it caught the Allies almost in mid-stride and brought a serious letdown. And it frustrated Pershing.

After hard beginnings, his Argonne offensive had picked up momentum and he wanted to drive into Germany, destroy its armies, reduce its economy—he wanted, in other words, proper victory for a grim and dirty war. But Versailles satisfied no one, and Pershing noted with distaste the
hatred and feuds bequeathed by the peacemakers. He agreed with the principle of limited peace after limited war, but could never accept armistice as an end to a crusade.

Victory brought unprecedented fame to the leader of the AEF and decorations from all Allied countries. In September 1919 Pershing received the coveted rank of General of the Armies—a rank held by only one other American, George Washington. Finally in 1921, after the shouting and adulation faded, the highest general of them all took up another desk job, this time as Chief of Staff. He stayed at that post until retirement in 1924. During these years Pershing laid the groundwork for the reorganization and modernization of the army which would prepare it for World War II.

After leaving the Army Pershing languished on the shelf. He dabbled in South American peacemaking, served on various commissions, shunned the spotlight as usual. His health finally failed and he was admitted to Walter Reed Hospital in May 1941, where he lived in a special suite until his death in 1948.

But the hospital years were not all dull. Battalions of visitors paraded to his rooms, he broke cover now and then for an official function or secret gourmandising, and during the Second World War he kept an active eye on the activities of General George C. Marshall, his former aide.

What meaning does Pershing's long career have in the Atomic Age? How does he stack up as a modern general? Was he a great man?

Taking the questions in reverse order: Yes, I think he was a great man—great, if character, if devotion, if self-discipline and self-development are elements of greatness. Stonewall Jackson's personal motto was "You may be whatever you resolve to be," and it might have been Pershing's. He rose to every responsibility because he had the capacity to learn from experience and to practice what he learned. There seems no limit to his ability to grow—suffice it to say that he grew beyond the demands of colonialism to shape an army of democracy.

As a modern general Pershing deserves high praise. Though he sometimes botched tactics, he rarely erred strategically: witness his sense of objective in the Argonne offensive aimed at the most sensitive point in the German positions along the Western Front. And most important in modern times, he always understood the relation of politics to war: witness his success politically and militarily in Moroland, his triumph over red tape in France. As a military businessman he displayed remarkable talent; I wonder if anyone else could have managed the total effort of the AEF with equal success?

Does his career still have importance today? Is the career of any Great Captain ever irrelevant? Pershing's self-discipline, his sensitive humanity, honesty, his example of rising to every challenge, are hallmarks of a superb leader and are as inspiring in this time as in his own.
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

He patterned his life according to the finest traditions of the service, and he helped make those traditions. Can any soldier do more?

Dr. Frank E. Vandiver is Professor of History at Rice University. He is a graduate of the University of Texas and received his Ph.D. from Tulane University. He served on the staff of the Historical Division of Air University and taught for the University of Alabama Extension Division and Washington University. He has been associated with Rice University since 1955 and is currently serving as Chairman of its History Department. An expert on Civil War history, Dr. Vandiver has written numerous articles for historical journals and book reviews. His published books include: Rebel Brass (1952), Mighty Stonewall (1957), and Jubal's Raid (1960). He also served as editor for Gen. J.A. Early's War Memoirs and for Gen. J.E. Johnson's Narrative of Military Operations. With W.H. Nelson, he coauthored Fields of Glory. Dr. Vandiver is presently completing three books for publication: A Basic History of the Confederacy, The Confederate States of America, and The Life of General John J. Pershing.
Leadership in the Old Air Force:  
A Postgraduate Assignment

David MacIsaac

We Americans have a peculiar propensity to single out for special notice those anniversaries measured in multiple decennia—as in a tenth reunion, a thirtieth anniversary, a fortieth birthday, a centennial, and so forth. Accordingly, the 17th of September this year will be marked by celebrations attendant to the bicentennial of the adoption by the Constitutional Convention of the Constitution of the United States. In similar if less august manner, the 18th of September will mark the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the United States Air Force as a separate service.

It was eighty years ago August 1, 1907, that the Army Signal Corps established an Aeronautical Division to take charge "of all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air machines, and all kindred subjects." Allotted to carry out this task were one captain, one corporal, and one private. When the latter went OTF (over the fence) shortly thereafter, the 1907 version of regression analysis revealed, as some late twentieth-century stylist might put it, "grave difficulties in maintaining necessary manning levels."

But help was on the way. Only two months earlier a young Pennsylvanian, a founding member and acknowledged leader of the "Black Hand" (a secret, nocturnal society of Bed Check Charlies and assorted other pranksters at West Point), ranking academically near the top of the bottom half of his class, and having spent the final four days before commencement on the tour ramp, was graduated from the Military Academy, having failed ever to be appointed a cadet officer. Shuffled off initially to the Infantry in the Philippines and later garrison duty on Governor’s Island—later the site of New York’s first airport—he volunteered for flight training, which he then undertook with the Wright brothers in Dayton, earning his wings as U. S. Army Military Aviator #2 in July 1911. By the following summer he had become the first winner of the MacKay Trophy. Five months later, following a particularly hair-raising experience at Fort Riley, he succumbed to fear of flying, vowing never again to set foot inside an airplane, a resolution steadfastly maintained for another four years. Had he been sent originally to his cherished Cavalry rather than the Infantry in 1907, he almost surely would not have volunteered for aeronautical training in 1911; had he not at length driven himself to overcome his fear of flying, the hall we meet in this evening
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

would be named for someone other than Henry Harley Arnold. So much for inevitability! But already I get ahead of myself.

I began by referring to 1987 as a decennial anniversary, and mentioned particularly the 40th birthday of the modern Air Force. I then hinted—by referring to the establishment of the Aeronautical Division in August 1907—that the years since 1947 might be looked on as constituting the second forty years of Air Force history. Tonight, out of what I assure you is conviction rather than perversity, I would like to look at the first forty years of that story—the forty years looking backward from 1947—and in particular at a few of the men who lived and made that story. It is a fact that those of whom I have chosen to speak rose to positions of high authority in World War II. It is not, however, true that they were in any sense predestined to do so. In each case so-called inevitability—an attribute we occasionally malassign to events only after the passage of considerable time—played no part at all; in each case, although for different reasons, miraculous would be a more accurate description of their eventual success than inevitable.

So I shall focus on their early years and thereby avoid a trap we too often fall into in studying the past, that of tending to isolate our great leaders in their moments of triumph, seemingly forgetting that each was a product of both experience (especially but not exclusively his own) and example, especially that of his seniors. Besides, however bizarre the notion might seem to you, it seems to me that people your age might be interested in learning something of the personalities and styles of young officers starting out their careers in a period when the pace of technological change appeared bewilderingly fast-paced and, indeed, chaotic . . . even more so in these respects than the 1980s!

A second reason I insist on reaching so far back in time is my conviction, well stated by Russell Weigley in 1973,

that what we believe and what we do today is governed at least as much by the habits of mind we formed in the relatively remote past as by what we did and thought [only] yesterday. The relatively remote past is apt to constrain our thought and actions more, because we understand it less well than we do our recent past, or at least recall it less clearly, and it has cut deeper grooves of custom in our minds.

Promoting the study of the past before young audiences has never proved an easy task. For many among your generation, for example, the Carthaginian Wars are psychologically equidistant in time, as measured from today, with the French and American adventures in Indochina. Santayana's warning that those who don't study the past are condemned to repeat
it carries much less weight than it once did—in part, I suspect, because we realize now that its opposite can also be true, as in dwelling on the Munich analogy to the point of confusing Ho Chi Minh with Hitler. The latter came about, I would suggest, not because history repeats itself but because people do. History cannot repeat itself because the circumstances and contexts of discrete events separated in time cannot be made to recur. But that's no bar to people repeating themselves, especially when available, convenient, and comfortable analogies present themselves. It is for this reason, among others, that looking to the past for the wrong reasons can prove at least as dangerous as ignoring it altogether.

In suggesting to you a particular approach to the study of the past, let me say up front that it is not one aimed at, or optimized for, attaining high grades in undergraduate courses. In fact, the approach I commend to you runs counter to the standard military approach to history, one usually expressed in the attempt to capture the so-called lessons of conflict, especially as those lessons pertain to weaponry and other physical factors (and the more recent the better). In fact, it runs so far counter to the standard approach that instead of seeking lessons, answers, or recipes, it looks instead for questions; its goal is to help us learn what questions to ask—of ourselves, of others, of theories, plans, decisions, and not least of conscience. For that reason it differs as well in its almost single-minded focus on people—rather than on events, trends, forces, factors, alleged parallels, and all those other amorphous vagaries that are as liable to mislead as to inform us.

Which leads us in turn to focus on biography, in the firm belief that the history of military matters, whether they be of the military at war or during peacetime, is a flesh-and-blood affair, not a matter of diagrams and formulas and bean counts, nor yet even of rules or procedures or computer printouts; not a conflict of machines, nor their products, but of men (and now women) and their hopes, dreams, and ambitions. And so, for our text to accompany this sermon we turn to Lord Wavell:

When you study military history don't read outlines on strategy or the principles of war. Read biographies, memoirs, historical novels [Anton Myrer's *Once an Eagle* and James Webb's *A Country Such as This* come immediately to mind in this respect]. Get at the flesh and blood of it, not the skeleton. To learn that Napoleon won the campaign of 1796 by manœuvre on interior lines or some such phrase is of little value. If you can discover how a young, unknown man inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight, how he gave it the energy and momentum to march and fight as it did, how he dominated and controlled generals older and more experienced than himself, then you will have learnt something. Napoleon did not gain the position he did so much by a study of
rules and strategy as by a profound knowledge of human nature in war. A story of him in his early days shows this clearly. When he was a young artillery officer at the siege of Toulon, he built a battery in such an exposed position that he was told he would never find men to hold it. [So] he put up a placard, “The battery of men without fear,” and it was always manned. 6

As few as ten years ago, those of us then here at the Academy who wanted to make this point had to do so, almost without exception, by recourse to examples drawn from the age before flight—or, if from the twentieth century, from such examples as George Marsh, Douglas MacArthur, George Patton, or Dwight Eisenhower. The absence of biographies of Air Force leaders was appalling. Beyond a first rate intellectual biography of Billy Mitchell, 7 along with a raft of sensationalist books about him and an occasional dictated memoir—those of Foulois, Brereton, Kenney, and LeMay come to mind—there was virtually nothing beyond what Theodore Ropp used to call the “Look, Ma, I’m flying!” stable of historical anecdote. All that has changed in the intervening decade.

Among those whose career paths have at length been revealed are Hap Arnold, Ira Eaker, Benny Foulois, Jimmy Doolittle, and Curtis LeMay; soon to join this group will be Carl Spaatz and Hoyt Vandenberg. Even subsequent generations have joined up; witness Chuck Yeager, Chappie James, and Lance Sijan. 8 It is my thesis this evening that, rightly approached, these volumes can prove both fun and rewarding.

Take Hap Arnold for example. Here was a young man destined by his father to attend Bucknell to become a Baptist minister. Then, when his older brother refused to accept the appointment to West Point his well-connected father had arranged for him, young “Harley” was directed to take and pass the entrance examination that was required to select his brother’s replacement. To the surprise of all he came in second, a respectable finish but one that left him off the hook. Then, the evening before the winner was scheduled to depart for West Point, he admitted to being married. And so Arnold, on the 27th of July, 1903, four and a half months before Kitty Hawk, found himself, to his considerable bewilderment, just one month after his seventeenth birthday, in a plebe’s uniform at West Point.

I referred earlier to his membership in the “Black Hand.” One of its triumphs involved the overnight dismemberment of the revolver cannon, along with its displacement to, and reassembly upon, the roof of the cadet barracks, straddling the apex. You can imagine his delight when it took the entire Engineering Department, aided by a team of six horses, an entire day to disassemble, lower, reassemble, and return the gun to its proper place. On the same roof Arnold would later be caught silhouetted against the glare of an elaborate, pinwheeled fireworks display spelling out “1907—Never
Again. And yet, in the end the permanent cadet private was graduated and, in part to teach him a lesson, shipped off to a disappointing assignment with the Infantry. And then everything changed almost overnight.

It is to what happened next, rather than to his reputation as a happy-go-lucky cadet prankster, that I would like to call your future attention. How he went to the Philippines, impressed everyone with his new-found diligence (his resourcefulness was never at issue); met, in addition to 1st Lt. George C. Marshall, a certain Capt. Cowan who two years later, back with the Signal Corps in Washington, remembered Arnold when he, Cowan, was stuck with the task of recruiting a couple of volunteers to go out to Dayton and learn how to drive air machines; how he accepted the offer, how he fared in training under the Wrights, and how he came to change his mind about the Cavalry being “the last romantic thing on earth;” how he “SLED” (self-initiated elimination) from flying duty yet managed to remain assigned to the Aviation Section; how he conquered his fears, returned to flying, and how he responded to the disappointment in 1917 and 1918 of being considered so important to the stateside buildup of military aviation that he was denied the opportunity to go to France until late in October of 1918, arriving at the front, in an automobile of all things, at almost precisely 11:00 A.M. on the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918. The guns he heard were firing in celebration; the Armistice had begun.

Arnold returned from France in December and was assigned to take charge of the demobilization of some 8,000 troops and 375 officers at Rockwell Field in San Diego, up until then the principal flying training field. He would have only a handful of regular Army officers to assist him, one of whom was a young war hero, Maj. Carl A. Spaatz, whom he had met briefly in New York in October as Spaatz was returning from France and Arnold was racing against the clock to get to Europe. Another was 1st Lt. Ira C. Eaker, a youngster who had won his wings in July 1918 and was just finishing up aerial gunnery training at Rockwell when the war ended. Spaatz was West Point, Class of 1914, seven years after Arnold; Eaker was Southwestern Normal School, Durant, Oklahoma, Class of 1917, who, along with all the boys enrolled in the school, had marched off to Greenville, Texas, on April 7, 1917 (70 years ago yesterday), to enlist in the Army. Let’s look for a few minutes at these two youngsters the young Col. Arnold had to lean on. (I should perhaps point out that when Arnold was appointed a temporary colonel in August 1917 he thereupon became the youngest colonel in the Army. “Thirty-one-year-olds just didn’t become colonels in those days. At first, he later recalled, he used to take back streets to his office, ‘imagining that people would be looking at me incredulously.’ ”)

Spaatz, like Arnold, was the son of a politically well-connected Pennsylvanian. Also like Arnold, he was an “area bird”—out marching tours right up to graduation day; a “clean sleeve”—never made cadet rank; and
Gen. Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, Chief of U.S. Army Air Forces, declares that Nazis have sufficient planes for the air war but lack gas and pilots during an April 1945 conference at Headquarters U.S. Ninth Air Force.

was graduated near the top of the bottom half of his class (57th out of 107). En route he survived a losing fight on the very first day of beast barracks, a mysteriously disapproved letter of resignation on the 21st day of beast, a court-martial for "conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline"—for which read: establishing, in collusion with the janitor, a stag bar of sorts in the basement of the library—and one of the most severe cases of "firsty-itis" ever recorded. During his final year he fell all the way from #38 to #98 in academics and all the way to 102, out of 107, in conduct. And yet there was something about the way he bore himself that allowed him to escape the wrath of either his betters or his peers. "He was one of our number," a classmate recalled, "who was known to take things easy, play bridge and poker and enjoy life as much as possible for a cadet, and still maintain a creditable class standing without much apparent effort. He was always himself and seemed never to be troubled by the stresses and strains that plagued [the] engineers who were striving for tenths [of a point in GPA] and goats who were struggling [just] to remain cadets." Another remembered that "he seemed always to feel sure of himself and to know just what to do in any situation."12

Also like Arnold, Spaatz apparently got serious about life immediately
following graduation in June 1914, perhaps inspired in part by the guns of August. At the end of his mandatory year with the 25th Infantry, his captain wrote: "Attention to duty, professional zeal, general bearing and military appearance, intelligence and judgment shown in instructing, drilling, and handling enlisted men [are] all excellent. Should be trusted with important duties. I would desire to have him under my immediate command, in peace or war."13

In October 1915 Spaatz reported to the Signal Corps Aviation School at San Diego, where the commander—the same Captain Arthur S. Cowan who had recruited Arnold in 1911—reported that Spaatz revealed a peculiar fitness for Signal Corps aviation duties. "I would desire to have him under my immediate command in peace and in war. In the event of war [he] is best suited for aviation duty."14 Upon receiving his Junior Military Aviator wings in May 1916, Spaatz was sent off to Columbus, New Mexico, to join Capt. Benny Foulois's 1st Aero Squadron, then assigned to the Punitive Expedition under Gen. Pershing. Equipment shortcomings by themselves rendered the air portions of that adventure a fiasco, so it was perhaps in the end not important that the secretary of war had specifically excluded any attempt at offensive operations for the air arm. In July Spaatz was promoted to first
lieutenant and in December reported to San Antonio to take command of the 3rd Aero Squadron.

In part as a result of the dismal record of the 1st Squadron in Mexico, but also with an eye to possible future involvement in the European war, the Congress in August 1916 had at last appropriated almost $14 million for aviation. (Only a few years before, so tradition had it, a congressman had querulously asked, “What’s all this fuss about an aerial machine for the Signal Corps? I thought they already had one!”) In any event, Spaatz’s selection for command brought with it another promotion, to captain, and a new flying experience.

Although an air war had been underway in Europe for more than a year, in the United States the only uses to which military aircraft had been put were liaison and observation; accordingly, in the absence of any requirement for aerial combat, acrobatics was not only not included in flying training, but was forbidden to all army flyers as both unnecessary and too dangerous. A few civilians, however, had begun to develop the art, one being the Stinson family in San Antonio, proprietors of an imaginative flying school. The Army contracted with the Stinson school to train three of its aviators in aerobatics and Spaatz was one of the three chosen. It is perhaps of interest to some in this audience that his instructor in this daring enterprise was one Marjorie Stinson, a daughter of the school’s owner, subsequently one of America’s premier women pilots.

By August of 1917 Spaatz was on his way to France where his first duty was to the Department of Instruction, Headquarters, Line of Communications, AEF. By November he had been appointed officer in charge of training at Issoudun, about 150 miles south of Paris, where the Air Service had established an in-theater advanced flying school. There he would remain for nine long months, advancing to post commander and promoted to major, but stuck in a training job because his seniors knew of no one better qualified or more effective. He faced a few problems. One was to build the base complex at Issoudun itself, in mud, in the winter, and while using flying cadets as common laborers, then build ten auxiliary fields; then run a training program with thirty-two different types of airplanes, including seventeen different versions of the Nieuport alone. And, of course, all the relevant technical orders were in French and the measurements metric.

All of this Spaatz managed somehow to accomplish just three years out of West Point and finally, in September of 1918, he managed to informally attach himself to the 13th Aero Squadron at the front. The squadron commander being a captain, Spaatz simply removed his insignia and flew as a junior wing man. He saw combat on the 15th and 26th, on the second occasion recording two confirmed kills, but managing to survive largely because his commander, Capt. Biddle, came to his rescue when Spaatz, having failed to “check six,” was about to be shot down himself. “Once
more the same old story," Captain Biddle later wearily recorded, "of a man forgetting that there is any danger other than that which may come from the machine which he is attacking. . . . Only bitter experience teaches them, and that is dearly paid for. The man who was being pursued by the Fokkers I drove off was a major temporarily attached to the squadron to get some practical experience. He got it all right."16

If Captain Biddle had not been impressed, Billy Mitchell at headquarters certainly was, and, in due time, young Major Spaatz was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for conspicuous gallantry in action.

And so, less than four years after commissioning, Carl Spaatz had found himself at the center of the effort to organize and train an air force for war—the first such effort in our history. "In nine month's time, he had been directly or indirectly involved in practically every kind of problem to be faced in organizing an air force for total war. . . . Further, he had gained a reputation and broadened his set of human relationships in a way that was to have a vital impact on his future and that of the U.S. air arm."17 Short-spoken, indeed terse to the point where his tact was often called into question by his seniors, Spaatz nonetheless won the admiration of those around him for both effectiveness and courage, the first of which lay dormant at West Point but the second of which he had revealed on the first day of "beast." Such was the background of Colonel Arnold's young deputy early in 1919 at Rockwell Field in San Diego.

The third member of the Rockwell triumvirate of 1919 was 1st Lt. Ira C. Eaker, who will celebrate his 91st birthday next Monday. Born in Field Creek, Texas, on April 13, 1896, Eaker moved with his family about a hundred miles to Eden, Texas, at the age of nine. The move took five days—in a covered wagon. "We camped where night overtook us, and where there was water and grass." A few years later, driven out by drought, the family removed to Durant, Oklahoma, where young Eaker enrolled in Southeastern Normal School to prepare himself for a career in law. His grades were phenomenal: English Composition, 97; English Literature, 97; Physics, 93; Physiology, 95; Latin, 93; Zoology, 97; Solid Geometry, 93. On April 6 of his senior year, war was declared and the men of Southeastern marched off to war.18

Shortly after enlisting on April 7, Pvt. Eaker saw his first general officer, Robert Lee Bullard. "He rode a horse; we marched afoot. It occurred to me then that this general's job was good work if you could get it."19 So he took the examination for appointment as an officer in the Regular Army, at least in part out of curiosity over how well he could do. While waiting to hear the results he was appointed a reserve second lieutenant and briefly considered joining his friend, Eugene Hoy Barksdale, who had volunteered for aviation duty. He decided instead to wait on the results of his Regular examination.
A chance meeting with an Aviation Section recruiter a few months later (November 1917) led him to reconsider. He entered flying training in March 1918, completed it on July 17th, and was promoted to first lieutenant. It was wartime, and events moved rapidly. Then his regular appointment came through, and in October, a month before the war ended, he was sent to Rockwell Field for advanced training.

Then, much more suddenly than most expected in view of the huge battles of mid-1918, came the Armistice. Instead of going overseas, Eaker found himself on the receiving end of fliers coming home, most of them to return to civilian life. Eaker was tempted to resign also. But he could not do so. "I was signed up. I had a regular Army commission. And they weren't letting any Regulars out. They were using them to process all those fellows they couldn't handle."20

So Hap Arnold, Tooey Spaatz, and Ira Eaker joined up in San Diego, more by accident than design. When the post adjutant cracked up while out flying one day, Arnold and Spaatz picked Eaker to replace him. That he performed splendidly was made clear when he was selected the next year to organize a squadron to go to the Philippines. There he conducted some of the first realistic tests of flying in clouds, experimenting with plumb bobs and carpenter's levels rigged in the cockpit. A year later he received his most important promotion—to captain in the Regular Army only three years after enlisting as a private. The West Point class of 1918, by comparison, waited until 1935—a mere seventeen years—to make captain! He was on his way.

Gen. Eaker's subsequent career, careers actually, are brilliantly portrayed in James Parton's new biography, *Air Force Spoken Here: General Ira Eaker and the Command of the Air*. He would serve in the office of six future chiefs of the Air Corps—Patrick, Fechet, Foulois, Westover, Arnold, and Spaatz. Along the way he would survive innumerable forced landings, five full-fledged crashes, and an extremely low-level bailout from a P-12 over Bolling Field.

His life was saved when he bailed out at about 200 feet over a house only because his half-opened chute came down on one side of the pitched roof and he on the other. His risers took up the shock, and his only serious injury was a broken right ankle. As he was struggling painfully on the doorstep to get out of his harness, the lady of the house peeked out, then shut the door. Reappearing a few minutes later, she explained that she had paused to call the local newspaper: "They give five dollars to the first person who calls on an ambulance case."21

His key role as a pilot in the 1926 Pan American Goodwill Flight and as

The pilot of the *Question Mark* in January 1929 are well known to all of you—or should be—or certainly now can be. Earlier, along with Arnold and Spaatz, he had helped prepare testimony for the Mitchell court-martial in 1925, an experience from which he,

drew conclusions about method that governed... the rest of his life. He was, to be sure, a strong admirer of Mitchell... But he also noted that Patrick’s procedures gained more in the long run. “General Patrick became in time our most respected and effective advocate of air power. His erudite and impressive testimony before the many boards and commissions formed to consider the organization, status, and budget for military aviation often turned the tide in our favor. He was as responsible as any other individual for raising the status of Army aviation...” Eaker decided that persuasion was better than confrontation and deliberately set out to become Army Air’s most persuasive spokesman.22

His approach, which he developed gradually over time and perfected into an art form, was to force himself “to suppress the quick reactions that leapt to his agile mind, never to raise his voice or lose his temper, and always to couch his arguments against an adversary in amiable, low-key style.”23 Or, as another of his admiring subordinates put it recently, he “developed a
trait of leadership as priceless as his steadfastness of purpose; the talent for amicable persuasiveness in the face of powerful dissent.”

* * * * *

I have at length arrived on initial approach and am about to turn onto the downwind leg of this long flight. What on earth, or above it, you must surely be asking, is the point of looking back now on the Air Corps of the 1920s and 1930s? Of what possible relevance can be the aspirations, adventures, hopes, dreams, successes, and failures of then young officers in a small, quiet, peacetime service composed of a mere 1,500 or so officers and less than 15,000 men?

Well, to begin with, puzzling over the Arnold and Spaatz experiences as cadets might serve to remind you that Robert E. Lee and Douglas MacArthur did not take out a patent on the path to leadership and command. You don’t have to be in the top ten percent of your class, let alone first captain/wing commander, to emerge later as the man of the hour. At least some of the best officers of the nineties will surely come from among the tunnel rats and curve riders, the ones with guts and faith in themselves and their vision. Add Eaker and even LeMay to the list here as reminders that an Academy ring earns you nothing by itself; that in fact you’ll be out-numbered, often out-gunned, and sometimes even out-classed by your future contemporaries from Officer Training School and Reserve Officer Training Courses. Eaker would for certain have become the Corps adjutant at West Point, but he never even thought of going there. Absent the declaration of war in 1917, he would have become a successful lawyer or corporation executive. Not one of the four I’ve just mentioned had any idea when they were your age of where they were going, let alone where they’d end up. Life and careers unfold despite the so-called system, let alone one’s own dreams and schemes. The real object is to be ready—prepared—when the window of opportunity opens to boldly go where no one else has gone before. Yes, I know this is difficult to see from your present vantage point, where such matters as choosing one’s major academic field are sometimes elevated to a level of significance equivalent to a go/no-go decision for a space shuttle launch. (The secret here, by the way, is to pick something you like and can do well; then do the latter and everything else will fall into place!)23

If you were to limit your investigations to just these four (Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker, and LeMay) but extend your vision to their careers as junior officers, you would find that they were different in more ways than they were alike. You might even decide that this was just as well since when the moment of truth came in 1941–42, more than one model was needed. Arnold became the dynamo of energy in Washington, gifted in selecting and using
people to attain impossible goals. Spaatz became the overall manager overseas of the effort to work out procedures and relationships for the application of all the roles of air power in modern war. Eaker became commander of the Eighth Air Force, carrying it through its most dire days with unflappable calm, despite the outrageous impatience and second guessing of Arnold back in Washington. And LeMay became the group commander down on the line, flying in the lead aircraft, devising the tactics, and demanding from all and sundry exactly what he gave of himself—his best, always.

I hope that my focus on these individuals has not left you with a false impression that it was only a small coterie of officers who eventually achieved flag rank who carried the lambent flame of the Air Force dream. Then, as now, there were hundreds of individuals—men like Captain Cowan or Captain Biddle—who also shared the dream (along with a love of flying and patriotic adventure) and who collectively fueled the notion that military aviation was a unique profession, a calling that transcended narrow, careerist pursuits. For every Spaatz or Eaker there were also individuals like Val Borque, Class of '60 (the first grad to be killed in action), or Wallace “Buzz” Sawyer, Class of '68 (who gave his life last year in the jungles of Nicaragua)—airmen who will, at best, be memorialized in a footnote in someone else’s memoirs—men whose collective contributions to the airman’s creed far exceed the contribution of the greatest of our “few, great captains.” The challenge truly begins the moment you pin on those shiny brown bars, and it can continue long after you leave active service—for whatever reason. All that really matters is that you share the vision and be prepared to accept the call to perform great deeds—the call to glory, if you will—that comes to each of us at least once in a lifetime.26

And yet, you might insist, the flying club of the 1930s, in which “everybody knew everybody else” and the atmosphere was that of an exclusive military club with branches scattered all over, is no model for today—let alone tomorrow. In response I would remind you again that situations do not repeat themselves but people do; that the challenges that lie before you are conceptually far less different from those faced in the 1920s and 1930s than you think. When you remind me that their task was to create an air force, I will suggest that yours might prove to be only the obverse of the coin, to preserve one, and to create an aerospace force at the same time, and to do all of that in an era when the service faces a combination of severe cutbacks in funding and a less than universal vision of its future roles.

Consider a few particulars. As the service approaches its fortieth birthday, we must remain on guard against the tell-tale signs of mid-life crisis that affect institutions as well as individuals. Occasionally over the past five or six years, for example, concerns that the service speak with one voice on controversial topics have tended to smother the kind of intellectual ferment
and debate that are absolutely necessary to growth. The new Chief of Staff, however, along with the new commander of the Air University, and the new President of the National Defense University (a 1959 graduate, by the way) speak as one against any squelching of responsible debate. In the words of Lieutenant Gen. Brad Hosmer, “We need to get the dialogue heated up over our ideas about tomorrow’s air power, testing the testable and subjecting the rest to hot, honest, professional debate.”

Consider in this respect that even basic air power doctrine seems less sure of itself today than it might be, while the question of roles and missions is as much in flux now as it ever has been. The United States today deploys four separate air forces; the concept of unified air power is in shambles. Even within our own service questions multiply regarding, for examples, what should be the Air Force’s role in space or what to do about the plain and simple fact that as presently constituted the USAF is incapable of fielding special operations forces in multiple remote areas simultaneously.

Over-arching all the conceptual problems is the down-to-earth reality of rapidly spiralling costs. In 1985 the combined Navy and Air Force tactical air and related accounts consumed close to one half the total general purpose forces budget. But platform costs running in excess of $45,000,000 a copy for F-15s are only a part of the problem. Looming on the horizon are avionics bills for the AMRAAM, LANTIRN, and HIR-Maverick AGM that will surely have the effect of reducing even further what is now an annual
aircraft buy of some 200 aircraft at most. What shall we do on the day that a president, let alone the Congress, loses patience over these costs?

Well, it wouldn't be the first time, nor surely the last. Way back in the mid-twenties, in a moment of frustration over the prospect of paying more than $25,000 for a squadron of aircraft, President Calvin Coolidge asked, "Why can't we buy just one aeroplane and let the aviators take turns flying it?" Rather more recently, in 1981, Dr. Norman Augustine analyzed the rate of increasing unit costs for aircraft between 1940 and 1980. Upon projecting that rate into the future, he offered up what he called his "First Law of Impending Doom":

In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one tactical aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy three and one-half days per week, except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.31

So much for everything being different. It's time now to turn onto final approach. The good news is that I have the runway in sight. The bad news is that some among you are so concerned just now with merely staying alive within the system that you've already read me out. Not to worry, Mr. Arnold or Miss Spaatz!

Not to worry because the really good news is that the reading and puzzling I've suggested to you constitute a post-graduate assignment, not to be undertaken until the evening of your first day back to duty following commencement. I know as well as anyone that you already have a full plate as cadets. I also know that the Academy years cannot provide you with an education but only the tools for pursuing one. The need to continue your self-education after graduation—or as I prefer to say, your commencement, or beginning—thereby fitting yourself for the time when, in a fighting service, you are called upon to shoulder the heavy and lonely responsibility of high command, cannot yet be readily apparent to you. Yet it cannot—indeed, must not—be put off until you decide you need it. Why? Because by then you'll be so busy trying to stay up with the everyday problems of being, or seeking to become, a wing commander that there'll be no time to play catch-up ball.42 More concretely to the point is a simply stated point: those who don't get started early in their careers never get started at all and hence end up like the senior officers long ago derided by Marshal de Saxe—those who, in the absence of knowing what to do, do only what they know.

No more than you should ever confuse what you are doing at a particular time with what is necessarily right, no more than you should fall prey to confusing quantitative data with significance—easy enough in this age—should you ever allow yourself to think that it is enough merely to excel in the duty to which you are assigned. It is implicit in the meaning of a
profession that its members concern themselves with the development and improvement of the state of the art. To do your part you must add to the total state of the art. And to do that effectively you must never forget for a moment that your education only began here at "The Great School in the Sky."

It is in the hope that some of these ideas might stimulate some of you to further thought and discussion of such matters, might even suggest—to end on the same note as the first lecturer in this series—that history can give depth to our understanding even in the extraordinary age in which we live, at the very least providing respect for the imponderables, the uncontrollable and unknowable forces that govern our lives, that my comments might lead you to question seriously the eternal heresy that our own times are unique, that I at length bring to a close what I have to offer here this evening in the Harmon Memorial Lecture for 1987.

Currently Associate Director of the Air Power Research Institute at Air University, Dr. David MacIsaac received his Ph.D. from Duke University as well as degrees from Trinity College and Yale University. During his career as an Air Force officer, he taught military history and strategy at the Air Force Academy, Naval War College, and Air War College. In addition to editing and contributing to numerous works, including the most recent edition of Makers of Modern Strategy, Dr. MacIsaac has authored Strategic Bombing in World War II: The Story of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey and The Air Force and Strategic Thought 1945–1951. During 1978 and 1979 he was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow. Before retiring at the rank of lieutenant colonel, he earned a Bronze Star, three Meritorious Service Medals, and two Air Force Commendation Medals.


9. “S. I. E.” is Air Force talk for self-initiated elimination from training school, usually, but not always, applied to flying.


11. My sources for Spaatz, in addition to those cited in n. 8, are: Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., *Stars in Flight: A Study of Air Force Character and Leadership* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1981), pp. 47-98; and occasional conversations with General Spaatz between 1968 and 1972. I am particularly indebted—not for the first time—to Dr. David R. Mets for his allowing me to use the initial draft of his forthcoming biography.


13. Ibid., p. 53.


17. Ibid., p. 93.

18. My sources for Eaker, in addition to James Parton's biography cited at the beginning of n. 8, are the five oral history interviews with General Eaker that are on file at the Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and both extensive notes and fond memories of many long conversations with him (in locations as disparate as Washington, London, Colorado Springs, and Montgomery, Alabama) between 1967 and 1981.

19. Parton, Air Force Spoken Here, p. 27.

20. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

21. Ibid., p. 80.

22. Ibid., p. 47.

23. Ibid.


25. I sometimes think that altogether too much significance is attached to the formative effects of Academy life. Roger Nye has suggested that changes in fundamental attitudes and values are difficult to discern among cadets and probably rare. The most obvious ones are limited to external or visible things, like greater confidence in speech, a sense of promptitude, and a greater concern for personal appearance. His own experience accords with mine as an Academy instructor. See Roger H. Nye, "The U.S. Military Academy in an Era of Educational Reform, 1900–1925," Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1968, pp. 176–77 (cited in Mets draft, p. 23).

26. This and the preceding two paragraphs are less idiosyncratic than they might at first glance appear. They are composed primarily of comments (on a first draft of these remarks) furnished to me by graduates of the Classes of 1960, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1974, and 1977.


34. With apologies to the late Wesley Frank Craven and to Gen. Sir John Winthrop Hackett and Mr. Martin Blunnenson.
Mr. Roosevelt’s Three Wars:  
FDR as War Leader  

Maurice Matloff

It is a privilege to be invited to the Academy, to participate in the distinguished Harmon Lecture series, and to address the members of the Cadet Wing and their guests from Colorado College. This occasion is particularly pleasurable since it brings back memories of my own introduction to the field of military history during my service in World War II—as a historian on the staff of the Fourth Air Force Headquarters. The early interest of your service in military history has now become a tradition fittingly carried on here in the Academy and in this series, which bears your founder’s name. I welcome the opportunity to speak to you this morning on the important subject that your Department of History has selected—one that has long interested me, that has affected all our lives, and that has bearing on your future careers.1

Let me begin by going back to March 1, 1945, when a weary President, too tired to carry the ten pounds of steel that braced his paralyzed legs, sat down before the United States Congress to report on the Yalta Conference—the summit meeting in the Crimea with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill—from which he had just returned.

“I come from the Crimea Conference,” he said, “with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace . . .

“This time we are not making the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time, as we fight together to win the war finally, we work together to keep it from happening again.”

Forty-two days later—April 12, 1945—Franklin Delano Roosevelt was dead. Not long afterward, Allied forces pounded Germany and Japan into defeat. Thereupon began a great controversy over the way President Roosevelt had directed what I have termed his three wars—the war against Germany, the war against Japan, and war against war itself.

No problem of World War II is more fascinating to the historian, none more difficult, than the question of President Roosevelt’s leadership. This subject that has run through your discussions for the past week has stirred violent debate ever since the war and, from all indications, will continue to do so. Two extreme views have appeared. One portrays a President who blundered into war, bungled its conduct, and lost the peace. The other presents a picture of a President who was drawn into a war he did not want,
rallied the free world, won a great victory, and moved the United States to the center of the world stage. One school of thought emphasizes blunders and mistakes—and on this list Pearl Harbor, the unconditional surrender policy, the Yalta Conference usually stand high. Indeed, in the early postwar days, writers seemed to be crying with each other in a numbers game—to see how many major mistakes they could find. The other school has called this approach “Monday morning quarterbacking” and refutes the charges, discounts the so-called mistakes, and stresses constructive achievements.

The controversy extends not only to the President's policies but also to his plans and methods. Some have argued that FDR had a master plan and a strategy to match. Others counter that he played strictly by ear. Some have contended he was the ready tool of his military staff, others that he manipulated that staff to his will. Interestingly enough, the two most recent accounts of revisionist writing on American strategy have attempted to make out a case for a strong activist role of the President in military strategy and to downgrade the role of the staff. Contrary to Robert Sherwood's findings that on “not more than two occasions” in the war did FDR overrule his staff, the latest account, just off the press, suggests there were more than twenty cases. We may be in for a new numbers game in the continuing controversy.

Where does the truth lie? Why all the controversy? It cannot be explained as simply a case of the “fog of war” or of partisan prejudices. In part the controversy stems from preconceived notions about Mr. Roosevelt—a carryover of stereotyped views about the myth and the man as New Dealer to war leader. In part it arises out of Mr. Roosevelt's highly personalized ways of doing business. He could be direct, he could be indirect, he could even be devious—and we shall have more to say about his methods as we go along. Those who stress Mr. Roosevelt as the “fox” and the “artful dodger” in domestic politics find it hard to believe he could be a genuine do-gooder and idealist in international affairs. The debate has also been fed by the disillusionment and frustrations of the postwar years—the cold war—and the tendency to look backward for scapegoats. Furthermore, there are problems of perspective, evidence, and motivation. World War II history merges into current history, but the most difficult part of current history is to find the current. Many of the trends set in motion during the war are still open-ended and our perspective is blurred. We cannot always be sure what is important, and it is difficult to evaluate with certainty what we identify. We have tons of records. No war was better recorded than World War II. Never have historians made such a concentrated assault on war documents so soon after a conflict. But all too often the historian who has struggled through mountains of paper finds the trail disappearing, at the crucial point of decision-making, somewhere in the direction of the White House. Nor can we always be certain of Mr. Roosevelt's motives.
recorded his reasons. He did not leave us the memoirs we have come to expect from our presidents. Though he was historically-minded, he permitted no historian to peer over his shoulder in the White House. As a result the historian has to pick and choose, interpret and reinterpret; he must distinguish between appearances and realities and try to fit the pieces into a proper pattern. Above all, he must beware of creating new myths in place of those he destroys.

To do justice to all the facets of FDR's war leadership would take far more time than we have at our disposal today. In our discussion here I would like to focus our attention principally on FDR's roles as Commander in Chief and war statesman after Pearl Harbor. We shall be especially interested to see what use he made of military power and how he viewed its relationships to foreign policy—problems of central importance to his war leadership and to your profession.

Long before the attack on Pearl Harbor plunged the nation into war, Mr. Roosevelt's apprenticeship for war leadership had begun. Intensely interested in naval affairs from his youth, he had had firsthand experience, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in World War I, in preparing for war. Extremely conscious of Wilson's experiences during and after World War I with Allies, enemies, and the U.S. Congress, he was determined to avoid Wilson's mistakes. Roosevelt himself had fought for the League of Nations, and Wilson had staked so much of his war policy. He knew that victory had been won on Capitol Hill as well as on the battlefield. A year before Pearl Harbor, in his "arsenal of democracy" speech—he had spoken out against the folly of a negotiated peace with the Nazis. During that same year he appointed two Republicans—Frank Knox and Henry L. Stimson—to be Secretaries of the Navy and War Departments, respectively—the first of a series of steps toward bipartisanship. The Commander in Chief would also serve as the politician in chief.

Between 1939 and 1941, under President Roosevelt's leadership, the country gradually awakened to the dangers from without and began to mobilize. His efforts during the prewar period to join military power to national policy were, however, only partially successful. Simply put, that policy was to try to avert war but to be prepared for it should it come. He used power to avert war—what we would today call the deterrent. Calls for planes, "now—and lots of them," keeping the fleet at Pearl Harbor, extending naval patrols, garrisoning Atlantic bases, reinforcing the Philippines did not avert war. Nor did he succeed in harnessing that military power—such as it was—to an effective diplomacy to develop an alternative to war. But he did succeed in getting rearmament started. He went as far as he dared in letting
foreign powers know that America would aid those fighting tyranny. By the
time of Pearl Harbor, we were, in effect, a nonbelligerent ally. He reached
for his Commander in Chief's baton early and used it actively. He madec
in the reins of military power, harnessed his team, and began to educate his
staff even as they were educating him for the tasks ahead. The relatively
prolonged "short of war" period gave him an invaluable "dry run" and by late 1941 he was ready.

Enemy action, not the President's wish or design, put an end to the
three years of peacetime preparatio. The measures he had instituted to stop
Japanese aggression may have narrowed the choices for Japan, but Japan
made the decision for war. FDR's campaign for preparedness was still far
from complete, but so far as advance military planning was concerned, the
nation never entered a war so well prepared. The armed forces were being
built up, weapons were beginning to flow, the basis of coordinated action
with Britain had been set. Pearl Harbor exposed weaknesses in America's
preparations, but the steps that had already been taken enabled the United
States within less than a year to take the offensive against Germany and
Japan. As events were to show, the President had successfully converted the
peaceful democracy to war purposes.

With American entry into the war, the Grand Alliance really came into
being. In the year following Pearl Harbor, the President devoted himself to
consolidating the hard-pressed Alliance. There was both need and opportu-
nity to shape that alliance composed of such diverse sovereign states as
Great Britain and the Soviet Union, both fighting desperately, and the still
untried United States. And, unlike Wilson, Roosevelt personally partici-
pated in the important wartime conferences of the Allies.

This coalition was really a polygamous marriage. It represented differ-
ent degrees of partnership. With Churchill and the British, Roosevelt had a
special relation—and the Anglo-American partnership was an alliance
within an alliance. Wearing both a political and a military hat, Roosevelt
sometimes found himself more in agreement with Churchill than with his
own military staff. Throughout the war, and particularly in the early defen-
sive stage, Churchill exercised a strong influence on him. The doughty Brit-
ish statesman-warrior, whose conversation always charmed Roosevelt even
when his ideas did not, was a perfect foil for FDR. As FDR once told
Churchill, "It is fun to be in the same decade with you."

With the Soviet Union—the half ally involved almost to the end only in
Europe—relations were never so intimate, and Roosevelt early took over the
role of mediator between Churchill and Stalin in this "Strange Alliance."
From the beginning, he strove to win the friendship of the Soviet Union.
"The only way to have a friend," he once quoted Emerson, "is to be one." To
bring the Soviet Union out of isolation, even as the United States had
been drawn away from its isolationism, became one of his major goals.
Roosevelt’s relationship with China’s Chiang Kai-shek, who was involved only on the Japanese side of the war, was also a special one. In this role FDR did not always find himself in agreement with the British or with his own staff. From the beginning he hoped to raise China to recognition as a great power.

To Roosevelt the alliance presented a grand opportunity to “win friends and influence people,” and to get allied nations, united by the common bond of danger, to know one another better and break down legacies of suspicion. To FDR the summit meetings from Washington to Yalta were more than assemblies to iron out war strategy and policy; they were historic chapters in international cooperation. To this end he early essayed the role he played throughout the war—guardian of the good relations of the coalition.

This attitude colored his approach to military strategy. Usually he went along with his staff on military strategy and was content to have the British and the Joint Chiefs of Staff settle it or to allow events to shape it. But wherever differences with major allies threatened to strain the coalition, he stepped in. Thus in the summer of 1942 he intervened to break a deadlock between the American Joint Chiefs—intent on preparing for an early cross-Channel operation in force—and the British Prime Minister and his staff intent on launching a North African operation. The decision for North Africa reversed the approval he had earlier given to the cross-Channel operation. He justified this decision on the ground that he wanted American troops in action in 1942, but he was also very much aware that the British were faltering and that the Russians were having a disastrous summer. The North African operation would provide a timely demonstration of allied solidarity. Not only did he overrule his staff on this occasion—as he was to do on several others—but he refused to permit the staff to give an ultimatum to the British, a threat to go all-out in the Pacific should the cross-Channel operation be canceled. Indeed in this connection in mid-July 1942 he used an imperative tone that was quite unusual to put down the stirrings of protest of his staff. Note, too, that throughout the war he steadfastly backed the “Europe first” decision—the basic coalition decision in strategy confirmed at the Anglo-American Conference in Washington soon after Pearl Harbor—a decision in which major allies found common political as well as military grounds.

It is difficult, on the face of available evidence, to ascribe strong strategic convictions to Mr. Roosevelt. Well into midwar he continued to show what his staff regarded as diversionist tendencies. When the invasion of North Africa proved successful, he could hardly repress a note of personal triumph to Gen. Marshall. “Just between ourselves,” he declared, “if I had not considered the European and African fields of action in their broadest geographic sense, you and I know we would not be in North Africa today.”
in fact, we would not have landed either in Africa or in Europe!" The Mediterranean fascinated him almost as much as it did Winston Churchill. The American staff spent a good part of its wartime efforts trying to win him—and seeing to it that he stayed won—to a strategy based on a scheduled cross-Channel operation in force. It is not generally realized that Mr. Roosevelt as late as the summer of 1943 toyed with the idea of a campaign through the Iberian peninsula in place of the cross-Channel attack and even at Teheran in November 1943 showed interest in Adriatic ventures.

This does not mean that FDR was opposed to the cross-Channel operation. Far from it. It does mean that he permitted his staff wide latitude in the day-to-day conduct of the strategic business of the war. But it also means that he reserved to himself the determination of the choice and timing of important decisions. Once determined—and no one could be more stubborn when his mind was made up—Mr. Roosevelt stood fast at Teheran for a cross-Channel operation and in the summer of 1944 for a southern France operation. By his interest in the Mediterranean and his desire to meet the British at least halfway, the President in effect compelled American strategists—in midwar—to broaden their strategic thinking and to consider various permutations and combinations of Mediterranean, cross-Channel and strategic bombing operations. The rigidity of American strategists has been much exaggerated.

Mr. Roosevelt's flexible approach to strategy gave his staff military advisers considerable problems. In the spring of 1942 he breezily tossed off a promise to Mr. Molotov for an early second front—to his staff's consternation. At times he adopted a cautious “wait and see” attitude, reluctant to commit himself in advance of an international conference. Occasionally he prodded the planners to do more for the Mediterranean. In this connection he once chided General Marshall, declaring that planners were “always conservative and saw all the difficulties.” Small wonder that for a long time—in midwar—the staff could not work out a united front with him for the great conferences with the British. FDR played off one school of thought against the other, for example those advocating ground offensives in the China theater versus those advocating more air operations there. Spectacular actions that promised fast results also appealed to him—send an air force to the Caucasus to help the hard-pressed Russians, he proposed in late 1942, an offer the Russians refused; let Chennault mount a daring air campaign to bolster limping China, he ruled in 1943. At a conference he could take a strategic strand from Churchill, one from General Marshall, and another from Gen. Chennault and come up with a position of his own. He could also reverse himself even during a conference—witness the decision by default in the case of a large-scale operation on the mainland of Asia at Cairo-Teheran. The chiefs became accustomed to seeing “OK—FDR” on their papers; at least once he also wrote “Spinach.”
Yet when all is said and done, there is nothing to indicate that he had a thought-out strategic military plan of his own— separate from that of his staff. This was a working partnership. If he pulled the rug from under his staff on occasion, he could also back them strongly. They freed him from immersing himself in details—details bored him. They enabled him to play his favorite mediatory role at the conferences. The precise number of times he overruled his staff is not really important. For every case offered there are literally hundreds where he did not intervene— as a glance at JCS minutes of the war would show. What is important is the area of differences and these we have suggested lie in the realm of keeping the alliance in harness to get on with the war. Note how little, in contrast to European strategy, he intervened in Pacific strategy— basically in an American theater where Allies played a relatively small role and where he gave the JCS a comparatively free hand within the context of the “Europe first” decision.

As Commander in Chief Mr. Roosevelt was fortunate in his choice of staff and commanders. Unlike Lincoln, he found his general early. General Marshall soon won his confidence and carried much of the burden of debate with Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff over European strategy, permitting Mr. Roosevelt to play his favorite mediatory role. The reliance he placed on Marshall is reflected in his decision not to release Marshall for the top command in Europe. As Roosevelt put it, “I... could not sleep at night with you out of the country.” In Admirals King and Leahy he found strong naval advisers; Leahy, his personal link with the JCS, also became his “leg-man.” Each could get his ear, as could also the Air Forces’ Gen. “Hap” Arnold, via Harry Hopkins. The working relationship that grew up among them justified his confidence and produced an orderly administration in the day-to-day conduct of the war that was in marked contrast to Roosevelt's personalized methods in other fields. His system of administration during the war may have appeared haphazard and his relationship with his staff loose, but that system and relationship worked for him.

As time went on, FDR’s respect for the complexities of military planning grew along with his knowledge. “You can’t imagine how tired I sometimes get,” he once stated, “when something that looks simple is going to take three months—six months to do. Well, that is part of the job of a Commander in Chief. Sometimes I have to be disappointed, sometimes I have to go along with the estimates of the professionals.” The JCS system, which came into existence soon after Pearl Harbor and to which, characteristically, Roosevelt never gave a charter, remained his bulwark in the military field. Unlike the ubiquitous Churchill, he did not hang over the shoulders of his staff and commanders; nor did he harry them with messages, overwhelm them in debate, and give them no rest. Weeks would go by when he did not see General Marshall and for a long period after the North Africa decision, to which Stimson had objected strongly, the President did not see his Secre-

...ary of War. While much advice from nonmilitary sources reached him informally through various members of his inner circle, as Commander in Chief he preserved formal but friendly relations with commanders in the field through accepted military channels. Only once, at Pearl Harbor in July 1944, did he see Gen. MacArthur during the war, and it is doubtful that even then he intervened in strategic decisions that were pending.

To sum up, in general the Commander in Chief exercised a loose control over military strategy but preserved an independent role in it. He kept his cards close to his chest, persuaded rather than commanded, or let events make the decisions. He conducted grand strategy through the JCS and outside of it. He used any and all instruments at hand; as usual, he was not too much concerned with system and form. He assimilated and synthesized...
strategic ideas and then used his power of leadership to translate them into reality. His flexibility in military strategy was entirely consistent with his desire to defeat the enemies decisively and to keep the alliance solidified. He was wedded to no strategic doctrine except victory. To the President, military strategy, like politics, was the art of the possible. Through lend-lease he gave the coalition bricks and mortar. He used strategy to cement the alliance. But he refused to use strategy to achieve strictly political objectives overseas. When the question of a possible Balkan operation came up in August 1943, he declared it was “unwise to plan military strategy based on a gamble as to political results.” To the American President, strategy had to serve larger and nobler purposes.

So far we have been talking about the President as Commander in Chief. The time has come to ask the most important question of all, what was FDR after—what were his objectives in the war and after the war?

To answer this question we must first consider the role of the war President in his other important capacity, as manager of foreign relations. From the beginning, Roosevelt, like Wilson before him, was his own Secretary of State. He did not give the State Department the exceptionally free hand he permitted the Pentagon. He turned down Cordell Hull’s proposal, after Pearl Harbor, that the Secretary of State participate in the President’s war councils, particularly those involving diplomatic matters. Indeed, the Secretary of State’s plea to be taken along to international summit conferences is one of the most poignant notes in all the literature of World War II. Only once, at the Quebec Conference of August 1943, did Secretary Hull attend a wartime summit meeting outside the United States; and even there he was not brought into the discussion by the Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff on the occupation of Germany. As a result, Roosevelt was his own quarterback. When on occasion he threw the ball to the Secretary of State, the latter was apt to be taken by surprise. By early 1942, a working division of labor had developed. FDR would be occupied with the JCS and with Allied political and military leaders in fighting the war; the Department of State would handle the more routine aspects of foreign relations and would work out the plans for the postwar settlement. The enunciation of higher aims in the struggle FDR reserved to himself.

It is not surprising therefore that when President Roosevelt made his announcement of unconditional surrender as his war aim at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, he had not threshed it out with the JCS or the Secretary of State. We know now that this momentous announcement did not come to him out of the blue—an impression he delighted in giving to the press on such occasions along with a flourish of his familiar long cigarette holder. The origins and the impact of the formula will long be debated. Here I should like to emphasize that the announcement was entirely consistent with his approach to war and peace and with the circumstances of the turn
of the year 1942. Unconditional surrender, he stressed at the time, did not mean the destruction of the peoples of Germany, Italy, and Japan, but the destruction of the evil philosophies that had taken hold in those lands. There must be no compromise—no deals—with those who fomented war. In effect this meant that a wedge must be driven between the enemy governments and their people—a moral offensive must be waged along with the fighting in the field. What he was offering was a simple dramatic slogan to rally the Allies for victory and to drive home to friend and foe that this time there would be no negotiated peace and no "escape clauses" offered by another Fourteen Points. This time the foe would have to admit he was thoroughly whipped.

We may conjecture that there were special circumstances at the time that reinforced his reading of World War I experience. In particular, the formula might reassure the Russians, disappointed in the delay of a second front in Europe, of the determination of the Western Powers to wage a fight to the finish with Germany. Also, since Pearl Harbor, he had been concentrating on defensive objectives of U.S. policy—essentially the security of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. By the time of Casablanca these objectives had been largely secured, and the President may have leaped ahead in his thinking, impatiently, to the peace conferences that would follow a clear-cut victory, at which he could appear, uncommitted, to emulate the purposes, while avoiding the mistakes, of President Wilson.

The unconditional surrender formula is as important for what it did not set forth as for what it implied. Significantly, the President did not set forth here as his war aim the objective of restoring the balance of power in Europe and Asia. This was never his stated objective in the war. Nor was he concerning himself here with the terms of the peace settlement. On the contrary, from the beginning of the war he spoke—as we have seen in his Arsenal of Democracy speech—of the folly of a negotiated peace with the Nazis. And from the beginning he wanted to postpone territorial and political settlements with the Allies until after the war. Indeed, on May 1942, he had intervened during Anglo-Russian treaty negotiations to oppose a guarantee of territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, even though at the time Churchill was willing to yield to the Soviet desire. Note that about the same time he had been willing to toss the Soviet Union a strategic bone—a promise for an early second front— he had not been willing to compromise the political settlement after the war.

The formula appears consistent, too, with his emerging views on an international security system after the war. Interestingly enough, and it may be more than coincidence, a recommendation for unconditional surrender that was brought to his attention shortly before the Casablanca Conference had been arrived at by a subcommittee of the State Department in the course of its own study of postwar organization for peace. In 1942 Mr. Roosevelt
had been thinking of an armed alliance of big powers—"sheriffs" to keep order during the transition from war to peace—but in 1943 he definitely gave his support to a United Nations organization. Certainly the President later openly called unconditional surrender the first step in the substitution for the old system of balance of power a new community of nations. Whatever reason bore most heavily with him in January 1943, unconditional surrender promised to allow him to come to the peace settlement with his own hands unbound by either enemies or allies, to keep the alliance in war unfettered by political deals, and to set the stage for molding a new environment of international relations after the war.

From Casablanca onward the President strove to achieve unconditional surrender and the establishment of a United Nations. For the American military staff, unconditional surrender was to serve essentially as a military objective, reinforcing its own notions of a concentrated, quick war. Winning the war decisively obtained top priority.

For his part, the President in 1943-44 concerned himself with cementing good relations with the Allies. The Grand Alliance must be brought through the war intact, converted for peace purposes, and housed in the United Nations. With the British, the close partners, this meant seeing to it that somehow their notion of a cross-Channel operation was reconciled with that of the Americans. With the Russians, it signified continued aid and the earliest possible establishment of a second front in Europe. As a result, FDR fought a coalition war without coalition politics in the narrow sense. The compromise nature of Allied strategy, as it emerged from the great midwar conferences, stemmed in considerable measure from his influence, as growing American power in the field strengthened his hand at summit meetings. More and more his attention at the conferences was taken up with the discussion of the United Nations organization. Meanwhile, as from the beginning of the conflict, he did nothing to jeopardize domestic public opinion or bipartisanship.

During midwar, he followed his policy of postponing specific political adjustments with the Allies and also sought to avoid American involvement in postwar Europe's politics. From the beginning he did not feel the American people would support a prolonged occupation in Europe. Nor did he want American troops in Europe permanently. He feared lest the United States be drawn into Europe's complex wrangles and trouble spots into "Pandora's box," to use Cordell Hull's phrase. This concern came out sharply in his discussion with the JCS, en route to the Cairo Conference in November 1943, on the zones of occupation in postwar Germany. As he told the JCS, "We should not get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence." The British had proposed dividing Germany into three zones, of which the United States should take the southernmost. He objected to taking the southern zone lest the United States thereby become involved in a
prolonged task of reconstituting France, Italy, and the Balkans. “France,” he declared, was “a British baby.” It was at this time that he went so far as to suggest that the northwest zone be extended eastward to include Berlin and that the United States take over that zone. “The United States,” he stated, “should have Berlin.” Significantly, the President added that, “There would definitely be a race for Berlin. We may have to put the United States Divisions into Berlin as soon as possible.” With a pencil on a National Geographic Society map he quickly sketched the zonal boundaries as he envisaged them, putting Berlin and Leipzig in the big American zone—one of the most unusual and hitherto little noticed records of the entire war. Later, in February 1944, he resorted to the jocular tone he sometimes used to get his point across to Churchill: “Do please don’t ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce in protest the paternity of Belgium, France, and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for the schooling now.” Eventually reassured by readjustments with the British in the zonal boundaries and lines of communication, the President broke the deadlock in September 1944 at the second Quebec Conference and accepted the southern zone.

FDR’s methods worked well in midwar; his main objectives seemed well on the road to realization. By Teheran the blueprint of quick, decisive military victory in Europe had finally been agreed upon by the Russians, the British, and the Americans, and the Allies had also agreed on the principle of a United Nations organization.

Teheran was the high point of the President’s war leadership. He had met with Stalin face to face for the first time in the war and, as he put it, had “cracked the ice.” The personal relationship he had enjoyed with Churchill might henceforth be extended to Stalin and, as we know, he had great faith in his ability to handle face-to-face contacts. So encouraged was he that in early March 1944 he commented:

> On international cooperation, we are now working, since the last meeting in Teheran, in really good cooperation with the Russians. And I think the Russians are perfectly friendly; they aren't trying to gobble up all the rest of Europe or the world. They didn't know us, that's the really fundamental difference.

And all these fears that have been expressed by a lot of people here—with some reason—that the Russians are going to try to dominate Europe, I personally don't think there's anything in it. They have got a large enough “hunk of bread” right in Russia to keep them busy for a great many years to come without taking on any more headaches.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's concept of postwar occupation zones for Germany drawn in pencil by the President on a National Geographic Society map while en route to the Cairo conference (Original map courtesy of National Geographic Society through National Archives).

In June 1944 the Western Allies landed in Normandy and the Russians began to drive from the east in a giant nutcracker squeeze that promised to crush Germany quickly; in August the Allied representatives met at Dumbarton Oaks to spell out further their ideas on the international organization to keep the peace. By the time of the second Quebec Conference in September FDR could look forward with confidence to ending the war in Europe, gathering momentum to wind up the struggle with Japan, and getting on with the business of peace. Military strategy and national policy seemed to be well meshed; indeed, military strategy, in effect, was national policy in midwar.
in the final months of FDR's war leadership the picture changed and the problems multiplied. It is this period, more than the other war periods, that critics of his leadership have dealt with most harshly. The full impact of the President's methods and policies began to be felt even as the Allied armies overran Europe and fought their way into the heart of Germany. The demands of a policy of total victory and of total peace began to conflict. Never was his leadership more necessary; never was it more fitful.

As the strategy unrolled in the field and the American staff strove to end the war swiftly and decisively, Churchill, wary of the swift Soviet advance in eastern and central Europe, wished Western strength diverted to forestall the Soviet surge and the war steered into more direct political channels. The President, who had so often sided with the Prime Minister in the past, would not go along. Many reasons may account for the President's refusal to change course—for example, his desire to get on with the war against Japan, a compulsion he could never forget—and his desire to get on with the peace. What part, if any, the state of his health played, we shall never be able to measure precisely. But it is clear by 1945 the Commander in Chief was caught in a political dilemma. He was disturbed by the Soviet Union's efforts to take matters into its own hands and to put its own impress...
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

Premier Josef Stalin (left), President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill appear on the portico of the Russian Embassy in Iran during the momentous Teheran conference, November-December 1943 (U.S. Army).

on the political shape of postwar Europe. As he had gauged domestic opinion, however, he had in mind a quick and decisive war. For to Americans war was an unwelcome disturber of normality, a disagreeable business to be gotten over with as quickly as possible. “Thrash the bullies and get the boys home” was the American approach. Moreover, the President’s policy for peace centered in an international organization to maintain the peace, not in reliance on the balance of power. To achieve this aim he had to take the calculated risk of being able to handle Stalin and keep the friendship of the USSR. In the event, American national policy in the final year placed no obstacles in the way of a decisive ending of the European conflict. The President did not choose to use for immediate political purposes the military power the United States had built up on the Continent. In the absence of political instructions to the contrary, the American military forces kept at the task of ending the war as quickly as possible.

It is one of the ironies of history that President Roosevelt, pragmatist that he was on most issues, should go down as almost inflexible on the Russian issue. To the end, he refused to use lend-lease as a bargaining weapon or the armed forces as “levers for diplomacy” —to use Herbert Feis’s apt phrase, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Roosevelt’s last ex-
changes with Stalin in March and April 1945—over the Polish problem and the negotiations for the surrender of German forces in Italy—were most sharp. His last message to Churchill, written an hour before his death, expressed the optimistic hope that the Polish problem, like others with the Soviet Union, would also pass and that the course toward the Russians had so far been correct, but at the same time urged firmness.

Ironically, too, in the final period, when winning the war decisively and establishing the United Nations—his two main goals—were clearly in sight, his dilemmas were piling up. And weaknesses in his leadership began to show up, along with growing divergences within the coalition he had tried to preserve and shape for larger postwar purposes. Immediate and harsh political problems were rising in the liberated countries of Europe for which his two main objectives provided no ready solution; the presence of armed power—not principle—threatened to set the conditions of the peace.

Against this background, the much-debated conference of Yalta must be regarded not as the cause but as the symptom of the loosening bonds of the coalition. Yalta brought together three great powers with divergent approaches to the fundamental problems of war and peace. The common danger that had held them together was fading, the political declarations and principles to which the Allies had subscribed—notably the unconditional surrender formula—were beginning to show weaknesses as binding links. Military strategy as a bond of unity was proving a thin cement. Great Britain was growing weaker; the United States and the Soviet Union relatively stronger.

Yalta marked the growing intrusion of problems of victory and peace, the disunity of the West, and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power. The American military were conscious of the Soviet rise and troubled by it. Even before Yalta they were stiffening their stand in dealings with the Soviet forces in the field and calling for a quid pro quo. But they were also conscious that the war was not yet over in Europe—the Battle of the Bulge was fresh in their minds—and that the final campaigns against Japan were still to be fought. As their Pacific drives had picked up momentum, China had declined in their plans against Japan and they wanted Russia as a substitute. Following military advice, Roosevelt's immediate objective at Yalta was to get the Russians into the war against Japan as soon as possible; his long-range objective remained—to come out with a working relationship to prevent another world catastrophe. This time, however, he had to pay a price—and that price was a breach in his policy of postponement.

All in all, Yalta marked an important transition. The balance of power in and out of the coalition had shifted without the full realization by the West—or by its leaders—of what the shift meant. The struggle between the West and the Soviet Union was beginning.

The growing disparity in power among the Allies as the war entered its
final stages was not inconsistent with FDR's military policy so long as the enemies were beaten decisively. But it did raise serious problems for his political policy. From the beginning his political strategy rested on the survival of the United Kingdom, China's recognition as a great power, and the cooperation of the Soviet Union. In the closing months of the war the basic props of his larger political strategy began to reveal weaknesses. Britain was strained; Russia's cooperation was beginning to be questioned; China had been largely bypassed in the war and Roosevelt had become disillusioned with trying to make China a great power in the near future. At Malta on February 2, 1945, he told Churchill that he now believed "three generations of education and training would be required before China could become a serious factor." Neither FDR's military nor his political strategy was able to arrest the decline of the alliance as victory approached. Gaps began to open between his military strategy and his larger political goals. His political
policy was not tuned to deal with what scholars have called the "middle range" of political problems that emerged between war and peace. Nor was he prepared to fill with American power the vacuums in Europe and the Orient that Allied strategic policy, intent on decisive military victory, had helped create.

III

In retrospect, it is apparent that President Roosevelt was not infallible. Before the war was over, his policies of concentrating on military victory and of laying the groundwork for a new postwar structure of international relations began to conflict and he had to yield on his policy of postponement. As we have seen, it is incorrect to say he had no political objectives. His political objectives remained general—a mixture of idealism and practicality, of optimism and reality. Flaws began to show up in his policies toward the USSR as well as toward China. He underestimated Soviet political ambitions. Certain policies introduced by the President in the early phases of the war were probably held too long and too rigidly—notably the generous lend-lease policy and the unconditional surrender concept. The limitations of unconditional surrender as a political formula began to show up in the last year of the war when the time had come—perhaps was long overdue—to replace a common war aim with a common peace aim.

No appraisal of FDR's failures and successes as a war leader would be complete without considering his attitude toward war and peace and America's place in world affairs. He saw war and peace in different compartments and as distinct phenomena. He did not appreciate that warfare in the twentieth century was undergoing a revolution and that distinctions between war and peace were becoming blurred. Although FDR could wear his military hat jauntily, he disliked war intensely. Like Wilson, drawn into a conflict he did not seek, he expanded his war aims to accord with the great costs he knew it would involve. Not wanting American involvement in the feuds of Europe or the wrangles of Asia, he converted the war into a crusade for remaking the entire environment, if not the structure, of international relations. With the entry of the United States, he lifted the struggle, begun with the upsetting of the balance of power in Europe and Asia, into a world conflict against aggression and evil. Those who fomented war were evil; those who joined to end it would be purged. This view of the nature of war colored his thinking on the way war was fought and on the peace to come. The driving purpose behind FDR's war policy was to create an instrumentality for peace as part of the conclusion of the war. He laid the foundations of a structure for international security intended to provide against the problems and dangers of the future; unfortunately the more urgent issues of the critical present still remained. He was willing to give the Soviet Union a
chance to work out its problems and join with other nations in a new international security system. It is doubtful, however, that he really understood Marxist-Soviet politico-military strategy any more than did most of his generation.

He fought a war on two levels—one military, the other political. He fought the war as a pragmatist and as a crusader. It is incorrect to say he was oblivious to the political—that is a myth. It is also incorrect to believe that he had a well-worked-out, coherent military strategy of his own. He can be accused of not meshing the two closely.

He left his country military victory, power, and a vision. His use of power to achieve national policy was most successful during the war; his greatest success was harnessing power to military victory. His use of power to avert war before Pearl Harbor was not successful. To harness military power to a new international political order still remained his dream at death. His very success in war has led to the sharpest criticism of his war leadership—overconcentration on military objectives.

Once committed to the struggle, FDR set no brake on the waging of war and on the achievement of victory—total and complete. He set no limit on its strategic escalation. Whether he could have done so, once we were fully committed in Europe and against Japan, will remain a question for theorists of war. It appears more and more that the decision to develop the atomic bomb was the decision to use the bomb. Roosevelt began by waging a limited war in the Pacific. That struggle refused to stay limited. It almost caught up with the European war as American services vied with each other and the Allies began to compete for a place in the victory procession. It is ironical that the atomic bomb, whose development he fostered as a deterrent weapon against Germany, was used in the war against Japan and remains a fundamental element in the uneasy equilibrium of the postwar world. It is ironical that the power he generated and planned to dissipate has done as much to contain Communism as anything he had hoped for in the way of a new order.

The war-time President linked national with international security and staked all on the United Nations, as Wilson had on the League of Nations. Roosevelt had set as his political goal a new concert of power, not old-fashioned balance of power. He refused to the end to use military power and negotiate from strength to force the Soviet Union into a new international harness. Such an approach represented to him the very antithesis of the world he sought and furthermore might make the USSR retreat to isolationism. He was playing for bigger stakes and for the longer haul. He did not want to foreclose the future by mortgaging the present. To the end he was trying to avoid Wilson's mistakes. He still wanted to appear uncommitted at the peace conference. The world of 1945 was not the world of 1919. A new colossus was already on the move in Europe. The strange ally was no
longer shackled by the common bonds of danger any more than it was checked by FDR's vision of the future. At the close of his term as Commander in Chief, FDR's strength rested on two pillars—moral force and military power. He refused to make a virtue of power. He thereby laid himself open to the charge of relying too heavily on the power of virtue.

What, then, may we conclude about Franklin Roosevelt the war leader? His strength as a war president arose from many factors—the full powers residing in the Presidency, his long experience in that office, his dominant, persuasive personality, the mighty war machine he generated, and, above all, his position as "arbiter in international affairs," as active but disinterested leader at the summit. He kept a firm, if outwardly loose, hold on the reins of national policy. Preoccupied with the mistakes of Wilson, when he put on his military hat he kept one eye on the domestic political front, the other on the postwar world. He was an extremely active and forceful Commander in Chief—one of the most active in American history. If at times the Commander in Chief yielded to the politician and at others to the statesman, he fought a nonpartisan war aimed at a nonpartisan peace. As a Commander in Chief and politician in chief he was highly successful.

He was a great war president but his greatness lay neither in the field of grand strategy nor of statesmanship. His greatness lay, rather, in rallying and mobilizing his country and the free world for war and in articulating the hopes of the common man for peace. He yielded a great war alliance and managed to hold it together long enough to convert it to peaceful purposes. Without his wartime drive, it is doubtful that the United Nations organization would have come into existence. His war leadership demonstrated that the structure of the American Government, and of the office of the President, in the hands of an active and forceful Commander in Chief, was capable of meeting the greatest test in war the nation had yet faced. Though his power as war president came to rival Hitler's, he remained a champion of democratic ideals. The United States, he warned, would have to accept responsibility along with power on the world stage, but power would have to be joined with morality.

With all its cruel dilemmas, war abroad gave him the greatest challenge of his Presidency—an opportunity to project the vision of America on the world stage. He deliberately gambled all on a new international order that would guarantee peace and achieve the noblest aspirations of mankind. The war he waged was part of the never-ending struggle of mankind to banish war. He fell, as did Lincoln and Wilson before him, in the crusade he was waging. He was thus Commander in Chief in a very special sense. Whatever his mistakes in World War II, it is in the context of the struggle for his ideals that he largely staked his place in history.

Franklin Roosevelt had really fought three wars—the war against Germany, the war against Japan, and the war to end war. He had won the first
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

two decisively. Had he really lost the third? Or had the war partners made a “good start on the road to a world of peace,” as he reported to Congress after Yalta? Had he pointed succeeding generations in the correct direction? Were the years of tension and crisis that followed World War II only a low point in a world that moves “by peaks and valleys, but on the whole the curve is upward”—as he viewed human progress? Was the “fox” and the “artful dodger” really an innocent abroad? Or, in the long run, will the pragmatist and the idealist prove more realistic than his critics? The experience of your generation may help to supply the answers that await the judgment of history.

Dr. Maurice Matloff is a graduate of Columbia University and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from Harvard University. He has taught history at Brooklyn College and the University of Maryland and has lectured on military strategy and international affairs at the Army War College, the Naval War College, Columbia University, and other universities. He has served as a historical consultant to various governmental committees and nonprofit research organizations. During World War II, Dr. Matloff served as an intelligence instructor and a historian in the Army Air Forces. A member of the Army’s Office of the Chief of Military History since 1947, he is currently Senior Historical Advisor and Chief, Current History Branch. In 1959, he was awarded a Secretary of the Army Research and Study Fellowship, a top government award. Dr. Matloff is the author of Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 (1959) and coauthor of Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (1955) in the official U.S. Army in World War II series. He also contributed to Command Decisions (1951) and Total War and Cold War (1962). His articles and reviews on modern strategy and statecraft have appeared frequently in professional and service journals. He is a recognized expert on World War II, and his works have been translated in foreign languages and are used in war colleges and universities in the United States and abroad.
Notes

1. In preparing this lecture, the author has in part drawn on his essay "Franklin Delano Roosevelt as War Leader," published in Total War and Cold War (Ohio State University Press, 1962).
6. Ibid., p. 211.
10. For an enlightening survey of the wartime role of the Department of State in postwar planning, with particular emphasis on the questions of the zonal boundaries in Germany and access to Berlin, see William M. Franklin, "Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin," World Politics, Vol. XVI (October 1963).
11. This discussion of the President's views en route to the Cairo Conference is based on Matloff, op. cit., pp. 341-42.
13. For the resolution of the deadlock at the Second Quebec Conference and the subsequent discussion of the zonal boundaries and Berlin, see Franklin, op. cit.
15. Ibid., p. 99.
Pacific Command: A Study in Inter-service Relations

Louis Morton

When two men ride the same horse, one must sit behind.
—Anon.

It is a pleasure and a privilege to have this opportunity to visit the Air Force Academy and to speak to you under the auspices of the Harmon Memorial Lecture Series, particularly since the Harmon name stirs memories of my own service during World War II. For almost two years I was on the staff—in a very junior capacity, I hasten to add—of Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Hubert Harmon's older brother and one of the leading figures in the early development of air power. As historian for the command, I had reason to learn that Millard Harmon had the same personal interest in military history that characterized the first superintendent of this Academy and is so fittingly memorialized in the present lecture series.

When Col. Kerig, of the History Department, invited me to give this lecture, I must confess that I accepted with some misgivings. To follow such distinguished historians as Frank Craven and T. Harry Williams, who gave the preceding lectures in this series, was a difficult enough assignment. But when I learned that my audience would number about 1,500, I was literally frightened. No academic audience, or any other I ever faced, numbered that many. The choice of topic was mine, but what could a historian talk about that would not only hold your interest for an hour but would also be of some value to you in the career for which you are now preparing?

Colonel Kerig made the choice easier. He suggested I talk about some aspect of World War II in the Pacific, a subject with which I had some familiarity, and I finally decided that you might profit most from a discussion of command. But I don't intend to talk about the art of command, about which Professor Williams spoke to you last April, but rather the problems involved in establishing and exercising command over the forces of more than one service. Such a command, which we call unified command, has always seemed to me one of the most difficult of military assignments, calling for the highest talents of diplomacy, management, and generalship. Yet, this kind of command, with all the demands it makes on the military man, is clearly the pattern of the future.

But as a historian, I would much rather talk about the past than the future, in the hope that we might find there some lessons of value.
understand fully the pattern of command in the Pacific, we must go back to
the prewar period, when these commands were first established. By the
time of Pearl Harbor, the United States already had four commands in the Pacific
theater: U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) and the Asiatic Fleet in
the Philippines; the Hawaiian Department and the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii.
The first, USAFFE, had been formed in July 1941, with Gen. Douglas
MacArthur in command, and included the Philippine Department, the Far
East Air Force under Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, and the Philippine
Army. Naval forces in the area were under Adm. Thomas C. Hart, com-
mander of the Asiatic Fleet. In Hawaii, Army forces were under Maj. Gen.
Walter C. Short, commander of the Hawaiian Department; naval forces,
under the Pacific Fleet commander, Adm. Husband E. Kimmel. In both
places, Hawaii and the Philippines, the Army and Navy commanders were
independent of each other and joint operations were conducted under the
principle of cooperation in accordance with prewar doctrine.

The inadequacies of command by mutual cooperation and the danger
of divided responsibility had been recognized before the war. But all efforts
to establish unity of command in those areas where the Army and Navy were
jointly responsible for defense had foundered on the sharp crags of service
jealousies and rivalries.

The disaster at Pearl Harbor provided the pressure needed to overcome
these differences. Determined that there should be no repetition of the
confusion of responsibility that had existed in Hawaii, President Roosevelt
ordered his military and naval advisers to establish unified commands where
they were needed. Thus, on December 12th, a unified command under the
Army was established in Panama, where it was thought the Japanese might
strike next, and five days later, a similar command was set up in Hawaii,
under Navy control.

The establishment of unity of command in Hawaii coincided with a
complete turnover in the high command there. Rear Adm. Chester W.
Nimitz was jumped two grades and appointed in Kimmel's place; Lt. Gen.
Delos C. Emmons, an air officer, replaced Short; and Brig. Gen. Clarence
L. Tinker took over command of the air forces.

In the Philippines, unity of command was not established until the end
of January, after the Asiatic Fleet and the Far East Air Force had left. What
MacArthur needed, once the Japanese had landed, was not control of a
non-existent navy and air force but reinforcements, and it was this need that
led to the creation of the first U.S. overseas wartime command of World War
II. The architect was Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who proposed to
Gen. George C. Marshall on December 17th that the troops in a convoy of
seven ships due to arrive in Brisbane, Australia, on the 22nd be made the
nucleus of a new command. Designated U.S. Army Forces in Australia
(USAUSA), this command. Eisenhower suggested, should be headed by an
Pacific Command: November 1941

Commander in Chief

Navy Department

Joint Board

War Department

Asiatic Fleet

Pacific Fleet

Hawaiian Department

U.S. Army Forces
Far East

Naval District

Naval District

Coastal Defense

Hawaiian Air Force

Philippine Department

Philippine Army

Far East Air Force

--- Joint operations
air officer from the Philippines and be responsible to MacArthur, since its primary mission would be support of the Philippines. General Marshall quickly approved Eisenhower’s plan, and orders went out immediately setting up the new U.S. command. Thus was established the base in Australia that later became the nucleus of MacArthur’s wartime headquarters.

The first Allied command of the war, like the first American command, also came in the Pacific. Designated ABDA for the initials of the national forces involved (American, British, Dutch, and Australian), the new command included Burma, the Malay Barrier, the Netherlands Indies, north-west Australia, and the Philippines. Its commander was a British officer, Gen. Archibald P. Wavell, and the staff was drawn from all the nations concerned, since the American and British Chiefs of Staff were anxious to guard against the preponderance of one nationality in the new headquarters. Thus, Wavell had an American deputy and a British, a Dutch, and an American officer to head the air, ground, and naval commands, respectively.

Almost from the start, national differences created problems. To the American, Dutch, and Australian officers, it seemed that General Wavell was devoting far too much attention, as well as a disproportionate share of Allied resources, to the defense of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, an attitude that seemed to them to reflect British rather than Allied interests. The American commanders, Admiral Hart and General Brereton, free from any territorial interest in the area, wished to protect the lines of communications. The Dutch desired above all else to concentrate Allied resources on the defense of their territories. And the Australians, concerned over the defense of their homeland, continually pressed for a greater share of the theater’s resources on the east and resisted requests for troops and planes they thought could be better used at home.

To all of these difficulties of ABDA was added still another—the impossible task of holding Burma and the Malay Barrier. When it became clear that there was no chance of stopping the Japanese, Wavell recommended that ABDA be dissolved. The British favored the move, but the Americans, anxious to avoid the appearance of abandoning their Dutch allies, objected. The compromise finally adopted was to allow Wavell to dissolve his headquarters but to retain the ABDA command with the Dutch in control. Arrangements were quickly completed, and on February 25th General Wavell turned over his command and left for India. With the fall of Java on March 9th, the ill-fated ABDA command came to an end.

MacArthur’s departure from the Philippines early in March provides an instructive example for students of command. Unwilling to give up control of the Philippines, he arranged to exercise command of the forces there from his new headquarters in Australia, 4,000 miles away, through an advance echelon on Corregidor headed by a deputy chief of staff.

Careful as he had been in making these arrangements, MacArthur
neglected one thing—to inform Washington. The result was utter confusion. The War Department assumed that Gen. Jonathan M. Vainwright, senior officer in the Islands and commander on Bataan, was in command of all forces in the Philippines and addressed him as such. But the messages came to MacArthur’s deputy on Corregidor, who sent them on to MacArthur, then en route to Australia. Finally, the President and the Chief of Staff sent separate messages to Wainwright telling him of his promotion to lieutenant general. “Upon the departure of General MacArthur,” wrote Marshall, “you become commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines.” No confusion was possible, and on March 20th Wainwright formally assumed command of U.S. Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), the name of his new headquarters.

MacArthur made no objections. He accepted the President’s decision gracefully and there the matter rested. Thus, by the end of March there were five major American commands in the Pacific: USAFFE, MacArthur’s pre-war command; USAFIA, the command in Australia; USFIP, Wainwright’s command in the Philippines; the Hawaiian Department; and the Pacific Fleet, encompassing all naval elements in the area and exercising unified command in Hawaii.

* * * * *

The command arrangements thus far made for the Pacific had been emergency measures. Clearly something more permanent was needed if the Allies expected eventually to take the offensive against Japan. The task of fashioning such an organization fell to the United States, which, by common consent of the Allies, assumed primary responsibility for the Pacific theater. By mid-March both the Army and Navy had worked out plans for such an organization. Oddly enough, neither gave serious attention to the appointment of a single commander for the entire area, despite the fact that such an arrangement had so many obvious advantages and was so close to the President and General Marshall’s belief in the importance of unified command. The reason was evident: there was no available candidate who would be acceptable to everyone concerned. The outstanding officer in the Pacific was General MacArthur, but he did not have the confidence of the Navy. Certainly the Navy would never have entrusted the fleet to MacArthur, or to any other Army officer. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the chief naval candidate for the post, had not yet acquired the popularity and prestige he later enjoyed, and he was, moreover, considerably junior to MacArthur. There was no escape from this impasse except the creation of two commands.

Just how should the Pacific be divided? The Navy’s idea was to place
Australia, the Indies, and New Guinea under an Army commander and the remainder of the Pacific under the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet; the Army's, to place everything south and west of the line Philippines-Samoa under MacArthur and the area north and east of the line under Nimitz. The Joint Chiefs finally resolved the difference by creating a Southwest Pacific Area and a Pacific Ocean Area along the lines generally favored by the Navy. The necessary directives were thereupon drawn up and approved by the President on March 30, 1942.

The appointment of commanders followed. As expected, General MacArthur was made Commander in Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area; Admiral Nimitz, of the Pacific Ocean Areas. MacArthur's domain included Australia, the Philippines, New Guinea, the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and all of the Netherlands Indies except Sumatra. Admiral Nimitz's command encompassed virtually the remainder of the Pacific and was divided into three subordinate areas. Two of these, the Central and North Pacific, were under Nimitz's direct control, and the third, the South Pacific, under a naval officer responsible to Nimitz. The dividing line between the first two was at 42° North, thus placing Hawaii, the Gilberts and Marshalls, the Mandated Islands, and Japan itself in the Central Pacific. The South Pacific Area, which extended southward from the equator, between the Southwest Pacific and 110° West Longitude, included the all-important line of communications to Australia.

Though superficially alike, the directives to the Pacific commanders differed in some fundamental respects. As supreme commander in an area that presumably would include large forces of other governments, MacArthur, like Wavell, was specifically enjoined from directly commanding any national force or interfering with its internal administration. Nimitz was not thus restricted, for it was anticipated that his forces would be mostly American and his operations more closely related to the fleet. Also, MacArthur's mission was mainly defensive and included only the injunction to "prepare" for an offensive. Combined with the statement that he was to hold Australia as a base for future offensives, it was possible to derive from it, as MacArthur quickly did, authorization for offensive operations.

Admiral Nimitz's directive assigned a defensive mission too, but it clearly envisaged offensive operations for the future by instructing him to "prepare for the execution of major amphibious offensives against positions held by Japan, the initial offensives to be launched from the South Pacific Area and Southwest Pacific Area." This wording implied that Admiral Nimitz would command not only the offensive in his own area but that in MacArthur's area as well. And this may well have been the intent of the naval planners who drafted the directives, for in their view all amphibious operations—and any operation in the Pacific would be amphibious—should be under naval command.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area, during a tour of inspection of an Australian camp (U.S. Army).

Adm. Chester W. Nimitz as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (National Archives).
MacArthur's organization followed traditional Army lines. In addition to Wainwright's command in the Philippines, soon to become inactive, he had three operational commands: Allied Land Forces under the Australian Gen. Sir Thomas Blamey and Allied Air and Allied Naval Forces under American officers. All American units, with the exception of certain air elements, were assigned to USAFIA, the administrative and service agency for U.S. Army forces, which was soon redesignated U.S. Services of Supply.

MacArthur staffed his headquarters with men of his own choice. There was nothing in his directive requiring him to appoint officers of the participating governments, as General Wavell had been required to do. Both the President and General Marshall urged him to do so, but MacArthur ignored these suggestions and named American officers to virtually every important post in his headquarters.

Admiral Nimitz exercised considerably more direct control over his forces than did General MacArthur. In addition to his command of the Pacific Fleet, he also commanded directly two of the three areas established. Like MacArthur, he was prohibited from interfering in the internal administration of the forces in his theater, but as a fleet commander he remained responsible for naval administration as well as operations. He was thus answerable to himself in several capacities, and it was not always clear whether he was acting as area commander, fleet commander, or theater commander responsible to the Joint Chiefs in Washington. This fact and the failure to define precisely the relationship between Admiral Nimitz and Gen. Emmons, the Army Commander in Hawaii, created much difficulty.

Of the three subordinate areas of Admiral Nimitz's command, the South Pacific presented the most immediate problem, for it was there that the first Allied offensive came. The organization established by Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, the officer selected to command the South Pacific, closely paralleled that of Admiral Nimitz. Retaining for himself control of all naval units in the area and of their administration as well, Ghormley exercised command through a staff that was essentially naval in character. Of 103 officers assigned in September 1942 only three wore the Army uniform. Thus his headquarters became the center for naval administration as well as joint operations and planning. In addition, all the major commands in the theater were under Navy officers and had predominantly Navy staffs.

The need for an Army command in the South Pacific could hardly be denied. Army troops in New Zealand, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, the Fijis, and elsewhere had been rushed out so quickly that there had been no opportunity to perfect arrangements for their support and control. Supply of these forces was cumbersome and inefficient, and responsibility divided. Thus a base commander might report directly to the War Department, get his supplies from the San Francisco port or Australia, and
Pacific Command Organization: July 1942

War Department

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Navy Department

South West Pacific Area (MacArthur)

Allied Air Forces (Kennes)

Allied Land Forces (Blamey)

Allied Naval Forces (Carpenter)

U.S. Army Forces Philippines (Inactive)

U.S. Army Forces Far East (Inactive)

U.S. Army Services of Supply (Marshall)

Fleet Forces

Fleet Marine Forces

Type Command Service Amphibious Submarines

South East Pacific Area

Pacific Ocean Areas and Pacific Fleet (Nimitz)

South Pacific Area (Ghormley)

Central Pacific Area (Nimitz)

U.S. Army Forces South Pacific (Harmon)

North Pacific Areas (Theobald)

Hawaiian Dept (Emmons)
take his orders for airfield construction, possibly his most important task, from General Emmons in Hawaii.

Allocation of B-17's to the South Pacific Area constituted another major problem. The assignment of the Army Air Forces' most precious weapon, the B-7, to the South Pacific brought into sharp focus the question of control of aircraft. Ghormley's command, despite its theoretically joint character, was naval, and the air commander was an admiral. Army aircraft thus came under Navy control for operations. This could not be avoided under the principle of unity of command, distasteful as it may have been to the airmen. But when it became apparent that the Navy would also be responsible for training, the Army expressed strong objections. Air forces, it held, should retain their identity, be assigned appropriate missions, and execute them under their own commanders in accordance with Army Air Force doctrine.

The solution arrived at in Washington late in July to meet this problem, as well as the problem of supply and administration, was to establish under Ghormley a new command, U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA), and to assign as its commander Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Chief of the Air Staff. General Harmon, in turn, chose for his staff highly trained airmen—Nathan F. Twining as Chief of Staff, Frank F. Everest, Dean C. Strother, and others—a clear indication that the new headquarters intended to uphold the interests of the Army Air Forces in this predominantly naval area.

In the North Pacific, Admiral Nimitz exercised his responsibility through Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald. But the situation was complicated by the fact that the bulk of the forces in the region were Army troops assigned to the Alaskan Defense Command, under Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., which, in turn, was a part of Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt's Western Defense Command in the United States. The Eleventh Air Force was headed by Brig. Gen. William O. Butler, who was under Admiral Theobald for operations. Unified command, difficult enough to attain under ideal conditions, proved impossible in the North Pacific, for the commanders there showed no disposition to subordinate their individual convictions for the common good. By August 1942, feelings in the theater had risen so high that Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, the chief Army planner, recommended that the War and Navy Departments inform the senior officers in the theater that there could be no excuse "for withholding wholehearted support of the Service or the Commander exercising unity of command. Strong notice of this conviction . . . ," he believed, "would do much to force essential cooperation and reduce much fruitless controversy between the two services."

When the situation did not improve, the Army proposed a separate Alaskan Department independent of General DeWitt and headed by an air
officer. This arrangement would also make it possible to shift the three top commanders in Alaska—Theobald, Buckner, and Butler—to other assignments quietly and without any unpleasantness. Eventually, Marshall and King decided against a change, and the situation so improved that Admiral King was able to write later that command in the North Pacific had worked out very well "largely due to the excellent cooperation between the responsible commanders concerned. I have not seen fit to press for a change in this set-up," he continued, "nor do I wish to do so now. In fact, it is working so well that I believe a change would be a mistake."

* * * *

The Guadalcanal campaign provided the first real test of unified command in the Pacific. From the first, Harmon felt that not enough emphasis was being given to air power. In his report to Marshall on the Guadalcanal landing, he called attention to the fact that no air construction units had been included in the invasion force and that even when Henderson Field was completed it would be impossible to base bombers there until fighter and antiaircraft protection was provided. Only if the Navy could send construction personnel and equipment up to Guadalcanal, together with Marine fighter and scout bombers, Harmon told Marshall, would he be able to send in his own bombers.

The Navy's failure to appreciate the importance of airfield construction was a reflection of the Navy's concept of air power as a supporting arm for naval and Army ground forces. In Harmon's view, and Gen. Henry H. Arnold's, air power was the dominant element in the war, surface and ground forces the supporting elements. Until this was recognized, he declared, the campaign would go slowly.

Harmon also deplored the defensive spirit that, he felt, dominated the Navy's operations. He appreciated the necessity for "reasonable caution" but pointed out at the same time that most of the Navy's surface losses had come when it was operating in a defensive role. Vigorous offensive action, he insisted, was the best defense, regardless of the strategic role assigned the Pacific in global strategy.

General Arnold, to whom these comments were directed, soon had the opportunity to judge for himself the truth of Harmon's assertions. His voyage to the Pacific later in September took him to Noumea, where he conferred with Ghormley and Nimitz, as well as with Harmon. His conclusions, presented to General Marshall on his return to Washington, were: first, "that the Navy had not demonstrated its ability to properly conduct air operations," and, second, that the Navy's failure to appreciate the importance of logistics had led to a shortage of the supplies required to support military operations.
Adm. William F. Halsey's assumption of command in mid-October and the offensive spirit that marked operations thereafter brought warm approval from Harmon. The two men worked well together and Halsey's insistence on the "one force" principle did much to eliminate misunderstanding, as did his willingness to give the Army more responsibility and a greater share in the conduct of operations. "Where disposition of Army forces is involved," Harmon told General Marshall, "the Commander South Pacific makes his decision only after conference with me."

Cooperation, or lack of it, between the South and Southwest Pacific also placed a heavy strain on command relations during the Guadalcanal campaign. General Marshall's frequent reference to the subject is a measure of the importance he attached to it. He had raised the matter very early in the campaign, and had received from MacArthur, Ghormley, and Harmon denials of any differences. Still, the rumors of a lack of cooperation persisted, and General Marshall more than once had to assure the President that MacArthur was doing all he could to support operations on Guadalcanal. Undoubtedly he was, but Marshall did not feel that lateral liaison was a satisfactory substitute for unified command.

One of the major obstacles to a unified command, General Marshall recognized early, was the service point of view, the inevitable result of a lifetime spent in learning the business of being a soldier or a sailor or an airman. Since there was no way of eliminating this obstacle short of an extended period of training, Marshall sought to diminish its effect by placing Army officers on the staff of naval commanders and sponsoring the appointment of naval officers to staffs headed by Army commanders. This exchange, he felt, would result in a better understanding by each of the services of the others' problems and practices and alert the commanders to potential areas of disagreement. Thus, when the South Pacific Area was established, Marshall had two Army officers assigned to Admiral Ghormley's staff. But Harmon reassigned both officers when he arrived in the area, on the ground that they were not needed, since he and his staff consulted frequently with their naval colleagues.

General Marshall did not agree. In his view, liaison between commanders was not nearly so effective as a joint staff. "Higher commanders talk things over in generalities," he pointed out. "Staff officers plan in intimacy over long periods."

The ideal solution to command in the Pacific would be to place the entire theater under one head. Everyone was agreed on this, but no one quite knew how to overcome the formidable obstacles in the way of such an arrangement. Finally, in October 1942, after a visit to the theater, General Arnold took the initiative and proposed to Marshall that an Army officer be made supreme commander in the Pacific. That there would be power opposition to such a move, he readily conceded. As a matter of fact, he thought a
“presidential decree” would be required to bring about the change. And for General Marshall’s information, he nominated three officers for the post: General MacArthur, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Marshall’s deputy, and Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, commander of the Army Ground Forces, all of whom he thought “perfectly capable of conducting the combined operations . . . in this area.”

What General Marshall thought of Arnold’s suggestion we do not know. All he did was pass it on to his staff without comment, at least none that is recorded. There it was studied by Brig. Gen. St. Clair Streett, an air officer, and Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer. Streett approved of the whole idea and thought that Marshall would support it, “regardless of the difficulties.” The real problem would come in selecting a commander, and that, Streett felt, would have to be done by the President himself. Wedemeyer also supported the idea of a single commander and thought command should go to the Air Forces, since that service, he believed, would exercise the strongest influence in the Pacific. His first choice for the job was General Arnold himself; his second choice, McNarney.

General Streett’s final thoughts on this subject are worth noting: “At the risk of being considered naive and just plain country-boy dumb,” he said that the major obstacle to a “sane military solution” of the problem was General MacArthur himself. Only with MacArthur out of the picture would it be possible to establish a sound organization in the area. Streett appreciated fully the political implications of removing MacArthur but thought it could be done safely if the general were given some high post such as the ambassadorship to Russia, “a big enough job for anyone.” Then, depending on whether the Navy or the Air Forces were considered to have the dominant role in the war, the post of supreme commander in the Pacific could be given either to Admiral Nimitz or General McNarney. The South and Southwest Pacific, Streett thought, should be combined, but the organization of the remainder of the theater could be left to the supreme commander who would “draw his own lines, designate subordinates, and select his own command post.”

Nothing came of all this discussion of a supreme command. Apparently, Marshall did not wish to precipitate a fight over command and did not, as far as we know, raise the problem with the Navy or with the President.

* * * *

The struggle over command did not end with the Guadalcanal campaign, and was renewed each time the Army and Navy began to plan future operations. Thus, when General Marshall proposed to Admiral King toward the close of the Guadalcanal campaign that the theater commanders be
directed to submit plans for succeeding operations against Rabaul, he precipitated anew the debate over command in the Pacific. The point at issue was not the objective or the timing of operations but command. Marshall proposed that the command be divided, as originally agreed, with MacArthur getting strategic direction of the entire campaign and Halsey operational control along the Solomons axis.

The Navy did not agree. Nimitz thought the entire offensive should be directed by Halsey and that “any change of command of those forces which Halsey has welded into a working organization would be most unwise.” The naval planners in Washington pointed out further that command was inseparable from control of the Pacific Fleet. Clearly, the Navy had no intention of entrusting the Fleet to an Army commander, but it was apparently willing to give MacArthur strategic direction of the campaign against Rabaul if Nimitz were appointed supreme commander. As MacArthur’s superior, then, Nimitz would become guardian of the Navy’s interests in the Pacific.

This proposal was clearly an offer to trade, a *quid pro quo* arrangement by which the naval planners offered the Army command over operations against Rabaul in return for control of the Pacific. But the Army refused to trade. “The Fleet,” General Handy observed tartly, “would be as helpless without air and land forces as the latter would be without the Fleet.”

When this move failed, Admiral King tried a new tack. The command established for Guadalcanal, he proposed, should be continued until Rabaul was reached. Then MacArthur could be given strategic direction of the operations against Rabaul, provided, first, Nimitz’s control was extended to include the waters of the Southwest Pacific and, second, the naval forces involved remained under Nimitz’s “general command.”

The strategy of this move was transparent, and Marshall rejected it out of hand. The Guadalcanal campaign had demonstrated only too clearly the shortcomings of the existing arrangement. To continue them, as King wanted to do, would be folly indeed.

It was now early January and the Joint Chiefs suspended the debate over command to meet with the British at Casablanca. Two months later, when discussion was resumed, it was evident that neither side had changed its position. The Army still insisted that strategic direction of the campaign against Rabaul should go to MacArthur; the Navy, that Halsey should remain in control of operations in the Solomons under Nimitz. The real issue was not operations in the Solomons but command of the Pacific. Behind the Navy’s insistence was the feeling that since the Army had the European command, it should have the Pacific. Bitterly, Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., the chief naval planner, wrote his Army counterpart:

When commands were set up in England for operations in France and for the invasion of North Africa . . . the Navy recognized that this was an
Army matter and accorded unified command to the Army upon its own initiative. . . . The Pacific . . . is and will continue to be a naval problem as a whole. If, to meet this problem we are to have unified command . . ., it is, in my opinion, up to the War Department to take steps necessary to set it up as a unified Naval command.

During the debate that followed, neither side would budge. There was no compromise; clearly one side would have to give way. Suddenly, without any advance notice, the Navy abandoned its case and accepted the Army plan almost without change. For four months, Admiral King and the naval staff had opposed the Army strongly and bitterly. In the end, they accepted MacArthur almost without question. The key to this strange about-face lies, perhaps, in Admiral King's unwillingness, in the face of Marshall's strong stand, to push matters so far as to prejudice his relationship with the Army Chief of Staff.

While the forces of the South and Southwest Pacific were making ready for the campaign ahead against Rabaul, to begin in June 1943, plans were being made to initiate the long-deferred offensive in the Central Pacific. By the middle of July 1943, these were virtually complete, and on the 20th of the month Admiral Nimitz received a directive from the Joint Chiefs to seize the Gilbert Islands in November and make plans for the later invasion of the Marshalls.

No sooner had the Army and Navy staffs in Hawaii begun to plan for these operations than they ran into some of the same problems that had beset the South Pacific staff. The most important fact about command in the area was Admiral Nimitz's own position. His role as commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas was clear, but his additional positions as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander of the Central Pacific Area created some confusion. Moreover, he used virtually the same staff while acting in all three capacities, and Army officers justifiably felt that their point of view could not be adequately represented on a staff consisting almost entirely of naval officers and functioning largely as a fleet staff. What ought to be done, the Army thought, was to give Nimitz an adequate joint staff and divorce him from his area and fleet commands so that he could function, like MacArthur, as a theater commander. The Navy stoutly denied the need for a change, and asserted that existing arrangements had worked well for the past eighteen months, and had "utilized our talents to the best advantage."

That the Navy would enter into discussions with the Army on so important a post in the naval hierarchy as the Pacific Fleet command, or assign to that command any but its senior representative in the theater, seemed most doubtful. To make the Pacific Fleet "a unit under a Theater Commander" would, in Fleet, remove it from the direct control of Admiral King in his
capacity as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. Rather than limit Nimitz's operational control as Fleet Commander, the Navy Department, the Army planners believed, would seek to extend his—and thereby King's—authority to include the surface elements in MacArthur's area on the ground that it was essential for the "maximum mobility" of the Fleet.

Admiral Nimitz himself saw little advantage in a separation of his functions or a change in his staff. Moreover, when he organized his forces for the forthcoming offensive, he adopted the usual naval task force pattern. To plan and direct operations, he established the Central Pacific Force, with Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance in command. Under it were three major commands: the Fifth Amphibious Force, the Fast Carrier Force, and Land-Based Air Forces, all headed by flag officers.

At the same time that Nimitz was making these arrangements, the new Army commander in the area, Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, was reorganizing his own forces. In recognition of the importance of shipping in an oceanic theater, he abolished the old Service Forces and created instead an Army Port and Service Command. All the combat divisions in the area he placed under separate command and organized a Task Force headquarters in anticipation of future needs. In addition, he recommended to General Marshall that he be designated commander of all Army ground and air elements in the area "so that Army troops used in the forthcoming operations will have a commander toward whom they can look for supply, administration, and assistance."

In Washington, Admiral King, no doubt prompted by Nimitz, supported Richardson's request on the ground that his appointment as commander of Army forces in the Central Pacific Area would create an organization similar to that in the South Pacific. Under such an arrangement, he pointed out, General Richardson's position vis-a-vis Nimitz would parallel the relationship between Harmon and Halsey. The Army was more than willing to comply, and action was quickly taken to create a new headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, with Richardson as commander.

The geographical extent of General Richardson's authority under this directive corresponded to the area delineated as the Central Pacific in Nimitz's original directive. Within this vast region, only a small portion of which was yet in American hands: Richardson was responsible for the administration, supply, and training of all U.S. Army troops, whether ground or air. Like Harmon, he had no responsibility for operations, other than to assist "in the preparation and execution of plans" involving Army forces in the area, subject always to the direction of Admiral Nimitz.

Differences of opinion over the division of responsibility between the Army and Navy soon arose. All land-based aircraft, including the Army's, had been placed under Adm. John H. Hoover, a naval air officer. General Richardson objected to this arrangement. Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hule, the
Seventh Air Force commander, he said, should be given this command, subject to Hoover's control. Nimitz refused but agreed to assign Hale to Hoover's staff, if the Army wished. This was not at all what Richardson wanted. What he was trying to establish was an Army headquarters in close juxtaposition to Hoover's, not representation on the staff. General Hale, he insisted, should command directly the Army air units in the invasion of the Gilberts. Only in this way would it be possible to insure the proper and effective employment of Army aircraft in accordance with Army Air Force doctrine. This argument, similar to the one General Harmon had successfully impressed on Halsey during the Guadalcanal campaign, apparently convinced Admiral Nimitz, and he finally agreed to appoint Hale commander, under Hoover, of a task group composed of Army air units.

Control of Army ground troops scheduled to participate in the Gilberts operation also caused difficulty. The V Amphibious Corps, headed by the Marine Gen. Holland M. Smith, had responsibility for amphibious training of all troops. In addition, Smith commanded the ground forces for the Gilberts operation. This dual command raised all kinds of questions about responsibility and relationships, and Richardson, seeking clarification, asked Nimitz who controlled the training of Army troops—the Army or Holland Smith?

Nimitz's answer, though lengthy, was clear. Holland Smith did. Richardson then turned to Marshall for help, but received none. Troops earmarked for specific operations, Marshall told him, would pass from his command at Nimitz's discretion, presumably but not necessarily after consultation with him.

If Richardson received no support from Marshall at this juncture, it was not because the Chief of Staff was unsympathetic but because he was determined to make the command in Hawaii, with all its imperfections, work. Thus, though he told Richardson, in effect, that he would have to get along with Nimitz, he continued to push for a joint staff that would give the Army a larger voice in the affairs of the Central Pacific. This matter, he told King, was an "absolute requirement" and an "urgent necessity," in view of the operations soon to begin in the Gilbert Islands.

Perseverance finally had its reward. On September 6th, after nearly four months of discussion, Admiral Nimitz announced the formation of a joint staff, to be headed by his deputy commander, a vice admiral, and to consist of officers from both services. Of the four sections of this staff—Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and Logistics—two were to be under Army officers. "It would seem," King exulted, "that we are in a fair way to setting up an adequate staff organization out there."

The Army planners were not optimistic. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell did not think such a staff would solve the "still nebulous" command problems in the Pacific nor make any clearer the "rather tenuous and ill-defined"
relationships between the various commanders and staffs. General Handy agreed with this judgment and noted further that Nimitz had made no provision for representation from the administrative and supply services—medical, signal, ordnance, and engineer. Moreover, he said, Nimitz should have named two deputies, one a flag officer, the other an Army general. Each could then coordinate routine matters pertaining to his own service.

General Marshall was somewhat more generous. The establishment of a joint staff, he told King, was definitely a step in the right direction, but he thought there was room for improvement. His goal was still a reorganization of the Pacific Ocean Areas that would divorce Nimitz from his area and fleet commands, leaving him free to assume the proper functions of a theater commander. But he recognized that there was little chance of securing such a change. The Navy had conceded as much as it intended to in the Pacific.

* * * * *

The command arrangements worked out so painfully during the spring and summer of 1943 remained unchanged for almost a year while Allied forces in the Pacific fought their way up the Solomons and New Guinea and westward from Hawaii to theGilberts and Marshalls. By March of 1944, with Rabaul and Truk largely neutralized, plans were being made to accelerate the pace of the war against Japan. Again the question of organization arose, for the forces of the South Pacific had fought their way out of a job. There were no further objectives in the area and no plans for further operations there. What had once been the most active theater in the Pacific was rapidly becoming a communications zone. The task facing the Joint Chiefs, therefore, was how best to utilize the combat forces of the South Pacific, to find appropriate assignments for their veteran commanders, and to organize what was left for support rather than combat missions.

The first move toward a resolution of these problems came in mid-March when the Joint Chiefs, after months of deliberation, agreed to divide the combat forces of the South Pacific between MacArthur and Nimitz. The lion's share would go to MacArthur—a corps, six divisions, service troops, and the Thirteenth Air Force, now commanded by Maj. Gen. Hubert R. Harmon. Nimitz was to get the remainder, the Third Fleet, marine units, garrison forces, and other elements required to defend and maintain the South Pacific bases.

The reorganization of the area proved somewhat more difficult to achieve than anticipated, and it was complicated by the fact that the Twentieth Air Force, scheduled soon to move into the Pacific, was under General Arnold's personal command. The solution finally adopted affected only Army forces and did not alter Admiral Nimitz's position or his relationship...
to MacArthur. The South Pacific remained under his control as before, but Army forces were placed under a new headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (USAFPOA), effective August 1st. This new command, headed by General Richardson, would control not only Army forces of the South Pacific, now to be redesignated the South Pacific Base Command, but also those of the Central Pacific. In addition, a command consisting of Army air units in both areas and designated Army Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas (AAFPOA), was created. General Millard Harmon would head this command and also serve as Deputy Commander, Twentieth Air Force. The assignment was a particularly difficult one, for Harmon had to serve three masters: General Arnold for matters involving the Twentieth; Admiral Nimitz for plans, operations, and training of Army air forces; and General Richardson for their administration and supply. That he was able, despite numerous differences, to work in harmony with all three is a mark of his qualities as a joint commander. His loss on a flight over Kwajalein in February 1945 deprived the Army Air Force of one of its ablest and most experienced officers.

As a result of these changes, there was a wholesale shift of units and commanders in the Pacific during the summer of 1944. On June 15th, General MacArthur took over from Halsey responsibility for operations along the Solomon-New Ireland axis and with it all the troops in that area. That same day Admiral Halsey left the South Pacific, followed two days later by General Harmon. In the weeks that followed, Army units continued to move to new locations in the Southwest Pacific. By August 1, 1944, when the new organization went into effect, the picture in the Pacific was quite different from what it had been six months earlier. There were still two major areas. But now MacArthur's responsibility included the Upper Solomons-New Ireland area, and his forces had been considerably increased. Nimitz, too, had gained additional resources—more Marine divisions, another fleet, and the promise of B-29s, once the Marianas were taken. Control of Army forces in the area was centralized under Richardson and Harmon, with local responsibility vested in the newly established South Pacific and Central Pacific Base Commands.

* * * * *

The new organization had been in effect only a few months when it became evident that something would have to be done about the original division of the Pacific made in March 1942. Plans were already being formulated for the invasion of Japan, and the somewhat artificial area boundaries established two years earlier were clearly becoming obsolete. What would happen after MacArthur recaptured the Philippines? Under the original
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

directive, MacArthur's area extended only as far north as these islands. Once they were taken, he would have no further combat mission. What would be done then? To place MacArthur under Nimitz was out of the question; to rule him out of the war on a technicality was obviously absurd. It was equally absurd in the Army's view to entrust the forty or fifty divisions and the thousands of planes required for the invasion of Japan to the overall control of an admiral. Moreover, the division of forces between two independent and separate commands, no matter how equitable the distribution, imposed a degree of rigidity and inefficiency in the use of these forces that was excusable perhaps in the early days of the war, but inadmissible for operations on the scale required for the defeat of Japan.

The most logical solution, of course, was to name a single commander for the entire Pacific with separate air, ground, and naval commands. The service interests and personality problems that had ruled out such an arrangement in the spring of 1942, however, were even stronger in the fall of 1944. No one, therefore, seriously pressed for a supreme commander at this time, though General Arnold did propose a single air command for the entire theater. The Navy generally stood firm on the area organization and sought initially to maintain the existing boundary, an arrangement which would have given Nimitz command of the final operations against Japan. Naval leaders soon abandoned this position in the face of Army opposition and proposed instead the creation of an additional area for Japan under the Joint Chiefs. Who would command this area was not made explicit, but presumably it would be an Army officer.

General MacArthur's position on reorganization of the Pacific for the final offensive against Japan was that existing commands should be retained, largely because of their allied character, but that all U.S. forces in the theater should be placed under separate Army and Navy commands reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs. What MacArthur was proposing, in effect, was dissolution of the unified commands created in 1942 and a return to the principle of mutual cooperation. But he recognized that unity of command would be required for active operations. When it was, it could be achieved easily, he thought, by the formation of joint task forces. Such an arrangement, he told Marshall, "will give true unity of command in the Pacific, as it permits the employment of all available resources against the selected objective."

In Washington, General Marshall and his planners supported MacArthur's views, as King did Nimitz's. The outcome, which was closely linked to the strategy for defeating Japan, represented in general a victory for the Army position. Thus, on April 3rd, General MacArthur was named Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC), in addition to his command of the Southwest Pacific Area, thereby acquiring administrative control of all Army resources in the Pacific, with the exception of the Twentieth Air Force. At the same time, Nimitz, while retaining his Pacific
Fleet and area commands, gained control of all U.S. naval forces in the Pacific. Under the direction of the Joint Chiefs, MacArthur would normally be responsible for land operations, Nimitz for sea operations. Each would have under his control the entire resources of his own service and the authority to establish joint task forces or to appoint subordinate commanders to conduct operations for which he was responsible.

The Twentieth Air Force constituted in effect a third separate command for the Pacific, though it did not have the status of the Army and Navy commands. General Arnold continued to argue for equal representation for his Air Forces and having failed in this, proposed a U.S. Army Strategic Air Force for the Pacific, to include the Twentieth and Eighth Air Forces under Gen. Carl Spaatz. Despite the objections of MacArthur, this proposal was approved on July 10th, a month before the Japanese surrender; and on the 16th Spaatz assumed command.

Meanwhile, both Nimitz and MacArthur had proceeded to reorganize their forces to conform to the new organization. There was not much for Nimitz to do, since he gained little if any authority and few units as a result of this latest move. MacArthur, however, had won much, and his first step was to establish his new headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, and to assume command. With his new title went administrative and operational control over all Army forces in the Pacific, excepting always the Twentieth Air Force. Keeping operational control in his own hands, MacArthur delegated administrative responsibility to two new headquarters: Army Forces, Western Pacific, and Army Forces, Middle Pacific. In addition, he retained command of the Southwest Pacific Area, through which he continued to exercise operational control over Australian and Dutch forces. His Army air elements, comprising ultimately all of the Army Air Forces in the Pacific except those in Spaatz's command, were under Gen. George C. Kenney's Far East Air Force.

Thus, when the war with Japan came to an end, the forces in the Pacific were organized into three commands, with the strategic bombardment force in a position of near equality with the Army and Navy forces. All efforts to establish a single commander for the theater had failed, and even the unified commands set up in 1942 had been abandoned under the pressure of events. Only on the battlefield had unity of command prevailed. There were many differences between the Army and Navy, but on one thing both were agreed. The main job was to meet the enemy and defeat him with the least possible loss of life. In Washington, in Hawaii, and in Australia, Army and Navy officers, with different outlooks and points of view developed over a lifetime of training and experience, weighed the issues of war in terms of service interest and prestige. But on Guadalcanal, on Tarawa, and at Leyte, there was no debate. Where the issues were life and death, all wore the same
uniform. Perhaps that is the supreme lesson of the Pacific war—that true unity of command can be achieved only on the field of battle.

Dr. Louis Morton is a Professor of History at Dartmouth College and one of this country's best known experts on the history of World War II. From 1946 to 1954, he was Chief of the Pacific Section, Office of the Chief of Military Historians, United States Army. From 1954 to 1960, he served as Deputy Chief Historian for the Army. He wrote The Fall of the Philippines (1953) for the official history series The United States Army in World War II. Still in preparation for this series are Strategy and Command: Turning the Tide, 1941-1943 and Strategy and Command: The Road to Victory, 1943-1945 (coauthor). He also contributed three essays to Command Decisions (1959) and has written numerous articles for leading historical and military journals. Dr. Morton has lectured at the National War College and the Army War College and has served as a consultant to this Academy's Department of History. He accepted in 1960 an appointment as a Professor of History at Dartmouth College. He was a former instructor at City College of New York (1939-1941). Dr. Morton received his M.A. from New York University in 1936 and his Ph.D. from Duke University in 1938.
Notes

1. This paper is based largely on the author's volume Strategy and Command: The First Two Years in the official series United States Army in World War II, to be published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Permission to use the manuscript of Strategy and Command in the preparation of the paper was granted by Brig. Gen. James A. Novell, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

Don Higginbotham

Though this is my second visit to the Air Force Academy, it is my first opportunity to present an address. I have had more exposure in this regard to one of your sister institutions: West Point. I must be careful not to speak of you as army men and women; but if I forget it will not be out of partiality. Gen. George Marshall at times was amused and at other times irritated by the partiality shown for the Navy by President Franklin Roosevelt, whom you may recall loved the sea and had been assistant secretary of the navy in the Wilson administration. On one occasion Marshall had had enough and pleaded good humoredly, "At least, Mr. President, stop speaking of the Army as 'they' and the Navy as 'us'!"

The title of this lecture suggests the obvious: that I consider it informative and instructive to look at certain similarities of experience and attitude shared by George Washington and George Marshall. In so doing, I want to speculate on their place in the American military tradition. These introductory remarks sound as though I am searching for relevance, and that is the case. No doubt at times historians, to say nothing of their readers, wish that the contemporary world would get lost so as to leave them unfettered to delve into the past for its own sake. Actually, for the first time in history there is the possibility that the contemporary world will go away but not in a manner that will be a boon to historical scholarship or anything else. That in itself is enough to keep us searching—even desperately at times—for a relevant past, and in no area more so than military affairs broadly defined.

Some of the similarities between Washington and Marshall are more relevant than others, but it might be useful to enumerate a number of them now and still others later when we endeavor to link the two men in terms of the American military tradition. Both are commonly thought of as Virginians and Marshall has been referred to as the last of the Virginians. If, in truth, Marshall was a Pennsylvanian by birth—he admitted that his nasaltwang gave him away—there was much Virginia in his life. His home, Uniontown in western Pennsylvania, was once part of Virginia's vast claim to the Ohio Valley. Because of that claim Washington had fought in the immediate region of Marshall's youth. As a schoolboy Marshall had hunted and fished at locations where Washington had vanquished a small French party under Sieur Coulon de Jumonville, where Washington later built Fort...
Necessity and had then himself capitulated to the Gallic enemy, and where—following Braddock's defeat—Washington and others had buried the ill-fated general. A distant relative of Chief Justice John Marshall, George Marshall had family roots in Virginia; he graduated from Virginia Military Institute; and he retired in 1945 to a Virginia country seat—having expressed a desire, as did Washington, to enjoy a simple, bucolic life after a long career of public service. Dodona Manor at Leesburg—an imposing old dwelling that had once belonged to Washington's grandnephew—was to be his own Mount Vernon. There he would rest and reflect, to quote Washington metaphorically, under "my own vine and fig tree." (Or as Marshall would have expressed it, with his beloved roses and tomato plants). Both genuinely wished to escape the limelight; having no desire to profit further from their past accomplishments, they rejected appeals from publishers and well-wishers to pen their memoirs. In Marshall's case, the offer of a million dollars from the *Saturday Evening Post* came when he had $1,300 in the bank.

Neither general, however, was destined to see his dream of solitude and privacy gratified at war's end. Ever selfless and responsible, they could no longer decline when duty again beckoned but in a different form: Washington became the nation's first president, and Marshall headed a postwar mission to China before serving as secretary of state and secretary of defense in the Truman administration. Something about their personal character explained their willingness to come forth once more in behalf of their country, and it is in the realm of character that the Virginia connection between Washington and Marshall rests most firmly in the public mind. For Marshall, like Washington and the other great Virginians of his generation and like Robert E. Lee, was thought to be a rock of stability, completely dedicated and committed to the cause he espoused.

The fact that neither the native Virginian nor the adopted Virginian was a backslapper or gregarious but just the opposite—remote and aloof—added to the aura that surrounded each man. Though both were named George, that in itself is hardly noteworthy, for neither as an adult encouraged first-name familiarity and could be downright chilling to those who tried to breach their inner walls. If, as the saying goes, a picture is worth a thousand words, perhaps the point about eschewing familiarity is best made with anecdotes.

While participating in the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, several delegates were commenting on Washington's reserve and distant manner. The bold and witty Gouverneur Morris felt that his colleagues had exaggerated, saying that he was as intimate with Washington as he was with his closest friends. To which Alexander Hamilton responded by issuing Morris a challenge, offering to provide wine and supper at his own expense if Morris would approach Washington, slap him on the back, and say, "My
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

dear General, how happy I am to see you look so well." On the designated occasion, Morris carried out his part of the bargain, although evidently with a degree of diffidence that had scarcely been expected in view of his earlier expression of confidence. Morris stepped up to Washington, bowed, shook hands, and gingerly placed his left hand on Washington's shoulder. "My dear General," said Morris, "I am very happy to see you look so well." Washington's reaction was instantly frigid. Removing the hand, he stepped back and glared silently at the abashed Morris, as the assemblage watched in embarrassment.3

The Washington anecdote, however, skal ing of the man's normal posture, may be apocryphal, but our Marshall story is authentic. At his initial official conference with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1938, Marshall, freshly minted deputy chief of staff, was asked a leading question about air power with which he did not agree. Roosevelt, thinking he had made an effective case for a priority in planes, said, "Don't you think so, George?" Marshall eyed the president icily and replied, "Mr. President, I am sorry, but I don't agree with that at all." Roosevelt, who first-named one and all, never after that addressed Marshall by anything but general. As Marshall himself recounted later, "I wasn't very enthusiastic over such a misrepresentation of our intimacy."4

Because Marshall is so close to us in time, and because of the splendid volumes of Forrest Pogue, we may have a more accurate appreciation of Marshall's contribution to our military heritage than we do Washington's. It may come as no shock to say that, with few exceptions, serious civilian historians have not displayed a consuming interest in Washington as a military man. What may be harder to explain is the lack of critical attention devoted to him by professional soldiers, who until fairly recently dominated the writing of military history in America, and all the more unusual because military men have tended to be deeply conscious of history. They have believed it to be relevant. To study a famous battle is to simulate combat, to give officers a vivid sense of being present, of engaging vicariously in a meaningful tactical exercise. It surely sharpens one's wits to be mindful of the need to anticipate unforeseen events or fortuitous circumstances. There is also the more important sense of involvement on a higher level in the examination of strategy that shaped campaigns and led to the battles. On becoming assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1927, Marshall made more rigorous an already existing requirement that every officer student prepare a short monograph on a military history subject. Marshall remembered that as a student himself at the Army Staff College he had devoted considerable attention to "past operations," particularly the Franco-Prussian War and the American Civil War; but he made no mention of assignments dealing with Washington's Revolutionary career.

157
Washington had become dated and irrelevant quite soon after the Revolution. Europeans, not Americans, continued to produce the influential military literature in the Western World, and there seemed to be nothing new and original in Washington's battles and campaigns. This was so not only because, broken down into its components, much of what had appeared novel about American warfare had antecedents in European light infantry, thin skirmish lines, and so on, but also because no European monarchy thought it would have to engage in the type of struggle that confronted Britain in America in 1775. Moreover, the War of Independence took place before the study of strategy was a recognized area of investigation. But that quickly changed with Napoleon, who captured the imagination of scholar-soldiers everywhere—a practitioner of the offensive (the strategy of annihilation), not the defensive, as was usually the case with Washington. If Europeans ignored Washington the soldier, so did Americans, except for the popularizers and romantics. Serious military writers and think on both sides of the Atlantic were under the hypnotic spell of a Swiss military intellectual, Baron Jomini, a founder of the strategic study of warfare who codified the lessons and principles of Napoleonic warfare. Even for Americans, writes Russell Weigley, "the object lessons were almost entirely Napoleonic and almost never Washingtonian. Early West Point strategists had their Napoleon Club, not their Washington Club. The first American books about strategy, Dennis Hart Mahan's and Henry W. Halleck's, contained much about Napoleon and little about Washington."

Serious-minded career officers also found Washington's personal example in some respects damaging to their ambitions for the army since his own military experience suggested to civilians and militia advocates—oblivious to Napoleon and Jomini—that expertise in arms was unnecessary in a republic. After all, Washington prior to 1775 had only held commissions in the Virginia forces and his combat activity had been confined to the frontier. In wartime during the century after Washington's death, the government continued to give high rank to amateurs with militia backgrounds, men who in turn used their military records as stepping stones to the most elevated political offices. Six of these officers with predominantly domestic backgrounds attained the Presidency: Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Franklin Pierce, Rutherford B. Hayes, James A. Garfield, and Benjamin Harrison.

An officer corps that was not as professional as its most professionally oriented members wished it to be—that is, as professional as its French and German counterparts—was not about to embrace Washington warmly. They faced problems enough in an America that voiced the rhetoric of democracy and equality, that looked ambivalently at best at learned and specialized professions, be they law, medicine, or the military.

But if the American military in the nineteenth century could not admire
Washington as a professional soldier, they nevertheless saw a kind of negative relevance in his inability to enlist in the Continental Army great numbers of men for the duration of the war and in his heavy reliance on poorly trained militia and short-term men. Here was a valuable lesson for their own day: even in time of tranquility, the nation should have a reasonably imposing military establishment so as to be better prepared in the event of conflict than Washington had been in the Revolution. Ironically, Washington, whose own military background and Revolutionary career seemed to offer little of a positive nature, was quoted in defense of a peacetime military structure that the American people refused to accept.

This is not to say that most Americans were pacifists or that many were ever really fearful of a military coup if the armed forces were substantially augmented. They were more preoccupied with keeping government small and taxes low and with the view—which was quite accurate—that after the War of 1812 America was secure from European embroilments. The danger of a formidable armed establishment was less from the military itself than from the politicians, who might be tempted to employ a beefed up army and navy in foreign adventures, including muscle-flexing in the Western Hemisphere. In retrospect, one may well conclude that peacetime defense spending, while never completely adequate, was fairly sensible—devoted to officer training at West Point, maintaining coastal fortifications and frontier posts, and exploring the West.

There was, of course, nothing wrong with military intellectuals such as Dennis Hart Mahan and Henry W. Halleck writing as advocates of exacting professional standards and claiming that European doctrine had much to offer. It was imperative that our officer corps possess the finest skills since it would in national emergencies need to train and assimilate many thousands of young men from civilian life into the armed forces. But had American military men been as disposed to read the Prussian theorist, Karl von Clausewitz, as they were Jomini, they might have given further concern to the uniquely American problems of defense and warfare, for Clausewitz revealed a breadth lacking in Jomini and his followers, stressing throughout his magnum opus, On War, that armed conflict was merely an extension of politics. They ignored the experience of Washington, who during the Revolution had approached Congress on the subject of long-term recruits with the utmost tact and who in training his men was ever mindful of their civilian backgrounds.

Both civilian and military students of American wars have, to be sure, always praised Washington for his devotion to the concept of civil control of the military; and historical revisionism on that score is most unlikely. We can point out two most recent expressions, one by a civilian and one by a soldier. Above all else, writes Richard Kohn, formerly of Rutgers University and now Chief of the Office of Air Force History, "Washington should be
remembered and appreciated for his absolute, unconditional, and steadfast refusal ever to seek or seize power outside legitimate political or constitutional channels." Indeed, "from the very beginning of his command, respect for civil authority was his first principle." Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr., formerly Chief of Military History, Army Center of Military History, states, "the example, the image, and even the legend of Washington have had an immense influence in shaping the American officer corps and in providing ideals of responsible leadership. I would point to General George C. Marshall, the World War II Chief of Staff, as a faithful follower of the Washington tradition."6

Obviously, I am not the only one to see a connection between Washington and Marshall, nor was General Collins. Douglas S. Freeman, the distinguished biographer of Robert E. Lee, hailed Time magazine's choice of Marshall as "Man of the Year" for 1943. Freeman, then at work on what would be his seven-volume life of Washington, declared that Marshall's "noblest qualities" were virtually identical to those found in Jefferson's "famous characterization" of Washington. "As far as he saw," said Jefferson, "no judgment was ever sounder... His integrity was most pure, his justice the most inflexible I have ever known, not motives of interest or consanguinity, of friendship or hatred being able to bias his decisions." "That is George Marshall," added Freeman, "that and much more besides." Harvard University also found a tie between Washington and Marshall, who received an honorary doctorate of laws degree at the Cambridge, Massachusetts, university in 1947, the occasion of his so-called Marshall Plan commencement address, outlining an American proposal for the postwar economic recovery of Europe. The latter's degree citation stated that in terms of character, integrity and respect for American ideals and institutions Marshall brooked comparison with only one other American, and that was Washington.7

All the same, Washington-Marshall comparisons have not been numerous; and what is even more surprising, those scholars who have been conscious of defining an American military tradition have not paid particular heed to our two "Virginians." A former Harmon Lecturer as well as a former colleague of mine, the late T. Harry Williams of Louisiana State University provides us with our point of departure for probing more deeply into comparative military analysis. In the aftermath of the Truman-MacArthur controversy of 1951, Williams produced an essay arguing that American military leaders have been either "Mac" or "Ike" types, and Williams' preference was clearly for the latter. The "Ikies" were open and easygoing, friendly and sometimes folksy, attuned to the democratic ideals of the republic, and consequently comfortable and understanding in their relations with civilian superiors. Williams believed that Zachary Taylor, U.S. Grant, and Dwight D. Eisenhower represented the "Ike" heritage at its best.
In contrast, the "Macs"—exemplified by Winfield Scott, George B. McClellan, and Douglas MacArthur—were haughty and cold, dramatic and even theatrical on occasion, their values and conduct derived from an older, elitist past, all of which made it hard if not impossible for them to accept comfortably civilian control.8

Williams' essay provoked a critical response from Samuel P. Huntington in *The Soldier and the State*, an influential work on civil-military relations in America. Huntington considered Williams' thesis, while useful in some respects, "restricted in scope, failing to encompass important elements of the American military tradition which fall into neither the 'Ike' nor 'Mac' category." According to Huntington, the "Macs" and "Ikes" were actually two aspects of the tradition of political involvement on the part of the military. Declared Huntington, "the true opposition is not between the Taylor-Grant-Eisenhower line and the Scott-McClellan-MacArthur line, but rather between both of these, on the one hand, and the professional strand of American militarism (which might be described as the Sherman-Pershing-Ridgway line), on the other. Therefore, the real difference was between the 'Ike Macs' and the 'Uncle Billies' or 'Black Jacks.'"9

Perhaps we can unite the concepts of Williams and Huntington by saying that some generals fit into a political component of the American military tradition and that the "Ikes" have behaved admirably in that respect and that the "Macs" have, to say the least, been controversial. We can also maintain that other military leaders have made considerable efforts to eschew close ties to the civilian sector, feeling—according to Huntington, at any rate—that such involvement compromises the integrity of the armed services and detracts from their endeavors to achieve a full measure of professionalism.

However, have Williams and Huntington, surely stimulating and provocative, tended to oversimplify the elements of our military heritage? Is it, in fact, impossible for individual American generals to represent the best of both aspects of the American military tradition? While not necessarily easy, I think that it is possible and that the proof is in the careers of Washington and Marshall.

For purposes of analysis, there are advantages to reversing the above-mentioned categories and discussing Huntington's professionalism before turning to Williams' political component. Washington and Marshall benefited from extremely important military experiences of a professional nature before each became commander in chief at a most critical period in American history: Washington in June, 1775, soon after the beginning of the Revolutionary War, which pitted the thirteen colonies against Britain, then the most powerful nation in the world; Marshall in September, 1939, on the very day Hitler's juggernaut descended on Poland. Yet there were those who felt that they had been cast in command rolls beyond their training and
competence. Charles Lee, a veteran British officer and a former general of Catherine the Great, seemed to some preferable to Washington. Marshall, still a colonel as late as 1936, had been elevated over the heads of senior brigadier and major generals in 1939. And if Washington had only commanded a regiment in the French and Indian War, Marshall had not led a division in World War I.

As for Washington, an effort to treat him as a professional may raise some eyebrows since he never held a regular commission prior to the Revolution and since military professionalism as we think of it today dates from the generation of Jomini and Clausewitz. Even so, in some ways he behaved as a professional and then some by the standards of his time.

As a colonial officer in the 1750s he had taken his military education seriously, availing himself of every opportunity to increase his “knowledge in the Military Art.” Eighteenth-century soldiers were educated by the tutorial method, which, if followed to the fullest, meant discussions with battle-tested veterans, independent reading, observation, and firsthand practice. Washington had done all these by the time he received command of the so-called Virginia Regiment in 1755 and the task of defending the backcountry of the Old Dominion. Though he failed in his persistent efforts to obtain a regular commission for himself and to have his entire unit taken into the British service, he learned a great deal from participating with British regulars in the Braddock and Forbes campaigns. He especially profited from his association with Gen. James Forbes himself and Col. Henry Bouquet, both first-rate soldiers. And we know that Washington not only devoured all the military literature available—and he asked his officers to do the same—but that he also took notes on what he learned and observed. He was a stickler for neatness; proper drill and ceremonial procedures, and efficient organization and administration. With obvious pride, the officers of Washington’s regiment announced that they required only “Commissions from His Majesty to make us as regular a Corps as any upon the Continent. . . . We have been regularly Regimented and trained; and have done as regular Duty . . . as any regimented in His Majesty’s Service.”

There was admittedly a gap of seventeen years between Washington’s resignation from his Virginia post in 1758 and his selection to head the Continental Army in 1775. But he had not forgotten his appreciation for a military life—he who had unsuccessfully tried to procure for his home at Mount Vernon busts of six great captains, including Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and Frederick II of Prussia, and he who had chosen in 1772 to be attired in his old Virginia uniform for his first known portrait, doubtless the same uniform he wore at the opening sessions of the Second Continental Congress as an indication of his willingness to fight for American liberties.

Washington, who had considered himself a teacher as a colonial officer, continued to think of himself in that manner as commander in chief, and
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

there assuredly was a good deal in his field grade experience that proved valuable to him in the Revolution. Washington in the 1750s had advised his provincial subordinates that "actions, and not the commission . . . make the Officer . . . there is more expected from him than the Title." In 1775 he elaborated on the same advice: "When Officers set good Examples, it may be expected that the Men will with zeal and alacrity follow them, but it would be a mere phenomenon in nature, to find a well disciplin'd Soldiery where Officers are relax'd and tardy in their duty; nor can they with any kind of propriety, or good Conscience, set in Judgment upon a Soldier for disobeying an order, which they themselves are everyday breaking."

At the same time, Washington the teacher was not unwilling to learn from others, including the German drillmaster Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. It is hardly insignificant that the officers who respected Washington most were themselves the most soldierly in their orientation: bright junior officers such as John Laurens and Alexander Hamilton, militarily self-educated senior officers such as Nathanael Greene and Henry Knox, conscientious European volunteers such as the Marquis de Lafayette and Steuben, and the officers of the French expeditionary army at Yorktown, particularly Major General, the Marquis de Chastellux, who spoke of the efficiency and businesslike atmosphere of Washington's headquarters.

Less effort is required to demonstrate Marshall's professional credentials. His résumé prior to World War II bulged with rich experiences, both at home and abroad—a tour in the Philippines, a student and teacher at the army schools at Fort Leavenworth, a second assignment in the Philippines, two years in Europe with the AEF during and after World War I, several years as special assistant to Chief of Staff John J. Pershing in the early twenties, a stint in China, an instructor and administrator at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, head of The Army War Plans Division, and deputy chief of staff—a career spanning nearly forty years before succeeding Gen. Malin Craig as chief of staff in 1939.

In his service record and his attitude of mind Marshall was a professional soldier in the finest sense. He undoubtedly received his most valuable professional education—and here I use the word professional in Huntington's strictly military sense—during what was then known as the Great War. Though he had not emerged in 1918 with a star on his shoulder and a divisional command as had MacArthur, he had participated from high ground. From the post of chief of operations and training for the First Division, he moved on to become chief of the Operations Division of the First Army. In the latter capacity, writes Forrest Pogue, "he had a key role in planning and supervising the movement and commitment of more troops in battle than any American officer would again achieve until General Omar Bradley established his 12th Army Group in France in 1944."

There are several noteworthy comparisons between Washington and
Marshall in terms of professionalism. Strange as it may seem to us, Washington as a young Virginia officer really thought of himself as a professional soldier and said as much. He was terribly frustrated by not receiving regular status, and for that reason as well as because of other difficulties he seriously considered resigning from the Virginia service in the midst of the most arduous part of the French and Indian War in his colony. Had he attained a royal commission, how would the course of history have changed? Not only would the Continental Army have had a different commander in chief, but Washington would likely have dropped out of posterity's sight had he made for himself a permanent career in the king's service. We can scarcely imagine that he would have gone all the way to the top, perhaps in the anomalous position of a former colonial as British supreme commander instead of Gen. William Howe, landing at New York in 1776 with an army of 34,000 men and the job of cracking the provincial uprising. Americans in the British regular service simply did not advance to rarified heights, lacking as they did the money to purchase expensive higher commissions and the close connections in London court circles that opened the doors to preferment.

Marshall obviously did get a regular commission after graduating from Virginia Military Institute in 1901, but it involved a good deal of energy on the part of people with the right political connections to accomplish it. He too had his share of disappointments in a small, peacetime army. Once at least he considered resignation in favor of the business world. Through no fault of his own it took him fifteen years to make captain and a total of thirty-four years to reach brigadier general. If Washington and Marshall were very ambitious men, they were also determined and persistent. If Washington was an ideal man to lead a revolution, Marshall had the stamina and tenacity to direct a worldwide military effort nearly two centuries later. Both of these hard-driving soldiers found diversion and relaxation in riding and hunting, an ancient Virginia pastime.

A second professional comparison concerns what World War I did for Marshall and what the French and Indian War meant for Washington. For Marshall, involved with planning for many thousands of men in a multiplicity of ways, the lessons that he tucked away for future use—to be acted on two decades later—seem obvious. What may be less clear is the relationship between Washington's experiences in the 1750s and his service on the larger stage that was the War of Independence. Not only did Washington command a regiment as a colonial, but during the Forbes campaign that saw the taking of Fort Duquesne he commanded a considerably larger body, an advance division, the only native American general in the Revolution to have had that type of opportunity in the previous Anglo-French conflict.

Out of the sum total of their background and training both Washington and Marshall had learned how to challenge men to give their best. They did so not by pompous rhetoric or theatrics but in part at least by the example of
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

Gen. George Washington, Commander in Chief of the Continental Army (right front), presides over a training exercise conducted by Baron Friedrich von Steuben at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, 1777 (National Archives).

Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (left rear), with troops at the 36th Division command post, Fifth Army, Italy, in June 1944 (National Air and Space Museum).
their own labor and dedication. It is common knowledge that Marshall always had to battle the tendency to be a workaholic; it is less well known that in eight and a half years as commander of the Continental forces Washington did not take a leave of absence, surely some sort of record in the annals of our military history. Both encouraged subordinates to be independent and creative, traits which are not invariably appreciated by those of the highest station, either civilian or military. Some authorities, feeling threatened by bright juniors, only give lip service to qualities of candor and openness. Washington and Marshall did not surround themselves with sycophants. They were intelligent, though not remarkably imaginative or flashy with their mental endowments; they wanted to be challenged—they asked questions and they were good listeners.

While Washington drew upon Greene, Knox, and Steuben—just as afterward as president upon Hamilton and Jefferson—Marshall had his Arnold, Bradley, Eisenhower, and Clark. Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Army Air Corps chief, remembered that at the outset Chief of Staff Marshall lacked a full appreciation of air power but that he learned quickly and was open-minded, part of "his ability to digest what he saw" and incorporate it into his "body of military genius." Gen. Omar Bradley recalled a revealing occurrence that took place soon after he joined the secretariat of the new chief of staff in 1939: "At the end of the first week General Marshall called us into his office and said without ceremony, 'I am disappointed in all of you.' When we asked why, he replied, 'You haven't disagreed with a single thing I have done all week.'" Later, when Bradley and his colleagues questioned the contents of a staff study, Marshall said approvingly, "Now that is what I want. Unless I hear all the arguments against something I am not sure whether I've made the right decision or not." And to Eisenhower, before the North African landings, Marshall declared, "When you disagree with my point of view, say so, without an apologetic approach."

If it is not clear how Washington came by such qualities, it appears probable that Marshall was significantly influenced by his mentor, General Pershing, for on various occasions in after years Marshall approvingly Pershing's remarkable capacity to accept dissen. As Marshall informed Col. Edwin T. Cole in 1939, Pershing "could listen to more opposition to his apparent view than any man I have ever known, and show less personal feeling than anyone I have ever seen. He was the most outstanding example of a man with complete tolerance regardless of what his own personal opinions seemed to be. In that quality lay a great part of his strength."

The quiet, low-key, reflective manner of instilling confidence and bestowing recognition of Washington and Marshall contrasted sharply with that of certain other military chieftains—Leonard Wood, for example, whose charm and way of inspiring subordinates is captured in a story by
Frederick Palmer, a war correspondent in Cuba. Emerging from Wood's tent, a young officer exclaimed, "I have just met the greatest man in the world, and I'm the second greatest." The illustration is not meant to imply that one method was right and another wrong, only to indicate that a general must resort to methods of leadership compatible with his own persona. Actually, Washington and Marshall were by natural disposition inclined to be fiery and temperamental, but they had by mastering self-control subdued these inherent tendencies. There were exceptions; neither suffered fools easily. There are tales of Washington swearing so mightily as to shake leaves from trees and of Marshall's blistering tongue peeling paint from walls.

For the most part, however, Marshall, like Washington, had sufficient patience to be recognized as an excellent teacher, and it goes without saying that no military arm can be fully professional without superior teaching. While Washington was never an instructor in a formal sense, he urged the creation of a military academy, a step which was delayed until Jefferson's Presidency. Marshall, who taught and occasionally lectured at a number of military institutions, has been particularly praised for his positive impact on the officer students and junior instructors at the Infantry School, where during his five years as deputy commandant he dealt with two hundred future World War II generals, including Bradley, Collins, Ridgway, Stilwell, and Van Fleet. As early as 1937, before it was clear that Marshall would vault the seniority obstacle and make it to the top rung of the military ladder, there were officers—so Marshall learned from Lt. Col. John F. Landis—"who regard[ed] themselves as self-appointed 'Marshall men'."

Both Washington and Marshall were attuned to the relationship between subject matter and pupil at all levels of instruction. American service-men were not simply soldiers; they were American soldiers, products of a free and open society, where restraints upon individual action and expression were minimal compared to many other parts of the world. That fact could be frustrating, but it could also offer dividends. Speaking of militia during the French and Indian War, Washington complained that "every man individual has his own crude notion of things, and must undertake to direct. If his advice is neglected, he thinks himself slighted, abased, and injured and, to redress his wrongs, will depart for his home." Years later, as Revolutionary commander in chief, Washington imparted his own reflections on leading Americans to Gen. von Steuben when the latter took over the training of the troops at Valley Forge. American soldiers, regardless of background, expected better treatment than they considered the lot of European rank and file. Steuben's Regulations, or "Het: Book," stipulates that a company commander's "first object should be to gain the love of his men, by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, enquiring into
their complaints, and when well founded, seeing them redressed. He should know every man of his company by name and character."

With all this Marshall could surely have agreed, convinced as he was that Americans possessed the substance to be first-rate fighting men. That meant, however, they must know the issues involved, and they must recognize that their officers were sensitive to their well-being. "Soldiers will tolerate almost anything in an officer except unfairness and ignorance," stated Marshall, in words strikingly similar to a previously quoted admonition from Washington. "They are quick to detect either." Marshall scholars have put such emphasis on this aspect of the General's military thought that it hardly requires further elaboration.20

The teaching point enables us to form a transitional link between our two generals as professionals on the one hand and as military leaders mindful of domestic and political factors on the other. They deserve to be remembered as professionals, albeit not in a narrow Huntingtonian sense. They were not greatly troubled by the nation's alleged anti-militarism, by the fear that civilian attitudes and values made genuine professionalism all but impossible in America—that is to say, out of the question unless the army could remain distant from what some officers saw as corrupting and undermining civilian influences. Undeniably Washington fussed and fumed during the Revolution about certain civilian attitudes and practices. He also lamented the lack of long-term enlistments and the inadequacies of green militia; but these remarks, so often quoted by Emory Upton and other advocates of a modified Prussian military system for America, were uttered in the midst of a stressful war that he was in danger of losing.

It is most revealing to see what Commander in Chief Washington and Chief of Staff Marshall thought about the future peacetime military picture for the country. Washington in his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment” in 1783, preferred a small yet highly trained army with a federally organized state militia system as a reserve force, a system realistic as to American resources and values, a plan praised in 1930 by a career officer, John McAuley Palmer, as the best scheme of national defense ever proposed, one far superior to Upton's far-fetched pleas, and one—we should add—that Palmer's friend George C. Marshall also found in keeping with American realities. As early as the immediate post World War I years, and before Palmer had read Washington's "Sentiments," the two friends, veterans of years of service but still relative juniors because of the army's complex promotion mills, felt that a substantial army for the 1920s would be unhealthy for the country.21 Nor did World War II really alter Marshall's thinking on what in Washington's day were called standing armies in time of peace. Interestingly, Marshall resorted to that pejorative expression himself in his final report as chief of staff in 1945. "There must not be," he warned, "a large standing army subject to the behest of a group of schemers. The
citizen-soldier is the guarantee against such a misuse of power.” According to Marshall, military needs should not be determined in a vacuum, should not be approached as military needs and nothing more. Rather, one must ask whether they would burden the country economically, as Washington himself in 1783 had said might happen were a sizable force retained, and whether they would be compatible with basic American principles.22

Today when we are in the midst of a debate over national priorities, a debate which includes among its components controversies over what constitutes an adequate nuclear shield, and more broadly the age-old economic question of guns vs. butter, Marshall has some timely words, possibly more meaningful for our generation than his own. “In the first place,” he declared on the eve of World War II, “national defense under modern conditions has become a tremendously expensive business, so much so that I think it is the business of every mature citizen to acquaint himself with the principal facts, and form a general idea as to what he or she thinks is the wise course for this country to follow.”23 In short, defense spending is so expensive and freighted with so many far-reaching implications that we cannot leave the subject solely to the experts, who themselves often disagree.

Neither Washington nor Marshall was enamored of war. If conflict had possessed a glamorous appeal in previous ages, asserted Marshall, it was no longer so in the twentieth century. Washington as president was accused of cowardly behavior in his determination to avoid hostilities in the face of British aggressions on the high seas and in the Northwest. Marshall, speaking before the American Historical Association, charged his scholarly audience with the task of investigating seriously the “deadly disease” of war, of which “a complete knowledge” was “essential before we can hope to find a cure.” In a modest way, the army itself might make a contribution to the study of war through the Historical Section of the War College, but Marshall did not share the view of General Pershing in the 1920s that the Historical Section should assume as its primary task issuing critical replies to historians who found fault with various aspects of the American military performance during World War I. Col. Oliver L. Spaulding, chief of the Historical Section, proposed that the adjutant general extend by letter to every state superintendent of public instruction an offer to have military men review American history textbooks “as to the accuracy of their presentation of facts.” Marshall accurately advised Pershing that many educational leaders would interpret such a campaign as an attempt “to mould public opinion along militaristic lines.” Furthermore, “once a book has been printed, its author and publisher would undoubtedly actively resent unfavorable reviews by the War Department.” Fortunately, Marshall’s wise counsel prevailed.24

Given their deep understanding of American history and culture, Washington and Marshall seem obvious choices for T. Harry Williams’ category
of "Ike" type military leaders. Why then did Williams leave them out? Here we can only speculate; perhaps he omitted them because they were not the affable, easygoing sort that Williams associated with his definition of the "Ikes." But does one have to be friendly and folksy to recognize that officers would lead wartime armies composed of citizen-soldiers, to appreciate the problems of civilian leadership, and to work harmoniously with that leadership? The careers of Washington and Marshall show that we can answer that question with a decided "no." Indeed, the man who holds himself back a bit may, if blessed with wisdom and integrity, command even more respect; and it is quite plausible to maintain that both men used their natural reserve to good effect. "Familiarity breeds contempt," is the saying, not that reserve elicits disrespect.

It is not enough for us to say that the "Ikes," along with Washington and Marshall, believed in civil supremacy, for it is doubtful if the "Mac" generals themselves were anything but dedicated to American constitutional government. Even so, Williams rightly informs us that the story of the "Macs" should make us mindful that civil-military relations have not always been as tranquil as we might like to think. McClellan grew up on Jomini, who said that after wars commenced the civilian authorities should retire and let the soldiers manage the fighting without interference, a view rejected by President Lincoln. Nor, of course, did Truman accept the interpretation of civil-military relations in wartime expressed by MacArthur after the president removed him from his Far Eastern post in 1951. "A theatre commander," MacArthur stated, "is not merely limited to the handling of his troops, he commands the whole area, politically, economically and militarily. At that stage of the game when politics fails and the military takes over, you must trust the military. . . When men become locked in battle there should be no artifice under the name of politics which should handicap your own men."

Where, then, is the difference between the "Macs" on the one hand and the "Ikes" and Washington and Marshall on the other so far as civil control is concerned? The latter not only believed in it, as did the "Macs," but they understood it as well, in all its dimensions. It meant, among other things, that the central government could not always give first priority to the military's total needs as defined by the military could not because of home-front requirements, or political considerations, or international factors. Time and again Washington endeavored to explain this truth to his discontented officers and men during the War of Independence. Furthermore, as Marshall said during World War II, democracies inevitably go to war ill prepared and they do not conduct their conflicts efficiently. He later added that "tolerance and understanding of our democratic procedures and reactions are very necessary" for military men. If Washington felt political pressures in the Revolution to hold New York City and to defend Philadel-
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

Philadelphia, the patriots’ capital, Marshall made a point of telling various classes at military schools that for reasons of homefront morale the politicians insisted on some major offensive thrust each year, beginning in 1942.26

Washington and Marshall not only adjusted to the realities of war in a free society, but they were praised for doing so. Both were extolled to a degree that seems almost unhealthy in a nation that has always been somewhat uncertain in its thinking about soldiers and military institutions. It troubled John Adams and his cousin Samuel that Washington was deified by his admirers. It did not disturb Presidents Roosevelt and Truman to speak of Marshall as the indispensable man. Yet our two army commanders never succumbed to a Narcissus complex, nor were they hesitant to speak out against actions and policies they considered ill-advised; and Marshall went so far as to warn Roosevelt that he would do so on his assuming the top army post in 1939.

Here in the nature of their occasional dissent from governmental decisions was a part of the American military tradition that is worth preserving. To be loyal is not always to be a “yes” man. It should be permissible, even desirable, for the military man to speak up if he feels that policies are absolutely wrong or in need of revision, provided he does so without endeavoring to create executive-legislative friction or without undermining the political and constitutional system. One wonders to what extent the Truman-MacArthur controversy subsequently inhibited military men from speaking their minds—not only at times in favor of greater military expenditures and involvements around the world but also in terms of doing less. Historically, military men in America have been quite sensitive to criticism, and Washington and Marshall were not exceptions; but at least they understood it as the inevitable result of our personal freedoms, and they were even somewhat philosophical about it.

I once suggested at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth that it might help civil-military relations if we could require every general to serve a term in Congress or on the White House staff and to insist that the most influential national political figures on Capitol Hill and in the executive branch direct a field army. But since the ideal is never the reality and since the military will continue to receive its lumps from the politicians and other civilians from time to time, where are we left? For one thing, we must not forget that the military probably suffers no more abuse than other sectors of government—and since Vietnam, if not during the war itself, even less, less than the president, the Congress, and the Supreme Court. Washington, for example, received far more slings and arrows as president than he did as general, and so did Taylor, Grant, and Eisenhower. And as for Marshall, his performance as a civilian in several high level posts in the Truman administration brought him the most vicious kind of abuse from the far right in this country.27
Whatever ills the American military feel are inflicted upon them from time to time, these can be better understood and countered if officers have had a healthy diversity of experiences with the civilian sector of American life. Washington as a young officer on the frontier had to deal with townspeople and farmers, with militiamen and volunteers, and with Virginia's executive and legislative leaders. Subsequently he himself sat for over a decade and a half in the House of Burgesses, and in 1774-1775 he represented his province in the Continental Congress at Philadelphia. He learned how political bodies behaved, how the legislative mind perceived things. He became more appreciative of the nature and complexities of the English heritage of civil control of the military, a heritage which Britain herself seemed to threaten after 1763 when a numerous peacetime military force for the first time was stationed permanently in North America. He did so in the context of outpourings of sentiment on such subjects as the evils of maintaining standing armies, the virtues of militias composed of upstanding citizens, and specific instances of civil-military friction.

As for Marshall, his remarkable insights into civilian attitudes and values owed much to his frequent teaching assignments with the National Guard over a period of thirty years. From an early stage in his career, he was acknowledged by professionals and amateurs alike as singularly proficient in dealing with guardsmen, whom he said (as Washington had written of militia earlier) must be accorded more than customary courtesy. When in 1908 the War Department established a Division of Militia Affairs to provide greater control over the National Guard, Gen. Franklin Bell tried and failed to get Marshall appointed assistant to the division head, a compliment nonetheless to the then twenty-eight-year-old lieutenant.

It is without doubt that some officers have had ample exposure to the civilian community and still fallen short in the area of civil-military relations. Probably a partial explanation for those failures lies in the fundamental character of the officers concerned. Experience alone does not guarantee future achievement, but it assuredly helps, particularly if it comes at a formative stage in an officer's career, and if he has the opportunity to build on that experience as did Marshall. He gained further insight into the civilian realm when he accompanied Chief of Staff Pershing to Congressional hearings, when he interacted with the academic world through participating at R.O.T.C. conferences, when he sought opportunities to speak to civic and business clubs and organizations, and when he worked with the New Deal's Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) in the 1930s—all of which narrow-minded officers would have scorned as digressions from military professionalism.

Marshall, in fact, realized at the time that they were invaluable. In 1938, he declared that his recent three-year assignment with the Illinois National Guard [was] one of the most instructive and valuable military
experiences I have had." Judging from Marshall's own assessments, his several assignments that involved the establishment and administration of CCC programs were equally beneficial. They constituted "the most interesting problem of my Army career," he told Pershing in 1933. Five years later his opinion had not changed. "I found the CCC the most instructive service I have ever had, and the most interesting," he observed to Gen. George Grunert.28

What had he learned? From his years with the National Guard and the CCC Marshall gained know-how in the mobilization, organization, and administration of large bodies of civilians. It proved to be crucial training for the man who as chief of st. would have the responsibility of preparing millions of draftees for duty in World War II. And for the time being, until they were ready for action, the military force that would separate America from disaster would be the National Guard. Unlike World War I, Marshall believed that subsequently America would not have the luxury of waiting months before making a heavy human commitment. "We must be prepared the next time we are involved in war, to fight immediately, that is within a few weeks, somewhere and somehow," he advised in March 1939. "Now that means we will have to employ the National Guard for that purpose, because it will constitute the large majority of the war army of the first six months." Yet, complained Marshall, too much of current American military training implied that the nation would be in to fight with combat-ready professionals—at Fort Leavenworth, for instance, he stated that the faculty could not see the forest for the trees.29

Consequently, Marshall believed it vital to upgrade the guard. Its training would afford the miniscule peacetime army practical awareness of the art they must have when conflict erupted, to say nothing of bolstering America's defenses and providing the nucleus of the citizen army that would ultimately fight a future war (which Marshall foresaw as coming), just as citizen forces had been the military backbone of the country in all its previous armed struggles.

No officers have ever equaled Washington and Marshall in effectively bridging the gap between the civilian and the military. Or to state the matter differently, which brings us back to the theories of Williams and Huntington, Washington and Marshall united the best of both the professional and political (or "Ike") characteristics of the American military tradition. Time magazine said of Marshall: "In a general's uniform, he stood for the civilian substance of this democratic society." Pogue tells us that Marshall "became familiar with the civilian point of view in a way rare among professional military men." A staff member stated the matter thusly: "Marshall had a feeling for civilians that few Army officers . . . have had. . . . He didn't have to adjust to civilians—they were a natural part of his environment. . . . I think he regarded civilians and military as part of a whole."
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

Washington said it even better: "We should all be considered, Congress, Army, &c. as one people, embarked in one Cause, in one interest; acting in one interest; acting on the same principle and to the same End."30

Notes


and also in Frank E. Vandiver's *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station, Texas, 1977).


29. Ibid., 707.
George C. Marshall: Global Commander

Forrest C. Pogue

It is a privilege to be invited to give the tenth lecture in a series which has become widely-known among teachers and students of military history. I am, of course, delighted to talk with you about Gen. George C. Marshall with whose career I have spent most of my waking hours since 1956.

Douglas Freeman, biographer of two great Americans, liked to say that he had spent twenty years in the company of Gen. Lee. After devoting nearly twelve years to collecting the papers of General Marshall and to interviewing him and more than 300 of his contemporaries, I can fully appreciate his point. In fact, my wife complains that nearly any subject from food to favorite books reminds me of a story about General Marshall. If someone serves seafood, I am likely to recall that General Marshall was allergic to shrimp. When I saw here in the audience Jim Cate, professor at the University of Chicago and one of the authors of the official history of the U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II, I recalled his fondness for the works of G. A. Henty and at once there came back to me that Marshall once said that his main knowledge of Hannibal came from Henry's *The Young Carthaginian*. If someone asks about the General and Winston Churchill, I am likely to say, "Did you know that they first met in London in 1919 when Marshall served as Churchill's aide one afternoon when the latter reviewed an American regiment in Hyde Park?"

Thus, when I mentioned to a friend that I was coming to the Air Force Academy to speak about Marshall, he asked if there was much to say about the General's connection with the Air Force. Then the deluge started. Marshall, I said, recalled being in Washington on leave in 1909 when Lt. Benjamin Foulois flew the Wright Brothers' plane from Fort Myer to Alexandria. Two years later during maneuvers at San Antonio, Texas, while serving temporarily with the Signal Corps, Marshall assigned the three pilots attached to the Maneuver Division to simulate the roles of brigade commanders in a command post exercise using wireless communications for the first time. One of the pilots was Lieutenant Foulois, then carrying out the first air reconnaissance in association with Army troops, and another was Lt. George Kelly, after whom Kelly Field would be named. Billy Mitchell was a student in classes of Marshall's at Fort Leavenworth in 1908-09 and "Hap" Arnold became a friend in the Philippines in 1914. Much earlier than
most of his Army contemporaries, Marshall developed an interest in the Air Corps.

I do not propose to argue that Marshall foresaw all of the future potential of the air forces in World War I or that he escaped some the ground force bias against air in the early postwar period. What is important is that he was aware that a strong bias existed and that he determined shortly after he came to Washington in the summer of 1938 as Chief of the War Plans Division to do something about it. Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, then Chief of the General Headquarters Air Force, took his air education in hand, inviting Marshall to accompany him on a visit to air stations and airplane plants throughout the country. A few months later, Marshall became Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, just as Gen. Arnold assumed the duties of Chief of the Army Air Corps. In the following spring, President Roosevelt announced that Marshall would succeed Gen. Malin Craig as Chief of the Army at the completion of his term. Shortly after the announcement, Marshall proposed to his superiors in the War Department that Andrews, who had reverted to his permanent rank of colonel after completing his tour with General Headquarters, be restored to general officer rank and made Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations in the War Department. Against strong opposition by top officials in the Department—"the first time I found them united on anything"—he carried his point. Andrews not only filled that slot, but Marshall sent him later to key posts in the Caribbean, in the Middle East, and finally to the post of Commanding General, European Theater, in London, before his career was tragically ended in an air crash in Iceland.

Marshall's closest air tie, of course, was with General Arnold. The airman wrote later that the Chief of Staff needed "plenty of indoctrination about the air facts of life." "The difference in George," he continued, "who presently became one of the most potent forces behind the development of a real American air power, was his ability to digest what he saw and make it part of as strong a body of military genius as I have ever known." Aware of the growing importance of air power and the increased pressure for an independent air force, Marshall quickly stepped up Arnold's authority, giving him great freedom to develop the Air Corps. In the fall of 1940, he made Arnold one of his three deputy chiefs of staff. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Marshall turned over to another airman, Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, soon to be named Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, the task of pushing through a reorganization of the War Department. In the new structure, Arnold became Commanding General, Army Air Forces. Not long afterwards, Marshall arranged for the airman's name to be included by President Roosevelt in a statement listing the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is easy to understand why Arnold later wrote of Marshall: "It is hard to think how there could have been any American Air Forces in World War II without him."
BIography and Leadership

Apparentiy we have wandered far afield, an illustration of the danger of stimulating a biographer to talk about his pet subject. But, then again, we have not wandered at all. Marshall's interest in the Air Forces is part of the story of his larger role in the war.

Clearly, Marshall was the first American general to be truly a global commander. As Chief of Staff, he commanded ground and air forces which at the end of the war in Europe numbered some 8 ½ million men in nine theaters scattered around the world.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, Marshall's only important garrisons outside the continental United States were in the Philippines and Hawaii. A few months later, he had troops moving to the Hawaiian Command, now commanded by airman Lt. Gen. Delos Emmons, for support of operations in the Pacific. Marshall had appointed Gen. Douglas MacArthur as commander of the Southwest Pacific Theater and arranged for him to be named as commander of the Australian forces as well. To head Army and Army Air Forces in the South Pacific, he named Arnold's Chief of the Air Staff, Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, brother of the distinguished general for whom this series of lectures is named. Air units and service troops were also on their way to India, Burma, and China, where Gen. Joseph Stilwell was to command. An air force was also set up in the Middle East.

One morning in 1944, General Marshall invited the representative of a commander who believed that his theater was being neglected to attend a morning briefing in his office. In accordance with the usual custom, the officers charged with this duty had placed on the map the pins showing the progress on the different active fronts of the world. At a glance one could see that fighting was raging in Italy, in northwest and southern France, on the Ledo Road, in the air against Germany and the possessions of Japan, or in the widely scattered islands of the Pacific. The Chief of Staff was amused as he saw his visitor's growing realization of the many fronts the War Department had to arm and supply.

In addition to his normal duties as Army Chief, Marshall had important special responsibilities. In 1941, he became the only military member of the high policy committee dealing with the atomic bomb project. Later, when implementation of the project was placed under Maj. Gen. Leslie Groves, that officer was made directly responsible to Secretary of War Stimson and to General Marshall.

General Marshall served as the executive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in giving directives to Gen. Eisenhower while he was Allied Commander in the Mediterranean and, later, when he became Supreme Allied Commander in northwest Europe. He also represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff in dealing with General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific and General Joseph Stilwell in the China-Burma-India Theater.

No other Chief of Staff in Great Britain or the United States carried a
heavier burden in dealing with legislative bodies, the Press, state executives, and makers of public opinion. In frequent appearances on Capitol Hill, he gained votes for appropriations and for huge increases in manpower. His support helped to pass the first selective service legislation, after it had been brought forward by civilian leaders and bipartisan groups in Congress. In 1941, it was his strong appeal to a handful of members of the Lower House that secured the margin of one vote in the House of Representatives for the extension of the draft four months before Pearl Harbor.

Marshall found that his task did not end with obtaining appropriations and the men he needed. Early in his term as Chief of Staff he discovered that business leaders were distant to White House demands for increased war production and suspicious of Mr. Roosevelt's proposals. Using the same frank approach to the Business Advisory Council that he had used to Congress, he gained greater business cooperation in meeting the Army's needs.

This tremendous spreading of his time and energies was not to his liking. He had written an old friend soon after becoming Chief of Staff, "I wish above everything that I could feel that my time was to be occupied in sound development work rather than in meeting the emergencies of a great catastrophe." But he was to spend his long term of slightly more than six years as Chief of Staff in struggling to prepare the Army and Army Air Forces for their duties in a global war. Sworn in a few hours after Hitler's army invaded Poland, he remained at his post until the war was finished and demobilization had begun. With the exception of Marshal Stalin and the Japanese emperor, Marshall was the only wartime leader to retain the same
position for this entire period. (Arnold, while chief of the Air Corps in September 1938, did not become Commanding General of the Army Air Forces and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1942.)

At the war's close, the British Chiefs of Staff, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope, and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Portal, who had served with Marshall during much of the conflict, hailed him as “architect and builder of the finest and most powerful Army in American history.” Prime Minister Winston Churchill spoke of him as the organizer of victory. Marshall's old friend, Bernard Baruch, called him the first global strategist.

What were the roads he followed to reach this end? One was that of the good soldier who learned his trade and another of an officer with a burning desire to know and the willingness to see problems whole. It is the story of a man who learned to control and order his own life, gaining through his personal struggle the secret of commanding men.

His early experience did not provide special training for global leadership. He often said that he was born in a parochial society, which had little knowledge or interest beyond state borders, that knew Manila only as a maker of rope and places in Europe as far-off spots of little concern to Americans. Yet in the limits of his own small area of western Pennsylvania there were reminders of the bonds which tied it to a part of Europe. A week after he became Chief of Staff he journeyed back to his birthplace and recalled for his audience that as a boy he had hunted along the Braddock Trail and had picnicked near the grave of Braddock some six or seven miles from his own home. Just beyond it, he had seen the ruins of Fort Necessity, which young Col. Washington had built and surrendered later to the French. One of his favorite trout streams, he recalled, “rose at the site of Washington's encounter (Jumonville Glen) at the opening of the French and Indian War where the first shot was fired there which was literally heard around the world.”

He learned more of the outside world in his career as a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute. Initially, his mind had been filled with the deeds of "Stonewall" Jackson, who had taught there before leaving at the beginning of the Civil War to gain fame and death, and of Robert E. Lee, who had spent his last years as President of nearby Washington College, showing how a great soldier could turn his talents to the task of postwar reconstruction.

In 1898, his second year at VMI, the cadets debated America's proper course in regard to Cuba; the sinking of the Maine and McKinley's call for action stirred Marshall and his fellow cadets deeply. They met in Cadet Society Hall and to a man volunteered their services to the Army. Reluctantly, they heeded their Superintendent's reminder that they would serve best by completing their military education. But the cadets got vicarious satisfaction out of the fact that one of the members of the Class of 1898
gained a captaincy and returned as Commandant in Marshall's last year. Another officer, Charles E. Kilbourne, classmate of Marshall's older brother at the Institute several years earlier, won the Medal of Honor.

Six months after leaving VMI, Marshall was commissioned as second lieutenant of infantry. A week later he was married. After a week's honeymoon in Washington, he reported to Fort Myer and within a month was in San Francisco bound for Manila.

In his first tour in the Philippines, Marshall gained his initial ideas of America's global responsibilities. At the same time he struggled through the necessarily painful process of learning how to command. The Philippine Insurrection had just ended and the volunteer officers who had served in the recent war and the ensuing fighting in the Islands were going home. As a result of the shortage of Regular Army officers, Marshall found himself—a few months after arrival—as the only officer in charge of a company in the southern half of the island of Mindoro. With little training to guide him, with no manual on how to deal with occupied territory, cut off from the outside world except for the monthly visit of a small supply boat, he fell back on what "the Corps, the Institute, expected of a cadet officer in the performance of his duty." He was green in military affairs, but he got by, as he recalled, with "the super-confidence of a recent cadet officer" and the help of two seasoned sergeants.

The young officer, returned to the United States after 18 months in the Islands, could never again take a wholly narrow view of the world. Although he would not return to foreign duty for more than a decade, he knew that American interests lay beyond restricted boundaries. Indeed, his career was to parallel almost exactly the first 50 years of the twentieth century as the tasks of the United States Army grew and as the United States expanded its global role.

In 1913, he went again to the Philippines. This time, he had behind him two years of intensive study at Fort Leavenworth and two years of teaching there. A ferment had been working at the Army schools and Marshall had found in one of his teachers, Maj. John F. Morrison, a man who brought a breath of fresh air to his subjects, emphasizing sound tactics and attention to practical lessons. In his summers from 1907 onward, Marshall worked with state militia and National Guard units in numerous maneuvers, learning the art of staff work and gaining experience in handling large units of troops. There had also been a four months' trip with his wife to Europe in 1910, during which he added to his fund of knowledge some idea of London, Paris, Rome, Florence and managed to observe British army maneuvers near Aldershot in the bargain.

Growing Japanese aggressiveness worried the small Army force in the Philippines during Marshall's second tour. He and his colleagues became involved in exercises designed to test the ability of an unnamed enemy to
overrun the Islands. In 1914, the sudden illness of the officer charged with acting as chief of staff of the “enemy” landing force in southern Luzon gave Lt. Marshall his big chance to show his ability as a staff officer. Stepping into a role for which he had rehearsed in maneuvers in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New York, and Texas, only a few years before, he gained a reputation for genius with battle plans that would be exaggerated in the telling. One who watched him in those exciting days was young Lt. “Hap” Arnold. Observing Marshall dictate a field order with nothing but a map before him, Arnold told his wife that he had seen a future Chief of Staff of the Army.

Marshall was to have one more experience with duty in the Far East before World War II. In the years between the great wars, he asked for duty in China. From 1924 to 1927, he served in Tientsin as Executive Officer of the 15th Regiment, which was charged with the duty of helping other foreign powers keep open the railroad from Peking to the sea. Left in command on two occasions when warring factions threatened to overrun the American sector, he managed by quiet firmness and persuasion to turn the marauders aside from the city.

Although his mental horizons were immeasurably widened by the three tours he spent in the Far East, Marshall perhaps gained most in his global outlook by his two years in France from the summer of 1917 to the fall of 1919. Member of the first division to go to France, training officer and then chief of operations of the 1st Division, he advanced to a planning assignment at Pershing’s General Headquarters at Chaumont, and then to the post of chief of operations of Gen. Hunter Liggett’s First Army in the closing weeks of the war. In one of his later assignments, he helped plan the operation at St. Mihiel. Then, while that battle was still in progress, he was shifted to supervising the moving of units into the Meuse-Argonne area for the final United States offensive of the war. This task, which required the orderly withdrawal from the line of French and Italian units and moving in over three main roads troops from the St. Mihiel front and other areas, approximately 800,000 men, brought into play his logistical talents. Newsmen referred to him as a “wizard” and Gen. Pershing in his memoirs singled out his contributions for special praise. A member of Pershing’s staff later wrote that Marshall’s task at First Army was “to work out all the details of the operations, putting them in a clear, workable order which could be understood by the commanders of all subordinate units. The order must be comprehensive but not involved. It must appear clear when read in a poor light, in the mud and the rain. That was Marshall’s job and he performed it 100%. The troops which maneuvered under his plans always won.”

Marshall’s rise in the Army was greatly assisted by his work in France, and his later leadership as Chief of Staff was strongly influenced by what he observed in World War I. He recalled the shocked faces of the French when they saw the almost total unpreparedness of the first American troops sent
to France. Unlike many of his colleagues, most of whom arrived later when trained American units showed up well alongside weary, battleworn French contingents, he understood French reservations about fighting qualities of American troops and was patient with their unfavorable reactions. He returned to the United States determined, if he had anything to do about it, never to let another Army go abroad until it was prepared to fight.

Several other lessons stayed with him. He recalled that there had been no proper sifting out of officers before the units came overseas and that Pershing at one time had thirty or more general officers on the road to the rear for reassignment. He was angered when he found a lack of concern for fighting men by the Services of Supply. Told that items such as candy and small necessities would be available by purchase only through post exchanges, he protested. When the Chief of Staff of First Army chided him about his remarks, he angrily exclaimed, “By God, I won’t stay as G-3 if the man at the front can’t have these things. I don’t favor sending men up to die if I can’t give them a free box of matches.” He fumed because recognition of bravery was long delayed, insisting that the value of medals and battlefield promotions lay in prompt recognition of performance so that other men would see that fine qualities of leadership and valor were appreciated by the Army. He was furious when red tape in the rear areas made unnecessarily difficult and unpleasant the process of demobilization. He was impressed by the fact that the officers responsible were fine men but “it was a huge machine and they were reluctant to make changes in it which would complicate things. . . .” As Chief of Staff of the Army, he never let his commanders forget that “we must do everything we could to convince the soldier that we were all solicitous for his well being. I was for supplying everything we could and [only] then requiring him to fight to the death when the time came. . . . If it were all solicitude that you had no Army. But you couldn’t be severe in your demands unless [the soldier] was convinced that you were doing everything you could to make matters well for him. . . .”

In the five years following the war, Marshall served as senior aide to General Pershing. With his chief, he visited the battlefields of France, Belgium, and Italy and shared with him the victory parades in Paris, London, New York, and Washington.

As his assistant, he sat through lengthy congressional hearings on the future National Defense Act of the United States. From the planning sessions and his observations of the legislative process, he gained a vital knowledge of how to work with Congress. This period of training was followed by trips with Pershing and his staff to the chief army posts and war plants of the country.

Marshall was not certain that the United States would again go to war, but he was convinced that the Army should continue to train good officers, encouraged to develop new approaches to problems, and that it should
devise teaching methods and manuals which could be applied by men with a
few months training in command of soldiers suddenly drawn from civilian
life.

These views he got an opportunity to apply, after his return from China
in 1927. For five years as assistant commandant in charge of instruction at
the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, he showed his great talents as a
teacher as he influenced many of the top ground commanders of the genera-
tion. During his stay at Benning, he had either as instructors, students, or
staff members more than 160 future general officers. Their number included
Generals Omar Bradley, Matthew Ridgway, Courtney Hodges, Bedell Smith,
Joseph Stilwell, Joe Collins, George Decker, four future chiefs of staff
besides himself, six or more future army commanders, and many top corps
and division commanders of World War II and afterwards.

At Benning, Marshall emphasized the practical over the theoretical, the
innovative over the staid, the realistic situation over the ideal. He insisted
that his officers study the first six months of a war, when arms and men were
lacking, rather than the closing phases when supplies and troops were plenti-
ful. "I insist," he wrote at the time, "we must get down to the essentials,
make clear the real difficulties, and expunge the bunk, complications, and
ponderosities; we must concentrate on registering in men's minds certain
vital considerations instead of a mass of less important details. We must
develop a technique and methods so simple that the citizen officer of good common sense can grasp the idea."

When he wrote this statement, American participation in war was almost a decade away. Yet he had touched upon the vital point for future training. His remaining assignments before he went to Washington as Chief of the War Plans Division in 1938 were closely bound up with the supervision and training of young civilians and with National Guard and Reserve officers. In Georgia and South Carolina and in Oregon he grappled with the problem of housing and supervising members of the Civilian Conservation Corps without the use of formal military discipline; in Chicago he served as senior instructor of the Illinois National Guard. As a member of a special committee on civilian-military relations in the early thirties, he served as chairman of national conferences between ROTC officers and college representatives at Lehigh and Purdue universities. It was vital training for one whose tasks as Chief of Staff involved the mobilizing of National Guard and Reserve units and the training of millions of draftees for war duty.

In the years between the wars, Marshall shared the frustrations of many of his fellow officers and dreamed of the day when he might have an opportunity to put some of his ideas into effect. Some of his colleagues relaxed as the Army, with an authorized strength of 280,000 sank at one point to less than half that number. Marshall kept at his tasks as if there would still be a chance for improvement. One of his friends, recalling Marshall's continued labors at his profession, remarked, "I wish I had spent less time on my golf game and more on my duties like George."

Named to the post of Chief of Staff in 1939, Marshall moved at once to bring the Army up to its authorized strength. He found, however, that he could not ignore the competing claims of America's friends abroad for a share of the aircraft and other military equipment then being produced in limited quantities. After the German invasion of France in the spring of 1940 and Britain's loss of essential guns and munitions in the evacuation of Dunkirk, both General Marshall and Adm. Stark were confronted by new appeals for assistance. When Hitler attacked Russia in the summer of 1941, one more supplicant for planes was added to the list. In meeting the requirements of what Churchill aptly called "the hungry table," Marshall performed one of his most important global services. By carefully balancing the needs of his new units against those of potential Allies abroad, he managed to keep our friends in the fight and also hastened the day when American units could bear their share of the battle.

Until the United States entered the war, Marshall played a cautious role in the discussions of the part the Army might play in case of expanded conflict. But in the first wartime Anglo-American conference, held in Washington less than a month after Pearl Harbor, he clearly became the leading figure among the Allied Chiefs of Staff. On Christmas Day, 1941, he opened
the fight for the principle of unified command. Finding the Prime Minister and his advisers somewhat skeptical about a proposal for an Allied Command in the Pacific, he carried the fight to Mr. Churchill and with the aid of President Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins got his way. A few days later, he won agreement for the establishment of a Combined Chiefs of Staff organization in Washington consisting of the United States Chiefs of Staff and a British Mission, whose members represented the British Chiefs of Staff in London. Recalling the delays and disagreements that had marked the actions of the Allies and Associated Powers in World War I, until reverses finally brought them to a unified command in the closing months of conflict, he urged them to avoid the needless sacrifice of valuable time and blood.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff organization worked in part because of the fruitful collaboration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. No less important was the fact that Marshall's ability to think in global terms was matched by the constructive attitude of the head of the British Mission in Washington, Field Marshal Sir John Dill. From the day the two men met at Argentia in the late summer of 1941 until the latter's death in November 1944, their friendship was a vital element in Anglo-American understanding.

As Chief of Staff of the Army, looking at a world map which showed pre-Pearl Harbor commitments to the proposition of defeating Germany first and the growing lines of red thumb tacks which showed continued Japanese conquest in the Pacific, Marshall found it difficult at times to agree with British proposals for ending the war. Although he accepted the need of making full use of British and Russian power to end the struggle first against the strongest of the Axis powers, he opposed a strategy which might delay the speedy defeat of Japan. In this he was influenced by General Douglas MacArthur and the supporters of full scale action against the Japanese and by Adm. King's desire to strike back at the enemy in the Pacific. Forgetting the task Marshall faced in holding steadily to the Germany first concept, some British commentators have criticized him for reluctance to follow up opportunities in the Mediterranean and his obstinate insistence on the Cross-Channel approach. In fact he did much to support the British line in the Mediterranean. After ceding reluctantly to Roosevelt's pressure for operations in North Africa for November 1942, the Army Chief of Staff accepted the logic of events in the Mediterranean, agreeing to the invasion of Sicily, landings in southern Italy, the Anzio operation, the drive for Rome, and a thrust northward to the Pisa-Rimini line. Even while holding resolutely to the commitment to land in southern France in support of Eisenhower's operations to the north, Marshall managed to give a measure of assistance to the Italian campaign.

Whatever the extent of Marshall's differences with the British, it is clear
that no high level military chief was more consistently generous in his efforts
to meet the request of foreign allies. Although they chronicled Marshall's
refusal to give further backing to Mediterranean enterprises, Churchill and
Alanbrooke never forgot his generosity after the fall of Tobruk when he
stripped from American units tanks and guns they had only recently re-
ceived and shipped them to the Middle East. When one of the ships carrying
part of this precious cargo was sunk, he promptly made good the losses.

Such, in brief, are some aspects of the career of the American leader
described by the British official historian, John Ehrman, as *primus inter
pares* (first among equals) in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Let us now ask
about some of his basic qualities and the beliefs that marked his career as a
soldier and as Chief of Staff.

First, said Dean Acheson, who served with him in the postwar period,
"there was the immensity of his integrity, the loftiness and beauty of his
character." Second, said Kenneth Davis, biographer of Eisenhower and
Adlai Stevenson, there was self-mastery. Third, said General Eisenhower,
who had reason to appreciate his firm backing, there was constancy: Mar-
shall stood like a rock. The Chief of Staff knew his mind and his capabilities
and he showed to his fellows the presence of inner strength and certainty in
troubled times. Recalling that Pershing, his mentor, had once said that he
must not lower his head in weariness lest someone looking to him for
courage interpret it as loss of hope, Marshall tried never to seem cast down.

A man of strong emotions, capable of burning or freezing anger, he
fought to keep himself under strict control. In his last speech to the cadets at
the Virginia Military Institute, his text "Don't be a deep feeler and a poor
thinker" stressed the conviction that the mind and not the emotions should
be the master. As a student, he had been quite willing to be what a later
generation would call a "square." He had come to the Institute ill-prepared
and he stood well down among his fellows in his first year class. But he had
worked at his subjects and the curve went steadily upward to place him in
the upper half of his class at graduation. In the business of being a soldier,
there was never any doubt. In picking cadet officers, his superiors named
him first among the corporals for the second year, first sergeant for the
third, and first captain at the last. When he went to the School of the Line at
Fort Leavenworth, still a second lieutenant, in a course intended for cap-
tains, many of whom had gained experience in the Spanish-American War,
he managed to place first. As a first captain and as company officer, he did
not seek plaudits; he preferred respect to easy popularity. He once said,
"The mothers should look with care in the training period to a popular
commander; chances are nine out of ten that he's going to get licked."

Marshall was impatient of verbiage, of protocol, and of the polite
palaver that often lubricates the wheels of administration. Contrary to the
disciples of Dale Carnegie, he dispensed with preliminaries and the soft sell.
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

As a result he sometimes frightened his subordinates. Experienced members of his staff soon overcame their initial awe; newcomers sometimes became inarticulate in his presence. In part his toughness was a mask put on to save time in the midst of war.

For him, the careful ordering of his life was all-important. As a younger man, he had suffered two near breakdowns from overwork and inability to cast off the burdens of the day. As Chief of Staff, he determined to preserve his health by demanding brevity in papers, conciseness in briefings, and a vigorous, responsible staff. Men presenting papers were expected to understand them and be prepared to offer a recommendation for final action. He was noted for saying that no one had an original idea after three o'clock. This did not mean that he left his office that early but that he believed it essential to delegate responsibilities, organize his work, and rely on younger aides so that he had time for exercise and recreation and the chance to reflect.

To those with whom he worked, Marshall showed loyalty—loyalty to his superiors and support to those who worked under him. He early determined to follow the lead of the President and to work with him and his assistants as a member of a team. True loyalty required frank speaking but ruled out making covert appeals to the Congress and to the Press. His commanders got his backing, almost before they knew they needed it. When he decided that MacArthur should be shifted from the Philippines to Australia, he immediately moved to stop any suggestion that he had run away from capture by stating that the order would come from the President, by arranging for the award of a Medal of Honor, and by asking the Australian Prime Minister to announce that MacArthur had come at his request. When Eisenhower was sharply attacked by British and American critics for his agreement with Adm. Darlan in North Africa in 1942, Marshall promptly met with key members of Congress and explained that the French admiral’s assistance had saved thousands of American lives. He radioed Eisenhower to get on with the fighting and leave the defense of his position to Washington.

To Congress and to the public, he spoke with candor, admitting mistakes, accepting responsibility for error, explaining what a great nation must do to put its house in order. With the strong backing of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, he resisted pressures by individual congressmen for political appointments and promotions. He closely questioned members of a congressional delegation seeking to keep in command of the national guard division from their state a general whom Marshall deemed incompetent. When they explained that he was their constituent, he asked whose constituents were the 12,000 to 15,000 men who might suffer for the general’s mistakes.

Since he had nothing to hide he did not flinch at congressional investigations. To staff members who wanted to hold back on revelations to a
Senate committee, he argued, "it must be assumed that members of Congress are just as patriotic as we. . . . I do not believe that we should adopt an attitude of official nervousness." Nevertheless, he felt that the War Department heads had become too defensive between the two wars and had failed to defend their subordinates in appearances before congressional committees. "I swore if I got up there I wasn't going to have any more of that damn business and I carried the flag when we went before the committees of Congress," he declared. "There is bound to be deterioration when there is no responsibility." He recalled that when a member asked if the Army was not seeking far more than was needed, he had replied: "That was the first time I knew of in American history that American troops in the field had too much of anything and that I was very, very happy that I was responsible." Because of his frankness, his evident mastery of the facts regarding the Army's needs and difficulties, his complete lack of interest in a future political role, he gained the confidence of Congress in a period when many Democrats and Republicans strongly opposed the President.

In choosing commanders, Marshall used no single criterion. Eisenhower and Bradley conformed to his personal model, quiet, non-showy, working with a minimum of noise and friction. And yet he had tolerance and even fondness for the more colorful, such as Patton, or the abrasive, such as Stilwell, delighting in their toughness and in their boldness in the field. He could forgive much in violent language and outrageous conduct if an officer was prepared to fight. He helped save Patton from his folly on at least two occasions and he brought back to fight again several officers who were relieved for earlier mistakes. But for the long pull, he prized the quiet men, who did their jobs with little fanfare and achieved their purpose with a minimum of display.

He had little patience for those who could not work with a team and who insisted that their theater or their unit needed more support than others. He applied the withering term, "localitis," to the ailment suffered by commanders whose requests were marked by a blindness to the needs of other fronts. He ridiculed efforts of those who were chiefly concerned by the prerequisites of their positions, saving his choice scorn for those who sought advancement so that they could have two cars or an extra bathroom for their wife. He barred military attaches from accepting decorations from countries drawing aid from the United States, and forbade commanders to employ members of their families as aides. He leaned over backward in respect to his own family to the point that it seemed that kinship to him brought a penalty. His two stepsons won their commissions by the accepted route of officers candidate school. He waived regulations in the cases of the stepsons and his son-in-law, so that they could see service overseas more quickly than by remaining in their regular units, explaining that he had no objection to
speeding their passage to the fighting fronts. He followed their progress with pride, did nothing to lighten the way.

Marshall applied the same rigid standards to himself that he set for others. During the war, he told his Secretary, General Staff, that if he received any decorations, honorary degrees, or had a book written about him, he would transfer him out of the Pentagon. Only at the President's personal direction did he waive the first prohibition. But he held personal honors to the minimum, explaining, "I thought for me to be receiving any decorations while our men were in the jungles of New Guinea or the islands of the Pacific especially or anywhere else there was heavy fighting... would not appear at all well..." It was of a piece with his postwar resolution not to write his memoirs, saying that he had not served his country in order to sell his story to a popular magazine. Even when he agreed to cooperate with a biographer, he stipulated that the writer must be selected by a responsible committee in whose deliberations he would have no part and that any payment received from the book or articles based on his statements or his papers could not go to him or any member of his family but must be given to a non-profit foundation to aid further research.

He was an austere man, but he had a saving sense of humor and a passion for simple justice. In a story which erases some of the grimness sometimes associated with him, he recalled that near the close of his first tour in the Philippines, he and some twelve to fifteen friends had a farewell dinner on the second floor of a hotel in Manila. The room was large, with a huge bay window with curtains. Someone proposed after the meal that they improvise an operetta using the area as a stage. As most of the company scurried about making preparations, there was suddenly a knock at the door and an American policeman appeared to complain that someone was dropping chairs from the room on people in the street. They discovered that one of the company, somewhat far gone in drink, was amusing himself by tossing furniture out of the window. Fortunately, one of the young ladies in the group persuaded the young policeman to take part in the entertainment and the complaint was dropped. Years later, Marshall recalled, when he was assistant commandant at Fort Benning, the culprit, now a rather stern member of the Inspector General's staff, came to investigate the conduct of two young officers who had committed some "semi-outrageous" offense. When Marshall suggested moderation of punishment, the officer retorted, "I hope you don't condone that sort of thing." Marshall's reply was, "at least they didn't drop chairs out windows." "You know," he told me with a chuckle, "they got off rather light."

Here was no Prussian-style martinet, barking out stern orders and harassing those who dared his wrath. There was compassion here and understanding and sympathy. "Write a letter to General **** on the death of his son," he directed once, "I had to relieve him and I fear I broke his heart."
Obviously he bore personally a touch of the tragedy that he had inflicted by demanding that a high standard of leadership be met.

He had time to see that warm and adequate clothing was devised and provided for his soldiers, that intelligent planning went into their care, that thought was given to the individual. Early in the war, he recalled a suggestion that he had made for the Civilian Conservation Corps that arrangements be made so that men could get away for a day or two from the routine of camp and permitted to arrange their own vacations. He turned down a suggestion that transient barracks be left unpainted to save money, pointing out the importance of a touch of color and attention to men brought into a new and regimented life. He insisted that men be told why they were fighting. When he found that the lectures he had initially suggested were not always well prepared, he turned to a series of films, Why We Fight, that achieved his purpose.

He reacted strongly to efforts of the Press and of certain politicians to stir soldier protests against policies of the government. In 1941, the draft was unpopular in many sectors, and there was a tendency for anti-Administration congressmen to fish in troubled waters. Cards were sent to camps, asking for signatures against the extension of Selective Service. Some publications played up soldier threats to go “over the hill in October,” suggesting that there might be widespread desertion if the men were held in military service beyond a year. Despite his desire to have an Army that was a thinking Army, Marshall believed there was a point at which such agitation must halt. He told members of the House Military Affairs Committee that he could not allow recruits to engage in politics: “We must treat them as soldiers; we cannot have a political club and call it an Army. . . . Without discipline an Army is not only impotent but it is a menace to the state.”

While he would not coddle soldiers, he would not attempt to kill their spirit. “Theirs not to reason why—theirs but to do or die” did not fit a citizen army, he said. He believed in a discipline based on respect rather than fear; “on the effect of good example given by officers; on the intelligent comprehension by all ranks of why an order has to be and why it must be carried out; on a sense of duty, on esprit de corps.”

Regularly there was laid on his desk a summary of all the letters from soldiers, bearing complaints and praise, which had found their way to the Pentagon and a summary of the gripes that had been gleaned by censors from the letters written by soldiers on the fighting fronts. Not only did he read them and pass on to commanders in the United States and abroad specific complaints about their commands, but he selected at least six letters a day from soldiers for personal reply.

No matter how busy he became, he never forgot the war’s cost in lives. He recalled later, “I was very careful to send to Mr. Roosevelt every few days a statement of our casualties and it was done in a rather effective way,
In an address to the first class of officer candidates at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, General Marshall summarized the task of the military leader. "Warfare today," he declared, "is a thing of swift movement—of rapid concentrations. It requires the building up of enormous firepower against successive objectives with breathtaking speed. It is not a game for the unimaginative plodder."

The Chief of Staff explained to them the difficulties of commanding American troops. Their characteristics of individual initiative and independence of thought, which made them potentially the best soldiers in the world, could become possible sources of weakness without good leadership. The American soldier's unusual intelligence and resourcefulness could become "explosive or positively destructive ... under adverse conditions, unless the leadership is wise and determined, and unless the leader commands the complete respect of his men."

He emphasized alertness and initiative as essential qualities in both junior and senior officers. "Passive inactivity because you have not been given specific instructions to do this or do that is a serious deficiency," he declared. Then, after listing the various responsibilities of the new officers, he concluded: "Remember this: the truly great leader overcomes all difficulties, and campaigns and battles are nothing but a long series of difficulties to be overcome. The lack of equipment, the lack of food, the lack of this or that are only excuses; the real leader displays his qualities in his triumph over adversity, however great it may be."

What have we found in this recital? It is a sketch of a leader with great self-certainty, born of experience and self-discipline, an ability to learn, a sense of duty, a willingness to accept responsibility, simplicity of spirit, character in its broadest term, loyalty, compassion. Many of these were old-fashioned characteristics then; they may seem even more archaic now. But they helped make him a world leader and they still have relevance to leaders in a new era.

These qualities impressed greatly Marshall's good friend and civilian superior, Secretary of War Stimson. On the last day of 1942, on Marshall's 62d birthday, Mr. Stimson summoned a number of Marshall's friends to his office for sherry and birthday cake. He then proposed a toast to the Chief of Staff.

In his long lifetime, Stimson declared, he had found that men in public life tended to fall into two groups, "first, those who are thinking primarily of what they can do for the job which they hold, and second, those who are thinking of what the job can do for them." He concluded: "General Mar-
shall stands at the very top of my list of those in the first category. . . . I feel, General Marshall, that you are one of the most selfless public officials that I have ever known."

Among all the British and United States Chiefs of Staff, Marshall was the leading figure in developing a global force, in cooperating with the Allied powers, in leading the fight for unity of command, in sharing his resources and production priorities with Allied forces around the world, and in attempting to find the means to uphold Allied interests while also protecting those which were purely America. I can think of no better ending than that tribute paid by Sir Winston Churchill not too long before Marshall's death:

"During my long and close association with successive American administrations, there are few men whose qualities of mind and character have impressed me so deeply as those of General Marshall. He is a great American, but he is far more than that. In war he was as wise and understanding in counsel as he was resolute in action. In peace he was the architect who planned the restoration of our battered European economy and, at the same time, laboured tirelessly to establish a system of Western Defence. He has always fought victoriously against defeatism, discouragement, and disillusion. succeeding generations must not be allowed to forget his achievements and his example."

Dr. Forrest C. Pogue received a Ph.D. from Clark University in 1939. He served with the U.S. forces in Europe as a combat historian for the First Army (1944-1945) and is the holder of several military decorations. He later joined the Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, becoming one of the principal authors of the U.S. Army in World War II series. In 1952 he joined the Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, based in Heidelberg, Germany. This was followed (1954-1956) by a professorship of history at Murray State College, Kentucky, the institution from which he received his A.B. in 1932 and where he had taught earlier from 1933 to 1942. In 1956, Dr. Pogue was chosen Director of the Research Library, George C. Marshall Research Foundation, Lexington, Virginia, a post he still holds. He is the author of several works, including *The Supreme Command* (1954). He is the coauthor of *The Meaning of Yalta* (1956) and has contributed to *Command Decisions* (1960) and *Total War and Cold War* (1962). He has also completed the first and second volumes of a projected four-volume work that promises to be the definitive biography of Gen. George C. Marshall. Volumes published to date are *Education of a General, 1880-1939* (1963) and *Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942* (1966).
I am doubly privileged this evening. It is a great privilege for me to be asked to give this 14th Annual Harmon Lecture, which honors the memory of a distinguished Air Force officer. It is a great privilege also to talk with you about Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., a distinguished Army officer. I hope that my association with the Naval War College will draw the Navy and the Marine Corps into our session here and make it a complete family affair.

I regard it as a distinct honor to have been asked to work in the Patton papers. I discovered there the development of a highly skilled professional and the growth of a very warm and engaging person. Quite apart from the professional concerns that George Patton documented, he left a record of a thoroughly likeable human being, a man of great charm. In addition to the pages of memoranda, speeches, instructions that he left, he wrote literally thousands of letters to his wife. They were always about himself—he was thoroughly self-centered—and they provide a marvelous account of his activities and thoughts. When he and his wife were separated, he wrote her almost every day, sometimes twice a day. The image of the man that emerges from these papers is quite different from the public image he projected. He was a devoted husband who in private was quiet and considerate and witty—yes, even funny. For example, he closed one letter to his wife with these words: “I cannot send you any kisses this evening because we had onions for dinner.”

A military genius, a legend, an American folk hero, George S. Patton, Jr., captured the imagination of the world. Even now, twenty-six years after his death, he can be pictured clearly as the Army general who epitomized the fighting soldier in World War II.

He had many faces, many contrasting qualities. A noted horseman, a well-known swordsman, a competent sailor and navigator, an airplane pilot, a dedicated athlete and sportsman, he was also an amateur poet, and sixteen of his articles were published in magazines. Rough and tough, he was also thoughtful and sentimental. Unpredictable, he was at the same time dependable. He was outgoing, yet anguished. A complex and paradoxical figure, he was a man of many faces.

He is remembered best for the unique leadership he exercised. He had the ability to obtain the utmost from American troops, and some would say
that he obtained more than the maximum response. Through his charisma,
exemplified by a flamboyant and well-publicized image, he stimulated
American troops to an aggressive desire to close with and destroy the enemy.
He personified the offensive spirit, the ruthless drive, the will for victory in
battle.

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower characterized Patton's Third Army as “a
fighting force that is not excelled . . . by any other of equal size in the
world.” As the outstanding exponent of combat effectiveness, particularly
with respect to the employment of armored forces, that is, the combined use
of tanks, motorized infantry, and self-propelled artillery, closely supported
by tactical aircraft, Patton brought the blitzkreig concept to perfection.

He is recalled mainly for his victories in World War II. He is honored
for symbolizing the strength and will required to vanquish the evil of Hitler's
Nazi Germany. If he was sometimes brutal in his methods, the brutality was
accepted and condoned because it was that kind of war, a total war of
annihilation. There was a remarkable cohesion during that war on the part
of the American people, who were united to a degree rarely achieved in a
nation. Nationally involved in the struggle to eliminate totalitarianism and
tyanny, Americans understood clearly the issues at stake and engaged, as
Eisenhower so aptly put it, in a crusade for victory. The soldier who best
represented the warlike virtues and the will to win was George Patton.

He was first and foremost a man of enormous ambition. He believed
that he was fated or destined for greatness, and he worked hard to make that
fate or destiny come true. As a matter of fact, he drove himself to make
good, to be somebody important, to gain fame, to attain achievement, to
merit recognition, to receive applause.

The initial entry he wrote in his notebook when he was a cadet at West
Point read: “Do your damnest always.” From time to time he added other
admonitions to himself. Like this: “Always work like hell at all things and all
times.” In a moment of doubt he wrote: “No sacrifice is too great if by it
you can attain an end. Let people talk and be damned. You do what leads to
your ambition and when you get the power remember those who laughed.”

How he longed for fame! “If you die not a soldier”—he meant
warrior—“and having had a chance to be one I pray God to damn you George
Patton. Never Never Never stop being ambitious. You have but one life. Live
it to the full of glory and be willing to pay.” At a time of particular anguish,
he wrote: “George Patton . . . As God lives you must of your self merit
and obtain such applause by your own efforts and remember that though at
times of quiet this may not seem worth much, yet at the last it is the only
thing and to obtain it life and happiness are small sacrifices . . . you must
do your damndest and win. Remember that is what you live for. Oh you must!
You have got to do something! Never stop until you have gained the top or a
gr:::c.”
These are terribly revealing statements. Yet he made no secret of his desire. He wrote to his father: "I know that my ambition is selfish and cold yet it is not a selfish selfishness for instead of sparing me, it makes me exert myself to the utter most to attain an end which will do neither me nor any one else any good . . . I will do my best to attain what I consider—wrongly perhaps—my destiny."

To his fiancee, he confided: "How can a man fail if he places everything subordinate to success? . . . I have got . . . to be great . . . and it is in war alone that I am fitted to do any thing of importance."

To his parents shortly before his graduation from the Military Academy, he wrote: "I have got to, do you understand, got to be great. It is no foolish child dream. It is me as I ever will be . . . I would be willing to live in torture, die tomorrow if for one day I could be really great . . . I wake up at night in a cold sweat imagining that I have lived and done nothing . . . Perhaps I am crazy."

To his fiancee in the same tenor: "I may lose ambition and become a clerk and sit by a fire and be what the world calls happy but God forbid. I may be crazy but if with sanity comes contentment with the middle of life, may I never be sane."

With these sentiments tormenting and driving him, he exerted all his energy in the pursuit of excellence. He fought the temptation to relax, to be lazy. He was, as a matter of fact, extremely hard on himself.

The first Patton to arrive in the United States came from Scotland although there is some mystery about him—and settled in Fredericksburg, Virginia, about the time of the American War for Independence. He married a daughter of Dr. Hugh Mercer, a friend of George Washington, and one of their sons became governor of Virginia. One of their sons, George Smith Patton, the first to bear his name, was General Patton's grandfather. He graduated from the Virginia Military Institute, practiced law, fought in the Civil War as a colonel in command of a Confederate regiment, and died of battle wounds in 1864.

His widow went to California with her four children, and the oldest, also named George Smith Patton, the second to have this name, was the general's father. He too graduated from VMI, practiced law in California, and was a Democratic politician who ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate in 1916. A businessman, he was moderately wealthy when his son George was born, considerably so twenty-five years later. The source of his wealth was land that his wife had inherited.

Mrs. Patton, the general's mother, was a Wilson. Her father was Benjamin Davis Wilson, a remarkable man. Although General Patton believed that he resembled his Patton progenitors, he was much more like his maternal grandmother, a pioneer, trapper and Indian trader, adventurer and Indian fighter, and finally a respectable man of means. He was born in Tennessee.
and worked his way across the continent to southern California, where he married the daughter of a wealthy Mexican and through her gained vast landholdings. This Mrs. Wilson died, and Mr. Wilson remarried, this time an American, and she was General Patton's grandmother. One of her daughters married the second George S. Patton, and this union produced the future general.

The Patton side of the family looked upon themselves as aristocratic Virginians, and they liked to trace their heritage to George Washington—Patton always referred to him as Cousin George—and beyond that to a king of England and a king of France, even to sixteen barons who signed the Magna Charta. The Wilsons were far less romantic, far less pretentious. Practical people, they drew their eminence from B. D. Wilson's early arrival in Southern California. Wilson founded the orange industry, planted the first great vineyards, gave his name to Mt. Wilson where the observatory now stands, was elected twice to the state legislature, and was highly and widely respected.

George Patton's early years were spent in southern California, a sparsely settled region of ranches. His first love was horses, and it endured throughout his life. Many years later when Patton reminisced about his childhood, he wrote: "I remember very vividly playing at the mouth of Mission Canyon and seeing Papa come up on a Chestnut mare... As he rode up on the Canyon... our nurse said, 'You ought to be proud to be the son of such a handsome western millionaire.' When I asked her what a millionaire was, she said—a farmer."

At the age of eleven, Patton entered a private school in nearby Pasadena. When he was 18, he went to the Virginia Military Institute, like his father and grandfather. He spent a year there and compiled a splendid record. He received no demerits.

He accepted an appointment to the Military Academy because graduation automatically gave him a Regular commission. He spent five years at West Point because he had to repeat his first year. The reason was peculiar. Officially, he was found, as they say, in mathematics. But it was his deficiency in French that generated his academic failure. It was his deficiency in French that required him to take an examination not only in French but also in math. What the connection was, I hardly understand. But apparently, if a student's work in class was acceptable, he was excused from final examinations. Although Patton's class work in mathematics gave him passing grades, his class work in French put him on the borderline. He passed the exam in French, but he failed the test in math. And so he was turned back.

He graduated in 1909, and in his class of 103 men, he stood number 46, about in the middle. He had been cadet corporal, sergeant major, and adjutant. He had won his letter in athletics by breaking a school record in the hurdles. He was on the football squad for four years, but he played so
recklessly during practice scrimmages that he broke bones and twisted ankles, elbows, and shoulders. According to the yearbook, "Two broken arms bear witness to his zeal, as well as his misfortune on the football field." The only game he ever got into was against Franklin and Marshall. He was sent in as a substitute at the end of the contest, and the final whistle sounded before the teams could get off a single play.

Upon graduation, he became a Cavalry officer and soon afterward married a charming young lady from Massachusetts whose family was immensely wealthy.

In 1911, Patton was transferred from Fort Sheridan, near Chicago, to Fort Myer, Virginia, close to Washington, D.C. The benefits were enormous to an ambitious young man, and he came to know important and influential people in the Army and in politics. As he said, Washington was "nearer God than else where and the place where all people with aspirations should attempt to dwell."

He certainly had his aspirations. He studied and worked hard at his profession, and he also cultivated the right people in the nation's capital, people who could help him advance. His assignment to Fort Myer was the real beginning of his rise to fame.

While at Fort Myer, he started to participate strenuously—and he did everything exuberantly and enthusiastically—in horse shows, in horse racing, and in polo games. He explained this activity to his father-in-law as follows: "What I am doing looks like play to you but in my business it is the best sort of advertising."

The advertising paid off. He came to know Gen. Leonard Wood, the Army Chief of Staff, Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, and he managed to have himself selected to take part in the 1912 Olympics at Stockholm, the games that Jim Thorpe, the great Indian athlete, dominated. Patton competed in the modern pentathlon, five grueling competitions—pistol shooting, a 300-meter swim, fencing, a steeplechase, and a cross-country foot race. He finished in fifth place.

After the games, Patton traveled to Saumur, the famous French Cavalry school, and took lessons from the fencing instructor. When Patton returned to Fort Myer, he cultivated his own reputation as a swordsman, and he designed a saber that the Cavalry adopted. For a young second lieutenant, this was prominence indeed.

In the following year, Patton again traveled to Saumur and studied with the French champion, not only to improve his own fencing but also to learn how to become an instructor. He went to the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas. He took the Cavalry course and he gave instruction in the saber. His title was impressive, and he was the first in the U.S. Army to hold it: Master of the Sword. He was still only a second lieutenant.

His next assignment was Fort Bliss, Texas, and the post commander, it
so happened, was Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing. Mexico was then in turmoil as the consequence of revolution, and Army troops were guarding the border to prevent depredations against American life and property.

In March 1916, when Pancho Villa and several hundred men raided Columbus, New Mexico, and killed seventeen Americans, Pershing was ordered to organize the Punitive Expedition and pursue Villa. Pershing took Patton along as an unofficial aide. Patton performed a variety of duties. He was in charge of the headquarters orderlies, he looked after the messengers, he censored newspaper correspondents' dispatches and soldiers' mail, he acted as liaison officer. But he was happy. He was where the action was.

Patton turned his service in Mexico to great advantage. In May 1916 he was one of fifteen men, and in command, traveling in three automobiles to buy corn from Mexican farmers. On a hunch, Patton led a raid on a ranch believed to belong to one of Pancho Villa's lieutenants. Three enemy soldiers were there, and when they tried to escape, Patton and his men engaged them in a lively skirmish and killed them. Patton's men strapped the bodies to the hoods of their cars, took them to headquarters for identification, and created a sensation. Villa had disappeared, there was little news about the Punitive Expedition for the folks back home, and Patton's feat made him a national hero for about a week. Perhaps more important, his action was probably the first time the U.S. Army engaged in motorized warfare. Patton and his men had leaped directly from their machines into battle.

Although service in Mexico was monotonous, Patton observed Pershing closely and studied him assiduously. Learning how Pershing operated, how Pershing gave orders, trained his men, judged his subordinates, maintained troop morale, and carried out his command duties, Patton modeled himself on Pershing. Shortly before the Expedition returned to Texas, Patton wrote his wife as follows: "This is the last letter I shall write you from Mexico. I have learned a lot about my profession and I hope how much I love you. The first was necessary, the second was not."

When Pershing assumed command of the American Expeditionary Force and went to France, he took Patton again. Once again Patton had no well-defined job. He was in charge of the automobiles and drivers at the headquarters, he did all sorts of odd and incidental work, like having American flags painted on the staff cars, and so on.

But he was obviously a combat soldier, and Pershing offered him command of an infantry battalion. Before orders could be cut, Patton became interested in tanks. They were then unwieldy, unreliable, and unproved instruments of warfare, and there was much doubt whether they had any function and value at all on the battlefield. Against the advice of most of his friends, and after much inner anguish and debate, Patton chose to go into the newly formed U.S. Tank Corps. He was the first officer so assigned. As Patton undertook his task, he explained to his wife: "The job I have tenta-
tively possessed my self of is huge for everything must be created and there is nothing to start with, nothing but me that is. Sometimes I wonder if I can do all there is to do but I suppose I can. I always have so far.”

Mastering quickly the techniques of how to run and maintain tanks and how to use them in battle, he became the AEF’s tank expert. He formed a tank school, taught and trained his tankers, and led them in combat. In the battle of St. Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, where he was wounded, he proved his high competence for command. He demonstrated the same qualities that would distinguish his performance in World War II. His troops were eager to move against the enemy, and they fought like veterans.

How he was wounded is an odd story. It occurred on the first day of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. He was a colonel in command of the 1st Tank Brigade—two battalions of American tanks and an attached French groupement—about 250 tanks in all. The barrage opened at 2:50 AM and at 5:30, three hours later, the assault wave moved forward into a heavy fog that hung over the battlefield. As long as the ground was obscured, the tanks advanced with little difficulty. But around 10 o’clock, the mist lifted, the German fire became intense and accurate. Some American infantrymen became confused, panicky, and disorganized.

Patton had said he would stay in his command post at least an hour after the attack started. But he was impatient. He could hear the tanks, the artillery, the machine guns, and he could see little. So he started walking forward with a small party of two officers and twelve messengers carrying phones, wire, and pigeons in baskets. After walking a mile or two, the group stopped and took a break. But after several minutes, a few shells fell in and some machine gun bullets came close. Patton moved his group to the protection of a railroad cut. Some infantrymen came through, and they said they had lost their units and commanders in the fog. Patton ordered them to join him. He soon had about 100 men, and the railroad cut became crowded. So he led them back to the reverse slope of a small hill and instructed everyone to spread out and lie down. Machine gun fire then swept the crest of the hill.

Down at the base of the slope, Patton noticed several tanks. They were held up by two enormous trenches formerly held by the Germans. Some tankers had started to dig away the banks, but when the German fire came in, the tankers stopped digging and took shelter in the trenches. Patton sent several of his men down to get the tankers across the trenches and up the hill and at the Germans. But the incoming fires were too intense. He finally went down the hill himself. He immediately got the men out of the trenches and organized a coordinated effort to get the tanks across. He walked to the tanks, which were being splattered by machine gun fire, removed the shovels and picks strapped to the sides, handed men the tools, and got them working to tear down the sides of the trenches.
Meanwhile, bullets and shells continued to fall in. Some men were hit. Patton stood on the parapet in an exposed position directing the work. When he was asked to take cover, he shouted, "To hell with them—they can't hit me." He got the tanks across and sent them on their way.

Collecting his hundred men, he led them up the slope. He waved his large walking stick over his head and yelled, "Let's get them, who's with me?" Most of the men enthusiastically followed Patton. They were no more than 75 yards over the hill when a terrific and sustained burst of machine gun fire washed across the slope. Everyone flung himself to the ground.

It was probably at this moment that Patton had his vision. Nine years later he wrote, "I felt a great desire to run. I was trembling with fear when suddenly I thought of my progenitors and seemed to see them in a cloud over the German lines looking at me. I became calm at once and saying aloud, 'It is time for another Patton to die' called for volunteers and went forward to what I honestly believed to be certain death."

When the firing abated, Patton picked himself up. Waving his stick and shouting, "Let's go," he marched forward. This time only six men accompanied him. One was his orderly, Joe Angelo, from Camden, New Jersey, a skinny kid who weighed 105 pounds. As this miniature charge of the light brigade walked toward the enemy machine gun nests, Angelo noticed that the men were dropping one by one as they were hit. Finally just he and Patton were left.

"We are alone," Angelo said.
"Come on anyway," Patton said.

Why? He was armed with his walking stick and a pistol in his holster. Angelo carried a rifle. In that hail of bullets, they resembled Don Quixote and his faithful servant Sancho Panza.

Did Patton think that he and Angelo led charmed lives? They had come through at the trenches where the tanks were dug out. Was Patton unwilling to admit defeat, lose face with the men who were crawling back across the top of the hill? Was he trying to inspire them?

Was he seeking to be hit? Was he inviting the glory of death or injury on the field of battle? Was he fulfilling his destiny?

Or was it battlefield madness, that taut anger, that barely controlled rage, that overwhelming hatred that makes a man tremble with the desire to hurt those who are trying to kill him?
"Come on anyway," he said.

No more than a few seconds passed when a bullet struck and passed through his upper leg. He took a few steps, struggled to keep his balance, kept going on nerve, then fell.

Angelo helped him into a shellhole where they remained until the fires subsided. Then Patton was carried out and evacuated to a hospital.

Perhaps what he wrote to his father a month later explained why he had
continued toward the German machine guns. "An officer is paid to attack, not to direct, after the battle starts. You know I have always feared I was a coward at heart but I am beginning to doubt it. Our education is at fault in picturing death as such a terrible thing. It is nothing and very easy to get. That does not mean that I hunt for it but the fear of it does not—at least has not deterred me from doing what appeared [to be] my duty."

Patton returned to the United States with the tanks, but not long afterwards went back to the Cavalry. The reasons are interesting. The National Defense Act of 1920 placed the Tank Corps under the Infantry. Patton had argued for an independent Tank Corps. But if, in the interest of economy, the tanks had to go under one of the traditional arms, he preferred the Cavalry. For Patton intuitively understood that tanks operating with Cavalry would stress mobility, while tanks tied to the Infantry would emphasize firepower. Tanks in peacetime, he feared, as he said, "would be very much like coast artillery with a lot of machinery which never works."

Furthermore, he believed that funds made available by the Congress to the Army during years of peace would be insufficient to develop tanks and tank doctrine.

Beyond that were personal reasons. Loss of independent tank status negated Patton's standing as one of the few high-ranking and experienced officers in the corps and his hope for early promotion into general officer rank. He knew relatively few infantrymen who could help him advance in his career, whereas he was at home in the Cavalry. Furthermore, Pershing was soon to be Army Chief of Staff; not only was Pershing a friend of Patton, he was also a cavalryman and interested in seeing that Cavalry officers got ahead. In addition, since Cavalry officers were expected to be prominent horsemen, Patton would have lots of opportunity to play polo, hunt, and participate in horse shows. He and Mrs. Patton liked Washington, D.C., and Fort Myer was a Cavalry post.

Perhaps above all, the tanks were unreliable machines that required roads and gasoline and oil, tanks demanded careful planning for operational employment and logistical support. They were used in mass, as in France. Horses, on the other hand, were mobile, could go anywhere, were dependable and could live off the country. Patton expected the next war to take place in a primitive area of the world, a place without road nets and rail lines, like Mexico, where a man on horseback was an individual, relatively free, able to charge the foe recklessly while waving his saber. Perhaps ultimately it was this romantic view of warfare that impelled him to return to the horses.

As it turned out, the tanks were absorbed into the Infantry and came to be regarded as accompanying guns. They lost the mobility that Patton had given them in France, and the development of armored doctrine stagnated in the United States until soldiers everywhere were astonished and shocked in
1939 by the German blitzkrieg. By then, Patton was identified with the horse cavalry. Although he retained his interest in tanks and followed tank developments closely during the interwar years, he became associated with the conservative cavalrymen who advocated continued reliance on the horse and who fought mechanization and motorization. As a consequence, Patton almost missed the opportunity to participate meaningfully in World War II.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Patton served in a variety of places and completed his military education. Although his academic record at West Point was unimpressive, he was an honor graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and a distinguished graduate of the Army War College. One could say that intellectually or academically he matured rather late.

His apparently aimless assignments during the interwar years came to an end in 1940, when he was suddenly transferred to the tanks. How this came about is interesting and revealing. He was tied to the horse cavalry, but the Chief of Cavalry, for whom he worked during four years, rated him as a versatile soldier. Patton's boss wrote of him: "While he is an outstanding horseman he is also outstanding as an authority in mechanization due to his . . . experience in France with the Tank Corps and to his continued interest in the study of the subject." So he was qualified for horses and tanks both.

In 1939, Patton was a colonel and in command of Fort Myer. The functions of the post were mainly ceremonial. Every spring there was a series of drill exhibitions featuring precision horsemanship by the troops, and these attracted congressmen and other notables in the capital and thus made friends and influenced important people in favor of the Army. Fort Myer furnished escorts for funerals and occasions of state. And of course Patton, who insisted on perfection in dress and behavior, was well suited to run this kind of show. But the U.S. Army, after years of stagnation, the result of shortages of funds, was beginning to stir and to expand in size as the clouds of World War II gathered, and Patton looked longingly toward new combat units being formed and trained. No one seemed to notice him. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th Mechanized Brigade were both experimental combat units, commanded by old friends of his, Kenyon Joyce and Adna Chaffee, and Patton would have loved to go to either. I think it would have made little difference to him whether he went to the horses or to the machines. But he remained at Fort Myer.

In the spring of 1939, the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. George C. Marshall, was about to move into Quarters 1 at Fort Myer. Work needed to be done on the house, and Patton invited Marshall to stay with him for a few days. The other members of the Patton family were away, and Patton wrote Marshall: "I can give you a room and bath and meals, and I ... I shall not treat you as a guest and shall not cramp your style in any way."
accepted. Patton was excited. He wrote to his wife: "I have just consummated a pretty snappy move. General George C. Marshall is going to live at our house!!! . . . I think that once I can get my natural charm working [on him] I won't need any letters from John J. P. [Pershing] or anyone else. . . . You had better send me a check for 5,000 dollars." A day or so later he wrote to his wife that General Marshall was "just like an old shoe." Patton entertained him, flattered him, took him sailing, and Marshall paid no attention. They became good friends, but Marshall remained calm, cool, and distant.

On September first, the day World War II opened in Europe, Marshall became Chief of Staff and a four star general. Patton presented him with a set of sterling silver stars. Still nothing happened to Patton even though other officers were being moved into combat training jobs and promoted. Marshall ignored Patton even as he searched for young and vigorous officers to fill vacancies in the expanding Army. Was Patton too old at 54? Was he too wedded to the horse cavalry? Was Marshall testing Patton's patience? Did the White House and Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt think that Patton's political connections through his wife with Republicans from Massachusetts were too close? Was Patton too flamboyant, too outspoken? Whatever the reason, Patton stayed at Fort Myer.

Finally, in the spring of 1940, several things happened. Maneuvers in Georgia and Louisiana, where Patton was an umpire, showed how far Chaffee had brought the development of American armored doctrine. With the lessons of the 1939 blitzkrieg in Poland at hand, together with the lessons of the maneuvers, Patton began to look definitely toward the ranks.
Late in June when Patton learned that his friend Chaffee was about to become chief of a newly formed Armored Force, he wrote him a letter. This letter has been lost, but Patton probably congratulated Chaffee, may have mentioned an observation from the maneuvers, and certainly invited Chaffee to stay with the Patton whenever he was in Washington. He may have made a joking remark that he wished he were helping Chaffee, but he would not have asked directly for anything. What Patton was doing in his letter was reminding Chaffee of Patton's interest in tanks and his interest in a new and exciting challenge.

Chaffee's reply was more than Patton could have expected. Chaffee put Patton's name on the list of colonels Chaffee thought were suitable for promotion to brigadier general and for command of an armored brigade.

A few days later President Roosevelt appointed Henry L. Stimson Secretary of War. Stimson was an old friend of Patton's, and Patton sent him an immediate letter of congratulations. Stimson probably wondered why a proved fire-eater like George Patton was being kept at Fort Myer and he may have mentioned this to General Marshall. The Army, now expanding rapidly after the fall of France, needed officers like Patton.

Patton was on leave in Massachusetts in July, when he read in the morning newspaper that he had been assigned to Fort Benning and the 2d Armored Division. The division commander, Charles Scott, was an old friend. Chaffee had placed Patton on the preferred list, but Scott had asked for Patton. Patton's immediate reaction to the news was to write several letters of thanks. To Scott he promised he would do his utmost to give satisfaction. To Chaffee he promised to do his damnedest to satisfy your expectations. To Marshall, who had obviously approved the assignment, he sent his gratitude. Soon after arriving at Benning, Patton also wrote to Pershing. "I am quite sure that you had a lot to do with my getting this wonderful detail. Truly I appreciate it a lot and will try to be worthy of having served under you." He was on his way to fame.

He took command of an armored brigade and soon regained his position as the U.S. Army's leading tanker. He moved up to command the 2d Armored Division, then the I Armored Corps, and went into combat at the head of the Western Task Force, which sailed from the Norfolk area and landed in November 1942 on the shores of French Morocco, one of three simultaneous landings in North Africa known as Operation TORCH.

In the spring of 1943, after the disastrous American defeat at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia, Eisenhower dispatched Patton to the battlefield to take command of the II Corps. He straightened out the disorganized American units, led them to victory at El Guettar, then turned over the corps to his deputy, Omar N. Bradley. While the Tunisian campaign was in its final stages, Patton planned the invasion of Sicily. He led the Seventh Army in that invasion, and although he was supposed to have only a secondary role
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

in the subsequent campaigning, he reached Messina ahead of Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery and thereby stole the glory.

But Sicily almost brought his career to a close, for impulsively, on two separate occasions, he slapped American soldiers in hospitals. They were in the dazed condition that was known in World War I as shell shock, in World War II as combat exhaustion. What Patton tried to do was sparked by his enormous compassion for his combat troops. He suffered deeply their wounds and injuries, he anguished over their deaths. And here were men who were letting down their magnificent buddies who were giving their utmost for their country. What Patton tried to do by the slapping and the cursing was to shake them into normality, to scare away their fright and nervousness, to get them back to their jobs. His action backfired. The incidents came to Eisenhower's attention, and he ordered Patton to apologize, not only to the soldiers he had slapped and those who had witnessed the scenes, but also to all the American troops in Sicily. Patton did so at great personal torment.

A letter he wrote in 1910, to his then future wife, curiously foreshadowed the slapping incidents. Patton was a young officer, a year out of West Point, stationed at Fort Sheridan, and he was supervising activities in the post stable. He wrote:

This afternoon I found a horse not tied and after looking up the man at the other end of the stable I cursed him and then told him to run down and tie the horse and then run back. This makes the other men laugh at him and so is an excellent punishment. The man did not understand me or thought he would dead beat so he started to walk fast. I got mad and yelled "Run dam you Run." He did but then I got to thinking that it was an insult I had put on him so I called him up before the men who had heard me swear and begged his pardon. It sounds easy to write about but was one of the hardest things I ever did.

It was no less difficult to apologize in Sicily thirty-three years later.

In the spring of 1944, Patton went to England and took command of the Third Army, scheduled to be follow-up after the D-Day invasion. The army became operational almost two months after the Normandy landings. It immediately broke into the open, swept through Brittany, drove eastward across France, and destroyed the German defenses. Shortages of supply brought the breakout and pursuit to a halt, and a period of difficult fighting took place during the autumn. In December, when the Germans launched their Ardennes counteroffensive, Patton made a spectacular march to relieve the paratroopers holding at Bastogne. In the spring, Patton's army drove into Germany, across the Rhine, and into Austria. At the end of the war, his
forces were in Czechoslovakia. Throughout, Patton had given a magnificent performance.

Old Blood and Guts he was called, but with affection. In the thousands, Americans still say with considerable pride, "I rolled with Patton." He had an impact on his time and place that few men have exerted. He has been compared with Stonewall Jackson and with Prince Murat who commanded Napoleon's cavalry. But he was unique.

Patton died in a freak automobile accident in December 1945, at the age of 60. He was probably ready to go. He had achieved his fate, his destiny. He was famous, a hero. He had earned the recognition and applause he had sought.

During his lifetime Patton displayed many appearances, many faces, and it is sometimes difficult to know who the real person was. The best-known image is, of course, his war mask. His toughness, his profanity, his bluster and braggadocio were appurtenances he assumed in order to inspire his soldiers and, incidentally, himself. He cultivated the ferocious face because he believed that only he-men, as he often said, stimulated men to fight. Like Indian war paint, the hideous masks of primitive people, the sabel yell, the shout of paratroopers leaping from their planes, the fierce countenance helped men in battle disguise and overcome their fear of death.

Social psychologists call these reinforcing factors. They are sounds, sights, and other stimuli that start the adrenaline flowing, that spur men to action, that make them act against one of their deepest intuitive drives, the urge for self-preservation. The battlefield is an eerie place, and the emotion most prevalent is fear, the fear of disfigurement, disability, and death. One
of the ways to make men act despite their fear is to cultivate the reinforcing factors that will lead them to disregard their fears.

This is what Patton did so well, and this is what the ivory-handled pistols, the oversized stars of rank, the tough, blunt, profane talk, the scowling face, the vulgar posturing were supposed to produce. They gave his men the warrior psychology, the will to meet the enemy, the confident feeling they could defeat their opponents.

Patton dressed and looked the part. A showman and an actor, he insisted that his troops do the same. "A coward dressed as a brave man," he once wrote, "will change from cowardice" and take on the courageous qualities of the hero. He believed that the appearance would prompt the reality. And so he sought to project the appearance of the warrior in himself and to stimulate the same in his men, which, he was sure, would create the kind of behavior necessary on the battlefield. It was this aspect of his personality that the recent movie on Patton presented so well, his warrior personality, an exaggeration and a caricature of the real man.

The war trappings, the highly visible qualities that Patton put on to inspire his men in combat, covered a thoroughly professional soldier. This was another facet of his personality, another mask. Beneath the beautifully turned out figure, impeccably dressed and benedaled—the troops in North Africa called him Gorgeous George—beneath the glitter was a cold and calculating commander who had the necessary knowledge, the professional know-how to be successful at his craft.

Apart from the psychology involved in leading men, the military profession requires an immense technical competence, a knowledge of weapons and equipment, of tactics and operations, of maneuver and logistics. Hardly appreciated is the amount of time and energy that George Patton expended throughout his career to learn the intricacies of his profession. He read enormously, voraciously, in the literature of warfare and history. Not only was he conversant with the field and technical manuals of his times; he was also familiar with the pages of history.

He studied the past to discover the great historical continuities. If history is a record of events, each unique and each understandable in terms of its context, that is, its time, place, conditions, and circumstances, history is also a record of continuities, great movements that can be identified as trends, patterns, clusters, forces, and the like. It is the recognition of these long-range continuities based on habit, tradition, custom, and the nature of man that provides a glimmer of understanding the past. What fascinated Patton in his search for the common elements of man's behavior in history were the meaning and importance of generalship, the factors that produced victory or defeat in battle, the relationships of tactics and supply, maneuver and shock, weapons and will power.

He discoursed easily on such matters as scale, chain, and plate armor,
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

German mercenaries in the Italian wars, Polish and Turkish horsemen, Arabian and Oriental military techniques, the Peninsular War, and Marshal Saxe. He was familiar with the phalanx of Greece, the legions of Rome, the columns of Napoleon, and the mass armies of World War I. He could compare the heavy cavalry of Belisarius with the modern tank, and he discovered insights into the operations of Belisarius during the sixth century that he applied to the developing doctrine of how to use tanks.

Patton was hardly an intellectual, and he would not have wished to be so regarded. He was thoughtful and contemplative, but, unlike most intellectuals, he believed that the ultimate virtue in warfare was action. Yet he often lectured his officers on the benefits of reading history. And according to his medical records, he reported on sick call more than once for treatment of conjunctivitis, an infection and inflammation of the eyes, because he had read many nights until one o'clock in the morning.

This was not casual reading, but intense study. He made copious notes, and in one instance, during the 1930s, when he read a book by Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, the acknowledged father of tank doctrine, Patton's written reactions covered seven pages of single-spaced typescript.

Patton's knowledge of and interest in history, and particularly military history, was another of his many faces, the virtue of a man of reflection who translated his knowledge into action.

Reading was hardly the only way in which Patton gained his military expertise. Training was extremely important to him. Training made men accustomed to obeying orders automatically. Training enabled the offensive team to get the jump on the adversaries. Training taught men to perform their tasks automatically. Only when soldiers were so proficient in their duties could they function under battlefield conditions.

Just as important, training by means of unit maneuvers and exercises was a method to test and experiment with doctrine. While training exercises could demonstrate and prove the soundness of doctrine, they could also be used as an opportunity to improve doctrine or methodology. When Patton commanded the tank training center in France and was preparing his troops for combat, he held a multitude of exercises and sham battles designed to test the then still rudimentary tank tactics; he also experimented with new techniques. For example, should infantry precede or follow tanks in the attack and at what distance? In Hawaii, where Patton served as a staff officer, he devised exercises to determine how troops on the march could best combat low-flying planes in the attack.

Throughout his adult life, during his thirty-five years of active duty, Patton's efficiency reports noted with remarkable consistency his enthusiastic study of and devotion to his profession. In the 1920s and 1930s, when military budgets were low and military forces small, many regular officers became discouraged. Some left, others turned to drink or gambling, many
simply went through the motions of training their men. In contrast, Patton was taking his soldiering seriously. In addition to his reading and his polo playing, he invented a machine gun sled to give riflemen in the assault more direct fire support. He devised a new saddle pack to increase the range and striking power of Cavalry. He worked closely with J. Walter Christie to improve the silhouette, suspension, power, and weapons of tanks. He designed a second and better saber for the Cavalry. He drew a plan to restructure the infantry division into triangular form in order to get more maneuver and firepower out of fewer men, and he thereby anticipated the World War II type formed by Gen. Lesley McNair. Patton continually sought ways to further mobility in operations. He became an expert in amphibious landings. So that he could better understand the developing maturity of air power, he earned his pilot’s license. He worked on the idea of employing the light plane for communication and liaison. All this he did before Pearl Harbor.

This dedicated attention to his profession paid off in World War II. For example, little remembered is the fact that Patton was the leading American amphibious expert in the European theater. His landings in Morocco were executed by an all-American force, the two other simultaneous invasions being conducted by Anglo-American forces. The rudimentary amphibious techniques of Operation TORCH, the first large-scale Anglo-American landings in the European theater, were immeasurably improved by the time of the next, the invasion of Sicily. This was probably the most important amphibious venture in the European arena, for it employed new communications and command methods to tie together the Army, Navy, and Air Force components, it made use of new equipment—landing craft, landing ships, the amphibious truck called the DUKW—it featured new methods of beach organization and supply, new ways of spotting targets for naval gunfire and close air support.

The invasion of Sicily was, in fact, the prototype of the subsequent invasions of southern Italy, Anzio, Normandy, and southern France. These operations made it possible to project Allied power across the water in order to bring ground and air strength directly against the enemy. Although Patton played no part in the invasions after Sicily, he set the pattern and he was consulted on all of them, officially and unofficially. Gen. John P. Lucas, the commander at Anzio, a close friend since their service with Pershing in Mexico, sought Patton out before the landings and asked his advice. Patton counseled driving inland as soon as Lucas got ashore. Lucas was unable to follow this guidance and dug in to protect his beachhead instead of driving for the Alban Hills, and his decision to do so was no small factor in his relief a month later.

Although the amphibious aspect of Patton’s career, this facet of his, has generally been overlooked, there is no question of his proficiency as a plan-
ner and leader of amphibious assaults. As a matter of fact, it was his willingness, his insistence, to conduct amphibious end runs in Sicily that enabled him to beat General Montgomery into Messina.

Still another example of his professional expertise was Patton's use of close support aircraft. The XIX Tactical Air Command supported Patton's Third Army throughout the European campaign, and Patton fostered the closest cooperation between both organizations. He made sure that his ground headquarters and the air headquarters were physically located close to each other. He encouraged the two staffs to work together, to eat together. He constantly applauded the efforts of the airmen and continually directed the attention of the newspaper correspondents to the importance of the air support. He fostered a close-knit feeling of mutual admiration and cooperation that was beneficial to both organizations.

During the spectacular dash of his Third Army eastward across France in August 1944, the Loire River marked the Army's right flank. Patton's ground forces were striking toward the Paris-Orleans gap, for Patton was convinced that a speedy advance would prevent the disintegrating German forces from reorganizing their defenses in France. He therefore had no desire to divert major units to protect his flank. Yet protecting the flank was essential because about 100,000 German troops were moving out of southwest France. This rather sizable group of men was trying to escape to Germany before being blocked by the projected meeting of the OVERLORD forces advancing eastward from Normandy and of the ANVIL-DRAGOON forces marching north up the Rhone valley from southern France. As the German group marched generally to the northeast, they threatened Patton's flank and supply lines.

In order to keep his Army driving, Patton turned to Gen. O. P. Weyland, who commanded the XIX TAC. He asked Weyland to patrol his right flank along the Loire River valley. Weyland obliged. He gave 24-hour coverage, using a squadron of night fighters to augment the daylight operations of his fighter-bombers. It is true that the pilots of the small artillery observation planes of a single division also flew reconnaissance, that small roving ground patrols kept the region under surveillance, and that the French Forces of the Interior added to the security. But the high-powered aircraft comprised the major instrument of flank protection.

Patton was confident that his unorthodox solution would work. The corps commander directly concerned with the Loire River boundary and the threat to the flank was less certain. When he asked Patton how much he should worry, Patton replied that it depended on how naturally nervous he was. The point is that Patton gambled and won. But only a technically proficient expert would have had the nerve and the daring to execute the concept. As for the 100,000 German troops, Patton had cut their escape route, and they marched to the Loire River and surrendered en masse.
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

Patton liked to give the impression that he was impulsive and offhand in his decisions. He liked to pretend that he acted instinctively. It is true that he had a sixth sense about where the enemy was and what he was up to, and his marvelous perception enabled him to deploy his forces with confident audacity. Yet underneath the sharp and boldly announced course of action was an appreciation of the solid staff work that underlay the execution and left little to chance, staff work by men he had handpicked.

His enormous technical capacity to handle large forces rested on staff work. Probably the best example of his sure hold on planning occurred in December 1944, when the German Ardennes counteroffensive drove a bulge into the First Army line. In 48 hours, Patton turned his Third Army 90 degrees to the left and started a drive that linked up with the embattled defenders of Bastogne and threatened the flank of the German bulge. The German attack was as good as contained.

According to Charles B. McDonald, distinguished Army historian, Patton's "spectacular moves in this case . . . would make Stonewall Jackson's maneuvers in the Valley campaign in Virginia, or Gallieni's shift of troops in taxis to save Paris from the Kaiser, pale by comparison." It is a well deserved tribute, but it is hardly surprising about a man who had consistently driven himself to conquer the most arduous and care-laden intricacies of maneuver.

All his campaigns indicated how professional he was. For several weeks in August 1944, he had one corps, about 60,000 men, going westward into Brittany, while three corps were moving in the opposite direction, with the heads of his columns getting farther and farther apart until almost 400 miles separated them. It took a genius to control these stampeding horses. It took a genius to suggest switching the axis of one of his corps, as he did, to start the Allied encirclement that resulted in forming the Argentan-Falaise pocket, where two German field armies were trapped. It was his solid professional skills and experience that made it possible for him to achieve the sensational success that was his.

He had no illusions about warfare. "Ever since man banded together with the laudable intention of killing his fellows," he wrote with grim humor, "war has been a dirty business." Contrary to popular belief, I suspect that Patton abhorred the chaos and disorder and destruction on the battlefield. His nature was fundamentally and paradoxically contemplative. He loved the individual pursuits—fishing, swimming, riding, boating, reading—and he had to push himself, to put on his war mask in order to participate in team sports—football and polo—as in war. What motivated him to the military life was the opportunity for glory, for greatness, for achievement, for fame, for applause. He believed himself unfit for any other profession.

The following statement is starkly revealing. "Unfortunately," he
wrote, "war means fighting and fighting means killing." Since he was widely and well read in history, he had no hope that man would ever build a world of permanent and perpetual peace. Man's history was a record of conflict and strife, and Patton believed that the struggle and war would continue.

Extremely pragmatic, he viewed man himself, his virtue and courage, as the ultimate weapon in war. "New weapons are useful," he once wrote, "in that they add to the repertoire of killing, but, be they tank or tomahawk, weapons are only weapons after all. Wars are fought with weapons, but they are won by men."

In a lecture to his officers in 1919, he said: "We, as officers . . . are not only members of the oldest of honorable professions"—he was making a distinction—"but are also the modern representatives of the demi-gods and heroes of antiquity.

"Back of us stretches a line of men whose acts of valor, of self-sacrifice and of service have been the theme of song and story since long before recorded history began . . .

"In the days of chivalry—the golden age of our profession—knights-officers were noted as well for courtesy and gentleness of behavior, as for death-defying courage . . . From their acts of courtesy and benevolence was derived the word, now pronounced as one, Gentle Man . . . Let us be gentle. That is, courteous and considerate of the rights of others. Let us be men. That is, fearless and untiring in doing our duty as we see it.

". . . our calling is most ancient and like all other old things it has amassed through the ages certain customs and traditions which decorate and ennoble it, which render beautiful the otherwise prosaic occupation of being professional men-at-arms: Killers."

Ten years earlier, in 1909, Patton had written into his cadet notebook: "Do not regard what you do as only a preparation for doing the same thing more fully or better at some later time. Nothing is ever done twice . . . There is no next time. This is of special application to war. There is but one time to win a battle or a campaign. It must be won the first time . . .

"I believe that in order for a man to become a great soldier . . . it is necessary for him to be so thoroughly conversant with all sorts of military possibilities that when ever an occasion arises he has at hand with out effort on his part a parallel.

"To attain this end I think that it is necessary for a man to begin to read military history in its earliest and hence crudest form and to follow it down in natural sequence permitting his mind to grow with his subject until he can grasp with out effort the most abstruse question of the science of war because he is already permeated with all its elements."

In his own life, he sought perfection whatever the task. He was never satisfied with his performance. He was always apprehensive that he would
he found wanting, not quite up to the standards he demanded of himself. He always feared that he lacked the qualities to reach the goal he dreamed of gaining.

A few days after his death, the Right Reverend W. Bertrand Stevens conducted a memorial service in the Church of Our Saviour at San Gabriel, California, Patton's birthplace. He summed up the general in these words: "General Patton's life had a fullness and richness that is denied to most of us. It was not merely the variety of things he did in his lifetime (which stagger the imagination) but in the fact that he seemed to have fulfilled his destiny."

His destiny to him was always clear, and he worked hard for what he wanted. He applied his talents and aptitudes to the job to the best of his ability, even better if that is possible. He served loyally and without complaint. He was exceptionally honest and clearheaded. He tried to be fair to all. He loved beauty in all its manifestations.

In the end, what made it possible for George S. Patton, Jr., to achieve what he wished so ardently was not only his driving will power; it was also his great good fortune that his lifetime required the kind of military leadership he embodied. In this he was lucky too. Yet it was not entirely a matter of luck. When opportunity knocked, he was ready to open the door.

A man of many faces, many aspects, many qualities, George Patton was essentially a warrior. A man of action, he was also a man of culture, knowledge, and wit. A man of erudition, he found his highest calling in execution. A throwback to the Teutonic knight, the Saracen, the Crusader, he was one of America's greatest soldiers, one of the world's great captains. We were lucky to have him on our side.

Presently Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, Professor Martin Hueston has taught at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Hofstra College, and Acadia University. From 1957 to 1967, he was Senior Historian in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. He is the author of eight books, of which the best known are: *Breakout and Pursuit* (1963), *Anzio: The Gamble that Failed* (1963), *Kasserine Pass* (1967), *Salerno to Cassino* (1969), and *The Patton Papers, 1885-1940, Vol. I.* (1972).
Notes


Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Korean War

D. Clayton James

When General of the Army Douglas MacArthur delivered his moving address before the joint session of Congress on April 19, 1951, I was watching and listening with bated breath before a television set in a room packed with excited college students at Southwestern-at-Memphis. Most of us were convinced at the time that President Harry S Truman was a foolish politician who had dared to rush in where the Joint Chiefs of Staff had feared. It seemed to us that the most momentous issues since World War II were at stake in the President’s relief of the general. The torrent of abusive mail that Truman received, the charges by otherwise responsible public leaders that the President was guilty of offenses just short of treason but deserving impeachment, the tumultuous welcome accorded MacArthur upon his return, the lengthy and sometimes dramatic Senate hearings on his relief from command, the gradual shift in public support from MacArthur to Truman as the testimony continued into June 1951, and the countless arguments in newspapers and magazines, as well as over television and radio, on whether the President or the general had been right—all this surely demonstrated the crucial nature of the Truman-MacArthur controversy to those of us who lived through this great excitement of 1951.

In the hearings before the Senate’s Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees in the late spring and early summer of 1951, two issues of the dispute emerged as dominant and have remained so in most later writings about the episode: MacArthur’s alleged challenges to the strategy of limited warfare in Korea and to the hallowed principle of civilian supremacy over the military. American history textbooks for high school and college students may abbreviate or ignore many aspects of the Korean War, but it would be difficult to find one that does not emphasize the Truman-MacArthur confrontation as a major crisis of that period. Disappointingly few scholarly works on the subject range beyond the supposed threats to limited-war strategy and civil-military relations. In their efforts to show that the Korean War was instigated by South Korean aggressors or American imperialists, the New Left historians so far have not paid much heed to the affair.

The notion that the Truman-MacArthur controversy was rooted in disagreement over whether the Korean conflict should be kept a limited war is a
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES ON MILITARY HISTORY

Gen. Douglas MacArthur delivered his famous farewell address to a joint session of Congress in April 1965. Behind him are Vice-President Alben Barkley (left) and House Speaker Sam Rayburn (Library of Congress).

myth that needs to be laid to rest. Many contemporary and later critics of MacArthur cleverly employed the false-dilemma argument, presenting the case as if only two alternatives existed—World War III or the war with the limitations that actually evolved. But other alternatives may have existed, including controlled escalation that might have prevented a frustrating stalemate and yet might not have provoked the Soviet Union into entering the fray. MacArthur surely desired escalation but only against the nations already at war against South Korea and the United Nations Command. At various times he requested permission to allow his aircraft to enter Manchurian air space to pursue enemy planes and bomb their bases, to attack bridges and hydroelectric plants along the Yalu River, to blockade Communist China’s coast and conduct naval and air bombardments against its industrial centers, and to use Nationalist Chinese troops in Korea or in limited assaults against the Chinese mainland. But all such requests were peremptorily rejected, and MacArthur retreated from each demand. He simply had no other recourse; disobedience would have meant his instant removal, as he well understood. It is interesting that in their deliberations on these proposals by MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs
either turned them down because they were tactically unsound and logically unfeasible or postponed a decision until further consideration. In truth, most of MacArthur's requests for escalation could not have been effectively executed. Not until their testimony before the Senate committees after MacArthur's relief did the Joint Chiefs assert that their main reason for rejecting MacArthur's proposals was that their implementation might have started a new global war.

Contrary to persisting popular belief, MacArthur never advocated an expansion of the land war into Manchuria or North China. He abhorred the possibility of a war with the Soviet Union as much as did his superiors in Washington. While the latter viewed the North Korean invasion as Moscow-directed and anticipated a massive Soviet response if MacArthur's proposed actions were tried, MacArthur did not believe the Soviet Union would become involved on a large scale in order to defend North Korea or Communist China. In view of the Sino-Soviet conflict that erupted not long after the Korean War, who is to say, especially with the sparse Western sources on strategic planning in Moscow and Peking, that MacArthur was altogether wrong?

No matter what MacArthur might have advocated in the way of escalation, the President and his military and foreign policy advisers were firmly committed to keeping the war limited because they were more concerned with a potential Soviet armed incursion into Western Europe. Washington focused on implementing the overall military build-up called for in the NSC-68 document of early 1950 and on quickly organizing deterrent forces under the NATO aegis. Knowing this and realizing it was unlikely that he would receive further reinforcements in Korea, MacArthur would have been stupid, which he was not, to nourish dreams of ground offensives above the Yalu, as some of his detractors have claimed.

MacArthur was not involved in the decision making responsible for unleashing the United Nations forces' invasion of North Korea, which, in turn, brought Communist China into the conflict—the only two significant escalations of the Korean War. MacArthur's troops crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea on October 1, 1950, only after he had received a Joint Chiefs' directive four days earlier authorizing such a move. And on October 7, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution that, in essence, called for the reunification of Korea by force. In many works, even textbooks that our youth must study, MacArthur is still portrayed as unilaterally deciding to conquer North Korea. In truth, MacArthur merely executed the policy made in Washington to seize North Korea, which turned out to be perhaps the most important decision of the war and produced the only escalation that brought a new belligerent into the conflict. For the decision makers behind this startling change in policy, one must look to Washington, not Tokyo. In summing up this point, the Truman-MacArthur controversy,
as far as strategic differences were concerned, was not a real disagreement on whether the war should be limited, only on how it should be done.

The other persisting notion is that MacArthur's actions produced a crisis in American civil-military relations. But he actually was not an "American Caesar" and was not interested in spearheading a move to overturn the long-established principle of civilian supremacy over the military, which, with his masterful knowledge of American military history, he knew was strongly rooted and widely endorsed by the people. There is no question that he issued public statements sharply critical of the Truman administration's military and foreign policies and expressly violated the Joint Chiefs' directive of December 6, 1950, requiring theater commanders to obtain clearance from the Department of Defense on statements related to military affairs and from the Department of State on releases bearing on foreign policy. His defiance was also manifest when on March 24, 1951, he issued unilaterally a surrender ultimatum to the Communist Chinese commander after having just been informed by Washington that the State Department was beginning diplomatic overtures that could lead to truce negotiations. But MacArthur's disobedience and arrogant gestures were a far cry from constituting a threat to the American system of civil-military order.

To call a spade a spade, MacArthur was guilty of insubordination toward his Commander in Chief, and therefore he was relieved, though perhaps belatedly and certainly rudely. General of the Army George C. Marshall, then Secretary of Defense, explained it in straightforward terms at the Senate hearings:

"It is completely understandable and, in fact, at times commendable that a theater commander should become so wholly wrapped up in his own aims and responsibilities that some of the directives received by him from higher authority are not those that he would have written himself. There is nothing new about this sort of thing in our military history. What is new, and what has brought about the necessity for General MacArthur's removal, is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement with the foreign and military policy of the United States."1

The President himself said in his memoirs that "MacArthur left me no choice—I could no longer tolerate his insubordination."2 Probably the major reason MacArthur was not court-martialed stemmed from Truman's weak political base at the time. In short, an officer disobeyed and defied his superior and was relieved of command. The principle of civilian control over the military was not seriously threatened by MacArthur's statements and actions; the President's exercise of his power as Commander in Chief should have made it clear that the principle was still safe and healthy.
If not limited-war strategy or a civil-military crisis, then what was the fundamental issue at stake in the Truman-MacArthur controversy? In essence, it was a crisis in command that stemmed from failures in communication and coordination within the chain of command and was exacerbated by an unprecedented political-social phenomenon called McCarthyism.

The failure in communication between Truman and MacArthur was due, in part, to the absence of any personal contact with each other prior to their brief and only meeting at Wake Island on October 15, 1950, and to the stereotypes each had accepted of the other based primarily on the views of their respective confidants. In his reminiscences and elsewhere Truman admits that he was miffed by the general's rejection of his invitation at the end of World War II to return home and receive the customary hero's welcome and visit at the White House. Truman had also expected to confer with

President Harry S Truman (left) and Gen. Douglas MacArthur meet at Wake Island, October 1950 (Courtesy Harry S. Truman Library).
MacArthur on issues in Japan when various congressional committees in 1946-48 requested his personal testimony, but each time the general remained in Tokyo, claiming that the pressures of occupation matters prevented him from returning to the States.

In his rise in politics, Truman had carefully cultivated a public image of himself as a representative of the common man. Unassuming and possessing a down-to-earth friendliness, he was completely without pose and affectation. As President, he continued without inhibition his poker and piano playing, bourbon drinking, and, when aroused, profuse cursing. Many people were deceived into thinking that this "little man" who spoke with a Missouri twang and dressed like a Main Street shopkeeper was not up to the demands of the nation's highest office and surely was not able to walk in the footsteps of Woodrow Wilson or Franklin D. Roosevelt in providing dynamic leadership. MacArthur and his GHQ confidants in Tokyo since 1945 had accepted this impression and had never had the personal connections with Truman necessary to disabuse them or to discover that the real Truman was a shrewd, intelligent, and skilled political master who, as chief executive, could be as aggressive and tough as necessary. And they did not learn that Truman's public image and the actual person meshed when it came to at least one important trait: his deep-seated contempt for pretension and arrogance.

While MacArthur and his Tokyo entourage underestimated Truman as a decisive leader, the President, at least until the autumn of 1950, held considerable respect for the general. After all, it was Truman who appointed him as supreme commander in Japan in 1945 and as head of the United Nations Command in the Korean conflict. Truman's earliest impressions of MacArthur derived from World War I where MacArthur, already a general officer, had won fame as a bold, courageous combat leader. When Truman came to Washington as senator in 1934, MacArthur was serving as military head of the Army and often was called upon to testify before congressional committees and not infrequently to confer with President Roosevelt. While MacArthur's name was in the headlines many times during World War II, Truman did not really achieve national prominence until his vice-presidential nomination in mid-1944. As President, however, Truman's respectful attitude toward the "Big General," as he sometimes called him, was tempered by his innate dislike of egotistical, aloof, and pretentious persons, among whom MacArthur began to stand out in his mind as the Japanese occupation continued to appear like a one-man act and particularly after the general's thinly disguised bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1948.

The first rounds of the Truman-MacArthur clash began in July-August 1950 with the general's allegedly unauthorized trip to Taiwan and his message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars attacking American policy in the Far
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

East. The final rounds came in late March and early April 1951 with MacArthur's brazen announcement of his terms for a cease-fire and Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin's reading before the House of Representatives a letter from MacArthur critical of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. On April 11, six days after the House heard MacArthur's letter, Truman, upon consulting with the Joint Chiefs and members of the National Security Council, announced the general's removal from his commands. By then Truman had discounted MacArthur's long and sometimes brilliant career, as well as his many positive leadership traits, and was ready to accept the negative side of his public image: the "Beau Brummell" of the A.F.E., the "political general" that F.D.R. in 1932 had paired with Huey Long as "the two most dangerous men in the country," the producer of self-seeking communiques from the Southwest Pacific theater, the "Yankee Shogun" in Japan, and now the haughty, insubordinate theater chief in the frustrating war in Korea. Unlike MacArthur's previous differences with Roosevelt, his confrontation with Truman would not be ameliorated by a long and deep, if enigmatic, friendship. This time there were no personal ties between the two, and each fell back on misperceptions based on stereotypes of the other. Each man incorrectly judged the other's motivation, and each erroneously estimated the impact of his actions (or lack of actions) upon the other's image of his intentions. The outcome marked the sudden end of MacArthur's career, and the clash played no small part in killing Truman's chance for another term as President.

The Truman-MacArthur relationship vis-à-vis the Korean War started and ended with decisions that might have had happier alternatives. The President's appointment of MacArthur to head the United Nations Command on July 7, 1950, was based largely on the grounds that, as chief of the American Far East Command, he had been handling the piecemeal commitment of American forces to Korea since shortly after the war began two weeks earlier and, as commander over the Japanese occupation, he was in position to prepare Japan as the principal staging base for later operations. But MacArthur was a half year beyond his seventieth birthday and, though not senile or in ill health, was beginning to show natural signs of aging. It was not as if the nation had gone many years without a war and lacked a supply of proven high-level commanders. Truman could have chosen the United Nations commander from a generous reservoir of able officers who had distinguished themselves in World War II, while perhaps leaving MacArthur to continue his direction of the occupation of Japan. Unlike some of the top commanders of the wartime European theater who had been in on the evolution of the containment strategy since 1945, MacArthur had not been in Washington since 1935 and was not acquainted with the twists and turns of Pentagon thinking nor with the officials who had been developing Cold War strategy. From his days as a West Point cadet at the
Turn of the century onward, MacArthur had been disciplined to think in terms of winning on the battlefield. As he remarked at the Senate hearings, "The only way I know, when a nation wars on you, is to beat her by force." In retrospect, then, the first mistake was in selecting MacArthur rather than a younger but fully capable officer who was known to be in accord with current Pentagon strategic thinking, such as Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway.

The Truman-MacArthur affair ended in a manner that surely did not surprise the general for its lack of consideration and tactfulness. However people may differ on the various facets of the controversy, most would agree that the relief of the distinguished old warrior could have been handled in a different manner. Although Truman had intended for Secretary of the Army Frank Pace to interrupt his tour in Korea and bring the orders of relief to MacArthur in Tokyo personally, there were mixups and the general learned of it through a public radio broadcast. Truman's orders stated that MacArthur was relieved immediately of his duties, with Ridgway, head of the Eighth Army in Korea, to succeed him in charge of the United Nations Command, the Far East Command, and the occupation of Japan. Always viewing himself as a soldier-aristocrat and a professional par excellence, MacArthur later opined, "No office boy, no charwoman, no servant of any sort would have been dismissed with such callous disregard for the ordinary decencies." To him it seemed that a commoner without "breeding" or professional credentials had dismissed an aristocrat and premiere professional. Truman would have missed such nuances, for to him it was simply a matter of the boss firing an unruly, disobedient subordinate. If, as he claimed, Truman lost no sleep over his decision to use atomic bombs in the summer of 1945, it is doubtful that he suffered insomnia after ousting MacArthur.

If lack of effective communication marred the relationship between the President and his theater chief in the Far East, failures in both communication and coordination flawed relations between the Joint Chiefs and MacArthur, as well as between the Chiefs and the President. In 1950-51 the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman; Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff; and Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. All of them had distinguished records from World War II and postwar commands, but none had ever served with or under MacArthur and, like Truman, had only secondary impressions of him—and vice versa. During the planning stage of Operation CHROMITI, the Inchon assault, the Joint Chiefs had been annoyingly conservative in their approach to MacArthur's risky proposal. But with the operation's startling success in mid-September 1950, the Joint Chiefs, along with the new Secretary of Defense, Gen. Marshall, seemed to throw caution to the wind and authorized MacArthur's crossing the 38th parallel into North Korea without a-

224
sessing the much higher risk factors with the care they had exercised in analyzing the Inchon plan. Indeed, MacArthur was given a virtual free hand in October and November as his forces fanned out across North Korea and pushed toward the Yalu River boundary with Manchuria. In the dazzling light of the Inchon success, few could see that the poorly planned amphibious operation at Wonsan a few weeks later, which logistically crippled the Eighth Army's offensive, may have been more indicative of MacArthur's strategic thinking at this stage than the Inchon assault. But the lessons of Wonsan never seemed to penetrate Washington minds until too late. Besides, the Joint Chiefs and Marshall were probably more absorbed in planning overall rearmament and NATO's new military structure than in what transpired immediately after MacArthur's seemingly decisive triumph over the North Korean Army.

During the advance above the 38th parallel the Joint Chiefs tried to limit MacArthur only to the extent of requiring him to use South Korean units solely in the approach to the Yalu. Armed with an ambiguous message from Marshall that he interpreted as giving him freedom to decide whether American forces should spearhead the advance, MacArthur boldly rejected even this slight attempt at control by the Joint Chiefs. Astonishingly, the Joint Chiefs offered no rejoinder and quietly yielded to the discretion of the theater commander—a practice that had usually been proper in World War II but which would prove disastrous in the Korean War. In an unprecedented conflict like that in 1950, where limited fighting could and did escalate dangerously, the Joint Chiefs should have kept a much shorter leash on their theater commander.

After the initial Chinese attacks of late October and early November there was an ominous hush while MacArthur began preparations for an offensive to consummate the conquest of North Korea and flush out any Chinese volunteer forces. By mid-November the Joint Chiefs and their planners were deeply worried by MacArthur's failure to concentrate his forces: the Eighth Army was heading up the west side of North Korea toward Sinuiju, while the X Corps was pushing to the Chosen Reservoir and northeastward to Chongjin, with a huge gap in the middle between the two forces. Not only the Joint Chiefs but also Marshall, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, and National Security Council advisers were becoming alarmed, but none proposed to change MacArthur's directive and none went to Truman to share his anxiety with the Commander in Chief. Since there was no overwhelming evidence on the Peking regime's intentions or the whereabouts of its armies, these key advisers to the President chose not to precipitate a confrontation with MacArthur. Just before MacArthur launched his fateful "end-the-war" offensive on November 24, even Truman commented, "You pick your man, you've got to back him up. That's the only way a military organization can work."

Actually a revision of MacArthur's directive was
urgently needed, but his Washington superiors hesitated because of the intimidating impact of the Inchon “miracle” and because of their outmoded trust in the principle of not reversing a theater or field commander without solid grounds. They were still searching for substantial evidence to do so when the Chinese forces struck in mass shortly after MacArthur’s troops had started forward.

There were also problems of coordination between American intelligence outfits, although in most writings on the war MacArthur is held liable for the intelligence blunders that failed to provide the signals of the impending North Korean invasion in late June 1950 and the Chinese intervention that autumn. It is nothing short of astonishing that at the Wake Island conference the President should ask MacArthur whether the Communist Chinese were going to enter the conflict. The general’s sadly flawed ego prompted him to respond with some ill-formed remarks reminiscent of his regrettable and uncalled-for comments in 1932 charging that the Bonus Army was a Communist-led menace. Actually MacArthur’s intelligence staff was responsible only for intelligence concerning the enemy at war, and the opposing belligerent in mid-October was North Korea, not Communist China. Intelligence on the intentions and activities of a nonbelligerent in time of war was the responsibility of the non-military agencies in that field. Yet, inexplicably, no known writings on the war seriously fault either the State Department’s intelligence arm or the Central Intelligence Agency. If and when the documents of those agencies for 1950 become available to outside researchers, it is predicted that those two bodies will be judged the chief culprits in the failure to provide advance warning of the North Korean and Red Chinese attacks. All that is now known is that there was little cooperation and coordination between them and MacArthur’s intelligence staff, which was headed by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, who, in turn, rarely welcomed “outside” opinions. The smoke created by MacArthur’s overly confident pronouncements led later writers to anoint him as the scapegoat and hid the lamentable failure to coordinate intelligence data.

The only long-term friend MacArthur had in the Washington “inner circle” in 1950 was Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, but on September 12, 1950, Truman removed him and appointed Marshall in his stead. Despite the fact that Marshall had been MacArthur’s immediate superior in World War II and the two had exchanged hundreds of messages on Southwest Pacific plans and operations, they had conferred personally at length only once, when Marshall visited him on Goodenough Island in December 1943. For the most part, Marshall can be excused from blame for the command crisis of 1950–51 because not only was he new to the job but also the role of the Secretary of Defense was not then as clearly defined or powerful as it would later become. Marshall’s relations with the Joint Chiefs were close and cordial, no doubt assisted by his close friendships with Bradley and
BIOGRAPHY AND LEADERSHIP

Collins. The Secretary of Defense's chief failure, as mentioned earlier, was shared by his colleagues, namely, failing to insist on closer control over MacArthur after Inchon and not having his directive revised or countermanded once the Chinese made their preliminary move against the United Nations forces in late October. Marshall's most controversial mistake was his message of September 29 to MacArthur stating, "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel." Thereupon MacArthur used this against the Joint Chiefs when they tried to inhibit his employments of units other than South Korean in advancing to the Yalu. It is hoped that Marshall's distinguished biographer, Forrest C. Pogue, will provide in his forthcoming volume a satisfactory explanation of this action by Marshall that was so uncharacteristic of his dealings with the Joint Chiefs. Whatever Marshall's intentions were, however, his message contributed to the dissonance in the chain of command.

Secretary of State Acheson had a well-known and hearty distaste for MacArthur, though the two were not personally acquainted. The feeling was mutual and began with an exchange of barbs in press statements about the troop strength required in Japan in the fall of 1945. It was hardly coincidental that shortly after Acheson became Secretary of State in 1949 a move was underway in the State Department to try to remove MacArthur as supreme commander in Japan. In September 1950, Truman appointed John Foster Dulles as the chief negotiator of a draft peace treaty for Japan (the final document to be eventually signed a year later); Acheson was not pleased thereafter when Dulles often solicited input from MacArthur. Acheson's role in the Truman-MacArthur controversy appears to have been that of a significant contributor to the President's shift to an almost totally negative image of MacArthur. As arrogant in his own way as MacArthur, Acheson later commented in his book on the Korean War: "As one looks back in calmness, it seems impossible to overestimate the damage that General MacArthur's willful insubordination and incredibly bad judgment did to the United States in the world and to the Truman Administration in the United States." This is sheer hyperbole as far as MacArthur's lasting impact on world opinion is concerned, though his feud with the President probably did some damage to Truman's political future. What was said in informal talks between Truman and Acheson, who undoubtedly was "on the inside" with the President, cannot be documented precisely, but, in understated language, the secretary's input did not likely contribute to better understanding between Truman and MacArthur. Moreover, Acheson was instrumental in the decision that led to one of the worst blunders of the war in the wake of MacArthur's removal: the indication to North Korea and Red China that the United States was ready to begin negotiations on a truce with a cease-fire line in the proximity of the 38th parallel, while at the time, early June 1951, Ridgway's unit commanders were reporting that Chinese troops were surren-
dering in unprecedented numbers and that the Communist forces appeared to be on the verge of collapse.

The command crisis at the level of Washington and Tokyo had its counterpart in microcosmic form on the Korean peninsula. There, thanks to an unwise decision by MacArthur, his GHQ chief of staff and crony, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, was given command of X Corps, whose operations were independent of Gen. Walton Walker’s Eighth Army. Almond and Walker developed a deep-seated animosity toward each other, as did Almond and his main division commander, Maj. Gen. O.P. Smith of the First Marine Division. Apparently MacArthur never became fully aware of the friction and lack of cooperation and coordination between these key field commanders. The results were that MacArthur either was not accurately informed on the situation at the front or received contradictory reports. Even when Ridgway took over the Eighth Army after Walker’s death in late December 1950, the channel between MacArthur and his new army commander was not satisfactory, though primarily the fault of the former. MacArthur was still rendering gloomy, alarmist reports to the Joint Chiefs long after Ridgway had turned the Eighth Army around. It is little wonder that Chief of Staff Collins was pleasantly surprised when he visited the Eighth Army’s front in mid-January 1951 and found the troops preparing for a major counteroffensive.

Besides the failures in communication and coordination within the chain of command, there were also political factors that impinged upon command relations and decision making. In the November 1950 congressional elections, the Truman administration and the Democratic Party suffered serious reverses that indicated, among other things, considerable voter dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war. The Democratic majority in the Senate dropped from twelve to two, while in the House the Democratic margin was reduced by two-thirds. It has been alleged, and not without some justification, that an important reason for Truman’s trip to Wake Island in mid-October had been his desire to identify his administration more amiably with MacArthur, who still enjoyed a large following in the States as a hero and continuing support from a sizable number of conservative Republicans who still hoped to get him into the Oval Office. No scholarly study has been published yet on how much the impending presidential election of 1952 affected the Truman-MacArthur controversy.

Unlike the Second World War, when an earnest, if not altogether successful, effort was made at bipartisanship, the politics of the Korean War were highly partisan. Many Republican leaders felt free to assail savagely the Truman administration’s management of the war and, of course, the President’s handling of MacArthur. Senator Robert A. Taft, often called “Mr. Republican” by his conservative colleagues, commented after MacArthur’s relief that he could no longer trust Bradley’s judgment because he allegedly
sided with Democrats. The distinguished journalist Walter Lippmann took an unfair slap at the Joint Chiefs when he deplored what he called "the beginning of an altogether intolerable thing in a republic: namely a schism within the armed forces between the generals of the Democratic Party and the generals of the Republican Party." There is little evidence for such alarm, but political considerations undoubtedly intruded upon the thinking of the main actors in both the Truman and MacArthur camps.

An area that still awaits in-depth research is the impact of McCarthyism on the Truman-MacArthur affair. It seems more than coincidental that Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's ship had already developed a full head of steam when the Truman-MacArthur controversy began and that both phenomena were making headlines in 1951. Unfortunately, my research for the third volume of my biography of MacArthur is not yet complete for this period. The evidence gathered thus far does not indicate any connections between the general and the volatile senator from Wisconsin, except for occasional laudatory remarks by the latter about MacArthur. Both men appeared to draw support from those citizens who were concerned about the loyalty issues, the menace of communism, and the allegedly faltering position of the United States globally that had led to the "loss" of China. Both men were strong on Americanism, though neither lucidly defined it, and both were critical of Truman's Fair Deal as an effort to continue and expand the liberal reforms of Roosevelt's New Deal, though MacArthur's critical of domestic policies was reserved until after the Senate hearings. Truman surely took the mounting excitement of McCarthyism with more seriousness than he indicated publicly.

Several recent scholarly writings have maintained that the principal reason for Truman's decision to hurl American forces into the gauntlet in Korea in June 1950 was that the President felt compelled politically to demonstrate that his administration, especially in the wake of the ouster of the Nationalists from mainland China, was prepared to act decisively and aggressively against world communism. But if the hypothesis is valid regarding Truman's motivation in this case, it is difficult to explain on similar grounds his relief of MacArthur. While the former action may have stolen some thunder from Senator McCarthy and his devotees, the latter action provoked their displeasure as well as the wrath of many citizens who had not endorsed McCarthyism. The dismissal of MacArthur still appears as an act of personal courage on Truman's part, taken at considerable political risk to himself. All such observations must be qualified, however, by a reminder that my research on the possible links between McCarthyism and the Truman-MacArthur episode is still underway.

As each year passes, the controversy between the President and the general seems less momentous. It is not likely that it can ever be called a tempest in a teapot, but the question of whether Truman or MacArthur was
right no longer appears as important. This is especially true in light of a number of fundamental questions that were not pursued carefully at the time, such as the following: To what extent was the Korean conflict a civil war? Were there signs available during the Korean War that portended the coming Sino-Soviet clash? Was American policy on French Indochina and Formosa significantly altered by Truman's actions in late June 1950 dispatching more military aid to the French and units of the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Strait? How important is bipartisanship in time of war? Should investigations like the Senate hearings on MacArthur's relief be conducted in the midst of war? Can the will and endurance of a democratic government and society stand the strain of a protracted limited war? Were there flaws in the American command structure that affected the prosecution of the war in Korea and perhaps were carried over into the Vietnam War also?

These and other important questions needed asking in view of the way history unfolded during the ensuing decade, but the publicity and excitement of the Truman-MacArthur controversy drew attention to its relatively less vital questions and shrouded the crisis in command of that era. In closing, I propose that besides the previous questions, one may ponder anew Bradley's famous statement at the 1951 Senate hearings as applicable not only to MacArthur's strategic ideas but also to the sad confrontation between the President and his theater commander. In their lamentable feud that inadvertently served to screen more crucial issues, Truman and MacArthur had been engaged against each other in "fighting in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."9

Professor D. Clayton James is recognized as the foremost authority on the life of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. He received his B.A. from Southwestern at Memphis in 1953, his B.D. from Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary in 1956, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Texas in 1959 and 1964, respectively. He is currently Professor of History, Mississippi State University. Dr. James has taught at the University of Texas, Louisiana State University, Mankato State University, and the U.S. Army War College. He recently returned to Mississippi State University from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College where he held the John F. Morrison Chair of Military History (1980–1981). He is best known for his definitive two-volume work The Years of MacArthur (1970 and 1975).
Notes


Part III. Soldiers and Armies
Introduction to Part III

As evidenced by the lectures in the preceding sections, scholars and students of military history have tended to focus on the generals and decision makers. Within the last several decades, however, more historians have begun to examine the life and role of the common soldier or officer as he prepared to execute his duties. By so doing, these historians hoped to provide yet another window through which to view and better understand the ways armies performed. In this section certain aspects of military life are reviewed in Russia, the United States, Prussia, France, and Great Britain.

John L. H. Keep's 1986 Harmon Lecture examined soldiering in prerevolutionary Russia and demonstrated that the Soviet Army, which emerged later, remained heavily influenced by the tsarist military tradition. For the nobility and those groups identified with the service state, military duty was expected. Yet an officer corps like that of Prussia did not develop in Russia; in fact a number of senior officers, such as Lavr Kornilov and Anton Denikin, were of lower class origins. The state never lacked for officers, but recruiting the required number of soldiers was another matter.

A vast gulf existed between officer and soldier. Discipline was extremely harsh and men served for long periods, often for life. Russian soldiers were capable of enduring great hardships and were expected to provide for themselves in the field. Westerners were impressed with their ability to subsist and the resulting economy they brought to the state. No Western soldier possessed their indifference to suffering and deprivation. The problems of the Russian military lay not with the caliber of its fighting men but with its infrastructure. While discipline remains today a key element of the Soviet military, Keep reminded his listeners that in meeting the current Soviet challenge we need to remember this country's soldiers are not "mindless automatons but . . . human beings who are the heirs to a long tradition of honorable service in the profession of arms. . . ."

If harshness typified the Russian soldier's experience, boredom best described life in the young American frontier army. Edward M. Coffman's 1976 Harmon Lecture also focused on the nineteenth century, when the young American officer could typically expect garrison duty in the West. Isolation made drinking commonplace, and not all officers were very refined. Combat was limited and promotions were slow. Officers looked for temporary duty back in the East or opportunities for leave to return home, often to enter important social circles that might enhance their careers. Ultimately boredom forced more than one officer to resign his commission, as
did Generals Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Henry W. Halleck before the Civil War.

The Spanish-American War, Coffman concluded, "established the Army on a new plateau." Colonial responsibilities in the Philippines provided many future generals, such as John J. Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall, George S. Patton, Henry H. Arnold, and Ira C. Eaker, with valuable leadership, administrative, and overseas experience (see Section II). In the early years of the twentieth century, greater attention was directed toward professionalism. Education assumed increased importance, and the Army began to mechanize with trucks and airplanes. Even so, frontier veterans still felt at home in the modernizing Army until World War I.

While Coffman's lecture described the life of young officers, Richard A. Preston's 1979 address examined the creation of the professional officer corps in Prussia, France, and Britain during the nineteenth century and the officer qualities needed after 1900. Where appropriate for purposes of comparison, he also offered observations on the developing officer corps in the United States. In the late 1700s officers from all three countries came from the nobility, but the French discovered that the best way to produce officers was through military academies rather than by apprentice training with regiments. Soon Sandhurst opened in Great Britain and West Point in the United States, advancing the development of the military profession in those democratic countries. Prussia became more interested in peacetime officer selection and professional training after its defeat at Jena in 1806.

Generally speaking, progress in military education in nineteenth-century Europe was frustrated by the belief that military virtues were derived from class and social status. The Prussians found ways to favor the upper class as a source for officers, and England, hampered by social customs, drew on only a small portion of its population for officers. The French, however, placed heavy emphasis on competition and recruited more widely.

According to Preston, at least three, perhaps four, elements characterized the officer-production systems in these countries: the development of personal character and leadership, general education, military training, and professional education. Each state held slightly different views on the relative emphasis of these elements. The United States offered an extreme example: West Point was expected to produce engineers for the growing nation as well as military officers. The question of emphasis continues today. What should cadets and midshipmen be taught at service academies—a broad curriculum or more specialized courses?

These three Harmon Lectures give the reader a glimpse of military life in several different states and settings. They reflect a growing interest among military historians to closely examine soldiers and armies, their origins, and their respective relationships to the states and societies they serve.
Soldiering in Tsarist Russia

John L. H. Keep

For most of us the title of this lecture conjures up images of technological backwardness and administrative inefficiency, perhaps also of bovine submissiveness on the part of vast numbers of peasant conscripts to some far-away autocrat, indifferent to their fate, and to equally unfeeling officers and bureaucrats—an instinctive loyalty, punctuated from time to time by violent and brutal mutinies.

It is a picture that is exaggerated and oversimplified. It owes much to Western historians' tendency to concentrate on the final years of the Imperial regime, which were untypical in that Russia's armed forces confronted unusually severe, indeed ultimately insoluble, problems. In World War I, all but isolated from her allies, Russia faced Ludendorff's mighty military machine, far better trained and better equipped, as well as the Austrians and the Turks. Along the Eastern front, her traditionally loyal and courageous fighting men suffered unparalleled casualties and privations in seemingly endless and unprofitable trench warfare until even they finally decided they had had enough. They rebelled; and this great upsurge of "the men in grey overcoats," coupled with disaffection in the rear, led to the collapse of tsarism in February 1917, the breakup of the Russian empire, economic chaos, the dissolution of the armed forces, and, within a matter of months, to the formation of a new "Red Army" under Bolshevik direction, which differed in many important ways from its Imperial predecessor.¹

Yet the social revolutionaries who so zealously advocated a people's militia imbued with political consciousness, and totally unlike any traditional army, soon found that the legacy of the past loomed larger than they had expected. It was especially evident in the logic of a situation that forced the new regime to take immediate, desperate measures to defend itself against its many internal and external foes. Only a trained, disciplined, centrally administered and well equipped force could do this. So it was that within a few months conscription came back and former tsarist noncoms and officers were recruited. After a few more years Trotsky's name disappeared down the "memory hole," and the Red Army became a fully professional force in which certain selected values and traditions of the old army were resurrected and even made the object of a veritable cult.²

This is not to say that there is continuity between the tsarist and Red armies. Stalin's army, like his successor of today, was a heavily politicized
body dedicated to supranational goals as defined by the ruling Party. But in
the pursuit of these goals it had proved expedient to invoke old-fashioned
sentiments of patriotism, of selfless service to the central state power, such
as had animated men in Russia for centuries, along with various familiar
institutional habits.

To understand how this was possible we have to take a longer historical
view than one focusing exclusively on the prerevolutionary years. Any army
expresses the mores of the society from which it is drawn. It will reflect the
goals of its leaders and suffer from the tensions that strain the nation's
cohesiveness. Already in medieval and early modern times Russian society
had been shaped by warfare: by internecine strife among the princes and by
the need to defend the forest heartland against attack from the open steppe.
The Mongol-Tatar conquest in the 13th century left psychological wounds
that have not entirely heeled today. We can see them in the fear and prejudice
with which many Soviet Russians view their great neighbor to the East.

Even once the Russian lands had regained their sovereignty under the
autocrats of Moscow in the fifteenth century, forces had to be mobilized
each year along the country's exposed southern border to grapple with
bands of aggressive Tatar raiders: skilful horsemen who came to take pris-
oners, whom they enslaved and sold in Near Eastern markets— that is, if
they did not choose to kill them instead.

The elderly and sick [wrote a Western traveler in the 1520s] who don't
defeat much and are unfit for work, are given by the Tatars to their young
men, much as one gives a hare to a hound to make it snappish: they are
stoned to death or else thrown into the sea.'

It must be acknowledged that the proud but impoverished rulers of
Muscovy (as Russia was then known) were rather slow to develop an effect-
ive response to this threat. The earthen and wooden palisades they built to
 guard the border were expensive to maintain and soon rotted away. Even the
warlike Cossack communities established beyond the line were a mixed
blessing, for at times their chieftains rebelled and led masses of disaffected
peasants against Moscow. It was not until the late eighteenth century that
this volatile region became stabilized; and even so the Russians could not be
certain that the Ottoman Turks, for long a formidable military power, would
not try, with backing from the West, to make good the losses of Islam— as
happened at least four times between 1806 and 1914.4

To her west Russia confronted European states that were more ad-
anced politically and economically. Nationalist and Communist historians
never tire of reminding us that in 1612 the Catholic Poles stabled their horses
in Moscow's holy churches, or that a century later Charles XII of Sweden
led an army of 40,000 men into Russia. He might well have reached Moscow
had he not shortsightedly put all his eggs in one basket and lost his supplies, which placed his forces at a disadvantage to those of Peter the Great, who proved to be an effective military leader. One might have thought that Napoleon in 1812 would have studied the lessons of history, but he did not and paid an even heavier penalty. Then of course in our own time there was the Kaiser, who could have made it in 1918 if he had really wanted to, and the Nazi Gen. Guderian, who certainly wanted to but was halted near Moscow airport.

Before jumping to the conclusion that the historical record justifies the Russians' evident "defense psychosis," let us add that they were not always the innocent victims. Many peoples of eastern Europe and northern Asia had reason to feel similarly about them. Some nations probably gained from absorption into the Russian Empire, as the Armenians did, and for a time also the Finns, Baltic Germans, and even Ukrainians. Others had more painful experiences: conquest by force of arms, violent repression of dissent, loss of cultural identity, and so on. One thinks here of the Muslim peoples of the Volga valley, the Caucasian highlands, of Central Asia, but most obviously of the Poles, who had enjoyed statehood before partition of their country, and whose four revolts (from 1794 to 1905) were put down with great severity. Nor did the Hungarians, whose uprising of 1848–1849 was suppressed by Nicholas I's troops, or the peoples of the Balkans, whom several nineteenth century tsars tried to protect or "liberate," necessarily have reason to remember the Russians fondly, whatever may be said to the contrary in these countries today.

All this warfare fueled international conflict and also posed problems of imperial integration, a task in which the army was only partially effective less so than in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for example. It also determined the lifestyle and outlook of much of the country's elite. When there were rumors of impending war with the Turks in Moscow in 1853, young officers "awaited impatiently for hostilities to break out so that they could fight the foe, 'toss their caps in the air,' as the phrase went, and win a few medals." They had plenty of opportunities, for right up to the 1870s Russian military planners preferred to have at their disposal a large semi-trained army rather than a professional cadre force—partly from traditional inertia, partly because manpower was the most readily available resource in what was still a "developing country." One contributory cause to Russia's economic backwardness was the tremendous strain placed on her limited productive resources by the rapacious ambitions of the state. This vast body of men had somehow to be paid, fed, clothed, lodged, and equipped.

Over and above this, for 400 years or so before the reform era of the mid-nineteenth century, Russia was a "service state"; that is to say, the various social groups were defined largely by their roles in supporting the
throne as the embodiment of sovereignty. The tsar's privileged servitors—those whom we call inaccurately "nobles" or "gentry," classes that had no close analogy in Russia—started out as cavalrymen. It was they who in Muscovite times manned the defensive screen against the Tatars already alluded to and who after Peter the Great's reforms officered the new standing army. Any commoner who worked his way up the ladder to subaltern rank automatically joined the privileged estate. This means that the autocrats could regulate social mobility, and that one's status was determined not by ancestry or wealth but by one's place in the official hierarchy.

For over a century most young well-born males preferred to render state service in the military, since this conferred greater honor and prestige than the civil bureaucracy. To be sure, the system was not watertight. Russia never developed an exclusive officer caste with its own ethos as the Prussians did, and in 1762 the obligation on nobles (dvoriane) to serve was actually abolished; but there were plenty of "volunteers"—indeed, almost too many for the army's health, since they could not all be properly trained or employed. Poverty and custom compelled all but the wealthiest aristocrats to spend at least some time in military uniform. Foreigners were often struck by the number of officers to be seen in the capital's streets: "cocked hats, plumes and uniforms encounter us at every step," wrote one English clergyman in 1839, while the more celebrated French observer, the Marquis de Custine,
noted the “haggard look” of the soldiers who passed by, not citizens but "prisoners for life, condemned to guard the other prisoners" in a “country that is entirely military.”\(^{11}\) Still, all this had its brighter side, too: social gatherings in St. Petersburg were brilliant affairs at which dashing dragoons and hussars, clad in all colors of the rainbow, paid court to the ladies.

Since almost everyone served, it comes as no surprise to learn that many of the great Russian writers had military experience. Lermontov served in the Caucasian wars, and Dostoevsky was an engineering officer before he resigned his commission and got into political trouble, which earned him a terrifying mock execution followed by forced labor in Siberia.\(^{12}\) Tolstoy served at Sevastopol, and though a Christian pacifist, it was in the army that he learned his habit of command; he once joked that he was “a literary general.”\(^{13}\) So many officers or ex-officers worked in government bureaux that an ambitious civil servant complained:

> It was almost impossible to make a career except by serving in the armed forces: all the senior offices in the state—ministers, senators, governors—were given over to military men, who were more prominent in the Sovereign’s eye than civilian officials. . . . It was taken for granted that every senior person should have a taste of military discipline.\(^{14}\)

Using modern sociological terminology, we can say that Imperial Russia fell into the category of states with a military preponderance, if it was not actually militaristic; in this respect it stood midway between Prussia and Austria. In any case the armed forces’ prestige remained high until the 1860s, when the attractions of soldiering began to pall for members of the elite, who now had other career options that paid better, imposed fewer restrictions on their liberties, and offered more excitement than life in some dreary provincial garrison town.

Those officers who stayed on in the forces gradually developed a more professional outlook. They were better trained, although the old cadet schools, with their strict discipline, narrow curriculum and caste spirit, survived in all but name right into the twentieth century.\(^{15}\) Most incoming officers were educated (if that’s the word) in so-called “junker schools,” on which the state spent only one-tenth as much money as it did on the elite institutions. Even so their quality had improved by World War I, and more and more entrants came from the underprivileged groups in society, including sons of former serfs. This was against the government’s wishes, but it happened all the same.

Can one speak of the “democratization of the officer corps?”\(^{16}\) Russian officers were too diverse to form a “corps” on the German model, and the humbly-born might be no more democratic in outlook than their more privileged fellows, perhaps even less so. But they were more likely to take a
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

professional, conscientious attitude to their duties. It bears restating that three of the best-known White generals in the civil war of 1918-1920--Denikin, Kornilov and Krasnov—were of this type. Unfortunately, they also betrayed a lamentable lack of political savoir-faire which can be traced back to their education and the deliberate, indeed disastrous isolation of the army from the country's political life and from the problems that concerned ordinary people. In old Russia a vast gulf yawned between officers and men. An attempt to bridge it was made by Dmitrii Miliutin, the reformist War Minister of Alexander II, but he had a hard struggle against arch-conservatives in the military bureaucracy. When the tsar was assassinated by left-wing terrorists in 1881, Miliutin was forced out of office, and the pendulum swung back to social exclusiveness until after the disastrous war with Japan in 1904-1905, which prompted further reforms. John Bushnell has argued eloquently, but perhaps a little one-sidedly, that the old vices, including corruption, persisted right up to 1914.

As for the soldiers, they were of course drawn overwhelmingly from the peasantry. In early times they generally served for a single seasonal campaign, but after Peter the Great set up the standing army they remained in the ranks for life—or perhaps one should say until death. In the 1790s the service term was cut to 25 years, but this made little difference, given the low life expectancy at that time. It is thought that perhaps one-quarter of all those enlisted survived to tell the tale, the rest falling victim to disease more often than enemy bullets, while one man in ten may have deserted.

Only some of the survivors returned to their native villages, which they would not have seen for a quarter century, since home furlough was unknown. If they did go back they might well find that their wives had remarried; no one would recognize them and they would be resented as "ghosts returned from the dead" and a potential burden on the community. The plight of the Russian veteran was harsh indeed. A foreign observer wrote in 1812:

"The Russian soldier generally serves in the army as long as he can and then joins a garrison, where he performs ordinary service until he becomes an invalid; then he is put in a monastery, where thanks to the frugal diet, he vegetates a little while longer."

Others got low-grade government jobs as doorkeepers and the like, and only a few fortunate enough to have been totally incapacitated fighting "for Tsar and Fatherland" qualified for institutional care and a tiny pension.

Yet many contemporary Western military writers admired the Russian military system and thought it preferable to select recruits from the native population than to hire mercenaries of doubtful loyalty. The system might be "despotic," but the authorities at least seemed to look after their men in a
SOLDIERS AND ARMIES

patriarchalistic spirit. For instance, soldiers who had children might find them taken away to be educated at the state's expense—they were literally state property! But then this was an age of serfdom when most peasants also belonged to someone and received next to no education. Soldiers were housed, fed, and even paid, so that materially they were better off than some peasants.

Still the system looked better from outside than from inside. The laws on selection of recruits, although designed to spread the load as fairly as possible, were actually full of loopholes that allowed the wealthier peasants to escape the net, so that the army might be left with the social misfits, as in the Western mercenary forces. The painful task of deciding which member of a rural community should be separated forever from his loved ones—a sort of blood tax—was beyond the capacity of the barely literate rural officials. There was a good deal of wheeling and dealing. Money changed hands to secure exemption from the draft, or to pass off as fit young men who were actually sick, or undersized, or deaf—once a recruiting board was presented with two men so deaf that they could not even hear a cannon being fired—or who squinted, or had no front teeth—a serious matter, since you needed them to bite off cartridges before ramming them down the barrel of your musket! It seems to be a legend that unwilling but resourceful recruits would put a gold coin in their mouth, which the examining doctor would pocket and he would let them go; but there is a surviving decree ruling that the tsar's army should not contain any eunuchs—a point readily established since recruits paraded naked en masse with their families still in attendance!

Service was unpopular. Men liable to the draft would flee to the woods or mutilate themselves, "cutting their fingers, poking out or otherwise damaging their eyes, and deforming their ears and feet," to quote another official decree. When finally taken, a recruit would have the front part of his scalp shaven like a convict—a useful means of spotting deserters and cutting down on lice—and was clothed in ugly prison gray garb. All this produced a traumatic effect. One of the few soldiers who wrote his memoirs gives us a glimpse of this: "When I woke up the next morning, as it happened opposite a mirror, and saw my head shorn, I was greatly shaken."

Officers tell us that the men soon settled down and adjusted to their unfamiliar environment, but the high rate of desertion tells its own story. Perhaps it was less of a problem than in the West, but that was partly because of the natural obstacles—settlements were rare, and if the peasants found you they would turn you in for the monetary reward, and partly because of the harsh corporal punishment that awaited those caught, which acted as a powerful deterrent.

It will come as no surprise to hear that discipline was maintained by physical coercion. In general absolutist Russia lagged in developing a judi-
cial system that encouraged respect for the law, let alone protected men's natural rights. So far as soldiers were concerned, natural rights were not recognized even in theory until the 1860s, although a system of military tribunals, modeled on that of Prussia, had existed since Peter I's day. The spirit of pre-reform military justice may be judged from a case which occurred in the Polotsk regiment in 1820. Some soldiers engaged in an illicit money-making scheme killed a noncom to stop him from squealing on them. Two privates reported the murder, and their account was confirmed on investigation. But the brigade commander ordered the informants, not the culprits, to be severely punished, and his verdict was upheld by higher authority. The case happened to come to the tsar's attention, but since he knew the brigade commander personally he simply ordered him posted and took no other action. The army's rank structure had to be upheld at all costs.

As in other armies, commanders had ample scope to impose "disciplin ary penalties" without any formal proceedings. These might involve all kinds of physical torture—for instance, standing to attention for hours at a stretch bearing up to six muskets, each of them weighing over 12 lbs., and above all, the dreadful "running the gauntlet." In Prussia, where this penalty originated, it was used only in exceptional circumstances, since it could well lead to the victim's death; but in Russia it was treated as a regular means of enforcing discipline. "Running the gauntlet" involved having a soldier beaten in public by all his comrades, who were lined up in two opposing ranks, through which the prisoner, stripped to the waist, staggered along while the men on either side struck him with thongs about 1 inch in diameter. To prevent him from moving too fast he was preceded by a noncom who held a musket with the bayonet fixed and pointing to the rear. An officer rode alongside to see that the blows were properly administered, and the victim's groans were drowned by the rolling of drums. Although his back would soon be reduced to a bloody mess, beating continued until he collapsed—and sometimes even after that, for his limp body would be placed on a board and carried along.

In 1801 the enlightened Alexander I, a correspondent of Thomas Jefferson, formally abolished torture throughout his domains and prohibited "cruel" penalties. Unfortunately, "running the gauntlet" was not considered cruel! The only change was that a doctor now had to be present, who could order the punishment stopped if he thought the victim might expire; but as soon as the prisoner revived the beatings recommenced. This was a mixed blessing both for the soldier and for the doctor, who had to compromise his Hippocratic oath, much as some do today in certain Latin American dictatorships. Tsar Nicholas I (1825–1855) issued secret orders reducing the number of blows to 3,000, but this rule was not always enforced, precisely because it was secret. Soldiers who deserted might now get 1,000
blows or double that number if they repeated the offence or stole while on the run. Men sometimes survived an incredible number of blows. The record is held by a stout fellow named Gordeev, who absconded six times and received a total of 52,000 blows; on the last occasion he was spared and sent to forced labor instead.

After the Crimean War corporal punishment was generally replaced by jail terms, although it was not abolished until the early twentieth century. Along with this reform came an improvement in the military judicial system. Court verdicts, for instance, might be publicized—this new openness was referred to by the same Russian term, _glasnost_ , that Gorbachev has recently made so free with. Tribunals conducted proceedings orally, by _P-trial_ contest, and allowed the defendant to have an advocate. An official of the military procurator carried out the pretrial investigation and saw to it that justice was done; and sometimes it certainly was, for during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878 we hear of a procurator standing up to a powerful functionary, saying, “Your Excellency, you have no power to alter a statute!”

A recent American historian states that by the turn of the twentieth century “the structure of Russian military justice, the legal education of military-judicial personnel, and [their] attitudes and practices . . . all buttressed due process of law.” Students at the prestigious Alexander Academy acquired “a highly developed legal ethos.” That was one reason why army leaders resented having to repress and try civilian political offenders, such as demonstrators and strikers, as the army did on a massive scale during the 1905 revolution, especially in the national minority regions of the empire.

The new legal ethos, in so far as it existed, was one fruit of the Miliutin reforms, which involved giving the troops some sense of what they were fighting for and humanizing their conditions of service. “An army [he wrote] is not merely a physical force . . . but an association of individuals endowed with intelligence and sensitivity.” This meant a veritable cultural and psychological revolution, for previously officers and noncoms had treated their subordinates like impersonal cogs in a machine. Now fear was to give way to trust, to “conscious self-discipline,” as the phrase went. Miliutin’s ideal was cooperation between all ranks in the common task, while preserving the hierarchical rank structure. He took over from the French republicans the notion of the army becoming “the school of the nation.” The idea was too radical for his contemporaries, who saw him as something of a “Red,” and the tsar stalled on it. Even so a start was made. Schools were set up in many units, and in 1867 it was ruled that noncoms had to be able to read and write. Many mistakes were made, such as putting on literacy classes in the evenings, when the men were exhausted after an 11-hour day, and the instructional material was hardly inspiring; training manuals, for instance, instead of contemporary literary works. The budget ran a miserably 10 kopecks a year per man, and interest soon waned. One expert
who toured regimental schools in 1870 reported that "the soldier can scarcely cope with the technique of reading... In a book he sees only the letters, not understanding what they mean, and he cannot relate what he has read." 38

Even so, by the end of the century educational standards were higher in the army than they were in the population at large, which admittedly is not saying much. Once the short (generally six-year) service term was introduced in 1874 literate soldiers who returned to their villages helped to awaken a thirst for knowledge among peasants. It was foolish of Miliutin's successor, Vannovskii, to shift the program to a voluntary basis in the mid-1880s. It was not restored until 1902 and then only for the infantry. When one subaltern in the 65th infantry regiment taught the men in his company the ABCs on his own initiative, his CO was furious and ordered him to stop at once: "Get those booklets out of here!" he thundered, "you'll get me into trouble with the War Minister!" 39

Among other things, the fin-de-siècle reaction meant that Russian soldiers were still poorly paid, housed and fed—significantly worse than in the armies of the other major European powers. Many received less than 3 rubles a year before the pay scales were doubled after the Russo-Japanese war. 40 Since they needed to cover not only personal expenses but also repairs to items of clothing and equipment, they could survive only by off-duty labor independently or under an officer's supervision, which took place on a vast scale. The regiment was as much an economic organization as it was a fighting one; in 1907 150,000 men, or 12% of total effectives, spent their duty hours tailoring. 41 This was an old tradition. Since the central supply services were notoriously inadequate, units were expected to be as self-sufficient as possible; but the pressure seems to have increased after the 1860s when the government was trying to save money on the army.

Tinned meat came into the quartermaster's stores around 1870, as did tea, much encouraged as an alternative to hard liquor. The food ration had until then consisted almost wholly of cereals, which the men would either mix with water to make a kind of gruel or dough, or else double-bake as biscuit to carry with them in their packs on the march. In this way they could do without the elaborate field bakeries other armies required. This impressed foreign observers. They thought the tsar was lucky to get his soldiers so cheaply. The first to make this point was an Englishman who went to Moscow as early as 1553:

Every man must... make provision for himself and his horse for one month or two, which is very wonderful... I pray you, among all our boasting warriors how many should we find to endure the field with them but one month? 42
SOLDIERS AND ARMIES

Another traveler of the time noted that gentry cavalrmen and their men shared the same frugal meal of millet and salt pork, "but it may occur that the master gets very hungry, in which case he eats evwrything himself and his servants fast splendidly for three days." Yet somehow they fought well and looked robust, which had some Westerners worried. The Frenchman Charles de Nerel wrote in 1853 that they were sober, impervious to fatigue, and

in a word an admirable fighting machine, more intelligent than Europeans generally think, who would be a redoubtable instrument in the hands of a conqueror, a Russian Napoleon, should the winds blow in that direction one day in their icy regions.  

This was an uncommonly good prophecy, some might say!

Patriotic Russian and Soviet historians have dutifully catalogued the many "exploits" (podvig), or feats of bravery, which these warriors had to their credit. There are countless inspiring tales of soldiers who volunteered for dangerous missions, who stood by the flag to the last man, who fired off all their ammunition but kept the last bullet for themselves, or even chopped off a dangerous arm with their own sword while awaiting transport to the dressing station. Foreigners sometimes thought these deeds more foolhardy than courageous. In the Seven Years War of the mid-eighteenth century, for instance, a Saxon engineer seconded to the Russian forces expressed amazement that troops would deliberately stand up on the battlements to draw enemy fire, commenting that "in this army rash bravery is much respected; if an officer wishes to win his troops’ esteem he must expose himself with them in a manner that would be reckoned absurd in any other army." Some critics maintained the Russians showed themselves to better effect in defense than in offense: "passive courage" this was called. Insofar as this existed, it may be linked to their cultural and social background as Orthodox Christian peasants, as well as to Russia’s lack of a chivalrous feudal tradition such as one finds in the West, including Poland. But one should not be too dogmatic about this. In the Russian army, as in others, soldiers’ morale on the battlefield was greatly affected by local circumstances. It mattered a lot whether one had a full stomach, whether earlier engagements had been successful, and above all whether one had a chief who could address the men in hearty comradely fashion and win their affection and loyalty, as Suvorov was conspicuously able to do.

This martial valor might not be such a good thing for the other side. If a general "gave the men their head" and allowed them the run of a captured place they would ransack it and commit atrocities. There were occasions of this on several of Suvorov’s campaigns. In 1794, at Praga on the Vistula opposite Warsaw (where Marshal Rokossovskii stopped his advance during
the Warsaw insurrection in 1944), the great commander allowed his men to loot the place for three hours. Afterwards they made up a ditty about it:

Our Suvorov gave us freedom
To take a walk for just three hours.
Let's take a walk, lads,
Our Suvorov has ordered it!
Let's drink to his health . . .
Long live Count Suvorov!
Thou livest by the truth
And leadest us soldiers justly!

They expressed no pity for the several thousand Polish combatants and noncombatants who were drowned in the Vistula or whose mutilated bodies lay around everywhere. Atrocities have of course accompanied warfare everywhere from ancient times to the present. The Russians seem to have been particularly bloodthirsty when dealing with Poles—or with Islamic peoples, which may help to account for the Soviets' present grave misconduct in Afghanistan; but in the Imperial Era they were no worse than others in Europe. The hungrier they were, the more likely they were to loot. When they marched through Germany into France in 1813-1814 and the supply trains could not keep up, they took what they needed, just as the Prussians did. Oddly, the first thing they went for was the feather bedding. Clouds of plumage could be seen floating over places that were being ransacked.

Russian soldiers were normally quartered in country districts in the west of the empire for much of the year when they were not away on maneuvers or campaigns. There was a good deal of tension between peasant hosts and their unwanted guests. Soldiers formed a separate caste and seldom made common cause with the people whence they had sprung. Only gradually were barracks built in major towns, and they were insanitary buildings deservedly unpopular with the men, who identified them with "everything that makes the soldier's heart miss a beat," to quote one critic.

Training was elementary and for long consisted mainly of drill, the mechanical repetition of evolutions which units were then supposed to reproduce on the battlefield. Many of the tsars had an unhealthy fascination with the parade ground. Nicholas I learned by heart all the bugle calls, which he could reproduce vocally, to the amazement of foreigners. He derived an almost sensual pleasure from the sight of massed formations. After some maneuvers he wrote to his wife: "I don't think there has ever been anything more splendid, perfect or overwhelming since soldiers first appeared on earth." His brother, Alexander I, used to go along the ranks inspecting whether the men's socks were at regulation height, and in 1816 he
had three Guards colonels put under arrest because their men were marching out of step. Such severity, he maintained, “is the reason why our army is the bravest and the finest.”

It was a shallow view but one readily transmitted down through the officer corps, which had more than its share of pedantic martinets. This was one of the hallmarks of a semi-militaristic society, where the army was as much a symbol of the autocratic power as it was a fighting force. It certainly looked gorgeous when drawn up on parade before the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, in a square that could hold nearly 100,000 men. But could it fight well? Its weaknesses were revealed during the ensuing Crimean War when, though the soldiers did fight just as bravely as ever, the infrastructure broke down.

The reforms that followed attempted to encourage a more professional attitude in this sphere, too. Drill was supplemented by gymnastics and weapons training; maneuvers became more realistic; personal arms were modernized, as the musket gave way to the rifle; the artillery received guns of bronze and then of steel, with a greater range; and we hear of millions of rubles being spent on mysterious “special objects.” But unfortunately it was becoming harder for Russia to produce all the arms and munitions her forces needed, since the empire’s industrial growth did not get off the ground until the 1880s and lagged behind that of her potential rivals, most obviously Germany. The harmful consequences of this weakness and of the reactionary attitudes that prevailed at the top after 1881 showed up in the war with Japan and even more catastrophically in 1914.

Russia entered the Great War with a crippling shortage of machine guns and small-arms ammunition. Too many heavy guns were immobilized in fortified places, built at great cost and with little realization of the mobile nature of twentieth-century warfare. The generals also complained bitterly about the “shell shortage,” but some recent Western historians have argued that this was something of a myth, invented to explain away reverses due to incompetent leadership. Moreover, many deficiencies of equipment were made up in 1915–1916, although only at the cost of grievously overstraining the country’s economic and social fabric. Once again, as in the Crimean War, it was the system that failed, not the army as such. The crisis was made worse than it need have been by Nicholas II’s well-intentioned but naive decision to lead his armies in person, a role for which he was totally unfitted. At headquarters he only got in the way of the professionals, whereas back in the capital he might have given some stability to his shaky government.

By this time the officer corps was grievously split between the few surviving prewar regulars and the civilian-minded replacements. “A marked clash of views appeared between the two groups,” writes one military memoirist; “when politics were mentioned the former would say . . . ‘I am a servant of the tsar and my duty is to obey my superiors,’ [while the reserv-
ists] followed the gossip about what was going on at home with passionate interest. Increasingly, so too did their men. The hunt was on for scapegoats who could be blamed for defeats, high casualty rates, and neglect or corruption in the supply services. "Treason in the rear" became a popular cry. This politicization spelled the doom of the Imperial Russian army and of the tsarist regime as well.

What then did the Imperial army bequeath to its Soviet successor? Directly, it passed on very little. Some Red Army chiefs, Tukhachevskii for instance, began their careers under the tsar and gained experience which would prove useful in the civil war; and the time-honored preeminence of the artillery arm continues to this day. Equally ancient is the tradition of bureaucratic, highly centralized administration which often saps the initiative of commanders in the field. Beyond that there is the age-old "security psychosis" that leads political and military decision makers to seek reassurance by militarizing much of the civilian population and by maintaining large armed forces and what we now call "overkill capacity." There is a familiar disregard for the creature comforts that would make life more agreeable for the common soldier, who is expected to bear all his hardships uncomplainingly and to give his life for a sacred cause, if need be. Even the old social divisions have reappeared, in a new form, beneath a veneer of comradeship.

Yet we should not oversimplify. Most of the former ingrained weaknesses have been overcome with industrialization, the technological revolution, and educational progress. In our discussions we shall be hearing about many new phenomena—advanced weaponry, nuclear strategy, political indoctrination and so on—that make the Soviet Army of today as remote from its tsarist predecessor as the B-1B bomber is from Kitty Hawk. What we should perhaps remember, as we refine our deterrent power to meet the Soviet challenge, is that its armed forces do not consist of abstract "enemies" or mindless automata but of human beings who are the heirs to a long tradition of honorable service in the profession of arms and who deserve our respect and understanding in their difficult predicament, past and present.

Professor John L. H. Kepp was born in Keaton, Kent, England, on January 21, 1916. Educated at the University of London, he received his B.A. in 1950 and his Ph.D. in 1954. He served in the British Army from 1943 to 1947; worked as a Research Officer for the Foreign Office in London from 1953 to 1954; and taught at the University of London, University of Washington, and University of Toronto. His major publications include: The Rise of Social I., Monarchy in Russia (1963), Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror (1964), The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization (1976), The Debate on Soviet Power 1917-1918 (1979), and Soldiers of the Tsar (1986).
Notes


18. For his biography, see Forrest A. Miller, *Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia* (Charlotte, N.C., 1968) and P. A. Zaionchkovski, "D. A. Miliutin: biograficheskii ocherk," in *Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1947).


HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY


24. Venables, Domestic Scenesh, p. 188.


29. For a graphic description by a sympathetic young officer (1847), see N. A. Moudzii, in Delo petreshentsiia, ed. V. Denisetskii, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1937), 1:251-2.

30. Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiskoi Imperii, vol. 27, no. 2015 (January 18, 1802) and vol. 30, no. 22379 (April 10, 1808).


32. USSR, TsGViA, f. 801, op. 69, d. 31 (1836). See also my "Justiz for the Troops: A Comparative Study of Nicholas I's Russia and the France of Louis-Philippe," forthcoming in Cahiers de monde russe et soviétique (Paris). Since there were some 5,000 desertions, several million blows were inflicted annually nationwide.


35. Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict, pp. 121, 126.


37. The best contemporary studies are M. I. Bogdanovich, Istoriiskii ochekk de yalet'nosti voennogo upravleniya v pervoy 25-let'ii ... imperatora Aleksandra Nikolayevicha, 1855-1880 gg. (St. Petersburg, 1879-81), vol. 3, and articles in Voennyi sbornik, a progressive military journal set up in 1858. See also my "Cheryakhovskii and the Military Miscellany" in Felder und Vogelrufder russischer Geschichte: Studien zu Ehren von Peter Scheibert, ed. J. Auerbach, et al., (Freiburg i. Br., 1985), pp. 111-33. Our understanding of popular literacy and taste has been revolutionized by J. Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read (Princeton, 1985), pp. 18-21 for the military.

38. P. O. Bohnowski, "Vzgled na granitnoi i uchebnyi komandy (ili polkovye shkoly) v nashei armii," Voennyi sbornik 78, no. 3 (1871): 60.


40. Bushnell, p. 568.

41. Bushnell, "'Tsarist Officer Corps,'" p. 766.


44. France, Ministere de la Guerre, Services Historiques de l'Armee de Terre, Vincennes, Memoires et Reconnaissances, vol. 1495, De l'armee russe, pp. 4-5.
SOLDIERS AND ARMIES

45. The first such work seems to have been S. N. Glinka, ed., Russkie anekdoty-voenny, grazhdanskie i istoricheskie, ili: Postroevovanie o narodnykh dobradeleakh Rossii drevnikh i nowykh vremen, 5 pts. (Moscow, 1822). One of the most recent works is N. Shliapnikov and F. Kuznetsov, comps., Iz byrogo prishlegra russkii armii: dokumenty i materialy o podvigakh russkih soldat i ofitsery (Moscow, 1947).


49. Pansi sobranne P. P. Kireevskikh, 2nd ed., fasc. 9, 326. This song does not feature in modern Soviet collections.


56. John S. Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War (Durham, N.C., 1979).

57. Zaionchkowski, Voenny reformy, for the “special objects,” see I. S. Bliokh, Finansi Rossi: XIX stoletie: istoriia, statistika (St. Petersburg, 1882), 2:58.


The Young Officer in the Old Army

Edward M. Coffman

In this Bicentennial year, at this place where you gentlemen are learning the profession of arms, it is fitting to look back on your predecessors of the frontier army, which in a sense lasted until World War I. Most of their experiences will seem as exotic to you as yours would appear to them. Yet, the problems of getting along with other people in a tightly-knit community and of accomplishing missions under difficult circumstances are eternally present in the military.

Then, as one reads the letters, diaries, memoirs, and records, he does come across items that could have appeared in a recent newspaper. On July 29, 1801, the Army's ranking officer, James Wilkinson issued his second order in three months banning long hair. This time he added: "... the less hair about a soldier's head, the neater and cleaner will he be." In 1829 and 1830, a young infantry lieutenant at Fort Gratiot, Michigan, noted in his diary two threats against his life by enlisted men. He took them seriously since someone had recently killed a sergeant. A soldier did wound Samuel P. Heintzelman in August 1830, but this was apparently an accident. Finally, there is another startlingly modernistic incident recorded in the personnel file of a first lieutenant of 15 years service in 1894. The post surgeon at Fort Yates, North Dakota, reported that this officer had died because of an overdose of drugs.

The peacetime army of the nineteenth century (formal wars took up less than a decade of those hundred years) was a small force dispersed for the most part in tiny frontier posts. There were always contingents of varying strength in coastal forts, but those people would have had somewhat different experiences as would the staff officers in the cities. In 1804, 178 officers and approximately 2,500 men garrisoned 43 posts. At 37, there were less than a hundred officers and men and at the largest—New Orleans—there were only 375. In the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, some 2,100 officers and 25,000 men occupied up to 200 posts. With the end of the Indian Wars and the abandonment of many small stations in 1895 there were 77 posts of which seven still had less than 100 officers and men and the largest—Fort Leavenworth—had only 830.

Soldiers built most of those posts and their hunting and farming skills helped many of the garrisons through the early years. In fact, survival in the face of the challenges of the frontier was a major effort even if the Indians
Soldiers stand garrison duty at Battery Rodgers on the Potomac River south of Alexandria, Virginia, in the War era (U.S. Army).

were not hostile. Actually there was less Indian fighting than one would assume—a good deal less than the motion-picture industry would have us believe. Some soldiers spent years on the frontier without ever hearing a shot fired in anger. It was just as well, at least in one case. As of January 18, 1831, at Fort Gratiot, Heintzelman reported: “We are now without cartridges at the Post.” And he was properly miffed: “A fine situation for a military Post on the frontier and in an Indian country.” As the representative of the Federal government and what passed for law and order on the frontier, the Army, on occasion, had more difficulty with the settlers than with the Indians. Some officers were even forced to defend their actions when carrying out orders before none too friendly settler juries in civil courts.1

In almost any given peacetime year from the War of 1812 to the Spanish-American War, the newly-appointed second lieutenants were Military Academy graduates; however, this does not mean that the officer corps was a closed corporation for West Pointers. The spasms of war brought in sizeable numbers of officers from civil life and the ranks; and, in the rare peacetime expansions, Congress saw to it that many of the vacancies went to civilians. The wars were naturally the high watermarks. They brought op-
portunities for distinction and promotion while the restless periods of peace meant years in grade on a treadmill of routine for most officers.

When John W. Phelps graduated from West Point in 1836, he wrote his sister about his assignment to the Fourth Artillery: "... it is called the immortal Regiment—there are lieuts in it with grey heads, fine prospects for me!" Sixty years later, second lieutenants found themselves in an identical situation. For thirty years after the Civil War aging Civil War veterans clogged the promotion channels. In 1895, the Commanding General of the Army, Nelson A. Miles, complained of the slowness of promotion and noted that "... many of the officers who commanded regiments, posts, and brigades in our Civil War are now on the list of captains with very little prospect of immediate promotion." A despondent young officer could then have written as Phelps did in his sixth year as a lieutenant in 1842: "Our service is such that a lieutenant like a wet blanket is kept upon the officer's shoulders, till every spark of military pride and ambition is smothered."

The lack of a retirement program was a principal cause of this stagnation prior to the Civil War. Thus, overage and disabled officers remained on the active list, in effect as charity cases, blocking the advancement of their subordinates. Because of the absence of so many field grade officers from their regiments during the Mexican War, the Adjutant General investigated the situation in 1846. He found that only a third of the artillery majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels were physically fit and that less than a third of their infantry counterparts were available for duty. He noted that a major in the Third Artillery, W. J. McClintock, "cannot walk; could not when he was promoted in June 1843, and will probably never be able to do a day's duty." In the Fourth Infantry, there was Major Waddy V. Cobbs who "cannot walk or ride, and has not performed a day's duty for seven years, and never can join his regiment." (Both died in 1848 but were still on the active list at the time of their deaths.) In that era, a young officer might find that his regimental commander was a venerable old soul in his eighties. In January 1861, the commander of the Fourth Infantry was William Whistler who had 60 years service as an officer. He had commanded the regiment since 1845. At the same time in the regiment there was a second lieutenant with seven and a half years service—Philip H. Sheridan. Although a limited retirement plan went into effect in 1861, it was not until 1882 that retirement became mandatory at 64, hence the Civil War veterans were permitted to stay and slow down promotion into the twentieth century.  

Pay was another sore point. For some fifty years (from before the War of 1812 to 1857) it remained essentially the same. The $25 monthly salary of second lieutenants even with allowances was not a handsome wage on the frontier where the cost of living was high. One officer complained in 1836 that civilian quartermaster clerks made twice as much as he did. Almost eighteen percent of the regular officers (117) resigned that year. Although
there were charges that some left to avoid service in the Seminole War, low pay and poor prospects were more likely reasons for their departure.6

Those who served in California during the Gold Rush were in particularly straitened condition. John Bell Hood and a classmate, en route to their first unit after graduation, landed in San Francisco after an arduous journey via Panama in 1853 and hailed a carriage. When the driver told them that the fare to their hotel was $20, they prudently decided to walk. Expenses were exorbitant but there were also fantastic business opportunities. The combination brought about more resignations—among those who left the service were Grant, Halleck, and Sherman. The latter explained the situation to his friend George H Thomas in late 1853: “Whatever effect California may have, there is no doubt it will cause promotion as many will be forced by necessity out of service, and many will be induced to leave to better their fortunes. . . . in fortune and reputation I am least of all [of our acquaintances], though at the head of a banking House. I hope after a few years labor to be able to live like a gentleman in Saint Louis.”7

Although officers continued to complain, pay was better after the Civil War. Infantry second lieutenants drew $116.67 a month in base pay and their mounted brethren received $125. Their pay, perhaps, remained relatively below that of their civilian counterparts but there was no mass of resignations comparable to those in 1836 in the late nineteenth century.

The varying strengths and missions of the Army, the stagnated promotions, and the low pay set the terms of their careers for young officers. Although there naturally were individual differences, many experiences were similar as these lieutenants faced their first assignments.

For the first classmen at the Military Academy in the 1880s there was the excitement when the tradesmen came to measure for uniforms and civilian clothes and to take orders for these and whatever other items they would need. Less than 6 months after graduation in 1886, George J. Godfrey struck a familiar chord in a letter to his mother: “My experience in this matter of buying on credit is such that I will never do it again for I am bound hand and foot, so to speak, and must use all my energies in contriving how to send off enough each month to have the tradesmen paid in time.”8

After a few months of leave, the new graduates started on their long journey to the frontier stations. Often they met classmates who would accompany them part of the way. The Class of 1877 recorded some of the adventures en route. Two members were involved in stagecoach robberies before they reached their first post. The bandit who held up John J. Haden’s coach near Santa Fe ordered the passengers out and began to search them. When he saw Haden’s uniform, he did not bother to search him but turned away and muttered with disgust, “Damn it, you army officers never have any money.” Henry Kirby was not so lucky. He lost his watch and five dollars to stagecoach robbers near Fort McKavett, Texas.9
In 1854, Zenas R. Bliss had a particularly disagreeable journey. He reported to Governor's Island, New York, and was assigned to take a large detachment of recruits by sea to Texas. For seventeen days at sea, he wrestled with such problems as a fire, a severe storm, a brawl between the recruits and the sailors, a near mutiny, and a threat on his life. Incidentally, he had no noncommissioned officers to help share his burden. Once ashore, he had to round up the drunken recruits (he never found 37 of them), ignore the yellow fever then in progress, and march his men overland for several days to Fort Duncan, Texas. When he finally reached the end of this tortuous journey, he hitched his mule and joined some of his old friends at the sutler's. Upon his return he found the mule and his equipage stolen.  

For some, the introduction to the small officer communities at isolated posts was most disheartening. A bookish West Pointer, grandson of Ethan Allen of Green Mountain Boys fame, Ethan Allen Hitchcock was appalled by the infantry officers he had to associate with in 1817-1824. " . . . a majority of them [were] dissipated men without education. They had no refinement of any sort and no taste for study. The general talk was of duels. . . ." He also used the terms “profane, indecent, and licentious” to describe his fellow comrades in arms."  

Some thirty years later, in 1852, when George Crook joined the Fourth Infantry at Benicia Barracks, California, he found a similar situation. All but two of the officers got drunk every day, I had never seen such gambling and carousing before. The Commandant Major Day . . . seemed head and foremost of the revellers, one of his pass [sic] times when drunk was to pitch furniture in the center of the room and set fire to it. . . . My first duty after reporting was to serve as file closer to the funeral escort of Major Miller who had just died from the effects of strong drink. We all assembled in the room where lie the corps [sic]. When Major Day . . . said “hell fellars old Miller is dead and he can't drink so let us all take a drink." You can imagine my horror at hearing such an impious speech and coming from an officer of his age and rank. I couldn't believe this was real army life. Duty was performed in such a lax manner that I didn't even see my company for over a week after I joined, when I would suggest visiting it, I would be put off by its commander with some trivial excuse and probably would be invited to take a drink.  

Another thirty years still did not see much change. George B. Duncan found all duties except guard mount and roll call suspended and most of the officers and men drunk during his first five or six days at Fort Wingate, New Mexico, in 1886. The explanation was that the paymaster had just passed through and paid off the command. Duncan later recalled: "To my unsu-
of a sophisticated mind this introduction to an army post made a deeply unfavorable impression and a regret that I had not resigned after graduation and

taken a job which had been offered me on the New York Central Railroad." Duncan soon escaped to a more satisfactory albeit more dangerous assignment on an Indian reservation and stayed in the Army to become a division commander in World War I.13

Of course, there was more to frontier life than drunken revels. By no means did all officers drink. Some found their new surroundings as intoxicating as the hardest liquor. The forests, mountains, lakes, prairies, deserts and the people were fascinating. Many officers hunted and fished and some left descriptions of the settlers, gun-toting cowboys, Mexicans, and, most of all, the Indians and their customs. (The Smithsonian published several of John G. Bourke's scholarly dissertations on Indian customs.)

Life was certainly more freewheeling on the frontier than in the States, as John Bigelow, Jr., noted a week after he arrived at Fort Duncan, Texas, in

October 1877. He and another officer had taken four ladies across the Rio Grande that evening to see the sights of Piedras Negras. This New York aristocrat was shocked when one of the officer's wives pushed her way to the monte table and proceeded to hold her own with "ruffian gamblers." It did not raise her in his esteem when she told him that all the ladies gambled. Today, Mrs. Gasman would pass as a liberated woman. In 1877, she was considered a brazen hussy.14

Young bachelor second lieutenants had the worst quarters available. This could mean a tent or a shack constructed of logs, adobe, or sometimes just large sticks or thatch. At Fort Duncan in 1854, Bliss lived in a tent at first. The dust was so bad that he would wake up in the morning with the windward side of his face black with the blowing dust. Phil Sheridan took pity and asked him to share his picket or stick house. But he found that he was still at the mercy of the elements when a rare but heavy rain came through the makeshift roof in torrents.15 However grim or primitive the quarters, there were servants from among the ranks of the command and the camp followers to ameliorate or complicate the young officers' lives.

If there was an Indian war in the vicinity, an officer might find more than enough excitement and perhaps death with an expedition or on one of the patrols. Otherwise the daily routine might include supervising the soldiers as they built the fort or, in the early part of the century, roads and carried out the required farming chores. There was little or no target practice in the Army until 1880. Two West Pointers of the ante-bellum era mentioned that they did not learn to shoot a rifle until after their graduation.16 In some instances weeks would pass without any drills. On some posts there might be only an hour of drill and very little else to occupy the rest of the lieutenant's day. At others, it was a different story. John Withers wrote in his diary at Fort Vancouver, Oregon, in 1856: "I am kept as busy as a bee from Reveille
until Tattoo." He was regimental quartermaster and acting adjutant, post adjutant, commissary and subsistence officer as well as caterer of the officers' mess. A cavalry lieutenant at Fort Walla Walla, Washington, informed his friends in 1877 that: "My company duties consist of attending reveille, morning stables, watering call, and sometimes retreat." He also said that the First Cavalry had two drills a day as a rule and, now that recruits were on hand, a third. Besides he had to spend time on courts and boards. He forgot to mention periodic tours as Officer of the Guard and Officer of the Day. Incidentally, in those days prior to large-scale literacy and the typewriter, many officers spent hours laboriously writing up the reports and doing the other required paperwork.

Recreation depended to a great extent on the size and location of the post. At a large garrison with a goodly number of officers' families there was a lot to do. If the post was near a town, there might be a great deal of reciprocal entertaining. Social calls, parties, dances, amateur theatricals, band concerts, and, in the latter part of the century, croquet and tennis, served to help pass the time pleasantly. Then, opportunities for horseback riding, hunting, and sometimes fishing were nearly always present. For the young bachelors, frequently there were unattached girls. George Duncan noticed that "... they seemed to arrive about the time a bachelor lieutenant reported." His classmate, George Godfrey told of one such visit at Fort Sully, South Dakota, in the fall of 1889 when the post trader's sister-in-law appeared. "The young lady was not particularly bright or attractive, but on account of our contracted social life, her introduction into the garrison was a most welcome and appreciated event while her departure leaves us absolutely without anything to break the monotony and dreadful ennui incident to a very small community." In the isolated, small, closely bounded officer communities, sex sometimes touched off explosions. At Camp Bowie, Arizona Territory, on a hot July afternoon in 1877, the post surgeon attacked Duane M. Greene on the croquet ground and accused him of seducing his wife. Greene, a second lieutenant of almost 5 years service who had been a captain in the Civil War, resigned within hours rather than face a general court martial on the charge of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

As days wore into weeks, months, and years, the tedium for some became overwhelmingly oppressive. On the occasion of his 25th birthday at Fort Gratiot, Heintzelman dolefully commented: "It is melancholy to think how I am spending my best days in this out of the way place without society, amusement or improvement." During his third year with a small detachment of artillerymen at Fort Brown, Texas, in 1856, John Phelps wrote: "Military life in peace, made up as it is of a routine and uninteresting little incidents, is wearing at best. ..." Three years later, Captain Phelps had reached the breaking point. From Camp Floyd, Utah, he wrote a friend: "I
am suffocating, physically, morally, and intellectually in every way. I am fairly gasping for fresh, outside air; and feel, as an officer said the other day, like begging to be taken out and hung for the sake of variety." Within the week, he handed in his resignation.²⁰

It is no wonder that the atmosphere virtually crackled at times with the tension induced by the tightness and isolation of these small officer communities. Petty matters could balloon into major crises as personalities ground on each other for dreary months and years. Quarrels and the resulting courts-martial were frequent. After all they did serve to break the monotony.

During February and March 1835, a brevet brigadier general and 13 other officers (about half of those present) at Fort Gibson, Indian Territory, spent 22 days on a General Court Martial Board considering two cases. Two years later another court of inquiry sat for 27 days on a related case. All stemmed from the interaction of Maj Richard B. Mason, 1st Lt. Jefferson Davis, and 2d Lt. Lucius B. Northrup of the Dragoons. In the first two instances, Mason preferred charges against his two subordinates. The last case resulted from a charge, among others, of the major's oppressive conduct toward Davis and Northrup.

Fort Gibson at that time was a major post with almost 500 officers and men. It was also an unhealthy spot. In November 1834, the returns listed more than half of the soldiers as sick.²¹ Conditions were bad and tempers fray ed. In the transcripts one can find justification in the arguments of all concerned yet also be impressed by the absurdity of trivial incidents provoked by the difficulties of existence in that primitive place and exaggerated out of reasonable proportions in an atmosphere charged by the pressures of the situation. In Davis' trial, the absurdity peaked.

The charge against Davis was conduct subversive of good order and military discipline. What happened was that Davis, who had not been feeling well for some weeks, did not personally take reveille roll call in his company on the cold, rainy morning of December 24, 1834. Later in the day, when the major remonstrated with him Davis' apparent insolence infuriated him. "Part of the specification read "... the said Lt. Davis did, in a highly disrespectful, insubordinate, and contemptuous manner abruptly turn upon his heel and walk off, saying at the same time, Hum..."

Since much was made of this during the trial, Davis in his defense gave it the attention it seemed to merit.

... instead of giving me credit for my silence which my acquaintance will readily believe resulted from military subordination, my accuser seizes upon an isolated meagre interjection as little expressive of any of its class, and magnifies it into an importance worthy the most significant word in the English language.

262
SOLDIERS AND ARMIES

In such a word as ‘hum’ the tone and manner with which it is used must determine entirely the significance, to be mistaken as to the tone and manner is therefore to be mistaken in the meaning, and that the witness for the prosecution has probably mistaken the tone and manner is to be inferred from his uncertainty as to the time and position when the word was used, for in the specification to the charge against [me] preferred by the witness for the prosecution, it is stated that I walked off saying ‘hum,’ when first called as a witness before the court he states that I said hum immediately after his addressing me and then whirled upon my heel, and when questioned by the accused he states that the interjection was used whilst turning, if then the witness is uncertain as to the time and position, points, on which he might naturally be positive, how much more uncertain must he be as to the tone and manner, points, on which all men are liable (even under the most favorable circumstances) to err.

Davis won the case but he had had enough of the Army. Within a month he resigned.

The location and the condition of the fort and, most of all, the chemistry of the personalities thrown together could make a frontier tour a delight. Although the location and condition were not particularly good in the sod house post of Fort Atkinson on the Santa Fe trail in what is now western Kansas, Henry Ileth later said that he enjoyed “the happiest three years of my army life” there in 1851-54. There were good companions such as Simon Bolivar Buckner with whom he read Shakespeare and played whist. There was no gambling and only moderate drinking. Then, the Indians proved to be endlessly fascinating to Ileth. Finally, he liked to hunt. While there he killed a thousand buffalo—one of which he dispatched with a bow and arrow while riding bareback—Indian style.

Such delights did not appeal to many officers who escaped whenever possible to the States where they served on staffs or in whatever positions they could secure. A chronic complaint of unit commanders was the shortage of officers since so many were away on detached service. Other officers absented themselves on infrequent leaves of several months duration.

These furloughs must have been tremendous bolsters to the ego as well as therapeutic. Few evidently spent the entire time at home with relatives. There was too much to do in the cities. In New York, Philadelphia and Boston, they moved in the socially prominent circles—attended parties, dances, plays, concerts and operas. Many visited their alma mater on the Hudson and almost went to Washington to press their ambitions upon senior officers and politicians. The young officer might dine with the commanding general and more than likely would visit the White House and meet the President. In 1842, Phelps commented on the highly experience of several days in the capital: “Washington is a fascinating [sic] place for a young
man, he finds himself somehow a fellow apple floating down the tide with the great men of the country." With his self-importance confirmed and perhaps his hopes for the future raised, a lieutenant could then face three or four more years on the frontier.  

In the 1890s the contours of army life changed. With the end of the Indian wars many of the small posts no longer served any need and were abandoned. The resulting concentration of troops in larger garrisons broadened possibilities for training as well as for a more amenable social life. Athletics began to flourish. No longer were lieutenants dependent on their particular regiments for promotion as the War Department began to make such promotion by branch. This eliminated one of the most gnawing irritations of the era. There was greater emphasis on professional improvement with compulsory examinations for promotion, required attendance at post lycceums and the newly introduced efficiency reports.

The Spanish-American War established the Army on a new plateau. Although the war was brief, the new colonial responsibilities brought about a permanently larger army. By 1910, there were 4,310 officers and almost 67,500 men in this service. During the Spanish War and in the period of the Philippine Insurrection, as had happened in the Civil War era, many former enlisted men and civilians entered the officer corps. The trend toward professionalism continued with increased emphasis on education. And there were the beginnings of mechanization as the Army purchased its first airplanes and trucks. Nevertheless, a frontier veteran would have felt at home virtually until World War I.

In the first few years of the century, a sizeable number of Civil War veterans remained on active duty. The 1900 Register indicated that all of the general officers in the line, all of the regimental commanders, and a considerable proportion of field grade officers and captains had served in that war. Retirement soon forced all off the active list; however, a former drummer boy, John L. Clem, did not retire until August 1915—a couple of months after Dwight Eisenhower and his classmates became second lieutenants.

Although Congress raised the pay in 1908, it was reluctant to permit the Army to abandon some of the frontier posts. Thus Indian war veterans and some future World War II commanders served together in small garrison posts built to protect settlers from the Indians.

When William H. Simpson, who commanded the Ninth Army in World War II, reported to his first assignment in the Sixth Infantry Regiment in 1909, he found himself in a battalion post—Fort Lincoln, North Dakota. At that time a battalion had less than 300 men. He recalled that it was "... almost a Civil War Army that I joined. ... The life was kind of simple; yet there was a discipline there that was very fine, and they were all reliable people." Promotion was still slow. Those of Gen. Simpson's classmates who went into the Coast Artillery Corps and Engineers made first lieutenant in two
and three years respectively. But the Field Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry second lieutenants had to wait up to seven years. Simpson waited until July 1916 as did the World War II Eighth Army Commander, Robert L. Eichelberger, while Jacob L. Devers (Sixth Army Group) and George S. Patton (Third Army) were promoted in April and May of that year. 30

It was difficult for some old timers to adjust to new machines and to shake off the customs established through years of routine. Louis M. Nuttman, a graduate of the Class of 1895, recalled that during his first tour his unit did the paperwork with pen and ink. Every two months when they prepared multiple copies of the muster rolls, it was customary for the officers, the first sergeant and the company clerk to gather at company headquarters. While one read the master copy, the others would follow in their manuscript copies to insure exact duplication. Years later, after the introduction of the typewriter, one old company commander of Nuttman's acquaintance still required a group reading to insure that all of the carbons were alike. 31

Some of the younger officers found a way out of this routine. Carl Spaatz spent only thirteen months with the 25th Infantry before he went to flight school in 1915. As he said later: "... it was a monotonous life. That's the reason I decided to get out of it and get in the flying game." 32 It was dangerous but an earlier air pioneer, Benjamin D. Foulois, did not let that bother him. He had served in the ranks and had fought the Moros in the Philippines. Later he recalled: "Someone asked me how I lived through the early days of flying. I told them that anyone who lived through the fighting in the Philippines could live through anything." 33

The horse was much more prominent than the airplane in the Army of that day. Riding was an art cultivated to the peak at the Mounted Service School at Fort Riley where weapons and tactics were rarely mentioned. 34 Polo was the game which entranced the Army and officers, their ladies, and the children rode, jumped and hunted on horseback. It is no wonder that when young Spaatz paid court to the daughter of a cavalry colonel that the older gentleman might worry about the situation.

One evening at Fort Sam Houston after Spaatz had taken the girl out on a date, the colonel said to his wife: "Edith, I don't like Ruth going out with this young Spaatz so much." Mrs. Harrison responded: "Why not, Ralph? He's a very nice young man." "I know," the colonel said, "But he's in that fly-by-night thing—this Air Service. Never amount to anything, he'll never amount to anything." 34

There has always been an Old Army and inevitably those who dwell on its glories, hardships or, at the least, its differences. This can be boring to the listeners, but on those frontier posts there was not much hope of escape for the youngster pinned down by the old timer who also happened to be a superior officer. One lieutenant, a future Chief of Staff, did solve the prob-
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

lem. Hugh L. Scott confided his technique to his mother. "... this is too much of a Tad Regiment for the old fogies—too many young Tads—[this was the Seventh Cavalry in 1878, hence, because of the losses at Little Big Horn, there was an unusually large number of new and younger faces.] When some old Capt. gets to bulldozing a youngster all the rest come to his assistance and the Capt. has no peace at the mess or anywhere else. ... No talk about the 'Old Army' and the 'service is going to the dogs' here—we all commence talking about what we did and saw at Cobb in '49 and it soon chokes off the 'Old Army'—".36

There is your antidote, gentlemen.

Professor Edward M. Coffman served in the United States Army from 1951 to 1953 and received his Ph.D. from the University of Kentucky in 1959. He has been on the University of Wisconsin faculty since 1961 and was appointed to the Advisory Committee, Office of the Department of the Army, in 1972. He received a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1973. Professor Coffman's best known works include The Hill of the Sword: The Career of General Peyton C. March and The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I. He is presently writing a social history of the United States Army.
Notes


5. The Adjutant General for the Secretary of War, July 30, 1846, WDAR, 1846, 71–74. Career biographical sketches of officers are in Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army from its Organization, September 29, 1789, to March 2, 1903, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1903), 1; Weigley, op cit, 231, 291.


7. John Bell Hood, Advance and Retreat (New Orleans, 1890), 6; Sherman to Thomas, November 29, 1853, in Papers Relating to Brown's Monument, Box 23; Adjutant General's Office General Information Index, Record Group 9 National Archives.


9. Albert Todd, The Class of '77 at the United States Military Academy (Cambridge, Mass, 1878), 57, 68–73. There are forty letters from graduates in this volume.


11. W. A. Crofton (ed), Fifty Years in Camp and Field: Diary of Major General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, USA (New York, 1969), 42, 47. William B. Skelton has come across 45 officer duels in the period 1794–1860. He believes that figure to be low. Skelton, "Professionalization in the US Army Officer Corps During the Age of Jackson." Armed Forces and Society, Vol 1, #4 (Summer, 1975), 469.

12. Crook unpublished autobiography, 1852–1865, Crook-Kernan Papers, USAMHRC.


14. Diary, December 21, 1877, John Bigelow, Jr., Papers, USMA Library.


18. Duncan, op cit, 17–18; Godfrey to mother, December 5, 1889.

19. W. M. Wallace to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arizona, July 19, 1877, #2383 DA 1879 filed with Diann M. Greene #1428ACP 1873, Record Group 94, National Archives. Greene attempted to get back at his erstwhile companion in his booklength critique Ladies and Officers of the United States Army or American Aristocracy, A Sketch of the Social Life and Character of the Army (Chicago, 1880, "Sex, Women, and the 'Old Army Officers,"
in Grady McWhiney, Southerners and Other Americans (New York, 1973), 39-60 is a scholarly attempt which deals with this facet of army life prior to the Civil War.

20. Heintzelman Diary, October 2, 1830; Phelps to John Hackman, May 11, 1856, and to John W. de Peyster, August 30, 1859. During the Civil War, Phelps became a brigadier general of volunteers. He was one of the first to enlist black troops and resigned because of the resulting controversy. In 1880, he ran for President as the Anti-Mason candidate. Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge, La, 1964), 368-369.


25. Phelps to Helen, January 21, 1842, Phelps Papers. See also Heintzelman Diary, August 1831-January 1832; Withers Diary, October 1836-January 1857; Morison, op. cit., 73-81.


34. The Ramp of 1912, the yearbook of this school, illustrates this point.


Perspectives in the History of Military Education and Professionalism

Richa A. Preston

An anniversary is a time for the recognition of achievement. At its twenty-fifth anniversary, the United States Air Force Academy, although young among the world's military colleges, has achieved a great deal. Created in time to produce officers for America's longest and most difficult war in which air power was a prime factor, it was invaluable for the production of officers for the prosecution of that war. At the same time, with the twin advantages of the experiences of its sister colleges and a new start, it has pioneered progress in military education.

But an anniversary is also an occasion for self-examination. In 1902, Julian Corbett, historian of the Royal Navy, fearing that in a crisis the Navy might be found as deficient as the British Army had recently been in South Africa, wrote as follows: "When we see a department of state [he meant the Admiralty], sitting aloft like Buddha contemplating its own perfections, experience assures us there is something seriously wrong. Any airy admission that you have reached your standard of perfection is a certain indication of decadence... It is an old and treasured saying that Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton. It is at least equally true that Colenso [a shattering defeat at the hands of the Boers] was lost in her classrooms." Armed forces must meet whatever changes social and technological developments require, otherwise, as Corbett warned, they will "rot." This principle applies equally to service academies.

Lt. Col. David MacIsaac of this Academy has indicated that the Vietnam War led American professional long-service officers to ponder seriously the role of the military in society. Any such consideration must take into account the past history of officer production. As no full definitive history of military education exists to guide us, this brief lecture can only be my personal assessment of a few vignettes to stimulate thought and decision on a topic that demands continual attention.

I shall address the creation of professional officer corps in Prussia, France, and Britain during the nineteenth century and add a few observations on the adaptation of officer corps to the needs of the twentieth century, with special reference to developments in the United States. These three examples were chosen because they are in the period when military profes-
sionalism developed. Although the social climate was different from to-
day's, when due allowance is made for that circumstance, the problems
faced were remarkably similar to ours. If my survey does no more than
demonstrate that the problems we face in military education are complex
and persistent, and that attempted solutions have almost invariably fallen
short, it will have served its purpose—that of encouraging open minds to
accept the need for continual adaptation.

But I must first trace some aspects of officer development prior to the
nineteenth century to show why military academies emerged. Greek citizen
phalanxes and Roman legions had more in common with modern military
organizations than had the feudal levies that followed them. Some classical
military formations, the phalanx for instance, may have been deliberately
imitated in the early modern period, and classical education and thought
were dominant in the Western world until late in the nineteenth century; so
we might expect to find some continuity in officer production from the
classical period or some parallels. But the rigid phalanx, as well as the
somewhat more flexible legion, had little need of junior officers and thus of
officer training. Greek hoplites were literally pushed into their places in the
ranks, and orders were passed back from front to rear. The liberty-loving
Greeks also talked back to their instructors. Most Greek armies were led by
elected officials. Early Roman legions were commanded by aristocrats who
served first in the cavalry. Centurions were more like senior NCOs than
company commanders or platoon leaders, and they had no prospect of
senior command.¹

Yet there were precedents. Xenophon tells us that Socrates quizzed a
man who had attended a military school and found that his course had been
limited to drill. The great philosopher commented that drill was only the
smallest part of military command, and he noted the need for instruction in
supply, planning, and effective management. He also said that intelligence
was more important for leadership than long experience.¹ This anecdote
suggests that problems that occurred in later periods have a long history; but
neither the Greeks nor the Romans succeeded in fashioning an effective
system for overcoming them or for training officers. We have inherited
nothing in this area from the classical period, unless it is the negative lesson
that lack of a sound officer corps backed by good education and training
may eventually be followed by decay.

Feudal society and feudal armies were very different from those of our
own day, yet some aspects of their military leadership have exercised a great
influence on ideas about military education right down to the present.
Knighthood was the equivalent of a commission and the qualification for
command in the field.¹ But the knight received no military education except
weapons training for, and in, tournaments. His early training as a page had
been designed to teach loyalty and obedience and to "civilizing process, a
kind of general education. In his next stage, squirehood, he had been an aide to a knight, carrying his armour and learning to handle weapons. Chaucer’s description of the squire strikes a familiar note. He was,

A lover and a lusty bachelor
Of twenty years of age, . . . I guess
Of his stature he was of medium height,
And wonderfully active and great of strength
Singing he was, or fluting all day,
He was as fresh as in the month of May.
Well could he sit a horse and excellently ride,
He could songs make and well indite,
Joust, also dance, draw well, and write.
So hot he loved that by the nightentale
He slept no more than doth the nightingale.
Courteous he was, lowly, and serviceable,
And carved before his father at the table.

The duty in the last line is I believe now restricted to fourth-classmen; but most of the rest of the description—with suitable allowance for the day and age—could fit most modern cadets. A fifteenth-century source said it was “proper that a squire first serve and be subject before he became a lord. Otherwise he would not understand the nobility of his authority when he became a knight.” Although some modern psychologists have denied that one must learn to follow before one can lead, this is still one of the fundamentals of cadet training.

The most important concept knighthood had handed on to us is the code of chivalry. In the Middle Ages, religion and chivalry became inextricably mingled, and though the general education of the knight did not include much of contemporary scholasticism, the church taught him simple lessons of honor and conduct. Those whose business it was to administer force (or to “manage violence” in the terminology of modern sociology) had to use it only for the protection of the fair sex and the weak, that is to say, of civilization. Most modern armies have adopted from that source the idea that an officer must have the qualities of a gentleman. Although it is no longer associated with aristocratic birth, this idea is still an essential concept in character development for military professionalism.

Feudal military structure, based on the service of the knight who held
land in return for providing defense, stability, and security, was remarkably effective in those respects over several centuries. Yet, from the first, the feudal hierarchical structure had innate weaknesses as a command system. As a result, two distinct phenomena appeared, especially after the rise of a money economy and cities. These were mercenary troops and city-state militiamen. John Schlight of this Academy has shown that the role of mercenaries in medieval warfare has been greatly underestimated; and Professor Alfred Vagts in his *History of Militarism* has argued that what smashed feudalism was not a technical invention, gunpowder, but socio-political change represented by the phalanxes of plebian pikemen from the cities and rapid-firing cross-bowmen and long-bowmen. Mercenary leaders of these new forces presumably learned their trade by a kind of apprenticeship system. Thus Gonsalvo de Cordoba, the “Great Captain” who served the Emperor Charles V in the sixteenth century, taught two successive generations of military leaders through apprenticeship.

Machiavelli had already shown, however, that independent mercenary bands were a menace to order and that they could be at the same time militarily inefficient. Feudal monarchs, and also the bourgeoisie, wanted a more reliable military force and system of command. Jacques Coeur, the merchant financier who was adviser to France’s King Charles VII in the fifteenth century, suggested a means of overcoming the unreliability of mercenaries, namely, by the creation of a standing army to take some of them into permanent royal service. What was needed next was a means of producing officers for the royal army. Several centuries were to pass before service academies were created to meet this need, but France, the strongest power in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, began in the meantime to move in that direction. Although the French nobility had resented Charles’s usurpation of their traditional right to raise and command troops, many young gentlemen sought careers in the royal armies. There were two roads to a commission: by service as a page in a royal or noble court or by service as a gentleman-volunteer in the ranks. Unfortunately, both methods had serious shortcomings. Pages, like their medieval predecessors, saw the finer side of contemporary life but got little or no military instruction and discipline. In 1587, François de la Noue declared that pages had become slack in speech, blasphemous, destructive, and mendacious. They were as inattentive to lessons in mathematics (already becoming important for the profession of arms with the introduction of gunpowder) as they were to sermons. They rejected discipline, dressed improperly, caused mayhem in the streets, and even fought pitched battles with rival pages of other courts. On the other hand, youths “trailing a pike” as gentlemen-volunteers in the regiments got practical military experience but learned discipline from the debonair men who were their teachers. De la Noue’s proposed solution was the establish-
SOLDIERS AND ARMIES

ment of military academies. In 1604, Henry IV did found a military school at La Flèche for the sons of penurious nobles and the orphans of officers. He put it under the control of the leading educators of the day, the Jesuits. But as it stressed general education and moral instruction for boys, the school at La Flèche was more likely a preparatory school or junior military college than a modern military academy.

For the next century and a half, the French Bourbon kings experimented with various means of establishing a loyal and efficient officer corps. The natural source of officers was still from among the descendants of the feudal nobility who regarded military leadership as their natural gift and right. The monarchy wished to use them to counterbalance the growing economic power of the bourgeoisie, and with landed property declining in relative value, a career in royal service was an attraction. But the nobility, especially those who lived in the provinces, preferred robust sports to literary studies. Many were unschooled and also resisted intellectual effort and study. Courses at court for young nobles, the attachment of "cadets" (younger sons in aristocratic families) to regiments in the army, and the creation of special companies of cadets stationed in garrison towns, were all tried from time to time to train young officers, but they were as often abandoned because discipline was difficult to maintain or because the cadets resisted academic instruction. A few sons of farmers or city merchants managed to break the nobles' monopoly of commissions by the end of the eighteenth century, but these were rare exceptions to the rule that military leadership was based on birth and to its assumed corollary that nobly born leaders had little need for systematic education or training.

A growing need for mathematical expertise in warfare prompted a break in this traditional monopoly of commissions by the nobility. The development of artillery and fortifications, the use of geometric knowledge to invest cities and even to conduct infantry drill, and the emerging science of sea navigation all figured in the appearance of technical academies at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Two such schools became more than transitory: the École du Corps Royal du Génie at Mézières, which gave the most advanced technical education in France beginning in 1748-49, and the artillery school established at La Fère in 1756. Because the nobility looked down on the technical commissions offered by these schools, Louis XV's Foreign Minister, Count D'Argenson, the founder of Mézières, admitted sons from middle class families.

The first non-technical military academy appeared almost concurrently in 1751 when Louis XV founded the École Royale Militaire in Paris. That monarch questioned the attitude of officers who confused honor with bravery and were more inclined to die uselessly than to accept instruction in military knowledge, as well as the views of those educated in the contemporary colleges and schools stimulated by the Enlightenment and emphasizing
rhetoric and literary studies who were inclined to question orders. Even though Louis was worried lest the disorders earlier experienced in the cadet companies would recur at the École Royale Militaire, he let himself be persuaded by D'Argenson and the royal mistress, Madame Pompadour, to open the new academy.

At first, the École Royale Militaire admitted boys from eight to eleven years old whose four grandparents were all of noble birth to give them an eight-year course leading to commissions as lieutenants. There were scholarships for the sons of impoverished nobles, but the wealthy nobility gained a monopoly of the school's advantage. In 1776, this school, for which the admission age had been raised to fourteen, was closed down for a year when the old problem of cadet insubordination broke out. After the École Royale Militaire reopened, it became the centerpiece in a reorganized officer training system, preparing only the best graduates from ten colleges in the provinces. The top École Militaire mathematical graduates joined the artillery; others went to the non-technical corps. The most famous graduate of this system was Napoleon Bonaparte, who started his preparation to be an officer at the regional college in Brienne and graduated from the École Militaire in 1785.

At this Academy's 1969 Military History Symposium, Professor David Bien produced contemporary evidence that suggested that when École Royale Militaire was founded there was a conscious intention to stress mathematics, not so much for its immediate military application as because contemporary civilian education was based on rhetoric and the classics which were believed to be more suitable for training the minds of scholars than of soldiers. Bien saw a deliberate intention to make the army a separate world by virtue of its distinctive educational system. This argument, that mathematics is more suitable than are the liberal arts for training minds to make the kinds of decisions that a military man faces, has long been used in support of a mathematical curriculum in military academies and has persisted to our time. Whether the argument is as valid today as it was then is a matter of debate. However, what was probably more important about the establishment of the École Royale Militaire than its mathematical bent was that the French had discovered that the best way to produce officers was in a military academy rather than through apprenticeship training with the regiments. That discovery included not merely the realization that the academy was more suitable for cultivating study; it also made for better discipline.

During the nineteenth century, military and naval academies proliferated. Although the French royal academies were abolished during the Revolution as havens of privilege, they were soon replaced by very similar institutions. About the same time, Sandhurst opened in Great Britain and West Point in the United States. The creation of similar academies within a short space of time in three of the great democratic powers of the future was
largely coincidental. Yet their appearance provided each of those three countries at almost the same moment with the essential base for what emerged in all great states during the course of the nineteenth century, a military profession that could claim in important respects to be kin to the older professions of law, medicine, and religion.

Samuel P. Huntington has shown that a profession differs from a trade in that the skills involved are not merely mastered by an apprentice "without reference to what has gone before," but are general in application without respect to time or place, are intellectual by nature, are capable of preservation in writing, and are dependent upon knowledge of their historical application. Furthermore, the professional man or woman has a responsibility in the functioning of society and is a member of a corporate association or bureaucracy that governs the application of his or her skills. The particular function of the military profession is the organized management of violence in the interests of the preservation of society, a very complex task without which civilization cannot exist and one which therefore requires intensive study and dedication. Military professionalism calls for a trained mind and for a broad study of war's purpose and of methods and problems in conducting it. The officer who is only interested in drill, ceremony, and discipline, important as those are, is thus not fully professional. Nor is the technical expert *ipso facto* a military professional. Finally, the officer trained only for low-level tactical operations is not yet a fully-trained professional in the complete sense. Military academies, even though usually not the only means of entry to a professional career, set the basis for, and the criteria of, professional standards. Academies thus have made military professionalism possible. In turn, they have had to meet requirements which professionalism imposes.

Everyone in service academies is aware that there is an inherent conflict between two aspects of officer production, education and training. Military training is assumed by its advocates to produce greater dedication, decisiveness, loyalty, leadership, and technical proficiency, while education is supposed by them to disperse effort into often unnecessary and irrelevant intellectual pursuits, foster questioning and diffidence, and end the essential homogeneity of a disciplined force. From the opposite viewpoint, education is held to develop independent and original thought, while too much devotion to training is alleged to crush initiative and to close minds.

This supposed dichotomy is, however, misleading. Brig. Gen. Robert McDermtt, one of the founding fathers of this Academy, has shown that there is no truth in the belief that an academic program promotes intellectual talent at the expense of leadership training or personal athletic ability; and Col. Monte Wright, another former member of this faculty, has argued persuasively that the apparent conflict in the Academy is valuable prepara-
tion for confrontations that cadets will meet later in their careers. Excessive stress on the conflict between training and education is, however, unfortunate because it detracts from the overriding goal, production of a professional officer who can meet all demands made upon him in peace and in war. The most serious result of this overemphasis on a dichotomy in officer production is that it grossly oversimplifies the tensions that lie within systems of military education. What I plan to do here is to examine nineteenth-century examples of those tensions.

There are at least three, perhaps four, distinct processes within officer-production systems. These are the development of personal qualities of character and leadership, general education, military training, and professional education. But there are large areas of coincidence among all four of these major objectives and processes. Thus general education is what any educated man needs to enable him to lead a useful life in society, including following any chosen career or profession; but some general or liberal studies also have considerably more relevance than others to professional military development. Furthermore, character-building is an essential component of all other elements.

But what was most important historically in regard to these four processes in officer-production was the time in life when each occurred, that is, in early youth, on reaching early manhood before commissioning, or later in an officer's career. Another complication was that the education of special technical officers appeared to require different curricula from that for line officers in the army, deck officers in the navy, and flying officers in the air force. More difficult was the identification of military character with social position. These problems have had a long history during which service academies responded imperfectly to technical, and even more so to social, change.

Although nineteenth-century military technology and the teaching of practical science in military academies no longer had the monopolistic lead enjoyed in eighteenth-century Europe, the obvious need to keep abreast of potential enemies, as well as the spinoff for non-military development, were incentives that inspired one aspect of professionalism and propped up the quality of military technical academies and the technical corps. But it was very different with officer-production systems as a whole. There were, of course, many officers in all countries who, from habits and interests developed in early schooling or from personal inclination, continued to grow intellectually throughout their careers. But in the officer-production systems as they became institutionalized, identification of qualities of leadership with those of an upper class, resistance by many officers to intellectual effort that seemed to them to be alien to the practical job of soldiering, the concept that a mathematical foundation essential for technical officers was also the best means of fostering the kind of mind all officers required, and
the classical tradition in British public school education hampered progress towards effective reform of military education and the leavening of the whole officer corps.

Huntington credits Prussia with having originated the military profession.30 In the eighteenth century, German princes had imitated French experiments with cadet companies and had then turned to Kadet-Akademies. These academies instructed artillery officers in mathematics but often despised other scholarship as “useless drivelling.” Frederick the Great, who once said “if experience were all a great general needs, the greatest would be Prince Eugene’s mules,” set up a special school in Berlin to turn out scholarly staff officers, but he did not attempt to raise the intellectual level of the vast majority of army officers who came from country districts where a preliminary education was not available.31 However, after the great defeat at Jena in 1806 at the hands of Napoleon, a Prussian cabinet order dated August 6, 1808, declared that the selection of officers in peacetime, and their further promotion, should be based on professional knowledge and education.32 In theory and in law, this was a case for military professionalism and the death-knell of the Prussian landed aristocracy’s monopoly of commissions through the concept that birth endowed the qualities needed for leadership.

The Prussian avowed objective in the nineteenth century was to ensure that all officers had a good general education followed by a sound professional education. Most young officers came from cadet houses, residential military schools with many free places for the sons of army officers and state servants, which were designed to build a strong military spirit. They gave a general education with professional subjects only in the senior year for selected cadets. Preselected prospective officers passed from the cadet houses to conscript service in the regiment before going on to divisional schools for professional education. In the divisional schools, military authorities exercised strict control over the quality of instruction. Classes were small and were said to cultivate powers of reasoning rather than the accumulation of factual knowledge. Curricula were practical rather than theoretical. Mathematics (which was left for later study by those who showed aptitude) and languages were excluded. Instruction was limited to reconnaissance sketching, military law and administration, drill, fencing, riding, and gymnastics.

The operation of the Prussian system was, however, much less open than it appeared on the surface. So much attention was given to accepted practical military qualifications, both moral and physical, that those attributes were often allowed to compensate for partial failure in theoretical attainments.33 Cadet houses were class-ridden and largely restricted to the sons of the nobility. Competition was minimized throughout the whole Prussian educational system, and in the Army, it was confined to promotion to the
senior class in the cadet houses and to entrance to the War Academy for senior staff officers. The reference to educational qualifications in the cabinet order in 1808 had indeed been qualified by a statement that “the chief requirements for a good officer are not knowledge and technical ability alone but presence of mind, rapid perception, punctuality, and accuracy, not to mention proper behavior.” As Army entrance examination standards were low, colonels of regiments used this to give preference to applicants with noble backgrounds; and regimental messes also exercised a veto on admission to their comradeship.

In his book *The German Officer Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945*, Karl Demeter argued that throughout the nineteenth century there was a great struggle in Prussia between those who wanted to improve the intellectual quality of the officer corps and those who emasculated the regulations in order to permit the aristocracy to retain its privileged position on the alleged ground that it provided the best military leadership. “Military diehards” regarded bourgeois officers as an unfortunate necessity. In 1859, when study in the divisional schools was made obligatory for all officers except entrants from the universities, it was deemed necessary to add that bad spelling and grammar were to be causes of rejection, an indication of the prevailing acceptance of low standards from the cadet houses. An attempt to impose a university entrance standard on the commissioning system was unsuccessful, and special exceptions from educational standards continued for members of noble families. The debate raged on until the eve of World War I. In 1860, sixty-five percent of the total officer corps was of noble birth. By 1913, the percentage had been reduced to thirty, but that reduction had only come about because of the great shortage of officers. The rationale for the theory that noble birth provided the necessary personal qualifications for military leadership often went as far as an assertion that too much education made bad officers.

The nineteenth-century Prussian officer production system thus assumed that an officer’s general education had been completed before commissioning but did not ensure this by competitive selection; furthermore, it allowed an assessment of personal characteristics, often based on social class, to override educational qualifications. Post-commissioning training was practical rather than theoretical and did not encourage intellectual effort. Prussian military professionalism, much admired by the end of the nineteenth century, was thus not maintained by the system of selection or by the quality of the divisional professional school but rather by competitive selection for the high level War College and the General Staff. The Prussians fell far short of their ideal of professional standards for all officers as announced in 1808.

In contrast to nineteenth-century Prussia, the rejection of aristocratic privilege in France reduced the potential impact of social discrimination in
SOLDIERS AND ARMIES

officer-production. The Revolution had brought the closure of Mésières as well as of the École Royale Militaire, and as Robespierre wanted to officer the Army with sans-culottes, he opened a purely training school called École de Mars. But as this did not provide technical officers, a civilian engineering school, École Centrale des Travaux Publics, was established in 1794. A year later it became the École Polytechnique charged with producing qualified technical men for the Army as well as for public service. In 1803, after Robespierre's training school had proved quite useless, the Consulate opened the École Spéciale Militaire at Fontainebleau, which moved the next year to St. Cyr. Polytechnique and St. Cyr, the two military schools offering commissions, quickly became popular because they were among the top scholastic prizes to which a young man could aspire and they were almost the only route to the best employment under the state. By the time of Napoleon III, they had given a great impetus to the nation's education because the lycées fashioned their curricula towards their entrance examinations. From St. Cyr, many graduates went on to the Staff Schools and the General Staff.

Both St. Cyr and Polytechnique were for young men who had completed their general education in the excellent lycées that Napoleon had founded rather than for young boys of secondary school age as in the Prussian system. Because the entrants into St. Cyr and Polytechnique were assumed to have completed most of their general education, the courses in the academies were directed towards professional development. Professional education at both schools was largely theoretical and academic, stressing mathematics and science, and it was assumed that capacity for practical application would be acquired in the regiments. At St. Cyr, however, there were, especially after 1856, lectures in military history and literature, subjects which were neglected in school competition for entry.

The big difference between the French and Prussian systems of education, both generally and in the services, was that France placed heavy emphasis on competition and recruited more widely. Entry to the Polytechnique and St. Cyr was by academic competition (with particular attention to mathematics), and there were competitive examinations throughout the courses. There was fierce competition for the twenty-five to thirty places available in the Staff School which went to St. Cyr graduates. Because École Polytechnique was the means of entry to civilian employment in government technical positions, the standards of the military engineers and artillery officers who graduated from there were enhanced. Choice of career and of service depended on placement in examinations.

The standard of education of French officers in the nineteenth century was higher than, for instance, that of their contemporaries in the British Army, but according to Charles de Gaulle, they lacked broad vision. Before the Franco-Prussian War, a noticeable difference from Prussian military
education was that education virtually ceased on commissioning. There were no post-commissioning schools in the French Army except for the staff schools and the practical engineering and artillery school at Metz. Study (except of cartography) was frowned on as a self-serving attempt to gain at the expense of brother officers. This standard of values was to linger on after 1870 when, for instance, one candidate for promotion, who advanced as his chief qualification that he had studied geology, found that the board had no use for him until it learned, "He rides a horse like a centaur." Gen. MacMahon is alleged to have said that he removed from the promotion list any officer whose name he found on the cover of a book. According to the historian of the French Army, Revol, the usual qualifications for promotion were a good physique, good health, and a correct bearing. He said that in the infantry the latter meant looking upon an officer's work as being similar to that of a corporal: holding the thumb tightly to the stripes on the pantaloons, and keeping the eyes fixed fifteen paces ahead while listening to the colonel. There were many first-class specialists in the French Army, former Polytechnicians, but they were ironically called savantes; and, unfortunately, the special nature of their technical knowledge blocked broad vision. Other officers gifted with superior intelligence too often stayed so long in an office job that they lost their sense of action. Competition in academic examination for entry to St. Cyr and Polytechnique and in their curricula
had thus failed to develop adequate professional standards because intellect
and education were given inadequate weight in further promotion. In 1870,
the failure of military professionalism added to other weaknesses contrib-
uted to defeat.39

As had been the case with Prussia in 1806, France's downfall led to a
military revival. The period of conscription was raised to five years, a more
effective staff college was established, and officers received instruction in
handling large formations. Applications for St. Cyr increased significantly,
and the great majority of Polytechnicians chose a military instead of a civil
career. Several new schools were founded for NCOs and for the various
corps of the Army, and French officers gained a habit of work they had
previously lacked. They began to write technical papers, and their intellec-
tual standards continued to compare favorably with those in any other army
right down to 1914. The enlargement of the Army provided more opportu-
nity for commissions and promotions, and the officer corps attracted a new
elite. The Army basked in public favor.39

This new prestige of the military did not last. French democratic opin-
on was opposed to the formation of a military caste like that in Germany
fed by its junior military schools. A call for economy in the 1880s led to a
reduction of the period of conscription to three years, and public opinion
compelled the application of conscription to the sons of the rich and to
intellectuals who had hitherto avoided it. As a result of these things, hostil-
ity in important quarters brought ridicule of the Army by part of the public
press. Long periods of garrison duty in peacetime soon had their usual
effect, the fostering of sedentary attitudes that weakened the spirit of the
officer corps. Career openings became limited, and promotion was subject
to favoritism. Unpopular colonial campaigns and unpopular duty in aid of
the civil power to suppress strikes and disorders undermined morale and
threatened the French officer's freedom of thought. Reduction of the term
of enlistment to two years after 1905 imposed heavy training duties on the
officers and NCOs. Political disputes between left and right in the nation
and the Boulanger and Dreyfus incidents which stemmed from them re-
moved much of the patriotic glow that had transformed France in the 1870s.
In the twenty years before 1914, the number of candidates for St. Cyr fell
from thirty-four hundred to eight hundred. There was a deficiency of eight
hundred lieutenants in the combatant arms, and there were increased appli-
cations for commissions in the service corps. In the Army and the country,
aCRimonious disputes arose about the relative merits of a professional army
as against an "armed nation.” By 1913, staff teaching had fastened, as if in
desperation, on a faulty creed of strategic and tactical offensive in all cir-
cumstances. Gen. Charles de Gaulle claimed later that the extent to which
promotions to high command came to depend on political compromises
meant that in 1914 half of the generals had to be dismissed. France's military
revival after her defeat in 1871 and the cultivation of intellectual interests in her military educational institutions had been unable to overcome the country's internal maladies which were to bring her close to defeat in 1914-18.40

In Prussia, the military disasters in the Napoleonic wars had been the impetus for change. In France, the Revolution had brought military professionalism, and defeat in 1871 had reinforced it. Britain, lacking either of these impulses and safe behind its naval shield, retained its eighteenth-century military system for at least half a century after reform had come on the continent. British officer-production continued to be built around the concept that military leadership was a natural concomitant of social status. Until purchase was abolished, there was no possibility of the British officer corps acquiring professional qualifications to fit it to meet the problems of modern wars.

But for a long time the purchase system was popular. It produced an officer corps, relatively cheaply for the taxpayer, from the younger sons of the wealthy classes. For many officers, a commission was an investment that yielded a pleasant career, social amenities, and the equivalent of a retirement pension. As in the eighteenth century, officers came from a class accustomed to giving orders and whose authority was accepted by subordinates. Many of these officers possessed a high sense of honor and duty and were conscientious, keen, and strong in morale based on regimental pride. Indeed, a leading British military historian, Brian Bond, argues that there is overwhelming evidence that the aristocratic officers of the nineteenth century had a passionate concern for professional development. It must also be noted that the sons of upper middle-class families, fashioning themselves on the landed gentry, were included by a system in which money bought the admission ticket.

On the other hand, purchase was a deterrent to efficiency when the Army continually emphasized the importance of character, which it equated with class, at the expense of intellect, which was regarded as of little immediate practical use to the average officer. As promotion was also subject to purchase, a rich man could command a regiment at thirty, and the ignorance of some commanding officers was appalling. Officers in the cavalry and infantry learned their trade in the regiment or troop. Those assigned to colonial garrisons, the chief occupation of half the Army, relied on practical rules of thumb rather than intellect to solve recurrent problems. In colonial warfare with ill-armed native peoples, visible courage was more valued than the contributions of technical specialists, who introduced tensions that the Army found unacceptable. Conformity was preferred over originality. At home, military duty took up only half an officer's time. Routine duties were left to NCOs and those officers too impoverished to pursue outside interests. Officers with artistic interests sketched, sang, or engaged in amateur theatricals, but few read books. Intellectual life hardly existed, and those who had
a personal bent that way often expended it in unrelated interests like geology or Asian cultures. Military theory, which should have been the basis for military decision making, related only to techniques of drills, rituals, and ceremonies that allegedly supported the development of such characteristics as steadiness on parade which were regarded as the big tests of soldierly qualities.

There were exceptions. Capt. Charles Kincaid-Lennox of the Life Guards became a Fellow of academically prestigious All Souls' College, Oxford, and Generals Sir John Fox Burgoyne, Sir Charles William Pasley, and Sir William Napier wrote important military works. Yet Burgoyne was one of the most articulate opponents of the abolition of purchase. The British officers' traditions, says Correlli Barnett, were "against books and study and in favour of a hard gallop, a gallant fight, and a full jug."

The history of British officer-production shows the nature of the problems that impeded the development of true professionalism even more clearly than that of France and Germany. Its repeated investigations and abortive reforms therefore need to be told in more detail. Britain had established a technical military academy for engineer and artillery officers as early as Mézières. What would become the Royal Military Academy (RMA) had originated at Woolwich about 1741, and from 1761 its graduates received commissions in the Royal Engineers without purchase. But for half a century, RMA's academic standards for admission and for progression through its courses were low. The cadets were callow youths, some of whom were admitted when only ten years old. Bullying was rife and was used to organize cadet resistance to study. Admission was by nomination by distinguished patrons until 1855, when open competition at the age of fifteen upwards was introduced, but this brought little improvement. The curriculum included mathematics, French, German, history, geography, drawing, and fortification, with practical classes in artillery, surveying, field work, and geology. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Royal Military Academy had only one redeeming feature, the prestige of its faculty which included Michael Faraday, the distinguished pioneer in electro-magnetism.

The introduction of academy training for non-technical officers in the British Army was the work of Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Gaspard Le Merchant, a Channel Islander who had seen the incompetence of British staff work in 1794 during the Duke of York's campaigns in Flanders. Le Merchant proposed the establishment of a "college" (the word may have been used to distinguish it from RMA) to train boys, cadets, officers, and NCOs. Two parts of this project, the courses for cadets and officers, were established as the Royal Military College (RMC), with its Senior Department at Marlow to train staff officers and its Junior Department at High Wycombe to educate cadets for commissions. In 1812, the Junior Department was moved to a new location at Sandhurst, where it was joined by the Senior Department in
1820. Both Departments decayed after Waterloo, however, when military needs were not pressing, and fell far short of Le Merchant's intentions. The Junior Department, admitting boys from thirteen years up by nomination with only an elementary qualifying examination, had a curriculum similar to the English "public" schools (English, grammar, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, languages, and geography) with the addition of a little military instruction and without the public schools' instruction in the classics. (In England, the "public" schools are private residential preparatory schools.) Cadets who successfully passed an oral examination after completing six "steps" in the curriculum were given direct free commissions. Those who did not complete the course could still enter the Army by buying the commissions, and many did so.

By 1849, RMC's popularity was at a low ebb. Its total enrollment was only one hundred and forty-five. Government appropriations had been eliminated. The staff had been reduced, and parents thought they were not getting an adequate return for the fees. There was prejudice in the Army against RMC graduates because they had not received the same basic classical education as other officers who entered by purchase from the public Royal Military College at Sandhurst, Great Britain, where it was relocated in the early nineteenth century.
Two anonymous articles in the *Quarterly Review* in 1846 and 1848 contrasted British military education with continental European systems and severely criticized Sandhurst. The author said the Army should be more than a means whereby a young gentleman could spend his early years in idleness; he should be given an intellectual foundation and tasks to fit him to take care of the lives of brave men and the honor and interests of the nation.31

In 1846, Sidney Herbert, the Secretary-at-War, an administrator with a seat in the cabinet, took up the cause of improving education in the Army.32 About the same time, Earl Grey, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, wrote a memorandum attacking the purchase system. In 1849, it was ruled that all recipients of commissions by purchase must pass a qualifying examination in history, geography, algebra, Euclid, Latin, field fortification, spelling, and handwriting.33 This was the first important step towards the elimination of amateurism in the British Army.

The death in 1852 of the Duke of Wellington, who had been the greatest obstacle to reform of the system that had triumphed at Waterloo, and failures in the Crimean War (1853–1856) opened the way. A parliamentary committee on Sandhurst in 1855 suggested that RMC’s Junior Department be divorced from the Senior Department and amalgamated with RMA,34 but the opposition to reform was still too strong. A year later, a Royal Commission on the System for Training Officers for the Scientific Corps recommended that entrants to Woolwich should be between the ages of sixteen and nineteen and that their preliminary general education should be left to the public schools.35 The new Commander in Chief, the Duke of Cambridge, said it was important to obtain “young gentlemen with a thorough gentleman’s education from the public schools and do away with your military schools as competion nurseries for the Army.”36 It was next decided that the age of admission to Sandhurst should also be raised to between sixteen and eighteen. The British officer training institutions thus moved toward present age limits.

The new system began in 1858 and got off to a bad start. The young men at RMC were given the same rations that had been given earlier to young boys—bread and milk for breakfast and a steady diet of mutton for dinner. The whole body of cadets at Sandhurst mutinied for three days, pelting the Superintendent with hard bread rolls which they had stored up. They were appeased only by the personal appearance of the Commander in Chief.37 More serious problems were that the purchase system was still entrenched and the Army qualifying examination was too low a hurdle.

In 1869, another Royal Commission was appointed to investigate further complaints about the state of military education. The Dufferin Royal Commission of Military Education reported in 1869 that, while it did not expect line officers to have exceptional ability or to do extensive reading, it
did believe that the possession of mental faculties disciplined by intellectual training and a store of well-digested information could be useful to the discharge of their routine duties and would help them to maintain ascendancy over their subordinates. With respect to Sandhurst, the Commission found that even though the College had improved in recent years it was still inefficient. This was partly due to the lack of enough applicants for Sandhurst to make competition for admission feasible. As a result, young men were admitted who had no hope of meeting academic standards and obtaining a commission without purchase. As the Commission noted, these quickly lapsed “during their stay into a condition of sluggish indifference alike pernicious to the intellectual and moral tone of the institution.” Furthermore, as Queen’s Cadets (the sons of officers who could not pay the full fees) and Indian Army Cadets were guaranteed a commission if they had passed a very low qualifying entrance examination, they were even less inclined to industry and so were another very bad influence. Compounding this state of affairs was the predominance of the military over the educational element in college authority.

Based on its studies, the Dufferin Commission made several significant recommendations. Unlike its predecessors, the Commission recommended against combining Woolwich and Sandhurst on the grounds that this would lower the standards existing at Woolwich. With respect to the preparation of young men to enter the two military academies, the Commission observed that most public schools gave a classical education and did not prepare students specifically for the Army entrance examinations, though some schools, Cheltenham, Marlborough, Wellington College, and Harrow, had introduced a course in Modern Studies with the Army in view. However, most Army candidates went to private schools known as “crammers” for special preparation. In the “crammers,” moral instruction was entirely lacking, and the nature of the education was what their name implied, a shallow but intense preparation merely to pass the examination. The Commission wished to maintain the principle that candidates should complete their general education before commencing professional education and therefore recommended that Latin and Greek should be included in the admission examinations for the college. It also argued that only by making entry to Sandhurst and Woolwich competitive could the public schools be induced to prepare for them; however, military subjects should not be introduced in the public schools. The Commission specifically recommended against the abolition of purchase. It held that British officers were “gentlemen of the highest spirit inspired by a most devoted sense of duty and eminently endowed with natural aptitudes which go so far to constitute the excellence of the military character.” Given the necessary facilities, it believed they would “carry military training to a point never yet exceeded in any Army in the world.” Clearly, fundamental reform was unlikely from that source.
Nevertheless, after a fierce losing debate in Parliament, the Liberal government got purchase abolished by persuading Queen Victoria to bypass Parliament by using her prerogative. Introduction of competitive examinations for all Army commissions led at first to the use of Sandhurst for post-commissioning education. But Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton recorded later that it became easier to shirk work there then than during any other period in the history of the Royal Military College. He added that no one took the examinations seriously because the War Office and the college authorities merely used them to contradict those who, like the Duke of Cambridge, were loudly proclaiming that too much education and too little purchase were spoiling the Army that had won at Waterloo.

In a very few years, Sandhurst was reinstituted as a pre-commissioning college, but there continued to be grave dissatisfaction with its operation and also, to a lesser extent, with that of Woolwich. Education in the country as a whole was expanding and improving, and officers commissioned from the other important sources, the Militia and the universities, were found to compare favorably with products of Sandhurst and Woolwich. There was, therefore, another call for the closing of the military academies. Standards had been fairly well maintained at Woolwich by the competition for commissions in the Engineers, but the examinations for passing out of Sandhurst were now even less competitive than they had been in the days of purchase. The principal problem was that the quality of entrants into Sandhurst had declined. In an attempt to reduce the resort to private cram-mers, entrance standards were lowered in the 1880s. Representatives of the Civil Service Commission which conducted the Woolwich and Sandhurst entrance examinations reported in 1888 that candidates were lamentably weak, largely because the best students in the public schools were on the classical side. Furthermore, fathers were convinced that sons who were not up to the standards of their offices in the city were good enough to command a company or a squadron. And then there were the Queen's Cadets who, because they got commissions automatically, were being accepted with lower marks and were allowed to coast through the course without working hard.

The poor performance of the British Army in the War in South Africa brought yet another committee to investigate military education. The Akers-Douglas Committee reported widespread dissatisfaction with the general and professional education of British officers as a class. Many could not write a good letter. The Committee had learned that junior officers in the Army were lamentably deficient in military knowledge and that their spirit and fashion was "not to show keenness." It favored the continuance of alternative sources of entry into the officers corps from the Militia and also reported that there was unanimous approval of the quality of officers who
came direct from the universities, even though most of these had received no previous military training.

The Akers-Douglas Committee criticized Sandhurst more severely than Woolwich, reporting that students there had absolutely no inducement to work and that instructors had no inducement to teach. It believed that, as at Woolwich, instruction at Sandhurst should be strictly military and technical and that foreign languages, except Hindustani, should be dropped. The Adjutant-General, Evelyn Wood, had said that lengthening the courses at Woolwich and Sandhurst to create military universities combining military and technical training with theoretical training would mean extending them by three years. If a choice had to be made, he would prefer restricting Woolwich and Sandhurst to practical, that is, military and technical, training. At the same time, Col. Gerald Kitson, Commandant of the Royal Military College of Canada, pointed to a significant difference between the four-year courses at West Point and the Canadian Royal Military College on the one hand and the shorter courses at Sandhurst and Woolwich on the other. The North American academics treated cadets "almost as private soldiers" while the British treated them very much as officers.

In 1905, changes recommended by Akers-Douglas were put into effect, but unfortunately some of the changes served to aggravate rather than alleviate problems at the academies. In keeping with the committee's desire that the academies be short courses providing only practical training, the entrance age for Sandhurst and Woolwich was raised to eighteen years, and the former course was cut to one year and the latter to eighteen months. This change in age limits had the unfortunate side effect of further reducing the flow of candidates for the military academies because many parents could not afford to keep boys on in a public school until they had passed the age of eighteen, and the normal leaving age in the secondary schools was sixteen. The reduction in the flow of candidates led to the implementation of loopholes in the selection processes that weakened standards in the academies. When a shortage of candidates developed, the Army Council could nominate boys who could not pass the qualifying examination but who had served in the Officer Training Corps at an inspected public school. A recommendation for such a cadet might read, "the boy is a born soldier, captain of his school eleven, who can ride and shoot in a way seldom seen, and is a real leader, but unfortunately he cannot do mathematics, or Latin prose or French." This pons asinorum, as reported on in the Army Review, was presented as a temporary expedient with a virtual apology. "Officers well acquainted with continental armies declare that, although the junior officers abroad, as a rule, cannot compare with our own in dash, initiative, and common sense, they are superior to us in general education. Surely it must be for the good of the state to remove the grounds for this adverse criticism and, while maintaining the good characteristics of our junior officers, to
ensure that the generations to come are of a higher standard of education."

The root of the trouble was that by comparison with France and even with Germany, the British Army was drawing on only a small part of the population for its officers and not getting the best selection from that part. The public schools, stressing the classics, did not serve the Army adequately. Secondary education in non-residential schools dated only from 1868 (except for a few ancient foundations) and did not become widespread until adequate state support was offered in 1902 and 1920. Although some seventy or eighty "lower middle class" candidates were said to be finding their way to commissions annually, this was minimal, and few of them entered through the military academies. Most British officers before, and even after, the First World War were boys whose parents could afford to keep their sons at a public school until eighteen and then give them an allowance to supplement their inadequate military pay and allowances.

An important obstacle to the introduction of reforms in British military education designed to produce officers able to meet the challenges of the twentieth century was that in a country that was deeply divided socially, the government was unwilling to spend more money on military education when it chiefly benefited the upper classes. Yet the government was also unwilling to end a system which discriminated in favor of these classes and which continued to accord them their traditional privileges. A defensive rationale for privilege or discrimination was that the public schools produced the ideal officer, who radiated self-confidence and took a courteous, if paternalistic, interest in his men. He was a sportsman rather than an intellectual, and field sports, the hunt, and stalking and shooting were assumed to be the qualities most needed by an officer. Officers were thus still believed to be "born" and not made. The troops, coming from a vastly inferior socio-economic class, took it for granted that such men were their natural leaders who knew very much more than they did.

Official investigators continued to find that although Woolwich cadets had a reasonably high level of intelligence, most Sandhurst cadets were intellectually below par. But the impression persisted in many quarters that an officer "... did not require as good an education as a gentleman in other professions."

The British belief that military leadership could only be found in the public schools lasted until after the Second World War. Until then, the announcement of Army entrance examinations was sent only to the public schools. Not until after that war, when Britain kept conscription for a time and the traditional source of officers dried up because the aristocracy and upper middle classes could no longer afford to send their sons into the Army, did officer candidates begin to come from the secondary day schools on any significant scale. It is of interest here to note that a recent critic contends that faced with an entirely different problem in military education
when all officers are no longer "gentlemen" in the nineteenth-century sense of the word (though certain regiments still maintain the old class distinctions) at when the troops are no longer socio-economic misfits and drop-outs, the new combined service academy, the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, is still designed to produce officers of the old type. On the other hand, there are obvious difficulties in finding substitutes from among classes less used to command to replace the former prestige of the public school man as a "natural" leader. More than either France or Germany, Britain had found it was hard to produce an adequate system to use general education as a foundation for military professionalism because of traditional conflict about the form that the general education should take, about when it should be undertaken, and about what military professionalism actually was.

Before I relate these examples of nineteenth-century military education to the problems created by the much greater social and technical change of the twentieth century in the United States, I must first outline briefly the ways in which officer production had developed there. At the close of the Revolutionary War, Washington, Hamilton, and other officers had wanted to set up a military academy to provide intellectual foundations for the professional officers of a regular army; but this was rejected as being against the democratic principles of the new republic. Instead, Jefferson approved the establishment of West Point to train engineers to build the country. Before the War of 1812, the Academy was neglected. The dramatic Partridge-Thayer confrontation in 1817 was in some respects a clash between two opposing conceptions of the Academy's purpose, the military and the scientific. Partridge, despite his academic qualifications, had the mind of a drill instructor. Thayer, with fewer of those qualifications, gave the United States a first-class engineering school which pioneered technical education. He rejected the classics, which were the basis of contemporary education; instead, following France's École Polytechnique, he based West Point's curriculum firmly on mathematics.

Until the Civil War, the military purpose of the Academy was definitely secondary to its civil function, and for a time it was turning out engineers rather than soldiers. Some important precedents were laid, however, that would greatly affect the future development of military education in the United States. Although there were no great social cleavages in America between a hereditary landowning class, a bourgeoisie, and a proletariat, appointments to the Academy before the Civil War were secured disproportionately by sons of families of social standing or with influence in politics, education, commerce, and the Army. Receiving a superior education, the corps of cadets came nearer to being an aristocracy than any other part of American government and society. But admission by nomination by each senator and congressman drew from the whole country and so obstructed
undue representation of an elite, and the Academy made no distinctions between rich and poor within its walls. However, because education standards varied greatly across the country, the West Point course had to be much longer than courses in similar institutions in Europe, and it had even more need than the latter to contain general education to make up for secondary school deficiencies. To prevent continuation of political and social interference in the Academy, Thayer introduced a strict system of regular grading that brought in the competition absent in the entrance procedure. To ensure application to studies, he instituted teaching in small classes and the recitation system. To cope with the effects of large differences in standards on entry and in previous education, he invented the practice of re-sectioning, which had the advantage of streaming cadets according to their ability and also of making it possible for those of relatively low capacity to proceed at their own pace. Re-sectioning was, in effect, a relaxation of the harsh com-
petition of the order of merit, and it permitted concessions to accommodate both superior and lesser intellects.

Although most authorities describe pre-Civil War West Point as a scientific school, this description is somewhat misleading. It was a basic engineering school. The Thayer system was eminently useful in producing excellent engineers and the uniformity of thought necessary to give coherence to an officer corps drawn from the varied circumstances of all parts of a huge country. Some weaknesses must be noted, however. The recitation system did not encourage a spirit of enquiry beyond the limits of the textbook or the professor's knowledge, as would have been required for pure science. Although French was taught for the utilitarian reason that the best engineering texts were in that language, the classics and all other liberal arts useful “merely” to shape the “character of an accomplished citizen” were rigorously excluded. On the eve of the Civil War, Superintendent Robert E. Lee and Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, both West Point graduates, agreed that absence of the liberal arts was a mistake. Davis said, “It has long been the subject of remark that the graduates of the Military Academy, whilst occupying the first ranks as scholars in the exact sciences, were below mediocrity in polite literature. Their official reports frequently exhibited poverty of style.” English literature, history, ethics and logic, military law, and field instruction were expanded; Spanish was added; and the course was lengthened to five years to accommodate these changes. But this lasted only until the Civil War. At this time, West Point's reputation was high, not merely for its contribution to public works but also for the promotion of military technical development. There were a few who pointed out that in preparing officers for the engineers, infantry, and cavalry, the Academy was attempting too much and that more specialized military academics in other countries, as well as many colleges in the United States, excelled in their particular fields. But the ultimate proof was the outstanding performance of West Point graduates on both sides during the Civil War, when tactics and strategy were revolutionized by technology and the impact of mass democracy presented an extraordinary challenge.

After the Civil War, the appointment in 1866 of an infantry officer as Superintendent deliberately broke the Engineers' traditional control of the Academy. Practical instruction in infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics was now given in all four years, and the Academy lost much of the theoretical scientific and engineering emphasis that Thayer had given it. As Congress refused to introduce competition for admissions, which would have diminished its patronage, entry standards remained low and presupposed completing general education at West Point. Although history was expanded and other non-technical subjects were added, the Academic Board held them to be of minor importance. Mathematics remained the core of the curriculum.
Superintendents and the Academic Boards alike resisted change on the grounds that the system had proved itself in the recent war. Rejection of the myth that class was the key to character and leadership had made it possible for the Academy to foster the personal qualities required by an officer. As cadets came from all classes and all parts of the country instead of from an elite, and as they had no inherited tradition of military command and spirit, the task of breaking down old habits and attitudes was much more complex than in Europe. Instruction and training in the military life-style became central to the purpose of the Academy and were brought about by strict discipline, by isolation from civilian life, by daily routine, by stress on athletics and by thorough indoctrination in military traditions and etiquette. Candidates were rapidly transformed despite their non-military backgrounds. Pre-military indoctrination, indistinguishable from college hazing except that it was rationalized by a military need and was reinforced by military authority, developed into a system under cadet control in the latter half of the century; and it was jealously protected by graduates. Another part of the process of indoctrination that made up for lack of an informal aristocratic code, the Honor System, like almost everything else at West Point, can be traced back in early concept to Thayer. Towards the end of the century, it too became the concern of the cadets themselves, and after the First World War, under Superintendent Douglas MacArthur, it was formally codified. All these developments were based on the belief that the qualities needed by an officer must be formed in the academies.

The evolution of naval education in the United States provides a different perspective on what has been called "a central issue of service academy education: how to provide education that will effectively humanize military leadership and, at the same time, provide sufficient background to master modern military technology." The author of that statement, William Sims, then an Air Force major, believed that one reason why the Naval Academy's approach took a quite different path at first than that of West Point was that Annapolis remained very responsive to the service that it served, while the United States Military Academy was obsessed by its own early image and remained less affected by outside influences, even those of the Army. Another factor was that life at sea and the techniques of sailing and fighting ships were more easily seen to belong to a world of their own; therefore, naval education may have been more consciously directed towards the goal of fitting naval officers, not merely for mastery of the technical problems of their service but also for comprehension of the relationship between their service and the very different society which they served.

When the Naval Academy was founded in 1845, the problem posed by steam propulsion was one of the incentives to its creation and growth. Its curriculum down to the 1880s was a flexible balance between liberal arts and
theoretical science; in the fields of mathematics and physics, Annapolis was abreast of contemporary liberal arts colleges. However, the pressure of technology and the problem of a conflict of interest in the preparation of officers for the bridge and for the engine room led to the introduction of a common curriculum in 1882 in which the relative proportion and theoretical level of liberal arts was significantly diminished. By the end of the century, line officers were being given an education that included engineering competence in addition to their traditional expertise. The way was open to prepare all naval officers, like the graduates of West Point, for the general military command and staff responsibilities of the future by a common form of education that would, incidentally, tend to set them apart from the rest of American society.88

In the twentieth century, acceleration in the rate of technological and social change has greatly complicated the fundamental problems that nineteenth-century military educators never completely solved. The extent of technical advance is so well known that it need not be detailed here. What does perhaps need to be noted is that expertise in many areas that relate to warfare is now so complicated that the conduct of certain aspects of conflict is beyond the comprehension of, let alone participation by, educated persons who have not specialized in applicable technical and military fields. This gap was so great in World War II that military forces found themselves very dependent on civilian scientists. Either that dependence will increase, or the services must extend their specializations. This presents problems to the

A view of the Naval Academy circa 1873 taken from midshipmen's quarters shows older buildings (left), the commodore's house (center), and officers' row (right) (United States Naval Academy Archives).
academies. How far should they attempt to prepare officers to understand scientific problems? Should they go even further still and lay down the basis for specialized personnel?

What is perhaps less well appreciated is that the extent of social and political change has been just as great and has produced problems that are just as difficult. These problems call for different kinds of adjustment in the domestic scene. Mass armies, raised standards of living, contemporary ideologies that stress egalitarianism and social justice, advances in educational standards, and a (not always complementary) belief in universal education, tend to set the military academy even further apart just at the time when many of these same things call for closer relations between the officer and civilian society. On the wider front, major ideological differences have sharpened international confrontations, deterrence rather than battle has become the ultimate (though not yet the immediate) objective in the use of force, and the rise of the third world powers has changed the strategic balance. For the United States, a particular problem is that the role of world leadership has entailed responsibilities very different from those it had in the late nineteenth century when its military operations were limited to cavalry skirmishes and when a small U. S. Navy functioned on oceans on which the British Royal Navy maintained a Pax Britannica. Such vast changes call for serious consideration of the way in which military education and training of officers has been, and will be, conducted.

Only the broadest outline of the ways in which the American academies have moved to meet these challenges in this century need be presented here. Although general competitive entry has not been introduced, the growth of the number of applicants and realization by nominators that the failure rate of unsuitable candidates imposes restraints on their freedom of selection has brought improvement in quality. Furthermore, steps have been taken to eliminate discrimination against minorities and to draw even more widely on the nation as a whole. Gen. MacArthur failed to achieve his objective of introducing more liberal arts courses at West Point to fit its graduates better to command the kind of men he thought would compose the mass armies of the future, but all the academies have since moved in that direction. The academies differ in their policy about employing civilians on their faculties, but all have taken steps to raise the academic qualifications of their teaching staffs. New courses have been added to conform with technical advance, and more advanced courses now build on rising standards in the secondary schools. Accreditation of undergraduate degree programs qualify academy graduates for post-graduate work in civilian universities, and many officers take such programs during their later careers. The services have also introduced numbers of in-service post-graduate professional and technical courses, so that it can now be said that the military profession in the United States requires more specialized education in mid-career than any other.
profession (partly because, unlike most other professions, its members do not get as much opportunity for operational experience).

On the other hand, the principle established by the end of the century that academy-produced officers in all arms in each service should receive a common basic pre-commissioning education, though not extended to a common pre-commissioning education for all three services as was seriously considered after World War II, has been maintained. The decision to create the Air Force Academy was in line with the conviction that one of the chief reasons for educating officer candidates in a military academy is to motivate and that each of the three services has different outlooks and methods. Given a new start less hidebound by tradition, the Air Force Academy has been able to advance further and faster in certain important directions, but it has also emphasized traditional methods and values inherited from its sister colleges. Motivation, part of the process of character building, an element in all officer training, continues to be stressed as in the other academies.

Progress in military education in the nineteenth century was frustrated by the belief that military virtues were derived from social class status. Where this belief did not entirely prevail, in France and the United States, two different solutions for the organization of military academies were adopted. In France, specialization in scientific education was separated from the education of generalists. In the United States, there was a common education and indoctrination. As we have seen, the twentieth century has need for yet more specialization in scientific studies along with a greater urgency for emphasis on social and humanistic study. The problem for the American academies now is how far they can introduce specialization in both the sciences and in social and humanistic studies while retaining their common curricula and maintaining their roles in character formation. Well-publicized systematic breaches in honor codes in all three academies have been caused in part by the tensions produced by the occasional conflict between these objectives.

The story of military education in the nineteenth century shows how difficult it was then to bring academics into line with developing technology while they adhered to military traditions and social structures that were threatened by social conditions and political needs. This problem is even more difficult today. The maintenance within a single institution of a basic general education, of a higher degree of specialization in both sciences and humanities, and of standards of conduct quite different from those that prevail outside the academies will obviously impose greater strains on the academies than they have known so far. However, with regard to specialization for professional development, there are signs that in civilian universities and colleges the hard line between general and professional schools is breaking down. Some aspects of pre-professional training are beginning to appear
in the undergraduate college, and there have also been some trends towards the liberalization of graduate professional education. Moreover, the hard line between general and professional education was never drawn as sharply in military academies as in the universities. It may be that the former will therefore be able to adapt themselves to achieve the complex purposes that will be required of them in the future. While the history of military education in the nineteenth century does not give ground for undue optimism in that respect, the future, not only of the military profession in the United States, but also of the nation and world society as a whole, may depend upon a successful resolution of this very complex problem.

Professor Richard A. Preston received his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1926. After serving as a flight lieutenant with the Royal Air Force during World War II, he taught briefly at the University of Toronto and was then appointed Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada. Since 1965 he has held the chair as W.K. Boyd Professor of History at Duke University. Author of more than a dozen books on Canadian and military history, he is perhaps best known for his *Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society* (1970). Service academy education has long been a particular interest of Professor Preston. He has chaired an international symposium on service academy education and written *Canada's RMC: A History of the Royal Military College* (1966).
Notes

Some of the research for this paper was made possible by a Nuffield Foundation Summer Travel Grant.

SOLDIERS AND ARMIES

22. Babeau, ll: 49, 63-64, 66; Boutaric, pp. 441-442; Bien, pp. 56, 64n.; Artz, pp. 92-95; Vagts, p. 54.
23. Bien, pp. 51-68.
24. Mathematical studies can contribute some of the qualities of mind needed by the soldier, for instance the ability to make clear decisions based on accurate measurements and computation. Modern liberal arts and social studies scholarship has qualities that its eighteenth-century equivalent lacked but which relate to certain modern social needs and also provide traind training and method.
30. Huntington, p. 31.
32. Ibid., p. 13; Huntington, p. 41.
34. Demeter, p. 82.
40. De Gaulle, p. 218; Graham, p. 188; Revol, pp. 207-209.
42. Bond, The Victorian Army, pp. 7-8.
44. Harries-Jenkins, pp. 105-107.
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

46. Barnett, p. 16.
52. Herbert's views were set forward in Rt. Hon. Sidney Herbert, Speech in the House of Commons, June 5, 1856, on the Education and Instruction of the Officers of the Army (London: James Ridgway, 1863), and in Herbert to Gen. Viscount Hardinge, War Office, January, 1854, in Report on Sandhurst Royal Military College, 1855, Appendix no. 5, pp. 193–195.
55. Lt. Col. William Yolland, Report on the Commissioners Appointed to Consider the Best Mode of Reorganizing: the system for Training Officers for the Scientific Corps; Together with an Account of Foreign and Other Military Education 0, 0.52, 0.53.
57. Thomas, pp. 115–117.
59. Smyth, p. 82; Barnard, pp. 568–569; Dufferin, First Report of the Royal Commission on Training for Commissions ... Digest of Evidence, pp. 8, 12–16, 28.
66. Ibid., p. 294.
70. Coulton, p. 271.
77. Catharine S. Crary, ed., Dear Belle; Letters from a Cadet and Officer to His Sweetheart, 1858-1865 (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1965), p. 15.
79. E.g., Ambrose, p. 87.
81. Simons, p. 42.
83. Simons, p. 56.
84. Lenney, pp. 133-156, a hostile criticism of plebe indoctrination.
86. Simons, p. 47.
87. Simons, p. 46.
88. Simons, pp. 50-52.
89. Ambrose, pp. 269-270.
90. Lovell, pp. 49-90.
Part IV. Strategy and Tactics
Introduction to Part IV

Strategy and tactics have been a central part of warfare since the classical period. Epaminondas, the brilliant Theban commander, introduced an original tactical move, the oblique line, against a larger Spartan army and won a crucial battle at Leuctra in 371 B.C. Frederick the Great combined a similar maneuver and surprise to win at Leuthen in 1757. William of Normandy made a feigned withdrawal and clever use of combined arms to defeat the Saxons at Hastings in 1066. Successful use of combined arms characterized the Axis and Allied victories during World War II and has since remained critical to military success.

While tactics have always commanded the interest of field commanders, strategy became a subject of greater attention after Napoleon's success in dominating Europe. His campaigns quickly became a source of study for commanders and scholars alike, and they still attract students of military affairs today. Four Harmon Lectures addressed strategy and tactics in some manner; two focused on the Napoleonic age.

Steven T. Ross's 1985 address, given when the U.S. Army and Air Force were revising and adopting new doctrinal field manuals and looking for more offensive power from smaller numbers, examined maneuver warfare as practiced by Napoleon. Ross pointed out that the new Army Field Manual 100-5 and the revised Air Force Manual 1-1 both acknowledged the necessity for combined arms operations and paraphrased much of what Napoleon said about the nature of waging war. As any successful military the French Army trained well, but after 1807 it went into decline and began to fight more battles of simple attrition. While Napoleon remained the master of the bold strategic maneuver, his tactical execution no longer matched his strategic genius. His victories, however, accelerated the changes taking place in the conduct of warfare and introduced the age of national wars when entire peoples became involved in the affairs of state.

Because of Napoleon's power and success, coalitions among his adversaries naturally evolved. With military alliances dominating the defense of Europe after World War II, Gordon A. Craig chose to examine the nature of coalition warfare in the Napoleonic era in his 1965 Harmon Lecture. While the alliance against Napoleon eventually numbered fourteen members, monarchs frequently quarreled and their field commanders sometimes gave little more than lip service to strategic plans. The result was inefficiency. Napoleon, with far fewer soldiers, was able to wage war much more effectively. When a coalition's enemy weakened, so did the coalition's bonds. Alexander
of Russia, for example, forgot the basic reason for the Grand Alliance. He entertained grandiose dreams of conquering France after the battle of Leipzig and suffered severe reverses from overextending his forces. Similarly, Craig warned, NATO nations should not lose sight of the reasons for which they established their coalition, or "... *the fact that our Bonapartes too are always in the near distance and that their menace is undiminished*.

The Napoleonic Wars altered military strategy, and changes continued into the twentieth century. In his 1967 Harmon Lecture Michael Howard began by noting that the study of military history without regard to diplomatic, social, and economic dimensions was of limited value. In Napoleon's time decisive battles were possible and single commanders could control the destiny of a state. Consequently, national leaders placed their hopes on large armies. But as the century concluded, political, social, and industrial developments made it increasingly difficult for a state to achieve decisive victories. Public support became more critical for with it attrition warfare could continue as long as resupply was possible. These developments, Howard explained, fostered the highest state of total war seen by man—the two world wars of the twentieth century.

In a Clausewitzian vein Howard reminded the reader that wars are not simple acts of violence but acts of persuasion or dissuasion. To destroy totally an adversary can create unforeseen problems. It makes better sense to leave one's adversary chastened and submissive but in control of his own political and social fabric and sufficiently balanced economically. In making war nations must think about making peace; the two activities are inseparable. If wars cannot be decisive, he wisely concluded, then a strategy for using warfare to achieve a state's political goals must be completely different than in decades past.

The Harmon Lecture prepared by Theodore Ropp in 1970 traced the development of contemporary strategy through political, military, and technological variables. Ropp argued that contemporary strategy has two important features: the *willingness* of the strongest power to use all of its weapons and the unification of the world conflict area. Ropp used a chart to show the progression of strategic thought over time, noting that new ideas come from many sources but are most often adopted by weak and defeated powers. The cold war received his closest attention, and he noted that USAF Basic Doctrine specifies that "Military power can still be used directly, below the level of all-out war... only if civilian leaders regard it as relevant and usable in specific conflict situations" and are confident that it "will be applied with appropriate precision and restraint." By 1964, Ropp concluded, virtually all military thinkers believed that the technological revolution had made all-out war obsolete, but the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and the prospect of antiballistic missiles (ABMs) took the logic of destruction even further. Through
it all there was no such thing as pure military advice when dealing with contemporary strategy. Military guidance required a broader perspective for all involved with national defense, including the soldier.

Strategists have long sought to discover and define a set of principles and rules that will guide them to success in waging war. In his 1977 Harmon Lecture Philip A. Crowl spoke to an audience that was asking fundamental questions about U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict. He warned that scientific laws of war cannot be precisely deduced from history for the obvious reason that history never exactly repeats itself. While history cannot provide such precise laws it can teach us to ask the right questions. His address featured six fundamental questions that all strategists should ask before deciding to undertake warfare: (1) What is it about?; (2) What is the objective, and is it worth it?; (3) What are the limits of military power?; (4) What are the alternatives to war?; (5) How strong is the home front?; and (6) Does today’s strategy overlook points of difference and exaggerate points of similarity between the past and present? Man, Crowl concluded, is not condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past or to overcompensate for those errors. But most mistakes are rooted in failures of the imagination and the intellect.

Strategy and tactics, then, remain important areas of study for military planners and thinkers. The ability to understand change and progression is fundamental to successfully using historical knowledge in a meaningful way, especially as we approach the twenty-first century.
Na,poleon and Maneuver Warfare

Steven T. Ross

It is a great honor to be invited to deliver the Twenty-eighth Harmon Memorial Lecture. Gen. Hubert Harmon had a lifelong interest in military history. His belief in the enduring importance of the historical study of war is confirmed by the call of many Great Captains to study the history of warfare both for its own sake and to gain greater depth and understanding of current and future problems.

Carl von Clausewitz was fully aware of the dangers of oversimplification and mistaken analogies. But, nevertheless, noted that “historical examples clarify everything and also provide the best kind of proof in the empirical sciences. This is particularly true of the art of war.” While still a cadet at West Point, George Patton wrote,

I believe that in order for a man to become a great soldier . . . it is necessary for him to be so thoroughly conversant with all sorts of military possibilities that whenever an occasion arises he has at his hand without effort on his part a parallel. To attain this end I think that it is necessary for a man to begin to read military history in its earliest and crudest form and to follow it down in natural sequence permitting his mind to grow with his subject until he can grasp without effort the most abstruse question of the science of war because he is already permeated with all its elements.

It was, of course, Napoleon who said, “Knowledge of grand tactics is gained only by experience and by the study of the campaigns of all the great captains.” He also urged officers “to read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Eugene and Frederick. This is the only way to become a great captain.” Thus, Napoleon, like many others, regarded the combination of experience plus reflection upon the immediate and distant past as essential guideposts for military professionals.

Recently, there has been a rediscovery of the importance of military doctrine which Gen. Curtis LeMay aptly described in the following terms: “At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory . . . It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental for sound judgement.” The study of doctrine has both a contemporary and a historical dimension.
Current interest focuses on maneuver warfare, a concept that involves combined arms operations, bold deep attacks and flexible operational methods. New U.S. Army and Air Force manuals emphasize rapid, deep, violent assaults designed to dislocate and disorient the enemy. A strategy based on swift unexpected strikes coupled with a relentless exploitation of initial success is not, of course, totally new. Many if not most great commanders were masters of mobile warfare, and Napoleon was one of the most able executors of maneuver doctrine and strategy. His reflections on the art of war have in fact a very modern ring, and it is instructive to compare them with current American manuals.

Napoleon always understood the necessity for combined arms operations and noted that "infantry, cavalry and artillery cannot do without one another." The 1982 edition of the U.S. Army's Field Manual 100-5 (FM 100-5) states, "the term combined arms refers to two or more arms in mutual support to produce complementary and reinforcing effects that neither can obtain separately."

In his campaigns Napoleon always relied upon surprise and speed. "It is," he wrote, "a well established maxim of war never to do what the enemy wishes you to do." He also believed that "the strength of an army like power in mechanics is the product of the mass by the velocity." Similarly, the 1984 edition of Air Force Manual 1-1 (AFM 1-1) calls upon commanders to "influence the timing and tempo of military actions by seizing the initiative and operating beyond the enemy's ability to react effectively."

The 1984 edition of FM 100-5 calls for operations that are, "rapid, unpredictable, violent and disorienting to the enemy."

Boldness and flexibility in battle were characteristic of Napoleon's style of combat. "In audacity and obstinacy will be found safety and conservation of the men," and war, he noted, was "composed of nothing but surprises. While a general should adhere to general principles, he should never lose the opportunity to profit by these surprises. It is the essence of genius. In war there is only one favorable moment. Genius seizes it." AFM 1-1 for its part bluntly tells commanders to "seize the initiative," while FM 100-5 enjoins commanders to "develop opportunities that the force as a whole can exploit."

To Napoleon fire was an essential component of maneuver, or as he put it, "in battle skill consists in converging a mass of fire upon a single point."

Pursuit in the wake of victory was another essential element of Napoleonic warfare. "Once the offensive has been assumed," he wrote, "it must be maintained to the extremity," and he also noted that a good general would
“never let the victors or the vanquished rest.”20 FM 100–5 points out the importance of taking “advantage of opportunities by momentum”21 and of sustaining the initiative by “exploiting success.”22 AFM 1–1 also recognizes the need to “attack the enemy relentlessly.”23

The American military has the opportunity to create and reflect upon its doctrine before having to test it in a major clash of arms. Napoleon on the other hand had to devise his operational techniques in the crucible of war. Fortunately, he had an instrument to match his genius—the army created by revolutionary France.24

The pre-1789 French Royal Army was both socially and tactically inflexible. The nobility dominated the officer corps. In 1789 the army contained 9,578 officers of whom 6,633 were aristocrats. Enlisted personnel numbered about 140,000 and consisted primarily of volunteers from the lower classes who joined the army to escape poverty, unemployment and occasionally the police.

Once in uniform soldiers felt little loyalty to the ruling monarch. Desertion was a constant problem. During the Seven Years' War about 70,000 French soldiers fled the army. Harsh discipline was necessary to maintain the army's cohesion, and brutal punishments were common.

The nature of weapons reinforced the need for rigid discipline. The standard infantry weapon was the inaccurate, short range, slow firing smoothbore flintlock musket. Under optimum conditions a trained soldier could fire his weapon two or three times a minute and expect to hit something only if it were less than 150 yards distant.

To obtain the most effective use of the musket, armies employed linear formations three ranks deep and up to several miles long. The linear battle order brought the most weapons to bear and produced the greatest volume of fire. Troop training, therefore, emphasized rapid deployments from marching columns to battle lines and rapid volley firing. Soldiers were forbidden to show individual initiative even to the extent of aiming their weapons, and officers and NCOs in battle typically devoted their efforts to keeping their formations properly aligned and ready to deliver volleys upon command.

Light infantry performed special tasks: scouting, rounding up prisoners and deserters, and harassing a retreating enemy. Light troops, however, remained functionally separate from the line battalions and rarely participated directly in major battles.

Cavalry composed about a fifth of the army's strength. In battle cavalry regiments usually served on the army's flanks and were employed as a shock force. Socially prestigious, the horsemen were occasionally effective in battle. Light cavalry units performed special functions: and often operated with the light infantry.

Field artillery usually provided a preliminary bombardment, but once
the army was fully engaged, the guns that were too heavy to move quickly, usually fell silent. Lighter regimental guns did move with the infantry but were too few to be of significant support to the foot soldiers. Recognizing the artillery's limited combat role, the Royal Army maintained a field artillery force of only 12,000 officers and men.

Old Regime battles were marked by rigid tactics. Troops in linear order traded close range volleys with their enemies until one side broke. Army commanders could move reserves to bolster the firing line or order cavalry charges, but linear formations made more extensive maneuvering impossible, and volley fire remained the deciding factor in most engagements.

Delivered by serried ranks at close range, volley fire produced heavy losses among victors and vanquished alike. Casualties could, in fact, reach as high as forty percent of the forces engaged. Consequently, battles were rarely decisive since the victors were usually too depleted to mount an effective pursuit, and the defeated army could usually escape annihilation.

The high casualty rate coupled with indecisive results also made generals reluctant to risk battle. The Royal Army had no effective reserve system, and commanders did not want to hazard their small forces in constant tactically expensive but strategically futile combats. Battles were, therefore, relatively rare, and most wars were indecisive. Statesmen in old regime France, as in other states, frequently devised ambitious diplomatic stratagems, but achievements usually fell far short of aspirations in large measure because the nature of warfare was not suited to the goals of state policy.

For France the Seven Years' War was an unmitigated disaster. The army entered the war without enthusiasm, fought without distinction, and emerged without victory. After 1763 the French made a sustained effort to improve their armed forces.

Infantry tactics were hotly debated. Some wanted to imitate Prussian expertise in linear deployments; others called for the use of shock power by introducing massive assault columns; and still others advocated a flexible combination of lines and small columns. The government increased the number of light infantrymen, and a few farsighted thinkers advocated that line troops receive light infantry training, thus creating a soldier who could fight in either close or open order.

The artillery corps made great strides. The number of gun calibers was reduced to four, and new guns, lighter than their predecessors, had standardized parts and packaged rounds. One officer, the Chevalier Jean du Teil, argued that light mobile field guns used in large concentrations against infantry rather than in counterbattery work would be decisive in combat. Du Teil's elder brother commanded an artillery regiment and trained his cadets, including a young Corsican named Bonaparte, according to the Chevalier's doctrine.

To improve interarm coordination the War Ministry in 1776 divided
France into sixteen military districts. The number was later raised to eighteen. Each district had a permanent garrison from all three service branches. Inspector generals were empowered to hold combined arms maneuvers, and for campaigns they could create task forces composed of elements of two or more branches.

Thus by 1789 the Royal Army had made some progress in improving its tactics and in developing combined arms doctrine. It, nevertheless, remained a small, long service volunteer force run by aristocrats and staffed by society’s lower orders. Moreover, the reforms were tentative, and it was to take the impact of domestic revolution coupled with foreign war to alter fundamentally the army’s organization and doctrine.

The first years of the Revolution witnessed a continuation of the reform efforts of the Old Regime. Infantry drill regulations, issued on August 1, 1791, described a variety of line and column formations and encouraged commanders to employ formations and maneuvers best suited to their particular geographic and tactical circumstances. The artillery corps introduced horse batteries, where mounted gunners accompanied their cannons into battle, and the aristocracy lost their virtual monopoly over the officer corps.

It was, however, the war which began on April 20, 1792, that forced French leaders to undertake drastic reforms to save the nation and its revolution. By 1793 France was at war with most of Europe, under invasion from the Channel coast to the Alps and from the Mediterranean to the Pyrenees. The nation also faced counterrevolutionary insurrections in the western departments, in the Loire and Rhone Valleys and in the major Mediterranean seaports.

The Republic’s first priority was to expand the army. When calls for volunteers proved inefficient, the government resorted to conscription. On February 21, 1793, the National Convention called 300,000 men to the colors, and on August 23, 1793, the government passed the levée en masse decree, placing all French men and women in a state of permanent requisition for the duration of hostilities.

Conscription was quite effective. Most of the French people supported the revolution, had a personal stake in the Republic’s survival and were willing to participate in the national defense effort. By January 1794, France had 670,000 men under arms, and by the end of the year the Republic had 1,108,000 troops, of whom 850,000 served in the field armies while the remainder garrisoned fortresses, guarded the coasts or underwent training in depots.

The government organized its soldiers into demi-brigades consisting of one battalion from the old regular army and two conscript battalions. By early 1794, the army contained 198 demi-brigades and fourteen smaller light demi-brigades. Army commanders began to place two or more demi-brigades with supporting artillery under a single officer. Division strengths
varied widely as did the number of field guns, but by 1794 the use of the multiarm division was standard in all field armies.

Since about two thirds of the officers of the old army left their posts because of opposition to the Revolution, the Republic had to create a new officer corps. Talent, experience and loyalty replaced birth and status as promotion criteria. The new officer corps was by social origin overwhelmingly middle class. Nobles who supported the revolution continued to serve the Republic; however, a few high ranking officers came from artisan and peasant backgrounds. Many generals of the Republic had previous service as enlisted men in the Royal Army, while others had served in the National Guard, an organization created during the Revolution's early years to provide local security.

The new officers were young and energetic. Not all were great commanders, but Republican officers on the whole were able leaders and succeeded in molding regulars, volunteers and conscripts into a fighting force able to face Europe's professional armies on better than even terms.

Officers used the 1791 regulations as the basic drill manual and also gave troops light infantry training. Their goal was to create all purpose infantrymen able to fight in open order, as part of an assault column or as a member of a firing line.

A typical nine company infantry battalion about 1,000 strong usually entered battle in a closed column, two companies wide and four deep. Thus, the column resembled a rectangle eighty men across and twelve deep. The ninth company remained in reserve. Depending upon battlefield conditions, the commander had a number of options. He could detach companies as skirmishers and reinforce them using, if necessary, the entire battalion. Alternatively, he could order the companies in column to launch a bayonet assault, or he could deploy his troops for fire action.

The demi-brigade enjoyed similar flexibility. The commander could place all three of his battalions in line or establish three parallel columns screened by light infantry. He also could put some battalions in line and others in column and shift formations from one mode to another during combat to respond to changing tactical circumstances.

Divisions could march and fight independently or as part of a larger force. Commanders could, therefore, wage encounter battles, feeding troops into action as they arrived on the field instead of waiting until their entire force deployed. Army commanders often used ad hoc, multi-division formations for specific missions. These corps could operate also on their own or as part of a field army.

Divisional and army commanders adopted du Teil's views concerning the employment of field guns. Serving in large batteries, guns provided close fire support for the infantry and operated as an integral part of Republican battle formations.
Only the cavalry arm did not witness a marked improvement, plagued as it was by insufficient training and a serious shortage of horses. Nevertheless, the cavalry performed useful services including scouting and screening the main body’s advance. The Republican cavalry earned the unique distinction of capturing a fleet. In January 1795, French horsemen charged over ice-covered water and seized a Dutch fleet.

Republican logistics were at best sketchy. Troops lived by requisitioning, and when there was nothing to requisition they did without. There were constant shortages of food, pay, shoes and uniforms in Republican armies, but troops put up with privations that would have destroyed an Old Regime army because they had a personal stake in the war.

The Republican army in which soldiers were motivated by patriotism and hope of reward as well as by fear of punishment allowed generals to operate with a boldness and flexibility that was simply not possible under the Old Regime. Commanders could and did attack constantly, seeking to wear down and destroy their enemies in pitched battles. The French were not always successful and did not win every engagement. Nor did the Republican forces have the ability to wage campaigns and battles of annihilation. With rare exceptions Republican forces employed a strategy of exhaustion. Fighting aggressively and attacking constantly, the French typically wore down their enemies in a series of engagements. Still, the creation of a citizen army, all purpose infantrymen and combined arms formations able to operate in any kind of terrain enabled the Republic to wage a multi-front war, defeat two great power coalitions, and expand substantially French territory and power.

Napoleon, after seizing power in November 1799, did not introduce fundamental changes in the French Army’s organization and tactics because he was satisfied with the Republican system. His infantry continued to train according to the 1791 regulations and to serve in three battalion demi-brigades that he renamed regiments in 1803. Napoleon continued to employ the division, which, as under the Republic, varied in size from three to five regiments. He also regularized the use of the corps. Napoleonic army corps ranged from 17,000 to 30,000 men in order to baffle enemy intelligence, suit a particular mission and suit the capabilities of the commander. A corps contained from two to four divisions, a brigade or division of cavalry and thirty to forty field guns. A corps could march independently and fight on its own. It could begin and sustain major engagements until the rest of the army arrived.25

Napoleon sought to expand the artillery corps, and by 1805 he had 8,300 howitzers, 1,700 mortars, 4,500 heavy guns and 7,300 light cannons. He also reorganized the cavalry and created a large reserve directly under his control. Cavalry capabilities improved, but as in the days of the Republic it remained the weakest service arm.
Napoleon noted that "I give myself only half the credit for the battles I have won . . . the fact is that a battle is won by the army," and he devoted much effort to training his forces in order that officers and men would fully understand his tactical and operational techniques.

Between 1801 and 1803 special inspectors visited regiments checking on maneuvers and testing sergeants on their knowledge of the drill regulations. Battalion officers and NCOs met twice a week with their regimental adjutants to study tactics. At the Boulogne camp in 1804 and 1805, Napoleon ordered officers to devote two days a week to battalion drill, three days to division drill and one day to corps maneuvers. Every fifteenth day the Emperor conducted a grand evolution involving several corps. Napoleon did not insist on rigid adherence to every detail of the 1791 drill book, but he did want his entire army to be able to operate in the flexible spirit embodied in the regulations.

At the start of the Austerlitz Campaign of 1805 Napoleon's Grand Army, 210,000 men strong, was a highly effective fighting machine. Almost all the senior officers were combat tested. About a quarter of the rank and file were veterans of Republican campaigns, another quarter entered the army between 1800 and 1804, and the remainder were new conscripts. Against them the Austrians sent 95,000 men into Italy, 23,000 into the Tyrol and 70,000 into Bavaria. About 95,000 Russian troops were to follow the Austrians into Germany.

Faced by threats to northern Italy and eastern France, Napoleon, whose forces were concentrated on the Channel coast, decided to seize the initiative.
by striking the Austrian forces in south Germany before the Russians could reach them.

He moved the Grand Army to the Rhine, sent 50,000 men to Italy to hold the Austrians in check and placed 30,000 troops at Boulogne to guard against an English descent. On August 26 he issued orders for the Grand Army to wheel south from the Rhine toward the Danube. Light forces were to demonstrate in the Black Forest to draw the Austrians further west while the Grand Army then crossed the Danube and enveloped the enemy forces.

The Duke of Marlborough had executed a similar maneuver in 1704, but he led a force of 40,000. Napoleon's plan called for moving more than five times that number. He assigned each corps an independent line of march, thus ensuring that only a single formation would have to live off the countryside in any given area. He reduced supply trains to a minimum and ordered engineer officers to scout the German roads. On the night of September 24-25, the Emperor ordered his forces to cross the Rhine and begin the enveloping maneuver.

While feints drew the Austrians west, the Grand Army advanced at a rate of about thirty kilometers a day, and on the evening of October 6-7 leading elements reached the Danube and seized a crossing. Napoleon next sent two corps toward Munich to hold off the Russians if they should arrive and seek to join the Austrian army camped around Ulm. He ordered his remaining corps to move south and west in order to surround the Austrians.

The ring tightened quickly. There were several sharp actions in which the demoralized Austrians lost about 20,000 men. On October 21 the Austrian forces at Ulm, 27,000 strong, laid down their arms while remnants of the Hapsburg army fled east. In twenty-six days Napoleon had marched from the Rhine to the Danube, scored a major victory and completely dislocated the plans of the Third Coalition.

Despite his triumph Napoleon realized he could not rest. Large Austrian armies were still in the field, the Russians were moving forward, and Prussia was contemplating joining the Coalition. Napoleon, therefore, decided to strike rapidly deep into Austrian territory in order to bring the Austro-Russian forces to battle. By October 25 the Grand Army was again on the march, and by November 12 the French were in Vienna.

The Austro-Russian forces retreated into Bohemia where they gathered 85,000 men near the small town of Austerlitz. Napoleon's forces were tired, deep in enemy territory and short of supplies. In addition to casualties French troop strength was further reduced by the need to garrison captured positions and guard lines of communication. By late November Napoleon had 53,000 men near Austerlitz with another 22,000 around Vienna. To make matters worse, the Prussians were becoming more belligerent, and Austrian battalions from Italy were moving steadily north.
The logical thing for the Emperor to do was retreat in order to rest and replenish his forces, but Napoleon's response to his dilemma was to seek a decisive battle. He began by deliberately giving the impression that his army was weak and exhausted. He accepted an allied offer to discuss an armistice, deliberately pulled his troops back from Austerlitz and the Pratzen Heights, the supposed geographic key to the area, and gave the impression that his right flank was especially vulnerable. The enemy took the bait and planned to strike the French right and sever the Grand Army's line of communications with Vienna.

The Battle of Austerlitz, fought on December 2, 1805, was the decisive victory that Napoleon sought. The allied forces fell on the French right, but to achieve this concentration the allies weakened their center. One of Napoleon's reserve corps had arrived to strengthen the Grand Army's left and center the night before the battle. The other corps moved up from Vienna, covering eighty miles in fifty hours, and the divisions entered the battle on Napoleon's right directly off the march.

When he felt that the allies were fully committed against his right, Napoleon unleashed his strategic reserve against the Austro-Russian center. After bitter fighting, the French broke the allied center and pivoted south against the allied left wing. When the allies finally retreated, they left behind 27,000 casualties—a third of their original strength. The Austrians soon sought an armistice while the Russians marched back to Poland.

Napoleon had struck at his enemies with deep, rapid, slashing maneuvers that threatened their communications and threw them off balance strategically and psychologically. Napoleon constantly retained the initiative, striking boldly and ruthlessly, and never gave his foes the opportunity to gather their forces or their senses. The capabilities of the Grand Army were, of course, vital to Napoleon's success. Their ability to move rapidly with a minimum of logistic support and their tactical proficiency on the battlefield enabled the Emperor to transfer his plans into action and provides an excellent historical object lesson.

The Prussian campaign of 1806 marked the apogee of Napoleonic maneuver warfare. The Grand Army, numbering about 180,000 troops, consisted almost entirely of seasoned troops. The Prussians had about 254,000 men under arms, of whom 171,000 were available for field operations. The Prussian king was irreligious, and the leading generals comprised a junta of septuagenarians. The troops, heirs of the traditions of Frederick the Great, were well drilled and well disciplined. Prussian battalions lacked the flexibility of French units but were still Europe's masters of linear tactics.

French troops were quartered in south Germany with army headquarters at Munich. In September the Prussians occupied Saxony and concentrated their forces at Leipzig, Dresden and Göttingen. Three possible courses of action presented themselves to the Prussian high command. The
army could stand on the defensive, retreating slowly eastward in a series of holding actions until the Russians mobilized and moved west. A slightly bolder scheme called for the army to concentrate in the vicinity of Erfurt north of the Thuringian Forest. If Napoleon moved east, the army could threaten the French left. A more daring strategy called for a concentrated drive from Erfurt towards Stuttgart to threaten the line of the Rhine, catching the French in their scattered garrisons and defeating them in detail.

The Prussian high command finally decided to pursue an offensive strategy, and in early October the Duke of Brunswick ordered the Prussian army to concentrate around Erfurt in preparation for a blow against Napoleon's left flank.

Never willing to await passively an enemy blow, Napoleon was determined to seize the initiative. He, therefore, decided to seek out and crush the Prussian army before the Russians could come to their assistance. A drive on Berlin would, he felt, force his enemies to offer battle.

In seeking a decisive engagement Napoleon examined several avenues of strategic approach. He could concentrate his forces on the Rhine near the Dutch border and march directly on Berlin. Such a move would, however, force him to redeploy the Grand Army, a time-consuming process that would grant additional weeks for the Russians to mobilize. Moreover, a Prussian army, if defeated on the north German plain, could simply retreat toward Berlin, its depots and the Russians.

A concentration at Mainz and an advance on Berlin via Frankfurt and Erfurt made the initial concentration of forces easier. Such a movement, however, faced daunting geographical obstacles, including the vast Thuringian Forest with its scanty road net. Once again the Prussians, if defeated, could retreat towards their magazines and reinforcements.

A rapid concentration of forces around Bamberg and Bayreuth in northeastern Bavaria followed by an advance north toward Leipzig or Dresden and then to Berlin promised the most spectacular results. The terrain posed problems since the Grand Army would have to pass through the Thuringian Forest, but given the current disposition of the army, the concentration area was most convenient. Moreover, a rapid advance through Saxony toward Berlin would at one stroke threaten the Prussian lines of communication, outflank their field forces, place the French in a commanding position between Frederick William and the Russians and imperil the Prussian bases and capital. If the Prussians held their ground, Napoleon might repeat the maneuver of Ulm. If they retreated hastily, the Grand Army would have several opportunities to defeat them piecemeal.

On September 5 Napoleon ordered engineer officers to reconnoiter the roads leading north from Bamberg. On September 18 and 19, the Emperor dictated 102 separate orders including the famous "General Dispositions for the Assembly of the Grand Army" wherein he directed six army corps, the
Guard, the Cavalry Reserve and a Bavarian contingent to begin moving toward north-eastern Bavaria. He then ordered his brother Louis, King of Holland, to mobilize 30,000 men and directed a 22,000 man corps to Mainz. These forces were to attract Prussian attention to the north, and in case of disaster they were to hold the line of the Rhine while the Grand Army retreated. If the Prussians lunged west, the troops in Mainz and Holland would form the anvil against which Napoleon could hammer the enemy from the rear.

Napoleon left Paris on September 24 and on October 2 took personal command of his forces. Three days later he issued orders for the advance through the Thuringian Forest and on into Saxony. The Emperor formed the Grand Army into what he called a bataillon carré able to meet an attack from any direction. The army was to march in three columns each two corps strong. The Bavarians joined the right flank column; the Guard and Cavalry Reserve followed the center column. All of the columns were within supporting distance of each other. If the Prussians struck one of the columns, the commander was to fight a defensive battle while Napoleon maneuvered the unengaged forces to attack the enemy rear.

At first light on October 8, 1806, the three columns preceded by a light cavalry screen began to advance. By nightfall on the 9th the Grand Army had largely passed through the forest meeting only sporadic opposition.

In the days following the French continued to march toward Leipzig, crushing an isolated detachment and taking 1,800 prisoners and thirty-three guns in the process. Caught off balance, the anxious Prussians gave up all thought of attacking the Grand Army. On October 13 the Prussians decided upon a hasty retreat to protect their communications. The main body, some 93,600 strong, was to march to Leipzig by way of Auerstadt. Two large detachments with a combined total of 53,000 troops were to take up positions between Jena and Weimar until the main body was clear of Auerstadt and then join the retreat to the north.

Receiving sporadic reports of the Prussian movements, Napoleon reacted quickly, issuing orders to his corps to swing westward in preparation for a major battle. The Emperor presumed that he would face the bulk of the Prussian army around Jena. What he did not realize was that the main enemy forces were already in full retreat and that the fighting on October 14 would in fact evolve into two separate engagements.

The dual battles of Jena-Auerstadt demonstrated that French tactical ability was again equal to the Emperor's strategic genius. At Jena one corps began the engagement, and Napoleon fed additional units into the battle as they arrived on the field. Ultimately, four corps with 96,000 troops crushed the Prussians, inflicting 25,000 casualties for a loss of 5,000. At Auerstadt a single corps of 27,000 men met the Prussian main force. So tactically supe-
rior were the French that at the end of the fight the Prussians were in full retreat having lost 10,000 men and 115 guns, while French casualties amounted to 7,000 killed and wounded.

Virtually without pause Napoleon ordered a relentless pursuit of the scattered demoralized Prussian forces. One force moved west taking Erfurt and 9,000 prisoners on the 16th, while other units pushed to the Elbe, covering seventy-five miles to reach the river on October 20. Four days and ninety miles later the French advanced guard was in the outskirts of Berlin. On October 25 the French marched through the city while other corps moved toward the Baltic and still others advanced on the Oder. By the 29th the French were at Stettin; Lübeck fell on November 5, and other corps were approaching the Oder. Throughout the advance the various corps took thousands of prisoners and huge amounts of equipment.

In the space of thirty-three days the Grand Army killed or wounded 25,000 Prussians and took 140,000 prisoners and 2,000 cannons. The king with remnants of his once mighty army fled across the Oder to join the Russians, leaving most of his state to the mercies of the Emperor.

As in 1805 Napoleon again struck his enemy from a completely unexpected direction. Surprise coupled with mobility completely disoriented the Prussian high command from the outset of the war. Moreover, Napoleon never gave the Prussians an opportunity to regroup.

Napoleon was, of course, ultimately defeated. There are numerous factors, including British sea power, his own policy of continual expansion and military reforms by enemy armies, that contributed to his downfall. Additionally and critically, the capabilities of the French army declined after 1807. Casualties plus ever-expanding military commitments diluted the quality of the Grand Army. New recruits were not as masterful on the battlefield as were the victors of Austerlitz, Jena and Auerstadt. Napoleon, therefore, had little choice but to substitute mass for tactical flexibility in his battles.

After 1808 his battles became battles of attrition. He won decisively at Austerlitz with 73,000 men, and 96,000 troops triumphed at Jena. A vastly outnumbered force emerged victorious at Auerstadt. At Wagram Napoleon deployed 170,000 men, at Borodino 133,000, at Dresden 120,000 and at Leipzig 195,000. Yet in each engagement, despite very heavy losses, he never destroyed an enemy field army. He remained a master of the bold strategic maneuver, but his army's tactical execution no longer matched his strategic genius.

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic era imposed dramatic changes on warfare. War became national, and entire peoples participated in the great affairs of state. Armies ceased to be composed of automatons adhering to a rigid tactical doctrine. Citizen armies employing flexible tactics and emphasizing individual initiative down to the small unit level dominated the battle-
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

After 1815 military leaders had to reflect upon and absorb the lessons of the Napoleonic wars, and even in the far off United States military men responded to this imperative.

In 1815 Sylvanus Thayer went to Europe to buy texts for the West Point library. Most of the books purchased were French, and French was the only modern foreign language taught at the academy. D. H. Mahan, father of the U.S. Navy's A. T. Mahan, studied at the Metz artillery school. He then joined the faculty at West Point, and for the rest of his career he proclaimed to his cadets that the study of Napoleonic tactics was essential for the modern officer. His textbook on tactics emphasized the flexible employment of lines and columns covered by skirmishers. Instructors and cadets formed a Napoleon Club where they discussed at length the Emperor's tactics and strategy.

Newly commissioned West Point graduates entered an army that despite its small size and unique frontier experience, nevertheless resembled on a minute scale the Imperial forces. During the Revolutionary War, Congress adopted a drill manual written by Baron von Steuben. It was a simplified version of Prussian drill. These 1779 regulations proved inadequate during the War of 1812, and Gen. Winfield Scott proceeded to drill the troops under his command according to the French regulations of 1791. In 1815 the government appointed Scott to head a board charged with revising the army's drill. The board ultimately adopted the 1791 manual for all infantry regiments. Scott translated the manual, and the army used it until 1854. In the following year the army adopted a more recent French drill book, and it was not until 1867 that the United States Army ceased using translations of French manuals and wrote its own.

It is now 180 years since Napoleon launched his Ulm-Austerlitz campaign, but despite vast changes in the technology of war, the Emperor's operational methods may still hold valid lessons. His use of bold slashing strokes pursued resolutely until victory, his ability to combine all of the service arms effectively, his insistence upon developing and perfecting a tactical system able to execute his strategic thrusts and his desire that everyone in his army understand his methods and use their initiative at every level to accomplish the mission seem to apply to contemporary military organizations.

Napoleon once noted, "Speeches preceding a battle do not make soldiers brave. Old soldiers scarcely listen and recruits forget them at the first cannon shot." The Emperor believed that intellectual preparation for war was essential but it had to take place long before combat. Genius cannot be taught, but the study of a particular genius and his methods may indeed be useful to mere mortals.
A graduate of Princeton University, Professor Steven T. Ross has been honored with both Woodrow Wilson and Fels Fellowships. He served as a visiting professor at Yale University and worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is the author of numerous articles and books on military and diplomatic history, including: European Diplomatic History, 1789-1799; Quest for Victory: French Military Strategy, 1792-1799; From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866; and French Military History, 1661-1799: A Guide to the Literature. Professor Ross is currently Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College.
Notes

6. Lanza, Maxim 47.
11. *FM 100-5*, p. 2-1.
12. Lanza, Maxim 15.
15. *FM 100-5*, p. 2-1.
16. Lanza, Maxim 92.
17. *FM 100-5*, p. 2-4.
27. Lanza, Maxim 61.
Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance Against Napoleon, 1813–1814

Gordon A. Craig

For some six generations now, the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 in Germany and France have exercised a powerful fascination over the minds of historians, and it is understandable that this should be so. It would be difficult to find another time in the modern age as full of dramatic crises as the autumn that saw Napoleon's strength and reputation broken at Leipzig and the spring that witnessed his brilliant but unavailing attempts to break out of the ring of steel that forced him towards surrender. To members of an older generation, the spectacle of this greatest of Great Captains fighting tenaciously but with shrinking resources to save the New Order he had created possessed all the qualities of classical tragedy, and they studied the details of his last campaigns with admiration for the flashes of inspiration that lightened the gathering pall of defeat and with sympathy for the desperate twistings and turnings that preceded the end. "The campaign of 1814," wrote a British historian in a book that appeared almost exactly a century after the events it described, "is certainly a wonderful example of what Napoleon's genius could do in circumstances which . . . had become so desperate that no other general of the time would have even attempted to make head against them."

Napoleon doubtless has as many admirers today as when that judgment was written fifty years ago. But circumstances alter cases and even have the power to change the prescription of the glasses through which the historian peers back at the past. What we see in history and the things in it that stir our active interest are largely determined by our own experience and by the perplexities of our own time; and that is why, living as we do in a country which, in the last quarter of a century, has fought two wars in alliance with other powers and is presently a member of the greatest peacetime alliance in history (although admittedly one that is very difficult to hold together), we are apt to be less interested in the purely military features of the last struggle against Napoleon than in those things that mirror our current and recent concerns. The tactical virtuosity of Napoleon will make a weaker claim upon the attention of our historians than do the problems of the coalition that opposed him, and particularly such things as the difficulties its members experienced in establishing an effective command structure, their in-
complete success in reaching agreement on war aims, and the repercussions this had on their operational efficiency, and the problems caused within their alliance by imperfect governmental control over commanders in the field, which threatened to expand the war against Napoleon to a new and frightening dimension. All of the thorny problems with which Western statesmen have wrestled during the Second World War, the Korean conflict, and the troubled history of NATO can be found, in hardly altered form, within the anti-Napoleonic coalition, a fact that suggests that certain problems are endemic to military alliances, which may or may not be comforting.

At the outset of the autumn campaign of 1813, Napoleon had at his disposal about 442,000 combat troops, of whom 40,000 were cavalry, supported by 1,284 guns. The bulk of this army, about 314,000 men, was concentrated north of the Bohemian mountains in an arc extending from Dresden to Liegnitz in Silesia; a force of 70,000 under Oudinot was poised on the southern border of Mark Brandenburg, within striking distance of Berlin; an observation corps under Margaron was bivouacked at Leipzig; and Davout commanded a mixed force of Frenchmen and Danes at Hamburg. Another 80,000 men were in garrison in the Elbe fortresses and those of Prussia and Poland, and an additional 43,000 stood in reserve. The Emperor had largely repaired the losses that had forced him to accept an armistice after his successes over the Russians and the Prussians at Lübeck and Bautzen in May. He was still short of supply and deficient in certain arms, but his new troop levies, while raw, were commanded by battle-tried veterans; their spirit was good; they could shoot; and French tactics—the advance in column—required no special skill in execution. In addition, the army had the great advantage of fighting on interior lines under the sole direction of a man of energy and purpose.

Napoleon's opponents were superior to him in every category but the last. The original Russo-Prussian alliance had now been strengthened by the adhesion of Sweden, whose Crown Prince, the former French Marshal Bernadotte, had brought a force of 35,000 troops to Pomerania in May, and a more important addition—by that of Austria, whose forces swelled the allied total to some 570,000 effectives, plus reserves and fortress troops. This force was, however, split into three widely separated groups: a mixed Prussian-Russian-Swedish force under Bernadotte based on Berlin (the so-called Northern Army); the Silesian Army (Prussians and Russians commanded by Field Marshal Blücher) at Breslau; and the larger Bohemian Army (Austrians, plus Russian and Prussian contingents) stationed south of the Erzgebirge under the command of Field Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg. For successful employment against a determined and centrally positioned
opponent, this federated force needed an effective command structure and a strategical plan that was accepted by all its members.

With respect to the first of these, it became clear, once Austria had joined the alliance, that supreme command would have to be vested in an Austrian general. The Russians and the Prussians had shown no particular talent for strategical direction during the spring campaign, and the defeats suffered at Lützen and Bautzen had been due on the one hand to Prussian impetuosity and inattention to detail and on the other to Emperor Alexander's penchant for superseding his commander in chief at crucial moments in battle and then becoming discouraged and relinquishing command when things went wrong. Bernadotte, who was accorded a degree of respect that he did not subsequently justify by his actions in the campaign (it was mistakenly believed by Emperor Francis of Austria, among others, that the Swedish Crown Prince knew the most intimate secrets of Napoleon's art of war and would turn them against its author), had not supplied enough troops to the alliance to qualify for the post. No one was clearer about this than the Austrian Chancellor Metternich, whose devious diplomatic campaign during the spring and summer of 1813 had been accompanied by an armament effort of great energy, which had brought Austrian troop strength, by August, to 479,000 officers and men, including 298,000 combat troops. Metternich was determined that this contribution should receive the recognition it deserved and that he should be entitled to name the supreme commander. "The important thing," he wrote to one of his associates on August 13, "is to have the decisive voice in the determination of the military dispositions, and to maintain against everyone—as I have been emphasizing to the Emperor Alexander—the principle that the power that puts 300,000 men into the field is the first power, and all the others only auxiliaries."

The Tsar ceded this point, but not without an attempt to influence the selection of the supreme commander. The logical choice, he suggested, would be the first man who had ever defeated Napoleon in the open field, Archduke Charles of Austria, the victor at Aspern in 1809, and the best possible chief for his general staff would be the Swiss Antoine Henri Jomini, formerly général de brigade in the French army and chef to Marshal Ney. Alexander's proposal is still intriguing to the historian who likes to speculate about might-have-beens. Next to Clausewitz, Jomini was the best known military theorist of the first half of the nineteenth century and the most incisive analyst of Napoleon's methods of war; and a partnership between him and the Archduke Charles, who, more than any other soldier of his day, enjoyed the love and admiration of Austrian troops, might have been a happy and fruitful combination. Or again, it might not: their common prejudice in favor of the methodical position warfare characteristic of the eighteenth century would not have commended them to the commanders of the Silesian Army, who were, in any case, scornful of French renegades like
Bernadotte, Moreau and Jomini. Moreover, it is possible that Jomini shone to best advantage in the study rather than in the field; the Silesian Army's Quartermaster General wrote later that Jomini's advice to the Tsar during the fighting around Dresden in August 1813 was so impractical that no one ever took him seriously again.10

The partnership between the Tsar's candidates never had an opportunity to prove itself because Metternich never considered it seriously. He was aware not only that Jomini was a member of Alexander's military suite but that Archduke Charles was in love with Alexander's sister Caroline and hoped to secure the Tsar's permission to marry her.11 In these circumstances, the two nominations promised to give the Russians a preponderance of influence at Supreme Headquarters. Even if that had not been true, the relationship between Charles and his brother, the Emperor Francis, had never been an easy one, and Charles had a record of conflict with civilian authorities that dated back to the 1790's and was regarded (not wholly justly) as a commander who was not amenable to governmental control.12 Metternich expected to have enough troubles with his allies without compounding them with differences within the Austrian camp. He said at this time: "We want a Feldherr who will make war, not one who is a politician. The Archduke wants to be minister for foreign affairs too, a position that does not accord with the functions of a Feldherr."13

With all this in mind, therefore, the chancellor decided not to take Alexander's advice. With his sovereign's approval, he selected a man of Charles' age but of different temperament, the 42 year old Karl Philipp
Fürst zu Schwarzenberg. A soldier without personal ambition, who admired Metternich and enjoyed his confidence, Schwarzenberg deserves a better reputation than that given him by historians, who have perhaps been unduly influenced by Clausewitz's biased and second-hand criticism of his generalship. The new supreme commander's talents were, to be sure, more diplomatic than strictly military, and it was probably a good thing that this was so. Like Dwight D. Eisenhower in another great coalition a hundred and thirty years later, his great gift was his ability, by patience and the arts of ingratiation, to hold together a military alliance which before Napoleon was finally defeated comprised fourteen members, and to persuade the quarrelling monarchs and their field commanders to give more than lip service to the alliance's strategical plan. This was not, as we shall see, an easy task or one that could be performed with perfect or continuous success.

In the strategical direction of the war, Schwarzenberg's chief assistants were Lieutenant Field Marshal Count Radetzky von Radetz, the chief of his general staff, and Lieutenant Field Marshal Freiherr von Langenau, a Saxon officer who defected to the allies in the summer of 1813 and who served as head of the operations section. Radetzky, the future hero of the Italian campaign of 1848-49, was the author of the strategical plan that guided the movements of the three armies during the autumn campaign of 1813, although his claim to this distinction has been contested by the Russians and the Swedes. As early as May 1813, foreseeing Austrian intervention in the war, he had laid an operational plan before his chief. In June, when he met the Tsar's Quartermaster General Toll at Gitschin, he had found that officer in complete agreement with his views; and in July, when the allies gathered (without Austrian participation) at Trachenberg, they accepted an operational plan sponsored by Bernadotte and Toll which was very similar to Radetzky's original plan and which was later amended to make it correspond even more closely to his concept.

Based upon the strategy of attrition—and hence depreciated by all Russian-German military publicists until the time of Hans Delbrück on the mistaken assumption that Ermattungsstrategie was an inferior form of war—Radetzky's plan was intended to make Napoleon split his forces, to wear himself out in constant movement, and, in the end, having lost the advantage of interior lines because of the constriction of the territory he controlled, to fight against armies advancing simultaneously against his center, flanks and communications. The method of achieving this he described as a coordinated advance by the three allied armies in such a manner that each of them would act offensively against detached French units but would withdraw if Napoleon sought to concentrate his forces against it, always refraining carefully from becoming involved in a major fight with a superior force, "lest the principal objective of the joint operation be lost," namely, "to strike the final blow with assurance." In general, as he wrote
years later, the plan called for "the Austrian Army to be the pivot, while the allies would form the swinging wings."\textsuperscript{19}

Although this plan won general acceptance, difficulties arose as soon as it was put into effect, partly because of the gap that always exists between paper plans and actual operations but also because of limitations upon the authority of the supreme commander which manifested themselves as soon as fighting began on August 17. During the whole of the autumn campaign of 1813, life was enormously complicated for Schwarzenberg and Radetzky by the presence of three of the allied sovereigns at, or uncomfortably close to, General Headquarters. These rulers had to be briefed on all specific operational plans and, when they were consulted, often gave less weight to the advice of the supreme commander than they did to their private military advisers. Of the latter there were many. Emperor Francis placed great confidence in General Đuka, a courtly desk general with whom Radetzky did not always see eye to eye. King Frederick William III of Prussia relied upon the judgment of his adjutant general Karl Friedrich Freiherr von dem Knesebeck, a man who had played an important role in the reform of the Prussian army but who, as an adviser on operations, was timorous and vacillating, excessively respectful of Napoleon's capacities, and inclined to believe that a strictly defensive posture was the best way of dealing with him.\textsuperscript{20} As for the Russian Emperor, he was surrounded by clouds of professional soldiers from all the countries on the map, chief among whom were his own countrymen Wolkonsky, Arakcheiev and Diebitsch and the Frenchmen Jomini and Moreau (until he was killed at Dresden). Life at General Headquarters was one continual war council, in which all of these royal advisers subjected operational plans to niggling criticism or proposed substitutes of their own. Before the campaign was far advanced, the usually mild-mannered Schwarzenberg was writing, "It is really inhuman what I must tolerate and bear, surrounded as I am by feeble-minded people, fools of every description, eccentric project-makers, intriguers, asses, babblers, criticasters; I often think I'm going to collapse under their weight.\textsuperscript{21}

Fully as irritating as this constant criticism was the tendency of the monarchs—like a group of early Charles de Gaulles—to withdraw troops from the joint command for their own purposes or to threaten to do so out of personal pique. From the very beginning of the campaign, Emperor Alexander reserved exclusive command over Russian contingents in the Bohemian Army, as well as over the sizeable Russian reserve, and Schwarzenberg could not always count on their presence in the line of battle when they were needed. As early as September 1813, the commander in chief was complaining to his sovereign that this uncertainty subjected him to pressures and tempted him to make concessions that might be dangerous to the state interest and the common cause; it was essential, he argued, that Russian troops be placed under the effective control of the supreme command.\textsuperscript{22}
Emperor Francis, unfortunately, had no power to satisfy this demand, and Schwarzenberg was forced to go on worrying about the Russians until Napoleon was overthrown. Nor was he concerned about them alone. There were moments during the autumn campaign, and particularly during the spring campaign in France, when the King of Prussia intimated to the Silesian Army command that he thought it advisable to avoid committing Prussian troops to battle, since further losses might weaken Prussia's voice when the peace talks began. As for the Crown Prince of Sweden, he not only tried to keep his own forces intact but made incessant demands for the assignment of additional Russian and Prussian corps to his command—in order to gratify his self-esteem, one must suppose, since he was very chary of using what was granted him.

Orders from the Supreme Command were transmitted to the Northern and Silesian Armies by the monarchs themselves or by their military plenipotentiaries on Schwarzenberg's staff, the Russian Gen. Toll and the Prussian Gen. von Hake. But instructions were not always carried out in the manner intended, for conditions at the army level were not dissimilar to those that prevailed at the Supreme Command. In the Silesian Army, there were differences between Blücher and his chef Gneisenau, on the one hand, and Müffling, the Quartermaster General, and some of the corps commanders on the other. York and Langeron, in particular, were worried by Blücher's lack of caution and sought, by means that sometimes verged on insubordination, to restrain it; and instructions from Schwarzenberg sometimes got lost in the clash of personalities. In the Northern Army there were similar difficulties. Bernadotte was suspicious of all orders emanating from the Supreme Command lest they overtax his resources and make it impossible for him to attain his real objective in the war, which was the acquisition of Norway for Sweden. The Prussian and Russian corps commanders, Generals von Bülow and Winzingerode, suspected him of sacrificing their troops for his private interest, while saving his own, and, before the campaign in Germany was over, they were accusing him of carrying on secret negotiations with the French. The Crown Prince, on his side, complained continually that he could not count on his generals obeying him.

In the face of these disruptive factors on every level of the command structure, it is remarkable that the strategical task confronting the allies was carried out at all, let alone within a bare three months. To direct a widely separated group of armies toward a common goal and a decisive battle in an age in which there were no railways and few good roads, and no telephone or telegraph, was a formidable enough undertaking even without the trouble caused by administrative duplication, international professional jealousies, and personal feuding within the separate commands. That it was accomplished was doubtless a tribute to the patience and forbearance of Schwarzenberg, but it was certainly due more to the general fear of Napoleon and
the common awareness that he was still far from being beaten. The divisive factors were always held in restraint by the common danger, and the allied war plan was enabled to achieve its objective.

Thus it was that, despite the brilliance of Napoleon’s employment of his depleted forces and despite some discreditable episodes on the allied side—York’s disinclination to accept direction from army headquarters during the fight on the Katzbach and the panic that inspired the monarchs and their staffs when Napoleon appeared like an apparition before Dresden—the first four weeks of the autumn campaign were, on balance, gloomy ones for the French Emperor. Oudinot was beaten at Grossbeeren by Bernadotte, MacDonald on the Katzbach by Blücher, Vandamme at Kuhl by a mixed force working for once with superb coordination, Ney at Dennewitz by Bülow. Prevented by Radetzky’s strategy from concentrating against a single enemy, worn out by constant movement, Napoleon slowly fell back upon Leipzig, where he found himself threatened by the three converging allied armies and elected to risk battle against them. The resultant Battle of the Peoples, which extended over three days of hard fighting, was marred by faults of tactical coordination and breakdowns of command efficiency on the part of the allies and by a stubborn refusal on the part of the Swedish Crown Prince to commit anything but his artillery to the common effort (he is reported to have said: “Provided the French are beaten, it is indifferent to me whether I or my army take a part, and of the two, I had much rather we did not.”), but, when it was over, Napoleon’s armies were broken and caught up in a retreat that was not to stop short of the Rhine. Despite their failure to devise a perfectly functioning command system, the allies had succeeded in liberating all of Germany.

II

Henry A. Kissinger has written recently:

As long as the enemy is more powerful than any single member of the coalition, the need for unity outweighs all considerations of individual gain. Then the powers of repose can insist on the definition of war aims which, as all conditions, represent limitations. But when the enemy has been so weakened that each ally has the power to achieve its ends alone, a coalition is at the mercy of its most determined member. Confronted with the complete collapse of one of the elements of the equilibrium, all other powers will tend to raise their claims in order to keep pace.

This describes very well what happened to the allied coalition after the battle of Leipzig. The military-technical questions which had troubled the allies in the past continued to be a source of irritation, but they became far
less important than the political divisions which now threatened to destroy the alliance utterly.

It was not, of course, immediately clear that "the enemy (had) been so weakened that each ally (had) the power to achieve its ends alone." When the allied sovereigns and their military advisers gathered in Frankfurt-am-Main in November in order to discuss the future course of the war, there was no agreement as to Napoleon's strength and capabilities. Blücher, scornful of what he called "the swarm of monarchs and princes . . . that spoils everything" might have felt that "it is perfectly certain that, had we all, without delay, crossed the Rhine, Napoleon would by this time be suing for peace," but York was of a different opinion, pointing out that his corps had already lost two-thirds of its effectives, and York's views, laid before the King by Knesebeck, impressed that ruler. Bernadotte, who had by now diverted his attention to a campaign in Denmark for the possession of Norway, took the view (perhaps natural, given his interests) that a campaign in France might jeopardize everything that had been won so far, a position shared by the Austrian Gen. Count Bubna, who had the ear of Emperor Francis and who believed that an advance into France would provoke a national rising beyond the power of the allies to control. "We must," he said, "carefully avoid driving a people to desperate resolves by insults to its honor." Among the allied sovereigns only Alexander was anxious for an immediate advance into France, and even his optimism was momentarily dampened by the doubts of his generals and the signs of war weariness among his troops.

The Tsar's periods of self-restraint were never, however, of long duration, and Napoleon's failure to make use of the opportunity given him by the pause at Frankfurt in order to secure a peace settlement on the basis of the Rhine frontier led the Russian ruler to renew his pleas for a reopening of hostilities. And from the moment when the Rhine was crossed in late December, Alexander's self-confidence and his ambition grew until they assumed grandiose proportions. As Sorel has written, he began to fancy himself as "the Agamemnon of the new Iliad." He began to revert to dreams of his youth, in which he had determined one day "to reconstitute Europe and assume the place usurped by Napoleon in the domination of the continent." He wanted now to take vengeance for the insults he had suffered . . . to persecute the war relentlessly, to show no moderation to the perfidious enemy, but to destroy his army and overthrow his power . . . He would dominate France, a Latin Poland, give new institutions to the land of Montesquieu, give a king to the Revolution. The destiny yearned for since Tilsit was now being fulfilled; the hour had struck for the revelation of his genius.
None of this was lost on Metternich, who realized that Alexander's fantasies, if unchecked, could lead to a costly prolongation of the war, ending not in a restoration of European order but a complete subversion of it in the Russian interest. Years later the elder Moltke was to say that the trouble with the Russians was that they always came too late and then were too strong. Metternich must have felt something of this. The Russian forces were fresher than those of their allies and their reserves were larger; their losses at Leipzig, in comparison with Austria's and Prussia's, had been very low. If the Tsar decided that his forces were strong enough to secure his objectives in defiance of his allies, then the consequences might be grave indeed. A peace settlement must therefore be arranged with Napoleon before France had become so weakened that Alexander would conclude that he could go it alone; and whatever military operations were authorized must support this political strategy.

To persuade Napoleon to conclude peace and to restrain Alexander were, therefore, the two poles of Metternich's policy from the winter of 1813 onward. He had hoped to end the war in December on terms that would leave France the boundaries of the Rhine and the Alps. When Napoleon refused to treat on that basis, the Austrian chancellor reluctantly agreed to a renewal of hostilities. But he and Schwarzenberg refused to consider the kind of headlong offensive against the Rhine fortresses that was advocated by Alexander and the chiefs of the Silesian Army. Instead, they proposed and, after much haggling, persuaded their allies to accept, a plan which called for an advance of the Bohemian Army in a great looping movement through northern Switzerland into the Franche-Comté and thence to the plain of Langres, where it would threaten Napoleon's communications. Meanwhile, the Silesian Army would cross the Rhine and advance through the Palatinate to Metz and eventually to the Marne, where it would fall in on the right wing of the Bohemian Army. It was a strategy designed to avoid bloody encounters, while exerting the kind of pressure on Napoleon that would induce him to negotiate seriously. Metternich was quite explicit on this point, instructing Schwarzenberg in January 1814 to advance "cautiously" and "to utilize the desire of the common man in France for peace by avoiding warlike acts."335

The lengthy debate over this plan had exacerbated relations between Metternich and Emperor Alexander,9 and they did not improve in the weeks that followed, as the sovereigns moved towards France in the wake of the soldiers. Exasperated by the long delays, the Tsar was soon openly accusing Schwarzenberg of sabotaging a genuine war effort, and his references to Metternich were hardly more flattering. By the time the monarchs had reached Basel in mid-January, Alexander was so exercised that he announced that he was opposed to any further negotiations with Napoleon—indeed, that he intended to demand the Corsican's abdication; and he let it
The Campaign in France in 1814

- Ghent
- Antwerp
- Brussels
- Düsseldorf
- Cologne
- Rhine
- Metz
- Silesian Army
- Frankfurt
- Silesian Army
- Bohemian Army
- Nancy
- Chaumont
- Langres
- Freiburg
- Basel
- Jura Mountains
- Ardennes Forest
- Laus
- Coblenz
- Stuttgart
- Chaumont
- Langres
- Belfort
- Plateau of Lorraine
- Basel
STRATEGY AND TACTICS

be known, in addition, that he considered the Crown Prince of Sweden, Bernadotte, as a logical successor to the throne.

To this body blow Metternich replied in kind. On January 16 he instructed Schwarzenberg, whose troops were now at Langres, to avoid any further forward action until the political situation had been clarified; and simultaneously he urged the King of Prussia to order Blücher to stand at Metz. The time had come, the Austrian statesman saw, for a showdown and a redefinition of purpose. “All our engagements are fulfilled,” he wrote to one of his ministers.37

All former goals of the coalition have been not only achieved but exceeded. Now we must get clear once more about our purpose, for it is with alliances as with all fraternizations; if they do not have a strictly determinate aim, they disintegrate.

Metternich found an ally in the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, who arrived at Basel on January 18. The Englishman was appalled when he learned of Alexander’s plans for the future government of France and also disturbed by the violence of tone employed by Alexander’s supporters in the Silesian Army, from which an intemperate memorandum from Gneisenau’s pen had just arrived, demanding an immediate advance on Paris. After a long and exasperating interview with the Tsar, who was in one of his most exalted moods, Castlereagh had no difficulty in agreeing with Metternich that a redefinition of the aims of the alliance was necessary.38 Armed with this support, and the private knowledge that the Prussian Chancellor Hardenberg felt the same way and that even the Tsar’s closest advisers, Stein and Pozzo di Borgo, were dismayed by his plans for Bernadotte, Metternich went on the offensive against both Alexander and Gneisenau. From Schwarzenberg he extracted a report which painted the military situation in hardly encouraging hues, since it underlined the high incidence of illness and desertion in the Bohemian Army, the disaffection of the local population, the difficulties of supply, the still formidable resources of Napoleon, and other factors that threw doubt on the feasibility of an easy advance on the French capital.39 Using this as a basis for argument, he wrote an alarmed memorandum of his own to Emperor Francis, pointing out that success in the war so far had been the result of a carefully coordinated politico-military strategy in which operations and negotiations went hand in hand. This strategy should not be abandoned lightly, although that seemed to be the intention of Alexander and Gneisenau. Before steps were taken which—in view of the facts stated by Schwarzenberg—might well be disastrous, the four powers must consult on fundamental questions.40

The Austrian Emperor agreed with this view entirely, as did Hardenberg and the Tsar’s own Foreign Minister, Nesselrode. Even so, Alexander did not
immediately give way. The showdown between Metternich and his imperial antagonist came on January 26–27, when the chancellor warned that if Russia intended to force Napoleon's abdication, Austrian troops could no longer participate in the campaign, and Alexander responded by threatening to march on Paris alone or with his Prussian ally. These threats were less serious than they appeared, however; or at least, once made, they induced second thoughts. It did not take much counting on the fingers to convince the Tsar that it would not be easy to defeat Napoleon without Austrian assistance, or much ratiocination to remind Metternich that he could not safely withdraw from the war, since a Russo-Prussian defeat or a Russo-Prussian victory in a campaign in France would be equally dangerous to Austrian interests. A private conversation between chancellor and Tsar on January 28 somewhat relieved the acerbity of their relations and paved the way for more general talks; and on January 29–30, at Langres, the allies agreed that military operations should be resumed under the direction of Schwarzenberg, who would pay "appropriate attention to military expediency" (a graceful way of saying that he would proceed in accordance with his own methodical plan rather than in the manner desired by Gneisenau). At the same time, negotiations would be opened at Chatillon with Napoleon's representative Caulaincourt to explore the possibility of a peace settlement on the basis of the frontiers of 1792, with Napoleon, presumably, remaining on the throne, since the Tsar had privately promised to refrain from interfering further in dynastic matters.  

It is indicative of the constant but sometimes curious interrelationship of politics and war that this undoubted political victory for Metternich should now have been upset by an unforeseen military success. On January 29, Blücher's army, advancing on Brienne, became unexpectedly involved in heavy fighting with Napoleon's main force, and, although it was rolled back to Trames, received strong reinforcements from Schwarzenberg and renewed the fight at La Rothière on February 1. By eight o'clock in the evening, the French line had been broken and Napoleon's grenadiers were retreating in disorder towards Brienne, leaving 3600 dead, 2400 prisoners, and 73 guns on the field. Allied casualties were almost as high, but Schwarzenberg and Blücher had won a clear moral victory, defeating Bonaparte decisively for the first time on his own soil.  

This splendid success had the unfortunate effect of reviving all of the Tsar's ambitions, and he had no compunction about violating the agreement just made at Langres. He instructed Razumowsky, his representative at Chatillon, to do everything in his power to delay a successful issue of the talks there; he refused to consider a French request for an armistice; and he began to talk once more of marching on Paris, dethroning Napoleon, and giving the French people a king of his own choosing. The kind of threat that had restrained him at Langres now seemed to have lost its effect. The Tsar
had used his strong personal influence over the wavering Frederick William III to win a promise from that sovereign that he would stand by him through thick and thin. Now, thanks to the blow suffered by Napoleon at La Rothière, Alexander could, as an American historian has written recently, 40 seriously contemplate withdrawing the 61,000 Russian troops from Schwarzenberg's Bohemian Army, joining them to Blücher's Silesian Army, two-thirds of which were Russians anyway, and leaving the Austrians to their own devices. Were Alexander to try it and were he to succeed, his hegemony on the continent would be an accomplished fact.

For Metternich this was a grim prospect. But he was rescued by Napoleon—or perhaps, more accurately, by his antagonists within the allied camp, Blücher and Gneisenau. The impetuosity that had become the hallmark of the Silesian Army had long worried some of their professional colleagues. General Muffling, who in later life was to become a distinguished and influential Chief of the Prussian General Staff, had noted during the spring campaign that his chiefs spent more time making inspirational speeches to their troops than providing for their security and that Gneisenau's conspicuous weakness was his failure to plan carefully, his excessive emphasis upon bravery as the determinant of victory, and his confidence in his own ability to inspire it whenever it was needed. 44 In the days before La Rothière, Schwarzenberg had remarked on the same dangerous tendencies and had written: 45

Blücher, and still more Gneisenau—for the old fellow has to lend his name—are urging the march on Paris with such perfectly childish rage that they trample under foot every single rule of warfare. Without placing any considerable force to guard the road from Chalons to Nancy, they rush like mad to Brie, Regardless of their rear and of their flanks, they do nothing but plan parties fines at the Palais Royal. This is indeed frivolous at such an important moment.

It was probably inevitable that this disregard of the fundamental rules of war would catch up with Blücher and Gneisenau sooner or later; and it did so in the second week of February when, in the neighborhood of Buentepe-Stages, Napoleon fell like a thunderbolt upon their overextended and hopelessly disarticulated forces and proceeded to defeat them corps by corps, inflicting over 15,000 casualties in five days of fighting and almost bagging Blücher himself in an ambush at Montmirail. 46

The news of this shattering reverse caused a near panic at Supreme Headquarters, and the phlegmatic Castlereagh noted with disgust that this affected not only the princes of the lesser German states but the Tsar as well.
Only a few days ago, Alexander had been talking of marching on Paris alone; now he was clamoring for an armistice. But this sudden imperial collapse did have the happy effect in the end of reducing the tensions within the alliance and preparing the way for ultimate victory. It enabled Metternich to isolate the Tsar diplomatically when he was most conscious of the slump of his military fortunes, and by threatening a separate peace on the part of Austria and the lesser German states, to force him, on February 15, to adhere to a formal interallied agreement, stipulating that military operations and diplomatic negotiations should continue side by side but that regardless of the fate of either, France's borders should in the end remain those of 1792, that if Napoleon accepted these, he would remain on the throne but that if he were deposed, the allies would regard the Bourbon pretender Louis XVIII as his successor, and that if Paris were occupied by the allies, they would administer it in common.

These terms assured France of an honorable place in the postwar balance of power under a ruler with a claim to legitimacy. They relieved Metternich of his fears that the country might be depressed into the position of a Russian satellite and, because they did so, permitted him to view the reopening of military operations in a more relaxed mood, even to the extent of agreeing that the Silesian Army should be authorized to start once more for Paris (although only after it had been reinforced by Russian and Prussian units detached from Bernadotte's inactive Northern Army, since—as Castlereagh said—Blücher was clearly “too daring to be trusted with a small force”). At long last, the first days of March saw the beginning of the resolution of the political differences that had weighed so heavily upon the alliance and slowed down operations so many occasions; and, after the treaty of Chaumont of March 4 had confirmed and elaborated the agreement of February 15 and had converted the coalition into a permanent alliance, the total military resources of the partners could be turned, without let or hindrance, against Napoleon. There followed in quick succession the battles of Craonne, Laon and Arcis sur Aube, and, on March 31, the allies entered Paris.

III

From what has been said above, it will have become clear that it was not only imperfect command relationships and differences on war aims that caused internal strains within the anti-Napoleonic coalition, but the problem of civil-military relations also played an important role. Even before Austria had joined the alliance, Metternich was expressing doubts as to whether the Prussian army was an entirely reliable instrument of its government, and during the campaigns of 1814 and 1815 British statesmen also came to regard the behavior of Prussian soldiers with misgivings.
Although most nineteenth century German historians sought to deny it, the war of liberation against Napoleon began with an act of insubordination by the Prussian military against its royal commander. Tension between King Frederick William III and his soldiers had existed since 1809, when the King had refused to join Austria in the campaign that ended at Wagram. Frederick William was a melancholy and pessimistic man who had more faith in the genius of Napoleon than in the ability of his people or his army to oppose him effectively, and he turned a deaf ear to the counsel of soldiers like Gneisenau who urged him to resort to the levée en masse in order to free his country. His attitude embittered the patriotic party and, when the King capitulated to Napoleon's pressure in 1811 and placed Prussian troops at his disposal, this feeling turned to a suppressed fury. "We will receive the fate we deserve," Gneisenau wrote of the King's action. "We will go down in shame, for we dare not conceal from ourselves the truth that a nation is as bad as its government." And again, with something bordering on contempt: "The King stands ever by the throne on which he has never sat."

When Napoleon's fortunes changed in Russia and the long retreat from Moscow began, Blücher, Gneisenau, Grolman, Clausewitz and others once more raised the cry of war and, when the King did not respond, became increasingly critical of him and his chosen ministers—notably Hardenberg—and increasingly inclined to a rebellious forcing play which would bring Prussia into the war on Russia's side. The capitulation of Napoleon's Prussian auxiliary corps, led by Gen. York, to the Russians at Tauroggen in December 1812 was such an action, and it was bitterly resented by the King, even after he had yielded to the popular enthusiasm aroused by it and had summoned his people to arms. The way in which Prussian intervention had been effected was not lost on foreign observers. The Austrian minister in Breslau wrote home in February 1813: "Under the guise of patriotism, the military and the leaders of the sects have seized complete control of the reins of government, and the chancellor (Hardenberg) is swept along by the stream."

Few things have so disturbing an effect upon statesmen engaged in a common war effort than the thought that the soldiers might begin to take important decisions into their own hands. The nervousness shown by our own allies during the Korean War as they observed the behavior and read the press releases of Gen. Douglas MacArthur is a case in point. And it was paralleled throughout the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 by the apprehension of Prussia's allies as they listened to the complaints and objections and demands of the Silesian Army commanders, their constantly reiterated opposition to any form of restraint, their violent criticism of the strategy of the Supreme Command, and their ill-disguised contempt for "the diplomats," whom Blücher once called "Schufien who deserve the gallows."

Disturbing enough during the months leading up to Napoleon's fall, the
soldiers' impatience with governmental control reached new heights after Napoleon's return from Elba and his second defeat. Blücher's headquarters in Paris in 1815 was a center of disaffection in which insubordination was the order of the day. Only the intervention of the British prevented Blücher from levying a contribution of a hundred million francs on the people of Paris and from taking other measures for which he had neither royal nor allied authorization. Col. Hardinge, the British liaison officer at his headquarters, reported that the King of Prussia was experiencing the gravest of difficulty in checking "the very unusual spirit of political interference existing in this army and its reported intimate connection with popular feeling in Prussia." The autumn of 1815 was marked by a lengthy dispute between Hardenberg and Blücher's headquarters over occupation policy, and the Field Marshal's open disobedience of instructions forced the King to intervene in October with an order explicitly stating that the chancellor was to be regarded as the final authority in political matters. Blücher and his most radical advisor, Grolman, were clearly trying to do what Moltke was to attempt in 1870 and Ludendorff was to succeed in doing in 1916—namely, to supersede the civilian authorities in a vital area of war policy.

The spectacle of their doing so alarmed Castlereagh, who admitted that he looked "with considerable anxiety at the tendency of (Prussian) politics" and noted that "the army is by no means subordinate to the civil authorities," and it led Emperor Alexander to say to a group of his generals: "It is possible that some time we shall have to come to the aid of the King of Prussia against his army."

Metternich was less concerned over the effects of the behavior of Blücher and his colleagues upon the authority of the Prussian crown than he was over the threat it represented to the common interests of the alliance. He sensed what it is easier for us, with twentieth century experience, to recognize: namely, that the Silesian Army commanders were fighting, or wanted to fight, a different kind of war than the allied sovereigns and ministers. The latter—and this was true even of Emperor Alexander, whose enthusiasms were always restrained before they went too far by a cool appreciation of state interest—were fighting for political objectives; the Prussian soldiers were fighting for ideological ones. In Blücher's headquarters, Gneisenau, Grolman and the others rubbed shoulders with fantasists and demagogues like Arndt, Görres and Jahn and partook of that mystical nationalism which turned the war against Napoleon into a fight against evil, a struggle against the anti-Christ and his minions. Gneisenau's quarrels with Schwarzenberg were not really about strategy; they were, at least to Gneisenau, about something much more fundamental, about faith, about religion. When he pressed for a headlong drive towards Paris, he talked of it as a crusade. "Destiny brought us here," he wrote to Stein in January 1814."
STRATEGY AND TACTICS

We must take revenge for the so many sorrows inflicted on the nations, for so much arrogance, so that the principle *discite justitiam moniti non temner· divos* may be observed. If we do not do that, then we are miserable wretches, who deserve to be shocked out of our lazy peace every two years and to be threatened with the scourge of slavery.

And again:

We must answer the visits of the French to our cities by visiting them in theirs. So long as that does not happen, our revenge and triumph will be incomplete. If the Silesian Army gets to Paris first, I shall at once have the bridges of Austerlitz and Jena blown up, as well as the Arc de Triomphe.

In these words, and in the behavior of Blücher in Paris in 1815, we sense a spirit which, if uncontrolled, could only expand the war to new dimensions of bitterness and devastation and make a viable peace settlement impossible. In them we find already an intimation of the ideological passions which were, in the twentieth century, to make it so difficult to keep war within the limitations that statecraft requires. Metternich and Castlereagh had every reason to be alarmed.

IV

When one reviews the history of the Grand Alliance of 1813–1815 and contemplates the serious deficiencies of the command relationships, the fundamental differences in political ambition and objective between the partners, and the dangers posed by the insubordination and ideological incompatibility of the Prussian soldiers, it is not immediately easy to understand how the coalition managed to survive even the first winter of the war. It did so, of course, because of the existence of that almost elemental force mentioned only occasionally in these pages—Napoleon Bonaparte himself, formidable even on a stricken field, endlessly resilient and resourceful, always ready to strike hammer blows against the weak points in the coalition arrayed against him. The pressure exerted by the mere knowledge that Bonaparte was still at large, reinforced as it was by his sudden and dreadful appearances, was enough to hold the alliance together in moments of crisis and eventually to persuade it to consolidate its resources in such a way that victory became possible.

It is always dangerous to attempt to draw lessons from history, and there are, in any event, profound differences between the Grand Alliance discussed here and the peacetime alliance of which we are a part today. Even so, at a time when we hear so much about the crisis of NATO and when so much is written about the difficulties of reforming its command structure or resolving
the strategical and political differences of its members, it may be useful to reflect that others have found it possible to live with administrative deficiencies and conflicts of interest and yet to be effective partners and that we may do so too, provided we remember why our alliance was established in the first place and provided we do not lose sight of the fact that our Bonapartes too are always in the near distance and that their menace is undiminished. The Grand Alliance of 1813-1815 is interesting because it is a kind of prototype of all alliances, with all the troubles to which they are heir. Its history may be a source of encouragement to us if we note that its internal divisions were deeper and more fundamental than those which affect the Atlantic Alliance today but that it survived and was victorious.

Dr. Gordon A. Craig was born in Glasgow, Scotland, and came to the United States in 1925. He received his A.B. from Princeton University in 1936. He attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar and received a B. Litt. in 1938. In 1939 he received his M.A. and in 1941 his Ph.D. from Princeton University. Dr. Craig taught at Yale University from 1939 to 1941. He returned to Princeton in 1941 and became Professor of History in 1950. In 1961, he became Professor of History at Stanford University. He has also served as Visiting Professor of History at Columbia University. He is a world recognized authority in German history and modern diplomacy. During World War II, he served as a captain in the U.S. Marine Corps. Dr. Craig is the author of *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945* (1955), *NATO and the New German Army* (1955), *From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft* (1958), *Europe Since 1815* (1961), and *The Battle of Königgrätz: Prussia's Victory Over Austria, 1866* (1964). He has coauthored and coedited several other works and contributes frequently to articles and book reviews in professional journals.
Notes

4. On Bernadotte's role in the subsequent campaign, see Franklin D. Scott, *Bernadotte and the Fall of Napoleon* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935).
7. On the financial and other obstacles that had to be overcome before this was possible, see *ibid.*, pp. 132ff., 221.
15. On Laugnitz, an able but vain and ambitious soldier, see Regele, *Radetzky*, p. 178.
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

27. Rudolf Friederich, Geschichte des Herbstfeldzuges 1813, II (Berlin, 1904), pp. 41ff.
34. See Cochenhausen in Wissen und Wehr, XX (1939), pp. 82ff. for Gneisenau’s objections to this plan and the amendments which freed the Silesian Army from the original restrictions placed on it.
36. This was partly caused by the Swiss issue, for Alexander did not want to violate the neutrality of the country of his old tutor La Harpe. On this and other aspects of the dispute, see Gustav Roloff, Politik und Kriegführung während des Krieges von 1814 (Berlin, 1891), p. 28.
37. Ibid., pp. 35f.; Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 113.
39. That Schwarzenberg’s picture was not an exaggerated one, as most Prussian historians have been inclined to argue, is shown by a report of Sir Charles Stewart of February 28, 1814, cited in ibid., p. 219 n.
40. Roloff, Politik, pp. 45f.
41. Ibid., pp. 49ff.
44. Müffling, Aus meinem Leben, pp. 33f., 36ff.
46. Accounts of the battle are to be found in Janson, Geschichte, I, pp. 237ff.; Friederich, Befreiungskriege, III, pp. 116ff.; Henderson, Blücher, pp. 217ff.; Petre, Napoleon at Bay, pp. 55ff.; Cochenhausen in Wissen und Wehr, XX (1939), pp. 88f.
47. Webster, Castlereagh, p. 218.
50. See Max Lehmann, Scharnhorst (Leipzig, 1886-87), II, p. 295.
55. Webster, Castlereagh, p. 463.
Strategy and Policy in Twentieth-Century Warfare

Michael Howard

My pleasure in accepting the very great honour which you have done me in inviting me to be the first foreign scholar to deliver the LeHarmen Memorial Lecture in Military History was tempered only by the uncertainty which I always feel as to what "military history" is, if indeed it exists at all as an independent category of historical studies and whether, if it does, I am a military scholar.

Fifty years ago neither in the United States nor in the United Kingdom would anybody have seriously raised the question. Everyone knew what military history was. It was the history of the armed forces and of military operations. Its subject matter occupied an insulated arena, with little if any political or social context. The military historian, like the military man himself, moved in a closed, orderly hierarchical society with inflexible standards, deep if narrow loyalties, recondite skills and lavish documentation. He chronicled the splendours and the miseries of man fighting at the behest of authorities and in the service of causes which it was no business of his to analyse or of theirs to question.

This kind of combat and unit history still serves a most valuable function both in training the professional officer and in providing essential raw material for the more general historian. To write it effectively calls for exceptional experience and skills. But it is not surprising that so limited a function attracted very few historians of the first rank. It is more surprising that so many historians of the first rank, for so many years, thought it possible to describe the evolution of society without making any serious study of the part played in it by the incidence of international conflict and the influence of armed forces. So long as military history was regarded as a thing apart, it could not itself creatively develop, and general historical studies remained that much the poorer. The credit for ending this unhealthy separation was due very largely to scholars of the United States—particularly the group which Professor Quincy Wright collected round him at the University of Chicago and those who gathered under Edward Mead Earle at Princeton. But it was due also to the foresight of the United States Armed Services themselves in enlisting, to write and organise their histories of the Second World War, such outstanding scholars as Dr. Kent Greenfield, Dr. Maurice Matloff, Dr. W. Frank Craven and Professor Samuel E. Morison, to name only the leaders in this gigantic enterprise. The work which
they produced is likely to rank as one of the great historiographical series in the world, and its influence on military history has been profound. Today, the history of war is generally seen as an intrinsic part of the history of society. The armed forces are studied in the context of the communities to which they belong, on which they react, and of which so formidable a share of budgets they absorb. And their combat activities are considered, not as manoeuvres isolated from their environment as much as those of a football game but as methods of implementing national policy, to be assessed in the light of the political purpose which they are intended to serve.

The number of wars in modern history in which a narrow study of combat operations can provide a full explanation of the course and the outcome of the conflict is very limited indeed. In Europe from the end of the Middle Ages up till the end of the eighteenth century, the performance of armed forces was so far restricted by difficulties of communications and supply, by the limited capabilities of weapons, by the appalling incidence of sickness, and above all by the exigencies of public finance and administration, that warfare, although almost continuous as a form of international intercourse, was seldom decisive in its effects. When states tried to support military establishments capable of sustaining a hegemony in Europe, as Spain did in the sixteenth century and as France did in the seventeenth, their undeveloped economies collapsed under the strain. More prudent powers kept their campaigns within limits set by a calculation of their financial capacity. Military operations thus came to be regarded as part of a complicated international bargaining process in which commercial pressures, exchanges of territory, and the conclusion of profitable dynastic marriages were equally important elements. The results of the most successful campaign could be neutralised by the loss of a distant colony, by a court intrigue, by the death of a sovereign, by a well-timed shift in alliances, or by the exhaustion of financial credit. There are few more tedious and less profitable occupations than to study the campaigns of the great European masters of war in isolation—Maurice of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Montecuccoli, Saxe, even Marlborough and Frederick the Great—unless one first understands the diplomatic, the social and the economic context which gives them significance and to which they contribute a necessary counterpoint. Any serious student of American history knows how widely he must read not only in his own historical studies but in the political and economic history of Britain and of France before he is to understand how and why the United States won its independence and the part which was played in that struggle by force of arms. A study of the campaigns of Washington, Cornwallis, and Burgoyne really tells us very little.

This was the situation up till the end of the eighteenth century; with the advent of Napoleonic warfare, the situation changed radically. During the last few years in the eighteenth century both political conditions and mili-
tary techniques developed to such an extent that now unprecedented proportions of the manpower of the nation could be called up and incorporated into armies of equally unprecedented size. These armies could be controlled and manoeuvred so as to meet in a single battle, or series of battles, which would decisively settle the outcome of the war. With national resources thus concentrated and at the disposal of a single commander, the destiny of the state hung on the skill and judgement with which he deployed his forces during a few vital days. The campaigns of Marengo and Austerlitz, of Jena and Wagram, of Leipzig and Waterloo possessed all the dramatic unities. Forces well matched in size and exactly matched in weapons, operating within rigid boundaries of time and space, could by the skill of their commanders and the endurance and courage of their troops settle the fate of nations in a matter of hours. Military operations were no longer one part in a complex counterpoint of international negotiation: they played a dominant solo role, with diplomacy providing only a faint apologetic obligato in the background. There were of course many other factors involved, other than the purely military, in the growth of the Napoleonic Empire and, even more, in its ultimate collapse; but the fact remained that Napoleon had lived by the sword and he perished by the sword. The study of swordsmanship thus acquired a heightened significance in the eyes of posterity.

Nothing that happened in Europe during the next hundred years was to undermine the view that war now meant the interruption of political intercourse and the commitment of national destinies to huge armies whose function it was to seek each other out and clash in brief, sanguinary and decisive battles. At Magenta and Solferino in 1859 the new Kingdom of Italy was established. At Königgrätz in 1866 Prussia asserted her predominance in Germany, and by the battle of Sedan four years later a new German Empire was established which was to exercise a comparable predominance in Europe. Operational histories of these campaigns can be written—indeed they have been written in quite unnecessarily large numbers—which, with little reference to diplomatic, economic, political or social factors, contain in themselves all necessary explanation of what happened and why the war was won. Operational history, therefore, in the nineteenth century, became synonymous with the history of war. It is not surprising that the soldiers and statesmen brought up on works of this kind should in 1914 have expected the new European war to take a similar course: the breach of political intercourse; the rapid mobilization and deployment of resources; a few gigantic battles; and then the troops, vanquished or victorious as the case might be, would be home by Christmas while statesmen redrew the frontiers of their nations to correspond to the new balance of military profit and loss. The experience of the American Civil War where large amateur armies had fought in totally different conditions of terrain, or the Russo-Japanese War which had been conducted by both belligerents at the end of the slenderest
lines of communications, seemed irrelevant to warfare conducted in Europe by highly trained professional forces fighting over limited terrain plentifully provided with roads and railways.

The disillusioning experience of the next few years did not at first lead to any major reappraisal of strategic doctrine by the military authorities of any of the belligerent powers. The German High Command still sought after decisive battles in the East while it encouraged its adversaries to bleed themselves to death against their western defences. The powers of the Western Entente still regarded their offensives on the Western Front as Napoleonic battles writ large: prolonged tests of endurance and willpower which would culminate in one side or the other, once its reserves were exhausted, collapsing at its weakest point and allowing the victorious cavalry of the opponent to flood through in glorious pursuit. From this view the United States Army, when it entered the war in 1917 did not basically dissent. The object of strategy remained, in spite of all changes in weapons and tactics, to concentrate all available resources at the decisive point, compelling the adversary to do the same, and there slug it out until a decision was reached. To this object all other considerations, diplomatic, economic and political, had to be subordinated.

But paradoxically, although military developments over the past hundred years had established the principle, indeed the dogma, of the “decisive battle” as the focus of all military (and civil) activity, parallel political and social development had been making it increasingly difficult to achieve this kind of “decision.” On the Napoleonic battlefield the decision had to be taken by a single commander, to capitulate or to flee. It was taken in a discrete situation, when his reserves were exhausted or the cohesion of his forces was broken beyond repair. He could see that he had staked all and lost. And since the commander was often the political chief as well, such a military capitulation normally involved also a political surrender. If it did not, then the victor’s path lay open to the victim’s capital, where peace could be dictated on his own terms. But by 1914 armies were no longer self-sufficient entities at the disposal of a single commander. Railways provided conduits along which reserves and supplies could come as fast as they could be produced. Telegraph and telephone linked commanders in the field to centres of political and military control where a different perspective obtained over what was going on at the battlefield. If by some masterpiece of tactical deployment an army in the field could be totally annihilated, as was the French at Sedan or the Russian at Tannenberg, a government with sufficiently strong nerve and untapped resources could set about raising others. Armies could be kept on foot and committed to action so long as manpower and material lasted and national morale remained intact. Battles no longer provided clear decisions. They were trials of strength, competitions in mutual attrition in which the strength being eroded had to be
measured in terms not simply of military units but of national manpower, economic productivity, and ultimately the social stability of the belligerent powers. That was the lesson, if anybody had cared to learn it, of the American Civil War. European strategists had studied and praised the elegant manoeuvres of Jackson and Lee, but it was the remorseless attrition of Grant and the punitive destruction of Sherman which had ultimately decided the war. And once war became a matter of competing economic resources, social stability and popular morale, it became too serious a business to be left to the generals. Operations again became only one factor out of many in international struggle, and a "military" history or a combat history of the First World War can give only a very inadequate account indeed of that huge and complicated conflict.

For with the increasing participation of the community at large in the war there went the broadening of the political basis of society. The necessary efforts would not be made, and the necessary sacrifices would not be endured, by populations which were merely servile or indifferent: that had been the lesson Napoleon had taught the Prussians in 1806, and they had learned it well. Popular enthusiasm had to be evoked and sustained. A struggle in which every member of society feels himself involved brings about a heightening of national consciousness, an acceptance of hardship, a heroic mood in which sufferings inflicted by the adversary are almost welcomed and certainly stoically endured. If more men are needed for the armies, they will be found, if necessary from among 15-16 year olds. Rationing is accepted without complaint. Sacrifice and ingenuity will produce astonishing quantities of war material from the most unpromising economic and industrial base. Necessity and scientific expertise will combine to produce ingenious new weapons systems. And as the long process of attrition continues, at what point can it be "decided" that the war is lost?

By whom, moreover, is the decision to be made? The situation may deteriorate. The army may fight with flagging zeal; statistics of self-mutilation and desertion may show a shocking increase; but the army does not break and run. Factories may work spasmodically and slowly, turning out increasingly inferior products, but they do not close their doors. The population grows undernourished and indifferent, absenting itself from work whenever it can safely do so, but it does not revolt. A staunch government can endure all this and still carry on, so long as its police and its military remain loyal. Open dissent is, after all, treasonable. The emotional pressures no less than the political necessities of a wartime society create an environment in which moderation, balance, and far-sighted judgement are at a discount. Few men were more unpopular and ineffective in France, Britain, and Germany during the First World War than those courageous souls who pressed for a compromise peace. Resolution and ruthlessness are the qualities which bring men to the front as leaders in wartime, and if they
weaken there will be others to take their place. Ultimately nothing short of physical occupation and subjugation may prove adequate to end the war. That was what we found with Germany in 1945, and so I suspect the Germans would have found with Britain five years earlier. One of the most distinctive and disagreeable characteristics of twentieth-century warfare is the enormous difficulty of bringing it to an end.

After the First World War, the classical strategic thinking came under attack from several quarters. There were the thinkers, in Britain and Germany, who hoped to replace the brutal slaughter of mutual attrition by new tactics based on mobility and surprise, which, by using armoured and mechanized forces instead of the old mass armies, would obtain on the battlefield results as decisive as those of Napoleon's campaigns. In the blitzkrieg of 1939 and 1940 it looked as if they had succeeded. The armies of Poland and France—not to mention those of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and Great Britain—were destroyed or disrupted so rapidly that the political authorities were left literally defenceless and could only capitulate or flee. But this proved a passing phase in warfare, applicable only under temporary conditions of technical disequilibrium and effective only in the limited terrain of Western Europe. When the German armed forces met, in the Russians, adversaries who could trade space for time and who had developed their own techniques of armoured defence and offence, battles became as strenuous, and losses as severe, as any in the First World War.

Then there were the prophets who believed that it might be possible so to undermine the morale and the political stability of the adversary with propaganda and subversion that when battle was actually joined he would never have the moral strength to sustain it. This doctrine was based on a grotesque overestimate of the contribution which Allied propaganda had made to the collapse of the Central Powers in 1918. It appeared justified by the rapidity with which the French armies collapsed in 1940 and the apparent equanimity with which France concluded peace with her conqueror and her hereditary foe. But propaganda and subversion, although very valuable auxiliaries to orthodox military action, cannot serve as a substitute for it. The British were to rely very heavily on these methods to try to undermine the Nazi Empire when they confronted it on their own in 1940 and 1941; but it was only when the United States entered the war, when Allied armed forces were deployed in strength in the Mediterranean and when the Russians were beginning to beat the Germans back from Stalingrad that these political manoeuvres began to show any signs of success.

Finally there were the prophets of air power, of whom the most articulate was the Italian Giulio Douhet, who believed that surface operations could be eliminated altogether by attacks aimed directly at the morale of the civilian population, a population who would, if its cities were destroyed around it, rise up and compel its governments to bring the war to an end.
This doctrine, as we now know, overestimated both the destructiveness of high-explosive bombs and the capacity of aircraft to deliver them accurately and in adequate numbers to their targets in the technological conditions then obtaining, while it equally underestimated the capacity of civilian populations to survive prolonged ordeals which previously might have been considered unendurable. Bombing, in its early stages, in fact did a great deal to improve civilian morale. It gave a sense of exhilaration, of shared sacrifices, a determination not to yield to an overt form of terror. It engendered hatred, and hatred is good for morale. In its later stages, bombing did indeed result in increasing apathy and war weariness among the civilian populations of Germany and Japan; but it produced from them no effective and concerted demand that the war should be brought to an end. It was only one form, if the most immediate and terrifying, of the pressures being brought to bear on their societies to force a decision which their leaders stubbornly refused to take.

So the Second World War, like the First, was a conflict of attrition between highly organised and politically sophisticated societies, in which economic capacity, scientific and technological expertise, social cohesion and civilian morale proved to be factors of no less significance than the operations of armed forces in the field. The disagreements between British and American military leaders over Grand Strategy arose primarily from the British belief that much attrition could be to a great extent achieved by indirect means—by bombing, by blockade, by propaganda, by subversion—whereas the United States Army believed that there could be no substitute for the classical strategic doctrine of bringing the enemy army to battle and defeating him at the decisive point, and that could only be as it had been thirty years earlier, on the plains of Northwest Europe, in the kind of prolonged sluging match which Grant had taught it to endure but which Britain—after the Somme and Passchendaele, had learned, with some reason, to detest. The Americans had their way. Yet in the battles in France there was no clear decision; there was only a slow ebbing of moral and material forces from the German armies until retreat imperceptibly became rout and military advance became political occupation. Then it was seen that the strength of the German nation had been drained into its armed forces—much as that of the Confederacy had been eighty years before; and the destruction of those armed forces meant the disappearance of the German State.

When the object in war is the destruction of the adversary's political independence and social fabric, the question of persuading him to acknowledge defeat does not arise. But the States of the modern world—certainly those of modern Europe—have seldom gone to war with so drastic an objective in mind. They have been concerned more frequently with preventing one another from pursuing policies contrary to their interests and com-
pelling them to accept ones in conformity with them. Wars are not simply acts of violence. They are acts of persuasion or of dissuasion; and although the threat of destruction is normally a necessary part of the persuading process, such destruction is only exceptionally regarded as an end in itself. To put it at its lowest, the total elimination of an adversary as an organised political entity, the destruction of him as an advanced working society, normally creates a dangerously infectious condition of social and economic chaos—as the Germans found with the Russian Revolution of 1917. It is likely to increase the postwar political and economic troubles of the victorious side—as the Allies found after 1945. Normally, it makes better sense to leave one's adversary chastened and submissive, in control of his own political and social fabric, and sufficiently balanced economically, if not to pay an indemnity in the good old style, then at least not to be a burden on the victors and force them to pay an indemnity to him. This means that, although the threat of destruction must be convincing, it is in one's interest to persuade the adversary to acknowledge defeat before that threat has to be carried out—a truism which loses none of its force in the nuclear age. In making war, in short, it is necessary constantly to be thinking how to make peace. The two activities can never properly be separated.

What is making peace? It means persuading one's adversary to accept, or to offer, reasonable terms—terms in conformity with one's own overall policy. Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which this persuasion can be carried out. First it can be directed to the enemy government or regime itself, as is normally the case in so-called “limited wars.” In such wars it is not part of one's policy to disrupt the social or political order in the enemy country. The existing regime, misguided as its policy may be, is probably the best that can be expected in the circumstances, and one does not want to see it replaced by wilder men or crumble into total anarchy. Alternatively, one may despair of men in power ever being brought to acknowledge defeat, as we despaired of Hitler, and even if they were to acknowledge defeat, of being relied on to abide by any agreement thereafter. Then one must seek to replace them by a more pliable regime. This can consist either of members of the same governing group seizing power by coup d'etat, as the Italian Army did in 1943 and the Anti-Nazi conspirators tried to do in July 1944. Or one may aim at a fundamental social and political revolution—or counterrevolution—which will sweep away the old order altogether and install a government which is ideologically sympathetic to one's own.

Any one of these methods involves persuading significant individuals or significant groups, in the opposing community, either those who already possess power or those who are capable of achieving power, that they have nothing to gain from further resistance and a great deal to lose. In achieving such persuasion, there is, to borrow a famous phrase, no substitute for victory. It was not until defeat stared them in the face that substantial
groups, in the Central Powers in the First World War or the Axis Powers in the Second, began to take effective measures to bring the war to an end. But the victor must still realise the enormous difficulties which will confront these groups in wartime from within their own society—in democracies from public opinion, in totalitarian societies from the secret police. If they are to carry public opinion with them—or opinion within their own elites—it may be necessary for the victor to make concessions to provide them with incentives as well as threats. It may be clear to them that peace at any price is better than continued and inescapable destruction, but peace with some semblance of honour provides a better means for postwar stability, both on an international basis and within the domestic framework of the defeated power. Strategy and policy have to work hand in hand to provide inducements as well as threats to secure a lasting settlement.

Everything that I have said so far applies to wars between States—organised communities fighting over incompatible goals. But most of the conflicts which have occurred since 1945 have not been of this kind at all. One can call them wars of liberation, guerrilla, insurgency or partisan wars, revolutionary wars, or, to use the rather charming British understatement, “emergencies.” In all of them, the object on both sides has been the same. It is, by the judicious use of force or violence, to compel the other side to admit defeat and abandon his attempt to control certain contested territories. In this conflict the traditional method of destroying the armed power of the enemy is not sufficient, or sometimes even necessary; of yet greater importance is the maintenance, or the acquisition, of the positive support of the population in the contested area. The capacity to exercise military control and to prevent one’s opponent from doing the same is clearly a major and probably a decisive factor in gaining such support; yet if a guerrilla movement, in spite of repeated defeats and heavy losses, can still rely on a sympathetic population among whom its survivors can recuperate and hide, then all the numerical and technical superiority of its opponents may ultimately count for nothing.

In this kind of struggle for loyalties, military operations and political action are inseparable. In a more real sense than ever before, one is making war and peace simultaneously. The guerrilla organization is a civil administration as much as a fighting mechanism. It acquires increasing political responsibilities with its increasing military success until ultimately its leaders emerge from hiding as fully fledged Heads of State and take their place among the great ones of the world. The established regime, on the other side, is concerned to keep operations within the category of policing, to maintain law and order, and to preserve the image of legitimate power which gains it the support of the uncommitted part of the population. In this struggle schools and hospitals are weapons as important as military units. Defeat is acknowledged not when one side or the other recognizes that the
Capt. Thomas R. Robinson of the 35th Tactical Dispensary at Phan Rang Air Base, South Vietnam, examines a young Vietnamese patient in October 1966 as part of an Air Force civic action program designed to gain the support of the South Vietnamese people.

destruction of its armed forces is inescapable but when it abandons all hope of winning the sympathy of the population over to its side. In such a struggle it must be admitted that a foreign power fights indigenous guerrillas under disadvantages so great that even the most overwhelming preponderance in military force and weapons may be insufficient to make up for them. In such wars, as in those of an earlier age, military operations are therefore only one tool of national policy, and not necessarily the most important. They have to be coordinated with others by a master hand.

In Viet Nam today, the United States faces two tasks. It has to help the government of South Viet Nam to attract that measure of popular support which alone will signify victory and guarantee lasting peace; and it has to persuade the government of North Viet Nam to abandon—and to abandon for good—its interference in the affairs of its neighbor. In tackling the first of these tasks it has to solve the difficulties with which both the French and the British wrestled in their colonial territories, with varying degrees of
success, for the past twenty odd years. In carrying out the second it faces what one can now call the traditional problem of twentieth century warfare: how to persuade the adversary to come to terms without inflicting on him such severe damage as to prejudice all chances of subsequent stability and peace. In my personal judgement the Government of the United States in tackling these tasks has so far shown a far greater insight into their implications than it is given credit for by its critics, either of the Right or of the Left. It has understood that although armed force is, regrettably, a necessary element in its policy, force must be exercised with precision and restraint and that its exercise, however massive, will be not only useless but counterproductive if it is not integrated in a policy based on a thorough comprehension of the societies with which it is dealing and a clear perception of the settlement at which it aims.

Operational histories of the Viet Nam campaign will one day be produced, and we can be sure that, in the tradition of American official histories, they will be full, frank, informative and just. But they will be only a part of the history of that war. The full story will have to spell out, in all its complexity, how the struggle has been waged, for more than twenty years, and between many participants, for the loyalties of the Vietnamese peoples. Such a study will show how policy and strategy have or have not been related. It is unlikely to distinguish clearly between military history on the one hand and social, political and economic history on the other. But it will shed much light on the problem which is of central concern to all mankind in the twentieth century, and to whose study the military historian—however we may define him—must try to make some contribution: Under what circumstances can armed force be used, in the only way in which it can be legitimate to use it, to ensure a lasting and stable peace?

Dr. Michael Howard has taught at King's College, London, since 1947 and in 1963 became Professor of War Studies. His works include Disengagement in Europe and The Franco-Prussian War. He has edited and contributed to three collections of essays, Soldiers and Governments, Wellingtonian Studies, and The Theory and Practice of War. He has published numerous articles and reviews on history and strategic affairs. In addition, Dr. Howard has been active in the reform of military education in the United Kingdom. He is a member of the Advisory Council for the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, and Chairman of the Army Educational Advisory Council. He is currently writing Grand Strategy, 1942-1945 (Vol. IV) in the United Kingdom history of World War II and is an editor of the forthcoming Works of Carl von Clausewitz to be published by Princeton University. During this spring semester he is a visiting professor at Stanford University.
The Historical Development of Contemporary Strategy

Theodore Ropp

This may be a nonlecture from nondocuments about the superpowers' "loud cries and shining objects"; containment victories which were often nonhappenings; and military victories by countries that are by traditional standards nonpowers. In 1967, 93 such powers, with gross national products of $186 per head, spent $8 on defense to $7 for public health and education combined, while 27 developed states with GNPs of $2141 put $170—almost the others' GNPs—and $150 into those services. But these crude figures concealed gross military inequalities within each development category and even greater confusion—a quarter of a century after the most total general war in history—about the external and internal uses of military force, national and alliance strategy, and even the concept of victory.

Strategy is an expansion of "stratagem," a term used by Charles James in 1802 for "the peculiar talent" of the French "to secure their victories more by science [and well-concerted feints] than by hardihood." Straratimetry was "the art of drawing up an army." To Carl von Clausewitz strategy involved both concepts: the "assembling of military forces" and "the use of engagements to attain the object of the war." The 1962 Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage expanded this to the "art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces . . . during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat," while the 1964 United States Air Force Basic Doctrine put "victor" in an all-out war in quotation marks, and defined "defeat of the enemy" as "the attainment of our specific political objectives."

To untangle contemporary military strategy from politics and technology, we will limit ourselves to some hypotheses about (1) its special features, (2) its modern background, and (3) its historical development since Clement Attlee, "on what may have been the most important mission ever undertaken by a British Prime Minister," flew to Washington in October 1950 to ask President Harry S. Truman not to use nuclear weapons in Korea and the dismissal of Douglas MacArthur as United Nations Supreme Commander the next April.
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY

THE VARIABLES OF WAR

POLITICAL, MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL

TACTICS STRATEGY

STRATEGY is the RATIONAL ALLOCATION of National and Alliance Resources to maritinely specialized FORCES for DIFFERENT PLANS KEEPING STABILIZATION, DOMICILE AND INVESTMENT.

CLASSICAL STRATEGIC MAXIMS: "FIND out where your ENEMY is. STRIKE as HARD as you can and as OFTEN as you can, and keep MOVING on."

STRATEGY is the EMPLOYMENT of FORCES in TIME and in SPACE.
Some Special Features of Contemporary Strategy

These events lit up two features of contemporary strategy: the unwillingness of the strongest power to use all of its weapons and the unification of the world conflict arena. Both came from that deliberate and continuous application of science to military technology which was to enable the USAF Basic Doctrine to say that "technological and tactical improvements must be continuous," and which had so multiplied mass by mobility that "all of the centers of civilization," as Gen. H. H. Arnold had written in 1946, would soon lie "within reach of destruction." To some twentieth century followers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder, and Giulio Douhet, "he who controls the sea [or Heartland, or air] controls the world." In the past two decades there has been little question as to who has controlled each element but a great deal of question about the world being controlled by their controllers, once we leave the world of technology for those of politics and ideology.

The resulting confusion is not uniquely American, but with strategy's language now as American as it was once French or German, the resulting problems can be suggested by American heraldic examples. This Academy has an eagle and his missiles, Annapolis Ex Tridens Scientia, and West Point that "Duty, Honor, Country" in which Samuel P. Huntington sees "the military ideal at its best . . . a gray island in a many colored sea, a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon." All officers wear the Great Seal's eagle and "new constellation" breaking through the clouds. The reverse—on the currently ailing dollar bill—has the Eye of Providence and Novus Ordo Seclorum, a New Order of the Ages which has been as Messianic as any of the others in this century.

The Americans and Russians have been, by their previous standards, militarily and technologically successful. In Vietnam their strategies have been very largely determined by political and ideological considerations. As the ideologue of containment, George F. Kennan, later noted, the world Communist—or capitalist, or imperialist—conspiracy "is both a reality and a bad dream . . . but . . . its deepest reality lies . . . in its manifestation as a dream."

No superpower is militaristic. Their soldiers are curbed by the Party, ours by Huntington's "historical constants" of a "liberal ideology and conservative Constitution" which made "civilian control depend upon their virtual exclusion . . . from political power." They could not dominate an 1890 society which had 28 times as many physicians as active duty officers (104,805 to 3,718), where there were only 26,703 of the latter in 1938, and where physicians were more numerous (203,400 to 181,467) as late as 1950. So American soldiers accepted late nineteenth century ideas of war as "an independent science" and their society's technological bias. The Chinese, for their part,
had to believe in morale and manpower, and the Russians had to try harder at both technological and revolutionary development.

While technology and the unification of the conflict arena have tended to make contemporary strategy more scientific, deterrence may be a non-event and sufficiency argued from the worst ideological and political nightmares. We will say more about American strategy under these four conditions, partly because we know more about it, but mainly because—from the original decision for containment—the Americans generally retained the technological initiative, if only because of a possibly exaggerated fear of losing it as well. With contemporary soldiers rather less conservative than many successful soldiers of the past, the rate of technological change correspondingly greater, and more emphasis on deterrents, our strategic models are, fifth, even more speculative than those of the relatively peaceful eras after the Frederician, Napoleonic, and Moltkean military revolutions. Those peaceful eras were, as yet, longer than ours, but we have reached 1788, 1840, and 1896 on 1763, 1815, and 1871 time scales, and the confusion of contemporary strategists is analogous to that of those generations.

The Modern Historical Background

Ferdinand Foch's 1903 *Principles of War* saw modern war as beginning with the French Revolution. Since then, as we have just noted, there are analogies to contemporary dilemmas in the peaceful generations (1891–1920, 1831–1860, 1771–1800) which we have arbitrarily worked back from 1950 to the Comte. de Guibert's proposals for French military reform of 1772. Paradigms or models are what the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead called "ideas about facts." Thomas S. Kuhn sees *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* in terms of alternating "puzzle-solving" and "paradigm-testing" eras. He sees no regular generational patterns in science, but the application of his model to the roughly generational alternations of peace and war since 1763 gives a new look at modern military paradigms. The dilemmas of the 1970s are not the same as those of 1790, 1850, or 1910, but they reflect similar difficulties of military reform and model-testing in peacetime.

In "normal" or "puzzle-solving" eras, scientists work within agreed systems. Tests of "anomalies" are "trials only to themselves, not of the rules of the game. They are possible only so long as the paradigm itself is taken for granted. Therefore, paradigm-testing occurs only after persistent failure to solve a noteworthy puzzle has given rise to crisis . . . [and] only after the sense of crisis has evoked an alternative candidate for paradigm. . . . [These] ordinarily incorporate much of the [old] vocabulary and apparatus. . . . But they seldom employ these borrowed elements in quite the
PUZZLE-SOLVING AND PARADIGM-TESTING
FROM MID-EIGHTEENTH TO MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY

1741-1770
NEOCLASICAL LIMITED WARS
Friedrich II, the Elder Pitt

1771

1800

1771

1830

NAPOLÉON, Bonaparte,
Clarewitz, Concert of
Europe

1831

1860

1831

1860

1860

1900

1900

1831

1900

1971

1950

1971

1950

1971

1950

1971

1950

1971

1950

1971

1950

1971

1950

1971

1950

1971

1950
traditional way. Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experi-
ments fall into new relationships."

Guibert and other French military reformers, 1771–1800, suggested uses for those democratic and national “passions” which helped Napoleon force the old monarchies to use them to defeat him, 1801–1830. The Industrial Revolution’s railways, steamships, and telegraphs made it possible to move and control even larger conscript armies, 1831–1860. The Prussian General Staff’s solutions to its puzzles made a united Germany the strongest land power in Europe, 1861–1890. The Great War showed that armies could not move against still newer rapid-fire weapons, 1891–1920. Mechanization brought more than Napoleonic and Moltkean victories, 1921–1950, and set total war problems with which our generation’s soldiers and politicians are still struggling.

If the best answers to why it takes them so long to reform lie in the generational patterns of modern wars and revolutions, this question is often answered by clichés about military minds and military-industrial-educational-political complexes. They all now want progress, but they must follow tested routines, and their leaders are committed to historically-justifiable “ideas about facts.” So doctrine easily becomes dogma—more hair of the one that bit you—and reformers get short shrift until “persistent failure to solve a noteworthy puzzle” produces “crisis.” Jcy was good ecological politics until people could not fish the Detroit and could smell the Potomac River.

New ideas come from many sources but are most likely to be adopted by weak or defeated powers. France had done badly in the wars of the mid-eighteenth century. Prussia was the weakest of the powers in the early eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But alternatives must look practical. Mechanization was one solution to the Great War’s tactical puzzles, Russia had no industrial base for all-out mechanization and China needed an antimachine model to compensate for even greater weaknesses. The Americans, on the other hand, had the industrial power to adopt “British” ideas of mechanization and “German” science-based military technology to project their armed forces across two oceans, while husbanding their relatively scarce manpower resources. And, if Charles de Gaulle’s abandonment of the nation-in-arms was to be revolutionary in terms of modern French history, it was highly practical for a former great power which felt that it needed a finger on the American nuclear trigger. But it was to be still more practical, in terms of economic development, for other former great powers to pay only lip service to the military power game. This model met American ideas of fighting internal Communism with butter instead of guns, showed trust in American leadership, and helped the Americans legalize superpower nuclear supremacy by nuclear nonproliferation agreements.

As the collective brain of the Prussian Army, the General Staff was one
STRATEGY AND TACTICS

of those institutions which sparked what William H. McNeill sees as the "accelerating self-transformation" of modern Western civilization by "deliberate innovation." I The Prussians' peacetime "preparation," planning, and indoctrination of the French Revolutionary nation-in-arms with Napoleon's "mass multiplied by impulsion" to break the enemy's moral and material resources in battle." But soldiers' use of what Whitehead saw as the nineteenth century's "invention of the method of invention" by "disciplined attack upon one difficulty after another," 5 was hampered by the lack of field testing of the differences between Foch's "mathematical demonstration" that "any improvement in firearms . . . ultimately . . . strength[ens] the offensive" and the economist and banker Ivan S. Bloch's figures and tables on tactical and strategical stalemate, economic ruin, and political and societal revolution in The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations. 6 With the tests of the relatively peaceful decades of 1891-1910, 1831-1850, and 1771-1790 comparatively inconclusive, puzzle-solvers stuck to solvable puzzles, dorma hardened, rhetoric inflated, and organization men toed the line until the wars of 1911-1920, 1851-1860, and 1791-1800 set the "more significant" problems and "alternative candidates" for paradigm. The Chief of the German General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen, agreed with Bloch on frontal attacks and planned to Cannae the French army by enveloping it through neutral Belgium. 7 But there were no scientific, joint, or political staffs to check on the "difficulties" or "anomalies" in this or any other army staff's 1914 preparations.

We can now figure that every man in Bloch's "earthen ramparts" had 42 times the firepower of one of 1814 or 16 times that of one of 1864 to hold only 10 to 12 times as much ground. Machines poured men and munitions into the trenches. Their attackers walked and carried everything into the "storm of steel" at a Roman 2 miles an hour. While offensive machines first mass-produced (the submarine and airplane) or designed (the tank) during a 4-year war were not decisive, J. F. C. Fuller—with B. H. Liddell Hart, the prophet of a mechanized Blitzkrieg—saw war now demanding "(1) political authority; (2) economic self-sufficiency; (3) national discipline; and (4) machine weapons." 14 And some mathematical formulas for operational analysis of these weapons had been developed by the automotive engineer F. W. Lanchester for dealing with the new and critical problems of Aircraft in Warfare. 19

During the 1918-1939 Armistice every great power adopted some version of Fuller's formula. None took all of Douhet's views of the airplane as "the offensive weapon par excellence," an independent and primary air force, and the "disintegration of nations" once indirectly done by attrition, blockade, and subversion now being "accomplished directly" by terror bombing. 20 The Anglo-Americans preferred economic targets, but technol-
**LETHALITY, DISPERSION, AND MOBILITY INDICES, 1801-1970**

(Total numbers increased to 1950, 1970?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Napoleonic War</th>
<th>American Civil War</th>
<th>World War I</th>
<th>World War II</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lethality Index</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>232.8</td>
<td>1280.5</td>
<td>32,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square miles, 1000 men</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1290</td>
<td>33,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battlefield movement, mph</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25 to 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours to cross diagonal</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10.5 to 4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, 1964*
ogy and politics made them smash and burn cities anyway as war—as Clausewitz had feared with “the participation of the people in this great affair of state”—approached those absolutes of violence, range, and ideological and political pressures which feature contemporary strategy. After Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Calvin Woodrow Foster, there seemed to be little that developed nations would not do. “Bounds, which only existed in the nonconsciousness . . . of what is possible . . . are not easily built up again; and . . . whenever great interests are in question, mutual hostility will discharge itself in the same manner as . . . in our time.” If strategy, in another Napoleonic definition, is the art of the possible, these wars had so expanded its possibilities that “not until the enemy lay powerless on the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop and come to any understanding with respect to the mutual objects of the contest.”

Two total wars had developed total weapons, mobility, states, and total victory for some powers and total defeat or exhaustion for others.

The Development of Contemporary Strategy

American presidential dating puts Russia's containment in the first Truman Administration and its extension to China in the second, views massive retaliation in Eisenhower's first term as giving way to an incipient flexible response strategy in the second, and views the Kennedy-Johnson as more successful than the Johnson Administration. The immediate postwar era saw the usual institutionalization of successful wartime agencies, a separate air force, conscription, and the creation of a Department of Defense. Its internal conflicts were increasingly managed with the mathematical social science tools of the Strategic Bombing Survey, and by military intellectuals from the public-private USSBuses of the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation and other tanks for Thinking about the Unthinkable.

Eight of the ten Secretaries of Defense have been businessmen or lawyers. After a generation in which increasing machine production had been the main American—and Russian—military problem, “Engine Charlie” (Charles E.) Wilson's “more bang for a buck” or Robert S. McNamara's “cost-effectiveness” systems analysis program packaging sounded scientific to politicians whose control over soldiers was through the budget. Then, in something of a reversal of roles, President Richard M. Nixon chose a civilian military intellectual, Henry A. Kissinger, to advise him on strategy, and a professional politician, Melvin R. Laird, to get “(1) clear and concise policy direction; (2) full participation in the decision-making process; (3) an open information policy; and (4) decentralized management with accountability” in defense administration.

Victory over Germany's machines had brought Russia into conflict with the Americans. Her European conquests could not protect her from Ameri-
can air power, although her ground forces and local Communists could threaten Western Europe. The Russians read the war's lessons—and their need for air power and absolute weapons—in American terms. A conservative strategy was linked with “technological and tactical improvements” in a policy which appealed to the surviving Stalinist apparatchiks to whom even the surface fleet expansion of the 1960s may have been justified by the old imperialist rules for showing the flag.

Both superpowers had misread Mao Tse-tung’s “more significant” thoughts on countering his enemies’ superior machines by hiding his Party and Army in the population of his “vast semicolonial country . . . unequally developed politically and economically.” He exploited the great powers’ conflicts and the xenophobic nationalism of nearly self-sufficient “stagnant rural areas . . . far from outside help,” or machine attacks, until his friends’ machines and enemies’ mistakes had given the Communists China, half of Korea, and Vietnam in wars which, by 1954, had already lasted longer for Mao than those of the French Revolution and Empire.

In paradigm-testing, to use Pablo Picasso’s phrase, “the against comes before the for.” As MacArthur told the senators investigating his dismissal in 1951, “scientific . . . mass destruction” and “the integration of the world” had “oulawed the very basic concepts upon which war was used . . . to settle international disputes.” Arnold had already shown—with Japanese cities destroyed at “1 square mile for 3 million dollars” and future costs of “less than half a million”—that “destruction by air” was “too cheap and easy.” A “possibility of stalemate” meant forces “built around atomic weapons,” but not around them alone, for a New Warfare defined by C. N. Barclay in 1954 as “the means by which a nation (or group of nations) seek to impose its will . . . by all means short of total war, and without disturbing its own economy to an extent which is unbearable, or unacceptable, to its people. The methods include: propaganda, obstruction, planned mischief, underground war, sabotage, intimidation, bribes, armed threats, limited war, and wars by proxy.”

Kissinger’s 1957 Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy would meet “the difficulty . . . of holding a perimeter of twenty thousand miles while always remaining on the defensive politically, militarily, and spiritually” by limited offensives. Much “of the perimeter encompasses countries which are in rapid flux . . . in some countries forces hostile to our interests will gain ascendancy. . . . The side . . . [with] faith in victory has a decided advantage over” that which wishes “to preserve the status quo” and will “run greater risks because its purpose will be stronger,” while “each move” opens other possibilities, and forces the enemy “to concentrate on purely defensive measures. This does not mean preventive war. . . . Principle would prohibit such a course apart from the enormous destructiveness of modern
STRATEGY AND TACTICS

weapons." But "a doctrine and a capability for the graduated employment of force" would change our "traditional . . . overemphasis on total solutions," and supplement our massive retaliation strategy "with subtler military capabilities which address themselves to the likelier dangers and involve a less destructive strategy."28

By the 1960s American military intellectuals and civilian administrators were near agreement on a new military paradigm, though not on McNamara's administrative methods or on Kissinger's feeling that "the diffusion of nuclear weapons technology will be to our net strategic advantage." But McNamara's "no first strike" strategy was to be linked with Kissinger's leaving "no doubt that all-out war would mean disaster for the Soviet bloc," and his "no cities" pledge agreed with Kissinger's modification of "the principle that wars can be won only by dominating the airspace completely. . . . The minimum condition of limited war will be the immunity of the opposing strategic striking forces." Towns "not used to support tactical operations" and cities "more than five hundred miles from the battle zone" might be immune, and "the elimination of area targets will place an upper limit on the size of weapons it will be profitable to use."29 And their opponents might see all this as moralistic verbiage by reformed city smashers, or as justifying nuclear nonproliferation or arms pacts in which they, as less moral, would accept permanent inferiority.

"'Forecasting' is to the modern mind"—Bertrand de Jouvencel notes in The Art of Conjecture—"the forecasting of figures."30 If technology's facts are as hard as its calculations are cold, Clausewitz saw that while the estimation of "means" in "figures" was possible, "the strength of the will is much less so and only approximately to be measured by the strength of the motive behind it."31 The summit meetings of 1955 were followed by Suez, Hungarian, and Lebanese crises, Sputnik, and Fidel Castro. By 1960 an alleged "missile gap" and economic stagnation were issues in a close presidential election. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean's Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age saw "all military problems" as partly "economic problems in the efficient allocation and use of resources," and Russia, by putting more of its more rapidly growing GNP into arms, matching American defense spending by 1965.32 The Bay of Pigs and Berlin Wall added to the gloom in 1961, and the historian, W. K. Hancock, feared that the Americans might "throw in their hand before the Russians," because they would not accept the peacetime controls necessary for "a high rate both of industrial growth and of defence expenditure."33

Victory in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Sino-Soviet split, Marxist economic troubles, and a capitalistic boom were the backdrops for the 1964 USAF flexible response Basic Doctrine for "military contests" . . . "from thermonuclear exchanges to guerrilla and counterguerrilla activities. . . . Thermonuclear weapons and assured delivery capability . . . have altered
In response to the successful U.S. blockade of Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet ship *Amosov* departs from Cuba in November 1962 with eight missile transporters holding canvas-covered missiles (U.S. Navy).

Members of the Reconnaissance Platoon, 6th Infantry in West Berlin, Germany, inspect the “Wall of Shame” during a routine patrol of the sector border in April 1964 (U.S. Army).
STRATEGY AND TACTICS

the use of total military power . . . [and] are likely to cause unacceptable
damage even to the ‘victor.’ Hence, an enemy capability to destroy our cities
demands . . . objectives more prudent than his total defeat,” or even that
of “a lesser opponent,” if that might bring in “an enemy who could wage
war on our population centers. . . . Military power can still be used di-
rectly, below the level of all-out war . . . only if civilian leaders regard it as
relevant and usable in specific conflict situations,” and are confident that it
“will be applied with appropriate precision and restraint.” This was 8 days
after the Southeast Asia Resolution had empowered the President to “take
all necessary measures to repel armed attack against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further aggression,” and 2 months before the fall of
Nikita Khruschev and a major rise in Russian defense spending.

The present dilemmas of American strategy stem partly from Vietnam
and Russian and Chinese arms catch-ups, familiar phenomena in the indus-
trial era. Others stem from containment’s successes, the earlier reservation
of nuclear weapons to the “Anglo-Saxons” in alliances which included three
defeated aggressors and a prostrate France, and from specialization within
that “vast spectrum of conflict,” which the Basic Doctrine saw as “a fluid,
integrated whole.” The need to harden missile sites has increased the need
for megaton weapons. Multiple independent reentry vehicles may not be big
or accurate enough for such targets and are better city smashers, and anti-
ballistic missiles have not changed a numbers game which, in the overkill
view, long since reached diminishing returns. To Jerome B. Wiesner “the
lower limit to a deterrent . . . might be the force which could deliver six
modern nuclear weapons on city targets. Even this number seems high to
me, but if it is too low to you, make it twenty.” Quincy Wright sees an
inherent contradiction in a system requiring “that the threat of a destructive
second strike be sufficiently credible to assure that the threat of a first
strike will be incredible,” while “in quite probable circumstances”—as in the
Cuban missile case—“a threat of a first strike may be credible and the threat
of the second strike incredible.” Now that they have parity, the Russians may
sign for it, but this will not get larger conventional forces from American
great power allies who prefer strategic and tactical nuclear forces to trigger
American support, nor will it stabilize the underdeveloped world.

Most Western studies of revolutionary warfare came after their military
intellectuals had developed the complexities of limited response. While their
Metaphors and Scenarios reached few underdeveloped marchers to different
drummers, the major surveys of strategy by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy’s
collective, André Beaufre, and Henry Kissinger agreed with Bernard Brodie’s
1959 Strategy in the Missile Age and Liddell Hart’s Deterrent or Defense. By
1964 the technological revolution had made all-out war obsolete, had limited
conventional war in Europe, and had “given capitalism a chance to use its
control of much of the world’s technological, transport, and capital re-
sources to give states dependent on access to these resources a stake in international economic growth and political stability.39

But technology soon upset 1964's optimistic assumptions, and increased arms spending and—in MIRVs and ABMs partially nullifying the certainties obtained from intelligence satellites—nuclear uncertainties. Resource discoveries and substitutions decreased the need for and the prices of outside raw materials and bases. Military specialization, as has been noted, made peacetime strategy the political allocation of national and alliance resources to noncomplementary forces for deterrence, stabilization, and home defense in a North Atlantic alliance whose conventional force goals— as John C. Slessor had noted in his 1954 Strategy for the West40—were obsolete and "unacceptable" to many Western Europeans and Canadians almost as soon as they were formulated. And new wars of national liberation continued to make neo-colonial guidance systems less reliable than those for missiles, as the direct American costs of the Vietnam War ran over $100 billion and Soviet military advisers saw their pupils blow $2 billion of sophisticated equipment in 1 week against Israel in 1967.

If this picture of nuclear certainties and speculations, worldwide ideological commitments and economic strain for us and prosperous anomie for our great power allies, and militarism in developing countries and politics in developed ones is confusing, it is analogous to those of other paradigm-testing eras. This same confusion—except about all-out war—has helped in "Halting the Inflationary Spiral of Death." Levels of violence are below those of the last two generations. American containment paradoxically prevented all-out war until there was a real nuclear balance, without Westerners becoming totalitarian in the process. If the American Century is dying two generations after Europe's Proud Tower41 began to crumble at the Marne, Western Europe and Japan have not gotten closer to George Orwell's fear that after producing the war machines which almost destroyed them— they would turn to their equally well-tested social ones "not to extend but to diminish the range of thought"42 of their overworked and undernourished citizens. And ideas of the effectiveness of The New Warfare in old revolutionary states whose ambitions, models, and fears have led them to defer consumption to invest in heavy industry and weapons may be moderating as their citizens find their continued sacrifices "unbearable, or unacceptable."

"Since the difficult problems of national policy," Kissinger wrote in 1957, "are in the area where political, economic, psychological, and military factors overlap, we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as 'purely' military advice."43 With everyone practicing the "art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces," however, soldiers have sometimes forgotten to check the terrain, and civilians were surprised by internal political reactions while they were playing soldier. The defense of the Vietnam war on strategic grounds—of base,
TRENDS IN WORLD INVOLVEMENT IN WAR

- MILLIONS KILLED
- MILLIONS POPULATION
- NUMBERS OF WARS
raw materials, or manpower accretions—would have been difficult at best. But its high ideological and political content led its opponents to attack the whole political establishment rather than particular details of policy, such as the historically “proven” dangers of using conscripts in a limited war for the highly professional job of pacification. And American proposals to follow Canada and Britain in giving up conscription are seen in Germany as weakening the whole ideological and political purpose of NATO.

What has happened may be summed up as follows. In an era of rapid technological change which may now be bringing diminishing returns, Americans saw machine answers to many military questions, and, in the confident early 1960s, forgot some traditional maxims of strategic geography, economy of force, and simplicity in machine designing. Mao’s successes in machine-countering led many national liberators to a similar overemphasis on morale and ideology and even, in Che Guevara’s case, to underestimating Andean topography. The Russians were ideologically committed to machines and revolutions. The other great powers used the American nuclear umbrella. But if the events of the late 1960s have shown the limitations of some quick frozen paradigms, Kuhn’s model suggests, as we have noted, that another new one will “incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative, that the traditional paradigm had previously employed.” It is this new synthesis which is the greatest intellectual challenge to this generation of professional soldiers, in spite of our condescending assumption that all military intellectuals are civilians, long after Clausewitz had remarked and many American soldiers had shown that “everywhere intelligence appears as an essential cooperative force and . . . the work of war, plain and simple though it appears, can never be conducted with distinguished success without distinguished intellectual powers.” Or as Peter Paret puts it in a previous lecture in this series: “What the soldier of today must do is to step outside the very close circle of his duties and seek to understand what he and his country are involved in. Not only the techniques of your profession matter, but also their purposes,” so long as, for some states and some conflicts of interest, “armed action may be the only method of resolution.”

Professor Theodore Ropp received his A.B. from Oberlin College in 1934 and his A.M. and Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1935 and 1937, respectively. He taught at Harvard University, and since 1938 he has taught at Duke University where he has been Professor of History since 1959. He studied at the French Naval War College and was formerly Ernest J. King Professor at the U.S. Naval War College. Professor Ropp has served as President of the American Military Institute since 1968. He is perhaps best known for his work War in the Modern World (1959).
Notes

1. The first phrase is from Leo Tolstoi. Archibald S. Alexander, “The Cost of World Armaments,” *Scientific American*, Vol. 221, No. 4 (Oct. 1969), pp. 24-26. This is one of several recent studies, all subject to challenge, but there is little doubt that arms spending rose sharply in the last half of the Development Decade.


14. Foch, quoting Clausewitz, *Principles of War*, p. 43. A “doctrine or mental discipline” is “a common way of objectively approaching the subject . . . [and] a common way of handling it,” p. 18, or what Kuhn would call a common “conceptual and manipulative” paradigm, *Scientific Revolutions*, p. 148. The result of this “common way of seeing” is “a common way of acting” which should become “instinctive.” Foch, p. 13.


34. USAF *Basic Doctrine*, pp. 1-1, 1-2.
45. Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 43-44.
The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers

Philip A. Crowl

First, let me bring greetings from the nation's oldest service college to the nation's youngest service academy. The U.S. Naval War College, which it is my honor to represent before this distinguished audience, was founded in the year 1884—93 years ago. Now, before you dismiss this fact as mere "ancient history," let me remind you of something that may have escaped your attention. And that is this. On the date when this institution—the U.S. Air Force Academy—celebrates its 93rd anniversary some of you will still be around. On that date, which I calculate to be the year 2047, some of you will be here—decrepit but still alive and no doubt full of tiresome tales of the good old days when the Air Force Academy was young and in its prime.

I mention this only to call to your attention one fact that may have escaped you; that is, that much of what passes as history today falls within the memory of living men and women. The past is not nearly as remote as it sometimes seems. Much of it unfolded—as you will some day realize—only yesterday.

At this point you are probably expecting me to launch into a fervent defense of the teaching and study of history, its relevance, and its utility to you as citizens and as future officers in the U.S. Air Force. Professional historians like myself are likely to get quite exercised over this subject, especially as we inspect the figures on declining enrollments in college history courses and the declining market for historical monographs. You will no doubt be relieved to hear that tonight I intend not to enter into any argument about the relevance of history—largely because I think it is a non-issue. The utility of history is, it seems to me, self-evident, and I do not feel called upon to defend it. History is simply recorded memory. People without memory are mentally sick. So too are nations or societies or institutions that reject or deny the relevance of their collective past.

The question then is not whether history is useful but rather how it is used. Here there is room for honest argument, and argument there has been. And since we are concerned tonight with the formulation of military strategy, let us explore for a moment how strategists of past generations have in fact used history for their own very practical purposes.

A hundred years ago, no serious student of the art of war would have
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

dreamed of challenging the proposition that history taught useful lessons to military practitioners. In those confident times, when the dogmas of theology were giving way to the certainties of science, it was held as axiomatic that history provided the raw data from which could be deduced the "scientific laws of war." These laws could be expressed as "the principles of war." And the search for these principles was, in the words of Maurice Matloff, the U.S. Army's Chief Historian, an effort "to distill from the great mass of military experience over the centuries simple but fundamental truths to guide commanders through the fog of war."1

This was the basic assumption of Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, who came to the Naval War College shortly after its establishment to teach naval history. Like most so-called scientific historians of the nineteenth century, Mahan firmly believed that a study of history would permit the discovery of certain immutable principles in the field of human affairs comparable to the laws of science governing the physical universe. Specifically he believed that from the study of naval history would emerge certain principles of maritime strategy, certain permanent truths of equal applicability today as yesterday and tomorrow as today. Or, to quote from Mahan's first great work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783: "... while many of the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant, and can be elevated to the rank of general principles. For the same reason the study of the sea history of the past will be found instructive, by its illustration of the general principles of maritime war."2

Now if Mahan was ardent in his search for the general principles of war to guide naval strategists, Army strategists throughout the western world were even more so. At the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris, and the U.S. Army War College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, great effort was made to develop a body of general principles that presumably governed the conduct of war on land. But if these military analysts agreed that history taught clear and useful lessons, and that these lessons could be expressed in terms of scientific laws or "principles," they did not necessarily agree as to what these principles were, or even how many there were. The Swiss Gen. Jomini and the French Marshal Foch, for example, each enumerated four, but their separate lists bore very little resemblance to each other.3 U.S. Army field manuals over the years have added to, or subtracted from, the official list of principles, and in 1968 settled down to the figure of nine—nine "fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war." These are, in order: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity—all duly inscribed in Army Field Manual 100-5 in capital letters, as eternal verities should be. But, as the Field Manual itself pointed out, these principles "may tend to reinforce one another or to be in conflict." And, as the official Army
historians admitted, the violation of these principles has brought as frequent success on the battlefield as has their observance. Small wonder then that in the most recent (1976) version of FM 100-5, specific reference to the “principles of war” was omitted altogether.

One is driven to ask therefore: What good are they or were they? Are these indeed to be looked on as “fundamental truths” or are they mere truisms, tautologies, empty and meaningless platitudes? Is the old Army Field Manual’s solemn pronouncement that “every military operation must be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and obtainable objective” really much more helpful than Calvin Coolidge’s famous statement that “when many men are out of work, unemployment results?” If this is to be the end product of years of intensive study of several centuries of warfare, then what indeed are the uses of history? What practical value, if any, can military or civilian leaders derive from the historical study of war, or its causes or consequences?

The truth of the matter is, I am afraid, that scientific laws of war cannot be precisely deduced from history for the obvious reason that history never exactly repeats itself. The present is never exactly analogous to the past, and those who would draw simple analogies between past and present are doomed to failure. Even Mahan, for all his dedication to the search for fundamental truths, was aware of the dangers of historic analogies. Although he believed that there were “certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant,” he also warned that because of rapid technological change, “theories about the naval warfare of the future are almost thoroughly presumptive.” He warned of the “tendency not only to overlook points of difference, but to exaggerate points of likeness” between the past and the present. In short, Mahan, for all his efforts to deduce principles of war from the study of naval history, was at least aware that the past could not be used as a precise predictive instrument.

Then why do we who are concerned with the great issues of war and peace, of strategy and policy, of statesmanship and generalship continue to study it? My answer is not that we can predict the future on the basis of the past, because for the most part we cannot. My answer is simply that the study of history will help us to ask the right questions so that we can define the problem—whatever it is.

So this evening, what I propose to do is to outline some of the questions history suggests that strategists must ask before they commence a war, or before they take actions which might lead to war, or before they undertake a wartime campaign, or before they end a war in which they are already engaged. By strategists I mean both the civilian and military leaders in whom this and other nations have entrusted major responsibility for decision making in these matters and their advisors, which no doubt some day will include some of you. I shall specify six such questions, with several
variations on each. The number is arbitrary and could no doubt be easily expanded, though perhaps not so easily contracted. All of these questions are suggested by the history of war and diplomacy in the Western world over the past century and a half.

The first and most fundamental question to be asked of any prospective war or other military action is: What is it about? Or in the words of Marshal Foch, “De quoi s’agit-il?” What specific national interests and policy objectives are to be served by the proposed military action? How great is the value attached to those interests and objectives, and what is their fair price?

It is of course, to the great German strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, that we owe the first precise formulation of the concept that lies behind this question. “War is no pastime,” wrote Clausewitz, “it is a serious means to a serious end. . . War . . . is an act of policy. . . War . . . is a continuation of political activity by other means. . . The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it. . . War should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy. . . War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. . . Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic. . .”

So, when the possibility of war presents itself, political and military leaders must ask themselves, What specific policy objectives will be served by going to war, what specific national interests require these objectives to be pursued, and are these objectives and interests worth the price that war more often than not demands? I have said that political and military leaders must ask this question. A more appropriate word would be “should.” Because often they don’t, and when they don’t, the end result can be disastrous.

Let us take for example Imperial Germany in 1914. Why did the Kaiser and his advisors opt for war on two fronts against both France and Russia? Though they claimed to be victims of encirclement, the Germans stood in no clear and present danger of attack from any of their neighbors when the July crisis erupted. Their dominance in Central Europe was unchallenged; they were in essence a “satiated power.” Yet they gave their Austrian allies a “blank check” to make outrageous demands on Serbia which could only provoke Serbia’s ally Russia into military action which would almost inevitably escalate into general war. Why? The final answer has eluded historians for 60 years and more. Were the Germans powerless to hold Austria in check? Not really. Compromises over the ticklish Balkan question had been reached before and could have been reached again. Were they covetous of French and British overseas empires? Yes, but not enough to go to war over a few remote colonies in Africa and Asia. Was internal domestic discontent so worrisome to German leadership that they welcomed a war as a device to short-circuit social unrest? Some historians have suggested this as an answer but not altogether convincingly. The answer, I am afraid, is simply that the Kaiser and his entourage and especially his military advisors were stupid.
They lacked the intelligence to analyze the costs and benefits of the war on which they so blithely embarked. They neglected seriously to ask the fundamental question: What is the objective, and is it worth it?

"Stupid" is not the word one would apply to our own leaders and their advisors who presided over the drift into a full-scale war in Vietnam. They were, in the ironical words of David Halberstam, "the best and the brightest" of their generation. But certainly theirs too was a failure of the intellect, a failure to give sufficient attention to the question: What's it about? What were our national objectives and what national interests were at stake? This was never made very clear at the time and is not clear today. Was it primarily to contain the spread of monolithic Sino-Soviet Communism whose puppet was Ho Chi Minh? This was certainly the most widely advertised of our objectives. But was Ho Chi Minh really a puppet of Moscow or Peking? Possibly, but this has not been proved. As for monolithic Communism, by the early 1960s it was already becoming evident that the Sino-Soviet bloc was splitting apart. Were we under treaty obligation to intervene massively in Vietnam? Not at all. Neither our membership in the United Nations organization nor in SEATO required us to do so. Did the United States have any vital interest in Southeast Asia as a region? It was not apparent, either from a strategic or an economic point of view. Certainly we had no historic involvement there. The French had abandoned the area; why
should we have moved in? President Eisenhower had warned that if Vietnam fell to the Communists so might the other nations of Southeast Asia, like "a row of dominos." The trouble with the domino theory is that at best it was highly conjectural, and at worst it begged the question, What are the vital U.S. national interests that need protection from falling dominos? In the end, defenders of our military involvement in Vietnam had to fall back on the argument that national credibility and honor were at stake; that having created the Republic of Vietnam we were morally obligated to preserve it; that having spent so much blood and treasure in Vietnam, we were honor bound to make good the losses. These may have been legitimate reasons for fighting it out in Vietnam once we were deeply involved. Indeed, they are the reasons that persuaded me, for one, to support the continuation of the war to an acceptable conclusion. But they are not valid reasons for our initial involvement. Our national honor and credibility were not at stake until we had put them at stake. There was no essential need to have done so. Had either President Kennedy or President Johnson or their advisors thought through the probable costs and benefits of our initial military involvement in Vietnam, it seems highly doubtful that they would have acted as they did. They neglected to ask the right questions.

The second question for strategists concerns not the decision to go to war but the proper methods of fighting the war once it starts. Assuming that a nation at war has some rational objectives, the next question is: Is the national military strategy tailored to meet the national political objectives? What this question suggests is that there be a close correlation between the political ends of war and the military means employed to achieve those ends.

One of the great masters at achieving such correlation was certainly Count Otto von Bismarck. Take the Austro-Prussian war as a case in point. Bismarck's purpose in provoking a war with Austria was to consolidate the many separate sovereign states of Germany into one empire under Prussian domination. To do this Austria's ancient pretensions to leadership among the German-speaking peoples had to be eliminated. One decisive military defeat would be enough to lower Austrian prestige to the point where Prussia could easily establish her preeminence. And when in fact the Prussians did soundly beat the Austrian army at Koniggratz, Bismarck simply called off the war. The Prussian generals wanted to follow up their victory, march on Vienna, and humiliate the Austrians and their Emperor. But Bismarck vetoed the proposal for the simple reason that it was redundant. The object of the war had been achieved, and it was now more useful to cultivate Austrian good will than to prolong hostilities. Bismarck realized full well that today's enemies can become tomorrow's friends and vice versa.

The same cannot be said for Franklin Roosevelt in 1945 as the victorious campaign against Hitler's Germany was drawing to a close. Certainly Eisenhower's armies were capable of pushing farther east into Germany and
Czechoslovakia than in fact they did. But neither Roosevelt nor his successor, Harry Truman, would order the General to do so. In the absence of political direction to the contrary, Eisenhower stopped at the Elbe River and refused to allow Patton to drive on to Prague. He felt fully justified in this decision on purely military grounds, and on those grounds alone he was probably right. Yet by that time it was clear to many that there were good political reasons for preventing the Soviet armies from overrunning any more of central Europe than was absolutely necessary. As Churchill put it, "I deem it highly important that we should shake hands with the Russians as far to the east as possible." Yet Washington refused to acknowledge the idea that policy should dominate strategy, and Gen. Marshall went so far as to oppose the liberation of Prague by the Western Allies on the grounds that he "would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes." Here is a curious statement indeed from such an experienced soldier/statesman as George C. Marshall. One could reasonably ask: Why else was the war fought at all if not for political purposes? The confusion between ends and means that Marshall's statement implies can probably be laid at the door of Roosevelt himself and his public declaration that the sole object of the war was "unconditional surrender." He made that announcement at Casablanca in January 1943. Thereafter he gave little serious thought to the postwar balance of power in Europe. The "unconditional surrender" doe-
trine tended to blind Washington to the probability that the total removal of the German threat to the balance would automatically raise another threat from the Soviet Union. It was an error that Bismarck would never have made.

A third and most difficult question that strategists must ask is: What are the limits of military power? This one more than any other sticks in the craw—especially in the craw of us Americans whose major national sin is grandiosity and even more of American military officers whose professional creed is best expressed in two words: “Can do.” Yet there are many things that armed forces, no matter how powerful, cannot do. Field Marshal Montgomery once said that “the first principle of war is not to try to walk to Moscow.” Napoleon and Hitler both tried—and couldn’t. They miscalculated the terrain, the weather, and the will of the Russian people. So the first requirement for answering this question is a careful calculation of one’s own resources, including those of one’s allies, and of the resources of the enemy and his allies. Accuracy in these matters is hard to come by and the chances of error are great. Simple prudence therefore is the watchword.

But even beyond the demands of prudent calculation, wise strategists will recognize that there are limits to what mere military force can accomplish. The object of war, said Clausewitz, is “to impose our will on the enemy” and physical force is the means thereto. But it does not follow that the enemy’s will to resist is going to be in exact inverse ratio to the quantity of physical force applied. Between the two world wars some advocates of strategic air power were convinced that the massive bombing of enemy cities would terrorize the target populations into quick surrender. Events proved them wrong. The Blitz on London did not persuade Churchill’s government to capitulate, nor did the massive bombing of Berlin, by itself, induce the Germans to surrender. In Vietnam, our overwhelming air superiority produced results that were even more disappointing. By the close of the year 1971, six million tons of bombs and other munitions had been dropped from the air on Indochina, yet the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong kept on fighting. Here indeed was a costly lesson in the limits of military power.

Question number four is simply: What are the alternatives? What are the alternatives to war? What are the alternative campaign strategies, especially if the preferred one fails? How is the war to be terminated gracefully if the odds against victory become too high?

Of the four elements that make up the climate of war, according to Clausewitz, one is “uncertainty” and another “chance.” Now, chance and uncertainty are the natural enemies of the “military planning process.” Operation plans, staff studies, war game scenarios and their solutions—all suffer from the same inherent weakness; that is, they are all minutely conjectural. They must assume an exact sequence of future events that may never, indeed probably will never, take place. Yet on those shaky assumptions,
precise blueprints are drawn up, stipulating in detail the location, movement, and preferred courses of action for vast numbers of men, ships, planes, tanks, guns, and supplies. What happens then if events unroll differently than expected? The wise strategist will of course have prepared contingency plans. But even these may not exactly suit the case. Here, as Clausewitz says, is where military genius may enter the picture. The really superior strategist will above all else be flexible, will adapt quickly to changed circumstances, will turn chance or even misfortune to his own advantage.

Two historical examples suggest themselves—one bad, one good.

On August 1, 1914, the great German Army commenced its mobilization against France and Russia, in accordance with the detailed logistic plans that had long since been drawn up in anticipation of this contingency. Late that afternoon came a telegram to the Foreign Office in Berlin suggesting that if Germany mobilized on its eastern front only and called off its movement against France, England would remain neutral. The Kaiser was intrigued with the prospect of fighting only a one-front war. He called into his presence his chief of staff, Helmuth von Moltke, nephew to the late great General Moltke, Bismarck’s colleague and rival. The Kaiser urged that the entire mobilization effort now be shifted to the eastern front. Moltke replied simply: “Your Majesty, it cannot be done.” To turn around the deployment of a million men from west to east was beyond the imagination of this very able, but very rigid, Prussian general. “Your uncle,” said the Kaiser bitterly, “would have given me a different answer.” And so the machine ground on—and in the end the German Empire was destroyed and the Kaiser lost his throne.

Yet the military mind has not always been so inflexible. A case in point would be the non-invasion of Yap in World War II. At the Quebec conference in September 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff ordered Gen. MacArthur to take Morotai that month, Nimitz to take Peleliu and, a month later, the island of Yap in the Caroline. Both were then to converge on Leyte in the Philippines in December. In the Pacific Fleet, detailed plans were drawn up accordingly and in September a task force bound for Yap sailed from Pearl Harbor. By the time these ships arrived at their staging area in the Admiralty Islands, the plan had been changed. Yap was to be bypassed and the task force would invade Leyte in October, two months ahead of schedule. So, new logistic plans were cranked up, new charts were issued, operation orders were revised; and off we sailed to return MacArthur to the Philippines. Here I say we advisedly since my own ship was one of those involved. Even at that tender age, I was astonished at the speed and efficiency with which this massive shifting of gears took place. I still am. It was a model of military flexibility.

Let us turn now to another aspect of military strategy often overlooked
by Pentagon planners and armchair strategists alike. My fifth question is: How strong is the home front? Does public opinion support the war and the military strategy employed to fight it? What are the attitudes of influential elites both inside and outside the government in office? How much stress can civilian society endure under the pressures of the wartime sacrifices demanded? Is the war morally acceptable? Can it plausibly be explained as a "just war?"

Today the point is so obvious that it hardly needs elaboration. None of us who has lived through the Vietnam war is likely to forget the impact of public opinion on military strategy. The student revolts, Kent State, the defection of the intellectuals, the assaults on the military establishment—all these are of too recent memory to be easily set aside. If the Vietnam war taught us anything, it is that, in the United States at least, no government can wage a protracted war successfully without strong domestic support. Dictatorships might be able to pull it off but not democracies.

Yet before we leave the Vietnam war, let me make one further point about it. It may be that we have learned its lessons too well. Vietnam will never happen again exactly as it happened once. And if this nation should respond to every future international crisis with the simple bromide of "No more Vietnams!", then we are in serious trouble.

This brings me back full cycle to my earlier remark that history never exactly repeats itself, that simple historical analogies are therefore very dangerous. It also brings me to the sixth and final question for strategists, which is a paraphrase of Mahan's warning already noted. Does today's strategy overlook points of difference and exaggerate points of likeness between past and present? Has concern over past successes and failures developed into a neurotic fixation that blinds the strategist to changed circumstances requiring new and different responses?

Generals and admirals are constantly being accused of fighting the last war or of preparing to fight the war just finished. And sometimes the accusation is just. Let us look briefly at the French Army of 1914-1915. Dazzled by the quick success that had attended German operations in the Franco-Prussian War, and recalling the splendid victories of Napoleon's dashing columns of infantrymen, the French General Staff had become infatuated with the "principle" of the offensive. Relying too heavily on these two historical models, the French developed a theory of combat that equated the will to win with victory. Their simple formula for military success was "Attack, attack, attack!" What this formula overlooked of course was the machine gun. And thousands and thousands of French poilus went to their deaths in the first two years of the war because of this oversight. The machine gun, plus improvements in the art of entrenchment unknown to Napoleon or even to the Prussian troops of 1870, had vastly enhanced the advantage of the tactical defense over the offense. By the end
of the war, the French had learned that lesson. But perhaps they learned it too well. Underestimating the great new offensive power of tanks and planes, they devoted too much of their resources to the Maginot line and relied too heavily on the defensive strategy that ended in their defeat in 1940. History did not repeat itself.

On this unhappy note I come to the end of my disquisition. Let me assure you, however, that I am not a Spenglerian pessimist. I do not believe that in war and diplomacy, in strategy and policy, man is forever condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past or to overcompensate for those mistakes. Most of the mistakes that I have recounted here have been, at root, failures of the imagination, failures of the intellect. The strategic problem is essentially an intellectual problem. And before it can be addressed, it must be defined. And to define the problem, one starts with questions. What is the object? What are the means to achieve it? Are they available? What are the costs and the benefits? What are the hazards? What are the limitations? How will the public react? Are the proposed actions morally justifiable? What are the lessons of experience? How does the present differ from the past?

And one final warning to those of you who are on the threshold of your careers as strategic planners. After all your plans have been perfected, all avenues explored, all contingencies thought through, then ask yourself one final question: What have I overlooked? Then say your prayers and go to sleep—with the certain knowledge that tomorrow too will bring its share of nasty surprises.

Professor Philip A. Crowl received his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University in 1942. He taught at the U.S. Naval Academy, Princeton University, and the University of Nebraska where he was Chairman of the Department of History. He also served as a naval officer during World War II, as a historian in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, and as an intelligence officer in the Department of State. Since 1972 he has headed the Naval War College’s Department of Strategy as the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History. His best known works include Maryland During and After the Revolution, Campaign in the Mariannas, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, and The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War (coauthor).
Notes

10. Ibid., pp. 653–654.
Part V. Military Thought and Reform
Introduction to Part V

The military is among the most conservative institutions found within a society with good reason: it is charged with state security and the well-being of its citizens. Should it fail, astrous results can linger for decades, and combat costs are paid in human lives and suffering. Indeed, military operations are the only activities wherein man plans for and expects the loss of life. Thus commanders reluctantly make radical changes in the way they maintain their armies, choose their weapons, or employ strategy and tactics. The known is more comforting than the unknown. In fact, most changes in military organization, methods, or doctrine come after a disastrous defeat; the Prussians after the battle of Jena and the Germans after World War I are two prominent examples in modern times. Yet those leaders who lack the vision for necessary changes invite failure as well. How, then, do a state and its commanders recognize the need for critical changes, and how do they incorporate reforms into their military?

Peter Paret focused on this matter of innovation and reform in his 1956 Harmon Lecture. (Captain B. H. Liddell Hart had agreed to give that year’s lecture, but became too ill.) Paret noted Liddell Hart’s admonition that during interwar years some officers ought to be given time to think and reflect on questions of military strategy, organization, and tactics. Only after Germany’s victories during the early years of World War II did this necessity become clear in Great Britain. For Liddell Hart and Paret the questions were simple ones. How do military institutions adjust to new realities, what forces carry innovation forward, and what obstacles stand in the way? The most important problems of innovation, Paret concluded, are not the development of new weapons and methods, or even their general adoption, but their intellectual mastery.

Beginning with Napoleon, Paret noted how the introduction of political variables during this leader’s time changed the nature of warfare to an extent greater than any new weapon, tactic, or strategic insight. As the twentieth century arrived the complexity of warfare increased with more technical, economic, and social variables. While the need for a formal analytical method became necessary for commanders, judgments and subjective factors always remained. Society in general must come to understand more fully the nature of warfare and accept the reality of limited war, said Paret. Today’s soldier, he concluded, must step outside the very closed circle of his duties and seek to understand what he and his country are involved in. War will not be abolished; therefore, we need to learn how to control warfare and
use it in the most effective manner possible, he added. At a time when U.S. commitments to the Vietnam conflict were rapidly growing, his message held a special, almost ominous meaning.

Elting E. Morison's 1969 Harmon Lecture focused on the U.S. Navy between 1870 and 1890. The intellectual level of its officers at the time was not very high, he argued, and nobody knew why there was a navy, what it was supposed to do beyond defending the coastline, or how it was supposed to perform its duties. Simple faith and habit ran the organization. Its leaders, for example, retained wooden ships even after the introduction of ironclads during the Civil War because they wanted to maintain a system that had been satisfactory. All of this changed in 1890 when Alfred Thayer Mahan published his epoch-making book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, showing that a navy could command the seas.

Commanders can be bombarded with too many innovations and ideas, Morison warned, and can be distracted from commanding their units. Moreover, we may well be stressing too much the means to achieve our political objectives via armed conflict as opposed to alternatives that might bring us the same results. Morison's question of how society can avoid an overload of new ideas remained for the reader to answer. To some scholars, however, not having enough innovative ideas was a more dangerous situation, especially when dealing with doctrine.

Two noteworthy Harmon Lectures reviewed the evolution and role of military doctrine in this nation's early history of air power. In his 1974 address, I.B. Holley, Jr., reiterated the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of doctrine: "Fundamental principles by which the military forces . . . guide their actions. . . . It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application." During the very early days of the Air Service, there was no agency devoted to the development of air doctrine or its implementation within the defense scheme of the United States. Between 1926 and 1931, when the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) moved from Langley Field in Virginia to Maxwell Field in Montgomery, Alabama, the first doctrinal guidelines were developed for the air arm. Holley gave the ACTS high marks, despite some errors in the school's thinking and its lack of an adequate built-in mechanism for rigorous self-criticism. He concluded by noting the type of environment conducive to doctrinal formulation, what is necessary for its success, and its major pitfalls.

William R. Emerson's 1962 Harmon Lecture brilliantly described the impact of doctrine on the Army Air Forces during World War II operations. The ACTS had taught that the best use of air power came with a large bomber force capable of daylight precision bombing and self defense. Consequently, most Air Corps resources went into bomber production. Escort aircraft were not given serious attention, and the concept of escorting bombers clearly had no place in the operational planning of the early com-
MILITARY THOUGHT AND REFORM

manders. Reality forced changes. After disastrous losses at Regensburg and Schweinfurt, it became apparent that the old doctrine needed modification. Consequently, Gen. Hap Arnold directed air leaders to develop escort fighters for the Combined Bomber Offensive.

The success of “Big Week” in February 1944 and the heavy blows dealt the Luftwaffe properly prepared the way for the Normandy invasion. Operation POINTBLANK, the systematic plan for destroying the German war-making capability, owed much of its success to the adoption of fighter escort and the modification of doctrine when evidence showed change was needed. Doctrine, warned Emerson, should not become dogma or rather should not be confused with dogma. To the credit of the Army Air Forces, the necessary changes were made in time to win the battles in the skies over Europe.

Perception, like doctrine, is also an important element of military thought. How men and governments view their problems and adversaries, regardless of accuracy, greatly influences their actions; misperceptions can be critical and costly. Two Harmon Lectures dealt with this subject. On the eve of the nation’s bicentennial, John W. Shy looked at the American Revolution in terms of current social values and noted the role perceptions played in that conflict. The British lost the Revolutionary War, he argued, not so much because of their leadership but because of the circumstances surrounding the war. While Howe could be faulted for not pursuing Washington after the battle of Long Island, the British general had some good reasons for moving slowly. The British had to act with some hope of reconciliation early in the war; at the same time, such actions could be easily perceived as indicating little will to sustain the fighting. We must be careful, Shy reminded the audience, in judging past decisions when the principal figures lacked the knowledge we enjoy today.

Other perceptions came into play. While it may have been possible for the British to win because their troop strength was greater and the rebel army suffered from weakness, desertion, and internal dissension, American leaders and the people feared disunion after the war more than anything else. This would mean failure and disgrace. Thus, the rebels simply had to avoid defeat.

Shy concluded by noting that in war reality always seems to escape perception. Results exceed intentions, and the final outcome is far greater than the sum total of decisions made at headquarters. This is clearly exemplified in the American Revolution. Commanders and civilian leaders alike must always recognize the nature and importance of perceptions as they relate to the conduct of warfare and its outcome.

Akira Iriye’s 1980 Harmon Lecture noted the differences traditionally perceived by Westerners regarding oriental and occidental cultures. Unfortunately, these perceived differences are superficial and too simplistic. More-
over, the determining factor in foreign relations between these cultures has less to do with culture and more to do with the balance of power between the nations involved. The story of East-West relations can be told as military history in terms of armaments, strategy, and wars—the ingredients of power. Cultural differences assume a lesser role.

But one must not assume that power is everything. We still continue to evaluate the Orient by Western standards, and military involvement in Asia has had little impact on how Americans view Asians. Simplistic generalizations can sometimes cause serious damage, Iriye argued, but he noted that cultural boundaries seem to have become less and less distinctive in the past fifty years. We need, he concluded, to discard timeworn cliches about the mutually exclusive civilizations of the Orient and the Occident and to consider American-Asian relations in a broader framework of interdependence.

Creating an environment for reflective military thought and modifying military organizations and plans to match new ideas remain today among the most difficult tasks confronting our military leadership. Those who would ignore this reality risk the danger of failure. For these reasons, the military must free some of its very best minds for reflective thought, as Liddell Hart suggested, and assure their efforts are not ignored or shunted aside by the pressing day-to-day issues that every military organization faces.
Innovation and Reform in Warfare

Peter Paret

It is a pleasure to be at the Air Force Academy and to be able to talk to you this evening. I should tell you, however, that I am no more than a stand-in for the man who was originally invited to give the 8th Annual Harmon Memorial Lecture: Capt. Basil Liddell Hart. The Academy's invitation meant a great deal to him, and only ill health kept him from coming here. I am glad to say that after a major operation last month he is now convalescing and doing well. I don't know what topic he would have chosen for his talk today. Although Captain Liddell Hart served in the infantry he is free of the narrow traditionalism, that earthbound quality, of which footsoldiers are sometimes accused by members of newer branches of the service. His mind ranges widely. In his long career as soldier and writer, he has done much to help us understand war in general and to show us how military institutions might be better attuned to their tasks of carrying out national policy. As you know, in the 1920's he was one of the pioneers of armored warfare. In the early years of the Nazi Era he provided intellectual leadership to a small number of English politicians and soldiers who strove to modernize British defense policy and the British army. In a series of memoranda written in 1937, he urged among other innovations the formation of fully mechanized divisions, combining "high mobility and concentrated firepower with economy of men," air squadrons providing cover for the mobile forces, changes in the recruitment, education, and promotion of officers to enable young and vigorous men to reach positions of authority, and the establishment of an operational research department in the War Office. He wrote,¹

At present, there is no proper military research. Problems are continually being pushed onto officers who are up to-the-eyes in ordinary work. They ought to be given time to think them out, to explore the data, to collect the data by going round the Army to consult people instead of merely relying on War Office files, and to work out the conclusions unhampered by time restrictions. The way that decisions are reached on questions of organization, tactics, etc., from inadequate knowledge, is fancially unscientific.

His proposals on the whole met with failure; it required the German victories in Poland, France, and the success of the early campaigns in Russia to convince men of their validity. But his failure did not dissuade Liddell Hart from continuing to seek out the realities of war and from speculating
on the changes required of military thought and action to meet the new problems of defense in the postwar period.

You will recognize the connection between his work and the subject of this talk. In a sense, Captain Liddell Hart’s career, his intellectual victories and his practical defeats, led me to the topic; but it is, of course, one with which we are all concerned: How can men attune their minds as clearly as possible to the constantly changing conditions and demands of war? How do military institutions adjust to new realities, what forces carry innovation forward, and what obstacles stand in its way? And these questions outline only one aspect of the problem.

Military institutions, after all, are not objects isolated in political and social space; they are not only responsive to their surroundings but also responsible to them. They themselves are part of reality; they too create situations to which men must react. Innovation and reform in warfare touch on numerous issues in the military and civilian spheres. We can deal with only a few during the next half hour or forty minutes. Above all, I want to consider the most important problem of innovation—not the development of new weapons or methods, nor even their general adoption, but their intellectual mastery.

In our discussion I shall first look to the past, particularly to the years of the French Revolution and of Napoleon. This period was in some respects not unlike our own. At the end of the eighteenth century, technological advance combined with economic, social, and political change to create new tactics and to bring about more encompassing operational and strategic possibilities. War became more destructive, more complicated to wage, and more difficult to exploit for the purposes of state policy. It was the task of the French professional soldiers of the day to understand these changes and to integrate them into an effective doctrine. The soldiers defending Europe against revolutionary France faced additional difficulties. They had to recognize the nonmilitary sources that made the French victories possible—otherwise their attempts at modernization would have remained superficial—and they had to reform their own armies in a manner that did not overturn the political and social values that they represented.

It is hardly necessary to introduce a word of caution here. Whatever resemblances to the present we may discover in the 1790’s and the first fifteen years of the new century, we will not find exact reflections. Every event in the past is unique, as is every incident of our own day. We can learn a great deal from history, but history cannot be treated as a dictionary in which we look up the answers to contemporary problems. It is nothing as grand as that, and few historians would advance such a claim for their discipline. Oddly enough, however, people that are not professionally involved in the study of the past do sometimes invest history, or their view of it, with a kind of universal authority.
An example of this tendency, very much in evidence in recent weeks, is comparing Vietnam to the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938. Not continuing or intensifying the war against the Vietcong is likened to French and British appeasement of Hitler, with the result promising to be another world war entered by the United States in unnecessarily unfavorable circumstances. It would, however, be difficult to discover a situation that is less like the Czechoslovak crisis than the conflict in Vietnam. Neither in their social conditions and politics nor in their strategic positions can the two areas be compared. And even larger dissimilarities exist between the vital interests, capabilities, and policies of the major protagonists of thirty years ago and of today. The wisdom of American policy in Southeast Asia is not at question here; but those of its supporters who attempt to explain and defend it by recalling the failure of the western democracies in 1938, or who claim to base their decisions on lessons learned from this failure, do their cause less than justice. And what is equally serious, by mixing up two very different episodes, they make it more difficult for the American people to understand the course of action that is advocated. I want to return to this question of communication and education which I consider to be a problem of major importance in present-day defense policy.

My immediate predecessor in this series of lectures, Gordon Craig, whose brilliant delineation of the alliance against Napoleon in 1813 and 1814 many of you will remember, ended his talk with these words:2

It is always dangerous to attempt to draw lessons from history, and there are, in any event, profound differences between the Grand Alliance discussed here and the great peace-time alliance of which we are a part today. Even so, at a time when we hear so much about the crisis of NATO and when so much is written about the difficulties of reforming its command structure or resolving the strategical and political differences of its members, it may be useful to reflect that others have found it possible to live with administrative deficiencies and conflicts of interest and yet to be effective partners . . .

Appealed to in this modest and cautious manner, the past can assist us in achieving a realistic evaluation of our own situation. And it is in this spirit—willing to recognize resemblances but unwilling to see them as patterns for our own actions—that I propose we consider the revolution in warfare that occurred at the end of the eighteenth century.

II

The first departures from the conventional that allied officers discovered in the opposing French armies during the early wars of the Revolution
were somewhat greater tactical flexibility in the enemy's infantry and artillery and the presence in some units of political idealism or fanaticism, the ideological factor often giving impetus and tenacity to the new tactics. Later, other innovations became apparent: a more mobile supply system, the organization of larger commands such as divisions—permitting better coordination among the several arms of the service—the abolition of social privilege as a determining factor in manpower policy, the introduction of conscription, the replacement of a cautious strategy based on the acquisition and defense of key points and lines of communication by the concentration of force against the main enemy armies.

It would be wrong to assume that these innovations swept the field before them. On the contrary, the French encountered great difficulties and were repeatedly beaten. They were saved only by their vast numerical superiority—by what their opponents described as their hordes of volunteers and conscripts—and by the political fact that the war directly affected their national interests, while it was far from clear whether this was the case with the Allies. Then doctrine, training, and organization became regularized, and a new generation of leaders emerged who understood how to use the new politico-military instrument. Among them, Napoleon is the outstanding figure.

The French were able to effect this revolution in warfare because they could apply the results of decades of military theorizing and experimentation in a changed social and economic environment whose need to defend itself against external and internal enemies tendered it particularly favorable to military innovation. Napoleon was not himself a reformer; with a profound understanding of their potential, he made use of forces that had already been created. Earlier commanders might also have dreamed of strategies that sought the decision in climactic battles. So long as they led armies of expensive mercenaries whose reliability could be assured only by stringent control and care, they could not cut loose from their supply bases. They were compelled to fritter and fragment their troops in the defense of every position and to limit the risk of battle. In the revolutionary and imperial armies, however, much more could be demanded of the soldier. Soldiers now were more expendable, which rendered the risk of battle less onerous.

What differentiated the new wars from their predecessors was not a new weapon, a different tactic, or fresh strategic insights but the integration of these and other factors in the matrix of a new political reality. War, so Clausewitz described the change, was taken out of the hands of the professional soldiers who had dominated it for over a century, and "again became a matter for the people as a whole." The passive subject turned into a citizen and patriot. New sources of energy were thus made available to the military institutions of the state.

The decisive importance of this change was recognized by a few of
France's opponents. The man who a decade later was to guide the reform of the Prussian army—Scharnhorst—wrote in 1797 that the reasons for the defeat of the Allied powers "must be deeply enmeshed in their internal conditions and in those of the French nation," and he added that he was referring to psychological as well as to traditional military factors. How could the new techniques of war be introduced into nonrevolutionary societies, without adopting the political changes that had originally made them possible in France or at least without adopting more than a minimum of these changes? And was comprehensive change really necessary? It required time to isolate these two key questions, to understand for instance, the connections that existed between the new tactical formations and the economic and political conditions of the soldiers that employed them on the battlefield. At first, even the most progressive-minded officers in the armies of the European monarchies admitted only reluctantly the need for comprehensive change. Who can blame them for their unwillingness to leave their strictly professional concerns and interest themselves in such matters as social justice or the reform of a state's administrative or political machinery? The great majority were at best willing to admit some slight modifications—the limited opening up of tactical formations, for instance, or the introduction of more humane discipline. Neither they nor their governments would or could move further. Most troublesome to their conservatism were the reasoned suggestions of men who like Scharnhorst were cautiously feeling their way towards the new. Far easier to dispose of, and at the same time maddening in their radicalism, were those enthusiasts who demanded nothing else than total abolition of every traditional and tested method.

Perhaps the most persuasive spokesman of the opponents to reform was the Hanoverian staff officer Friedrich von der Decken, who later distinguished himself under Wellington in Spain. In a book on the military profession and state policy, published in 1800, Decken acknowledged that one of the characteristics of the new citizen-soldier, enthusiasm for the ideology of his government, had proved of great value to the Revolutionary armies. If the French, he wrote, had not been defeated in the early 1790's it was because their disorganization and indiscipline had been compensated for by terror and enthusiasm. Lately they had reintroduced the principle of subordination, but patriotic fervor remained a force that their enemies could ignore only at their peril. Soldiers of a nation whose people did not make the concern of the government its own could master this ideological élan only with superior discipline, pride in their unit and in their officers, in short with the timeless values of the professional fighting man. Properly trained and led, the apolitical professional soldier should be able to defeat the armed revolutionary.

But while Decken would not consider proposals that were incompatible with the principles of absolutism, for instance a citizen army, he did recog-
nize the need for change in less critical areas. Indeed, he concluded his book with a discussion of reforms and of the barriers they had to overcome. He wrote,

The first obstacle lies in recognizing the true nature of the defect. . . . Such a close relationship exists among the separate components of the military estate, which in turn is bound up so intimately with the state as a whole, that in order to achieve anything many wheels must be set in motion that often seem far removed from one another.

Personal and professional bias add to the difficulties of diagnosis and subsequently inhibit corrective action. Another major impediment "consists in the dislike of change felt by most men, and their resulting hatred of the individual who suggests change or is charged with bringing it about." There is also the matter of timing:

Change encounters less obstacles shortly before the outbreak of a war that threatens the state with great danger. A danger sensed by all muffles the voice of intrigue, and the innovation appears as a smaller evil that must be accepted to avoid a greater. Conditions are different when a reform is to be instituted in times of peace. Then the government tends to view the
defect as insufficiently grave to subject itself to a very painful operation. People are prepared to make some sacrifice to alleviate this or that abuse, but they cannot bring themselves to overturn and change everything.

Finally, some defects are of a kind that cannot be cured. A state may simply lack adequate strength to carry out a desired policy. Other imperfections, for instance, unrealistic national attitudes that influence policy, can be alleviated only little by little.

Decken's observations on the problems of reform are cogent, but no doubt items have occurred to you that he might have discussed more fully or that he failed to treat at all. Among them might be named the conservative nature of all institutions, the difficulty of reaching an objective judgment when one's career is involved, as well as other human and institutional difficulties attached to the decision-making process, which many of you know at least as well as I do. The timing of a particular reform will not only affect resistance to it but also has something to do with how well it works. Shortly before the fall campaign of 1806, in which Napoleon was to destroy the greater part of the Prussian field forces, Scharnhorst introduced the divisional organization to the army. It was a desirable reform, but it came at the wrong moment, since no one had time to learn how to operate the new system. In the same campaign, Scharnhorst's strategic plans were as advanced as Napoleon’s in their recognition of the essential strategic aim, but the Prussian administrative and command structure was far too cumbersome to carry out a scheme that was ideally right. And, finally, we may feel that Decken overlooked a condition that appears to be particularly favorable to military reform: not the time shortly before the outbreak of war, or a revolution, but also the period following on a major defeat. Not only does the shock of failure weaken preconceptions, demonstrate the fallibility of certain traditional methods, but the confidence of the established order in the rightness of its own procedures and personnel may also be weakened, and ideas and institutions are more ready to change. Prussia after the disaster of 1806 is an example of this new willingness to experiment. More recently we have seen similar reactions in Russia after 1917, in Germany after 1918 and again since 1945.

As it happened 150 years ago, men were spared some of the most difficult decisions concerning innovation and reform. Repeated French victories over fifteen years made it sufficiently evident to all that the old forms of military thought and policy could not continue unchanged. At the same time these victories overextended French power and crystallized opposition. After 1807 Napoleon's strength slowly began to ebb. And as the nation changed from a hotbed of revolution to an increasingly conventional and socially stable empire, her techniques lost some of their subversive onus and became easier for conservatives to adopt. Above all, republican fervor could
be channeled into the safer trough of patriotism. It became possible to introduce military change without unduly or permanently liberalizing social and political conditions.

In one respect, however, innovation was not compromised. The military leaders and theorists who reached maturity in the Napoleonic Era developed a comprehensive understanding of—and thus control over—the new forms of war. This theoretical achievement capped all other changes that had occurred in equipment, organization, tactics and strategy. Their recognition of the nature of modern conflict was best expressed in Clausewitz’s work On War.

War, Clausewitz wrote, is not an isolated area of human activity but rather an extension of policy in different form. War is an expression of political life, shaped by the social, material, and psychological qualities of each generation. It is an act of force, undertaken to bring about changes in the opponent’s policy, and in theory its ultimate objective must be the destruction of his will and of his means to resist. Violence has the tendency to escalate. However, the concept of total violence, which provides the necessary point of reference in Clausewitz’s analytic process, is modified in reality by political interests, material and psychological strengths, and by the imponderables of life. Politics govern the purpose of fighting, the means employed, the goals to be attained. Together these factors determine the character of each particular war: a nation may fight for its existence, or the political purpose and military goal are limited, with a consequent diminution of the energies mobilized.

The greatest military achievement of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period is that it came to understand and master the new aspects of war.

III

In the twentieth century the economic, technical, and social power that can be employed in war has increased enormously. Have we also advanced in our ability to adapt to the new military realities? No one will claim that our political and strategic competence even approaches the excellence and sophistication of our weapons system. Certainly, no war in the eighteenth century or in the Napoleonic Era was so gravely mismanaged as the First World War. None carried out national policy as inefficiently and ineffectively—and this applies to the performance of all participants, with the exception, perhaps, of the United States and Japan—and none was equally destructive of society and produced as many causes of future conflict. The war was la: gely fought with attitudes and according to principles that derived from Napoleon’s day; but these had been twisted and their meaning perverted with the passage of time. They no longer suited a modern highly industrialized society. Let me give you an example. After the Ameri-
MILITARY THOUGHT AND REFORM

Prussian general and military strategist Karl von Clausewitz.

can and French Revolutions the enthusiasm of the citizen-soldier was recognized as an important aid to the military effort. Conscription institutionalized this new energy. Indeed on the European continent universal military service became an effective device for the indoctrination of patriotism and nationalism. This enthusiasm, by 1914, which 100 years earlier had been little more than a means of strengthening the will of the soldier, could no longer be automatically controlled. These feelings had grown into a force—often an uninformed and highly prejudiced force—that now influenced policy and at times interfered with the rational conduct of war. A potential source of strength had gotten out of hand. Much the same dissymmetry between power and the ability to use it characterized other political and technological spheres. The leaders of the warring nations possessed only very imperfect ability to use their military tools, and they no longer fully understood how to relate war to national policy. In fact, by 1914 soldiers knew how to apply force effectively only where there was no countervailing force. Twentieth-century armies had proved adequate in colonial wars and in expeditions against underdeveloped societies; they were certainly effective instruments of political control in their own countries. Face to face, as instruments of national policy in major crises, they showed themselves to be defective. The technological complexities produced by the industrial revolution had led to greater emphasis on the technical training of officers and on the mastery of certain administration and organizational problems—for instance mobilization and supply. In these areas, and also in the manage-
ment of smaller commands—that is, in the operational realm—the armies of the First World War excelled. In the lower reaches—tactics—and in the higher sphere—strategy—they failed. I am not, of course, referring to errors of judgment and execution—these are inevitable in conflict—but to the fundamental failure to understand how military power should be used for the purpose of the state and how the state's politics and policy should be adjusted to the capabilities of the existing military instruments—both one's own and that of the antagonist.

The Second World War did not return to this nadir of incompetence of Western civilization. Nevertheless, inability to handle the tools of modern war continued to be in evidence on all sides. There is no need to mention the gigantic failure of the Axis powers to understand its possibilities and limits. The Allies, too, though not erring as dangerously, fell into numerous traps set by doctrinal rigidity and blindness to the essentially political nature of the conflict. Let me briefly list a few examples, very different in kind and significance, with which you are all familiar: the British insistence on area bombing to destroy the morale of the German civilian population, in which wildly inaccurate scientific arguments served as a cover for the personal opinions, or prejudices, of a few senior officers and civilian experts; the refusal of the Army Air Forces until 1944 to provide its B-17s and B-24s with a long-range escort fighter because doctrine held that bombers did not really require such protection; the inability throughout the war in the Pacific to overcome service and personal rivalries sufficiently to establish a single commander for the theater; the insistence of American planners in 1942 and 1943 to concentrate against the enemy in Northwest Europe, rather than forcing him to disperse by posing alternative threats and attacking him after his troops were pinned down guarding a dozen threatened fronts. This last, incidentally, is an example of the limitations of the so-called "principles of war," a catalogue of commonplaces that since the beginning of the nineteenth century has served generations of soldiers as an excuse not to think matters through for themselves. In Napoleon's time, the principle of concentration of force made operational sense, especially when it was brought about by high mobility, separate advances, and the indirect approach. When in his later years Napoleon tried to apply this same principle to tactics, pressing his infantry into solid, ponderous masses, whose path was to be cleared by a vast accumulation of artillery, the strategic concept degenerated into a self-defeating tactical absurdity. Its validity in the mid-twentieth century remains at least in doubt.

IV

The Second World War is now rapidly becoming ancient military history. Since Hiroshima, the world's political conditions have changed —a change that is likely to have far-reaching consequences.
cally, and military technology has been revolutionized. For this country the period since 1945 has been one of unremitting political and military conflict. Under the pressure of new weapons and new threats a new kind of discipline has developed, that of strategic studies, which attempts to subject policy problems and the qualities of weapons systems to exact analysis in order to reach the best possible decisions regarding force composition, the development of equipment, the way wars might be avoided, or—if necessary—should be fought.

Formal analytic methods as an aid to military decision making were pioneered in England during the Second World War. The scientists and soldiers who developed operational research were concerned primarily with immediate problems involving the use of equipment in operation or about to be put into operation. The organization of antiaircraft defense in southern England and of the convoy system were two of their significant successes. The systems analysis of today is far more speculative, addressed to the future, and thus infinitely more complex. It is concerned with what ought to be done, not simply with how to do it. As one of its practitioners has put it:

Consider . . . the problem of choosing bombers and missiles to include in the SAC force of the mid-sixties. What are the relevant objectives? What do we want SAC to accomplish? Deterrence, of course. But what kind? Deterrence of a surprise attack on the United States, or deterrence of Soviet aggression in the Middle East? These may have very different implications for force composition. How do we measure deterrence in a quantitative manner? And is deterrence the only objective? Obviously not. If possible, we also want a SAC that will strengthen our alliances, that will not trigger an accidental war, and that will fight effective if deterrence fails.¹⁰

The complexities of contemporary military problems can be unravelled only with the help of formal analytic methods, and in the last twenty years their application has raised the study of present and future conflicts to new heights. Systems analysis has, for instance, enabled men to formulate and establish the accuracy of such typically twentieth-century propositions as: the worst that the enemy can do to us is not necessarily the best that he can do for himself—a recognition that underlies the concept of deterrence.¹¹

But while systems analysis and the entire body of academic investigation into conflicts and their resolution have been productive, their conclusions are far from definitive; they are incomplete and are only gradually being fitted together into a doctrine that is not tied to a particular political direction in this country but will have a measure of validity for the foreseeable future. And the answers they give are not necessarily correct. Research is affected by value judgments and imprecise knowledge. Above all, the
questions we choose and the types of answers we are looking for reflect certain characteristics of our society. In other words, subjective factors are introduced into the process. For instance, the innate American belief is that a better gadget can do wonders, of which the Russian counterpart seems to be an equally self-centered faith in the miraculous power of ideology.

We not only lack adequate knowledge about enemy intentions and capabilities, we are also uncertain about our own policies. This uncertainty affects our nuclear strategy, and it influences the conventional and revolutionary wars we actually have been fighting and are engaged in today. The world is becoming a smaller place, and you are doing your share to make it so. This shrinkage has led to a great increase in American power, but from the point of view of simplicity in international relations, the change has not been all to the good. If our interests and concerns have spread across the globe, so have those of other states. Imperviousness to outside influence and pressure is now a thing of the past, even for the most powerful of nations. For much of its history the United States has been a country of innovation, whose achievements have profoundly affected men everywhere. But now we must have to learn to react to others more than we have been accustomed to doing in the past. Until there is fuller agreement on this nation's aims and responsibilities in a very rapidly shifting political universe, there will be continued and dangerous uncertainty about the role of war in American international relations.

I shall end by indicating three further obstacles that block our understanding of contemporary war: an insufficiently educated public; a failure among many political and military leaders fully to recognize the political nature of war; and the friction between violence and control that is a permanent characteristic of all armed conflict.

I am naive in thinking that a nation's defense policy is strengthened if the government not only explains to the public what it is trying to do, but also informs it of some of the simpler facts of military life today? Certainly, a gap must always exist between the insights of government and the vague comprehension of the public. No doubt it is possible to govern intelligently even if the people are ill informed. But there is a link between an educated public and educated policy, especially in the long run, and it is one that governments ignore or minimize at their peril. Only three days ago a United States Senator suggested that in this year's elections the voters might favor those candidates who promised to finish with the Vietcong in six months over those that spoke of a war lasting for years. Can this country afford to conduct its foreign relations according to the prejudices and fears of the uninformed?

It is the business of government to be as frank as possible in explaining its policies—in the case of Vietnam, for example, to place less emphasis on free elections, the validity of which at the present stage of Vietnamese
political development is rightly doubted, and more on our national interests in Southeast Asia, as the government sees them. Some humbug is inevitable in public affairs—we have indulged in too much of it. And isn't it time for the American public to have a better understanding of war? It is time to recognize, for instance, that not all wars are fought to achieve total military victory, ending with surrender ceremonies and the trial of war criminals; that more than ever sanctuaries, considerations for allies and neutrals, and numerous other restricting factors are compelling realities between which statesmen and soldiers must wend their difficult and dangerous path in search for the best possible political results. Imagine the gain in maturity in public life if there were to develop a genuine comprehension and acceptance of the concept of limited war—not only in the nuclear field but also in the revolutionary wars which we are fighting today and which we are doing all we can to turn into the conventional and more manageable wars of old.

Not only is war fought for a political purpose, which means that the physical punishment of the opponent is not the prime objective, but individual military action must often be guided by political concerns. It is sometimes preferable to forego destruction of men or inanimate targets for the sake of the greater political good, even if this seriously handicaps the fighting forces. War is not a fair contest; and the people who are least subject to fair treatment are the men actually engaged in it.

What makes war such an extremely difficult enterprise to conduct and to understand is that it demands both the most extreme forms of violence that men are capable of, and the coldest, most objective reasoning. War, to be effective, must be measured violence. It was the failure to achieve this union of force and control to anything like the required degree that turned the First World War into such a disaster for its European participants. It was this same failure on the German, Italian, and Japanese side during the Second World War that made the defeat of these countries far more destructive than was necessary. And today the uncertainty about the right proportions of violence and control constitutes one of the most interesting and important features of this country's policy in Vietnam. That there is so much concern on this score may be an indication that we are making progress in understanding modern war.

A useful way of approaching the problem of measured violence historically is to look at wars of coalition, in which powers can rarely act solely according to their own desires. An invariable result is intense mutual criticism among the Allies. You feel that the selfishness and incompetence of your partners prevents you from having your own way. To some extent, at least, you are compelled to control yourself. This process needs to be internalized in all wars. Your critical ally must be transformed into your own critical judgment—you might say, into your military superego.

Our civilization is frequently accused of immaturity because it has not
been able to abolish war. But it seems unlikely that severe conflicts of interest between states and alliances will soon disappear, and for some, conflicts and armed action may be the only method of resolution. It is not war that is an indication of our immaturity but the manner in which too often wars have been fought.

What the soldier of today must do is to step outside the very close circle of his duties and seek to understand what he and his country are involved in. Not only the techniques of your profession matter, but also their purposes. You may object that it is unrealistic to expect a serving officer to be concerned with the implications of his work. But isn't that the mark of the true professional? And more than ever today this search for understanding is required of all who are concerned with war. Everyone expects you to have the courage you need to carry out your duties. You have the same right to demand the courage to think and to act from the rest of us, who make up the society that you represent and for which you may have to fight.

Dr. Peter Paret, Professor of History at the University of California, Davis, was born in Berlin in 1924. After serving with the Army during World War II, he completed his undergraduate studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He was awarded a Ph.D. from King's College, University of London, in 1960 and has been on the faculty of the University of California, Davis, since 1962. Dr. Paret has developed one of the few graduate programs in the United States that deals with the history of military thought, institutions, and policy. He has held grants from the Social Science Research Council and the Rockefeller Foundation and will be at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton University during the academic year 1966-1967. Apart from numerous articles on European history and contemporary defense problems, he has written *Guerrillas in the 1960's* (with John Shy), *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria,* and *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform,* which will be published this fall. He is also completing a translation of Gerhard Ritter's biography of Frederick the Great and is an editor of Princeton University's *Works of Carl von Clausewitz.*
Notes

Cadet Commander Martin, Cadet Roselle, and the members of the Cadet Wing: It is of course an honor for me to be asked to be one of the members of the distinguished list of Harmon Lecturers. It is also an honor for me to be here in Arnold Hall. In fact, if it had not been for Gen. Arnold perhaps none of us would be here. He was thought by some to be innocent and simple. This was a deception. He was an extremely skilled negotiator and dedicated to whatever purpose he had in mind. The purpose he had in mind above all others was a separate Air Force and he contributed markedly to the attainment of that objective. Hence, you are here; hence, I am here. It shows you what one man can do even in a complex and large system like an Air Force.

I am here under certain handicaps. The previous speakers on this program were real military historians. They were old pros—I am not. I have done some work in naval history in a period now long gone, and I have spent most of my time in that period thinking about the Navy as a society rather than an armed force, trying to find out in a kind of sociological way what happens in a highly articulated, neatly organized, closed society. So I appear with some diffidence following these others who, as I say, have been old pros. I also have a feeling of diffidence or handicap in other ways. I am told, for example, that some of you think of this room as a master bedroom—that you tend to go to sleep here. Then I have a third diffidence. My subject is largely the Navy and I have been told over and over again that this is not a subject which has first claim to your interest or affections.

I have, I hope, some redeeming features. The Navy that I am going to talk about is the Navy from 1870 to 1890, a period in which the Navy in fact did not look so good. You can take some superior satisfaction in that. Indeed, I do not intend to talk much about the Navy. I want to talk about another subject (and the Navy will give me an opportunity to do so) which I would call “The Care and Feeding of Ideas.”

It cannot have escaped your notice that anyone who lives in this society today, whether in an armed force or outside of it, lives in an environment based in large part upon scientific understanding and engineering applications, and in order to thread our way through that complicated, densely intellectual environment, we must all master certain kinds of information.
and master certain ways of dealing with ideas. So I thought it would be more interesting to spend some time tonight talking about, as I say, "The Care and Feeding of Ideas," or the dangers of having too few ideas on the one hand, or on the other, the dangers of having too many.

I will start this investigation with the Navy of the period that I was billed to talk about, from 1870 to 1890. For much of the period that I will be concerned with there was little science, less technology, little invention, and fewer ideas. I think the quickest way for me to give you some sense of what that environment was like, what an armed force was like a hundred years ago, is simply to tell you a few stories or anecdotes. These will of course distort the meaning of the whole somewhat and I am aware of that, but I am anxious to give you a general feeling for what the world of the United States Navy in those years was about. We can correct some of the distortions later.

First of all I would like to talk about David Dixon Porter, one of the most celebrated naval officers who ever lived and the most effective commander in the Civil War. In the year 1886 he appeared before a committee of Congress to argue with all of the force at his disposal for keeping full sail on warships. This was eighty years after the *Claremont*, Fulton's steamship, had begun her regular duty between Albany and New York. It was about forty-five years after the first merchant vessel had crossed the Atlantic under steam. Yet, the Admiral of the Navy approached the Congress of the United States to plead with all his force to retain full sail power on the naval vessels of the United States.

A second brief anecdote deals with ship design. It occurred along about 1885 to some members of the Navy that they needed a new kind of ship, but they were puzzled by how to proceed because they had been building vessels out of wood (in a way that I will come to later) but they knew they had to try something new, and they had no one available to help them. So they told one officer to go about the shipyards of Europe and buy the plan of a useful warship for the United States Navy. He was obviously an indefatigable officer. He came up not with one plan for one ship but with four different plans for various parts of one ship, which he had culled from various shipyards. The resulting vessel was a composite of plans he had picked up from one British warship, two Italian warships, and one Chilean warship. She sailed for about five years, but she never sailed very well. This was in 1885.

We come then to the question of energy within the military society. Target practice would be a good place to begin. There was a regulation that each ship should have a target practice every quarter—every three months. Now this was a distressing duty for many ships. It dirtied the vessel. You had to clean it up afterwards and you never had any great confidence that you were learning how to shoot anyway, because you only shot once every three months and you shot at small moving targets which you rarely hit. In fact one article in the *Army-Navy Journal* said, "It was a brilliant display of
gunnery. All the targets were left untouched but it was a brilliant display.”
One resorted in this matter to remarkable methods of circumventing the
regulations.

The most remarkable and ingenious circumvention was attributed to an
officer who, finding that he was a little late and could not order up the target
practice on time, had his men throw all the ammunition for the quarter
overside and then took out the forms and filled in a fictitious set of target
reports. Then, his conscience overcoming him, so as not to send in a fake
report, he tore it up into small pieces, put the small pieces of the target
report into a small box, put two cockroaches into the box, nailed up the box,
and sent it off to the Department, the hope being that it would be felt that
the cockroaches had eaten the target practice reports on the way.

We come next to another aspect of our problem. When the Navy began
to build its own ships, having little experience, it did some trials and
experiments. It thought that one very interesting thing to do was to try to
mount as many guns, to get as great a weight of metal as possible, on a small
platform by doing what was called superimposing the turrets. You mounted
the turrets for the eight inch guns, which were about as large as they were
building in 1890, and mounted on top of them the turrets for five inch guns.
This was done to get a maximum amount of gun power in a small space.
They neglected to take into account two things which became very apparent
in the course of the first practice. One was that the turrets were arranged to
swivel or turn on the same turning circle at the same time, but the correction
for the rifling and wind velocity and everything else for the five inch guns
was different from the eight inch guns, so you never could train both sets of
guns at the same time on the target. Also, they used the same ammunition
hoist, and there was room for only one ammunition bag at a time, so only
one gun could be kept going at a time; so the whole expensive contrivance,
which was looked upon as a miracle of imagination, simply complicated the
gunnery task enormously.

Now I hope that, by these short little anecdotes, I have given you some
feeling for the general state of the professional body of seamen at that time.
There is, however, always in an armed force (you will find out soon if you
have not already) the civilian side of the thing, notably the Secretary and his
assistants. They are looked upon by civilians as the source of the most
refreshing inputs into the military, who may get stale if they get sunk in their
own juice. It is felt that civilians constantly bring in new ideas from the
outside. In the middle of the period I am talking about, there was a Secretary
from Indiana named Thompson. He had just been appointed. Indiana
is an inland state. He went on his first inspection tour. He went aboard a
ship. He looked down a hatch and was heard to exclaim in surprise, “Why,
the damn thing's hollow!”

Now these anecdotes give some distortion, but not much, about the
general intellectual level of the Navy at that time. I would like to say one or two more things in general about the state of the Navy so that when we come to talk about ideas, you will have some feeling for it. Consider ships in the era 1870 to 1890. In general they were still built more often of wood than of metal, and they still were more often powered with full sail power than with effective steam power.

Let us take the work of the seamen and the sailors on a cruise. They stood watches, shot the sun at noon, they kept watch, quarters, and station bills up to date. Standing watches was about all there was to do. It was what seamen had done when at sea for three or four hundred years—a set of routines, arbitrary, clearly defined. They had a role to play. If you were at sea for as long as they were—frequent cruises of three to four to five months—it was necessary, having a ship’s company that did not have too much to do, to have a set of rather arbitrary routines that held the whole society together and that in fact held the watch officer (who was a junior officer) or the senior officer himself together; but it was not a very imaginative or changing situation.

Consider ordnance. There were still a lot of smoothbores on the ships, of low power and little accuracy. As far as tactics were concerned, there were still people in 1890 who argued seriously that boarding and ramming were the major ways to engage in a sea fight. The great and fundamental wisdom about tactics was still Nelson’s great dictum, “No officer can go very far wrong who lays his ship alongside an enemy.”

In strategy the highest thought was that you existed to protect the coastline. You went out on a station if there was war and waited for the enemy to come to you. You then went close to her and at very short ranges either boarded or rammed or poured broadsides into her.

In all, nobody really quite knew why there was a Navy at this period. The definition of what a Navy was supposed to do and how it was supposed to do it was not clear. There was no naval doctrine. There were no tactical rules except the rules of thumb. The result was a series of wooden ships mostly under sail (I am talking about most of this period from 1870 to 1890 at least) that went on individual missions following patterns of sailing that were devised shortly after the war of 1812. The mission was the suppression of the pirates in the Mediterranean, the prevention of the slave trade from Africa to this country, or showing the flag in alien ports. But in the last third of the nineteenth century, the pirates had disappeared from the scene, and the slave trade was over.

Naval society was run by faith and by habit. It had really no ideas at all. It never changed at all during this period and it was an exceedingly stable and pleasant life for many people. It was not, however, as though the seamen were in Eden before the serpent. In fact officers had had a taste of
The USS Essex, one of the wooden ships, at dressed ship in April 1889 (U.S. Naval Historical Center).

The fruit of the tree of knowledge. They did know much more at this time than their actions suggested. They had been through a civil war a very short time before, and in the course of that conflict they had learned that steam was infinitely superior to sail. They had learned that iron was infinitely superior to wood. They had learned that rifles were infinitely superior to smoothbores. They had learned that a blockade was infinitely superior to coast defense by isolated ships. They had, in fact, learned all the things they were turning their backs on. In the course of the Civil War two ships had been built that were twenty-five years ahead of their time. Fifty years after that, at the very turn of the century, a great naval designer said those two vessels were the greatest men-of-war that had ever been built. They had speeds that were not equalled for a quarter of a century. They had sea-keeping qualities that were not equalled for thirty years. They had maneuverability and fire power. They lasted exactly two years after the Civil War,
when one was made a Navy receiving ship and the other was sold into the merchant marine.5

The Navy had the instruments, it had the demonstration that all of the things it had learned in the Civil War might make a brand new and effective and exciting Navy. Yet it systematically destroyed the weapons and turned its back on the ideas. All the new-fangled stuff was turned back, and in order to assure that the Navy would not have to deal with these complicated new systems and thoughts, the men who had been at the bottom of them, who were technical men, engineers and naval constructors, were either demoted or were put into stations or into positions or into areas of the Navy where they could do no harm by having new ideas. So they returned to paradise in 1865, which was the condition of things before the Civil War, and they could maintain this posture for several very interesting reasons.

First, there was peace and it was a real peace of a kind that we do not understand now. There was no view of a war ever happening again. Second, there was no system such as what we now call the military-industrial complex. Steel had to be bought abroad. There was no effective steel company in this country right after the war. Ship designs had to be bought abroad. We did not have, once you got rid of the original engineers, anyone with enough know-how in the system. Third, there was Congress, as there always is; and congressmen were devoted to the idea of coastal defense so that they could tell their constituents that Charleston or Portsmouth or Boston would be protected by these single ships. This was a great comfort to people who lived there. Finally, there was (and I think this is one of the fundamental things) abroad in the land or in the Navy no real intellectual notion of how to use

The Lehigh, a Passaic class monitor—state-of-the-art during the Civil War—patrols the James River in 1863 (National Archives).
the Navy, what it was for, or how to go about doing anything except sailing in these antique patterns. So back you went to look for the pirates who were not there, to repress the slave trade that did not exist, and to show the flag.

Now it sounds as though nothing was happening. In fact, new ideas were floating about in this bloodstream, mostly among the younger officers. There was a man named Fiske who came up with a brand new range finder with a telescopic sight that he showed proudly to the captain of his vessel. The captain was a celebrated naval officer, "Fighting Bob" Evans. He took one look at it and tossed it overside on the grounds it was useless in the present situation. Then there was a man who recommended that armor plate be used, and for years he came up against the resistance of naval officers who felt that wooden ships were more effective. There was a man named Homer Poundstone who developed a new design called the all big gun battleship that fifteen years later became the major capital ship of Britain. There was a man named Sims in gunnery who devised all kinds of new ways of shooting; these, too, were sat on.

The reason for this was, as I say, that there was an interest in retaining a system which had been satisfactory to grow up in, and live in, and which did not seem to need to be changed; there was no understanding of why one should change. Finally, there was no way within the system to make all these things fit together. Someone developed a new range finder. What use was it if you were going to fight by ramming and broadside at close range? It could not necessarily lead to telescopic sights that would provide, after the range finder, a better bead on the enemy. These were isolated ideas that never fitted together because there was no general theory or system into which they could fit. I can give you an example.

Long ago in Athens a man named Hero invented a steam engine, a pretty good little model that actually worked. It was never used at all and dropped out of sight for centuries because there was no way to hook it up to anything. It could not do work with anything, it was an isolated idea; and it faded. This is very much the situation with the telescopic sight, with the range finder, with the new system of gunnery that could have been put together. There was no way for the society which had no use for ideas in general to make any use of these specific notions.

And then finally in 1890 an event happened that I think was as important as all of the other things that were helping gradually to move the Navy into a more modern place. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote a book on the influence of sea power on history, and in the course of it he defined what use a navy could be. It could command the sea, and the way in which it could be used to command the sea was by general fleet actions, far from the coast, with fleets in being, fighting each other in the middle of the ocean. This defined for the first time, really, very clearly for officers and for people who thought about it, whether they were politicians or citizens, what a navy in
fact could do and how it could do it. Very shortly after this all of the random ideas that had been floating around in the society, ideas that had been thought of as products of rebels, of stormy petrels, of isolated men working alone, all these ideas found homes within a system—Mahan's—in which they interacted so that you could begin to build a technical system within which the Navy could operate effectively and understand why it was operating. It was not until a great, ruling, general idea came into effect that ideas in general began to work within the naval body. The Navy had been an entity—it had held itself together most effectively up to this time as a society but mostly through habit. In about 1890 the force of habit began to be supplanted by a theory.

Now both habit and theory give pattern and structure to a society, but the one, habit, provides a rigid, resistant, impenetrable scheme for going on exactly as you have, whereas the other, a theoretical structure, provides a pattern and a means for assimilating ideas that can relate to each other, that can change and move and grow. Now in all military establishments, as you well know, there is a certain amount of routine, and there is a certain amount of loyalty and devotion to routine. It is simply that in the Navy of the period I was talking about the devotion was too great and unqualified. I
think any armed force can run, as any society can run, the risk of proceeding by habit and faith and devotion to certain primitive schemes until it runs out of energy and steam. As long as you are existing within a theoretical structure—a body of ideas—you have a chance to grow and survive. Now that is the first part of what I wanted to talk about—what happens to a society when it loses its interest in ideas and falls back on familiar patterns and ancient loyalties, however noble and however splendid a past it may have had.

I want now to speak about the second part. We will leave the Navy. The first part was the possibility of having too few ideas in a community. The second part is the possible danger of having too many ideas in a community. Today we are 180 degrees from where the Navy was in the previous century. The difference is as from night to day. We have a system going for us of pumping new ideas and devices into the whole society, although I am speaking at the moment just about an armed force. That system has its base in fundamental science, which is still conducted in the society mostly by universities, and in engineering applications that are still conducted mostly in industries and in places like the Bell Laboratories, and within the research and development agencies of the armed forces. You have as a result of this system of interaction between general and fundamental ideas and specific applications, a system that has markedly cut down, for one thing, the time from the moment you have an idea to its application.

Poor old Bradley Fiske, when he had the idea of a range finder, had to spend about fifteen years before he could get anybody to listen to him and had to take about five years more to make a good one. Today such is the system, it seems to me, that the lag between the first fundamental notion and the application is reduced, by the nature of the system I have mentioned, to a minimum. I could describe at great length, if you wanted me to, the nature of this process for systematically producing and developing new ideas. I can give you some feeling for the results of it very quickly.

I was in Pearl Harbor on a destroyer in January of this year, and I had not seen a destroyer in about eighteen years. The number of things on that vessel that I had never seen before, and the number of new things one had to learn to make use of those new things, had totally changed the routines of a man at sea in a destroyer within the course of eighteen years and in large part had changed the purpose or the mission of the particular vessel. We have got a thing, as I say, going that pumps in new notions so rapidly that we can in fact change large sections of our society in a very short time.

There is another thing I want to say about this system besides the way it has collapsed the time lag between the fundamental idea and the application. Remember it took literally centuries to go from the steam engine to its useful application. The normal course up to 1890 of an application of an idea after its fundamental, first thought was probably a hundred years, and
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

now we have reduced it to, in some cases, a term of months. That is the first thing about the system that we have devised.

The second thing is what I would call the predictive characteristic in the system as we have built it; you can make an extrapolation from what you know you can do to what you think you may need in just a few years. Fiske, after all, when he had his range finder or his telescopic sight, had no idea of the system he was working in, so he had no idea of what uses to which it could be put, what organized system he could put it into, or what prediction he could make about where he would go from there. Today, however, all science in a way is a means of predicting what you can do. We now have in the scientific and technical way a method of saying that from this stage of the game it is only about ten years or five years or three months before we can proceed to the next stage.

I have two worries about the meaning of this extremely powerful system of ideas and mechanisms that we have put into the world. The first is, as with the destroyer, if we get to the point of thoughtlessly introducing too rapidly too many changes into an armed force, the structure that existed—the structure that the men in the last part of the nineteenth century wanted to preserve and protect because their very lives depended on it—might disintegrate under the load of new ideas and machines. Anybody in an armed force lives by a certain dedication to routines and loyalties and procedures inherited from the past. If you swamp those too rapidly—those old structures and routines—with a series of new findings that alter the way the men in the armed forces live, it may be too difficult for them to survive effectively in a very rapidly changing system. Indeed, they may in many ways find that things that they have done before are no longer possible to do at all, and they may have to find some new way of ordering their lives as an armed force. So it would worry me some that unless we find ways of selecting and controlling the load that we put on an armed force, whether Army, Navy, or Air Force, we may put too great a social and emotional burden on the men in it to accommodate to rapid change.

I have a second worry as it relates to armed forces, one that is more complicated and one that I hope I can be clear about. It has to do with Clausewitz's statement that “War is a continuation of policy by other means.” It is in our society an accepted belief that policy controls the use of arms—that arms exist to support a policy and that that policy is determined by the civilian branch of the government and therefore in a representative form of government by the civilians themselves. What I have wondered about is that with this capacity to generate new ideas rapidly, to predict in advance the long-range technical needs of an armed force, whether, given these possibilities, we will not all of us—civilians and soldiers and politicians alike—come to concentrate much too simply on the means available to us rather than the ends to which those means are put. In other words, I
worry now and then that by concentrating upon the means of applying force, we may in some subtle way distort the making of policy in any other terms. We may lose sight of alternative policies that we otherwise might take into account, that might enable us to avoid the tragedy of war at all. We may tend to lose our sense that there are policies of various grades and sizes, policies that various kinds of power—not just military force—can be used to support.

Now, thus far I have spoken only of the armed forces, but I said to you earlier that my interest in them historically has been too look at them, to try to think my way through into problems that are more obviously part of the whole society but less easy to think about because most societies are more loosely structured, less articulated than armed forces, so you cannot see the effect so clearly. I think that what I have been speaking about is the possibility of overloading the structure of an armed force with new ideas and the possibility of getting so concerned with those new ideas that you lose sight of why you are developing them and what you want to use them for. This is not a problem for the military alone. It is a problem that we must all face together.

I think that the developments in biology which have given us a much fuller sense of what makes human personality what it is, what it might be, and how it might be changed; the developments in physics, which have given us a much fuller understanding of the natural world and how we might change it; developments in all areas of life that science can throw light on and that is most of them, have given us a complicated system for introducing new ideas and new ways of dealing with things into the whole of society so that we may very well overload the existing classical structures. Clearly we have overloaded the cities. They cannot handle their problems. Clearly in some ways we have overloaded governments of all kinds. Clearly in recent days we have overloaded the classic structure of the universities. These are all symptoms, it seems to me, of the decay of institutions that have been overloaded by ny inputs mostly from science and technology.

So if I worry about what happens to an Air Force as a result of new missile developments, I worry also about what happens to all of us, what happens to cities, universities, and organized governments of one kind or another, and our established habits and conventions. I think that what we all have to be is to think about much more clearly than we have is the question of what ends we want these means to serve. I think it means the development of new kinds of institutions and new kinds of criteria for judging, so that we can set up a restraining context—organized schemes like Mahan's theory that will enable us to control the extraordinary energies and applications that we have power over in such a way that they will serve man and society most effectively.

I think this calls for the most urgent and concerned and dedicated
cooperation among the scientists, the engineers, the social scientists, and the humanities, and any other elements in the society that have a concern for it, whether in industry or in armed forces or whatever. One of the reasons that I wanted to come tonight, and one of the reasons that I admire the Air Force, is that you seem sufficiently aware at the Academy of the importance of getting this cooperative venture going when all of us can begin to think about the development of new institutions, the invention of new kinds of conventions, and the creation of new kinds of cultures to enable us to hold in check the forces that we have let loose within a context that will serve us effectively.

To have historians join you in thinking about this and take two days doing it, and to have you join historians, is at least a beginning, I think, in the kind of joint concern that we all have got to have if we are going to keep the show on the road, whether it is the Air Force or the Navy or the United States or the world as a whole.

Professor Elting E. Morison, who received a Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1937, is a faculty member of Yale University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Before World War II, he served as an Assistant Dean at Harvard University and taught industrial history there and at the MIT. He served in the United States Navy from 1942 to 1946, rising to the rank of lieutenant commander. After the war, he served as a consultant to the Research and Development Board, Department of Defense, until 1952 and as a consultant to the Houghton-Mifflin Company from 1946 to 1951. In 1942 he received the J.H. Dunning prize of the American Historical Association for his biography of Admiral William S. Sims. Professor Morison is also a biographer of Henry L. Stimson, the author of *Men, Machines, and Modern Times*, and the editor of an eight-volume collection of the correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt.
Notes

5. Bennett, *op. cit.*, Chapter Twenty-Nine gives the fullest account of these ships.
An Enduring Challenge: The Problem of Air Force Doctrine

I. B. Holley, Jr.

One sunny morning in January 1924, an Air Service lieutenant by the name of Odas Moon was flying southeast along the Caribbean shoreline from Costa Rica with a cargo of mail for the Army units stationed in the Panama Canal Zone. As he dropped below a cloud formation above the Chiriqui Lagoon, he was amazed to observe below him an armada of naval vessels - 4 battleships, 3 submarines, 21 destroyers, a carrier, and a host of smaller craft, more than he could count. Quite by accident Lieutenant Moon had stumbled upon the Navy’s “black” or invasion fleet assembled in secret 125 miles west of Colon for a sudden descent upon the Army forces defending the Canal Zone as one feature of the annual winter maneuvers.

Here was a target too tempting to overlook. Moreover, by coincidence the lieutenant had available some appropriate ammunition, a case of luscious, ripe, red tomatoes which he was carrying back to Panama for his wife. As a resourceful officer he selected a target without hesitation and closed in a diving attack, scoring three direct hits with his tomato-bombs on the makeshift carrier Langley.1

When word of Lieutenant Moon’s exploit reached the Canal Zone, he was the toast of the command. But on sober second thought his superiors decided they were not very pleased after all. One of the undeclared purposes of the maneuver was to demonstrate that the Army desperately needed a 10 million dollar appropriation to mount 16-inch coastal defense batteries without which the Canal’s defenses were hopelessly outgunned by the assault force.2 Now, however, after Lieutenant Moon’s tomato-bombing there was no little danger that Congress might get the idea that coastal defense guns were no longer needed. Whereupon the umpires gravely announced that the maneuvers would be delayed for one day while the exposed “black” fleet was permitted to slip out and take up a new secret position - just as if one airplane had never been invented.

End of story. Doesn’t Odas Moon sound like a romantic character from the seat-of-the-pants, wind-in-the-wires era of open cockpit flying? I’m sure you’d enjoy hearing me tell you many more stories about Odas Moon and his contemporaries. But what good would it do you? Instead, I’m going to ask you to follow me down a more serious line of thought. It may not be so
much fun but far more valuable. I'm working on the assumption that one of
you out there is going to be Chief of Staff in the not too distant future, and I
hope I have an important message for you.

Let's go back to Odas Moon. What happened? The Navy was incensed,
and there were some ruffled feathers. But more importantly, what did not
happen? Why was there no analysis of this experience for its long range
implications, no exploratory recasting of doctrine in view of the potential
role of aircraft in coastal defense? Why was there no careful assessment of a
possible reordering of priorities and a reallocation of appropriations be-
tween the Air Service and the Coast Artillery, especially since Billy Mit-
chell's famous bombing tests beginning in 1921 had already suggested the
necessity for such a recasting?

The reason for this failure seems clear. In its primitive state of organi-
ization, the Air Service lacked an appropriate agency uniquely devoted to
the development of doctrine and its implementation or defense within the War
Department.

If we are going to discuss doctrine, it will be useful if we start out with
an understanding of what doctrine is and why it is so important. The Joint
Chiefs currently define doctrine as "Fundamental principles by which the
military forces . . . guide their actions. . . . It is authoritative but re-
quires judgment in application." 1

An earlier definition from the Joint Chiefs expressed the same thought
but with a somewhat different emphasis: "Doctrine is a compilation of
principles . . . developed through experience or by theory, that represent
the best available thought." Such doctrines while serving as guides "do not
bind in practice." 4 In short, doctrine is what is officially approved to be
taught. But it is far more than just that. Doctrine is the point of departure
for virtually every activity in the air arm.

Basic doctrine defines the roles and missions of the service, the scope
and potential capabilities of its weapon systems. Doctrine lies behind the
decisions as to what weapons will be developed and gives guidance as to the
relative importance of several competing roles or weapon systems when the
time arrives to apportion the invariably inadequate supply of dollars. Doc-
trine provides the rationale for favoring one weapon system over another. If
current doctrine officially placed a higher priority on close support of the
ground forces than it granted strategic bombardment, as was the case in the
ey early nineteen twenties, then it follows almost inexorably that the close
support mission will be more generously funded; more effort will be in-
vested in developing the weapon systems devoted to close support along with
a major share of training facilities, allocations of available manpower and
so on.

Doctrine is like a compass bearing; it gives us the general direction of
our course. We may deviate from that course on occasion, but the heading
provides a common purpose to all who travel along the way. This puts a grave burden on those who formulate doctrine, for a small error, even a minute deviation, in our compass bearing upon setting out, may place us many miles from the target at the end of our flight. If those who distill doctrine from experience or devise it by logical inference in the abstract fail to exercise the utmost rigor in their thinking, the whole service suffers. As the old Scot preacher put it, "A mist in the pulpit is a fog in the pews."

Now that we have the notion of doctrine clearly in mind, we can go back to Odius Moon and the Air Service of the nineteen twenties. Undermanned, ill-equipped, and beset with a confusion of voices as to which way to turn, the Service was in serious disarray. Fortunately, however, the Air Corps Act passed by Congress in 1926 marked a significant turning point, establishing, as it did, a clearer charter, better opportunities for advancement, and a mandate for more equipment. But insofar as doctrine is concerned, the critical turning point came sometime between 1926 and 1931 when the Air Corps 'tactical School was transferred to Maxwell Field in Montgomery, Alabama.  

The move from Langley Field in Virginia, where the school had operated ever since 1922, was more than just a physical relocation. What emerged at Maxwell was an improved and highly creative institution. There, in

The Air Corps 'tactical School (center) of the 1930s after it was transferred to Maxwell Field, Alabama.
the decade from 1931 to 1941 a small but able and dedicated faculty, in conjunction with a succession of some enthusiastic, if atypical, students, hammered out the doctrinal guidelines for the modern Air Force.

If Billy Mitchell is to be regarded as the revolutionary firebrand in the cause of air power, then it would seem appropriate to identify the generation of officers at the Air Corps Tac School in the thirties as the Founding Fathers who carried out the far more difficult task of writing a suitable constitution for strategic air power. For it was they who took Billy Mitchell's ill-defined and decidedly imperfect conception of bombardment and fleshed it out in detail as basic doctrine. For this we venerate them today.

In many ways the work of the Tac School officers in the thirties represents a remarkable achievement. They had but a slender base of experience in bombardment aviation during World War I; they had to rely upon a sustained effort of creative imagination to lay out what later became the basic doctrines shaping the air arm which fought World War II. Not only did they devise the strategic and tactical means to apply air power; in addition it was their imagination and vision which ultimately lay behind the specifications of such great airplanes as the B-17 Flying Fortress.

But, while recognizing the great achievements of the Founding Fathers at the Tac School, we must also look at the other side of the coin. With the advantage of historical hindsight, we can now see that there were some fundamental flaws in the unofficial doctrinal notions developed at Maxwell. When subjected to the brutal test of war these defects in conceptualization promptly surfaced.

In retrospect it is clear that a pivotal misconception of the Tac School thinkers stemmed from their erroneous assumption that high speed strategic bombers would generally elude interception by enemy fighters. From this mistaken premise followed a train of serious miscalculations. If the superior speed of the bomber was such as to make interception improbable, or at worst, infrequent, then no provision need be made for escort fighters to accompany the bombers on their long range mission. The near fatal consequences of this faulty doctrinal inference are too well known to require further elaboration here. Suffice it to say, since no long range escorts were deemed necessary, there was no pressure to develop this kind of hardware.

A second erroneous inference held that if interception would be encountered infrequently, if at all, then it followed that heavy bombers could be relatively lightly armed. As a former aerial gunner I find the implications of this particular misconception not only peculiarly fascinating but highly illuminating.

To illustrate the problem we need only go back and look at the defensive armament of the original XB-17. The type specifications for heavy bombers drawn up in 1935 by the Air Corps called for a minimum of three caliber .30 machineguns. Boeing proposed to increase this to five, but Air Corps offi-
ficials resisted, pointing out that there were not enough crew members free to man five guns continuously. Boeing went ahead anyway and brought in the X-model with five guns, one in the nose, one in a roof hatch, one on each side and one in a floor hatch. All of these guns were limited to relatively restricted fields of fire which left large areas of approach unprotected. The B-17 certainly wasn't any "Flying Fortress" then!

Because the Air Corps thinkers put their faith in high speed, serious restrictions on the all-around coverage by fields of fire were probably unavoidable. The only way to improve the scope of defensive fire was to add blisters or turrets. And protuberances such as these cut down on the speed which was expected to outrun interception. Because high speed was weighted more heavily than defensive armament in design competitions, aircraft manufacturers had a powerful incentive to minimize armament when preparing their bids.

Even if bombers were faster than interceptors, this still left open the possibility of a frontal approach from head on. To test this possibility, a trial was arranged with a Curtiss P-36 flying at just over 300 mph on a collision course with a Martin B-10 bomber flying at just over 200 mph. The participants must have been faint-hearted; at any rate, they concluded that nose attacks were not feasible. The approaching fighter pilot reported that he barely had time to pull away after identifying the on-coming bomber. As a consequence the Tac School doctrine on bomber defense was allowed to stand unshaken. The vigor with which Luftwaffe pilots subsequently pressed nose attacks on 8th Air Force formations over Festung Europa provides all the commentary that is necessary for this particular bit of doctrinal myopia.

More curious still is the disparity between what the doctrine said and the bombers built in the light of that doctrine. It was officially estimated that 80 percent of all attacks by enemy fighters would fall within a 45 degree cone extending from the bomber tail. But it was precisely this region behind the tail which was left unprotected. Need I remind you that the original B-17, like its predecessors, had no tail gun?

The official rationale for the absence of a tail gun was that considerations of weight and balance made it impractical to install a weapon behind the tail assembly. It was even suggested that the high accelerations which would be experienced by a gunner stationed there further reinforced the decision not to install tail guns. This conclusion is all the more curious because at the very time the Air Corps reached it, the British were developing the prototype Vickers Wellington bomber, a weapon system with all the grace and beauty of a freight car, mounting power-operated four-gun turrets at both nose and tail.

Under the circumstances it is difficult not to suspect that a substantial element of wishful thinking may have entered into the calculations of the
Tac School authors of bomber doctrine during the between-war years. The outbreak of war in Europe, however, spelled an abrupt end to self-delusion. Just how far the doctrine of bomber defense had to be modified is evident in the B-17E which appeared in September 1941. It fairly bristled with armament: upper turret, lower turret, a twin-gun tail position, plus two handheld flexible guns, one on either side in the waist, two more flexible guns in the nose, and one in the roof hatch. What is more, these were not peashooter caliber .30s but .50s with significantly greater killing power. The B-17G added a chin turret, bringing the total to 13 guns in all, eight of which could be fired forward. Yet even all these guns proved to be inadequate without long range escorts when the assault on Hitler's Europe was undertaken in earnest.

At this point it might appear that my intent is to play the iconoclast, debunking the Founding Fathers at the Air Corps Tac School and the doctrines they devised. Let me remind you that the role of the historian is neither to praise nor to blame—only to understand. In all humility we may ask: would we, you and I, have done any better had we stood in their shoes back in the nineteen thirties at Maxwell? Would we have done as well? Even with the advantage of looking back after the event, can we be sure what went wrong? Historians are not blessed with 20/20 hindsight; all too often they see in the past only what they set out to find. The most difficult task confronting the historian is to be sure he is asking the right questions. With this in mind, let us put aside the Founding Fathers and the Tac School for the moment and turn now to the Air Force of today. By contrasting the present with the nineteen thirties we may be able to develop some insights on the whole problem of how doctrine is devised.

Responsibility for the formulation of doctrine in the Air Force today rests in a special Air Staff Directorate for Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives located under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. In contrast to the all but non-existent organization for doctrine in the Air Service in the nineteen twenties, and the part-time employment of faculty members at the Air Corps Tac School in the nineteen thirties, the present-day arrangement provides an agency exclusively devoted to doctrinal matters. It defines the objectives and concepts of the Air Force; defends them when subjected to criticism and attack; and monitors their implementation throughout the service. More than 50 officers, aided by an additional supporting staff, devote their full energies to this important business.

How different the problems are now from what they were back in the Tac School days at Maxwell. Then they started from a virtually clean slate. The Air Corps inventory of a few hundred first line operational aircraft was too small to constitute a hostage to any particular conceptual interpretation. With few aircraft available and operating funds scarce, the range of experience it was possible to acquire remained sharply limited. Doctrine then was
MILITARY THOUGHT AND REFORM

derived largely by attempting the soundest possible theoretical extrapolations from the narrow base of experience available, most of it from World War I.  

Now, today, the situation is totally different. The Air Force inventory of aircraft numbers in the thousands, and each functional type of aircraft has its dedicated advocates, ready and articulate. As a consequence, the promulgation of doctrine today is no longer a matter of comparing the merits of rival abstractions or theoretical formulations. Instead it has become a contest between contenders who usually have large quantities of existing hardware and many thousands of expensively trained men as the basis for their claims.

While all the major operational commands in the Air Force vie with one another for resources and therefore compete for roles and missions, the major doctrinal battles today are more often found on the inter-service level. Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate how these contests take place is to plunge in with an example of an on-going doctrinal problem. Even if we have time for no more than a glimpse at the process, it should prove informative.

The National Security Act of 1947 assigned the Air Force a virtual monopoly on air activity vis-a-vis the Army. The L-series aircraft, puddlejumpers used for liaison and artillery-fire correction, were but a trivial exception. This was a comfortable posture for the Air Force, snug behind the statutory assurance that there would be no major shift in the scope of its mission without congressional approval. This comfortable arrangement offered a good deal of security—indeed, almost a certainty—of a major share in the available appropriations. And sure enough, after a decade of existence the newly independent Air Force received sums ranging upward to nearly half the total defense outlay. But as the great, late Justice Holmes once put it, "To rest upon a certainty is a slumber which, prolonged, means death."

The air arm monopoly was not to endure; the very scale of its funding gave the other services a powerful incentive to seek congressional support for taking over portions of the Air Force mission. In fact, the Secretary of Defense subsequently gave his blessing to such moves, saying in effect to the several services, "Whoever can do the job better and cheaper gets the assignment." As a result, the services in recent years have engaged in a series of running battles, semantic contests, in which each attempts to carve out a definition of roles and missions that will enhance or at the very least preserve its existing posture.

Typically, these doctrinal contests have come about when one of the services comes in proposing to assume a mission by using a piece of hardware developed for an entirely different purpose. An example of this kind of ploy at the intra-service level took place in Vietnam when some imaginative and resourceful young officers converted transport aircraft into gunships
which proved highly cost-effective truck killers to the consternation of a large number of spokesmen for some expensive aircraft in the Tactical Air Command, the organization to which current Air Force doctrine assigns the interdiction role.\textsuperscript{18} If the instinct for self-preservation in holding on to roles and missions is acute even \textit{within} the Air Force, one can readily understand how much more intense the struggle becomes at the level of \textit{inter-service} competition.

In the limited time at our disposal one example of inter-service rivalry, albeit an important one, will have to suffice. When the Secretary of Defense during the Eisenhower Administration gave the Air Force responsibility for strategic nuclear weapons, the Army was explicitly limited to the development of tactical nuclear weapons of sharply circumscribed range for battlefield support only. These short range, surface-to-surface nuclear weapons were visualized as providing a protective umbrella over Army units operating in any given battlefield area.\textsuperscript{19}

The Air Force could scarcely take exception to this arrangement inasmuch as it was little more than a nuclear application of the covering-fire doctrine which had existed for many years in connection with the use of conventional field artillery. But then, in came the Army with a request to extend the range of its tactical nuclear weapons substantially so as to provide an umbrella which would cover groups of Field Armies maneuvering in conjunction with one another. There was a persuasive logic to this, so the Secretary of Defense approved the request. Appropriately improved hardware was developed, and trained units deployed to the field.

At this juncture, the US Army in Europe came up with a list of formidable targets, military targets of the Warsaw Pact powers, lying beyond the East-West frontier. Since the Army's tactical nuclear weapons were already available, why not assign them to counter the Eastern bloc threat in a persuasively cost-effective manner?

In terms of cost-effectiveness, the Army's proposal was decidedly convincing and received the nod from the Department of Defense. From the point of view of the Air Force and its doctrinal watchdogs, the issue had other ramifications. Here was a classic example of the dangers to be encountered when one lets the camel get his nose under the tent. What had started out as a purely tactical weapon offering a nuclear supplement to conventional artillery doctrine, now seemed to be subtly transformed into a strategic weapon encroaching upon a mission assigned to the Air Force.\textsuperscript{20}

This in itself was enough to alarm the guardians of Air Force doctrine, but an even greater threat soon appeared on the horizon when the Army surfaced a proposal to modify the existing tactical nuclear weapon with improved electronic gear to enable its missiles to search for, identify and lock on to rapidly moving targets such as an advancing column of tanks.\textsuperscript{21}

Here the contest was clearly joined. If the Air Force were to sit idly by
MILITARY THOUGHT AND REFORM

An Atlas missile is launched at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, June 1961.

while the Army upgraded the capabilities of its missiles beyond the normal scope of battlefield defense to take on strategic roles and interdiction roles, the very existence of the Tactical Air Forces might be gravely threatened. If more than enough funds were always available, this would not be so. With ample appropriation: the Army and the Air Force could both develop their capabilities along complementary and mutually reinforcing lines. But funds are never ample enough to permit redundant and overlapping procurement.

The sunk costs of the initial Army missile at issue here have amounted to more than a billion and a half dollars over the past decade. Even greater costs can reasonably be projected over the next decade. The guardians of Air Force doctrine must assess the probable impact on their service if this threat is not met. If Congress pours a billion and a half dollars into this Army missile over the next decade, what affect will this have on the funding of components such as the tactical wings assigned to do the same job?

At this point the proponents of Air Force doctrine begin to build the best case they can against the Army missile and in favor of an air arm solution. They observe that the missile-launching unit is prodigiously expensive in manpower, requiring nearly three times as many people as a fighter wing. They
plunge into a study of all the parameters and variables involved: what is the accuracy of the missile and how does it compare with the performance of tactical aircraft? What is the response time of the missile? How many missiles can be launched in a given period? How does the missile compare with air arm alternatives as to flexibility in use? If it cannot be re-programmed in flight, it suffers a serious shortcoming; score one for the Air Force.

But meanwhile the Army advocates have been doing their best on the other side of the argument. They come down heavily on the all-weather capability of the missile in contrast to the vulnerability of aircraft in this respect. Score one for the Army. And so the issue is fought out, item by item, characteristic by characteristic, costs against benefits.

Surely it is evident to you all that as a historian my function is not to come down on one side or the other. I am not qualified to speak authoritatively on the relative merits of Army missiles and tactical aircraft. Nor is it my intention to do so. Here we are interested only in the process by which air-arm doctrine is formulated. Now that we have had occasion to catch a glimpse of that process at three widely separated points along the historical continuum, the nineteen twenties, the nineteen thirties, and today, it is time to stand back and try to determine what it all means. What insights of present significance can we derive from the record of experience in the Air Service, the Air Corps and the Air Force?

The Air Service era we can dismiss rather quickly. There was no organization devoted exclusively to the study of doctrinal questions. And the organizations which did exist, at least down to 1926, were largely dominated by the ground arms.

The Air Corps era affords more substance for thought. While the Tac School faculty was not exclusively devoted to the search for suitable doctrine, the academic setting at Maxwell proved to be almost ideal for the stimulation of creative imagination. One is reminded of Henry Steele Commager's suggestion that most of the truly creative eras in history have revolved around relatively small, intellectually active communities: Athens in the Golden Age, Florence in the Renaissance, the London of Shakespeare and Elizabeth, the Concord of Emerson and Thoreau, and the best of the modern universities.

In some measure the Air Corps Tactical School of the nineteen thirties shared in the qualities which characterized these imaginative and highly productive communities—an academic mountain top sufficiently removed from the cares and pressures of day-to-day operation, to provide its members, faculty and students alike, the leisure in which to think. But the Air Corps Tactical School, good as it was, suffered as we have seen from a near-fatal defect. Not only did it suffer from the absence of authority to promulgate doctrine officially, but what was perhaps worse, it lacked an adequate, built-in mechanism for rigorous self-criticism. As a consequence, some of
MILITARY THOUGHT AND REFORM

its most constructive contributions to the concepts and doctrines of strategic air power were seriously and dangerously flawed.

By contrast, the present day Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives, whatever its limitations, provides a large, full-time staff exclusively devoted to doctrinal matters. Another difference is evident. Because the Air Corps Tac School faculty could start with a virtually clean slate, uninhibited by large existing forces, they could envision whatever force they thought best. Those who draw up doctrine today confront a different situation.

There are tens of thousands of individuals in the Air Force whose training and traditions lead them to identify with one or another of the major commands, with SAC, or TAC, or MAC. And each of these bespeaks a vested interest. Each such interest must be placated, reconciled, accommodated. These necessities, along with the never-ending confrontations with the other services fighting for roles and missions, keep the present-day guardians of Air Force doctrine eternally on the run. They are so busy putting out fires, few of them find time in which to think at leisure. This is not the criticism of an outside observer but the assessment of the participants themselves.2

In short, if the 'Tac School of the nineteen thirties was perhaps too much of an academic mountain top, it may well be that the Directorate of Doctrine today is too much in the marketplace. Or, as one officer in the organization put it: "Sometimes we feel we are so busy stamping ants we let the elephants come thundering over us." Undoubtedly some sort of arrangement can be worked out with the schools at the Air University to foster the creativity and detachment of the mountain top while at the same time retaining the undeniable stimulation of the marketplace afforded by the daily battles on the Air Staff.

Whatever mix is eventually worked out, surely one feature in which the present-day organization is vastly superior to the old 'Tac School will be retained. Today's organization, as we have seen, provides precisely that quality which was most lacking at Maxwell in the nineteen thirties—a built-in, assured arrangement for criticism, a mechanism to provide rigorous and objective evaluation.

From the newspaper headlines one can readily get the impression that inter-service rivalry is essentially vicious, endless bickering and backbiting, selfish partisanship operating to the detriment of the public interest. Partisanship there undoubtedly is, and it can be harmful, but should we not recognize that competition amongst the services, no less than competition amongst the several commands within the Air Force, serves a useful purpose, especially in matters doctrinal.

Competition helps to keep us honest by providing a highly motivated mechanism for insuring that every argument put forward will be subjected to the most searching scrutiny by a rival with great interest at stake. The
competition provided by inter-service rivalry under the aegis of the Department of Defense today would almost certainly have rectified the defects in bomber doctrine which so jeopardized our initial foray into the strategic offensive during World War II. Air Force Maj. Gen. Glenn Kent made the point with refreshing candor not long ago when he suggested that whatever objectivity the services achieve in their presentations stems not so much from the purity of their motives as from simple fear of rebuttal.

Now for a few words in conclusion. In looking back at 50 years of air arm history, from 1924 to 1974, we have tried to make two points: first, that doctrine is crucially important in the Air Force, and second, that we should be as concerned with the process by which doctrine is devised as we are with doctrine itself. For, as Marshall McLuhan might phrase it, the medium has a most disconcerting way of becoming the message!

As to our first point, the official Air Force line holds that doctrine is indeed highly important. There has long been a regulation which requires all Air Force officers to possess and be familiar with AFM 1-1, the manual on basic doctrine. If my own highly fallible, informal survey is to be trusted, however, that regulation appears to be more ignored than obeyed.

As to our second point, concern for the process by which doctrine is devised: surely it is significant that the official Air Force historical bibliography appearing as recently as 1971 does not even carry an index entry for the term doctrine.

Let me send you away with an anecdote, a cautionary tale, on the importance of thinking doctrinal matters all the way through. This comes from a friend in the RAF during World War II. The supply of magnetic mines for planting in the mouth of the Elbe to tie up the port of Hamburg had run dangerously short. Then some sharp operator reasoned that it is not the number of actual kills which makes river mining so effective but the delays imposed on shipping while the mines are being swept. Why worry about the shortage of real mines when we can plant dummy mines filled with concrete. Since the enemy won't know until all are retrieved if any or none are dangerous, even dummy mines will tie up the river.

So the RAF planted a number of dummy mines in the Elbe estuary. It worked beautifully. The conscientious Germans spent days retrieving every last one. River traffic came to a standstill and presented lucrative targets for RAF bombers.

About a week later, however, a Luftwaffe raid passed over the Thames estuary, liberally mining the river well up toward London. River traffic was backed up for days while the minesweepers did their work. I need not tell you what they eventually dredged up: the original British dummy canisters filled with concrete. Each one still bore the inscription, “compliments of the PAF.” For ought I know, that story may be apocryphal. No matter, it will serve us nicely as our text when reflecting on matters doctrinal.
Professor I.B. Holley, Jr., received his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1947 and has been on the faculty of Duke University since that time. He served in the U.S. Army during World War II and is a brigadier general in the U.S. Air Force Reserve. He is also Chairman of the Secretary of the Air Force's Advisory Committee on the USAF Historical Program. His best known works are *Ideas and Weapons* (1953) and *Buying Aircraft: Air Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces* (1964). Professor Holley is presently at work on a biography of Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer. In July 1974, he took leave from Duke University to serve as Visiting Professor of Military History at the United States Military Academy for the academic year 1974-1975.
Notes


4. Quoted in R. E. Fittrell, "Some Patterns of Air Force Thought," in Air University Review (Jan 1964) 84. The author is heavily indebted to Frank Fittrell as are all other serious students of doctrine for this provocative article as well as the exhaustive research reflected in his massive two-volume study, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell AFB, June 1971.)

5. Something of the limitations on doctrinal studies at the Langley Field Tactical School is suggested by the fact that as late as 1923 some 25 hours of the course were devoted to the care and management of horses. See J. G. Taylor, "They Taught Tactics," 13 Aerospace History (summer 1966) 67. See also USAF Historical Studies: No. 89, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941, USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Sept 1955, pp 16, 29-30.

6. An Air Service Field Officers School opened at Langley in Oct 1920. Its name was changed to the Air Service Tactical School in 1922.

7. Strictly speaking, the conceptions of strategic air power taught at the Air Corps Tactical School were not "doctrine" because they had not received official approval from the War Department General Staff. These conceptions finally received official sanction, albeit implicit and indirect, with the approval of AWP-1, the air annex of the Army strategic plan of Sept 1941. For the best accounts of this backdoor entry of air power doctrine, see Maj. Gen. H. S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, GA, 1972) ch 4, and David MacIiuan, "The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1944-1947," (Duke University, Durham, NC, 1969) 6-21.

8. Fittrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 1, 58-59, 70 and 75 documents the shift in Air Corps thinking regarding the probability of successful interception. For the drastic reversal of views during World War II, see, ibid 139. See also MacIiuan, op cit 17, and C. L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York, 1949) 20-26.


10. Memo, Maj. R. C. Compland, Ordnance Dept, for Chief, Air Corps, Feb 9, 1940, quoted in Holley, op cit, ch 3, ch 5, p 54. Another factor which may have impeded the development of bomber armament was the relative neglect of gunners, their training, etc. See, for example, M. C. Olnstead, "First of the US Heavies: The Martin Bombers," 20 Aerospace History (Sept 1973) 152.

11. Holley, Turrets . . . ch 4, 4c: also William Green, Famous Bombers of the Second War (Garden City, NY, 1959) 64. The Vickers Wellington Mk I, first production model which first flew Dec 23, 1937, had power turrets in both nose and tail; there was also a ventral gun. See also C. G. Guy and L. Bridgeman, eds, Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1938, London, 1938) 75c.


13. AF Regulation 1 2, Dec 9, 1971, Aerospace Doctrine: Responsibilities for Doctrine Development. The Air Staff reorganization of Feb 1963 moved responsibility for the promulgation of doctrine from the Air University, where it had been since 1947, to the Air Staff. (See Fittrell, op cit 750 f). To the objective observer it seems clear that while there were certain
advantages derived from proximity to the seat of authority and from direct relationships with the Army and Navy, the shift undoubtedly went too far in removing virtually all responsibility for doctrinal matters from the Air University.

14. The constraints imposed on the formulation of sound doctrine by limited resources, including not only aircraft and airfields but operating funds, may be pointedly illustrated by recalling those instances in the 1930s when "red" and "blue" air forces for the opposing sides in a maneuver were forced for want of adequate resources to operate from the same airfield.


20. Ibid.


22. This observation is based on interviews with a dozen officers assigned to the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives. See, for example, interview with Col. D. M. Murane, Acting Deputy Director, Jan 3, 1974.

23. Interview with officers cited immediately above.


25. See AFR 5-54 (May 17, 1954) which appeared soon after the appearance of the first USAF major doctrinal statement in March 1953.

26. Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force History; An Annotated Bibliography (Washington, 1971). It should be noted, however, that Futrell's major study, mentioned above in footnote 4, did not appear in print until after this bibliography was published.

27. Maj. Gen. W. Y. Smith, Director of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives in the Air Staff, and Lt. Gen. M. F. Rogers, Commander, Air University, while in no way responsible for my conclusions, have my gratitude for making available the resources of their organizations in connection with the research for this address. At the Air Force Academy so many people put me in their debt with many kind attentions that I cannot possibly thank them all. For helpful critics of my text, however, I must single out Col. Alfred F. Hurley and Maj. David Macha. 

439
Operation POINTBLANK: A Tale of Bombers and Fighters

William R. Emerson

It has been a damned serious business...a damned nice thing—the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life...

—The Duke of Wellington on Waterloo.

May I say what a pleasure it is for me as a former Air Force officer to be here at the Air Force Academy. All of us who have served in the Air Force look with pride on this Academy and on you, the Cadets who make it up. To a greater degree than you perhaps realize, the Academy represents the crystallization of the hopes and trials, the accomplishments and even some of the shortcomings of the airmen who have gone before you. It stands in the line of a short tradition—as military traditions go—but a proud one, which it will soon be your obligation to carry forward into a future that no man can weigh or fully trace. Feeling this, I deem it a signal honor to have been invited here to deliver the 1962 Harmon Memorial Lecture, dedicated to the memory of the Academy's founder and first Superintendent.

I have chosen to discuss tonight one part of that Air Force tradition—American air strategy in Europe during the Second World War. I want to concentrate, in particular, on an aspect of that strategy, Operation POINTBLANK, as it was called, the wartime code name for our strategic bombing offensive against the industrial potential of Germany in 1943 and 1944 and especially against the German Air Force. POINTBLANK was itself part and parcel of a larger Anglo-American air effort—the Combined Bomber Offensive—which brought Germany under round-the-clock aerial bombardment by American heavy bombers by daylight and RAF Bomber Command by night. Unfortunately, time does not permit me to examine the massive and important contribution of the RAF's night bombers—the Halifaxes, the Wellingtons, the Lancasters, the Mosquitoes—to the air offensive. In our enthusiasm for the accomplishments of our own bombers, Americans have sometimes underestimated the achievements of Bomber Command. But I have not time to consider them. And I will content myself with noting that the recent appearance of the official history of Bomber Command—*The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1939–1945*, by Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland—has set that record to rights. It was an impressive achievement; and it is an impressive history.
In the time which I have available, it is difficult enough to cover the American side of POINTBLANK in the detail which it deserves. I have called this lecture, perhaps frivolously, "Operation POINTBLANK: A Tale of Bombers and Fighters." If I had wished to be more frivolous still, I might, in the Victorian way, have appended another sub-title: "Don't Look Now—But Your Doctrine Is Showing." There would have been more than a germ of truth in it. POINTBLANK is one of the Air Force's great accomplishments, a famous victory. But it was very far from being a vindication of the Air Force's strategic doctrine. Indeed, because of shortcomings in that doctrine, POINTBLANK came within measurable distance of being a great defeat—even a disaster—for American arms. In this fact lies its continuing interest for the military historian. The weapons and tactics by which it was prosecuted are quite obsolete now, of course. Nevertheless, Operation POINTBLANK still holds some lessons for us for today and, I think, for tomorrow.

Now, POINTBLANK reached its high point—its low point, too—certainly, its crisis, on October 14, 1943. On that day the Eighth Air Force mounted Mission Number 115 against the Franconian city of Schweinfurt, the center of the German anti-friction bearings industry. Schweinfurt and the bearings industry were considered crucial targets for the bomber offensive. In January 1943, the combined British and American Chiefs of Staff had issued a general directive to the bomber commanders—the so-called Casablanca Directive—calling for "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." Among the other target systems which the Directive set up, the German aircraft industry was given top priority. And since bearings played a crucial role in aircraft production, as well as in other sectors of the armament industry, the German bearings industry was given second priority. For a variety of reasons the bearings industry appeared to be vulnerable. It depended to some extent on the importation of Swedish steel which could be choked off. As a high precision industry, its destruction could, it was argued, set up a bottleneck in German armament production. Allied intelligence authorities had estimated that German reserves of bearings were so low that any disruption of the industry would have made its efforts felt immediately on aircraft production. Finally, the industry was highly concentrated geographically; 64% of German production was located in only four cities—Schweinfurt, Berlin-Erkner, Stuttgart, and Leipzig—and 42% of it was in Schweinfurt alone.

The risks of hitting Schweinfurt were known to be great. The Eighth Air Force had attacked it for the first time in August 1943, along with the Messerschmitt fighter assembly plants at Regensburg on the Danube, in the first of the deep penetration raids into Germany by American bomber
forces. The losses then had been serious—60 heavy bombers shot down out of 376 dispatched, a loss rate of about 16%. Schweinfurt clearly was no "milk run." At such extreme range, moreover, it would be impossible to provide fighter escort for the bombers. Even with its newly devised auxiliary fuel tanks, the P-47 Thunderbolt, the main Eighth Air Force fighter during 1943, had a combat radius of action of just over 250 miles. Complicated arrangements with RAF Fighter Command permitted escort to be provided on the first stages of the raid by the short-range British Spitfires, with P-47s taking over and escorting the bombers inland from the Channel Coast. But P-47 range barely sufficed to take the fighters to the German border. The Thunderbolts would be forced to turn back somewhere around Aachen, just inside the German border. After that point, for about three hours, the bombers would be alone in the air over Germany, completely on their own.

The Eighth Air Force did not underestimate these risks. But the targets:
in Schweinfurt were adjudged to be so vital to the success of the Combined Bomber Offensive that the risks were accepted. This estimate of the importance and the vulnerability of the German bearings industry was unfortunately an incorrect one. The raids, though successful as far as bombing results went, had little effect on the German industrial machine. After the war, German experts estimated that even if the bearings industry had been wholly destroyed—and the raids fell far short of that—it could have been rebuilt absolutely from scratch in about four months. But this was not known until after the United States Strategic Bombing Survey had examined the matter. On the basis of the available Allied intelligence in 1943, Schweinfurt appeared to be a target of first importance. Thus, on 14 October, the 1st and 3rd Air Divisions of the Eighth Air Force were committed to the second of the great raids on Schweinfurt—sixteen bomber groups in all, 290 B-17s, and over 2900 aircrew members.

The results were catastrophic. The figures speak for themselves. Out of 291 bombers dispatched, 257 entered the German airspace. Sixty were shot down, just over 20% of the number dispatched. Two hundred twenty-nine bombers reached Schweinfurt and dropped their bombs. One hundred ninety-seven returned to England. After reaching England, five more
bombers were abandoned or crashed upon landing. Seventeen others landed safely, but with such damage that they had to be written off entirely. The total number of B-17s lost, therefore, was 82 of 291, 28.2% of the force dispatched, 60 of them with all the crews. Moreover, of 175 bombers remaining, 142 had sustained damage to a greater or lesser degree. Only 33 bombers landed unscathed, about 12% of the force. It was a hecatomb.

Some of the bomber groups were lightly hit; three of them took no losses. With others, things went harder. The 94th Group lost six bombers out of twenty-one committed. The 92d Group lost seven out of nineteen. The 306th Group lost ten out of eighteen. The 384th Group lost nine out of sixteen, and three more of its bombers crashed on returning to England, although their crews bailed out safely. Hardest hit was the 305th Group, which lost thirteen of its fifteen bombers which reached German airspace. The human casualties were equally heavy. Five complete aircrews were reported killed in action; ten were seriously wounded and thirty-three lightly wounded; 594 men were missing in action, many of them dead—642 casualties among the 2900 aircrew members involved in the mission, over 18%.

Moreover, the Schweinfurt raid was merely the climax of a week of maximum bombing effort which had taken heavy toll of Eighth Air Force planes and crews. Four great raids between October 8 and October 14 had seen a total of 1342 heavy bomber sorties. One hundred fifty-two bombers (11.3%) were lost and another 6% received heavy damage. The casualties for the entire month of October, Eighth Air Force's month of greatest effort up to that time, were equally dire. A total of 214 heavy bombers had been lost during October, almost 10% of the number dispatched. The damage rate was 42% for both major and minor damage. Taken together, losses and damages mounted up to more than half of the credit sorties flown during the month. At this rate, an entirely new bomber force would be required almost every three months in order to maintain the bomber offensive.

Such losses were prohibitive. The Schweinfurt raid has become enshrined in Air Force history in the words which one of the surviving bomber crews applied to it—"Black Thursday." But the second week of October 1943 was, even more, a black week for the heavy bombers; and October was a black month. These losses were real ones. Their symbolic effects—both on aircrew morale and on Air Force strategy—were perhaps more important. For they overthrew the very basis of American air strategy: the belief that unescorted heavy bombers, owing to their strong defensive firepower and the high altitudes at which they operated, could penetrate German airspace on daylight bombing raids without excessive casualties. After Schweinfurt, it was clear that they could not, that the major belief underlying Air Force strategic doctrine had been proven wrong in combat. In higher command circles, as is not seldom the case in military history, an effort was made to put a good face on things. On the day after the raid, VIII Bomber Com-
mand estimated that "it may be possible for the Germans eventually to restore 25% of normal productive capacity but even that will require some time." This estimate was quite wide of the mark; in fact, German bearings production dropped off by only about 5% during the last quarter of 1943, although production losses in certain categories produced by the Schweinfurt plants were as high as 33%. Even these slight losses were quickly made good. But VIII Bomber Command's mistaken estimate was accepted in Washington. On October 18, it was reflected in a press conference called by the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, Gen. H. H. Arnold, who exultantly announced, "Now we have got Schweinfurt!"

To the bomber crews in East Anglia, however, General Arnold appeared to have gotten it backwards. "We have had Schweinfurt" would in their view have been a more accurate way of putting it. As an aircrew member of the 384th Bomb Group, which lost twelve B-17s of sixteen committed to the Schweinfurt raid, wrote on the night after the raid,

It has come to be an accepted fact that you will be shot down eventually. The 384th entered combat four months ago with a combat flying strength of 363 officers and men. In these four months we lost more than we started with. We are just as strong, due to replacements that are continually coming in, but there are few originals left... It is little wonder that the airmen of Grafton Underwood have by this time developed the idea that it is impossible to complete a full tour of duty.

Four days later, at the same time that General Arnold was holding his press conference, at a meeting of VIII Bomber Command wing and group commanders, the Commanding General, Brig. Gen. Fred L. Anderson, in effect, called off the bomber offensive against Germany. "We can afford to come up," he said, "only when we have our fighters with us." One of the bomber crewmen had put the matter less elegantly at his de-briefing after the raid. "Any comments?" the de-briefing officer asked. "Yeah," he said, "Jesus Christ, give us fighters for escort!"

As it turned out, the Air Force was able in the end to provide escort fighters. In February 1944, the Eighth Air Force, after marking time for four months, resumed its penetration raids on Germany with full, or almost full, fighter escort for "the heavies." In Operation ARGUMENT at the end of February—"Big Week," as it has come to be known in Air Force history—VIII Bomber Command launched a series of six major raids within little more than a week, a prolonged and bitter air battle over Germany which was the beginning of the end for the Luftwaffe. In early March, the new P-51
Mustangs of VIII Fighter Command took “the heavies” all the way to Berlin and back. And in the following weeks, VIII Fighter Command grappled with and crushed the German fighter forces. By April 1, 1944, the American Air Forces—the Eighth based in England, the Fifteenth based in Italy—had established command of the air over Germany, never again to lose it. It should be observed that during all this time, under this hail of bombs, German single-engine fighter production, the priority target for POINTBLANK, rose—if not steadily, notably at any rate. Single-engine fighter production for the first quarter of 1944 was 30% higher than for the third quarter of 1943, which we may take as a base figure. In the second quarter of 1944, it doubled; by the third quarter of 1944, it had tripled, in a year’s time. In September 1944, monthly German single-engine fighter production reached its wartime peak—3031 fighter aircraft. Total German single-engine fighter production for 1944 reached the amazing figure of 25,860 ME-109s and FW-190s. Seemingly, German fighter production thrived on bombs.

But in fact, the German fighter force was no more. It had disappeared as an effective combat force in the great air battles following “Big Week.” And on D-Day, Lt. Gen. Werner Junck, commanding Luftwaffe fighters on the invasion coast, had on hand only 160 aircraft, of which only 80 were in operational condition. The entire Luftwaffe effort on D-Day, fighters and bombers alike, mounted to only about 250 combat sorties; it had negligible effect on the invasion forces. By contrast American aircraft mounted the staggering total of 8,722 sorties of all kinds on D-Day. The completeness of our command of the air is attested by the derisory losses taken by this great aerial armada—only 71 aircraft lost from all causes. General Eisenhower could truly say to his invasion forces on the eve of D-Day, “If you see fighting aircraft over you, they will be ours.”

But if it was a famous victory, it was, as concerns the means by which it was wrought, a completely unanticipated one, “an uncovenanted mercy” to rank with Oliver Cromwell’s victory at Preston. For in producing, belatedly, the long-range fighters capable of escorting its heavy bombers, the Air Force surprised itself mightily. Indeed, in doing so, it went against its own better judgment about the character of air war. In retrospect it can be seen—and none of the authorities, I think, dissent from this view—that it was the commitment of the long-range fighter which alone made possible the resumption of the bomber offensive, shelved after Schweinfurt, and which brought about the defeat of the Luftwaffe. The official AAF history concludes its account of “Big Week” as follows:

The Allied victory in the air in early 1944, important as it was, must be considered in the last analysis a by-product of the strategic bombing offensive. It is difficult, however, to escape the conclusion that the air
battles did more to defeat the Luftwaffe than did the destruction of the aircraft factories.

The RAF official history, *The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1939–1945*, puts it more strongly.9

... the achievement of "Big Week" and the subsequent attack on the aircraft industry was to reduce not the production of aircraft but the fighting capacity of the Luftwaffe. The attack on the aircraft industry was, in fact, another example of the failure of selective bombing. ... This combat was provoked by the American heavy bombers which carried the threat of the bomb to the heart of Germany by reaching out to targets of deep penetration and leaving the German fighters with no alternative other than to defend them. But the combat was primarily fought and certainly won by long-range fighters of VIII Fighter Command. ...

If this was the result, it was, however, no part of the plan. From the beginning of the war—indeed, from the 1930's—Air Force opinion about escort fighters had been equivocal in the extreme. The question of escort troubled people, it is true, but mainly because it encroached upon the dominant American, and, one might add, British, ideas about what an Air Force should be. It was studied time and again by one pursuit board after another between 1935 and 1942. But the conclusions, which were always the same until mid-1943, were essentially as follows: escort might be desirable but, in view of the defensive capabilities of the heavy bomber, it would probably be unnecessary; in any event, it was technically impossible, or nearly so; and even if it were not quite impossible to provide long-range escort, fighters could not conceivably do the job.

If this seems an odd set of conclusions—and it was, in the light of what happened later—there were strong arguments in their support, nevertheless, and almost nobody in the American Air Corps or the RAF dissented from them. To see why this should be so, we must turn back for a moment to consider the evolution of the doctrine of air war during the 1930's.10 At the time, this was the responsibility of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, which, despite its somewhat misleading title, served in fact as the Air War College. Our air doctrine emerged during the 1930's at the hands of a group of young captains and majors who made up the ACTS faculty and whose names form a kind of roster of the Army Air Force's high command during the Second World War. Their studies and speculations produced a coherent approach to strategy which rested upon an interlocking set of beliefs—or, if you will, assumptions—about air warfare.

Foremost, and basic, the ACTS faculty outlined a new approach to war, a new view of what war is and what its proper objects should be. This view,
although a novel one, reflected fairly accurately the experience of the first World War, itself novel among wars, and foreshadowed that of the second World War. It was, in a word, the concept of "total war." This concept, while not held only by airmen, was certainly most attractive to them. It rested on a refusal to make any distinction, from the point of view of strategy, between the armed forces of the enemy and the civilian population and industrial structure which support those armed forces. Under conditions of total war, it was argued, the latter constitute as legitimate an objective of military action as do his armed forces; under certain circumstances, they can be a far more profitable objective. As the first World War had shown, the military are directly and heavily dependent upon the civilian economy. The modern industrial economy is a very complex and delicately balanced mechanism, its operations marked by a high degree of specialization of function. Specialization, in the view of these airmen, was at once the strong point of the modern industrial economy, providing as it does a high degree of efficiency—and its weak point. For vital industrial functions may be, and often are, concentrated in two or three factories; if their production were knocked out by aerial bombing, or even seriously impaired, the effects on the enemy economy might be serious and could, at their worst, lead to something like industrial paralysis.

Thus, the emergence of air power, it was argued, presented an entirely new means of defeating the enemy. There was, it is true, some confusion in the minds of these airmen about the precise strategic implications of this new weapon. From one point of view, the effects of air bombardment might be considered indirect in their operation; bombing might be aimed, indirectly, at reducing the fighting efficiency of enemy military forces by action against the home front, softening up the enemy for the kill, so to speak, by one's own armed forces. This was, in fact, the air strategy pursued by the Western Allies in the war against Germany. During the 1930's, however, and during much of the second World War, most airmen preferred to think in terms of a direct air strategy—direct in the sense that it was aimed straight at the sources of enemy military power, his industrial economy, not at its periphery, his military forces. Strategic bombing, it was argued, could have such powerful effects on enemy supply and armament production and on civilian morale as greatly to reduce our dependence on conventional forces—armies and navies—for the prosecution of our strategy. Indeed, not a few airmen believed that air power might make armies and navies obsolete.11

On one key point, however, there was general agreement: an air force need not meet and defeat the enemy air force before going on to the bombardment and destruction of his industrial economy. This belief was put most clearly by the commander of the RAF, Lord Hugh Trenchard, in a memorandum entitled "The War Object of an Air Force," which he laid before his colleagues on the British Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1928.17
It is not necessary . . . for an air force, in order to defeat the enemy nation, to defeat its armed forces first. Air power can dispense with that intermediate step, can pass over the enemy navies and armies, and penetrate the air defenses and attack the centers of production, transportation and communications from which the enemy war effort is maintained.

This does not mean that air fighting will not take place. On the contrary, intense air fighting will be inevitable but it will not take the form of a series of battles between the opposing air forces to gain supremacy as a first step before the victor proceeds to the attack of other objectives. . . .

For his main operation each belligerent will set out to attack direct those objectives which he considers most vital to the enemy. Each will penetrate the defenses of the other to a certain degree. The stronger side, by developing the more powerful offensive, will provoke in his weaker enemy increasingly insistent calls for the protective employment of aircraft. In this way he will throw the enemy onto the defensive and it will be in this manner that air superiority will be obtained, and not by direct destruction of air forces. The gaining of air superiority will be incidental to this main direct offensive upon the enemy's vital centers and simultaneous with it.

It was all put more succinctly by a member of the ACTS faculty, Capt. Harold L. George, who later was to command the Air Transport Command during the second World War. "The spectacle of huge air forces meeting in the air," he wrote in 1935, "is the figment of imagination of the uninitiated."

The implications of this view are worthy of note, for they were to loom very large over Air Force plans and intentions during 1943. They may be summed up as follows: it might be necessary to fight to defend one's right to exploit the air for offensive purposes, but it would not be necessary to fight to assert it. This opinion was reinforced by another view which reflected fairly accurately the fighting experience of airmen during the first World War; the proper, indeed, the only profitable, employment of an air force was the offensive. Air fighting in 1915–1918 had clearly shown the weakness of a defensive posture in air war. Possession of the initiative in war has always permitted great economies of force; in air fighting during the first World War those economies had been doubled and redoubled. An air defense, it was found, required forces utterly disproportionate to those required for the offense. There were many examples to support this view. The experience of the French Air Force during the Battle of Verdun is a case in point. But it is seen most clearly in the oft-quoted effects of the random German bombing attacks against England in 1916–1918. The Royal Flying Corps in 1916–1917 had employed sixteen fighter squadrons against the German Zeppelin at-
MILITARY THOUGHT AND REFORM

tacks. Against the German Gotha bomber squadrons, which never numbered more than forty aircraft in all, the British were forced to commit 159 day fighters, 123 night fighters, 266 antiaircraft guns, 353 searchlights, as well as a commitment of personnel for manning barrage balloons. In terms of aircraft, the ratio between the defensive and the offensive effort was as 7 to 1. In terms of total effort, it was much higher.

Improvements in bomber design during the 1930's, moreover, appeared greatly to increase the inherent strategic advantages of the aerial offensive. The American B-9, B-12, and B-17 were very little, if any, slower than the American fighters of the day. With its great speed, the bomber was considered to be unstoppable in these days before the development of radar had revolutionized air defense. Fighters, it was estimated, required a speed advantage of 40 to 50% over the bomber in order to maneuver successfully against it. In tests against the B-12, the old P-12 Hawks, and the Boeing P-26s they had nothing like that advantage. These tests were by no means conclusive proof of the superiority of bomber over fighter. Capt. Claire Chennault, ACTS instructor in pursuit tactics, criticized them vigorously and, on the whole, not unfairly for “sticking the deck” against the fighters. But Chennault’s protests, however, went unheeded. And the lessons of the 1930’s, as they were read by most airmen of the day, were summed up in the comments of one faculty member of ACTS,

Military airmen of all nations agree that a determined air attack, once launched, is most difficult if not impossible to stop. . . . The only way to prevent an air attack is to stop it before it gets started—by destruction of the bombers on the ground.

All this being so, the bomber, it seemed, was the basic air force weapon. It was the most economical instrument of air power. It gave, it was widely believed at the time, promise of gaining a rapid decision in war by striking directly at the enemy’s productive machine and the morale of his civilian population. It appeared, moreover, to be almost invulnerable to the defense. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Stanley Baldwin, expressed a widely held opinion when, in 1934, he observed, “The bomber will always get through.”

Finally, there was the question of escort for the bombers. The Air Force’s ideas on the matter followed logically enough from the foregoing. They were wrong—but they were logical. For one thing, the need for escorting bombers, as one Air Corps study board of the 1930’s put it, “has not as yet been thoroughly demonstrated.” It was generally felt that the high altitude, the speed, and the defensive fire power of the modern bomber would permit it to defend itself successfully, in formations, against enemy interceptors. Nevertheless, the matter was kept under study by a succession of pursuit boards and committees of one kind and another set up between 1935

451
and 1942. From all these studies two main conclusions emerged which—unfortunately—became imbedded in American air doctrine. First, it appeared that the performance standards requisite for an escort fighter were such as to make it a technical impossibility. This sentiment made its first appearance in the report of a board set up in 1935 to establish performance standards and specifications for pursuit aircraft in light of the recent breakthroughs in bomber design and performance. This board prescribed the following specifications for escort pursuit planes:

1. construction safety factors at least as high as those required for interceptors.
2. top speed at least 25% greater than that of bombardment aircraft.
3. range at least as great as that of bombardment aircraft.
4. service ceilings as high, preferably higher than, those of bombardment aircraft.
5. a high rate of climb.

From all this, the 1935 Board came to the puzzling conclusion that such a plane "would apparently be larger than the bomber," requiring three engines rather than the two engines customary on bomber aircraft at that time. Clearly, it seemed, such an aircraft would not have the performance characteristics of a fighter plane.15 Most of the subsequent pursuit boards came to the same perplexing conclusion. Another study undertaken in 1940 concluded its treatment of escort fighters with the following words:16

It is obvious that no fighter airplane can be designed to escort medium and heavy bombardment to their extreme tactical radius of action and then engage in offensive combat with enemy interceptor fighter types on equal terms. Therefore the most that can be accomplished in this respect is to provide an escort fighter which will augment the defensive fire power of the bombardment formation, especially at the rear where it is most vulnerable to attack by hostile interceptors.

RAF experience during the early stages of the air fighting in Europe appeared to support these recommendations. Col. Ira Eaker, later Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force, on a visit to the United Kingdom in 1940 found the British skeptical of long-range fighters. During the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, British fighters had found that the German ME-110s and ME-210s, designed as penetration escort fighters, were "cold meat" for their Spitfires and Hurricanes. And their own Typhoons and Tornados had proven unable to contend on equal terms with ME-109s. On the basis of this experience the British strongly advised against the development of what they called a "compromise fighter." The best that could be done, the British Chief of Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, told Eaker, was an escort plane "built exactly like a bomber... [designed to] surround
bombardment formations and carry guns as heavy as any which enemy fighters could bring against them."

This view was reflected in the recommendations of the last Air Force board to study the question before American entry into the war—a board on which Colonel Eaker sat as a member along with Col. Frank O'D. Hunter, who, in 1942, was to find himself leading VIII Fighter Command in England. Its conclusions on the escort fighter followed in the well-trodden paths of all the earlier studies. The board conceded that “only with the assistance of such an airplane may bombardment aviation hope to successfully deliver daylight attacks deep inside the enemy territory and beyond the range of interceptor support.” Despite this, it did not recommend development of such an airplane.

The Board [their report concluded] is unable to say whether or not the project is worthwhile and can only point out the need for furnishing day bombardment with the very maximum attainable defensive power if that form of attack is to be chosen to gain a decision in war against any other modern power.

As a result, the board recommended for escort aircraft a sixth priority among the other fighter types in development at the time, late 1941. Under the circumstances of the time, sixth priority, of course, was tantamount to no priority at all.18

The conclusions of all these prewar studies may be summed up in a word: for technical reasons, only a bomber could escort bombers. This, it should be emphasized, was nearly the unanimous opinion of both British and American airmen. Furthermore, as the RAF official history puts it:19

The incentive to grapple with the formidable technical problems involved in the production of an effective long-range fighter was, perhaps, blunted not only by the authoritative opinion that the task was impossible, but also by the suspicion that it was unnecessary. The belief still lingered that heavy bombers might yet be cast into self-defending formations capable of carrying the war to the interior of Germany in daylight.

From this, too, flowed another conclusion about the role of escorts which was to hamper American fighter operations until well into 1944—and which until the present time has prevented us from grasping fully the role which the fighter played in the defeat of the Luftwaffe. Almost all American airmen looked upon the bomber as the dominant instrument of air warfare. This being so, the role of the fighter could only be regarded—and was regarded—as second in importance to that of the bomber. And the tactical function of escort aircraft was envisaged as basically a defensive,
even a passive, one. This view was put very clearly in the report of the 1940 Pursuit Board which defined the function of escort in the following words:

... to follow or accompany the particular unit being supported and to provide air security for the escorted force. This task involves defensive action against fighter aircraft.

"Defensive action against fighter aircraft," unavoidably, is somewhat ostrich-like. There is question as to whether it can be considered to be "action" at all. But the Pursuit Boards did not blink at the paradox. Still another board, set up in 1941, stated the matter in plain language. What was required, in its view, was a "convoy defender." Its report, indeed, made an explicit distinction between the "convoy defender" and the long-range fighter whose functions, as it envisaged them, were the maintenance of air alerts and distant patrols, support of ground forces and intruder operations.20

The same view found its way into the Air Force's basic war plan—AWPD/1—drawn up in the summer of 1941.

Escort must be designed to fill one role: defense against hostile pursuit. The escort fighters would initially take positions on the flanks and rear of the bombardment formations. When combat was forced these planes would be maneuvered to positions where the maximum hostile pursuit attack was developing. In substance the escort fighters would be so disposed that hostile pursuit could not attack the bombardment formation with impunity without first passing through the fire of the fighters or without first disposing of them.

Escort's function, thus, was a simple one—to get shot down first. This was not an attractive function, of course. It was not deemed a very important one, either. AWPD/1 called for procurement of thirteen experimental models—modified bombers "designed solely for defensive purposes"; its recommendations on this topic, however, were ignored. When it was revised with the publication of AWPD/42, dated September 9, 1942, which reflected the early combat experience of the B-17 in England, the matter of escort for heavy bombers was not even mentioned as such. It was estimated that American day bombers, without escort could bomb Germany with losses that would probably not exceed 300 bombers in all. This, of course, was considerably less than the number of heavy bombers shot down over Germany in September and October 1943 alone.

Thus, summing up the effects of doctrine on American air strategy in Europe, we may say that for reasons of both a strategic and a technical character—which, incidentally, supported or seemed to support each other—the bomber was regarded as the main, perhaps the sufficient,
weapon. It was given every priority. The fighter was given an ancillary role, at best. Its functions were adjudged to be entirely defensive in character. And despite certain reservations about the vulnerability of the B-17 and the B-24 to enemy fighter attack, the Air Force made no provision for an escort fighter. On no point was American air doctrine more clear-cut. On no point was it to prove so wrong.

III

The crisis of 1943— which culminated in the Schweinfurt raid in October, but which had been building up steadily during the preceding months— brought a rude awakening. Some bomber commanders were slower than others to see the handwriting on the wall. As late as July 1943, one Eighth Air Force bombardment wing commander could write, 21

There is no question in my mind as to the eventual result. VIII Bomber Command is destroying and will continue to destroy the economic resources of Germany to such an extent that I personally believe that no invasion of the Continent or Germany proper will ever have to take place.

He felt this despite the fact that a month earlier, on VIII Bomber Command’s first raid into Germany (on Bremen and Kiel), his own Wing had lost twenty-two aircraft out of sixty attacking—37% of his force— to German fighter attack. And VIII Bomber Command as a whole had lost 16% of its attacking force, while over 70% of the returning bombers had been damaged.

Old ideas die hard. But this kind of thinking became increasingly rare in the Eighth Air Force as the summer of 1943 wore on. The hard knock over Kiel— “a sobering defeat,” as the AAF official history calls it— was the first which the Eighth Air Force had taken. It was to prove merely the first of a series of hard knocks. VIII Bomber Command, it is true, had taken serious losses in its earlier operations against French and German coastal targets. Its combat losses for the six months January through June 1943 had averaged 6.6%, and the damage rate averaged 35.5% in those months. Those losses, however, could be explained away—and they were explained away. Owing to the diversion of heavy bombers to the Pacific and the Mediterranean theaters the build-up of VIII Bomber Command’s “heavies” had lagged far behind the anticipated rate. During the first half of 1943, it had risen slowly from six bomber groups in January to thirteen in June, and its effective operational strength was little more than 200 heavy bombers at the end of the period. A force of this size, it was argued, could not commit bomber formations large enough to provide their own defense or to mount diversionary operations in order to decoy and pin down the Luftwaffe fighter
### Eighth Air Force Combat Availabilities, 1943*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Groups at End of Month</th>
<th>Hvy Bomber Groups</th>
<th>Fighter Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 31, 1943</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 28, 1943</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 31, 1943</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 30, 1943</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31, 1943</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 31, 1943</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31, 1943</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 31, 1943</td>
<td>16+</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 30, 1943</td>
<td>20+</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 31, 1943</td>
<td>20+</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 30, 1943</td>
<td>21+</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 31, 1943</td>
<td>25+</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Eighth Air Force Heavy Bomber Availability: Daily Average by Month (1943)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>In-Theater</th>
<th>In Tactical Units</th>
<th>Fully Operational in Tactical Units</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Available</th>
<th>Effective Combat Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>1085</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>1503</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>1556</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

forces. In this matter, as is so often the case in military history, bomber commanders relied on a "magic number"—300 bombers. A smaller number, it was felt, was bound to get hurt by the German fighters. As Gen. Eaker had written to General Arnold in October 1942, Eighth Air Force commanders were "absolutely convinced that . . . 300 heavy bombers can attack any target in Germany with less than 4% losses." Until attacks on that scale had been attempted—and this had been impossible before July 1943—the bomber commanders were inclined to discount the significance of the losses on their early operations.

Their optimism was bolstered by another notion—the notion of the German "fighter belt," as the phrase went. In 1942 and early 1943, it is true, the main German fighter defenses had been concentrated forward, on the coastline of France and the Low Countries. From these forward positions the Luftwaffe fighters had put up a stiff and unyielding defense. But once the "fighter belt" had been penetrated, it was felt, German resistance further inland would not be so stiff. If "the heavies" could be provided with enough fighter escort to break the "fighter belt," they might thereafter range at will over Germany. Operations in March 1943, particularly the successful and lightly contested bombing of Vegesack on March 18, on which only two "heavies" were lost out of 97 dispatched, seemed to bear out this view. Gen. Carl Spaatz reflected the widespread optimism in Eighth Air Force circles after Vegesack when he wrote to Eaker on April 8, 1943:

I am just as convinced as ever that the operations of the day bombers, if applied in sufficient force from the United Kingdom, cannot be stopped by any means the enemy now has and your more recent raids should have gone a long way toward demonstrating that fact to the more persistent unbelievers.

In July 1943, both these ideas were tested and found wanting. Three hundred-bomber raids became possible for the first time, and, also for the first time, limited penetrations of German airspace were attempted. German fighter defenses, however, were found to be even stiffer than they had been previously. Cannon-firing ME-109s proved more than a match for the B-17s with their defensive 50-caliber machine guns. New fighter tactics—particularly the overhead pass and the head-on pass by cannon firing, and later in the year, rocket firing German fighters—easily penetrated the bombers' defensive boxes and on some occasions broke them up completely. It became clear, too, that the Luftwaffe fighters were under continuous control by radar-equipped ground control stations capable of pursuing systematic and elaborate defensive strategies which VIII Bomber Command had no means of countering at that time. There was no German "fighter belt." Rather, there was an elaborate fighter grid, disposed in great depth.
backwards from the coast, and capable of deploying large—and growing—
fighter forces over wide areas and directing their operations with great flexi-
bility. The Luftwaffe could not stop the raids; it is rightfully the proud boast
of VIII Bomber Command that German opposition never turned its heavy
bombers away from their assigned targets. But it was becoming increasingly
clear that the German fighter defenses could impose—and were imposing—
heavy and growing losses on the bomber formations, approaching 50% in
certain cases.

During the summer months of 1943, the air battles over Germany—
over the fringes of Germany, it should be emphasized, for VIII Bomber
Command attempted no deep penetrations of Germany until August 1943—
were taking on precisely the character which American air strategists had
least expected. Air warfare was developing into attrition war on a large scale,
larger than American air planners had ever foreseen. The prize was mastery
of the air over Germany. And the German fighters, if they were not winning
the air battle, did not appear to be losing it. As a consequence, VIII Bomber
Command combat losses rose seriously in the latter half of 1943. In July,
losses were 6.8%; the damage rate was 62.5%, some serious, some trivial. In
August, during the first half of which VIII Bomber Command, exhausted
by its efforts in July, slackened its operations, losses, nevertheless, remained
at 6.5%, and the damage rate was 31.5%. And in October, POINTBLANK
reached its crisis; in that month, as we have seen, VIII Bomber Command’s
losses reached a prohibitive level—9.9% of its bombers were shot down or
crashed and 41.7% sustained damages. After Schweinfurt, no more penetra-
tion raids were attempted.

In this rising crisis, it is difficult, studying the historical record, not to
feel that there occurred something like a breakdown of communications, or
of understanding, at any rate, between Air Force Headquarters in Washing-
ton and the commanders in the field. It is not an easy thing for the historian
to lay his finger on. One does sense among at least some of the bomber
commanders in England a mood of urgency, a sense of approaching crisis
for the POINTBLANK strategy, which seems not to have communicated
itself fully to Washington and which, to the extent that it did, was not fully
appreciated there. This is partly attributable, perhaps, to a lack of candor
on the part of the bomber commanders. Military men are usually loath to
burden their superior officers with their own troubles. General Arnold, for
his part, was a commander who was apparently less willing to be burdened
with others’ troubles than another commanding general might have been. It
is attributable also to a natural unwillingness of the bomber commanders in
England to admit that their ideas about strategic air power, and the official
estimates of the situation which for more than a year they had forwarded
back to Washington, had not worked out in practice. Partly, too, the bomber
commanders’ picture of the air battles was distorted by the exaggerated
claims of VIII Bomber Command crews in regard to numbers of enemy fighters shot down in action. On the October Schweinfurt raid, for example, bomber crews claimed 186 enemy fighters destroyed; the actual German losses were 38. Claims such as these were the usual thing and led the bomber commanders greatly to overestimate the attrition their raids were imposing on the Luftwaffe.

Whatever the motives behind the actions of the Eighth Air Force commanders, their explanations of VIII Bomber Command's losses between June and October 1943 do not seem, in afterlight, to reflect accurately the dimensions of the approaching crisis of POINTBLANK. In dispatch after dispatch they characterized the German successes as, in effect, the last gasp of the Luftwaffe. Thus, in his Tactical Mission Report after the raid on Kiel in June, one bombardment wing commander called the German reaction "a desperate but vain attempt to stop daylight bombing."

This suicidal defense by the German fighter force [he wrote] will quickly attrite the one opposing factor of any consequence to our heavy bombardment forces. As our bombardment force grows, successive and relentless destruction of German war installations will be accomplished.

If the experience of the succeeding months failed to bear out this conviction, the idea, nevertheless, had firmly lodged itself at Air Force Headquarters in Washington. Indeed, on October 14, the day of the second Schweinfurt raid, Arnold cabled Eaker that, according to the evidence as it appeared in Washington, the Luftwaffe was on the verge of collapse, and Eaker, on the next day, supported that estimate. "There is not the slightest question," he wrote, "but that we now have our teeth in the Hun Air Force's neck." He likened the German defense of Schweinfurt to "the last final struggle of a monster in his death throes."24

At the same time there was a growing awareness, by no means yet clear-cut, that in some way or another fighter escort had to be provided for the heavy bombers. In June, in the aftermath of the Kiel raid, Eaker had mentioned long-range fuel tanks for fighters as only his third greatest need. On the other hand, he convinced Mr. Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, who visited England during the same month, that development of a long-range fighter, specifically the P-47, should take a commanding priority; and on his return to Washington, Lovett gave that program the first vigorous push it had yet received. The summer raids further highlighted the importance of fighter protection. VIII Fighter Command disposed only three or four fighter groups during those months, and fighter combat radius, as we have seen, was severely limited. Even so, the effects of fighter escort on the bombers' losses were formidable and unarguable. Statistics produced by Eighth Air Force's Operational Research Section in early au-
tumn 1943 showed that an unescorted bomber mission took seven times the losses and two and a half times the damage sustained by missions given full fighter escort and that a partially escorted bomber mission took five times the loss and twice the damage sustained by fully escorted ones. These statistics were based on thirty-eight missions mounted during July, August, and September 1943; the figures for October, when they became available, were even more persuasive.  

Bomber commanders were fully aware of these facts. They demanded and got fighter escort whenever it was available. All bomber missions into France and the Low Countries were given full escort and American fighter pilots—the “little friends,” as they were known—found a warmer welcome from their “big friends” in the skies over German-held territory than they had always received in bomber group bars and grills. But despite the fact that Germany was a more difficult target, only peripheral fighter escort could be provided for the penetration raids. RAF Spitfires and VIII Fighter Command P-38s took them across the Channel; Thunderbolts took them inland as far as they were able. After that point—roughly the western border of Germany—the bombers were getting worked over pretty thoroughly by Luftwaffe fighters. In some respects, it must be conceded, the German fighter forces were at their “last gasp”; despite their triumphs of late 1943, weaknesses already were apparent to the German fighter commanders which, under the relentless VIII Fighter Command pressure in 1944, brought the collapse of the Luftwaffe. Without that pressure, however, they might never have manifested themselves. In any event, these weaknesses were not apparent to VIII Bomber Command aircrews at the time. After Schweinfurt they, too, knew something about “last gasps.”  

By autumn 1943, it was clear that, whatever prewar doctrine may have said, escort fighters alone could salvage Operation POINTBLANK. Although the need was urgent, it cannot be said that the actions taken to deal with it were. This was partly attributable to the old ideas about the “convoy defender,” the belief that only a bomber could escort bombers. Much time was wasted in development of the YB-40, a modified B-17 with heavier armor and armament. This program had been set on foot by the recommendations of an Eighth Air Force board set up in August 1942 to study, with the usual results, the familiar problem of escort. It was pursued with top priorities during late 1942 and early 1943, and much was expected of the aircraft. Twelve YB-40s were delivered to VIII Bomber Command in late May 1943. They quickly proved a complete failure. They could not climb at the same rate as the B-17s, nor could they keep pace with them, especially after the bombing runs had been completed. And, with only 20% more firepower than the B-17, they were ineffective against enemy fighters. On July 1, 1943, General Eaker requested discontinuance of the YB-40 project. When Washington proposed that similar modification be attempted to make
the B-26 into a "convoy defender," Eaker opposed the project and it was ultimately dropped.26

The YB-40, that belated obeisance to prewar doctrine, while it had no other effects, did serve for a time to divert attention from two projects that did promise, and ultimately produced, relief for the heavy bombers—range extension development for the P-47, and later, the emergence of the greatest "dark horse" of the war, the P-51 Mustang. The issue of range extension turned on two matters: an increase in the internal fuel tankage of the P-47, a problem solved easily enough, and the development of external, droppable fuel tanks suitable for combat. Now, auxiliary fuel tanks were not an easy problem technically. What is more important, the question got bogged down in perhaps the most thorough Air Force bureaucratic muddle of the second World War. As early as October 1942, Eighth Air Force had inquired whether jettisonable fuel tanks could be made available for the P-47. Nothing came of the request. In February 1943, an Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Brig Gen. Benjamin Chidlaw, requested information from the Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson Field about the status of the P-47 belly tank program, among others. It is not clear from the record what response was forthcoming to this request from Wright-Patterson, but it is clear that little was accomplished up to June 29, 1943, when AMC belatedly held a final design conference on P-47 auxiliary tanks, among others under develop-
MILITARY THOUGHT AND REFORM

ment. On August 8, 1943, however, AMC had to confess that although some experimental types had been completed, none were yet available for use in operational theaters.

Meanwhile, VIII Fighter Command had developed its own belly tanks by means of contracts with local suppliers, despite shortages of materials in England which forced the English suppliers to fabricate the tanks out of a kind of cardboard. V Fighter Command did the same, producing amid the New Guinea jungles—presumably from old Spam cans—an auxiliary tank for P-47s superior to that produced, belatedly, by Wright-Patterson. General Arnold, who himself had only lately seen the importance of combat range extension, was disconsolate at this. "There is no reason in God's world," he wrote, "why General Kenney should have to develop his own belly tanks. If he can develop one over there in two months, we should be able to develop one here in the States in one month." In fact, it took eleven months. Not until Mr. Lovett's return from England in June 1943, was the program pursued with any urgency. Even so, it was pursued by fits and starts; in September 1943, it was found that monthly production of the 150-gallon belly tanks for the P-47 was only 300, as against Eighth Air Force requests for 22,000. Not until December 1943 did production begin to approximate the plangent and obvious needs of the situation. All these delays in a program so long under development and so vital to our air strategy are inexplicable—and indefensible. Materiel development should anticipate and forestall the needs of field commanders; at least, it should seek to accommodate them. In the matter of auxiliary tanks, the Air Materiel Command lagged far behind events and, for that matter, explicit requirements. It is difficult to dissent from the opinion of Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody, who examined the matter for General Arnold in August 1943 and reported that "it indicates a lack of forward thinking."

The effects of increased internal tankage and auxiliary tanks on the combat capabilities of the P-47s were extraordinary. On its first entrance into action on escort missions, on May 4, 1943, the Thunderbolt's range had been about 175 miles; its deepest penetration prior to the development, by VIII Air Service Command, of English-produced auxiliary tanks had been on July 17 when "Jugs" had taken the bombers as far as Amsterdam, about 200 miles. On July 28, using the British cardboard tanks—which restricted altitude to 22,000 feet—they went all the way to Emmerich, 260 miles: from their bases, an exploit which greatly discomfited German fighter controllers and, even more, German fighter pilots who encountered them for the first time so far inland. On September 27, the longlegged "Jugs" proved their mettle and underlined the importance of escort. On that day, they took the B-17s all the way to Flak-laden and back. As a result, bomber losses on that mission were only 3% of the attacking force, far below the prevailing averages. By March 1944, the combat range of the P-47s had been extended all
The P-47D, an enhanced P-47 with greater internal fuel capacity (National Air and Space Museum).

the way to Helmstedt, over 400 miles from their bases in East Anglia. By January 1944, indeed, most of Western Germany had come within P-47 range. This was crucial. The February air battles, which saved Operation POINTBLANK, were fought almost entirely by Thunderbolts. And they remained the Eighth Air Force's workhorse fighter until gradually supplanted by the P-51 during the summer of 1944. I hope you will not take it as merely the maunderings of a former "Jug" pilot if I observe that it was the "Jug" that first put the German Fighter Command back on its heels. Others were to exploit the victory; the P-47 won it.

But the real "dark horse," of course, was the P-51. Its history comprises one of the strangest stories of the war. The fact is that in the P-51, the Air Force, without knowing it, had all the time, had at its disposal what was to prove the finest fighter of the war. In its origins the P-51 - or the Mustang, as it is perhaps more proper to call it, in view of its parentage — was a British project. During the winter of 1939-1940 the RAF, anxious to extend its purchases of the P-40 Tomahawk, approached the North American Aviation Corporation with a view to getting North American to produce the P-40 on contract from its prime contractor, Curtiss-Wright. North American countered the British request by offering to design a fighter on its own, which it proceeded to do in the remarkably short time of 117 days. The result was the Mustang, which the RAF purchased in modest numbers from 1941 onwards and which it used as a tactical support fighter for the ground forces, a task for which it was not, in fact, well suited. As a matter of courtesy, the Air Force received two Mustangs for experimental purposes. It was not impressed. However, in 1942 - partly with an eye to employment
conditions in Inglewood, California, where the Mustang was built—the AAF ordered some hundreds of Mustangs, which it converted into a dive bomber, designated the A-36 Invader, and used with indifferent success in the Mediterranean theater during 1943.

In truth, the Mustang’s performance with its original power plant, the GM Allison engine, was not sensational. But the RAF saw possibilities in it. In the summer of 1942, they dropped a Rolls-Royce Merlin 61 into the Mustang—and the results were sensational. In October 1942, shortly after the first Merlin Mustang flew, our assistant Air Attache in London, Maj. Tommy Hitchcock, the old ten-goal international polo player, tried it out. He immediately reported to Washington that the Merlin Mustang was “one of the best, if not the best, fighter airframe that has been developed in the war up to date”; it compared favorably, he reported, with the Spitfire, currently considered the world’s best fighter. Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the RAF Fighter Commander, and Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker confirmed Hitchcock’s report so strongly, indeed, that President Roosevelt himself, that notable fighter plane expert, took an interest in the matter. The AAF thereupon ordered 2200 P-51Bs, as the first model of the Merlin Mustang was designated, in November 1942. Even so, its development was not pushed with any sense of urgency, and it was lost in the shuffle for reasons which Tommy Hitchcock summed up in horseman’s language: “sired by the British out of an American mother, the Mustang has no parent in the AAF or at Wright Field to appreciate and push its good points.”

Not until the summer of 1943 was much done about the P-51. In June 1943, Mr. Lovett returned from England convinced by Eaker and Gen. “Monk” Hunter, VIII Fighter Commander, that the development of escort fighters was vital to the success of the bombing offensive. At Lovett’s insistence, General Arnold on June 28, 1943, ordered the whole question of escort fighters to be gone into thoroughly for the first time since our entry into the war. Moreover, he ordered the development—by modification of existing types, if possible; “from scratch,” as he put it, if necessary—of a long-range fighter capable of accompanying the heavy bombers all the way to their targets and back. Lovett, reflecting VIII Fighter Command opinions, seems to have looked to the P-47 as the most likely answer to the escort problem. General Arnold thought the P-38 might be the item. The matter was turned over to Col. Mervin Gross, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Materiel, Maintenance and Distribution, who initiated an examination of all fighter aircraft considered capable of being modified for use as escort fighters. Colonel Gross’s report, on July 3, 1943, highlighted for the first time the possibilities of the P-51, despite all the earlier talk about its excellence. Performance tests at Elgin Field revealed that the Mustang was, indeed, a superior aircraft, far superior, in fact, to its German counterparts. It was 50 m.p.h. faster than the FW-190 at altitudes up to 28,000 feet, about
The P-51D also boasted increased internal fuel storage and, in this case, external wing tanks for added range (National Air and Space Museum).

70 m.p.h. faster above that altitude. It was 30 m.p.h. faster than the ME-109G at 16,000 feet and 50 m.p.h. faster at 30,000 feet. It could outdive the FW-190 at any altitude and could outdive the ME-109G in prolonged dives. It clearly out-turned the ME-109 and was marginally superior to the FW-190. Only in rate of roll was it adjudged slightly inferior to the FW-190, though not the ME-109.

If its performance was remarkable, the P-51's range was even more so. In its original form, built to British specifications, its combat radius had been less than 200 miles. Increases in internal tankage and external wing tanks greatly extended its range. In its first escort mission for VIII Fighter Command, on December 13, 1943, the Mustang took "the heavies" all the way to Kiel and back, a combat radius of 490 miles, the record escort mission to that date. In March 1944, it accompanied the bombers all the way to Berlin, 560 miles from its bases, and back. By mid-1944 it could take them as far as Polish and Silesian targets. By the end of the war in Europe, indeed, the P-51 had a longer combat radius of action than did the B-17.

It all makes an amazing and instructive story—the history of the P-51. It should warn us against using the word "impossible" too quickly. It should warn us, too, against accepting too easily and too completely the teachings of doctrine. For the conclusion is irresistible that it is prewar doctrine as much as technical and production difficulties—probably, in fact, more than these—that deprived the Air Force of a long-range escort fighter. The P-51, after all, had been there the whole while. It was only at a very late date,
when crisis and defeat loomed, that it was noticed. And we may say of the P-51, as the Duke of Wellington said of the Battle of Waterloo, “It has been a damned serious business . . . the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life . . . !”

IV

With the emergence of the P-47 and the P-51, VIII Fighter Command got the tools with which to do the job. It finished that job with extraordinary rapidity once it set its hand to it. The defeat of the German Air Force before D-Day is, indeed, the classic example of the fragility, the inherent instability, of command of the air. Between January and June 1944, the Luftwaffe suffered the fate which RAF Fighter Command might have suffered—and came very near suffering—in the Battle of Britain. The margin which separates defeat from victory in air warfare is closer even than it is in other forms of war. In January 1944, the Luftwaffe fighter defenses, fresh from their triumphs of October, were supreme. In that month, General Marshall reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that, thus far, the Combined Bomber Offensive had hit only about 20% of its assigned targets, only five months before the invasion of Normandy was scheduled to go ashore. By June 1944, the Luftwaffe was a defeated air force. Until the end of the war it retained its ability to hit and to hurt severely the bomber formations. But increasingly it had to call its shots. After the “Big Week” air battles, it ceded the initiative to VIII and XV Fighter Commands.

The American fighters exploited their opportunities to the full. This, it should be emphasized, was not the result of any specific strategic decision. It was the result, rather, of tactical decisions made on the spot by fighter group combat leaders. At the same time that fighter combat ranges were being increased, the numbers of American fighter planes in the European Theater had gradually increased. From four fighter groups in July 1943, VIII Fighter Command rose to ten groups—750 aircraft—by December 1943, and thirteen groups, including only two P-51 groups, by February 1944. With their greater strength, the fighter leaders began to lay less emphasis on escorting the bombers and more on chasing and harrying the German fighters. Commencing in January 1944, fighter groups began to divide their forces between defensive and offensive missions; one squadron hung about to give close escort to “the heavies” while the remaining two squadrons ranged far afield, seeking combat with enemy interceptors on our terms, not theirs. These tactics produced quick results. They confused German fighter controllers, who found it increasingly difficult to read the patterns of American air operations as they developed. By hitting German fighter airfields, American fighters made it difficult for the Germans to fly second sorties against the same raids, a tactic on which much of their
previous success had rested. Most important, after January 1944, these tactics imposed an increasingly heavy wastage on German fighter units, both on the ground and in the air.

The new fighter tactics were the cause of some rather sour and certainly shortsighted criticism from the bomber groups. One bombardment group commander forwarded a complaint which summed up an all-too-common reaction.\(^3\)

It is suggested that in some instances our friendly fighters have been more intent upon destroying enemy fighters than in staying with the bombers. In particular it appears that we might question their tactics of chasing enemy fighters down to 16,000 or 12,000 feet when our forces are a mile or so above this level. It may be that we could have a net gain in the effectiveness of their support if pursuit of enemy aircraft were limited to a reasonable chase in the more or less immediate vicinity of our formations.

The losing of the fighters from close escort missions was sound strategy, and it was soon extended. By April, VIII Fighter Command was ordering low-altitude fighter sweeps deep into Germany, some undertaken in conjunction with bomber missions, others planned as independent strikes employing all of its fighter groups. For the first time, fighters were being used in their true role—an offensive role. As the spring months wore on, the disruptive effects of VIII Fighter Command operations—on German fighter units, on Luftwaffe training units, and on the whole structure of the enemy air force—forced the Luftwaffe increasingly off balance and shifted the balance in the air increasingly towards the Anglo-American side.

The effects of these new tactics were intensified, in turn, by serious German strategic mistakes. The most obvious of these was their failure, almost entirely the responsibility of Hitler, to push forward the development of the jet-powered ME 262 as a fighter aircraft. The months wasted in experimenting with its possibilities as a “oliz-bomber”—Hitler’s phrase—could never be regained. It might not have turned the tide of the air battle, but it certainly could have caused grave difficulties for the Allied air commanders. At the same time, the Luftwaffe commanders, feeling the mounting pressure from American day fighters, ordered their own fighter forces to withdraw from forward positions into their inner defense zone and to concentrate their efforts entirely on stopping the bomber forces, ignoring the fighter escorts. This was a grievous misapplication of the principle of concentration. The proper strategy should have been to echelon part, at least, of the German fighter forces forward, with instructions to attack Eighth Air Force’s escort fighters as far forward as possible, forcing them to drop their auxiliary tanks early in their missions and limiting thereby their combat radius. This done, the German fighters could have concentrated
MILITARY THOUGHT AND REFORM

later on the heavy bombers. Instead, the Luftwaffe command let the fighters go, unmolested, to extreme range, hoping that there was a limit. After the P-51 appeared, in March and April 1944, there was no limit. No part of Germany was exempt. And the American fighters were free to devote their best efforts to offensive sweeps against Luftwaffe fighters rather than to protection of "the heavies."

Under this unrelenting pressure, the German Air Force cracked up. Its combat losses from December 1943 through March 1944, according to Gen. Adolf Galland, Inspector General of German Fighter Forces, amounted to about a thousand fighters. Wastage on training and ferrying missions during the same period, he estimates, at about the same. After three or four days' continuous action, the German fighter staffeln were wiped out completely, and had to be withdrawn to be reconstituted. The effects on pilot quality were equally serious. During early 1944, for the first time, VIII Fighter Command pilots began to be aware of wide differences in the skill and daring of Luftwaffe pilots; some were as good as ever; others were greenhorns and the numbers of the latter continually increased. In such fashion, does defeat in the air feed on itself. Finally, the effects on German pilot morale were disastrous. They are summed up in the diary of one German fighter pilot, a squadron commander, who participated in the 1944 air battles.

How much longer can it all continue? Once again Division Control reports those blasted concentrations in sector "Dora-Dora." Concentrations in sector "Dora-Dora"! This report has now come to have a different significance for us; it is a reminder that for the moment we are still alive. . . . Every day seems an eternity. There is nothing now—only our operations, which are hell, and then more waiting—that nerve-wracking waiting for the blow which inevitably must fall, sooner or later. Everytime I close the canopy before taking off, I feel that I am closing the lid of my own coffin.

Thus, slowly, inexorably, command of the air passed into the hands of the Allies. By April, the Luftwaffe was defeated. By June, it was impotent, as its performance at the time of the invasion of Normandy attests. And on the occasion of the climactic German counterattack against the Allied armies in Normandy, at Mortain in early August, not a single Luftwaffe aircraft put in an appearance to assist the attacking German panzer divisions. Normandy, indeed, was as much an air force as a ground force victory. The scope of Allied air superiority in that decisive campaign was nowhere more clearly shown than during the great sweep of General George Patton's Third U.S. Army from Brittany to the borders of Germany during August 1944. On that drive, flank cover for Patton's Army against the German Nineteenth
Army south of the Loire was provided by P-47s of IX Fighter Command. The German Air Force had been swept from the skies.

With this, the objectives of Operation POINTBLANK, so nearly forfeited in the winter of 1943, were gained in a period of two or three months in early 1944 and held thereafter. We should note, however, that in gaining those objectives, American air commanders had had their original expectations reversed on almost every point. The results aimed at—air superiority—had been achieved but not at all by the means and methods originally envisaged. It was a victory of improvisation, and even of luck, as the case of the P-51 shows, as much as, perhaps more than, a victory of prevision and planning. Like their RAF colleagues, whose experience paralleled their own in so many ways, the American Air Force commanders had clearly seen the importance of air power in the years before the war, years during which its promise was hidden from most military men. They had seen, too, that air forces, if they were to achieve their maximum effect, must be commanded independently. Both of these facts are very much to their credit.

But beyond these points, which are in all truth important enough, it cannot be said that American air commanders saw at all clearly the character that air war would assume or that they weighed at all accurately what its demands would be. In particular, they failed completely to grasp the essential meaning of air superiority. This is not surprising; the second World War, after all, is the first, and so far the only, experience we have had of large-scale air war. During the 1920's and the 1930's, all that they had to go on was hunches and guesses. In such a pioneering venture, error is unavoidable. And if American airmen made mistakes, certainly they made fewer than did the airmen of any other nation. Making all due allowance for the difficulties and the genuine accomplishments of our air strategists, it should, nevertheless, be perfectly clear that every salient belief of prewar American air doctrine was either overthrown or drastically modified by the experience of war. Germany proved not at all vulnerable to strategic bombing. As our bombing attacks grew, so did German production. Her total armament production rose over 300% between January 1942 and July 1944. As late as November 1944, by which time the strategic bombing attacks had reached formidable proportions, it still stood at 260% of January 1942 levels. Postwar estimates by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, much controverted, suggest that all the bombing did was to slow down this impressive rise of German armament production by 15 to 20%. The result was similar with German aircraft production. It doubled in 1943. It doubled again in the first half of 1944. Bombing may have contributed to slowing down that formidable rate of increase by, again, a factor of 15 to 20%.

The lesson is clear. VIII and XV Bomber Commands did not destroy the German Air Force by bombing it; it came nearer destroying them. Indeed, the German Air Force was never truly destroyed. It was defeated in
battle, partly by the heavy bomber missions which forced it, as the RAF in 1940 had not been forced, to defend its homeland, partly by the American day fighters who struck not only at its materiel, as the bombers did, but at other factors no less important in an air force—its leadership, its veteran pilots, its command structure, its morale, its hopes. This, of course, represented a return to an indirect strategy, or, to use the current argot, a "counter-force" strategy: the classic military strategy of challenging and defeating the enemy armed forces by wager of battle. Despite the visions of its protagonists of prewar days, the air war during the second World War, no less than the fighting on the ground and at sea, was attrition war. It did not supplant the operations of conventional forces; it complemented them. Victory went to the air forces with the greatest depth, the greatest balance, the greatest flexibility in employment. The result was an air strategy completely unforeseen by air commanders, different in its methods but not different in its objects from traditional strategy.

Since 1945, obviously, changes in weaponry have greatly diminished the importance of any practical lessons we might draw from our World War II experience. I might add, however, that I, for one, am not convinced that such changes have nullified those lessons. That depends entirely upon circumstances, which are in the nature of things unpredictable; the "impossible" is always happening, as we have just seen. But one lesson of Operation POINTBLANK has not been overshadowed by what has happened since. All military history shows the dangers of confusing doctrine with dogma. When one does, one is too likely to put all the eggs in one basket. The Air Force, with its heavy bomber dogma, came perilously close to doing just that in 1943. It was saved from paying the price for that mistake by a mixture of luck, of improvisation, and of strategic blunders by the enemy—but only by fairly narrow margins. It need hardly be pointed out that if ever again the Air Force were to find itself in such circumstances, the consequences could be fatal. That, I think, is the great lesson of Operation POINTBLANK. It is a lesson which I hope you will always carry with you through your future careers in the Air Force.

Dr. William R. Emerson is Assistant Professor of History at Yale University. As a fighter pilot during World War II, he flew P-47 Thunderbolts in the Mediterranean Theater. After the war he graduated from Yale University in 1948 and obtained his Ph.D. at Oxford University in 1951. He then returned to Yale, where he has taught European military history ever since. He is a former trustee of the American Military Institute and is presently serving as a member of the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of the Army on Military History. Dr. Emerson's published writings include *Montgomery's Rebellion* (1952), *The Estates of the Petre Family in Essex, 1540-1640*, (to be published this year), and a chapter on "E.D.R. (1941-1945)" in *The Ultimate Decision* (1960). He is presently at work on a history of European war from the sixteenth century to the present.
Notes

2. Ibid., pp. 122-123.
3. Ibid., pp. 54-55. After the war the Strategic Bombing Survey estimated that the October 14 raid destroyed or damaged only about 10% of the machine tools in the Schweinfurt plants and rendered unusable about 20% of finished stocks: USSBS, Over-all Report (European War), p. 26.
5. Ibid., p. 383.
6. USSBS, Aircraft Division Industry Report, Exhibit III-D.
7. Wesley F. Craven and James I. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago, 1951), III, 58, 190-195.
8. Ibid., 63.
10. For United States air doctrine between the wars see Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (ISAF Historical Studies: No. 89, RSI, Air University, 1955). For the development of RAF strategic doctrine, which paralleled American doctrine but seemingly had little influence on it, see Webster and Frankland, op. cit., I, part I.
13. Claire L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York, 1949), p. 26. Chennault's criticisms of two of these tests are to be found in an ACS paper on Pursuit Aviation, dated September 1933 (USAHD 4778-6) and a paper on the 1935 maneuvers drawn up for the Chief of the Air Corps (USAHD 4686-35).
15. USAHD 167. 5 2.
16. USAHD 168. 79 50.
18. USAHD 168. 12 9. It is interesting to note that this Board examined and reported upon no less than eighteen fighters then in development by the AAF. Seemingly, however, neither the AAF leadership they did not examine was the one which was later to solve the problem, the P-51 Mustang, then entering production on a British contract with the North American Aviation Company of California.
19. Webster and Frankland, op. cit., I, 239.
22. Boylan, op. cit., p. 68.
23. Ibid., p. 86.
24. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, II, 711. General Walker revised this opinion within the week in a following dispatch.
25. USAHD 520. 346, pp. 18-19.
26. For the history of the YB 40, see Craven and Cate, op. cit., II, 680, VI, 217-218, 268.
27. USAHD 201. 2 11.
28. VIII Fighter Command History of Range Extension for Fighters, USAHD 524. 01.
29. Craven and Cate, op. cit., VI, 219.
31. USAHD 525. 548 (January 12, 1944).
The American Revolution Today

John W. Shy

"The American Revolution Today," as a title, must sound vaguely familiar. Surely we have read or heard this one before, somewhere, in the Sunday magazine section or on television. If the title seems banal, that was the intention, because it seemed more appropriate here not to strive for profundity or esoteric reinterpretation of the American Revolution as an armed struggle, but to deal directly with certain aspects of the Revolutionary War so obvious and so elementary that they are easily overlooked. The first, perhaps most important, aspect has to do with the relationship between a war fought two hundred years ago and now.

"Relevance" was never a strong word. Vague, and a little soft at the center, it simply could not carry the load placed upon it during the 1960s, when a silent, accepting generation gave way to one that was vocal and full of doubt. And now the word is exhausted. Sophisticated people visibly react, wincing or smirking, when others use the word, as if the speaker were wearing an odd piece of clothing gone out of style. We (at least we in history departments, who have suffered during the last decade a hemorrhage of students to more obviously relevant disciplines like psychology and sociology) relish signs of a counterattack that will administer the coup de grace to "relevance," as in a sign tacked on a history office door: "The surest way not to find relevance," it said, "is to go looking for it." With a sigh of relief, teachers of history watch enrollment figures bottom out, then begin to climb again, and they go back to teaching history, not trying to explain why history is worth studying.

And yet, that weak word, muttered and shouted by a generation of students already moving toward middle age, a generation that may never have thought carefully about what it was demanding when it demanded "relevance," makes a vital point. There ought to be a better, stronger, clearer word, but there isn't so "relevance" has had to do what it could to make that vital point. The point is: historians inhabit two worlds, the world of the present, and the world of the past. And it is not just any "past" world but some particular location in time and space which each historian probably knows as well or better than he knows the world of the present. Most historians read the documents of the past more systematically and carefully than they read today's newspaper. They reconstruct the physical environment of the past with painstaking care, while usually taking their own
almost for granted, often hardly noticing their immediate surroundings. The vital point, so feebly made by the cry for “relevance,” is that these past and present worlds not only ought to connect, but they absolutely do connect, whether we like it, or are aware of it, or not. There is simply no escaping the subjective quality of historical study; “history” is memory, and the human mind is the inevitable filter through which every gritty historical fact either does, or does not, pass. We may smile wisely at those who still demand relevance; but then we go back to work, our present world subtly dictating the past time and place we choose for intensive study, dictating our priorities for research, dictating our preliminary hypotheses and our angle of attack, dictating when we can meet to talk about history, who our audience will be, and even suggesting what that audience would like to hear.

Consider, briefly, how the historical “present” has effected study and understanding of the Revolutionary past. Historians who lived through the great Civil War focused on the Constitution, that miraculous and delicate achievement which had bound together disparate, scattered groups of people; for these historians of the nineteenth century, the Revolution was primarily the story of the long road to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, and the question lurking in the backs of their minds was how the Constitution could contain the forces of disruption which threatened the Republic in the 1860s and 1870s. For a later generation of historians, those who lived and worked through an era of great reform and great depression, of Woodrow Wilson and the two Roosevelts, the concerns were different. In both the causes and the consequences of the Revolution, they looked for the effects of class conflict and economic interest, and of course they found them. For a still later generation, profoundly affected by the Second World War and working under the influence of the Cold War, the chief concern seems again very different: it was with the essential unity and goodness of eighteenth-century American society, not contrived at Philadelphia in 1787 so much as sprung from the basic equality and security of life, and from the basic soundness of belief, in colonial and Revolutionary America, giving the nation the strength and purpose—then and now—needed both to defend itself and to lead the world by example. Needless to say, the most recent generation of historians has begun to raise questions about this view, less by direct refutation than by exploration of some of the disturbing sides of life in eighteenth-century America—slavery, poverty, violence, Indian relations, and the place of women, to mention a few.

But our focus is not the Revolution as a whole, but the role played by armed force in the Revolution. More than a decade ago there was noted a revival of interest in the military side of the Revolution. Between the Civil War and the Second World War historians had moved away from the study of military history. Many, reacting to the horrors of the First World War, simply found war a repulsive subject (which of course it is), and others
thought (not unreasonably) that for too long excessive attention to military history had caused other important aspects of the past to be neglected. But with the Second World War and the Cold War came another shift. War again seemed interesting and its study respectable. By looking at a few examples of the forms taken by this revived interest in military history, we can see again how the mid-twentieth century "present" and the Revolutionary "past" have interacted.

Piers Mackesy of Oxford gave us a radically new perspective on the Revolutionary War by putting it into a global context and by making us see it from London; King George III and his cabinet could not match the British performance of 1939-1945, but it is hard to imagine Mackesy's book without the Second World War to serve as a concealed analytical framework. My own study of the British Army in America before the Revolution, and what some reviewers thought excessive preoccupation with the confusion and contradictions in British military policy for America before 1775, was at least partly a product of what seemed the appalling confusion of American military policy under Eisenhower, the dreary interservice wrangling, and contemporary failure to think through basic assumptions about the use of force. Ira Gruber of Rice, in his study of the unfortunate Howe brothers, focused on the actual use of force; and if I do not misunderstand him, he has been fascinated by the effort to make war an extension of politics in the formulation of Clausewitz, whose reputation as a military thinker rose in the course of the great strategic debate of the later 1950s and early 1960s (when Professor Gruber was doing his work) over how, after Korea, the United States could best make war an effective political instrument. Whether his study of the Howes contains any lesson for our own times, or whether the author ever thought about Clausewitz, Flexible Response, and all that, only Professor Gruber can say.

Den Higginbotham of North Carolina is a last example. Daniel Morgan, the subject of his first book, was not exactly a guerrilla, but he certainly was irregular in many respects, and he was the kind of effective and charismatic soldier who turns up in the revolutionary wars of our own time. Vietnam, especially, created an interest in seeing the American Revolution as a truly revolutionary war, with guerrilla tactics, popular attitudes, and even counterinsurgent methods getting new attention. Higginbotham's next book, a general history of the war, gave full scope to these "revolutionary" elements in the military conflict, but he also pointed a still more recent trend—toward interest in the deeper effects of the war on American society. More than any previous military historian, Higginbotham began to ask particularly about what mobilization of manpower and ruinous inflation did to people, how the Revolutionary War as a protracted, strenuous public event affected thousands and thousands of private lives. Somehow, as I compare the air fare to Colorado Springs this year with what it was in 1969,
when I last attended the symposium, or watch my own personal response to
the televised ordeal of Watergate, I find those few pages in which Higginbotham
discusses wartime psychology and the effects of runaway inflation
highly relevant. It seems strange that military historians have waited so long
to study war, not merely as a series of maneuvers and battles, but as a kind
of revolution in its own right.

Now it is important to be as clear as possible about how the historian's
own present world impinges on his understanding of the past. The present
has a powerful effect on what seems most relevant, but it does not dictate
conclusions, although it may nudge those conclusions in a certain direction.
Mackesy thought that Britain might have won the war had it persevered a
year or so longer. Gruber thought the Howes virtually lost the war because
they let their political role fatally compromise their military performance.
Other historians, equally fascinated by the global nature of the conflict and
by the interplay of politics and strategy, would strenuously disagree. The
danger that historians will tell lies about the past in order to serve present
political or ideological ends is less than the risk that, by responding to the
lure of relevance, we will distort the past by being one-sided. To have many
students of British strategy and military policy but too few of the grass-roots
American response to wartime pressures will produce a lopsided understand-
ing of the Revolutionary War. But that kind of risk is not peculiar to the
study of history and the perils posed by a quest for historical relevance; it
goes with simply being alive and trying to understand anything.

What then is the right approach to the American Revolutionary War
today? My audience is mainly military, brought together primarily by a felt
need to do something about the two-hundredth anniversary of the Revolu-
tion. Military professionals hope, like militant students, to learn something
relevant. Over us all looms the Bicentennial, so far an embarrassing mess, in
part because so far too few have had the heart or displayed the imagination
required to celebrate it properly. Our lack of heart, and our paucity of
imagination, are themselves symptoms of a "present" that seems all the
more disheartening when we look at the evidence of energy and brilliance
two hundred years ago. And so, speaking directly to soldiers, who seek
guidance, and impelled but disconcerted by the Bicentennial occasion and
its doomed desire for profundity, what is there to say about the Revolution-
ary War? Or is there anything to say?

We can begin to find an answer if we let ourselves be guided by the
pressures of relevance. The military, like all other professions outside of the
academic world, seeks knowledge not for its own sake but for its professional
uses. Humbly consulting experts, soldiers try to pick out the profession-
ally useful in whatever the experts convey. Are there lessons, or is there
other useful knowledge, for the American military professional in the story
of the Revolution? It is a fair question, better brought into the open than suppressed by academic impatience with utilitarian concerns.

The other side of "today"—the Bicentennial—does not point so clearly. But let me try to define the problem: it is mainly in the sense of remoteness that we feel from the Revolution. It is not only a problem of distance in time. For many people today, the Civil War has an immediacy, a palpability, that the Revolution lacks, however much we may admire George Washington, Monticello, or early American furniture. Lincoln lives, but Washington is a monument. The heart of the matter is in the very success of the Revolution. The Civil War, like every other major event in American history including (we now begin to see) the Second World War, has a tragic, human, two-sided quality that the Revolution seems to lack. Whatever was done or decided in 1775 or 1777 or 1781, the outcome justified it, and the whole complex of events takes on a smooth, self-contained character that makes getting the right emotional grip on the subject very difficult. The American nation was a success story from the beginning; the nation began with the Revolution, *quod erat demonstrandum*. In short, finding something useful to the military profession, and breaking down the barrier posed by time and success, is the task imposed on me by "today." Let us start with the most basic facts, and try to work our way toward some useful and satisfying result.

The first fact about the Revolutionary War is that the British lost it. And the inevitable question follows, for soldier as well as historian, why? It is easy to assemble a whole catalogue of answers: military failure to adjust to American conditions; blunders by the field commanders, incompetence and corruption in London; stubborn and obtuse misunderstanding of American grievances by both Crown and Parliament; and collapse of British public support for the war after Yorktown. But a second look at each of these answers raises a new set of questions.

From early on, the British and their German and American allies seem as adept at irregular warfare, at the tactics of hit and run, as do the rebels. For every tactical blunder like Bennington there is a comparable rebel blunder. British tactics might have been better, sooner, but it is hard to put much weight on the tactical factor. The quality of high command in America is another matter. From the faulty planning of the march to Concord in 1775, through the Yorktown fiasco in 1781, British field commanders made serious mistakes. More than anything, they repeatedly misjudged the American military and popular response. In retrospect, it is easy to say what they should or might have done. But as I look at the men and their decisions, several things occur to me: one is that none of these men—Gage, Howe, Clinton, Carleton, Cornwallis, even Burgoyne—was notably incompetent. Their military accomplishments justified giving each of them high military command. Second, a few mistakes—like the failure to seal off the southeast-
ern exit from Trenton on January 2, 1777—are the kinds of lapses that inevitably occur in every war, that every commander in history has been guilty of committing or permitting. Third, the other mistakes—like not destroying Washington's army in the autumn of 1776, like expecting to reach Albany from Canada without too much trouble in the summer of 1777, like expecting to re-establish a sea line of communication from the Virginia tidewater in 1781—seem reasonably calculated risks, which of course in the event were miscalculated. That historians can still argue vigorously about these decisions suggests that the commanders themselves, however hapless they may have been, were at least not stupid or grossly incompetent. For example: Professor Gruber thinks Howe should have pursued Washington to destruction after the battle of Long Island in 1776. Hindsight strongly suggests that Gruber is right. But the length of the British casualty list at Bunker Hill, plus Howe's belief that the beaten American army would probably fall apart and his fear that pointless killing of the King's American subjects might have a boomerang effect, led him to play a cat-and-mouse game during those months after Long Island. A mistake, probably, but not a foolish or irresponsible one. We may hold high military commanders to an unrealistic, Napoleonic standard; when they fail to meet the standard, we may judge them too quickly as incompetents. British commanders, as a group, were not unusually bad, and I think it is a mistake to tie the can of British defeat to their tails.

As for the situation in Britain itself, Lord George Germain and the Earl of Sandwich may have been unattractive people, but the sheer size of the unprecedented British financial, administrative, and logistical effort which Germain and Sandwich, as the responsible cabinet ministers for army and navy, mobilized and directed suggests that corruption and confusion in London is at most a marginal part of our explanation for failure. Likewise, the crucial collapse of British public opinion after Yorktown needs to be seen against fairly solid popular support for the war at the outset, even among many who had been critical of British policy in America before 1775, and a miraculous revival of that solidarity when it was threatened in the aftermath of Burgoyne's defeat by French entry into the war, by the danger of a cross-Channel attack, and by an almost revolutionary economic and political crisis in the home islands themselves. Finally, whether greater political flexibility in the cabinet and House of Commons, more generous and timely concessions to American demands, might have split and dissipated the revolutionary movement, is a fascinating but impossible question to answer. Certainly American leaders were afraid of just such an event. The timing of the Declaration of Independence was, in part, a congressional coup intended to foreclose serious negotiations which the British seemed ready to undertake. But the basic British line on negotiation was that previous flexibility had been repeatedly misread by Americans as weakness.
and irresolution and that only major concessions, extracted by the pressure of armed force from the Americans themselves, could mean the start of a negotiated peace. A wrongheaded position, perhaps, but one which we, of all people, ought to be able to recognize as not completely unreasonable.

Should we conclude then that the root cause of British defeat was not so much in the failure of British leaders or British people but in the circumstances of the war, or that Britain’s objective was simply not attainable without great good luck or divine intervention, or that there was a radical disjunction between British ends and British means? Or were the British trapped in a set of basic assumptions about their problem that made the American Revolutionary War a British Tragedy?

“Tragedy” is a word with a seductive ring to it, especially when the tragedy happened to someone else, long ago. But if we stay close to the facts, we find some knowledgeable, relatively detached observers on the spot who did not see the British problem in tragic terms. They thought the British had a good chance to win, and they believed the margin between winning and losing lay well within the available range of military power and strategic perception. To take only one example: Col. Louis Duportail was one of the ablest French officers to serve the American cause. He became chief engineer and rose to
the rank of major general in the Continental Army. He was also a spy for the French Minister of War. In a long, brutally candid letter written after Burgoyne's surrender and on the eve of Valley Forge, a letter that never reached its destination because the British intercepted it, Duportail stated that the British could win if they replaced Gen. Howe, which they did, and if they could maintain an army in America of 30,000 men, a figure actually surpassed in 1776 and not maintained subsequently because forces were dispersed. Duportail based his estimate on weaknesses in the American situation, which I will turn to in a moment. Deciding whether Duportail and some others who agreed with him were exactly right is less important than seeing that such opinions existed. Major American defeats in Canada in 1775, around New York City in 1776, on the Brandywine in 1777, at Charleston and Camden in South Carolina in 1780, as well as the collapse of the American position in New Jersey in 1776, later in large areas of the South, and still later in the trans-Appalachian West, suggest that we must take Duportail seriously. The British lost, but they were fighting with that zone of contingencies where both winning and losing are not unlikely outcomes.

And what of the American Revolutionaries? The second most obvious fact about the Revolutionary War seems to be that the rebels won. But a safer, more accurate statement is that they did not lose. If we look closely at the American side of the war, we see a very mixed picture—impressive in some ways, but very unedifying in others. From the outburst of enthusiasm in the spring of 1775, genuine support for the war appears to have declined through the next six years. The service and pension files in the National Archives indicate that a large proportion of the white male population, and a significant part of the black male population as well, performed active military service, but only a tiny part of the population performed truly extended military service. People seemed to get tired. They got tired of serving, and they got tired of contributing. Of course, they got angry when British or Hessian or Tory troops misbehaved, but they also grew weary of being bullied by local committees of safety, by corrupt deputy assistant commissaries of supply, and by hordes of ragged strangers with guns in their hands calling themselves soldiers of the Revolution. They got very tired of worthless and counterfeit money. Duportail, for one, also thought Americans were soft. He said that supply shortages were wrecking the Revolution, not shortages of munitions but of things like linen, sugar, tea, and liquor. They were not, he said, a warlike people, but were used to living comfortably without working too hard. Of course the European peasant was his standard of comparison, but those peasants—the poorest, most miserable and desperate, toughest ones—comprised the backbone of every European army. Duportail, himself committed fully to the American side, told the French government, "There is a hundred times more enthusiasm for this Revolution in any Paris café than in all the colonies together." Surely he exaggerated,
but too much other evidence supports the line of his argument to reject it out of hand.¹⁹

This realm of simple and obvious facts in which we have been operating is slippery. American Revolutionaries did not win the war, but they did not lose it. What do these words mean, and what is the point of the distinction? Clearly, they mustered enough strength from internal and foreign sources of support not to be defeated decisively, and they hung on long enough to discourage the British government and people. Though not beaten as the Confederacy in 1865 and Germany in 1945 were beaten, neither did they win militarily as the Union won and the Allies won. The point of the distinction has to do with the character of the struggle, which went on for more than seven years. In characterizing the war from the Revolutionary viewpoint, what stands out is weakness, part of which Duportail noted, the rest of which was not yet apparent to him.

In discussing American Revolutionary weakness, we must be careful. There is danger of distortion and exaggeration. Obviously, the rebels could have been much weaker than they were. Moreover, military historians are too apt to look for someone to blame. As we asked about the British, so we ask about American revolutionaries: were the generals incompetent, Congress irresponsible, the States selfish, and the people apathetic? These may be the wrong questions, leading us to irrelevant answers. If politicians squabbled endlessly, if commanders repeatedly committed elementary military mistakes, if States ignored Congress while the Army damned it, if ordinary people quit and went home or hid their cows or even packed up and went to Vermont or across the mountains to get away from the war and its ceaseless demands—and all these things did in fact happen frequently in the later years of the war—then it is beside the point to blame the politicians, the soldiers, or the people. One wonders why the whole affair did not simply collapse, what kept it going so long.

Some good American patriots at the time wondered the same thing. Did war take on a life of its own, like the Thirty Years war as portrayed in Berchtold Brecht's "Mother Courage," with people virtually forgetting what it was about, and trying to do no more than survive, even if survival meant collaborating with the impersonal machinery of mobilization? That is not the way we like to think about the origins of the American nation, but there is evidence to support such a view (though the Revolution never attained the far-flung ferocity of that most brutal and protracted of the religious wars). The years from 1776 to 1782 might indeed be recounted as horror stories of terrorism, rapacity, mendacity, and cowardice, not to blame our ancestors for these things, but to remind us what a war fought by the weak must look like. The bedrock facts of the American Revolutionary struggle, especially after the euphoric first year, are not pretty.

But everything turned out all right. The British went home, even the
French went home; thousands of German prisoners of war blended into the Pennsylvania landscape, and only the Spanish, the Indians, and black slaves were left to deal as best they could with the victorious Revolutionaries. How a national polity so successful, and a society so relatively peaceful, could emerge from a war so full of bad behavior, including perhaps a fifth of the population actively treasonous (that is, loyal to Crown), must be a puzzle.  

Duportail, like many other observers on all sides, thought that the United States would split into fragments once the war was over. The Hessian Col. Dincklage was even more pessimistic as he looked into the future:

They may have peace but not happiness when the war is over. It matters little whether the Americans win or lose. Presently this country is the scene of the most cruel events. Neighbors are on opposite sides, children are against their fathers. Anyone who differs with the opinions of Congress in thought or in speech is regarded as an enemy and turned over to the hangman, or else he must flee.

We give these refugees food, and support most of them with arms. They go on patrol for us in small groups and . . . into their home districts to take revenge by pillaging, murdering, and burning. . . .

If peace comes after an English victory, discord between the two parties will flare up underneath the ashes and nobody will be able to resolve it. If the rebels should win, they will break their necks, one by one. What misery the people have plunged themselves into.

Dincklage, like Duportail, was too pessimistic and his prediction was wrong. Yet even the most prominent leaders of the Revolution had similar fears.

A brilliant young staff officer, Alexander Hamilton, after several years of watching the course of the war from Washington's headquarters, confided to his closest friend:

... our countrymen have all the folly of the ass and all the passiveness of the sheep in their compositions. They are determined not to be free and they can neither be frightened, discouraged nor persuaded to change their resolution. If we are saved, France and Spain must save us. I have the most pigmy-feelings at the idea, and I almost wish to hide my disgrace in universal ruin.

Thomas Jefferson, who saw most of the war from Philadelphia and Virginia, and whose optimism allegedly contrasts with Hamilton's cold-eyed conservatism, occasionally revealed similar fears, especially once the unifying British threat had passed:
I know no danger so dreadful and so probable as that of internal contests. . . . The states will go to war with each other in defiance of Congress; one will call in France to her assistance; another Great Britain, and so we shall have all the wars of Europe brought to our own doors.

Jefferson predicted that "From the conclusion of this war we shall be going down hill." Having faced apathy, riot, and even secessionism as governor of Virginia when he had tried to mobilize the State against British invasion in 1781, Jefferson had reason to worry about the postwar prospects of the United States. Jefferson, at his gloomiest, sounded not unlike Dinniklae and Duportail.

Why were they all wrong? When Shay's Rebellion broke out in 1786, and again when the Whiskey Rebellion erupted in 1794, many thought that the beginning of the end had come. As predicted, the unwieldy, centrifugal Republic, like Poland, was collapsing into anarchy. Even Hamilton and Jefferson, as emergent party leaders in the 1790s, were acting out the scenario both had written: sectional conflict and violent rhetoric followed by apparent appeals for foreign intervention and cries of treason. But it did not happen. Affluence—which Duportail disparaged as the soft life—is part of the explanation; no matter how aggrieved or deprived, no one was likely to starve in America, so insurrection seemed to lack the desperate edge that it could have in England, Ireland, or France. But more than mere affluence explains Revolutionary success.

Part, perhaps the most important part, of the explanation lies in the character of the war itself and in contemporary perceptions of the armed struggle. Bitter experience of fighting from weakness had all but obliterated the naive optimism of 1775 and had sensitized Americans to their own political peril. Fearful prophecies, based on dismal fact, functioned to defeat those prophecies by channeling political energies into the struggle against anarchy. Leaders thought, talked, and even compromised, shrinking from the last act of the scenario that they knew so well; people listened, talked back, occasionally resisted, but ultimately acquiesced, at least for the crucial season when the future of the Republic hung in the balance.

Nothing was feared more by leaders in the postwar era than disunion, and most people felt the same way. Disunion meant failure and disgrace, so widely predicted and expected, and the fear itself generated extraordinary efforts to prevent it. All had learned the lessons of a dirty revolutionary war that had ended not with Napoleonic victories or massive defections from the enemy armies but with ragged unpaid American soldiers drifting down the Hudson valley to sign on as sailors in the ships which were evacuating British forces, while American officers back at Newburgh halfheartedly planned a coup d'etat to get the money owed them by Congress. The Revolution, as an armed struggle, ended with a whimper.
Where in all this are the lessons for the soldier and the Bicentennial message? For the Bicentennial there is only a greater sense of reality, of immediacy, of (I hope) honesty in looking at the Revolutionary War as it actually was. In a way, the Bicentennial itself, and our anxiety about it, are a continuation of the national myth which began in the 1780s, when the elation of ultimate victory combined with the sour memories of widespread human weakness and depravity as revealed in the seven-years struggle, to produce a wonderfully creative period in American politics. The ink was barely dry on the Treaty of Paris before myth and reality about the Revolutionary War were becoming entwined. The Bicentennial is indeed a birthday, and we all know the strange emotional effects induced by birthday parties. Being born the way we were was glorious? We think. Or was it? Or is it? Much about the event called the Revolutionary War had been very painful and was unpleasant to remember; only the outcome was unqualifiedly pleasant. So memory, as ever, began to play tricks with the event, which is not always a bad thing, though it makes the historian's task difficult.

And the lessons for soldiers? The most important lesson may be more philosophical than practical. Soldiers, like other professionals, learn to see themselves as the center of the activity which defines their professionalism. But the use of force is a weird activity. What most impresses me about the War of the Revolution is the sort of thing that professional military education does not dwell on because it does not seem very practical and even sounds vaguely defeatist. It moves the commander from stage center into the chorus, if not, like Tolstoy’s Kutuzov, into the orchestra or the audience. It reminds all of us, civilians as well as soldiers, of the deeply relativistic and contingent nature of violent encounters. Killing is a terribly easy thing to measure, and the results of killing called “victory” and “defeat” seem almost equally unequivocal. The British lost, so the Americans won. But when we stop fixating on military failure and success, and start scrutinizing that dynamic, unstable process of collectively trying to kill and not get killed which George Patton labeled war, then the commander and his intentions and decisions become no more than one in a set of complexly interacting elements. Because it may be an extreme case, the Revolution drives home the lesson that in war reality always seems to escape perception, results outrun intentions, and the final outcome is much more than the sum total of decisions made at headquarters. It may be a bleak sort of lesson for the professional soldier, but realism is better than illusion, and the lesson, if properly regarded, carries a certain cold comfort.

Professor John W. Shy is a graduate of the United States Military Academy. Following army service, he obtained graduate training in history at the University of Vermont and then received his Ph.D. at Princeton University in 1961. He taught at Princeton and since 1968 has
Notes

1. Among the views of the many historians and philosophers of history who have discussed this point, the most stimulating and instructive are the early statements by Carl L. Becker, "Everyman His Own Historian," American Historical Review, XXXVII (1932), 221-222; the extreme statement that "relevance" not only does but ought to dictate by Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (New York, 1963); and the iconoclastic second thoughts of J. H. Hexter, particularly "The Historian's Day," in his Reappraisals in History (Evanston, Ill., 1962) and "The Historian and His Society: A Sociological Inquiry—Perhaps," in his Doing History (Bloomington, Ind., 1971).


13. In addition to the works already mentioned, William B. Willcox, Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton in the War of Independence (New York, 1964), and Franklin and Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis: The American Adventure (Boston, 1970), are important.


17. A copy of the letter from Dupontail to the Minister of War, the Comte de Saint-Germain, dated at the White Marsh camp, November 12, 1777, is in the papers of Sir Henry Clinton in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A summary of the letter is in the papers of the Earl of Shelburne, then in political opposition, also in the Clements Library. A published translation by Arthur P. Watts, based on another copy in the British Public Record Office, is in Pennsylvania History, 1 (1934), 101-106. The summary in the Shelburne papers indicates that the letter was intercepted in the English Channel, which Dupontail himself guessed (see Elizabeth S. Kite, Brigadier-General Louis Lebique Duportail [Balti-
more, 1933, 59]. Duportail was Minister of War early in the French Revolution, later fled to the United States, and died in 1802 on his way to join Napoleon.

18. In fact, pension files exaggerate the amount of longer service because the pension law of 1818 required a minimum of nine months service with Continental forces, and the law of 1832 required a minimum of six months with the militia. The large number who served even less than these minimum periods is apparent only in antiquarian local studies, like that by Howard K. Sanderson, *Lynn [Mass] in the Revolution*, 2 vol (Boston, 1909).

19. See, for example, the entries from 1779 onward in *Extracts from the Diary of Christopher Marshall*, edited by William J. Duane (Albany, 1877).


27. This definition of war is in Maj. George S. Patton, Jr.’s unpublished thesis of 1932 in the Army War College archives, acc no 387-52, p. 46. The full passage is, “The guiding principle of [military] organization should be the endeavor to devise means of killing without getting killed."
Western Perceptions and Asian Realities

Akira Iriye

I am very honored to have been invited this evening to address this distinguished audience. I am extremely impressed with this year's Military History Symposium, which brings together many specialists to discuss aspects of United States involvement in East Asia. I only hope that my paper will do justice to the enormous amount of preparation that has gone into the planning for this symposium.

In considering the broad theme of tonight's topic, Western perceptions and Eastern realities, I think it might be useful to take a long look at the last half-century, going back to the Manchurian crisis of 1931. That crisis began a fifteen-year war between China and Japan, a war that eventually involved the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and many other countries of Europe and Asia. That year may therefore be taken as a point of departure for American military involvement in the Far East. It also happened that in the same year, far away from Mukden where the Manchurian crisis began, an American sociologist, Robert E. Park, was in the Chinese city of Hangchow, delivering a paper for a meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The paper was entitled “The Problem of Cultural Differences” and discussed the transmission and diffusion of culture. Following William Graham Sumner, Park noted that the Orient and the Occident constituted “two grand divisions of culture in the world.” China represented the former, and America the latter, in the sense that each embodied certain traits that had become part of its cultural heritage. The paper contrasted the Orient's stress on permanency, stability, equilibrium, and repose with the Occident, where “life is prospective rather than retrospective . . . [the mood] is one of anticipation rather than of reflection . . . [and the] attitude toward change is embodied in the concept of progress.” The United States exemplified the West's preoccupation with action and mobility. It was a society where “changes of fortune are likely to be sudden and dramatic, where every individual is more or less on his own . . . ; [fashion] and public opinion take the place of custom as a means and method of social control.” In sum, Park said, in the West, and particularly in America, the “individual is emancipated, and society is atomized.” In sharp contrast, the Orient, especially China, was more “immobile” and “personal and social relations tend to assume a formal and ceremonial character.” The individual in such a society lost initiative and spontaneity, preferring stability and security to
adventure. Whereas Occidental and American culture, Park said, "may be said to have had their origin and to have found their controlling ideas in the market place," it was from the family that Chinese and Oriental civilization derived "those controlling ideas that constitute their philosophy of life." Having listed all these differences between Orient and Occident, Park concluded the paper with a cryptic statement that "everything" in our modern world, under the pressure of changing conditions, has begun to crumble. Even the Western world's "conviction of its own superiority" on which "its faith in its future is finally based, has also begun to crack."

Fifty years after these thoughts were penned, it is easy to say that many of Park's ideas were superficial observations by a generalist without the knowledge of the languages and histories of Asian countries. Even in 1931, the facile dichotomy between a fast-moving, individualist West and an immobile, tradition-bound East would have been too simplistic. If anything, it was the countries of Asia that were undergoing rapid political and social change, whereas economic production and population movements had slowed down in the United States and European countries, due to the spreading world economic crisis. Some Western observers were already beginning to be skeptical, if not cynical, about the assumption that the West's market place orientation had been synonymous with individualism and freedom, whereas the East's family-centeredness and economic underdevelopment sustained each other. Daniel Bell has argued that after the turn of the century there developed a disjunction between productive capacity and mental habits in modern societies, so that while automated systems of production continued to generate more goods, the Protestant ethos of hard work and self-discipline was eroded. In contrast, the Chinese had begun what Alexander Eckstein was to term a major "economic revolution" without fundamentally affecting their family and kinship structure. In Japan the pace of economic and cultural change was even faster, but like China, some of the people's personality traits and social habits were not seriously affected.

My point is not to ridicule some old-fashioned generalizations made by a venerable sociologist. Rather, I cite Park's paper because the juxtaposition, fifty years ago, of that paper and the developing crisis in Manchuria enables us to trace two levels of U.S. involvement in East Asia. One is the level of invasions, wars, armament and other factors that constitute "power realities." American military power in Asia at the time of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was extremely limited. The second level of American-Asian relations is more existential. It is the fact that the United States, Japan, and other countries evolve their respective domestic institutions and economics and that their people engage in their own daily pursuits. American-Asian relations at this level are simply the sum total of all these activities and pursuits. Because this is a very complex phenomenon.
and difficult to come to grips with, many images and concepts are used to comprehend and represent what is happening in other societies. Park was doing this when he resorted to some familiar views about cultural differences between East and West. Unlike American power, these ideas were enormously influential.

Edward Said has argued, in his study of European attitudes toward the Middle East, that the division of the world into Orient and Occident was something that originated in Europe after the eighteenth century. According to him, “the Orient” was not so much a real world of Oriental peoples but a creation of Western minds which were preoccupied with Europe. Starting from the late eighteenth century, European archaeologists, anthropologists, novelists, and linguists “discovered” an Oriental world which the indigenous peoples had never discovered themselves. These people really had no consciousness of their identity or their heritage, but now the Europeans gave it to them by writing about Oriental civilization. Thus, from the very beginning, Orientalism was given its definition and character by non-Orientals, and the Orient was of necessity represented in terms of the more familiar West. The East was what the West was not, lacking the latter’s vitality, spirituality, and individuality. It is easy to see how such a dichotomizing scheme affected generations of Europeans even as they broadened the scope of the Orient beyond the Middle East to include India, Southeast Asia, and East Asia.

Americans inherited such conceptions of the Orient from Europeans, but added elements of their own. As Park said, the United States was often viewed as the most Western of Western societies. This view went back to the nineteenth century, when American writers and orators were fond of describing the United States as the most progressive of nations. The idea of progress, as Ernest Thompson has pointed out, had two roots. One went back to, and modified, the Christian idea of millennium, the kingdom of heaven. Whereas in traditional Christian doctrine the millennium was by definition something that would not be realized on earth, some Protestant thinkers, notably Americans like Samuel Hopkins, converted the vision into that of a more perfect society here in this world. And, not surprisingly, these thinkers believed that America was closer to the earthly millennium than any other country. The second component of the idea of progress was more secular, derived from Enlightenment thought. Henry May has noted that most Enlightenment figures were not extremists; this combined a sense of moderation and a healthy skepticism with belief in reason. But the Enlightenment clearly had an impact; man’s rational faculties to create more enlightened conditions generated optimism about human progress. Here, too, it was easy for Americans, conscious of their freedom from the past, to conceive of their society as the most advanced of all. The perception of America as the most progressive, modern, or “civilized” nation of the West became fixed by
the early nineteenth century, and while other perceptions were periodically added to dilute some of the naïve optimism, the view that the United States was in many ways at the forefront of modern societies remained strong even during the Depression.

A subtheme of the idea of millennium was what Tuveson has termed the notion of America being a “redeemer nation.” The United States, according to this perception, believes it already is or is close to being the most perfect of all societies and thus serves as a model to which other countries can aspire. Otherwise, America would be a singular exception in a sea of wilderness. America’s self-definition contains the optimism that other societies can be transformed in its image. Indeed, Americans have a mission to ensure such transformation. Implicit in such views is the assumption that while Orient and Occident are two sharply contrasting civilizations, the latter is bound to be a more normative pattern of human development than the former and that the Orient is more likely to be influenced by the Occident than the other way round. If indeed America is the most advanced of Occidental countries, and if the Occident is more progressive than the Orient, it follows that Oriental societies would come under its influence. They will be attracted to many of its features and tend to become Americanized. Park himself noted that in China, American movies and social dances had so permeated the country that many Chinese were influenced by the Western notion that marriage, or for that matter divorce, is based upon romantic love. Park assumed that this was a healthier institution than the Chinese system of family-arranged marriages and that the acceptance of the new concept of marriage would liberate individuals and destroy the traditional family structure in China.

Such were some of the prevailing ideas at the beginning of the 1930s. The influence of those ideas was far out of proportion to the actual military power of the United States in East Asia, which was severely limited due to the naval disarmament agreements and to the policy of reducing marines in China. Even the Philippines, the bastion of American military power in the Pacific, were on the way to obtaining independence. Nevertheless, one could agree with Said that ultimately, Western ways of viewing the world of Asia were a reflection of, indeed necessitated by, Western economic and military supremacy in the modern world. The West’s relative power position vis-à-vis the rest of the world since the sixteenth century provided the terms and vocabulary for representing the East. A key question, then, would have been whether America’s relatively inconspicuous military presence in East Asia foreshadowed a declining cultural influence of the West, or whether, despite the erosion of Western power, its cultural impact would remain predominant.

In actuality, one thing that drastically changed was the power position of the United States in East Asia. After 1931, the United States government and military steadily became convinced that maintenance of the balance of
MILITARY THOUGHT AND REFORM

power in the Asia-Pacific region was crucial to the nation's security and that steps must be taken to insert and augment American power in the area to maintain the balance. Stephen Pelz has pointed out in his study of the Japanese-American naval rivalry during the 1930s that the naval armament race fundamentally altered these two countries' relations because each side regarded the other as increasingly dangerous to stability.9 Toward the end of the decade, as Michael Schaller has noted, the United States government became concerned that Japanese domination over China would compromise American security, and began intensive efforts to buttress China, primarily through military aid to the Kuomintang regime.10 These two themes, naval rivalry in the Pacific and clashing policies in China, were joined when Japan entered into a military alliance with Germany and Italy in September 1940. From the American point of view, it became all the more imperative to discourage the growth of Japanese power, whether Japanese expansion was at the expense of the Soviet Union or the European colonies in Southeast Asia. More and more items were placed on America's list of goods embargoed for Japan, and the U.S. Pacific fleet was reinforced. Air power was added to the equation; volunteers were given official encouragement to train Chinese pilots in bombing Japanese bases, and the Philippines were designated as the major bastion for placing fighter planes and heavy bombers to deter Japanese advances.11

From this perspective, there is little doubt that power was what determined the state of U.S.-Japanese relations. American strategists may not have had a sophisticated understanding of Japanese or Chinese culture, but what mattered was that the balance of power was being steadily eroded by Japan and that it had to be redressed through American power. In this sense, all sides understood what was at stake. Chinese and Americans were pitted against Japanese, now allied with Germans. An uneasy equilibrium could still have been maintained if the power situation prevailing at the beginning of 1941 could have been frozen. For this reason, Japanese and American strategists were extremely sensitive to signs of any intention on the part of the other side to alter the balance. When the Japanese invaded the southern half of French Indochina in July 1941, after the German invasion of Russia, American reaction was instantaneous. The United States embargoed oil shipments to Japan and sought to strengthen strategic coordination with China, Britain, and the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese, on their part, viewed such moves as evidence of America's intention to extend its power at the expense of Japan. Just as the Americans considered Japanese action detrimental to the status quo, the Japanese resisted what they regarded as America's determination to alter the status quo by strengthening the "ABCD powers." Escalation of the crisis would have been averted only if both sides had been able to arrive at a mutually acceptable definition of the status quo or if one of them had decided to retreat. Neither was the case,
and war came. It was not entirely hypocritical for the Japanese to call it a
war for national survival, just as it was not an exaggeration for the Ameri-
cans to view it as a direct threat to national security. By 1941 both sides' de-
scription of security had become so extended that a balance of power for
one of them seemed to imply a provocation to the other.

It is clear in retrospect that in their road to war, the leaders in the
United States and Japan understood each other perfectly, as far as the power
equation was concerned. There was nothing abnormal or irrational either
about the Japanese decision to challenge the United States, given their
perception of the type of Asian order required for their country to survive,
or about the American policy of embargo and stiff negotiating strategies,
given Washington's view that further Japanese expansion was detrimental to
the balance of power. The struggle was in essence between a nation that was
trying to define a new regional system of power, and a country that resisted
the attempt. What is also interesting is that Japanese and Americans shared
the view that their relationship had been drastically altered after 1931. Such
a view implied that before 1931 there had existed an older order of stability
and peace based on a balance among the United States, Britain, Japan, and
other countries.

During the war, numerous writers in Japan and the United States de-
bated whether the pre-1931 balance could ever be restored. The answer was
not a simple one. For one thing, the war indicated that the United States and
its allies had the resources to punish Japan for its violation of the peace and
to deprive it of all fruits of victory, not just those acquired after 1931 but all
the territories it had obtained after the late nineteenth century. In that sense
what was restored after Japan's defeat would be not so much the world of
1931 as an earlier period when Japan was weaker. At the same time, it was
thought that after Japan's defeat, postwar Asian stability would to a great
extent be based upon close coordination between the United States and the
British empire, as it had been during the 1920s. What were uncertain at first
were the roles of China and Russia in the area. Japan's wartime new order
had been built on the assumption that there would be collaboration between
Japan and a pro-Japanese China and between Japan and the Soviet Union.
The idea that Japan, China, and Russia would constitute a new grouping to
check Anglo-American power stayed with Japanese consciousness until the
very end of the war. They made a mistake to believe, rather naively, that
China and Russia would opt for such an alliance rather than for an affiliation
with the Anglo-American powers, but they were not wrong to anticipate
the emergence of those two countries as significant factors in future power
equations in Asia and the Pacific.

In any event, when the war ended, with Japan disarmed and reduced to
its home islands, the United States was faced with the choice of whether to
continue to emphasize cooperation with Britain as the key to security in Asia
or to invite China and Russia to join in the undertaking. By and large Washington was inclined to choose the first alternative, the more so after 1947, when the Soviet Union emerged as the new potential adversary. The question then was whether China, now increasingly under Communist influence, should be co-opted into working with Anglo-American powers as a check on Russia or viewed as lost to the Soviet camp and therefore as an object of containment. Recent studies by Warren Cohen, John L. Gaddis, and others amply demonstrate that Dean Acheson and the State Department were extremely interested in splitting China from Russia by offering various inducements to the Chinese Communists. In the meantime, they also advocated ending the occupation of Japan and rearming the country as a potential ally against Russia and, should it become necessary, China. The Korean War settled the debate in Washington about policy toward the People's Republic of China. It became virtually impossible to form a de facto alliance with a country which was at war with the United States. Instead, United States policy in Asia came to focus on the containment of China through such means as mutual security pacts with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,

During the American occupation of Japan at the close of World War II, Gen. Douglas MacArthur (center front) and other officers salute the flag over the American Embassy in Tokyo (National Archives).
In the spirit of military cooperation that developed between the United States and various non-Communist Asian countries after World War II, 2d Lt. Henry Arbeeny (right front), a U.S. Air Force jet pilot instructor, briefs Republic of Korea Air Capt. Chun Hyung (left rear) during a training class by the 6157th Operations Squadron near Osan, Korea.

the encouragement of Japanese economic recovery through expanding trade ties with non-Communist areas in Asia, and, ultimately, its own military involvement in Vietnam to frustrate what was believed to be China-backed attempts by North Vietnam to unify Indochina. Some of these efforts were more successful than others, but in the end they failed to deal adequately with the question left over from the Second World War: how to incorporate China and Russia into a stable system of Asian international politics. The status quo, defined in terms of holding the line against Chinese expansion, was costing America tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars, while the Soviet Union steadily augmented its military capabilities not only in Asia but in Europe and elsewhere. One result of this development was increasing tension between Russia and China, which came to a head after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, followed by the Chinese-Russian border clashes in 1969. The United States had sought to act as the regional stabilizer, but the situation was becoming more and more volatile.
Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that the United States should have abandoned the strategy of containing both Russia and China, and replaced it with a bold attempt at rapprochement with the People's Republic. The architects of the new policy, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, practiced the traditional art of balance of power in approaching China as an instrument to weaken the Soviet hold on world politics. The Chinese willingly obliged, for they were, as Kissinger has recorded in his memoirs, "the most unsentimental practitioners of balance-of-power politics I have encountered." Kissinger's memoirs can be read as a 1,400-page apologia for his China policy which was based, in his view, totally on realistic calculations of power, not on sentiment or economic needs. He simply felt it would be foolish for the United States not to take advantage of the rift between the two Communist giants and supplement America's power by the appearance, if not the reality, of an alliance with Chinese power.

The story since the Nixon-Kissinger years has, on the whole, confirmed the outlines of their strategy. The United States and China established normal diplomatic relations in January 1979, while China and the Soviet Union did not renew their thirty-year alliance which terminated in 1980. The America-China axis, rather than the Soviet-China axis, now defines the base line of Asian international politics. Not only politically, but militarily, too, Chinese and American officials have been intensifying their efforts to join forces against the increasing power of the Soviet Union. A key assumption has been that America's sophisticated weapons can be combined with Chinese manpower to deter Soviet ambitions. As the United States has had to divert its resources increasingly to such regions as the Middle East and Latin America, China is emerging as the principal military partner in Asia to maintain stability. In the meantime, Japan's role in the American security system has undergone change. Japan is no longer a junior partner of the United States in the strategy of containing China. It is rather a "fragile super-power," to use Frank Gibney's phrase, in the sense that while it is a leading economic power, its foundation is extremely fragile in the absence of indigenous natural resources and because of the constitutional restrictions on building up its military capabilities. This situation has led Chinese, American, and Japanese officials to urge that Japan incorporate itself more fully into the emerging security system in Asia through increased military spending and development of more efficient systems of detecting and deterring hostile moves by the Soviet Union. A minority of Japanese have even begun calling for the country's nuclear armament.

Whatever develops in Japan, there is little doubt that the United States, China, and Japan are now on the side of regional stability and cooperate together to prevent Russian expansion. Whether a new equilibrium will in fact emerge on that basis remains to be seen. It may be noted, however, that a system which completely isolates the Soviet Union will certainly remain
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

unstable. Russia is and will remain an Asian and Pacific power, and it will be futile to think that anything other than a temporary balance will prevail so long as the Soviet Union is shut out of regional security considerations. The Soviets may be expected to take military steps as a reaction to increases in the combined forces of America, China, and Japan. The arms race can escalate, and in the end the region will be no closer to stability than before. In this sense, the one question bequeathed by the Second World War, namely how to incorporate the new power of Russia into the international system, has not been satisfactorily solved.

This is a very hasty sketch of the vicissitudes of American power in East Asia during the last fifty years. My purpose in recounting this familiar story has been twofold. One is to emphasize that the story can be told as military history, in terms of armaments, strategies, and wars. The key ingredient is power, and cultural differences are of minor importance, if not irrelevant. The reversals in United States-Japanese relations—from war to peace—or in U.S.-Chinese relations—from alliance to cold war to quasi-partnership—can be viewed as indicating, in Kissinger's phase, "the absolute primacy of geopolitics." One characteristic of geopolitics is interchangeability of actors; that is, it really makes no intrinsic difference whether the United States is in alliance with China against Japan or with Japan against China. What matters is the fact that all are playing the game of power politics. The United States became militarily involved in East Asia after the 1930s not because of some actual or perceived cultural differences between Americans and Asians but because all the actors were oriented toward power balances, regardless of who was doing the balancing or unbalancing.

My second aim is related to this point. It is to raise the question of the impact of America's military involvement in Asia upon the cultures of the United States and of East Asia. Although culture was essentially irrelevant to the story of that involvement, the fact remains that Americans and Asians continued to develop their respective cultural values and institutions during these fifty years. Because military history can be discussed in power terms, one must not assume that power is everything. When Park described East-West relations in 1931, he assumed that the differences between Occident and Orient were fundamental. But he also sensed that the Oriental world was becoming more and more Westernized, while the Westerners' sense of superiority was beginning to be undermined. What has happened since then? Has the deepening involvement of American power in Asia and the Pacific brought about new developments in American-Asian cultural relations? These are difficult questions to examine, but let me make three observations.

First, it would seem that the kind of dichotomous generalizations that Park mentioned have continued to represent a very influential way of looking at Asian affairs. The growth of Japanese power in the 1930s, for instance, was seen by Americans as a challenge to Western civilization and its
values. Chinese, whether Nationalist or Communist, were considered more “Western” in their heroic nationalism, resourcefulness, hard work, and their alleged determination to establish a more democratic form of government. After Japan’s defeat, Gen. Douglas MacArthur measured the success of his occupation policy by such Western yardsticks as the Japanese people’s acceptance of democracy and Christianity. During the 1950s and the 1960s there was a vogue of modernization theory, according to which a country was considered either more or less modernized by means of certain criteria. Not surprisingly, the criteria were derived from the experience of the United States and western European nations. Even in the 1970s and later, when post-industrial society, rather than modernized society, became a norm for Western development, non-Western societies were analyzed in terms of the distances they had travelled in the direction of modernity and post-modernity. In the meantime, the idea that East-West differences are substantial and perhaps unbridgeable seems very influential even today. Travellers to Japan and China still come back with tales of the mysterious and exotic East, and, on the other side of the coin, Americans readily define themselves as Westerners, meaning they are not inheritors of certain characteristic traits that allegedly govern the behavior and thoughts of Easterners.

The fact that such ideas have persisted for so long is very interesting. It is as if the ups and downs of America’s military involvement in Asia have had little impact on how Americans view Asians. This is surprising in view of the fact that today, far more than in 1931, there are major differences among the countries and peoples of Asia. Whatever validity there may have been fifty years ago in speaking of Orientals as a distinguishable group, the concept would seem totally inadequate as an all-embracing term to include Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Filipinos, Thais, Burmese, Indians, and many others. The persistence of certain stereotypes indicates that all the turmoil of wars and invasions has not really affected long-accepted categories of thought.

So long as these categories are employed in order to define one’s own cultural boundaries, they may be considered harmless. But sometimes simplistic dichotomies in terms of “we” and “they” can cause serious damage, as happened during the war when the Japanese sought to justify their invasion of Asian lands in the name of pan-Asianism. They mouthed slogans about Asia’s liberation from the West and about the West’s spiritual bankruptcy. They put Park’s ideas upside down and called on all Oriental peoples to reject the Occident as a model. Instead, they were exhorted to return to their historic purity and to create a moral order free from such Western vices as materialism and egoism. The Japanese vision was just as flawed as Park’s generalizations, for as soon as Japanese troops landed in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and elsewhere, they started behaving just like the Western colonial masters. For the mass of Chinese, Indochinese, and others
it made no difference whether the Japanese called themselves Asians; what
did matter was that the United States and its Western allies were willing to
help throw the invaders out.

This, then, is the second point I would like to make. Simplistic general-
izations can sometimes cause serious damage. Cultural misconceptions and
stereotypical images will undoubtedly remain, but let us hope that they will
be confined to private spheres and not allowed to confuse international
relations by imposing artificial boundaries between human groups.

My third and final observation is to go a step beyond this second point
and say that cultural boundaries seem to have become less and less distinc-
tive in the past fifty years. If Park's generalizations about the contrast
between East and West in 1931 were not very sound, today it would make
even less sense to divide the world into rigid cultural groupings. In part this
has been due to the military interactions between Asia and the West. Wars
and their aftermath (such as military occupation) have brought Americans
and Asians into direct contact to a far greater extent than ever before. The
results have not always been good, as direct encounters sometimes confirm
one's prior prejudices. But certainly one by-product has been to enable more
and more people of these countries to see one another as individuals, not
simply as aggregate masses. Most important, the wars have provided them
with a shared experience in a broad sense, so that they are all heirs to the
horrors of war. If there is one thing that unites Americans, Chinese, Kore-
ans, Japanese, and others, it would be their determination not to repeat the
horrible experiences of Asian wars, which lasted more or less intermittently
from 1931 through 1975.

Shared experience, after all, is what enables one to transcend national
and cultural boundaries. An American today may share as much experience
with an Asian thousands of miles away as with an American a hundred years
ago, even fifty years ago. But do shared experiences produce shared percep-
tions, values, and attitudes? Forty years ago one might have said that Amer-
icans and Japanese had absolutely nothing in common. Twenty years ago
the same thing might have been said of Americans and Chinese or Ameri-
cans and Koreans. But today it would be an extreme bigot who does not
recognize that all these peoples are concerned with similar things and pursue
similar objectives. In practical policy matters, in trade disputes, and in
responding to specific questions, they may from time to time come together
or drift apart. But, underneath such events, one senses growing awareness in
these countries that what is good for one of them is also good for the others
and that craving for a higher and more humane standard of living, for a
cleaner environment, for knowledge, for art and music and, ultimately, for
mutual understanding is not a monopoly of one cultural group.

Such being the case, I believe we should confront the situation by
discarding time-worn clichés about the mutually exclusive civilizations of
the Orient and the Occident and by considering American-Asian relations in a broader framework of interdependence. Fifty years ago, America’s interactions with Asia, both in power and cultural terms, were largely superficial. The situation is vastly different today. The destinies of Americans and Asians are interwoven, and the greatest challenge facing them in the next fifty years may well be the question of whether they will succeed in making use of the growing interdependence among them to devise a regional community not only of peace and security but also of tolerance, humaneness, and compassion.

Professor Akira Iriye is a leading scholar of East Asian affairs. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1961 and has been a faculty member or visiting professor at Harvard University, University of California at Santa Cruz, University of Rochester, and University of California at Berkeley. He was a Guggenheim Fellow in 1974 and is presently the Chairman of the Department of History at the University of Chicago and the Chairman of the Committee on American-East Asian Relations. Professor Iriye has written or edited more than a dozen books in Japanese and English. His works include: After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (1968); The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction (1974); From Nationalism to Internationalism: American Foreign Policy to 1914 (1977); and Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (1981).
Notes

8. This latter idea inspired John Carter Vincent, consul general in Mukden at the time of the incident, who retained a strong faith in the universal applicability of certain (especially liberal) Western ideas. See Gary May, China Scare: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent (Washington, 1979).
Part VI. The Military and Society
Introduction to Part VI

The relationships between societies and their armed forces have been of keen interest to American military historians since World War II. Although their independence grew out of military action, Americans have always looked upon the military with watchful eyes. Americans came to view any professional military establishment as did Machiavelli—a constant threat to society—and always favored instead a citizen-soldier approach to fulfill the military needs of society.

In the United States, war was also considered separate from the political process. The relationship between warfare and politics, so closely described by Clausewitz, was a foreign notion to the new nation. Warfare, when it was to be engaged in, usually represented a failure on the part of the societies involved to live peacefully. Therefore, war had to assume the quality of a crusade; that is, the desired end had to justify the appalling use and cost of force. Total war, to the extent possible, was the only logical approach to fighting; notions of limited war for limited goals seemed inappropriate.

With the exception of the War of 1812, Americans enjoyed a string of military victories from the Revolution through World War II. Then, nuclear weapons and the Korean conflict introduced new factors into the matter of applying military force; these considerations made many Americans uncomfortable. In the post-World War II period, scholars from different disciplines began to examine more carefully the different relationships between American society and its military. In particular, Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* became a pioneering work still used today by students of military affairs, and Russell Weigley's *The American Way of War* provided a framework for analyzing America's approach to and treatment of national defense.

Five Harmon lecturers addressed the multifaceted topic of civil-military relations in some way. As America struggled with the Vietnam War in 1970, Great Britain's General Sir John Winthrop Hackett gave his American listeners clearly defined roles for the military. Noting first that effective governments need a credible military force dedicated and firmly committed to the state, he then compared the British and American approaches to warfare. The former believed that war continued policy; the latter felt war replaced politics. This fundamental difference obviously affected the way each state viewed its defense organization.

After weapons of mass destruction appeared, Hackett continued, civilian leaders had to monitor their military more carefully and civil-military
relations took on new dimensions. Potential military disobedience to civil authorities over the use of nuclear weapons posed a grave threat to democratic societies. In an age in which only limited but costly wars seem probable, it must be the civilians who determine national goals and the level of resources allotted to achieve those ends.

In his 1976 Harmon Lecture Robert M. Utley focused on the American frontier in his treatment of civil-military relationships. The U.S. military tradition, he argued, is an accumulated body of experiences, influenced in no small measure by frontier service. Indeed, until the eve of World War I, our Regular Army was almost wholly a creature of the frontier, which in turn shaped its strategy and structure. Military leaders considered Indian warfare a bother and made no real effort to devise special ways to wage it; neither did the Army organize or plan for conventional war. Nonetheless, open warfare on whole Indian populations was often practiced as a frontier manifestation of what later became an American military proclivity for total war.

Utley concluded that the frontier failed as a training ground for orthodox wars, demonstrated the need for the militia, and revealed the inadequacies of the Army. He also noted, however, that the frontier ultimately contributed to the professionalization of the U.S. Army. The isolation of the Army from the rest of the population fostered a spirit of self-development that laid the groundwork for the future postgraduate military school system, original thought on the nature and theory of warfare, and professional associations and publications.

Given its political origins and traditional commitment to civil rights, American society has long viewed militarism with contempt. As the Vietnam War wound down, the U.S. military received much criticism for the course of events in that unfortunate conflict, and mention of militarism appeared from time to time on the lips of military critics. In his 1972 Harmon Lecture Russell F. Weigley addressed the topic and spoke to the dangers of confusing militarism with the military way. The military way exists when armed forces seek to win national objectives with the utmost efficiency. The militaristic way appears when armed forces glorify the incidental and romantic trappings of war for their own sake. Appropriate military activities of armed forces are not militaristic activities, nor is militarism the opposite of pacifism. As the Vietnam War became increasingly distasteful many Americans tended to blur the distinctions.

Examples of militarism are best found in nineteenth century Europe when the Prussian Army dominated the state and its officer corps abused power by reshaping national policy to suit the military. Prussia's military success led other continental states to emulate its system, and the resulting spread of militarism late in the century partly accounted for World War I. Great Britain and the United States, however, were exceptions to this general
trend and avoided the shift toward militarism. In fact, Weigley argued, the United States has never experienced anything even approaching militarism in the true sense of the term.

Weigley concluded with a vital point. As the professional military officer corps comes to work more closely with its civilian leadership in the future, it will tend to become more politicized, and the boundaries between the two will become more blurred. Both will need to guard against the dangers emanating from this new relationship.

In his 1984 Harmon Lecture Harold C. Deutsch elaborated on the German militarism noted by Weigley when he spoke about military planning in Germany before the two world wars. Before 1914 the German General Staff came to dominate military planning with little or no contribution from civilian leaders. Fearing a coalition against Germany, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, head of the General Staff, made plans to strike first in the East if attacked by a coalition including Russia and France. His successor, Count von Schlieffen, reversed the strategy by planning to attack in the West in the same situation. To do so, however, German armies had to violate Low Country borders. Military planners ignored the full political implications of this dangerous act on European politics, and the civilian leadership did not register its objection in an effective manner. When the Germans declared war against Russia and France in 1914, they marched through Belgium, according to the von Schlieffen Plan. Great Britain, which felt expressly obligated to defend Belgium's neutrality, declared war on Germany, thus entering the conflict that became World War I.

In summary, the German plan simply violated a dictum of Clausewitz; that is, the political imperative must maintain supremacy over military strategy. The planners’ decision making leading to the events of August 1914 provide the best example of militarism in Western society.

By contrast, pre-World War II Germany allowed its civilian leadership under Adolf Hitler to organize freely and execute national war plans without serious challenge from its generals. The Army did not oppose Hitler's rise to power, and in return was left relatively free to expand and develop. Over time, the Army became beholden to Hitler, who may well have considered it to be the military branch of the party. When Hitler took more direct control over military operations and planning, the results proved disastrous. While the pre-World War I experience featured far too much military influence, the later period found too little military advice being followed by the state. In both cases Germany, and indeed the world, suffered greatly.

During war democratic societies generally pull together in a surge of collective effort; if battlefield results prove disappointing, support for the war wanes. While the Vietnam War freshly reminds us of the latter experience, Americans fondly think of our society's conduct during World War II as a model of full cooperation and support—the way a nation needs to work
together to win a war. Notwithstanding that popular belief, John M. Blum reminded those attending his 1982 Harmon Lecture that serious divisions within U.S. society existed even during America's most popular war.

A society needs to prepare itself mentally before it can successfully wage war, Blum stated, and Americans were not in that frame of mind on 7 December 1941. Even after the attack on Pearl Harbor, one 1942 survey indicated that seventeen million Americans were opposed to prosecuting the war. Over time, however, events and depictions of the enemy as cruel and warlike (and in the case of the Japanese, as ungodly, subhuman, and treacherous as well) did much to galvanize the public to support the war effort fully. Even so, not all was well in fortress America. Class conflict erupted between different social groups, and race riots occurred in major cities. While real wages rose, full employment reappeared, and government fiscal policy effected a considerable redistribution of wealth downward, strife over wages and labor differences did not disappear during World War II but lay smoldering.

Within every warring nation, Blum continued, even when there is a high degree of unity against the enemy, men and women will also unite against their fellows, often with ferocity and prejudicial hate. While America was among the most internally moderate of those nations fighting World War II, the U.S. home front was far from fully united even though its war effort was substantial. Factions existed or developed within society based on class, race, and politics. Blum's lecture forced the audience to realize that a society that totally and harmoniously supports its military endeavors is indeed a rare phenomenon, a point worth remembering by officers studying warfare.

The increased attention to relationships between societies and their armed forces has been a direct product of our nation's extensive attention to World War II and the work of historians and social scientists in military affairs. More historians are mastering the tools of the social sciences and applying them to their research. In the future the amount and level of information scholars and leaders will have on the link between societies and their armed forces will dwarf that available in the twentieth century and should further advance our knowledge of civil-military relations. This concluding section of Harmon Lectures on the subject of the military and society provides a glimpse into studies already done in this area and suggests, perhaps, something about the nature of studies yet to come.
The Military in the Service of the State

General Sir John Winthrop Hackett

I am much honoured by the invitation to address this distinguished gathering tonight, and my wife and I are deeply indebted to our hosts for their hospitality and for the opportunity to visit this beautiful and remarkable place. My topic tonight is one upon which much has already been said. It might reasonably be asked whether anything omitted from the distinguished writings of men like Samuel Huntington, Hanson Baldwin, Spanier, Clark, Legere, Coles, Ralston, Higgins to name only a few, as well as those very distinguished men, Theodore Ropp and Forrest C. Pogue, and my own good friend and countryman Michael Howard, who have also enjoyed your hospitality on similar occasions, has sufficient importance to justify a transatlantic journey to say it. But times and perspectives change. It is perhaps worthwhile to ask, from a point in time now well advanced in a century which has seen swifter change in human affairs than any since the world began, what the relationship between the military and the state looks like today, what changes have taken place in it in our time, and what factors are at work leading to further change. To try to be exhaustive would be to succeed only in exhausting patience. I propose therefore only to outline a basic position and suggest broadly how it has developed up to our own time, to point to some of the factors bearing in a novel way upon the relationship between the military and the state in the second half of our century and to ask what their effect might be, and finally to consider some ethical aspects of the relationship.

Until man is a great deal better than he is, or is ever likely to be, the requirement will persist for a capability which permits the ordered application of force at the instance of a properly constituted authority. The very existence of my society depends in the last resort upon its capacity to defend itself by force.

"Covenants without swords are but words," said Thomas Hobbes three hundred years ago. This is no less true today. Government thus requires an effective military instrument bound to the service of the state in a firm obligation.

The obligation was at one time uniquely personal. Later it developed into an obligation to a person as the recognized head of a human group—a tribe, a clan, a sept, or a nation. The group develops in structure,acquires associations and attributes (including territoriality) in a process occurring in
different ways at different times in different places. The polis emerges in ancient Greece. King John is found in Mediaeval England describing himself on his seal, the first of English kings to do so, as Rex Angliae, King of England, and no longer Rex Anglorum, King of the English. The state is born. In Western Europe statehood had by the mid-thirteenth century largely replaced the concept of an all-embracing Christendom as the basic political structure. Military service continued however to be rendered as an obligation to a person, to the single ruler, to the monarch, and the personal link has persisted in one form or another right up to today.

I leave the Middle Ages with reluctance, as I always do, in a world in which the book I have long been preparing on a topic in the twelfth century has so often been pushed aside by the preoccupations of the twentieth. As we leave the Middle Ages behind, the military profession emerges, clearly distinguished from other institutions. Continuous service, regular pay, uniforms, segregation in barracks, the revival and improvement of ancient military formations such as the Roman Legion, the development of tactics, the introduction of better materials and techniques and of firearms, more attention to logistics—these and other developments had by the early eighteenth century given to the calling of the man-at-arms a clearly distinguishable profile as the lineal antecedent of the military profession we know today. The eighteenth century regularized this calling; the nineteenth professionalized it. From the late nineteenth century onwards, armed force was available to the governments of all advanced states through the medium of military institutions everywhere broadly similar in structure and essentially manned—and wholly managed—by professionals. The soldier and the statesman were by now no longer interchangeable and the subordination of military to civil was, in theory everywhere and in your country and mine in fact as well, complete.

The Napoleonic experience led not only to the complete professionalization of the military calling; by reducing to a system the basic concept of the French revolutionary armies, it opened up the era of the nation-in-arms and thus of total war. In the eighteenth century, wars were conducted by a relatively small sample of the nation's manpower applying a relatively small proportion of the nation's wealth. The nineteenth century led to the situation where the totality of a nation's resources in men and materials was applied to conflicts in which all other belligerents were similarly mobilized. In the eighteenth century, war and peace could to some extent coexist. England and France were at war when the writer Sterne received his passport to travel in France from the French ambassador in London himself, with the words, "A man who laughs is never dangerous." Odd vestiges of the coexistence of war and peace persisted even into the nineteenth century: George Washington's investment account was handled by Barings of London throughout the Revolutionary War; and Russia, seventy years later, helped
to finance the Crimean War against France, Turkey, and Britain by means of loans raised in London. But by quite early in the twentieth century, war and peace had come to be mutually exclusive concepts and could coexist no longer.

A century and a half after Napoleon we seem to have reverted in some respects to the position evident before him. Total war is now unacceptable, total peace is apparently unobtainable. The world lives in a state between the two: war and peace again now coexist.

With the military institution professionalized, regularized, and seen to be subordinate to the civil power, what was its sphere of operation and to what or whom was it ultimately responsible? Clausewitz declared that war was the continuance of policy by other means. Military action in war must always be governed by political requirements.

But some who have accepted that the state is master have not always accepted that the statesmen are the masters or have done so with extreme reluctance. "I can't tell you how disgusted I am becoming with those wretched politicians," said Gen. George McClellan in October 1861—a sentiment which has possibly been echoed more than once since then. On at least one important occasion in recent years, hostility and distrust have erupted into something near open insubordination.

The principles formulated by Clausewitz have not been accepted as binding at all times everywhere. In Germany in World War I, the Army under the control of Hindenburg and Ludendorff became "a state within the state claiming the right to define what was or was not to the national interest." The supreme command reserved to itself the right of defining Germany's war aims.

The history of the United States in our time has also afforded instances of tendencies to operate in a sense opposed to the concepts set out by Clausewitz. The case of Gen. MacArthur is important here and I shall return to it later. But in quite another respect the approach of the United States to military/civil relationships up to the middle of our century could be described as anti-Clausewitzian.

Let us look at the spring of the year 1945 as events drove swiftly on to military defeat of Germany. In spite of agreement between the Allies on postwar areas of occupation, "It was well understood by everyone," as Winston Churchill wrote, "that Berlin, Prague and Vienna could be taken by whoever got there first." The Supreme Allied Commander, writes Forrest C. Pogue, "halted his troops short of Berlin and Prague for military reasons only." As Gen. Eisenhower himself said of this time, "Military plans, I believed, should be devised with the single aim of speeding victory."

General Eisenhower recognized that Berlin was the political heart of Germany. Gen. Bradley, however, in opposing the British plan for an all-out offensive directed on the capital, described Berlin as no more than "a pre-
tige objective,” though he frankly conceded later that: “As soldiers we looked naively on the British inclination to complicate the war with political foresight and nonmilitary objectives.”

Here lies the crucial difference between two philosophies. The one holds that war replaces politics and must be conducted by purely military criteria towards purely military ends. When war has been ended by the enemy’s military defeat, political action can once more take over from the military.

The other maintains that war continues policy and is conducted only to a political end, that in grand strategy purely military criteria and objectives do not exist, and that military action must at all times be governed by political considerations arising out of clearly defined war aims. Under the first concept the only war aim is to win the war and to do this as quickly as possible. Under the second the prime aim in war is to win the peace. A policy of unconditional surrender is not a war aim at all but the acknowledgment of the lack of one.

There were of course towards the end of World War II problems of national sensitivity within the alliance which complicated issues. It would be wrong now to oversimplify them. Nevertheless, whereas Churchill asked at the time whether the capture of Berlin by the Russians would not “lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties for the future,” the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that such “psychological and political advantages as would result from the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the Russians should not override the imperative military consideration, which in our opinion is the destruction and dismemberment of the German armed forces.” There is no evidence whatsoever that General Eisenhower at any time put American national interests above those of the British. There is plenty of evidence that he acknowledged the complete priority in importance of the general political interest over the military. “I am the first to admit,” he said, “that a war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation. ” The Combined Chiefs gave him no other instructions on this critically important point than to make his own dispositions. The new President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, cabled Churchill on April 21, 1945, that “the tactical deployment of American troops is a military one.”

On May 2, 1945, with the Allied troops still halted according to their orders from SHAEF on or about the Elbe, the Russians completed the capture of Berlin. On May 12, with the Allies halted on orders from the same source to the north and west of Prague, the Russians entered Prague too. I do not think I need dwell now on the consequences of these events or their effect upon the history of our own time. Let me only add a warning
against oversimplification. The record stands as quoted. The Yalta agreement, however, is also on the record and it is not easy to see how the Allies could have stayed in Berlin and Prague even if they had gotten there first.

The decisions which led to the course of events I have outlined here were in general wholly consistent with United States attitudes up to the mid-twentieth century. The national ethic was not greatly in favour of the application of armed force to a political end. It is true that America had been involved in limited wars (like the Spanish-American and that of 1812-14 with Britain) and in wars against the Indians which could scarcely be justified on grounds either of absolute morality or of national survival. But the nation has in general been reluctant to fight except when there was clear and compelling danger of national overthrow or a violation of the moral code which the nation followed—a violation so grave and flagrant as to demand correction. It has then suspended normal peacetime procedures wherever the military imperative demanded, thrown its whole weight into the crushing of opposing armed force as speedily as possible and, this accomplished, returned with relief to its own way of life.

From this concept there developed a division of responsibility of which a classic exposition is quoted by Morton from an Army War College statement of September 1915. "The work of the statesman and the soldier are therefore co-ordinate. Where the first leaves off the other takes hold."10

The middle years of our century, however, have seen changes which have profoundly affected the relations of military and civilians and have set up a new situation. Of developments in military practice, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction is the most obvious. It is not the only one. Improved and new techniques and materials abound and have been applied not only in all aspects of weaponry but over the whole range of tools for war. Developments in metals, ceramics, plastics; new sources of energy; new forms of propulsion; new techniques in the electric and electronic fields; laser beams and infrared; the startling developments in solid state physics which have revolutionized communications and control systems—these are only a few examples chosen pretty well at random from a list any military professional could almost indefinitely extend. What has been happening in space needs no emphasis nor does the dramatic rise in powers of surveillance. The flow of information from all sources has vastly increased and the application of automatic processes to its handling has opened a new dimension.

There are other developments than those in the hardware departments. International alignments have changed. The United States has replaced Britain in important traditional roles; Russia has been reborn; China has emerged as a major power. The Third World has grown up out of disintegrating colonial empires—British, French, Belgian, Dutch—and stresses have developed in the international community no less than at home as the rich are seen to get richer much more quickly than the poor do. International rela-
tions have grown more complex with the demise of bipolarity. The Russians have moved further from strict Marxism at home and developed a striking potential for armed action at a distance abroad. The failure hitherto of yet another attempt to establish a world community of nations in the United Nations has been accompanied by a growing impatience worldwide with warfare as a means of settling social problems, while there has been no decline at all in the resort to warfare. There has been a surge of interest everywhere in the study of defence problems, an interest which springs, in my view, from a basic realization that what is at stake is nothing less than human survival. There has been much striving towards international agreement to take account of a new situation, and some of it not unpromising—the Test Ban Treaty, for instance, and SALT. The American relationship with Europe has changed and is changing further. Many other things have happened. These are only some of the more important developments in the field of external relations.

Here in the States you have seen an increase of centralized authority and a closer scrutiny of the decision-making process in relation to national security. The risks of the nuclear age and the complexity of international issues have resulted in a day to day involvement of the executive in external affairs, with all their military implications, far greater than in the past. The reasons for this, as well as for the development of defence analysis into a considerable industry, lie in the imperatives of nuclear weapon power. Armed forces cannot now be brought into being more or less at leisure after the crisis breaks, as was formerly possible for America beyond the oceans, and for Britain, protected by her navy, when Britain could afford to be content to lose every battle but the last. For in general and unrestricted war the last battle is now the first, and we know that it cannot be won. Thus it is vital not to let the war take place at all, and deterrence becomes the major element in defence. But deterrence demands an apparatus sufficient in size and performance, always up to date, always at a high state of readiness, but never used and never even fully tested. It is therefore quite inevitable that the military agency will be closely and continuously monitored by its civil masters.

From all these and other developments, the civil/military relationship now finds itself in a new frame of reference. I select two important elements in this new environment for further comment.

First of all there is the enormous rise in the cost of warlike material since World War II and the huge increase in the burden on national resource, in money, materials, and skilled manpower, which preparation for war demands. President Eisenhower spoke of the growing significance of a military/industrial complex. General MacArthur among others drew attention to the ruinous cost of preparation for war, as distinct from the cost of its conduct. The demands of the military upon national resource, in times when a world war is not being fought, can be so great that the whole
orientation of national policy, not only abroad but at home as well, can be
determined by them. The danger of the formal supersession of civil author-
ity by the military can today in our two democracies be dismissed as negligi-
ble. National resource, however, whatever its size, is limited. Money spent
on space cannot be spent on slum clearance. Money spent on the contain-
ment of pollution cannot be used for an anti-ballistic-missle system. Even if
the usurpation of civil government by the military is no longer to be feared,
the orientation of policies, particularly at home, which might be forced
upon the state by demands upon material resource and money and skilled
industrial, technical, and other manpower, could place the military in a
position of dominance in the state scarcely less decisive in the event than
formal usurpation of powers of government. In a pamphlet published in
Britain this month, J. K. Galbraith speaks of the growth of a huge bureau-
cratic organization of defence contractors and politicians acting with service
advice. It began to grow, to use Galbraith’s arresting phrase, before poverty
was put on the national agenda. The danger that the military, through the
demands upon resource of the military/industrial complex, would exercise
too powerful an influence over the state was never high in postwar Britain.
Professor Galbraith suggested to me last week in England that the British
tradition of civil supremacy was probably too powerful to allow it. There are
other, simpler reasons. The World Wars which greatly enriched the United
States greatly impoverished the United Kingdom. Britain was made very
sharply aware at the end of World War II that drastic reduction in national
resource demanded a drastic review of spending priorities. Over the postwar
years Britain has asserted and confirmed priorities in which social spending
went ahead of expenditure on defence. In the past few years, for the first
time ever, less has been spent in Britain on defence, for example, than on
education.

In the United States, where resource was so much greater, the realiza-
tion only came later on that resource, however great, was not unlimited.
Hard priorities have had to be drawn and as this disagreeable task was faced,
perhaps a little reluctantly, the demands of some other claimants on na-
tional resource have had to be heard too.

My own view is that the danger of unbalancing the relationship between
military and state through inordinate demand upon national resource was
never great in Britain; and now in the United States, as national priorities
come under review, it is on the decline. There is here, however, an aspect of
civil/military relations to which we are not yet, I think, wholly
accommodated.

Of crucial importance in this relationship between armed forces and the
state is atomic weapon power. It is a commonplace now that total war is no
longer a rational act of policy. George Kennan saw this earlier than most
when he wrote in 1954, “People have been accustomed to saying that the day
of limited war is over. I would submit that the truth is exactly the opposite: that the day of total wars has passed, and that from now on limited military operations are the only ones that could conceivably serve any coherent purpose. The implications of this situation have not everywhere been fully accepted. The concept of the nation-in-arms is in major powers no longer viable and we have to think of national security in other terms. But in what terms?

The introduction of atomic weapons has thrown new light upon a hallowed principle of Clausewitz. "As war . . .," he wrote, "is dominated by the political object the order of that object determines the measure of the sacrifice by which it is to be purchased. As soon, therefore, as the expenditure in force becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value this object must be given up, and peace will be the result."

Into an equation which Clausewitz saw in relative terms, atomic weapons have now introduced an absolute. Can any political object be secured by the opening of a nuclear war which devastates both sides? Hence, of course, derives the whole language of brinkmanship in a situation in which one object has come to be common to all parties. This is now survival. In the context of general war we have here a completely new situation.

In the closing stages of World War II President Roosevelt showed much reluctance to impose a policy upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His successor, President Harry S Truman, was disinclined at a critical time in 1945, as we have seen, to instruct General Eisenhower to act in Europe on any other than purely military considerations. It was only five years later that this same presidential successor found himself roughly compelled to accept the logic of the new order and act in a diametrically opposite sense.

"The Korean War," says Samuel Huntington, "was the first war in American history (except for the Indian struggles) which was not a crusade." I cannot quite accept this, but it certainly was for the United States a war of unusual aspect. It was a war conducted according to the main concept supported by Clausewitz and not at all according to the practice of Ludendorff. That is to say, the object from the beginning was clearly defined in political terms, and limited. There were variations from time to time in the war aim. After MacArthur's brilliantly successful amphibious operation at Inchon, the aim shifted from the simple re-establishment of the status quo in South Korea to the effecting of a permanent change in the whole Korean Peninsula. The chance was seen to reunite this at a time when China was thought to be too preoccupied with the danger from the old enemy Russia to be inclined to intervene by force of arms. But China did intervene and the Administration reverted to its former aim, whose achievement would in its view run small risk of furnishing the USSR with excuse and opportunity for the opening of World War III before Europe was strong enough to resist.
In a specific interdiction effort to choke off North Korean supply and communications routes, a key Korean locomotive repair center is destroyed by B-29 Superforts of the U.S. Far East Air Forces Bomber Command in October 1950.

General MacArthur could not accept this position in terms either of the limitation of means or of the restriction of ends. He challenged the Administration on both counts. In criticizing the Administration's desire to prevent the war from spreading, he declared that this seemed to him to introduce a new concept into military operations. He called it the "concept of appeasement . . . the concept that when you use force you can limit that force." He was not consistent here. He did not, in fact, advocate the use of every available means against China. He was strongly against the use of American ground forces in any strength on the mainland, for example, and advocated in preference air bombardment and sea blockade with the possibility of enlarging Nationalist forces on the mainland out of Formosa. He did not, in my view, either convincingly or even with total conviction argue against the acceptance of limitations on hostilities. What he did insist on was that the limitations accepted should be those of his, the military commander's, choice and not those settled upon by his political superiors. But given the acceptance of limitation in principle, the identification of those areas in which specific limitations must be accepted is a clear matter of policy. Is that for soldiers to determine? MacArthur challenged the Administration on this issue and appealed to the legislature and the American people over the Administration's head. He lost. Perhaps he underestimated the character of
the President and the degree to which experience had helped him to develop since the spring of 1945. Perhaps he overestimated the support that he could expect in the Joint Chiefs. The position taken by the Joint Chiefs, however, supported that of the President. It conveyed quite clearly that the instrumental nature of the military, as an agency in the service of the state, was not going to be forgotten. In the seven years between 1945 and 1952 there probably lies a watershed in civil/military relations in the United States, which future historians will see as of prime importance.

But another question arises, and this too was raised by the case of MacArthur, as it arose in the matter of the Curragh incident in Ireland in 1914 and with Gen. de Gaulle in 1940. Where or by what is the allegiance of the military professional engaged? Personal service to an absolute monarch is unequivocal. But in a constitutional monarchy, or a republic, precisely where does the loyalty of the fighting man lie?

In Ireland just before the outbreak of World War I, there was a distinct possibility that opponents of the British Government's policy for the introduction of Home Rule in Ireland would take up arms to assert their right to remain united with England under the Crown. But if the British Army were ordered to coerce the Ulster Unionists, would it obey? Doubts upon this score were widespread and they steadily increased. In the event, there was no mutiny, though the Curragh incident has sometimes been erroneously described as such. The officers in a cavalry brigade standing by on the Curragh ready to move into the North of Ireland all followed their brigade commander's example in offering their resignations from the service. This in peacetime was perfectly permissible. The Curragh episode, all the same, formed a more than usually dramatic element in an intrusion by the military into politics which seriously weakened the British Government of the day and forced a change in its policy. As a successful manipulation of government by the military on a political issue, it has had no parallel in Britain in modern times. But is also raised the question of where personal allegiance lay and raised it more sharply than at any time since 1641, when the hard choice between allegiance to the King and adherence to Parliament, in the days of Thomas Hobbes, split the country in the English Civil War.

Essentially the same question was raised by MacArthur. For he not only challenged the Administration on the fundamentals of policy—upon political ends, that is, as well as upon choice of military means. He also claimed that he was not bound, even as a serving officer, by a duty to the executive if he perceived a duty to the state with which his duty to the Administration conflicted. His words to the Massachusetts legislature are worth quoting:

I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept, that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of
the Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous. 16

There is here a deep and serious fallacy. I do not refer to the possible violation of the President's constitutional position as Commander in Chief. I have more in mind a principle basic to the whole concept of parliamentary democracy as it is applied, with differences in detail but in essential identity of intention, in our two countries. It is that the will of the people is sovereign and no refusal to accept its expression through the institutions specifically established by it—whether in the determination of policies or in the interpretation of the constitution—can be legitimate. MacArthur's insistence upon his right as an individual to determine for himself the legitimacy of the executive's position, no less than his claim of the right as a military commander to modify national policies, can never be seen in any other way than as completely out of order. It is ironic that MacArthur, who himself might perhaps have been brought to trial for insubordination, should at one time have sat in judgment on another general officer for that very offence. Gen. Mitchell, though possibly wide open to charges of impropriety in the methods he used, was challenging the correctness of the Administration's policy decisions. MacArthur's act was the far graver one of challenging his orders in war and of appealing to the legislature and people over the Commander in Chief's head.

It is worthy of note that in the wave of criticism of General MacArthur from non-American sources, some of it violent at times, the voice of General de Gaulle in France was almost absent amongst those of comparable importance which was raised in MacArthur's defence. De Gaulle himself, of course, had been there too. He had declined to accept the wholly legitimate capitulation to a national enemy in war of a properly constituted French government. This is something for which France will always remain deeply in his debt. There is no doubt, however, of the correctness of the position taken by officers of the so-called Vichy French Forces after the fall of France. We fought them in Syria on account of it. The Troupes françaises du Levant had orders to defend French possessions in mandated territories against all comers and this they did. I was myself wounded for the first time in the last war, in that campaign, commanding a small force in an untidy little battle on the Damascus road which we won. After the armistice in Syria and the Lebanon, walking around Beirut with an arm in plaster, I met a French officer who was another cavalryman and a contemporary whom I had known before the war as a friend. He had the other arm in plaster and, I discovered, had been in this little battle the commander on the Vichy French side. We dined together in the St. Georges Hotel while he explained to me with impeccable logic how professionally incompetent the command had been on our side. The fact that we had won was at best irrelevant and...
worst aesthetically repugnant. But I do not recall that in the whole of our discussion either of us doubted the correctness of his action in fighting against the Allies and his old friends.

There is sometimes a purely military justification for disobedience. Britain's greatest sailor, Lord Nelson, exploited it. After Jutland, Adm. Lord Fisher said of Adm. Jellicoe that he had all Nelson's qualities but one: he had not learned to disobey. What I describe as military justification rests in the opinion of the officer on the spot that he can best meet the military requirement of his superiors if he acts in some way other than that prescribed by them. This is a matter of professional judgment, and of courage, for failure can prejudice a career. It is not a matter of morals. But there are also circumstances in which men or women find themselves under a moral compulsion to refrain from doing what is lawfully ordered of them. If they are under sufficiently powerful moral pressure and are strong enough and courageous enough to face the predictable consequences of their action, they will then sometimes disobey. This, I know, is terribly difficult ground. "My country right or wrong" is not an easy principle to reconcile with an absolute morality, even if we accept a Hegelian view that the state represents the highest consumption of human society. Early in World War I a brave English nurse called Edith Cavell, who had said that "Patriotism is not enough," was shot by her country's enemies for relieving human suffering where she found it, among people held by the enemy to be francs tireurs or partisans. Nurse Edith Cavell's statue stands in London off Trafalgar Square, around the corner from the National Gallery, and it is worth a look in passing. It bears the inscription I have quoted: "Patriotism is not enough."

In the half century since that time doubt has grown further, not only on the ultimate moral authority of the nation state but also upon its permanence as a social structure. The nation state could at some time in the future develop into something else. States have before now been united into bigger groupings, and supra-national entities are not impossible.

I do not see the nation state disappearing for a long time yet, but already we have much experience of international political structures under which groups of national military forces are employed. The United States in the last third of a century, it has been said, has learnt more about the operation of coalitions than ever before. Conflicts of loyalty are always possible where forces are assigned to an allied command. I have been a NATO commander in Europe, and as such I had on my staff an officer of another nation who was engaged in the contingency planning of tactical nuclear targets. This was less of an academic exercise for this particular officer than it might have been, say, for an American or even for a Briton, for the targets were not only in Europe but in this officer's own country and in parts of it he had known from boyhood. It was made known to me that this officer was showing signs of strain and I had him moved to other work,
for the military servant of a nation state can even now be put under moral strain in situations where conflicts of loyalties arise. The tendency towards international structures will almost certainly increase and the incidence of such situations is unlikely to grow less.

Let me draw together these thoughts upon the moral, as distinguished from the professional, aspect of obedience. The fighting man is bound to obedience to the interest of the state he serves. If he accepts this, as MacArthur certainly did, he can still, rightly or wrongly, question, like MacArthur, the authority of men constitutionally appointed to identify and interpret the state's interest. He could even, like de Gaulle, flatly refuse to obey these men. Those who consider General MacArthur open to a charge of insubordination may consider that General de Gaulle was probably open to a charge of no less than treason. Neither is constitutionally permissible. A case in moral justification might just possibly be made for both, though such a case is always stronger when the results of the act are seen to be in the outcome beneficial. "Treason doth never prosper," wrote Sir John Harrington in the days of Queen Elizabeth the First. "What's the reason? For if it prosper none dare call it treason." In the event, de Gaulle became in the fullness of time President of the French Republic. It was poor Pétain that they put on trial.

Finally there is disobedience on grounds of conscience to an order, lawfully given, whose execution might or might not harm the state but which the recipient flatly declines, for reasons he finds compelling, to carry out. This will be done by the doer at his peril; and the risk, which can be very great, must be accepted with open eyes.

Another possible cause of strain upon the military is divergence in the ethical pattern of the parent society from that of its armed forces. Samuel Huntington, in the book *The Soldier and the State*, which will always occupy a high place in the literature upon this topic, spoke in the late 1950s of tendencies in the United States towards a new and more conservative environment, more sympathetic to military institutions. He suggested that this "might result in the widespread acceptance by Americans of values more like those of the military ethic." The course of events since Huntington wrote thus, in 1956, throws some doubt on the soundness of any prediction along these lines. The qualities demanded in military service, which include self-restraint in the acceptance of an ordered life, do not seem to be held in growing esteem everywhere among young people today. In consequence, where a nation is involved in a war which cannot be described as one of immediate national survival and whose aims, however admirable they may be, are not universally supported at home and perhaps not even fully understood there, strains can be acutely felt. Limited wars for political ends are far more likely to be productive of moral strains of the sort I have here suggested than the great wars of the past.

The wars of tomorrow will almost certainly be limited wars, fought for
limited ends. The nation-in-arms has vanished; the general war is no longer a rational concept. But the nation state will persist for a time yet and the application of force to its political ends will persist with it. These ends, however, will be limited and the means limited too—not by choice of the military but by choice of their employers, the constitutionally established civil agencies of the state. These employers will also be watching most carefully the level of demand being made, on the military behalf, on national resource. If this level rises so high as to prejudice enterprises higher in the national scale of priorities than preparation for war, they will be resisted. There are signs that the very high priority given to the demands of the military upon a national resource in the United States in the third quarter of the twentieth century will not persist into the fourth.

Ladies and gentlemen, in addressing myself to the topic chosen for this memorial address, "The Military in the Service of the State," I have selected only a few aspects of a big and complex theme. Let me end with something like a confessio fidei—a confession of faith. I am myself the product of thirty-five years' military service—a person who, with strong inclinations to the academic, nonetheless became a professional soldier. Looking back now in later life from a university, I can find nothing but satisfaction over the choice I made all those years ago as a student—a satisfaction tinged with surprise at the good sense I seem to have shown as a very young man in making it. Knowing what I do now, given the chance all over again, I should do exactly the same. For the military life, whether for sailor, soldier, or airman, is a good life. The human qualities it demands include fortitude, integrity, self-restraint, personal loyalty to other persons, and the surrender of the advantage of the individual to a common good. None of us can claim a total command of all these qualities. The military man sees round him others of his own kind also seeking to develop them, and perhaps doing it more successfully than he has done himself. This is good company. Anyone can spend his life in it with satisfaction.

In my own case, as a fighting man, I found that invitations after the World War to leave the service and move into business, for example, were unattractive, even in a time when anyone who had had what they called on our side "a good war" was being demoted and, of course, paid less. A pressing invitation to politics was also comparatively easy to resist. The possibility of going back to Oxford to teach Mediaeval History was more tempting. But I am glad that I stayed where I was, in the Profession of Arms, and I cannot believe I could have found a better or more rewarding life anywhere outside it.

Another thought arises here. The danger of excessive influence within the state to which I have been referring does not spring from incompetence, cynicism, or malice in the military, but in large part from the reverse. What is best for his service will always be sought by the serving officer, and if he
believes that in seeking the best for his service he is rendering the best service he can to his country, it is easy to see why. He may have to be restrained. He can scarcely be blamed.

The military profession is unique in one very important respect. It depends upon qualities such as those I have mentioned not only for its attractiveness but for its very efficiency. Such qualities as these make of any group of men in which they are found an agreeable and attractive group in which to function. The military group, however, depends in very high degree upon these qualities for its functional efficiency.

A man can be selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured, and morally corrupt in a wide variety of other ways and still be outstandingly good in pursuits in which other imperatives bear than those upon the fighting man. He can be a superb creative artist, for example, or a scientist in the very top flight and still be a very bad man. What the bad man cannot be is a good sailor, or soldier, or airman. Military institutions thus form a repository of moral resource which should always be a source of strength within the state.

I have reflected tonight upon the relationship between civilians and military in the light of past history, present positions, and possible future developments and have offered in conclusion my own conviction that the major service of the military institution to the community of men it serves may well lie neither within the political sphere nor the functional. It could easily lie within the moral. The military institution is a mirror of its parent society, reflecting strengths and weaknesses, It can also be a well from which to draw refreshment for a body politic in need of it.

It is in the conviction that the highest service of the military to the state may well lie in the moral sphere, and the awareness that almost everything of importance in this respect has probably still to be said, that I bring to an end what I have to offer here tonight in the Harmon Memorial Lecture for the year 1970.

General Sir John Winthrop Hackett has, to a unique degree, combined the careers of soldier, scholar, and educator. After taking some courses at Oxford University, he was commissioned in the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars in 1931. Prior to World War II he served in the Middle East where he completed a thesis for the degree of B. Litt. at Oxford. In 1942, he became commander of the 4th Parachute Brigade in the Middle East Theatre and led it through the Market/Garden Operation in Europe in September 1944. In 1947, he returned to the Middle East as Commander of the Transjordan Frontier Force. From 1963 to 1964 he was Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and from 1966 to 1968 he was Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine. During his wartime service he was wounded several times and decorated for gallantry. He served as Commandant of the Royal Military College of Science from 1958 to 1961 and is presently the Principal of King's College, London. General Hackett is the author of The Profession of Arms (Lees Knowles Lectures for 1962).

523
Notes

5. Ibid., p. 377.
6. Ibid., p. 378.
7. Ibid., p. 380.
8. Ibid., p. 381.
The Contribution of the Frontier to the American Military Tradition

Robert M. Utley

It is all a memory now, but what a memory, to cherish! ... A more thankless task, a more perilous service, a more exacting test of leadership, morale and discipline no army in Christendom has ever been called upon to undertake than that which for eighty years was the lot of the little fighting force of regulars who cleared the way across the continent for the emigrant and settler.¹

So declared Capt. Charles King in an address to Indian War veterans after the disappearance of the frontier had indeed made it all a memory. In dozens of novels penned after the effects of Apache arrows and bullets placed him on the retired list in 1879, King verbalized and reinforced the frontier army's view of itself. That the images he evoked fall somewhat short of historical truth does not exclude them from a prominent place in the American military tradition.

Captain King's heroic picture contrasts with images evoked by bumper stickers proclaiming that Custer died for our sins and by motion pictures such as "Little Big Man" and "Soldier Blue" depicting the frontier troopers as brutes rampaging about the West gleefully slaughtering peaceable Indians. These images have been intensified and popularized in recent years by a national guilt complex that would expiate sin by bending history to modern social purposes, but they are rooted in the rhetoric of nineteenth-century humanitarianism. "I only know the names of three savages upon the plains," declared the old abolitionist Wendell Phillips in 1870, "—Colonel Baker, General Custer, and at the head of all, General Sheridan." Baker's assault on a Piegan village in 1870 inspired a verse that could well have been written in the councils of the American Indian Movement a century later:

Women and babes shrieking awoke
To perish 'mid the battle smoke,
Murdered, or turned out there to die
Beneath the stern, grimy, wintry sky.²
No more than King's images do these represent historical truth, and no less are they too a part of the American military tradition.

As these contrasting images suggest, I see the American military tradition as in part a record—a record as we perceive it today, not necessarily as it was: in fact—of those people and events of the past that we have singled out to provide us with inspiration, edification, guidance, and even, as I have intimated, self-reproach. Besides this record, I take the American military tradition to be the accumulated body of military usage, belief, custom, and practice that has descended to us from the past. It is also policy, doctrine, thought, and institutions as they have evolved by selection, rejection, and modification through past generations to today. Let us examine how the frontier, which formed so long and prominent a part of the nation's military history, may have contributed—or indeed may have failed to contribute—to some of these aspects of the American military tradition.

Today's selective record of our frontier military experience may well be the frontier's most enduring contribution. From this heritage we have drawn a congeries of vignettes that loom conspicuously in the national memory and thus in the national military tradition. "Mad Anthony" Wayne's Legion sweeps with fixed bayonets through the forest debris of Fallen Timbers, routing the Indian defenders and planting the roots of the fledgling Regular Army. Andrew Jackson's infantry storms the fortifications at Horseshoe Bend, slaughtering more than five hundred Red Sticks and crushing a Creek uprising that threatens the Southwest in the War of 1812. Canby dies by assassination during a peace conference in California's lava beds, the only Regular Army general to lose his life in Indian warfare. The golden-haired Custer falls with every man of his immediate command in the best-known and most controversial of all frontier encounters. To Nelson A. Miles, Chief Joseph utters the moving words: "From where the sun now stands, I will fight no more, forever." This part of our tradition is one that arouses pride, or at least the thrill of adventure. Its symbols are battle and campaign streamers gracing the Army's colors, the military art of Frederic Remington, Charles Schreyvogel, and Rufus Zogbaum, and the motion picture depiction of the frontier army.

Especially the motion pictures. It is difficult to exaggerate their influence. John Ford was the master. In the climactic scene of "Fort Apache," for example, cavalry officer John Wayne philosophizes on the courage, stamina, skill, and jocular nature of the regular army troopers who opened the American West. A cavalry column with banners flying marches in silhouette against a desert sunrise as swelling music proclaims the majesty of their part in the epic of America. With such stirring scenes Ford shaped a whole generation's conception of the frontier army. In a television tribute, John Wayne conceded that Ford was not above perpetuating legends, consoling
himself that if this was not exactly the way it happened, it was the way it ought to have happened.

Darker images form part of the picture too. Gen. Winfield Scott's troops uproot Cherokees and herd them, suffering and dying, over the "Trail of Tears" to new homes in the West. "Gen. Jimmy" Carleton's volunteers conduct Navajos on an eastward "Long March" replete with similar tragic scenes to new homes in the sterile bottoms of the Pecos River. Chivington's "hundred-dazer:" slaughter Black Kettle's Cheyennes at Sand Creek. Exploding artillery shells shatter Big Foot's Sioux at Wounded Knee. Such scenes, likewise reinforced and distorted by motion pictures and television, take their place beside the stirring and the heroic in the mosaic of the national military tradition.

What we choose to remember and the way we choose to remember it may unduly flatter or unfairly condemn our military forebears, may indeed be more legend than history. Legends thus form a conspicuous part of our military tradition and are often far more influential in shaping our attitudes and beliefs than the complex, contradictory, and ambiguous truth. Our reading of truth, or at least the meaning of truth, changes from generation to generation. What is uplifting to one may be shameful to the next. We select and portray our heroes and villains to meet the needs of the present, just as we formulate doctrine, policy, practice, and other aspects of military tradition to meet the conditions of the present. The US Army's frontier heritage, replete with stereotypes and legends as well as with genuine historical substance, has furnished a galaxy of heroes and villains.

In the people and events of the military frontier we have found a major source of inspiration, guidance, pride, institutional continuity, and, not least, self-deprecation. But several centuries of Indian warfare should have contributed more to the national military tradition than a kaleidoscope of images.

The Regular Army was almost wholly a creature of the frontier. Frontier needs prompted creation of the Regular Army. Except for two foreign wars and one civil war, frontier needs fixed the principal mission and employment of the Regular Army for a century. Frontier needs dictated the periodic enlargements of the Regular Army in the nineteenth century. Frontier needs underlay Secretary of War John C. Calhoun's "expansible army" plan of 1820, which, though never adopted, contained assumptions that shaped US military policy until 1917. For a century the Regulars worked the frontier West. They explored and mapped it. They laid out roads and telegraph lines and aided significantly in the advance of the railroads. They campaigned against Indians. They guarded travel routes and protected settlers. By offering security or the appearance of it, together with a market for labor and produce, they encouraged further settlement. As enlistments expired, some stayed to help people the frontier themselves.
Citizen soldiers also contributed, though less significantly. From King Philip's War to the Ghost Dance, colonial and state militia, territorial and national volunteers, rangers, “minute companies,” spontaneously formed home guards, and other less admirable aggregations of fighting men supplemented or altogether supplanted the Regulars on the frontier. Often, indeed, the two worked at dramatic cross-purposes.

The contribution of the frontier to American military history was of paramount significance, but its contribution to the American military tradition was not of comparable significance. Inviting particular attention is the influence of the special conditions and requirements of the frontier on military organization, composition, strategy, and especially doctrine. A century of Indian warfare, extending a record of such conflict reaching well back into colonial times, should have taught us much about dealing with people who did not fight in conventional ways, and our military tradition might reasonably be expected to reflect the lessons thus learned. Some were not without relevance in Vietnam.

In examining the role of the frontier in nineteenth-century military history, however, we encounter a paradox. It is that the Army's frontier employment unfitted it for orthodox war at the same time that its preoccupation with orthodox war unfitted it for its frontier mission. In this paradox
we find the theories of Emory Upton and Samuel P. Huntington contradicting what seem to be fairly evident realities.

Emory Upton first stated the proposition that the Army had never been ready for a real war because it had been maintained chiefly to fight Indians. More recently, Samuel P. Huntington enlarged on Upton's thesis. As summed up by Huntington, "the requirements of the frontier shaped the strategy and structure of the Army." Organization, composition, command and staff, tactics, weapons, and the system of military education were all, in the Upton-Huntington view, decisively influenced if not altogether dictated by frontier mission.

If so, all these features of military policy proved singularly unresponsive to frontier conditions. A commanding general was supposedly needed for the operational direction of an active force on the frontier; yet he commanded scarcely more than his personal aides. A staff was needed not to plan for the next war but to support the ones currently underway on the frontier; yet the staff system contained flaws that severely impeded its logistical function. The organization of companies and regiments seems wholly conventional in nineteenth-century terms; it is difficult to see how they would have been differently organized for conventional war—and in fact they were not basically changed when conventional war came. The cavalry arm traced its beginnings to frontier needs, but the Mexican War or Civil War would surely have prompted the formation of mounted units anyway. The "rough and unsavory" rank and file that Huntington sees as well fitted for Indian fighting and road building were not well fitted for much of any duty, and the record of federalized volunteer units in the West during the Civil War plainly established the superiority of this class of troops over the typical peacetime regular. Nor, with the possible exception of the revolving pistol, a response to the frontier only insofar as mounted troops found a repeating handgun of great utility, can the evolution of military weaponry be linked to frontier needs.

So far as a system of border outposts constituted strategy, it was of course shaped by the frontier. But these forts represented less a deliberate plan than erratic responses to the demands of pioneer communities for security and local markets. The forts, incidentally, encouraged settlers to move beyond the range of military protection, stirred up the Indians, and led to still more forts, many beyond effective logistical support. Secretary of War Peter B. Porter lamented this trend toward overextension as early as the 1820s, but it continued for the balance of the century.

On the operational level, strategy and tactics are clearly not a product of frontier conditions. Most army officers recognized their foe as a master of guerrilla warfare. Their writings abound in admiring descriptions of his cunning, stealth, horsemanship, agility and endurance, skill with weapons, mobility, and exploitation of the natural habitat for military advantage. Yet
the Army as an institution never acted on this recognition. No military school or training program, no tactics manual, and very little professional literature provided guidance on how to fight or treat with Indians, although it should be noted in minor qualification that Dennis Hart Mahan apparently included in one of his courses at West Point a brief discussion of Indian-fighting tactics.

Lacking a formal body of doctrine for unconventional war, the Army waged conventional war against the Indians. Heavy columns of infantry and cavalry, locked to slow-moving supply trains, crawled about the vast western distances in search of Indians who could scatter and vanish almost instantly. The conventional tactics of the Scott, Casey, and Upton manuals sometimes worked, by routing an adversary that had foolishly decided to stand and fight on the white man's terms, by smashing a village whose inhabitants had grown careless, or by wearing out a quarry with persistent campaigning that made surrender preferable to constant fatigue and insecurity. But most such offensives merely broke down the grain-fed cavalry horses and ended with the troops devoting as much effort to keeping themselves supplied as to chasing Indians. The campaign of 1876 following the Custer disaster is a classic example.

The fact is, military leaders looked upon Indian warfare as a fleeting bother. Today's conflict or tomorrow's would be the last, and to develop a special system for it seemed hardly worthwhile. Lt. Henry W. Halleck implied as much in his Elements of Military Art and Science, published in 1846, and the thought lay at the heart of H. Hiney Upton's attempted redefinition of the Army's role in the late 1870s. In 1876 Gen. Winfield S. Hancock informed a congressional committee that the Army's Indian mission merited no consideration at all in determining its proper strength, organization, and composition. In part the generals were motivated by a desire to place the Army on a more enduring basis than afforded by Indian warfare. But in part, too, they were genuinely concerned about national defense. Therefore, although the staff was not organized to plan for conventional war, or any other kind for that matter, the generals were preoccupied with it, and the army they fashioned was designed for the next conventional war rather than the present unconventional war.

However orthodox the conduct of Indian wars, the frontier not only failed as a training ground for orthodox wars, it positively unfitted the Army for orthodox wars, as became painfully evident in 1812, 1846, 1861, and 1898. Scattered across the continent in little border forts, units rarely operated or assembled for practice and instruction in more than battalion strength. The company was the basic unit, and it defined the social and professional horizons of most line officers. Growing old in grade, with energies and ambitions dulled by boredom and isolation, the officer corps could well subscribe to Gen. Richard S. Ewell's observation that on the
frontier an officer "learned all there was to know about commanding forty
dragoons, and forgot everything else." 1

That the Army as an institution never elaborated a doctrine of Indian
warfare does not mean that it contained no officers capable of breaking free
of conventional thought. The most original thinker was Gen. George
Crook, who advocated reliance on mule trains as the means of achieving
mobility and who saw the conquest of the Indian as dependent upon pitting
Indian against Indian. Army organization provided for Indian scouts, but
Crook's concept went considerably beyond their use as guides and trailers.
"To polish a diamond there is nothing like its own dust," he explained to a
reporter in 1886:

It is the same with these fellows. Nothing breaks them up like turning
their own people against them. They don't fear the white soldiers, whom
they easily surpass in the peculiar style of warfare which they force upon
us, but put upon their trail an enemy of their own blood, an enemy as
tireless, as foxy, and as stealthy and familiar with the country as they
themselves, and it breaks them all up. It is not merely a question of
catching them better with Indians, but of a broader and more enduring
aim—their disintegration. 12

Had the nation's leaders understood the lessons of General Crook's
experience, they would have recognized that the frontier army was a conven-
tional military force trying to control, by conventional military methods, a
people that did not behave like conventional enemies and, indeed, quite
often were not enemies at all. They would have recognized that the situation
usually did not call for warfare, merely for policing; that is, offending
individuals needed to be separated from the innocent and punished. They
would have recognized that the conventional force was unable to do this and
that as a result punishment often fell, when it fell at all, on guilty and
innocent alike.

Had the nation's leaders acted on such understandings, the Army might
have played a more significant role in the westward movement—and one less
vulnerable to criticism. An Indian auxiliary force might have been developed
that could differentiate between guilty and innocent and, using the Indian's
own fighting style, contend with the guilty. Indian units were indeed devel-
oped but never on a scale and with a continuity to permit the full effect to be
demonstrated. Such an Indian force would have differed from the reserva-
tion police, which in fact did remarkably well considering their limitations.13
It would have been larger, better equipped, and less influenced by the vagaries
of the patronage politics that afflicted the Indian Bureau. Above all, it
would have been led by a cadre of carefully chosen officers imbued with a
sense of mission and experienced in Indian relations—the kind of officers
artist Frederic Remington said were not so much "Indian fighters" as "Indian thinkers." How different might have been the history of the westward movement had such a force been created and employed in place of the regular army line. How vastly more substantial might have been the contribution of the frontier to our traditions of unconventional warfare.

By contrast, a major aspect of twentieth-century practice owes a large debt to the frontier. Total war—warring on whole enemy populations—finds ample precedent in the frontier experience. Russell Weigley has pointed out how different the colonial Indian wars were from the formal and not very destructive warfare of the European pattern. In King Philip's War of 1675-76, for example, the Indians almost wiped out the New England settlements, and the colonists in response all but wiped out the Indians. "The logic of a contest for survival was always implicit in the Indian wars," Weigley writes, "as it never was in the eighteenth century wars wherein European powers competed for possession of fortresses and countries, but always shared an awareness of their common participation in one civilization, Voltaire's 'Republic of Europe.'"

Examples of total war may be found through subsequent centuries of Indian conflict, notably in the Seminole Wars, but it remained for Generals Sherman and Sheridan to sanctify it as deliberate doctrine. With the march across Georgia and the wasting of the Shenandoah Valley as models, they set forth in the two decades after the Civil War to find the enemy in his winter camps, kill or drive him from his lodges, destroy his ponies, food, and shelter, and hound him mercilessly across a frigid landscape until he gave up. If women and children fell victim to such methods, it was regrettable but justified because it resolved the issue quickly and decisively and thus more humanely. Although prosecuted along conventional lines and thus usually an exercise in logistical futility, this approach yielded an occasional triumph such as the Washita and Dull Knife fights that saved it from serious challenge. Scarcely a direct inspiration for the leveling of whole cities in World War II and Vietnam, frontier precedents of total war may nevertheless be viewed as part of the historical foundation on which this feature of our military tradition rests.

Another area that might be usefully probed is the relationship of the frontier to the militia tradition, whose modern expression, after generations of modification, is the mass citizen army. Though not exclusively a product of the frontier, the militia owed a great debt to the recurring Indian hostilities that brought pioneers together for common defense, and it figured prominently enough in the American Revolution for Walter Millis to see it as the principal factor in the "democratization" of war that prompted the collapse of the set-piece warfare of the eighteenth century. So firmly implanted was the militia tradition in the thinking of the Revolutionary generation, together with abhorrence of standing armies, that the architects of the
nation conceived it as the foundation of the military system, the chief reliance for national defense as well as frontier employment. Frontiersmen demonstrated how wrong they were. The Indian rout of Harmar and St. Clair so dramatically exposed the inadequacies of the militia as to give birth to the Regular Army, a contribution of the militia to US military history of no small significance, however negative. The organized militia fell apart after 1820, as foreign threats receded, but the militia tradition, nourished in part by the Indian frontier, evolved through various mutations into the twentieth century.

A clear and undeniable contribution of the frontier to the national military tradition is its large role in the rise of professionalism in the Army. Albert Gallatin wrote in 1802: “The distribution of our little army to distant garrisons where hardly any other inhabitant is to be found is the most eligible arrangement of that perhaps necessary evil that can be contrived. But I never want to see the face of one in our cities and intermixed with the people.” And rarely for a century, except in the Mexican and Civil Wars, were the soldiers intermixed with the people. Physically, socially, and at last in attitudes, interests, and spirit, the soldiers on the frontier remained isolated from the rest of the population. This separation, so costly in terms of public and governmental support, had one enduring benefit. Turning inward, the Army laid the groundwork for a professionalism that was to prove indispensable in the great world wars of the twentieth century. The postgraduate military school system, original thought about the nature and theory of warfare, and professional associations and publications find their origins in this time of rejection of the soldiers by their countrymen.

A final feature of our military tradition with strong frontier roots is the prominent role of minorities. The Regular Army's black regiments served on the frontier for three decades following their organization in 1866 and wrote some stirring chapters of achievement. They saw harder service than the white regiments and, because they afforded continuous and honorable employment in a time when blacks found few other opportunities, boasted lower desertion rates and higher reenlistment rates. Immigrants, too, found a congenial home in the Army, as well as a means of learning the English language and reaching beyond the teeming port cities of the East where so many countrymen suffered in poverty and despair. And not to be overlooked are the Indians themselves, who loyally served the white troops as scouts, auxiliaries, and finally, for a brief time in the 1890s, in units integral to the regimental organization.

Today the American military tradition must be responsive to the imperatives of nuclear warfare, and nuclear warfare discloses few parallels with the small-unit Indian combats of forest, plains, and desert. But the tradition must also be responsive to the “limited wars” that the nuclear superpower has spawned, and these do disclose parallels with frontier warfare. It is a mea-
Troops of the 10th Cavalry, an all-black regiment of the Regular Army, participate in a training exercise at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, near the turn of the century (Nebraska State Historical Society).

Coyotero Apache Scouts at Apache Lake, Sierra Blanca Mountains, Arizona, escort two members of the Wheeler Expedition of 1873 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Office of History).
sure of the failure of the Indian-fighting generations to understand their task that today's doctrine does not reflect the lessons of that experience. And yet, as we have seen, the American military tradition owes a debt of noteworthy magnitude to the frontier experience. As Captain King observed, it is all a memory now, but a memory to cherish.

Mr. Robert M. Utley has been the Assistant Director of the National Park Service for Park Historic Preservation since 1973. He received his M.A. from Indiana University in 1952. After army service, part of which he spent as Historian, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Mr. Utley served with the National Park Service as Regional Historian, Southwest Region, from 1957 to 1964; Chief Historian, Washington, from 1964 to 1972; and Director, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, from 1972 to 1973. He is one of the founders of the Western History Association and served as its President from 1967 to 1968. His works include _Custer and the Great Controversy_ (1962); _The Last Days of the Sioux Nation_ (1963); _Frontiersmen in Blue: The U.S. Army and the Indian, 1846-1885_ (1967); and _Frontier Regulars: The U.S. Army and the Indian, 1866-1891_ (1973).
Notes


3. The 1st and 2nd Dragoons in 1832 and 1836, the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen in 1846, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry and 9th and 10th Infantry in 1855. The Army Act of 1866 expanded the Regular Army to meet both frontier and Reconstruction duty, but the subsequent reduction of 1869, as Reconstruction needs diminished, left a net gain of four cavalry regiments (7th to 10th) and six infantry regiments (20th to 25th) that may be attributed to frontier needs. (All mounted regiments were restyled cavalry in 1861 and a 6th Cavalry was added that was a response to Civil War needs.)


8. Had Emory Upton responded to Gen. Sherman’s belief that the British experience in India held lessons for the US military frontier, Upton’s *The Armies of Asia and Europe* (New York, 1878) might have ventured into the doctrine of unconventional war. In fact, Upton did see some parallels between India and the US frontier. He admired the organization, discipline, and record of native troops led by British officers. He likened the native peoples with whom the British dealt to the American Indians in their disposition to fight one another more than their colonial rulers, and he attributed British success to a policy of mingling in their quarrels and playing one group against another. He declared that the British Indian army was worthy of US imitation. But except for rotation of officers between staff and line, scarcely a reform of special frontier application, he failed to spell out particulars. (pp. 75–80.) Continuing to Europe, Upton forgot about India in his enchantment with the Prussian war machine, and he finally concluded (p. 97) that to the armies of Europe the United States must look for its models. See also in this connection Weigley, *Towards an American Army*, pp. 105–06. Capt. Arthur L. Wagner’s *The Service of Security and Information*, first published in 1893, contained a short chapter on Indian scouting, but it seems almost an afterthought to the substance of the book.


This is a series of articles correspondent Lummis wrote for the *Los Angeles Times* during the Geronimo campaign of 1886.

17. Arms and Men, pp. 19-20, 34.
The End of Militarism

Russell F. Weigley

Gen. Clark, Col. Hurley, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

When this past August Muhammad Ali went to West Point to be an analyst for the American Broadcasting Company's telecast of the Olympic boxing trials held at the Military Academy, sportswriter Dave Anderson wrote in the New York Times about the ironies that placed Ali, "Once a symbol of antiwar sentiment, . . . on a campus dedicated to a militaristic philosophy." By implication, presumably we are meeting today on another "campus dedicated to a militaristic philosophy." If that be true, however, then apparently one of the features of a militaristic philosophy is that it permits and encourages a critical examination of the nature of militarism and of the relations between the military and society, for such is the purpose for which the Fifth Military History Symposium of the United States Air Force Academy has assembled.

We can no doubt assume that Dave Anderson wrote with no clear idea of what he meant by "a militaristic philosophy." But more serious writers have not always been clear either about what they intend when they write about militarism and things militaristic. Even among the most careful analysts of American military problems, those words carry with them a train of historical associations and connotations that may obscure our understanding of the principal problems of the military and society today.

Popular and also serious usage of the words "militarism" and "militaristic" seems to have been stretched a long distance away from the precision with which Alfred Vagts tried to endow the terms in his now classic History of Militarism, first published in 1937. In that book Dr. Vagts drew a careful distinction between the legitimate "military way" and the "militaristic way." "The distinction is fundamental and fateful," said Vagts. In Vagts's view, it is a distortion that overlooks the needs for and legitimate uses of armed forces to regard everything military as militaristic. In Vagts's terms, the military way exists when armed forces seek to win the objectives of national power with the utmost efficiency; the militaristic way appears when armed forces glorify the incidental but romantic trappings of war for their own sake and often to the detriment of efficient pursuit of legitimate military purposes. "An army so built that it serves military men, not war, is militaristic," in Vagts's definition; "so is everything in an army which is not preparation for fighting, but merely exists for diversion or to satisfy peace-
time whims like the long-anachronistic cavalry." But in Vagts's analysis, the appropriate military activities of armed forces are not militaristic, and "militarism is thus not the opposite of pacifism. . . ."

In American usage today, such distinctions have virtually disappeared. Even in such a relatively serious, albeit polemical, book as *Militarism, U.S.A.*, by Col. James A. Donovan (USMC Retired), almost everything connected with the American defense establishment is not simply military but militaristic, and "America has become a militaristic and aggressive nation embodied in a vast, expensive, and burgeoning military-industrial-scientific-political combine which dominates the country and affects much of our daily life, our economy, our international status, and our foreign policies." Perhaps so; but here the word militarism is intended to encompass so wide a range of problems, and the emotion-stirring connotations of the word have so much dissolved its specific denotations, that with usage such as Dave Anderson's and Colonel Donovan's we might well argue for the end of militarism as a term to be employed in discourse and debate, simply on the ground that it has been stretched so far that it no longer means anything in particular.

But indiscriminate tarring of the American military system with the brush of militarism hinders understanding of the present military policy and problems of the United States in a deeper way. It confuses thought about the various predicaments facing us in military and foreign policy by confusing us about the sources of our problems. It implies that the blame for our predicaments lies with a kind of institution that no longer exists anywhere in the world and never existed in the United States. It sets up a scapegoat for blunders shared by the whole American nation, and it suggests that there is a relatively easy way out of the difficulties imposed on us by the burden of arms that we carry, when unfortunately no such easy way out exists.

When the word retained enough specificity of meaning to foster understanding, "militarism" described the phenomenon of a professional military officer corps not only controlling the armed forces of a state but existing as a state within the state, an officer corps existing as an autonomous sovereignty separate from the other institutions of the state and likely in a difference of opinion with those other institutions to have its own way, because the officer corps possessed a monopoly of the armed force on which the state depended.

The classic instance of militarism is of course Prussia and then the Prussian-dominated German Empire, from the Napoleonic period through the First World War. The classic Prussian type of militarism did not appear until the time of the military reforms that followed Napoleon's defeat of Prussia in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstädt in 1806, because only then did the first truly professional officer corps begin to develop, as Samuel P.
Huntington has made well known in his book *The Soldier and the State.* Before the Prussians invented the professional officer corps, no distinctively military interest existed in the European states. Previously, military officer-ship was an appurtenance of aristocracy. Previously, the officer did not possess a military education that in any way can be called professional, he was typically an aristocrat first and then an officer, and his political interests were not distinctively military ones but primarily the class interests of the aristocracy. Without a distinctively military interest and influence to work upon the policies of the state, there could be no militarism.

By creating the first professional officer corps as a means of offsetting the individual genius of Napoleon with an educated collective intelligence, the Prussians took the first essential step toward nourishing a distinctively military interest within the state and thus militarism. Because Prussia was a state uniquely dependent upon its military, it soon moved into the other essential step as well, that of allowing the professional military interest to become an autonomous sovereignty within the state. Modern Prussia had always been uniquely dependent on military power to maintain its claim to great-power status and its very existence. Though the Prussian reformers of the Napoleonic era hoped to bring the army closer to the people at large than it had been in the time of Frederick the Great, in fact the newly professional officer corps was able to exploit Prussia’s extreme dependence on the army to make the army more separate from the rest of the state and the nation than before, and more autonomous. The professionalization of the officer corps gave the army leadership a special expertise to enhance its claims to freedom from control by the civil state. The conservative stance of the army against the middle-class liberals who in the mid-nineteenth century hoped to transform Prussia into a parliamentary state widened the gulf of suspicion and misunderstanding between the army and the nation at large. Yet, because the Prussian liberals were also nationalists, the decisive role of the army in placing Prussia at the head of the German Empire in the wars of 1864–1871 also left even the middle-class liberals reluctant to challenge the increasingly autonomous and privileged position of the army.

In the midst of the wars for Prussian hegemony over Germany, the officer corps quarrelled with the great Chancellor Otto von Bismarck himself, asserting the independence of the army from all direction by the civil government and the independence of military strategy in wartime from the Chancellor’s efforts to bend it to national policy. On January 29, 1871, the Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, responded to Bismarck’s charges that the army was both indulging in political activity of its own and denying the Chancellor information about operations, in writing to the only superior authority he acknowledged, the Emperor:

I believe that it would be a good thing to settle my relationship with the
Federal Chancellor definitively. Up till now I have considered that the Chief of the General Staff (especially in war) and the Federal Chancellor are two equally warranted and mutually independent agencies under the direct command of Your Royal Majesty, which have the duty of keeping each other reciprocally informed.¹

This declaration of the independence of the German army from the rest of the state except for the Emperor had already been preceded by a number of specific efforts by the army to override Bismarck's policies in the name of the autonomy of military strategy, as for example when the army had wished to complete the military humiliation of Austria in 1866 at the expense of the Chancellor's efforts to lay the foundation of future friendship and alliance, and as when the army obstructed Bismarck's efforts to negotiate an early peace with France to head off possible foreign intervention in the Franco-Prussian War. It required all Bismarck's political astuteness and power, and all the Chancellor's persuasive influence with the Emperor William I, to keep the army in harness with national policy through the wars of 1864–1871, and at that Bismarck did not succeed in every detail.

When Bismarck was succeeded by lesser German Chancellors, the officer corps and especially the General Staff emerged not only as a state within the state but able to challenge with frequent success the independence of the civil state from army dictation in behalf of army interests. Because Chancellor Leo von Caprivi sponsored a Reichstag bill to reduce compulsory military service from three to two years—albeit increasing the peacetime strength of the army in the process—the army undermined Caprivi's standing with Emperor William II so badly that the Chancellor concluded he must resign. Under the next Chancellor, the army at various times forced the removal of a War Minister, a Foreign Minister, and a Minister of the Interior who displeased the officer corps.

Here indeed, in Germany after the Franco-Prussian War, the phenomenon of militarism existed: the professional officer corps, a distinctively military interest, had become virtually a sovereignty unto itself independent of the civil state, and it exploited its sovereignty to bend the whole policy of the civil state to the interests of the military whatever might have been the interests of the nation at large. Here in fact was a militarism whose power exceeded the implications of Alfred Vagts's definitions in his History of Militarism. Here was a German officer corps whose abuse of its power to reshape national policy to its will far belied Samuel Huntington's idealized depiction of the German officer corps, in The Soldier and the State, as practically the embodiment of the model type of the professional officer corps bound by "objective civilian control." Here already was plainly foreshadowed the dictatorship of the army over the civil state that led Germany to disaster in World War I.
But in 1871 Germany's disasters of 1914–1918 were far in the future, and for the present the most conspicuous feature of the German military system was that the skills of a professional and autonomous officer corps had transformed Prussia from the least of the great powers into the center of a unified German Empire whose strength approached military hegemony in Europe. If the Prussian officer corps, headed by its General Staff, could accomplish so much beginning from a base that afforded them limited resources, what could they not accomplish now that they could draw on the most populous state in Europe outside Russia and upon an industrial system rapidly proving toward European preeminence? All the rival powers concluded that in self-defense they must emulate the Prussian-German military system, including the professionalization of the officer corps and the granting to it of a considerable measure of autonomy.

In victorious Germany in the 1870s, the army was the darling of the nation because it had won; even most of the previously disgruntled liberals joined in the national love affair with the army. In defeated France in the 1870s, the army was almost equally the darling of the nation because it had lost: the army must be pampered and cultivated so that it would not lose again. The French Third Republic was considerably quicker to pass the basic laws creating a military system remodeled after the Prussian example than to adopt the basic constitutional laws settling the decision between republicanism and a restoration of the Bourbons or the Bonapartes. By the turn of the century, the Dreyfus affair revealed to France some of the dangers inherent in cultivating a military interest powerful and arrogant enough to set itself up as a judge not only of the policies but of the moral fiber of the nation at large; yet for all the acrimony of the Dreyfus case, as soon as the affair seemed to endanger the efficiency of the army—when the public learned of anticlerical spying against Catholic and conservative officers and the keeping of files concerning such officers in the headquarters of French Freemasonry—the voters and government once again rallied behind the army. The last ten years before 1914 saw any intention to curb the autonomy and pride of the French officer corps dissolved in the effort to strengthen the army against its increasingly restless rival across the Rhine.

Great Britain and the United States did not feel obliged to follow the Prussian military example so thoroughly as the continental powers. In the wake of 1870, neither of the Anglo-Saxon powers abandoned its traditional volunteer armed forces to adopt the Prussian system of recruitment and training, the cadre-conscription system. Neither created an army large enough or became dependent enough on its army to foster the continental pattern of militarism. But even in the Anglo-Saxon powers, the officer corps had to be remade into a body of professionals where previously there had been a relatively easy interchange of military and civilian roles. The consequent creation of a distinctively military interest created unprecedented tensions
between the military and the rest of the society even in Great Britain and the United States.

In the United States, the military scholar and writer Emory Upton both contributed greatly to the professionalization of the officers and nourished within the officer corps a distrust of American civilian values and of democratic government. In Great Britain, where for all its abuses the system of purchasing commissions had kept the interests of the officer corps in harmony with those of the civil leadership, the abolition of purchase as one of the responses to the rise of Prussia opened the way to that military contempt for civilian leaders exemplified by the young Douglas Haig when he said: "I would disband the politicians for ten years. We would all be better without them." Until the professionalization of the officer corps, British soldiers habitually had been politicians themselves, the leading soldiers frequently sitting in Parliament; there had been no clear separation of military and civil interests. When the Great War of 1914–1918 at last compelled Britain to build a mass conscript army, military professionalism's creation of a distinct military interest separate from and hostile to the politicians brought militarism even to Britain, as the soldiers sought and through much of the war won a quasi-sovereignty, and in the crises of the war an ascendancy, over the civil government.

By that time, militarism on the European continent had reached the climax of its history, as a decisive influence among the forces that plunged Europe into the Great War. In Austria, Russia, and Germany, the quasi-sovereignty of the military, their ability in a crisis to bend the policies of the civil governments of their countries, and the insistence of the general staffs that diplomacy and national policy must be sacrificed to the expediencies of military strategy and the military mobilization plans ensured that there would be no escape from the Sarajevo crisis without material collision.

Militarism contributed decisively to the coming of the First World War; but historical militarism, the militarism of the quasi-sovereign professional officer corps, was also among the casualties of the war. Each of the European states had favored its officer corps with the power and privileges of a state within the state because after the wars of 1864–1871, each state believed it needed to do so in order to protect itself against the fate of Austria in 1866 and of France in 1870–1871; and each state at the same time hoped that by doing so it might win from its military a repayment in the form of swift, decisive victories comparable to those of Prussia. But despite the sacrifice of diplomacy to the mobilization timetables, none of the armies, including Germany's, was able to reproduce the quick triumphs of 1866 and 1870 in 1914. None of the armies was able to win a better result than bloody stalemate as recompense for the privileges it had enjoyed. The diffusion of military professionalism among all the great powers contributed to the stalemate by tending to give all the armies a command system competent enough
at least to avoid the most egregious blunders of the kind by which France had played into Prussia's hands in 1870. The lavishness with which all the powers had offered their resources to the military similarly assured a standoff in men and matériel.

In the outcome, failure to redeem their implied promises of swift and decisive victory in the Great War of 1914-1918 cost all the armies of the European great powers the special privileges that had made them virtual sovereignties. In all the powers, a disillusioned citizenry moved to restore the military to civil control. In France, Gen. Joseph Joffre began the war by almost sealing off the Zone of the Armies from the rest of the country and from the scrutiny of the Ministry and the Deputies, while he exercised wide military powers under a state-of-siege decree in the Zone of the Interior as well; but Joffre's failure to follow up the miracle of the Marne with additional and more positive miracles that would have released northeastern France from the grip of the invader emboldened the Chambers to revoke the state of siege in the Zone of the Interior in September 1915 and the Ministry at length to badger Joffre into retirement at the end of 1916. The removal of Joffre opened a gradual process of restoration of parliamentary control over the French army. Hastened by the army mutinies of 1917, the process culminated in the thorough subjection of the army along with all the rest of the apparatus of the state in 1918 to Premier Georges Clemenceau, who put vigorously into practice his famous principle that war is too important a business to be left to the generals. Less forthrightly than Clemenceau, David Lloyd George in Great Britain similarly terminated the independence that the military had enjoyed at the opening of the Great War: first whittling away the powers of the War Minister, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, then breaking the alliance between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig at the head of the B.E.F in France, and finally leaving Haig still powerful but much hedged about by the Prime Minister's recapture of control over the machinery of military administration and command in the capital.

In Russia the end of military autonomy came dramatically, with the Bolshevik Revolution, the dissolution of the old army, and the careful binding of the new Red Army to the political control of the Communist Party. In Germany the end of military autonomy came gradually; in the birthplace of modern militarism the army seemed to be able to ride out its failure to repeat the victories of 1864-1871. The war years brought not a recapture of parliamentary power over the military in Germany as in France and Great Britain but the military dictatorship of Ludendorff and Hindenburg; and after the Armistice the old army was able to remain a state within the state by holding at arm's length the Weimar Republic. Nevertheless, even in Germany the inability of the army to rescue the nation from the terrible strains of four years of indecisive war could not but undermine confidence in the wisdom
of the military and in the necessity to go on granting the army immunity from civil interference. Nor could the stab-in-the-back legend altogether save the army from the consequences of finally losing the war. The German army of the Weimar Republic was still powerful enough to assist in Adolf Hitler's rise to the chancellorship; but when Hitler chose to reduce the army to the same uniform subserviency to his will and the same nazification that he decreed for all the institutions of Germany, the army proved no longer powerful enough to resist. By the time World War II had developed far enough that much of the German military command would have liked to get rid of Hitler because they could now recognize he would bring them not endless victories and more and more marshals' batons but ruinous defeat, they could no longer do anything effective against him. They no longer had their own autonomous network of command; against the Waffen SS and the nazified Luftwaffe with its own ground troops, the army no longer possessed a monopoly of armed force; the army itself was too permeated with Nazism. By the time the military command became disillusioned with Hitler, the Führer had so reduced the professional soldiers to his will that he was not only in possession of political mastery but himself giving operational and even tactical orders to the troops.

In none of the great powers in the Second World War did there exist a quasi-sovereign military influence upon the policies of the state comparable to the militarism with which all the European great powers had entered the First World War. In Germany, the army was the pliant tool of Hitler. In Japan, a professional officer corps in the Western sense had never existed; there were always plenty of military officers in the civil government of modern Japan, but they habitually flitted back and forth between military and civil capacities, the role of the soldier had never been clearly differentiated from that of the politician or statesman, and thus the soldiers in the Japanese government represented not the distinctive military interest characteristic of militarism but a jingoist nationalism that they shared with other government figures who rarely or never wore a uniform. In the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin had assured the docility of the military just before the Second World War by purging the principal leadership of the army. While Stalin felt obliged to grant some concessions to military professionalization during the crisis of the war, he demonstrated his continuing ascendancy over the soldiers by appropriating to himself the public glory of being Russia's principal strategist of victory, while significantly pushing his most successful soldier, Marshal G. K. Zhukov, into the obscurity of a provincial garrison command as soon as the war was over.

In Great Britain, Winston Churchill never had to maneuver deviously as Lloyd George had done to assure the compliancy of the military to the civil power; instead, any suggestion of military autonomy was so discredited by the memories of the Somme and Passchendaele that from the moment he
combined within himself the offices of Prime Minister and War Minister, Churchill commanded outright, even to the point of carrying the British armed forces into essaying the application of some of his most quixotic flights of strategic fancy.

In the United States, whose remoteness from the center of world politics had previously denied militarism even so much of a foothold as it had gained in Britain in the early years of World War I, there was no belated surrender in 1941-1945 to an autonomous military able to shape the decisions of the state. President Franklin D. Roosevelt to be sure kept his military advisers close to his side during his war years as Commander in Chief, but the President remained very much the Commander in Chief—witness Kent Roberts Greenfield's now familiar refutation of the old canard that only twice did Roosevelt overrule his military advisers; Roosevelt's overruling of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was relatively frequent. And Roosevelt remained very much the President as well as the Commander in Chief; that is, he kept his attention fixed on the pursuit of the political goals which in his judgment should be the objects of American military strategy in the war. The idea that President Roosevelt and the United States habitually sacrificed political aims for military expediency in World War II is another canard.

All of which is hardly to deny that in the United States, the military factor in decision making during World War II weighed heavily enough to be a reasonable cause of discomfort among men anxious about the preservation of America's generally unmilitary traditions. And in the Cold War and Indochina War years the military factor in American policy has often weighed more heavily still. But it is not militarism of the historical type with which we are dealing in the contemporary United States or in any of the great powers since World War II; an essential ingredient of historical militarism, that of the military as an autonomous state within the state virtually immune from the ordinary processes of civil power, is missing.

Thus it would seem advisable to focus our studies of the military and society increasingly upon the combinations of ingredients that actually prevail in the great powers today. Historians and political scientists have been diligent in investigating the pathology of the traditional militarism of the Prussian Kingdom and German Empire and of all the European states in the First World War. No historian would deny the general value of the past toward illuminating the present. But recurring investigation of traditional militarism is likely to yield diminishing returns toward illuminating the place of the military today in the United States and in the other contemporary military powers. Whether the role of the Great General Staff in Germany and thus European history is to be regarded as primarily that of a sinister influence, as it is in the most prevalent democratic view, or as a model of military professionalism under "objective civilian control," as it is in Samuel P. Huntington's view, the circumstances of civil-military relationships in all
the powers today are so different from those of 1914 that using the Great General Staff as a model for studying the soldier and the state is not likely to have much more to tell us, either as warning or encouragement, about our own situation.

Having witnessed the end of traditional militarism, we need to begin studying more carefully the military systems in which a professional officer corps akin to that of the old Prussian model in its professionalism remains, but in which the autonomous separation of the military from the civilian state is gone. Clearly, this different combination of ingredients is likely to produce consequences different from those of traditional militarism.

We can suggest at least one possible tendency. When Hitler destroyed the historic privileges of the German army as a state within the state in the birthplace of traditional militarism and put the army in thrall to the civil power embodied in himself and his party, one striking effect was to politicize the members of the officer corps. It was implicit in the quasi-sovereign status of the old German army that the officers remained aloof from the politics of the civil state and the civilian parties, except when they intervened institutionally in behalf of the interests of the army. Hitler, however, so closely identified the army with Nazism that it became almost impossible for an officer to continue being politically uninvolved. Either the officer had to embrace Nazism, or he had to become a political opponent of Nazism, as did those officers who, deprived of the German army's earlier means of asserting itself, resorted to assassination attempts against the Führer.

The effects of the efforts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to assure the subordination of the Soviet Army to doctrine and party have been similar. Merely for the officers to retain the measure of military professionalism they believed essential to military efficiency, Soviet officers have had to become politicized. They have had to participate actively in the internal politics of the Soviet state, not in the manner of traditional militarism as a quasi-sovereign power operating outside the arena of civilian politics, but as one of a congeries of interest groups vying within the Soviet political arena.

While Stalin lived after World War I, the Soviet military saw their advancement in professional doctrine and even in military technology impeded by the official myth that Stalin was the great military genius of the war and that the generalissimo's methods—the methods of World War II—were sacrosanct. To regain enough influence in the state so that professional judgment could again control professional decisions, the military plunged into political activism following Stalin's death. They aligned themselves with the party apparatus led by N. S. Khrushchev and the state bureaucracy led by G. M. Malenkov to destroy the effort of L. V. Beria and the secret police to win supremacy in the regime; the armed secret police represented a special threat to the ability of the military to control their own professional destiny.
After the fall of Beria, the army remained in partnership with Khrushchev against Malenkov. Khrushchev rewarded the army and the rehabilitated Marshal Zhukov by arranging for Zhukov to become the first professional soldier to receive candidate membership in the Party Presidium. In 1956 the Central Committee of the Communist Party elected six professional soldiers to its full membership and twelve others to candidate membership. The military in turn rewarded Khrushchev by saving him from the attempted coup d'etat of June 1957; but Khrushchev's consequent dependence on the army made him uncomfortable, and in his latter years in power he attempted gradually to restore the military to the discipline of the party. Khrushchev's humiliation in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 weakened his hand enough to cut short this effort, and the disgruntlement of the military over both the Cuban fiasco and Khrushchev's efforts to restore party predominance even in matters of military doctrine probably contributed to Khrushchev's downfall in 1964. Since then the new party leadership and the military have remained in a condition of somewhat uneasy, but for the time being relatively stable, compromise of party and military claims and aspirations.

In sum, however, the post-Stalin Soviet military have emerged as active politicians, following the same path the German generals were beginning to take after Hitler deprived them of their old-fashioned kinds of power. In both these instances, the professionalism of the officer corps has been no guarantee against political involvement; on the contrary, with the loss of old-fashioned military autonomy, the very need for protection of military professionalism has offered a motive for officers to politicize themselves.

In all the great powers, the politicization of the military is likely to prove an outstanding tendency of the new combination of a professional officer corps, with its distinctive military interests, but without the kind of autonomy that pre-World War I soldiers enjoyed to protect their interests. It is not only the armies of totalitarian states that have displayed the growing tendency toward a politically active military. After the French army lost its privileged status of 1871-1916, it became by the 1940s and 1950s perhaps the most politically active of all major armies save the Chinese Communist army. In the United States, it distorts matters to regard the post-World War II armed forces as "militaristic" in the historic, Prussian sense; but it is a critical element in our current military-civil relations that the Defense Department as a whole and the armed forces severally have become centers of actively mobilized and manipulated political influence and power on a scale altogether without precedent in our history. The theme of the politicization of the American military, the transformation of the military into an active contender for spoils within the arena of American politics and of soldiers into active political figures, may suggest the shared roots from which spring both so obvious a phenomenon of the current military scene as "the selling of the Pentagon" and events more puzzling in the light of older American

military traditions, such as the apparently independent policy-making of Gen. John D. Lavelle.

It would no doubt be going too far to suggest that in the future the model to which we should look for guidance toward an understanding of dominant tendencies in military-civil relations should be not the old Prussian army but the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Nevertheless, the immensely politicized PLA, in which military and political roles blur indistinguishably together, may represent in an extreme form the tendencies developing in all major contemporary armies. On the one hand, the "civilian militarism" about which Alfred Vagts wrote in the two chapters appended to the 1959 edition of his History of Militarism points toward a blending of
civilian and military attitudes and values; much might be said about civilian militarism in recent American administrations as a primary cause of the expanding war in Indochina. Meanwhile, the politicization of the military which I have suggested as a likely sequel to the end of traditional militarism points toward another blending of the civil and military elements in the contemporary powers. The future development of the military in society may witness the blurring of all the boundaries that symposia such as this one have hitherto marked. The increasing concern of future symposia may be with a politicized military in a militarized politics and society.

Notes

3. Ibid., p. 15.
4. Ibid., p. 17.
9. Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), Chap. III. For an expression of the idea that President Roosevelt rejected the advice of the Joint Chiefs only twice in the course of World War II, see Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 322.
Military Planning and National Policy:
German Overtures to Two World Wars

Harold C. Deutsch

The celebrated dictum of Carl von Clausewitz that war is the continuation of policy has bred variants which, although not necessarily contradictory, approach the problem of war and peace rather differently. Social revolutionists, notably Lenin, like to switch emphasis by perceiving peace as a moderated form of conflict. Our concern here, the interplay between military planning and preparation for war with the form and conduct of national policy, has less to do with maxims than with actuality in human affairs.

The backgrounds of the two world wars of our century tell us much about this problem. They also indicate how greatly accidents of circumstance and personality may play a role in the course of events. This was notably true of Germany whose fate provides the central thread for the epoch of the two world conflicts. At some future time they may yet be known historically as "the German Wars." This is not to infer that, had Germany not existed as a nation, and, let us say, France and Russia had been geographic neighbors, the first half of our century would have been an era of peace. Some of the factors that led to international stress would have been at work in any event. But the reality of Germany's existence largely determined the nature and sequence of affairs as they appeared to march inexorably toward disaster.

Military Planning and the Coming of World War I

Much is unusual or even unique about the German security and expansion problems during the Hohenzollern Empire. Germany's central position among powers weaker than herself bred among them an inclination to combine against or even encircle her. So central was this anxiety for Otto von Bismarck that he confessed to a sleep troubled by the nightmare of coalitions. German soldiers shared this concern and sense of professional responsibility.

After the 1870 triumph over France, there no longer were fears of any single adversary. To all intents and purposes, the only war one need apprehend would be with two or more opponents, most probably France and Russia. This implied both the hazards and advantages of fighting on geo-
graphically opposite fronts. Elementary military logic forbade any equal allocation of forces east and west. The only possible course was to stand defensively on one front and launch an all-out effort on the other. This demanded an early and decisive victory in the initial drive—a matter really of weeks—to make possible a quick shift to the originally defensive front.

We cannot dwell here on the course of development that followed this appreciation. Most vital was recognition that the construction of a massive French fortification system after 1875 made an 1870-type dash toward Paris illusionary. Relying heavily on Austria-Hungary as an ally, the elder Moltke opted without enthusiasm for a first offensive effort against the Russians. He had few illusions about achieving a quick decision in Russia's limitless space but gradually reconciled himself with the idea of occupying Poland and then moving to the negotiating table. But what if the Russians should prefer to stick it out in an endless war of attrition? In a farewell address to the German Reichstag in 1888, Moltke showed how this weighed on his mind when he spoke of a next war lasting as long as seven years—perhaps even thirty!

Moltke's successor one-removed was Count Alfred von Schlieffen whose legendary figure has dominated German military thought to and beyond Ludendorff's offensive in 1918. His prestige, indeed, lasted into the thirties and World War II. American military thinkers thought so highly of him that his principal literary legacy, *Cannae*, was translated at Leavenworth and distributed at a nominal charge within the U.S. Army and to the academic community. Since the late forties his reputation has been somewhat dimmed, and among historical critics, he is now something of a controversial figure.

Schlieffen combined extraordinary intellect and persuasive powers with a simplicity and lack of pretension which dominated his principal associates and won him legions of disciples in the younger leadership corps. "Mehr sein als scheinen" (be more than you appear to be) was his principal motto. Single-mindedness that critics have at times labelled obsessiveness characterized his thinking on strategic problems, and the brilliance of his dialectic swept away opposition. He may be counted among the prophets of the indirect approach so much admired by Basil Liddell Hart. Insofar as planning was concerned, he was assuredly its outstanding military practitioner. The most famous product of his mind, of course, was the plan that has been inseparably linked with his name.

In 1938, when I interviewed nearly a hundred leading figures of the World War I era, the Schlieffen Plan and the eventuating Marne campaign were major topics of discussion. I spoke with five staff officers who had worked on the plan itself or been associated with its execution. The most notable figure among them was Wilhelm Groener who headed the field railways of the prewar army, later succeeded Ludendorff as Supreme Quar-
Count Alfred von Schlieffen, German military strategist and author of the Schlieffen Plan (U.S. Army).

terminus General, and ended his career as Minister of Defense under the Weimar Republic. On the political implications of military plans and preparations, I consulted two wartime foreign office officials, Arthur Zimmermann and Richard von Kühlmann, the secretary and principal man of confidence of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Kurt Rietzler, the Bavarian Minister to Berlin, Count Lerchenfeld, and the German Crown Prince. The blocking of my road to the Emperor and Erich Ludendorff, who should have been my principal witnesses, was a great disappointment.

Schlieffen, in contrast to the elder Moltke, lacked all faith in the capacity of modern society to endure the strains of protracted war. He further recognized the special vulnerabilities of Germany in any contest of attrition. Such convictions could only strengthen his resolve to stake all on an early and decisive victory. Given this single and apparently unalterable goal, most of the famous plan on which he commenced work in the mid-nineties undoubtedly conformed with the dictates of logic.

Schlieffen shared fully the fear of many German military leaders of becoming mired in Russian space if the east-first concept should continue to prevail. A switch to the west, however, would only put one back where
Moltke had started. Unless, of course, some way around the French fortifications could be discovered. This could only be accomplished by infringing on the territory of small western neighbors. Notably Belgium, once its narrow eastern gateway had been forced, offered flat space in which one could stretch out. Historically it was the favored east-west invasion route. The trouble lay in the tight squeeze of the cramped German-Belgian frontier—a scant fifty miles as the crow flies. Of this a good portion is taken up by the difficult Ardennes. The passage toward Liège in the north features defiles that funnel east-west movement.

Schlieffen could see nothing for it but to include Luxembourg and that extension of the Dutch province of Limburg known as the Maastricht appendix. The railway bridges over the Meuse at Maastricht and Roermond were a particular attraction as they carried most of the traffic from Germany.

As planning proceeded during the 1890s, Schlieffen gave scant attention to the obvious political implications. In 1899 he did inform Foreign Secretary and later Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow who as yet took a complacent view of things. If the Chief of Staff and such a strategic authority as Schlieffen thought this necessary, said Bülow, it was the duty of diplomacy to adjust to it. A year later another army communication on the subject to the Foreign Office elicited a reply in almost the same words from its principal motor, Counsellor Baron von Holstein.

The Emperor also was probably apprised about the same time. Certainly he knew things by 1904 when he sought to intimidate King Leopold II of Belgium and let the cat out of the bag. Bülow himself seems to have had some second thoughts, for in the same year he ventured to argue with Schlieffen about going through Belgium. He recalled Bismarck saying that it went against plain common sense to add an extra enemy to an opposing lineup. Schlieffen insisted that Belgium would confine itself to protesting. In 1912 Foreign Secretary von Jagow did raise doubts about going through Belgium but was fobbed off by a memo from Moltke.

It is noteworthy and leaves one somewhat staggered that no one then or later seems to have urged the convocation of a crown council or lesser gathering of civil and military leaders to deal with a problem of such moment to the German fate. Bismarck, who had scant awe of the military, would assuredly have taken a hand. Yet no council dealing with war plans was convoked by his feeble successors before the ultimate crisis of July 1914.

At least equally strange is the failure of the last two prewar Chancellors, Bülow and Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, to attack the problem of armament necessary for a three-front war. For, though the European scene might conceivably produce a future situation in which Britain would accommodate herself to a German march through Belgium, nothing remotely portending such a change was then in evidence.
The second Helmut von Moltke, nephew of the first, owed a position he did not covet to William II’s envisaging him as a kind of good luck piece; always mindful of his grandfather, he too wanted to be served by a Moltke. But this modest, rather retiring figure was plagued by lack of self-confidence, particularly in regard to any ability to act decisively at times of crisis. It was only with a heavy heart that he steeled himself to carry on with his predecessor’s daring project. Despite somewhat limp efforts in recent years to rehabilitate him as a commander, he remains the chief whipping boy for the disaster of the Marne. Criticisms of Moltke’s generalship focus about equally on his alterations in military dispositions in the period 1906–1914 and his conduct of operations in August–early September 1914.

One step for which Moltke is never faulted is elimination of the Netherlands from the sweep westward. In part this derived from Moltke being more sensitive politically than Schlieffen had been. Thus he reckoned the costs of having Britain as an enemy considerably higher. Adding the Netherlands to the list of victims of military necessity doubled the risk of having Britain to deal with. Belgium was enough to give him sleepless hours. “Many hounds are the hare’s death” was an old German proverb his dismayed staff would hear him mutter in anxious moments. In fact, Moltke probably put as much thought as anyone in the civil government on how to keep out the British. It was he who first suggested what later became a feeble effort toward that end: a guarantee to Belgium of her sovereignty and boundaries if she permitted the march through.

Aside from hoping to reduce somewhat the certainty of British intervention, Moltke was influenced on the Netherlands by signs that the Dutch were alert to the threat. Extra track and railway sidings on the German side of the frontier screamed danger to them. They announced to all and sundry that they were prepared to protect their neutrality with arms. Perhaps most persuasive was their placement of mine chambers and heavy steel gates on the railway bridges at Maastricht and Roermond.

An additional factor in the decision to give up the dash through Limburg was the rebuilding after 1905 of the British Army into an expeditionary force. With the Netherlands in the war, the possible employment of these troops to threaten the flank and rear of the German rush westward had to be reckoned with. Finally, Moltke’s second thought focused on what the Netherlands had to offer as a neutral: a windpipe through the anticipated British blockade by which Germany could draw food and raw materials.

Where Moltke really parted company with Schlieffen before the latter’s death in 1913 was on the forces assigned to the east. In a swansong memorandum of 1912 Schlieffen had advocated the virtual denuding of that front, placing there no more than three divisions. In the end, Moltke allocated nine.

Though all of Moltke’s eggs were thus no longer in the western basket,
its capacity had been shrunk alarmingly by confining the passageway to Belgium and Luxembourg. It was a problem that gained in seriousness and complexity as the German Army grew larger. Though most of the extra troops were stationed farther south, the First and Second Armies, which had to force their way through a bottleneck at Liège, were also slightly beefed up. Well over half a million men were to be crowded together at this point.

Liège was one of the celebrated Brialmont's fortresses. It was surrounded on a fifty kilometer perimeter by twelve forts, great masses of concrete and steel, that guarded the vital crossing over the Meuse. The principal problem for the Germans was to get through before the Belgian field army could deploy in the spaces between the forts and erect field fortifications to block these passages.

There is a good deal of irony in the fact that Moltke, who lacked so much of the courage of Schlieffen's convictions on the larger aspects of the campaign, should here be obliged to embark on the greatest adventure of all. For if there was a military gamble in the Schlieffen Plan as it was in 1914, it assuredly lay in the coup de main projected for Liège. Five approaches led from the frontier through the spaces between the easternmost forts into the city itself. To exploit these, five brigades were stationed close to the border. Once a state of war existed, their function was to dash across the border and penetrate the ring of forts. The project faced stupendous risks: if
the major railway tunnel and/or the bridge over the Meuse were destroyed, the logistics of the German First and Second Armies would be fatally affected. Politically the consequences of the enterprise could be equally serious, for as will be seen, a straightjacket was put on diplomacy in July 1914.

Both Schlieffen and the younger Moltke considered from time to time being anticipated by the French in Belgium. Much was bound to be alluring for them in the thought of the French relieving them of the onus of violating Belgian neutrality. Both the elder Moltke and his successor, Count Waldersee, rather liked the idea militarily. From heavily fortified Alsace-Lorraine they might then attack the French in flank.

The French had thought much about the Belgian problem since the 1870s. A book written by Eugène Ténot (1882), at the instigation of Gen. Sérè de Rivière, stressed that with the building of the French fortifications, Belgium was “henceforth inseparable from any rational German offensive plan.” For the time being the problem was considered only from a defensive standpoint. But as the French Army expanded and the Russian alliance promised to divert large German forces, speculation about offensive opportunities grew. In 1911, when the replacement of Gen. Michel by Gen. Joffre as Chief of Staff unleashed a veritable mania for offensive action, the issue of moving through Belgium and Luxembourg came into the foreground. Joffre’s importunities led to the convocation of the Superior Council of National Defense on January 9, 1912. The minutes of this meeting and other documents vital to our problem were released only in the early 1970s. They show that the only argument countering Joffre’s plea was fear of damaging the military ties with Britain which just then were in process of being greatly expanded. Neither legal nor moral scruples concerning a violation of Belgian territory were mentioned. How little they counted may be adduced from the fact that Joffre was given the free hand on Luxembourg denied him on Belgium.

Vital to any discussion of the Schlieffen Plan in relation to the Empire’s security problem is a search for logical alternatives. As Sir John Hackett has cogently formulated it, the soldier’s duty is to come up with as many options for his government as it is willing to pay for. Neither Schlieffen nor the younger Moltke ever responded to this challenge. For them, as for all who try to second guess them, the stumbling block is that no one has yet advanced a tenable solution that fits the prescription of a swift and decisive victory. Also, no civilian leader appears ever to have taken issue with this approach of the two generals. Even the far-from-bellicose Bethmann went along with them on a German need for expansion (in his case colonial) as against Bismarck’s famous delineation of Germany as a saturated state.

Of course the option which conforms with the wisdom of our current hindsight would have been a defensive posture, in effect a rejection of the total victory formula. Ironically, this might most nearly have met the gen-

559
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

erals’ victory dream through, so-to-speak, the back door. In view of the superior strength of the defensive and the continually more lethal power of weaponry, not to speak of the compelling French craze for “attack, attack, attack,” this assumption is not unreasonable. But in fairness to the generals, it should be noted that neither the civil government nor the nation would have understood such a course, should they have somehow summoned up sufficient spirit of self-denial to adopt it. It would certainly have been rejected by their military contemporaries in all the powers of Europe who were almost unanimously fostering the offensive spirit and doctrine. It should also be borne in mind that at this period the defensive carried with it the odor of a long war which everyone wanted to avoid.

One is on safer ground in charging Schlieffen and Moltke with never having given the defensive alternative a fair hearing. From the mid-nineties on, alternative options that contemplated defensive or limited war got short shrift. “When such alternatives were evaluated,” says a recent study, “they were designed to fail, and they were held to a tougher standard than was the Schlieffen Plan.”

In some mitigation of the indictment that frequently is levied against the German military leaders of the period, one should not ignore the calculation that there is not too much to distinguish their approach to the problem from that of soldiers elsewhere. Even those captains who are prepared to recognize the primacy of policy both in peace and war seem instinctively to lean to the assumption that policy is best served by total military victory. There is little difference in their approach both in situations of prewar planning and in the conduct of war.

The seekers of total victory though battles of annihilation tend, of course, to include among themselves the proponents of preventive wars. In the case of Germany, Schlieffen inclined to one during the First Morocco Crisis and Moltke had similar thoughts in the spring of 1914. It follows that military leaders are usually more inclined than their civilian counterparts to doubt in times of crisis the likelihood or possibility of a diplomatic solution. It is natural that this inclination should be the more pronounced when immediate sharp action appears required if war does eventuate.

Despite Schlieffen’s one-sided approach to Germany’s military problems, his sterner critics go overboard when they picture him as a gambler who staked the fate of Germany on a roll of the dice. It would be grossly unfair, for example, to compare him and his plan to Ludendorff and the sink-or-swim offensive of 1918. It should not be passed over, as is nearly always done, that he was fully determined to cut his losses if things did not turn out as he hoped and expected. In that event, he proposed an immediate peace overture before the grip of the armies was irrevocably set on each other’s throats.

Inevitably, indictments drawn against the Schlieffen Plan stress the
plain fact that in the end it did fail; in the view of the more severe critics it was bound to fail. All of these arguments underline logistics. Undoubtedly Schlieffen was remiss, some say slack, in this area. This is not the place for a full analysis, but it must be pointed out that the issue is not yet settled. The proof of any pudding, to be sure, is in the eating. The failure at the Marne is unquestioned, and the logistical situation undoubtedly played some part. But there is impressive evidence that the latter was by no means catastrophic.

Gen. Groener, who was in charge of railway communication, gave eloquent testimony on the strained but far from desperate state of affairs. As a disinterested party, the General Staff's later strategic specialist, Wilhelm Wetzel, was perhaps more impressive. The proof of the pudding, as he described it, lies not in the failure of the plan itself. He points out how the Schleswig-Holstein Army Corps, in his view the second or third best in the German Army, in recrossing the Marne and lining up against the French on the Ourcq, marched seventy-five miles in three days, and, in fighting with the relatively fresh French troops from Paris, had definitely the best of things. "Bone weary? Yes," said Wetzel in effect; "Exhausted to the point of prostration? Emphatically, no!"

German soldiers did not have as much to say as one might have expected during the July crisis of 1914. There was occasional interference as when Moltke, terrified that Conrad von Hötendorff would botch the Austro-Hungarian mobilization facing Russia, in effect urged him to ignore the advice Bethmann was giving the Vienna government. But in critical ways prewar military plans and arrangements cut down the diplomats' elbow room. In this regard statesmen and soldiers equally should note the lesson of how rigidities of military planning may breed fatal political consequences. In question, particularly, is the project of the coup de main at Liège.

Although civilian authorities had long been au courant about the intended moves through Belgium, Luxembourg, and initially, the Netherlands, no one seems to have told them of Liège. Groener and more humbly placed officers who worked on the Schlieffen Plan and its implementation knew nothing of such a communication. Zimmermann, then deputy to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was sure no such information had reached the Foreign Office. Kurt Rietzler, who was privy to most of Bethmann's official secrets, testified to the consternation of his chief when the political implications of the project were brought home to him. The Crown Prince in his turn was sure that his father was unaware of it.

Yet in the crisis that led to war, the Liège coup de main may well have wrecked the last faint hope of peace. As the troops could move only after a state of war with someone existed, it had to be brought on as soon as war was virtually, though perhaps not quite, certain. That stage was reached when Tsar Nicholas decreed Russia's general mobilization. The other concerned powers would then follow almost automatically. But the key feature
was that while France and Germany had a ten-day mobilization period, that of Russia was about twice as long. Once her own mobilization was completed, Germany would have to go to war. It would be near fatal to lose her time advantage over Russia. But for about ten days the diplomats could have had their final innings. Liège robbed Europe of these last ten days of grace during which by some miracle peace might yet have been preserved. One could hardly move into Belgium without previously being at war with France, and the 1914 situation demanded that this should follow war with Russia.

When was Bethmann apprised of this by Moltke? We do not know exactly, but it must have been sometime after his conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, on July 29. During this exchange Bethmann let the cat out of the bag on the intention to march through Belgium. Pure luck was on his side here, for in their preoccupation with their own problem, the British did not think of immediately warning Belgium. If they had done so, the Belgian government would certainly not have ordered the commander at Liège, General Leman, not to construct field-works between his forts because of German sensitiveness. The order was dispatched at midnight July 31 and would scarcely have been sent if Brussels had known what the Germans had in store for Belgium.

Moltke, however reluctantly, here called the tune, and the civilian authorities, represented by Bethmann, paid the piper. For many years he had to bear the historical burden of the strange German rush into war; it was declared on Russia at 6 P.M. on August 1, just one hour after the announcement of mobilization.

A further feature of rigidity in the diplomatic scene of July 1914 that was created by military planning concerned Russia. Despite nearly half a century of assumption that only a war on two fronts was possible, Schlieffen and the younger Moltke wished to play it safe and maintained standby plans for Russia and France singly. When Russia was preoccupied with Japan in 1905 Schlieffen would have liked to use the First Morocco Crisis to strike preventively at France. After 1909 Russia made gigantic strides toward military recovery. Her army jumped from 750,000 to twice that in 1914 and was scheduled to reach two million by 1916. Troops were piling up in Poland raising German prospects for a quicker decision in the east. But a war game reviewing the Schlieffen Plan in 1912 showed that by the time one got to Minsk the French would be on the Rhine.  

Despite the growing Russian threat Moltke continued to think only in terms of a two-front war. In 1911 he actually cast aside contingency plans for war with Russia altogether. This error of committing himself to a single assumption was brought home to him in the July crisis when William II, in a momentary fancy that France might stay neutral, proposed to mobilize against Russia alone. When Moltke in his consternation insisted that mili-
Not only did the German soldiers in 1914 find themselves in one sense or another the prisoners of their own too rigid plans. The French discovered the Belgians were putting up a far stiffer resistance than had been expected. On Joffre's staff there arose an impulse to alter dispositions and to strike northward into the flank of the massive German advance. Such inclinations were curbed by Joffre's adamant mental commitment to Plan 17 on which, incidentally, the civilian leadership had never been consulted. The same may be said of British generals who three years before the war promised the French to dispatch immediately an expeditionary corps, this too without consulting civilian authorities.

Since 1897 William II and his closest advisers had geared up German foreign policy to a world embracing level that was marked by expansionistic coloring. The status quo posture that had characterized Bismarck's policy after unification was left more and more behind. Such aims and moods were bound to be reflected in the military arena, so that some critics voice the claim that Germany's civilian leaders in the end got only what they had bargained for. The military chiefs are occasionally portrayed as having merely adapted themselves to the political aims of the Imperial Government or even as exercising restraint on a venturesome foreign policy. A grain of truth may be found in this: the military was more responsible than any other quarter in Germany for keeping down the size of the Army. Because of anxiety about the social composition of the officer corps, it dragged its feet on expansion and was dragged along by the government, public opinion, and the Reichstag.

Jehuda Wallach, in a volume soon to be published in translation, brilliantly demonstrates how the Schlieffen Plan violated the dictum of Clausewitz, quoted at the start of this discussion, upholding the supremacy of the political imperative over military strategy. Policy and diplomacy became to a large extent the prisoners of military dispositions. But the civilian leadership of Germany in multifarious and, in the end, fatal ways, permitted itself to become the handmaiden of a self-imposed military necessity.

It may appear strange that nothing has been said here about the role of the German Navy in relation to policy and war preparation. It goes without saying that Grand Admiral von Tirpitz did much to exacerbate relations with Britain and that the growth of the German Navy, so ardently backed by William II, was the principal feature in the estrangement of the two countries. But it is noteworthy that Tirpitz, who perforce had to beat the drums on rivalry with Britain if naval expansion was to continue, straightway sang a different tune whenever war with Britain loomed. In every crisis from 1897 to July 1914 he lay back, protesting that the fleet was not ready. For him, as for the Emperor, it was largely an end in itself. After the war he addressed
bitter reproaches to those who had permitted it to come about and destroy his life's work.

As for Bülow and Bethmann, they had little faith in the Navy as a genuine factor in the balance of power. But like the Army leaders who bitterly resented the gigantic slice the Navy cut out of the defense pie, they saw nothing for it but to humor the Emperor.

Dictator and Army in the Coming of World War II

The interwar political and military scenes in Germany (1871-1914; 1918-1939) diverge so diametrically that it is a challenge to discern parallel lines of development. The German Empire founded amidst the victory over France could boast such prestige and power that it stood militarily unrivaled by any single antagonist. Only coalitions could hope to deal with it with any prospect of victory or survival. Its military and external policies were governed by this stark fact.

In bitter contrast, the Germany slowly emerging after 1918 from the ashes of defeat was for a foreseeable time eliminated as a positive factor in European and world affairs. Its armed forces were restricted so severely that they had meaning only for internal order or, conceivably, domestic turnover. The condition and imbalance of the national economy discouraged hope in substantial military recovery even if the Versailles Treaty restrictions should be lifted or dramatically amended. Yet there always loomed in the background an unquestionable prospect for the restoration of Germany as a major power. The obvious potential of population, location, martial tradition, militarily trained manpower, and the conflicting policies of other states had a fixed place in the awareness of all concerned.

The relations of the Army with the political regimes which governed Germany in the twenties and thirties were in large part determined by its social composition. During the Empire, it has been noted, most of its leaders resisted expansion because of hesitation about accepting lower middle class officers and working class recruits. The rigorous contraction to a 100,000-man level imposed on Germany by the victorious Allies, though deeply resented, made possible reversing directions, sloughing off borderline elements among the socially suspect. By the time Hitler took office one-fourth of the officers and half the generals were noblemen; the rank and file could now be recruited entirely from reliable social strata, mostly country boys.

The republic for most members of the Reichswehr (armed forces) was the creature of defeat and revolution, and its leading party, the Social Democrats, was a collection of pacifists and internationalists. In effect the political and social horizons of soldiers of all ranks were likely to be limited. As Nazi influence grew in Germany, some split in the officer corps did develop.
between age groups. The older and higher in rank tended to regard Hitler and his ilk as vulgar upstarts; many also were deeply disturbed by the growing attack on traditional religion. All officers of whatever rank and age found appeal in the national and martial flavor of Nazi ideology, were delighted with the agitation for rearmament, and applauded demands for a vigorous foreign policy aimed at revising the Versailles Treaty.

Younger officers were intrigued by Nazi dynamism, were impressed by Hitler's knack for enlisting national enthusiasm, and found inspiration in the pleas for social solidarity and comradeship. Their generals and colonels were regarded as somewhat stuffy, as too wedded to old ways, and somewhat behind the times. As yet this did not portend any rejection of prestigious leaders, all of them veterans from the First World War and most of them a highly positive selection among the survivors of that conflict. There is little doubt that in 1933 the vast majority of young officers would have obeyed any order from their superiors.

At that time it would have been at least conceivable that the Army could have been thrown into the scale against Hitler's assumption of power. Its Commander in Chief, Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, was bitterly anti-Nazi; if assured of sufficient support and at least the acquiescence of President von Hindenburg, he might well have acted. His Chief of Staff, the crusty Bavarian Wilhelm Adam, would certainly have gone along. In fact, there was sufficient apprehension among those whose maneuvers and deals made Hitler Chancellor that the new, compliant Defense Minister, Werner von Blomberg, was virtually smuggled into office from his post as disarmament negotiator at Geneva.

Hammerstein and Adam were so suspect to the parties who had brought in Hitler that within a year they were replaced by generals regarded as more amenable to working with the regime. Thus began a process that was to come to a climax only after the attempted coup of July 20, 1944: the systematic though intermittent weeding out of politically suspect or overly independent figures. It is all too often forgotten in looking at the collection of yes-men, careerists, just-soldier types (nur-Soldaten), and dyed-in-the-wool Nazis who made up much of the higher Generalität in the final stage of the regime that they were no longer representative of what it had been in 1933.

There is much irony in the fact that Werner von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck, the men chosen to take the places of Hammerstein and Adam, were later to be counted among the chief military victims of the regime: Fritsch to become the target of the dirtiest of Nazi intrigues, Beck to emerge as the chief of the military conspiracy that grew largely from this episode.

The period 1933-1936 was one of comparative inactivity in both domestic and external affairs. Hitler was not yet the uncompromising egomaniac who emerged in the war period. Circumstances also prohibited excessive risk
taking. Though occasionally he dropped the mask sufficiently to hint at more extreme goals than those he publicly professed, the military were not alone in seeing therein flights of fancy that need not be taken too seriously.  

Except for a single reckless fling on Austria in July 1934, Hitler's first three years demonstrated tolerable restraint and the enunciation of aims that would be faulted by few Germans. On Poland, the one area where popular feeling would have supported a relatively strong policy, Hitler astonished the world by a non-aggression pact that would have elicited a storm of outrage against anyone who was less a nationalist.

Certainly the Wehrmacht did not object to the clandestine rearmament of these years and to the repudiation of the Versailles restrictions in the spring of 1935. There was some regret in the Army on the petering out of collaboration with the Red Army by which the Germans had trained Soviet staff officers in return for permission to experiment and train with forbidden weapons on Soviet territory. But as one could now proceed more freely within the Reich itself, there was no lasting setback for the rearmament program. For professionals who for fourteen years had been forced to exercise their craft strictly under wraps, the free hand Hitler gave them must have been felt as a deliverance.

How did Adolf Hitler view the Army and its leadership? At one time he had for them a respect that approached awe. Bridging the psychological gap between the private soldier and an army's chief is no easy task. But in Hitler's case this state of mind in time was translated into an inferiority complex that he seems to have resented. Perhaps his derogation and fault-finding with the generals were meant to compensate for this. Probably he resented most the lack of commitment of the Army's leaders to the type of armament program and expansionist ideas he was pushing. He could not get over their lack of bellicosity. He once said that he had expected to find them straining at the leash like a butcher's dog. Instead he was continually forced to whip them on. In two 1931 conversations with Richard Breiting, a prominent newspaper editor, he launched into the kind of compulsive self-revelatory orations that seem the best guideposts to his innermost thoughts. He dwelt bitterly on his lack of confidence in the Generalität and expressed his intention to fight the big war he expected "with a new Army and a new General Staff."  

It is entirely conceivable that even then he had in mind the ideal of an army that was a military branch of the party. The generals would then simply join his other paladins, or conversely, the paladins would be made generals. In principle he can have found little wrong with Ernst Roehm's aspiration to elevate his Brown Shirts into the official defenders of the nation. It might indeed have been after his own heart if he had felt able as yet to dispense with the professionals and the Sturmbteilung (SA) had looked more like a manageable instrument. When he later transformed the
Schutzstaffel (SS) into a branch of the armed forces, with the probable intention of going all the way after the war had been won, it accords with the desired pattern.

Basically of course, the dictator and the military had irreconcilable positions on rearmament and expansion. It must suffice to enumerate here the more fundamental aspects of his outlook and intentions.

1. Hitler was unalterably wedded to a dream of vast eastern expansion such as was conceivable only on the basis of aggressive war.

2. More nebulous, but only slightly less fundamental, was the concept of a German hegemonial position vis-à-vis the Eurasian land mass.

3. Given French and British acquiescence in German eastern expansion, he was prepared to leave them to vegetate, in power-political terms, in the West. At least until 1936 he had at the back of his mind the ideal of a working relationship with the British, for whose empire he had an enduring admiration. Of course if the western powers were obstreperous, he was prepared to shove them aside once and for all.

4. He suffered from the normal ultra-Fascist addiction to the idea that

German Chancellor Adolf Hitler (right front) conferred with the General Staff.
war is the ultimate test of a nation's vitality. Though willing enough to accept what he could get free in response to political or military pressures, to him such gains were only way stations to what would be in the end a trial of arms.

5. His time tables were vague and depended on circumstance. Though growing more impatient with the years, he was a complete opportunist as to means. He planned and expected to reach top striking power in the period 1943–1945.

6. Getting away with major power plays in the mid-thirties (repudiating the Versailles armaments restrictions and remilitarizing the Rhineland) and profiting hugely from Anglo-French preoccupations in the Mediterranean (Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War), his growing confidence and impatience spurred his craving to move in bigger ways. They increased his inclination toward risk taking and made him push harder in armament and aggressive military planning.

7. Arguments on German economic vulnerabilities for a long and even for a short war left him rather cold. He counted on early blitzkrieg victories that would give him control of other nations' resources.

The leading figures in the Generalität saw things differently on almost every point. None of them shared his racial fantasies or dreams of wholesale eastern expansion. They could not but agree with him on detesting the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles but differed greatly, even among themselves, on the urgency and desirability of particular revisions. The composition of Czechoslovakia and Poland looked to them to be both acts of injustice and a serious check to reattainment of the power position to which they aspired for Germany. Probably most of them had little or no objection in principle to war as a justifiable instrument for the attainment of such ends.

Though like general staffs everywhere they perforce had in their files plans for every imaginable contingency, there was little disposition to focus on any of them for the immediate future. The dreary years of crushing military inferiority had bred a tendency to overrate the forces of other countries, notably France. They were keenly aware of their own continuing shortcomings, especially economic gaps and vulnerabilities. These, they figured, would detract seriously from the punch of offensive war and make the long-pull type unthinkable.

In its economic anxieties, the Generalität was constantly nixed by Gen. Georg Thomas, its economic and armament specialist, as well as by Hjalmar Schacht, Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank,
almost the only individual who regularly dared to speak up to Hitler. Schacht's alarm about Hitler's growing bellicosity first came to a head about 1936, the year in which he became what may be called a charter member of the anti-Hitler conspiracy. He and Thomas carried on a systematic agitation among Army and business leaders against arguments that a \textit{blitzkrieg} might lead to a quick victory; in their view any next war was more likely to be another competition in exhaustion. Their record as prophets was to prove a somewhat mixed one. Many postwar interpretations of the German prewar economy have held that it coasted too much and could have made Germany far more formidable militarily had it been ready to produce at full steam. Recent studies have raised doubts about this thesis, holding that, except for womanpower, production was much closer to capacity than here assumed.

In some measure, economic considerations did play some sort of role in the army command's reluctance to force the pace of rearmament—a rare if not unique occurrence in the history of modern states. Quite apart from costs, the Army command, notably Chief of Staff Beck, was uneasy about calling so many men to the colors. Beck was upset when Hitler, in denouncing the Versailles limitations, declared his intention immediately to build the Army up to 550,000 men in thirty-six divisions. His own proposal was to limit growth during the next two or three years to 300,000 men and to reach 500,000 only in the early forties. Here the quality standards of the professional clashed with those of the amateur for whom quantity was most impressive. Hitler, as so often, insisted on the almost limitless power of the human will, holding that the patriotic zeal of a Nazi combat leader was worth as much as training and experience.

The upshot was that both quality and quantity were allowed some innings. Beck had to yield on force goals but, backed by Fritsch and Blomberg, won on officer training. Hitler, needless to say, gave way with ill grace and kept nagging for speed.

There was a further hassle on the sequence in which age groups would be called up for service. Hitler, champing at the bit for maximum early readiness, wanted to start with World War I veterans who, he argued, would only need an intensive refresher course. Beck urged the wisdom of making haste slowly, holding that the soundest policy was to concentrate on basic training for the younger age groups. In largest part he had his way, adding materially to the score which Hitler was tallying up against him and the Army command generally.

Hitler's tone in such disputes became more strident as his domestic and international elbowroom widened and he felt the more ready to take chances. Issues were sharpened the more one got away from the first years; then there had been no purpose arguing about maximums when the minimums of a respectable military establishment still seemed far away. As long as there was a large pool of industrial and manpower resources to draw
upon, each service had been allowed to launch its own rearmament program. Nothing like a coherent defense policy or systematic planning in the armament field had thus been allowed to develop. The services simply grabbed what they could get away with. Hitler contributed to the confusion by sudden and often inordinate demands. In 1938, for example, he proposed without preliminary warning a fivefold increase in air force frontline strength.

Toward the end of 1937 the Führer's impatience and frustration approached a point where something had to give. He found intolerable a situation in which he felt his style in external affairs cramped. Here lies his basic motivation in calling the historic Hossbach Conference on November 5. It was the sole occasion that something that looked like the empire's crown council was convoked during the Third Reich. But here was no real discussion. Hitler began a prolonged monologue with the flat statement that his mind was f–ed on the matters at issue. This was followed by extensive comment from other participants and that was it! The meeting had been initiated by Blomberg to deal with disarmament problems and, especially, to put a spoke in the wheel of the careening Luftwaffe which grabbed any resource on which it could lay hands. Hitler broadened the subject enormously by relating armament decisions and military planning to broad national policy and by adding the Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath, to the group.

The course of the meeting has been delineated in scores of studies on the period. It climaxed with Blomberg, Fritsch, and Neurath taking vehement issue with what Hitler had said. The Führer, in effect, had demanded every imaginable speedup in armament and had stated that 1938 might offer fruitful opportunities to do something about Austria and/or Czechoslovakia. He left no doubt about his intentions to wage aggressive war when the appropriate time came, in any event no later than 1943–1945.

To all intents and purposes the fate of the three footdraggers was now determined, and none survived the next three months of office. Surprise is sometimes expressed that Hitler was so ready to part with Blomberg, especially as he now knuckled down and provided the ordered revision of Case Green, the basic plan for war with Czechoslovakia, giving it a flavor of urgency. Blomberg had done much to bring the Wehrmacht closer to the party and had rejected importunities of outraged generals to use his office as a moderating influence on Nazi excesses. On the debit side from Hitler's standpoint, Blomberg had frequently sided with the Army on armament questions or refrained from using his authority to bring it into line with the Führer's wishes. At times of international tension he was always a brake, inducing Hitler to refer to him as a "hysterical old maid."

That had been notably the case in 1936 when diplomats and soldiers had been united in opposing the projected gamble of the remilitarization of
the Rhineland. Indeed their unanimous advice might have swayed Hitler if, unknown to them, he had not received a personal message from the French government that it was willing to yield on the basic issue if Germany did not injure French prestige or undermine the European treaty structure. Having learned that the French were ready to give way on substance, Hitler rightly decided that they would not go to war on a matter of form. In the end the dictator was able to make it appear that his intuition outweighed the united judgment of the services and the Foreign and Defense Ministries. It proved a ten-strike in the psychological game of intimidation that Hitler systematically pursued with the generals.

The removal of the three saboteurs in the so-called Blomberg-Fritsch crisis of January-February 1938 was only the central feature of the power play that can appropriately be called a coup d'état. The ongoing crisis had revealed much about how major figures of the Gen.ität stood in relation to their own leaders and to the regime generally. Hitler, therefore, determined to make as clean a sweep as possible of those who stood in his way; the consequent purge was the largest and most drastic of the Nazi period. Sixteen generals were retired or transferred, subservient figures like Generals Keitel and von Brauchitsch took over key positions, and, most portentous, Hitler abolished the War Ministry and put in its place an Armed Forces High Command (OKW) of which he was commander in chief. Dozens of other changes were made at critical spots of the Defense and Foreign Ministries and Army high command. The worshipful Col. Schmundt took the place of the ultra-independent Col. Hossbach as the Chancellor's Wehrmacht adjutant.

Hitler sailed full speed ahead to take over Austria in March and almost immediately shifted to pile pressures on Czechoslovakia concerning its German-speaking territories, usually called the Sudetenland. Only a summary statement can be made about the September crisis which bears that name and the conspiratorial activity that is associated with it.

The decapitation of the former Wehrmacht and Army leadership gave Hitler control of their command apparatus. But he had not yet seized the final bastion of resistance in the post of Chief of the General Statt occupied by Beck. For no one else had the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis been so much of an eye opener as for him. Beck was now the key figure among those who joined hands to resist Hitler's drive toward war with Czechoslovakia. Any final doubts where the Führer was heading were removed by himself in a high level meeting in the Reich Chancellery on May 23.

There was scant prospect of mobilizing the Generalität against a conflict with that state alone. But the likelihood of attaching thereto a European war featuring French and British intervention was quite another thing. Though to outward appearances the dictator's mastery of the military sector was now complete, what did not seem to occur to him was that, in slamming the door on protest and persuasion, he left those who were con-
vinced that he was leading Germany to disaster only the resort of conspiracy. No other course is open when a tyrannical regime has reached its nadir by eradicating sources of restraint. In removing Fritsch, whom Beck and many others had regarded as a final refuge against tyranny, the only course left open was to purge the state by toppling the regime itself.

Beck was Germany's most prestigious soldier after the departure of Fritsch; in the summer of 1938 and thereafter to July 20, 1944, he was the center of military opposition. His conviction that the General Staff was "the conscience of the Army" gave him a sense of mission that guided his course at this critical juncture.

What Beck planned in the first instance was a kind of general strike of the generals in which they would address an ultimatum on the war issue to Hitler. The climax of the campaign for the support of the Generalität came on August 4 when Beck presented the case to the assembled army and army group commanders by reading a memorandum he had prepared for Hitler which argued that an attack on Czechoslovakia meant war with the western powers and disaster for German arms. In the end, with two exceptions (Busch and von Reichenau), the assembled commanders endorsed Beck's position and asked Brauchitsch to convey this to Hitler. But the Army's commander in chief, who was under heavy personal obligation to Hitler, contented himself with merely forwarding the memorandum to the Führer through the army adjutant. This left Beck no choice but to resign, and he left office on August 28. Unfortunately, he obeyed Hitler's order to keep this quiet, and his departure was not announced until October.

There was, however, another arrow in Beck's quiver—a military coup if Hitler stuck to his war plans. Beck's successor, Franz Halder, was also in the conspiracy, so that the General Staff remained its official, though not its motor, center.

Clear proof that Britain and France would actually go to war with Germany in defense of Czechoslovakia was vital to launching a coup with any prospect of success. To assure this a string of messages had been addressed to London and Paris since spring which pleaded for clarification on this issue. They climaxed in the first days of September in meetings between the German chargé d'affaires, Theo Kordt, and the British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, and between Beck himself and a French representative in a Basel hotel.

As is only too well known London and Paris could not be persuaded to act in the desired sense, and the process of appeasement continued on its fatal course. Twice, at what seemed encouraging moments in September, Halder pressed the button that summoned action for the following day, only to have to cancel each call when Britain swept the ground from under the conspirators by Chamberlain's trips to Germany.

Hitler, contrary to worldwide assumption, was more infuriated than
enchanted by the Munich agreement. He bitterly resented Anglo-French concessions that took the wind out of his diplomatic sails and forced him to hold his hand militarily with regard to Czechoslovakia. The military leadership in turn was bowled over by what looked like new proof of an uncanny instinct for what foreign opponents could be made to swallow. Thereafter it ceased to struggle against the drift to war.

Hitler savagely struck out at what he labelled the Beck complex: the thesis that the Army could legitimately object to or even exercise a veto on its employment for war. There was no one left in his military entourage to gainsay him; confidence and self-esteem had suffered too severely. A string of generals who had stood closest to Beck but had somehow survived the February purge went the same way. Small wonder that the shrunken Brauchitsch, and more and more Halder, were cowed.

When Hitler summoned army group and army commanders to Berchtesgaden on August 22, 1939, to reveal his coming attack on Poland, he did not permit comment and none dared protest. Though army members did not wholly believe his claim that his deal with Stalin eliminated any chance of the western powers going to war with Germany, there was no getting around his extraordinary past record as a prophet in such matters. It is noteworthy, however, that until the guns began to shoot, the intimidated army leaders remained unconverted to Hitler's policy and continued to drag their feet as much as their cowed spirits would permit.

The relation of military planning and preparation to the development and conduct of national policy in Germany of the two prewar periods offers few parallels and almost inexhaustible contrasts. In fact, in the most basic problem areas, the determination of which was the cart and which the horse terminated in exactly opposite solutions. Before World War I military planning, except perhaps in some aspects of armament, seemed essentially independent of political guidance or decision. At the most critical juncture of all—the crisis of July 1914—plans devised without consultation, or advice, of the civilian authorities proved a straitjacket for diplomacy.

In the thirties it was the political leadership which took the bit in its teeth and dragged along a reluctant Generalität. The latter was always at least one step behind where the dictator wanted it to be, had no sympathy whatever for his larger foreign policy aims, and surrendered to him only after it had been repeatedly chastened and drained by successive purges of its most independent and politically and morally aware constituents.

Why such great contrasts and differences? The answer lies mainly in completely altered military and political realities of the Third Reich but also in the dawn of the new age in which the role of political leaders assumed forms novel to our century. Notable totalitarian really means total and permits no exceptions. A dictator with considerably less high flying ambitions of conquest than those of Adolf Hitler was bound to move in sooner
or later on the military leadership. The unique situation of Germany with its heavy psychological burdens derived from a disastrous war and catastrophic peace tells much of the rest of the story. Looking at the problem from the standpoint of a democratic society, one can perhaps glean insights from the fate of Wilhelmine Germany. Except in broad human terms there seems little we can gain from that of Adolf Hitler.

Dr. Harold C. Deutsch has done unique and extensive work in the modern military history of Western Europe. He obtained his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1929 and then taught at the University of Minnesota until his retirement in 1972. There he served as Chairman of both the Department of History (1960–1966) and the Program in International Relations and Area Studies. His tenure at Minnesota was interrupted by civilian service in World War II and eleven years of study, research, and teaching in Europe. After World War II, he served as a State Department interrogator of top German military and naval personnel. An eminent scholar, some of Dr. Deutsch’s more important books include: The Changing Structure of Europe (1970), and Hitler and His Generals: The Hidden Crisis—January Through June 1938 (1974). Since leaving the University of Minnesota, he has taught at the National War College (1972–1974); lectured at dozens of universities in Europe, Asia, and Africa; and taught at the U.S. Army War College from 1974 to the present.
Notes

1. The necessary intermediaries confessed to being fearful of the notorious indiscretion of both parties and of the touchy subjects that would have been among the topics of conversation. Especially the former G-2 of the Army High Command, Col. Walter Nicolai, clearly sought to protect Ludendorff from himself.

2. This is also the view of the most recent and excellent work on the guiding military doctrines of the 1914 belligerents: "Once the necessity of a rapid, decisive victory is accepted, Schlieffen's doctrine follows with inexorable logic." Jack Snyder. *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), p 132.

3. The state of British relations with France could be decisive here. In 1887, for example, *The Evening Standard*, the ministerial newspaper, at a time when British dissatisfactions with France ran high, commented that if it came to a Franco-German war Britain might not object to a German march through Belgium. In the meeting of the French Superior Council of National Defense in 1912, the discussion concerned a General Staff request for approval of marching through Belgium. On that occasion one of the ministers, no less a personage than Declasse, argued that the British would not object if they were sufficiently eager to see Germany defeated.


5. In 1911 the two General Staffs had agreed on the transfer to France of a British Expeditionary Force in the event of war with Germany. In 1912 a naval convention was to follow. The development of French planning on the basis of newly available French documents is dealt with at length in the Tehran paper of Pedroncini, pp 2-16.

6. The French suffered over 300,000 casualties during a single week (19-25 August), most of them as the result of futile attacks in Lorraine. The result of an overall defensive posture by Germany ought to have been correspondingly more devastating.

7. Snyder, p 122.

8. On the German side during the First World War the sole exceptions that spring to mind are such extraordinarily insightful figures as Max Hoffmann and Wilhelm Groener.

9. Bethmann-Hollweg related this to Count Lerchenfeld in May 1914, saying that for Germany the time for preventive wars had passed and that the Emperor would never agree to one anyway. Lerchenfeld interview, July 1938.


11. Gen. Dmitri Gourko, G-2 of the Russian Imperial Army, related how he purchased a copy of this war game from a German officer in 1913. This induced the Russians to switch to an offensive strategy against Germany instead of throwing almost everything against Austria-Hungary. The revised plan was ready in April 1914, virtually on the eve of war.


13. In 1912 Germany drafted 52 percent of its manpower of military age against 72-82 percent by France (estimates differ sharply on France). In view of the disproportion in the two populations (sixty-five million against thirty-nine million), the size of the two standing armies was about the same after the French had added an extra year of service.

14. Hammerstein stood out among top army figures for wider political and social horizons. He was one of the few generals who did not share in the bitter prejudice against the Republic. In a milieu so ultraconservative or starkly reactionary this looked close to radicalism, and in some quarters he was known as the "red general."

15. Five days after he became Chancellor Hitler told assembled generals that his foreign policy would go far beyond mere revisions of the Versailles Treaty. His aim, he averred, was to destroy the very framework of the treaty itself as well as the existing balance in Central Europe.

16. Edouard Colle, ed., *Ohne Maske: Hitler-Breitling Geheimgespräche 1931* (Frankfurt,
17. Among other pieces of evidence it is so reported in a dispatch of the British Embassy in Berlin.

18. Much light is thrown upon this aspect of the German rearmament problem by two recent studies. R. J. Overy, “Hitler's War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation,” in *The Economic History Review* XXXV No. 2 (May 1982), pp 272-91, argues that labor resources were fully employed and that the real brakes on industrial expansion were lack of raw materials, skilled labor, and foreign exchange. A big windfall that came just in time for the war that began in September 1939 was the takeover of rump-Czechoslovakia in March of that year. It yielded the Germans half a billion RM in gold, a huge stock of arms, and nearly two billion RM worth of raw materials. Williamson Murray in his superb *The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938–1939* (Princeton, 1984), devotes most of his first chapter (pp 3–49) to a penetrating analysis of the German economic and armament problems that arrives at the same general conclusion.

19. Called thus because the Führer's Wehrmacht adjutant, Colonel Friedrich Hossbach, took notes and later reconstructed the course of the meeting.


21. As related in 1945 by Richard von Kühlmann, a World War II foreign office official and in the thirties confidant of Neurath. Kühlmann was selected by the French to carry the message to Neurath and through him to Hitler.


23. The motor center lay in the command of the Abw, or armed forces intelligence) under its Chief of Staff, Col. Hans Oster, with the tacit support of the commander, Adm. Canaris.

24. The latter episode has not yet been discussed in print but will be dealt with at length in the writer's forthcoming book on this phase of the military conspiracy.

The United States fought the Second World War against ruthless and implacable enemies who had to be defeated and deserved to be defeated. Franklin D. Roosevelt felt just as did his countrymen when he condemned the Japanese attacks of December 7, 1941, as dastardly and infamous, and later, as victory approached, when he wrote, with reference to Germany, of retribution. During the war the American people united against those enemies in a measure greater than they united for any other wartime or postwar purpose. That unity was never complete. Periodic exhortations to refresh it drew, as one cabinet officer put it, on “nothing inspirational,” nothing “Wilsonian.” Rather, the American people responded to their visceral hatreds. Wartime intensification of emotions on the home front in their impact at home ordinarily whetted rather than dampened antecedent divisions within American culture and society. In their ethnic rivalries, class conflict and political partisanship, Americans continually united against each other. To be sure, Churchill was right for Americans, too; war did demand blood and sweat and tears. Obviously in battle but also at home, the tribulations of war again called forth courage, sacrifice and selflessness. But war did not alter the human condition, and among Americans, as among other peoples, the war at once aroused and revealed the dark, the naked and shivering nature of man.

Commercial radio, in the observation of one analyst in 1942, ordinarily provided a twisted treatment of military news. “The war,” he wrote, “was handled as if it were a Big Ten football game, and we were hysterical spectators.” He should not have been surprised. All social units, nations included, ordinarily achieved cohesion largely by identifying a common enemy against whom all their members could unite. Sensitive to that phenomenon, Franklin D. Roosevelt, while an undergraduate at Harvard, had attempted to whip up school spirit for the Yale game. In the Ivy League as well as the Big Ten, the cohesion of each university community had long reached a peak during the annual contest with a traditional rival, a peak in which a sense of common identity in a common cause imbued not undergraduates only but also alumni and even faculty, dedicated though the last constituency theoretically was to an unemotional pursuit of truth.
Within the federal government, during the period before American entry into the war, the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) had a large responsibility for achieving a similar national unity. In that time, Americans were divided about the war. A significant majority came to believe in helping to supply the victims of Axis aggression, but a considerable minority opposed that policy as needlessly inviting direct involvement in the war itself. The head of OFF, the talented poet and Librarian of Congress, Archibald MacLeish, attempted initially to let the facts tell the necessary story. That tactic failed. Several eminent authorities about public opinion advised, as one of them put it, that the agency would have to employ "a large element of fake," the proven technique of American advertising. MacLeish continued to hope that the splendid goals embodied in the Atlantic Charter, from which he drew inspiration, would also inspire the public. After Pearl Harbor, that hope, already fading, surrendered to the banalities and hoopla of commercial practice. The resulting propaganda struck some veterans of Madison Avenue as unpersuasive. One of them called openly for a propaganda of hate. MacLeish balked. He stood, he declared, in accordance with the Christian doctrine of hating sin but forgiving the sinner, not for hatred of the enemy but for hatred of evil. That laudable distinction made few converts, and soon MacLeish resigned.

MacLeish had overlooked a different distinction, one made by Walter Lippmann in his classic study of 1922, Public Opinion, a book hewn by its author's experience with propaganda during the First World War. An understanding of "the furies of war and politics," Lippmann wrote, depended upon the recognition that "almost the whole of each party believes absolutely in its picture of the opposition, that it takes as fact, not what is, but what is supposed to be fact." Indeed the adjustment of people to the environment in which they lived occurred "through the medium of fictions." The product of both acculturation and manipulation, those fictions served as facts, albeit counterfeit facts, and determined a large part of behavior.

No counterfeit was required to bring together for a time the factions which for two years had confronted each other about the question of whether the United States should go to war. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended that debate, as did the ensuing declarations of war on the United States by Germany and Italy. "The suddenness of the . . . attack," in the words of Isaiah Berlin, the British official in Washington charged with informing the Foreign Office about American conditions, " . . . came as a great shock to the nation. . . . The immediate effect has been to make the country completely united in its determination to fight Japan to the end. . . ." Formerly dissident elements, he added a week later, recognized that the country was "in the war for good or ill, and that all should unite their efforts to bring about the defeat of the totalitarian powers. It is also gradually felt that Hitler is the ultimate enemy. . . ." Those were sound analyses, but as the initial trauma
of the Japanese attack subsided, Americans at home yielded to habitual sentiments. In the United States the same observer later recalled, "political and economic life to a considerable degree continued as before, and . . . some of the pressures and internecine feuds between individuals and . . . blocs, inherited from the New Deal and even earlier times, continued." In the spring of 1942 surveys indicated that some seventeen million Americans "in one way or another" opposed the prosecution of the war. That summer, after a series of American defeats in the Pacific, public morale sagged. It would turn around, Isaiah Berlin predicted, only with the broad engagement of American troops in the fighting.

That forecast contained a telling insight. As Gordon Allport, a master of the study of prejudice, later demonstrated, "the presence of a threatening common enemy" cemented the loyalties of aggregates of people. There was to be no attack on the United States, but when American troops in large numbers did meet the enemy, they united against their foe with less need for artificial stimulation than was the case with their countrymen at home.

Whether or not there were atheists in American foxholes, there were few men in combat in any of the services who did not know danger and fear and a resulting hatred. Bill Mauldin, writing in Italy during the long campaign there, spoke to the essential condition of every front: "I read someplace that the American boy is not capable of hate . . . but you can't have friends killed without hating the men who did it. . . . When our guys cringe under an SS barrage, you don't hear them say 'Those dirty Nazis.' You hear them say, 'Those goddam Krauts.' " So also were the expletives about the Japanese of the crews in P.T. boats in the Solomons, or the Marines on Iwo, or the airmen over New Guinea.

The common cause each combat unit joined owed much to the shared danger of a group of men fighting side by side. As Ernie Pyle noted about the air corps, "Basically it can be said that everything depended on teamwork. Sticking with the team and playing it all together was the only guarantee of safety for everybody." In that respect the aviators were no different from the doggies. The G.I. fought at once against the enemy and for his buddies. Robert Sherrod phrased it well: "The Marines . . . didn't know what to believe in . . . except the Marine Corps. The Marines fought . . . on esprit de corps." The services deliberately inculcated a sense of unit—of platoon and company, of ship and task group, of pilot and crew and squadron. Training exercises in themselves required a quick responsiveness and spontaneous cooperation that fostered a needed togetherness. But danger provided the strongest cement.

In the backwater of the fighting, behind the lines, esprit was therefore harder to sustain. Like the marines, most soldiers and sailors had little awareness of the Four Freedoms. They were young Americans prepared to defend their country but eager to get it over with and go home. For the
supply service in the China-Burma-India theater or the garrison in Greenland, the enemy was far away. They found substitutes in their hatred of the natives, or the heat or cold or dirt, or the inescapable unfamiliarity of their stations. John Horne Burns described that phenomenon as it affected G.I.’s in Naples, Italy, J.D. Salinger as it operated on Attu. In the tragicomic novel, *Mr. Roberts*, the men of a ship assigned to dull errands in the South Pacific expressed their cohesion in their common detestation of their irascible captain. The officer hero of the novel, who understood the crew, deliberately defied the captain before obtaining the release he wanted, assignment to a combat ship, on which he later was killed. The fiction was rooted in fact, in the coming together of real crews or platoons far from danger in their dislike, sometimes persecution, of a tough drill sergeant or C.O., or of an outsider in their ranks, a teetotaler or a socialist, a black or Hispanic or Jew.

American civilians behaved in much the same way. Few doubted that the war had to be won or that they should do their part in contributing to victory. But that commitment often flagged as individuals, impatient for the fruits of victory, shopped in the black markets for consumer goods the government was rationing. Others, tense because of the absence of a husband or brother, or because of long hours on the job or long lines awaiting cigarettes, spent that tension by blaming neighbors or politicians or even phantoms whom they had never liked. But civilian morale was much sustained in a vicarious battle, a hatred of the enemy informed, not without cause, by the malign characteristics attributed to the Germans and Japanese. American civilians characteristically described the Germans as warlike and cruel, though also misled and probably amenable to postwar cooperation. American racism, spurred perhaps by Japanese fanaticism in the field, produced a more negative picture of the Japanese, who were usually viewed as treacherous, sly and fierce, and probably a poor risk for postwar friendship.

Those attributions of generalized national characteristics, those counterfeit facts, emerged, as in all wars, both from prior prejudice and from current propaganda, public and private. So it was that American blacks harbored less animosity toward Asians than did American whites. Yet even whites during the war had a benign opinion of the Chinese, the nation’s allies, though few Americans could easily differentiate on sight among different Asian peoples. Indeed at other times, earlier and later, as one authoritative study showed, the American image of the Chinese alternated between the villainous figure of Fu Man Chu and the amiable symbol of Charlie Chan. *Time* magazine endeavored to help its readers tell friend from foe. The journal asserted, with no basis in fact, were hairier than the Chinese; “the Chinese expression is likely to be more placid, kindly, open; the Japanese more positive, dogmatic, arrogant. . . . The Japanese
are hesitant, nervous in conversation, laugh loudly at the wrong time. Japanese walk stiffly erect . . . Chinese more relaxed . . . sometimes shuffle." Comic strips drew a similar picture, and even the War Production Board called for the extermination of the Japanese as rats. As did the Germans with the Jews, so did Americans with the Japanese, and to a lesser extent the Germans, enhance their own sense of unity by hating an outside group to which, in each case, they applied stereotypes sustained, as Allport wrote, "by selective perception and selective forgetting."

Though officially the federal government did not consider the United States a party to a racial war or a war of hatred and revenge, official rhetoric sometimes conveyed those feelings. The responsible spokesmen were genuinely angry and more, gravely concerned about spurring civilian participation in wartime programs. So it was that the Treasury Department, adopting a tactic which its analysts recommended after extensive study, endorsed advertisements for war savings bonds that depicted the Japanese as "ungodly, subhuman, beastly, sneaky, and treacherous," in one case as "murderous little ape men."

So, too, the War Department in its preparations for the trials at Nuremberg pursued retribution at a large cost to Anglo-American law. The attorneys who worked out the trial procedures proposed from the first to charge the Nazi government, party and agencies with "conspiracy to commit murder, terrorism, and the destruction of peaceful populations in violation of the laws of war." The conviction of individual Nazi leaders would implicate Nazi organizations that had furthered the conspiracy, and lesser German officials would then be convicted in turn if they had been associated with those agencies. That proposal, with its presumption of guilt by association, ran directly counter to the Anglo-American tradition of presuming innocence until guilt was proved. No such thing existed, moreover, as an "international crime of conspiracy to dominate by acts violative of the rules of war." Indeed conspiracy law had no place at all in European practice. Recourse to the conspiracy doctrine made the Germans targets of an ex post facto proceeding, even a bill of attainder of a kind. The British Lord Chancellor, unlike the American Secretary of War, preferred to hew to the "Napoleonic precedent" which called for political rather than judicial action to resolve what was essentially a political rather than a legal problem. But the Americans prevailed even though, as one critic later wrote, "the whole of the war-crimes policy planning was shot through with excess . . . combined with . . . overmoralizing." Those were precisely the qualities that marked wartime American reportage, fiction, propaganda and public opinion about the Germans.

Those qualities also characterized the language and behavior of various groups within American society which, throughout the war, united against each other with venom and occasional ferocity. Like troops behind the lines,
World War II propaganda posters encourage support on the home front (Army Art Collection, Center of Military History).
they found familiar targets close at hand for antagonisms that predated the war but drew new force, often with official sanction or indifference, from wartime developments. In the name of wartime necessity, racial prejudice sparked the most blatant official violation (except for chattel slavery) of civil liberties in American history—the confinement of Japanese Americans, American citizens as well as immigrants, in barren camps in the interior western states.

The Japanese Americans, of whom the overwhelming majority were loyal to the United States, were innocent of any proven crime, but after the attack on Pearl Harbor, anti-Japanese sentiment, especially on the west coast, reached hysterical proportions. Within weeks the noxious counterfeits of the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West had become official doctrine. The congressional delegations from the Pacific slope and the Attorney General of California demanded the evacuation of the Japanese Americans from the area, with internment the predictable sequential step. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commanding general there, announced that a “Jap is a Jap... It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not.” Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson backed DeWitt. The “racial characteristics” of the Japanese, he held, bound them to an enemy nation and required their evacuation. The Attorney General of the United States, after some hesitation, supported Stimson, as also vigorously did President Roosevelt. Almost universally the American press endorsed the policy. The head of the War Relocation Authority, charged with administering the internment camps, attributed a few, rare protests to “liberals and kind-hearted people” who did not understand wartime necessity.

That argument proved barren after the war when returning Japanese American veterans met open hostility in Washington state and California. The whole policy disregarded the experience of Hawaii where Japanese Americans, too numerous to be incarcerated, remained, with insignificant exceptions, exemplary citizens throughout the war. Yet even the Supreme Court in the Hirabeyashi case upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation on the ground that “residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of different ancestry,” though neither German nor Italian Americans were locked up. Two later wartime cases resulted in only inadequate modifications of the ruling, which was effectively overturned only many years later. The court’s record, its disregard for the wholesale deprivation of liberty without due process of law, provoked just one contemporary rebuke from a distinguished member of the bar, the stinging retort of Eugene V. Rostow. The treatment of the Japanese Americans, he wrote in 1945, “was in no way required or justified by the circumstances... It was calculated to produce individual injustice and deep-seated maladjustments... [It] violated every democratic social
value, yet has been approved by the Congress, the President and the Supreme Court.”

The attack on Pearl Harbor afforded a partial explanation for the persecution of the Japanese Americans but not for its counterpart, the “truculent anti-Negro statements” that “stimulated racial feeling,” as Isaiah Berlin observed, in the South and in northern cities. He also reported a less but growing anti-Semitism and mounting hostility, not least among servicemen, toward Hispanic Americans. The movement of blacks into industrial areas to find employment in war industries, the shortage of housing, schooling and recreational facilities in those places, the resulting rivalry of whites and blacks for various kinds of space, those and other wartime conditions intensified historic prejudices and, just as Allport postulated, sparked episodes of violence. Major race riots occurred in Mobile, Alabama, in Los Angeles (where the victims were largely Chicanos), in Harlem and, most destructively, in Detroit. The motor city, as a Justice Department investigation disclosed in 1943, was a “swashbuckling community... Negro equality... an issue which... very considerable segments of the white community” resisted. Among whites and blacks, truculence was growing. There had been open conflict in 1942 between Polish Americans and blacks over access to a new federal housing project. There followed sporadic episodes of fighting, often involving alienated teenagers. In the deep heat of a June weekend in 1943 a clash between blacks and whites in a park escalated into a riot that for two days rocked the city where thirty-four people, mostly blacks, were killed. Federal troops, summoned by the Michigan governor, restored a superficial quiet, but blacks and whites remained united in their suspicions of each other.

Predictably the press in Mississippi blamed the riot on the insolence of Detroit’s blacks and on Eleanor Roosevelt for proclaiming and practicing social equality. The NAACP pleaded for a statement from the President to arouse opinion against “deliberately plotted attacks.” Roosevelt did condemn mob violence in any form, but he ducked the racial issue as he did generally during the war.

Those developments conformed to the pattern of that issue in that period. The South opposed any threat to segregation. The presumed threats arose from the continued efforts of American blacks, during a war directed in part against Nazi racism, to fight racism at home too. The federal government moved reluctantly, when it moved at all, under political pressure from black leaders. Only the imminence of a protest march on Washington persuaded the President to establish the Fair Employment Practices Commission, which thereafter made small and erratic progress toward its assigned goal. Blacks did obtain jobs in war industry but less because of federal action than because of a shortage of workers, and then usually in semi-skilled positions and as members of pro forma affiliates of segregated labor
unions. Worse, no protest succeeded in stirring the armed forces to desegregate the services. Secretary of War Stimson supported segregation, as did Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, partly because they would not, in Stimson's words, use the army in wartime as a "sociological laboratory." But Stimson also believed that blacks lacked courage, mechanical aptitude, and the capacity for leadership. Consequently, though Roosevelt now and then scolded the army, black troops served primarily under white officers and in service of supply assignments. There were token exceptions, such as a black fighter squadron, as also within the navy, where almost all blacks performed menial duties. Those policies gave the lie to the government propaganda showing happy black workers at lathes in model factories or contented black soldiers poised for combat. The persisting inequality and humiliation of blacks impelled their leaders to unite their fellows, along with some sympathetic whites, against bigotry and official indifference. The war years saw the founding of CORE and the first modern freedom rides and sit-ins, some of them successful, all portentous, all fraught with interracial tension.

Like ethnic animosities, class conflict persisted during the war. In his reports about American morale, Berlin referred most often to industrial unrest. "Anti-labour feeling," he observed in November 1942, "has risen to a considerable height. Public indignation at . . . strikes in war industries . . . comparisons between industrial workers' wages and those of soldiers and farmers, all continually whipped up by predominantly Republican and anti-labour press." In June 1943 he noted a "rising tide of anti-labour feeling among armed services . . ." stationed within the country. Several months later, as he wrote, that feeling reached the top when Gen. Marshall, during an off-the-record press conference, "struck the table and said with genuine anger that the behavior of the labour leaders . . . might easily prolong the war at a vast cost in . . . blood and treasure." That outburst was not typical of Marshall, though the opinion may have been, as it surely was among almost all business managers, most Republicans and conservative Democrats, and many senior officials in the federal bureaus and agencies responsible for the conduct of the war, particularly those involved in production, manpower, and wage and price control. Their biases led them to exaggerate the satisfactions of working men and women and to resist and overestimate the power of the unions.

The wartime growth of the economy did carry with it significant gains for industrial workers. Demand for labor pulled into the factories previously ostracized blacks, displaced rural workers, and unprecedented numbers of women. Real wages rose, full employment at last returned, and government fiscal policy under those conditions effected a considerable redistribution of income downwards. The War Labor Board's adoption of its "maintenance of membership" policy assured a substantial growth in the unions. But
workers nevertheless continually expressed their legitimate discontent. Only a part of rising wages reached weekly pay envelopes which were reduced by deductions for union dues, an unaccustomed charge for the recently unemployed; for the federal government tax, for the first time collected on a pay-as-you-go basis; and for war bonds, which social pressure induced almost everyone to purchase. In crowded industrial cities even rising wages could buy only squalid housing. Rationing limited the availability of choice foods. "To the workers it's a Tantalus situation," a Fortune reporter observed, "the luscious fruits of prosperity above their heads—receding as they try to pick them." Other frustrations characterized the workplace—the unfamiliar discipline of the assembly line, inequities in job classifications and, especially for women, in pay and in the extra burdens of domesticity. The resulting anxieties and alienation took the form of recurrent absenteeism, particularly among women, and of wildcat strikes, particularly in the automobile, steel and railroad industries. Yet those activities seemed like sabotage to business managers and harassed federal officials, few of whom had ever known the daily burdens of industrial life.

That imperception, a manifestation of both a cultural difference and a
latent hostility between social classes, informed angry editorials, provoked military table-pounding, and fostered repeated demands within Congress, among middle-class voters, and ironically, among communists in the labor movement to discipline or to punish or even to conscript striking workers. Often labor union leaders were the objects of that animosity, though the workers in the troubled industries were usually more restless than were their representatives. Indeed, almost all the leaders had made a no-strike pledge in return for the maintenance of membership policy, and they had thereafter continually to strive to restrain the workers while they negotiated with responsible federal officers for increased wages to match the rising cost of living. In that mediating role they confronted the growing power within government of captains of industry and finance who had been brought to Washington to staff the war agencies and the Navy and War Departments. Among those recruits labor had few friends.

In the circumstances, most labor leaders moved with caution but not John L. Lewis, the head of the United Mine Workers (UMW), whose militancy made him the despised symbol of establishment hostility. Lewis had never believed in the no-strike pledge, disliked the President, and did not trust the government to effect a significant improvement of the still wretched conditions of work in the mines. Yet Lewis was no radical. He remained committed to business unionism, to the traditional objectives of collective bargaining. At least one cabinet member, Harold Ickes, who had a special responsibility for fuel, understood as much. Lewis seemed radical because his wartime tactics, often clumsy and usually strident, appeared to his opponents and were made to appear to most Americans, to be unpatriotic and unreasonable.

During 1942 and 1943 Lewis orchestrated a series of strikes and wildcat strikes to advance his purpose, the unionization of all mine fields and the improvement of wages, benefits, and safety conditions. In considerable measure he succeeded. But his ventures, colliding with the intransigence of the mine owners, did threaten necessary coal supplies for industry and therefore inspired a temporary government takeover of the mines. They also made Lewis and the UMW the undesigned but identifiable targets of the Smith-Connally bill which Congress passed in 1943. Roosevelt vetoed the measure because he recognized its ineffectuality, but immediately Congress overrode the veto. Essentially useless as a device to impose industrial stability, the act increased the President's power to seize plants in war industries, made it a crime to encourage strikes in those plants, and outlawed union contributions to political campaigns, long an objective of Republicans and conservative Democrats. Its political influence challenged, organized labor could take no solace in Roosevelt's veto message which recommended drafting workers who took part in strikes in plants in the possession of the government. In 1944, prodded by the War Department, the President went
further and urged a national service law which, he said, would prevent strikes. Though Congress did not approve that expedient, Roosevelt's recourse to it revealed how little influence labor any longer had in Washington. Lewis had united his miners against the owners, but in the process, he galvanized opinion at home and among servicemen against himself. The actual and the emotional imperatives of war produced a retaliation potentially damaging to the entire labor movement.

The leadership of the CIO, eager to retrieve their losses, had no one to turn to but the President who still stood in 1944 for most of the causes they embraced. The Republicans, in contrast, had a long record of hostility to unions and to progressive measures. Denied the ability to contribute union funds to the Democrats, Sidney Hillman and his associates formed the Political Action Committee to raise money from workers and their liberal friends and to get out the vote. Even so, the influence they exerted was too small to effect the renomination of their most outspoken champion in Washington, Vice President Henry A. Wallace. Indeed, the class and ethnic enmities of the war years underlay the rejection by the Democrats of Wallace and by the Republicans of Wendell Willkie, his counterpart within the GOP. Both men had attacked business management for its narrowness of vision; both endorsed the aspirations of American blacks.

Divisive issues affected politics throughout the war years. A coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats rolled back the New Deal, opposed progressive taxation, forced Roosevelt to move to the right. Those developments had begun before the war and might well have occurred without it. But politics was never adjourned; political rhetoric was, as ever, intemperate; and both parties stooped to a contentious meanness during the campaign of 1944. Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, the Republican nominee, exercised a patriotic generosity in excluding from his campaign any reference to MAGIC, the American compromise of Japanese cables which, had he chosen to mention it, would have assisted the enemy and raised with refreshed force the question of the Administration's culpability for the surprise at Pearl Harbor. Dewey also kept foreign policy out of the campaign in order to avoid premature controversy about the structure of the peace. Nevertheless, the Democrats gave him no quarter; identified him, in spite of his record as governor, with the reactionaries in his party; mocked him for his small physique and little moustache. Early and late, the Republicans, including Dewey, identified the Democrats, often openly, with communism and employed anti-Semitic innuendos to attack Hillman and through him, Roosevelt. Meanness often emerged in national campaigns. In 1944 the form it took again reflected class and ethnic issues.

The war did not create those issues but neither did it subdue them. In one sense, the remoteness of the battle fronts permitted the expressions of divisiveness that might otherwise have militated against victory. In a larger
sense, Americans behaved much as they always had and in a manner not
markedly different from other peoples, even those exposed to immediate
danger and defeat. Social and political factionalism crippled Italy and
France, where outright treason, as in Norway and the Netherlands, contrib-
tuted to German victories. Even in Germany, apart from the victims of
genocide, hundreds of decent men and women spent the war in concentra-
tion camps, dozens in clandestine subversion, and a group of disenchanted
officers, good soldiers all, attempted to assassinate Hitler. In Great Britain
the government interned German Jews, civilians grumbled far more than
official propaganda admitted, and the Labour Party prepared to win the
political triumph it enjoyed before the end of hostilities against Japan. The
Soviet state imprisoned or killed many ethnic Germans and dissident Ukraini-
ans, systematically murdered Polish soldiers who were allies but not com-
munists, and stood aside while the Germans demolished the resistance in
Warsaw. Thousands of Chinese collaborated with the Japanese, more thou-
sands engaged in civil war, and factionalism vitiated the Kuomintang.

In every warring nation, whatever the degree of its unity against the
enemy, men and women also united against their fellows, often with the
fervor of prejudice and hatred. In their dealings with each other, Ameri-
cans at home exhibited a moderation at least equivalent to that of any other
peoples. No inherent superiority of the national soul accounted for the
difference. Rather, the intensity of internal strife within the belligerent na-
tions correlated strongly with the proximity of attack, invasion and occupa-
tion. Defeat, or the close prospect of defeat, excited a search for scapegoats
or a scramble for survival of an intensity Americans were spared. In the
years after the war, when Americans first came to recognize their national
vulnerability to devastating attack, they united against each other much in
the patterns of the war years but more savagely and with more lasting
damage. Then, as during the war and at other times, the city on the hill, to
the sorrow of some of its residents, did not rise much above the plain.

Professor Blum, the Sterling Professor of History at Yale University, has written highly
acclaimed works on American culture and society, most notably a work on the American home
front during World War II, *V Was for Victory* (1976). After receiving his A.B. degree from
Harvard University in 1943, he served in the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater and on the staff of
the Chief of Naval Operations. He then returned to Harvard, receiving his Ph.D. in 1950. He
served on the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1948 until 1957 when
he went to Yale. At Yale he served as Chairman of the History Department (1964-1967) and
held the Farnam History Chair (1966-1972) and Woodward Professorship of American History
(1972-1981). He has also held three of the highest appointments in American history in Great
Britain: Pitt Professor at Cambridge University (1963-1964), Commonwealth Lecturer at Uni-
Notes

Appendix

Harmon Memorial Lectures

All but one of the Harmon Memorial Lectures were delivered at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado. Because of illness, the twelfth lecturer could not appear, and the address was never delivered before the Cadet Wing. Following is a chronological listing of all lectures. Presentation dates appear first; publication dates follow in parentheses.

APPENDIX

Index

Acheson, Dean G.: 188, 225, 227, 495
Adams, Charles Francis Jr.: 63
Adams, John: 171
Adams, Samuel: 171
Admiralty Islands: 385
Adolphus, Gustavus: 348
Africa: 380, 414:
Agitando, Emilio: 77
Air Corps. See United States Air Corps
Air Corps Act of 1926: 18, 21, 427
Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS): 392, 427-29, 434-35, 448, 450-51
Air Divisions (numbered): 444
Air Force Manual 1-1: 305, 310, 311, 436
Air Force Spoken Here: General Ira Eaker and the Command of the Air: 98
Air Forces (numbered):
Sixth: xiii
Seventh: 146
Eighth: 442-47, 452, 455, 458, 461, 463
Eleventh: 139
Thirteenth: xiii, 147
Fifteenth: 447
Twentieth: 47, 148, 150
Air Materiel Command: 463-64
Air Power in Three Wars: 38
Air Transport Command: 450
Air War College: 448
Aircraft in Warfare: 365
Aircraft types, British: 404, 441, 452
Aircraft types, German: 447, 452, 465-66, 468
Aircraft types, U.S.:
A-36: 465
B-9: 451
B-10: 429
B-12: 451
B-17: 14, 139, 404, 428, 429, 430, 442, 465, 454-55, 458, 466
B-24: 14, 404, 455
B-26: 451, 462
B-29: 14, 28, 148, 517
B-44: 14
B-44-A-1: 82
F-15: 102
P-12: 98, 451
P-36: 429
P-38: 14, 461, 465
P-40: 464
P-47: 443, 460, 462, 464-65, 467
P-51: 464, 465
XIB-17: 428
YB-40: 461, 463
YB-52: 102
Akers-Douglas Committee: 287-88
Alamein, Lord Alan F.: 181, 188
Alexander I (Russia): 244, 248-49, 305 6, 334-40
Alma, battle of: 45, 51, 309
Alloyed Air Forces: 137
Alloyed Naval Forces: 137
Allies:
World War I: 449
World War II: 352, 354, 404, 469, 511-12
Allport, Gordon: 579, 581, 584
Almond, Edward M.: 228
Alsace-Lorraine: 559
American, British, Chinese, Dutch (ABCD) powers: 493
American, British, Dutch, Australian (ABDA) powers: 132
American Expeditionary Forces: 83-86, 96. See also World War I
American Historical Association: 28
American Revolutionary War: 10, 12, 162, 164, 167, 170, 393, 403, 473-84, 510, 532
The American Way of War: 515
Amsterdam, Holland, bombing of: 463
Anderson, Dave: 539-40
Anderson, Fred L.: 446
Andrews, Frank M.: 39, 178
Angola, Joe: 202
Anglo-American Conference: 111, 186
Anzio, Italy, assault on: 187, 211
Apachil, Lake, Arizona: 534
Arakcheiev, Aleksey A.: 331
Axis sur Aube, France, battle of: 340
Ardant du Picq, Charles: 39
Ardennes counteroffensive: 20
Argentan-Dieulefait pocket: 213
Argonne, France, battle of: 85
Armenia: 239
Arms and Men: 13
Army Air Corps: 166, 178. See also U.S. Air Service; U.S. Army Air Forces;
U.S. Air Force
Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (AAPOA): 148
Army Air Forces, Western Pacific: 150
INDEX

Bourke, John G.: 26
Bradley, Omar N.: 163, 166, 167, 185, 190, 206, 224, 225, 228, 511
Bragg, Braxton: 53, 57
Brandywine, battle of: 480
Brauchitsch, Walther von: 571, 572, 573
Breiting, Richard: 566
Breton, Lewis H.: 92, 130, 132
Breslau, Germany: 326
Brittany, France: 213
Brodie, Bernard: 371
Brooke, Sir Alan: 139, 140
Brown, Junius: 65
Bryan, William J.: 73
Buckner, Simon B., Jr.: 139, 140, 263
Buell, Don Carlos: 53, 57
Bullard, Robert L.: 97
Burns, Field Marshal Ernst: 500
Burma: 132, 179
Butler, William O.: 139, 140
Calhoun, John C.: 527
Cæsar, Julius: 309
Cairo Conference: 119
Cambridge, Duke of: 285, 287
Camp Bowie, Arizona Territory: 261
Camp Floyd, Utah: 261
Canfield, James: 73
Cannae: 554
Cantigny, battle of: 85
Carleton, “Gen. Jimmy”: 527
Case Green: 570, See also Czechoslovakia
Castro, Fidel: 369
Cate, James L.: 7, 177
Castlereagh, Robert Lord: 337, 339, 340-43
Caulaincourt, Armand Marquis de: 338
Cavel, Edith: 352, 355
Cayley, Sir Charles: 34
CIA: 226
Central Pacific: 135, 143, 145
Central Powers: 352, 355
Chaffee, Ado: 204, 206
Chamberlain, Neville: 572
Charles, Archduke of Austria: 328, 329
Charles V, Emperor of Italy: 272
Charles VII, Emperor of France: 272
Charles XI, King of Sweden: 238
Charleston, South Carolina: 416, 480
Charlie Chan: 580
Chastellux, Marquis de: 163
Chatillon, France: 538
Chateau, France: 85, 183, 340
Che Guevara: 374
Cheltenham College, England: 216
Chennault, Claire: 451
Cherokee Indians: 527
Cheyenne Indians: 527
Chickamagus, battle of: 57
Chilalaw, Benjamin: 462
Chihuahua, Mexico: 81
Chile: 412
attack on Korea: 225-26
Communist: 218-20, 227-28, 368, 495
cultural changes in: 490-96
Kuomingtang regime: 493, 589
war with Japan: 489
China-Burma-India Theater: 179, 580
Chinese People’s Liberation Army: 550
Chivington, John M.: 527
Chongjin, Korea: 225
Chosen Reservoir, Korea: 225
China, Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC): 172, 186, 192
Clive, John L.: 264
Clémenceau, Georges: 545
Cobbs, Waddy V.: 257
Coffey, Thomas: 35
Coffman, Edward M.: 266
Cohen, Warren: 195
Cole, Edwin T.: 166
Cold War: 223, 547
Collins, James L., Jr.: 160, 167, 227, 228
Collins, Joe: 185
Columbus, New Mexico: 95
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 179, 187, 188, 385, 512. See also Allies
Commager, Henry S.: 434
Command and General Staff College: 171, 204

Commands (numbered):
  V Fighter: 463
  VIII Air Service: 463
  VIII Bomber: 455, 455, 455-60
  VIII Fighter: 447-48, 453, 460, 461, 463-69
  IX Fighter: 470
  XV Fighter: 467, 470
  XIX Tactical Air: 212

Communist: 364, 368, 381. See also China, Communist; USSR
Confederate States of America: 59, 60-63, 67
Constitution of United States: 474
Cooke, Charles M., Jr.: 149
Coolidge, Calvin: 103, 379
Cooling, Benjamin: 29, 37-38
Corbett, Julian: 269
Cordoba, Gonzalo de: 272
CORE (Congress of Racial Equality): 585
Cornwallis, George C.: 348
Corpus Christi, Texas: 32. See also Vietnam War
Corregidor, Philippine Islands: 134
A Country Such as This: 91
Cowen, Arthur S.: 93, 95, 101
Craig, Gordon A.: 305-6, 344, 397
Craig, Malin: 163, 178
Craonne, France, battle of: 340
Craven, Wesley F.: 3-5, 17, 23, 45, 347
Cressey, Edward S.: 27
Creek Indians: 526
Crimean War: 249, 511
Crook, George: 259, 531
Crowley, Philip A.: 307, 387
Cuba: 70, 76-77, 82, 167
Cuban missile crisis: 360, 370, 371
Cuneo, John: 34
Cunningham, Andrew B.: 114
Cunningham of Lynndrope, Lord: 181
Curragh incident: 518
Custer, George A.: 525, 530
Custine, Marquis de: 240
Czechoslovakia: 208, 397, 570, 571, 572
D'Argenson, Marc Pierre de Voyer: 273-74
Danube River: 317
Darlan, Jean F.: 189
Davis, Jefferson: 51, 68, 268, 292
Davis, Kenneth: 188
Davont, Louis-Nicolas: 326
Dawes, Charles G.: 73
Dayton, Ohio: 93
D-Day: 207, 447

Dechen, Friedrich von der: 399-401
Decker, George: 185
Declaration of Independence: 478
De Gaulle, Charles: 279, 331, 364, 19, 520
De la Noue, Francois: 272
Devers, Jacob L.: 265
Democratic Party: 228, 229, 512
Denikin, Anton: 235, 242
Department of Defense: 8, 220, 436, 549

Deterrence or Defense: 371
Deutsch, Harold C.: 507, 553-74
Denison, Lee: 265
Dewey, Thomas R.: 588
Dewitt, John L.: 139, 583
Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage: 359
Diebisch, Hans Friedrich: 331
Dill, Sir John: 187
Donald, David: 63
Donovan, James A.: 540
Doolittle, James H.: 39, 92
Dostoevsky, Fyodor M.: 241
Douhet, Giulio: 352, 361, 365
Dresden, Germany: 318, 321, 326, 331, 333
Dreyfus affair: 281, 543
Dufferin Commission: 286
Dull Knife: 532
Dulles, John F.: 25, 227
Dumbarton Oaks: 119
Duncan, George B.: 259, 260, 261
Dunkirk, France: 186
Dupont, Louis: 479-83
Durant, Oklahoma: 93, 97
Duh Teul, Jean: 312, 314

Eaker, Ira C.: 38, 46, 92, 93, 97-100, 236, 452, 453, 458, 460, 461 62, 465
Earle, Edward M.: 347
Earl of Sandwich: 478
Eckstein, Alexander: 490
Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age: 369

El Ghurn, Field, Florida: 465
Egypt: 70
Ehrman, John: 188
Eichelberger, Robert: 265
Elbe River: 321, 326, 383
Elements of Military Art and Science: 530
El Guettar, Tunisia: 206
Elizabeth I, Queen of England: 521
El Paso, Texas: 81
INDEX

Emden, Germany, bombing of: 46
Emerson, William R.: 392, 393
Emme, Eugene: 35
Emmons, Delos C.: 130, 137, 179
England. See United Kingdom
Epaminondas: 55, 305
Erfort, Germany: 319, 321
Erzgebirge, Germany: 326
Ethiopia: 568
Eugene, Prince: 52, 309
European Theater of Operations: 178, 211
Evan, Robert "Fighting Bob": 417
Everest, Frank E.: 139
Ewell, Richard S.: 530
Fair Oaks, battle of: 59
Fairchild, Mail: 31
Fair Employment Practices Commission: 584
Falls, Cyril: 52, 61-62
Far East: 222-23
Far East Air Force: 150
Faraday, Michael: 283
Fascism: 352. See also
Fast Carrier Force: 145
Fechet, James E.: 98
Feudalism: 270, 271, 272
Field Creek, Texas: 97
Fiji Islands: 137
Finland: 239
Finletter, Thomas K.: 31
Fisher, Lord John A.: 520
Flying Jennies: 82
Fontainebleau, France: 779
Fort Atkinson, Kansas: 263
Fort Benning, Georgia: 163, 185, 193, 206
Fort Bliss, Texas: 81
Fort Brown, Texas: 261
Fort Duncan, Texas: 259, 260
Fort Duquesne: 164
Fort Gibson, Indiana Territory: 262
Fort Gratiot, Michigan: 255, 256, 261
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 163, 173, 177, 182, 188, 255
Fort Lincoln, North Dakota: 264
Fort Myer, Virginia: 177, 204
Fort Riley, Kansas: 199, 265
Fort Robinson, Nebraska: 534
Fort Sam Houston, Texas: 265
Fort Sheridan, Illinois: 207
Fort Sully, South Dakota: 261
Fort Vancouver, Oregon: 260
Fort Walla Walla, Washington: 261
Fort Wingate, New Mexico: 259
Fort Yates, North Dakota: 255
Foster, Calvin W.: 367
Foulois, Benjamin D.: 92, 95, 98, 177, 265
academies in: 273, 274, 279-84, 296
bombing of: 461
invasion of: 186, 207, 211-13, 395
military life in: 225, 236
officer corps in: 269, 311, 313-14
Republic of: 313, 543
Revolution in: 279, 313-14, 321, 362, 365, 396-99, 403
Royal Army of: 311-22
in Seven Years War: 247, 311-12
Superior Council of National Defense: 59
in War of 1812: 325
in World War I: 83-86, 118, 183, 380, 385, 386, 450, 545, 559-63
in World War II: 352. See also
Bonaparte, Napoleon; World War I; World War II
Francis, Emperor of Austria: 328, 329, 331-32, 334, 337
Franco-Prussian War: 279, 386, 541, 553
Frankfort, Germany: 319, 334
Frankland, Noble: 441
Frederick the Great: 52, 277, 305, 399, 318, 348, 362, 541
Freeman, Douglas: 11, 160, 177
French and Indian War: 164, 167
Frisch, Werner von: 565, 569, 570, 572
Fryklund, Richard: 38
Fu Man Chu: 580
Fuller, J. F. C.: 62, 210, 365
Futrell, Frank: 36, 37
The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations: 365
Gallatin, Albert: 533
Gallup, John L.: 495
Galbraith, John K.: 515
Galland, Adolph: 469
Garfield, James A.: 158
Gay, S. II: 65
George, Harold L.: 450
George III (England): 475
Georgia Campaign: 65
German Americans: 583
German Army: 364-74
First: 558, 559
Second: 558, 559
591
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

Nineteenth: 469-70
Schleswig-Holstein Army Corps: 561.
See also Germany; German Empire; Prussia

German Empire: 343, 540, 541-45, 547, 553. See also Germany, Prussia

German Navy: 563-64. See also Germany

The German Officer Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945: 278

Germany: 316-18, 384, 401, 544, 553-74, 580, 589

army mobilization in: 385

air war against: 179, 353, 393, 404, 441, 471

attack on: 207

Howes Shirts in: 566
counteroffensive by: 207, 213

militarism in: 507, 548

Nazis of: 116, 548, 565, 566, 569, 571, 579, 582

officers in: 289, 549

in World War I: 351, 380, 385, 511, 545, 547, 553-64

in World War II: 107, 116, 201, 210-14, 352, 392-83, 395, 407, 564-74, 571. See also German Empire; Prussia

Gettysburg (Pennsylvania), battle of: 53

Ghonnley, Robert L.: 137, 139, 140, 141

Gibbs-Smith, Charles: 29, 36

Gilbey, Frank: 497

Gilbert Islands: 146, 147

Gitschin, Russia: 530

Glantz: 245

Gneisenau, August Neidhart: 332, 337-39, 341-42

Godfrey, George J.: 258, 261

Goldberg, Al: 35

Goodenough Island: 226

Goschen, Sir Edward: 562

Göttingen, Germany: 318

Governor's Island, New York: 259

Grand Alliance: 306, 343-44, 397

Grant, Ulysses S.: 4, 13, 45, 59, 72, 161, 171, 236, 258, 353

Great Britain. See United Kingdom

Greece: 270

Greene, Duane M.: 261

Greene, Nathaniel: 163, 166

Greenfield, Kent R.: 347, 547

Greenville, Texas: 93

Grey, Earl: 285

Groenewegen, Wilhelm: 554, 561

Grolman: 341-42

Gropman, Alan I.: 35

Grootebeek, Germany: 333

Groves, Leslie: 179

Gross, Marvin: 465

Gruender, Ira: 475, 476, 478

Guadalcanal: 140, 142, 143, 146, 150

Guibert, Comte de: 362, 364

Guderian, Heinz: 239

Gustavus, Adolphus of Sweden: 309

H-bomb: 33

Hackett, Sir John: 25, 505, 523, 559

Hadden, John J.: 258

Haidg, Douglas: 544, 545

Halbepest, David: 381

Halder, Franz: 572, 573

Hale, Willis E.: 145, 146

Halifax, Lord Edward F.: 572

Halleck, Henry W.: 53, 57, 159, 159, 236, 258, 530

Halsey, William F.: 141, 143, 145

Hamilton, Alexander: 4, 13, 66, 163, 166, 290, 482-83

Hamilton, Sir Ian: 287

Hammerscheidt-Equard, Kurt von: 565

Hancock, W. K.: 369

Hanford, Winfield S.: 58, 530

Hand, Thomas T.: 139, 143, 147

Hangzhou, China: 489

Hanibal: 53, 177, 309

Hardenberg, Karl von: 337, 341

Hardinge, Henry II: 342

Harmer: 533

Harmon, Hubert R.: 147

Harmon, Millard: 139, 140, 141, 145, 146, 148, 179

Harrington, Sir John: 521

Harrison, Benjamin: 158

Harrison, William II: 158

Harrodsburg, England: 286

Hart, Thomas C.: 130, 132

Hasdorf, James C.: 39

Hastings, battle of: 305

Haupt, Helmuth: 51

Hawaii: 135, 147, 149, 179, 583

Hayes, Rutherford B.: 158

Heintzelman, Samuel V.: 255, 256, 261

Henderson Field: 140

Henry IV (France): 273

Herbert, Sydney: 285

Herness, G. A.: 177

Heth, Henry: 263

Hickam, Horace M.: 39

Higginbotham, Don: 47, 174, 475

High Wycombe, England: 283

Hingham, Robin: 34

Hillman, Sidney: 588

Hindenburg, Paul von: 511, 545, 565

Hirabeysahi case: 583

Hispanic Americans: 584

History of Militarism: 272, 539, 542, 550

The History of United States Marine Corps in World War II: 5

History of United States Naval
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

Kent, Glenn: 436
Kerig, John A., Jr.: 129
Khrushchev, Nikita S.: 371, 548-49
Kiel, Germany, bombing of: 460
Kilbourne, Charles E.: 182
Kimmel, Husband E.: 130
Kincaid-Lennon, Charles: 283
King, Charles: 525-26, 535
King, Ernest J.: 113, 114, 140, 142, 144-47, 149, 187
King Philip's War: 132, 528, 532
Kirby, Henry: 258
Kitchener, Horatio Herbert: 545
Kitson, Gerald: 288
Knesebeck, Karl F.: 331, 334
Knox, Frank: 109
Knox, Henry: 163, 166
Kohn, Richard H.: 159
Korea: 225, 368
Korean War: 30-31, 38, 217-30, 341, 495, 516
Kornilov, Lavr: 235, 242
Kühlmann, Richard von: 555
Kuhn, Thomas S.: 374
Kulm: 333
Kwajalein: 148

Lafayette, Marquis de: 163
LaFère, France: 273
LaFleche, France: 273
Laird, Melvin R.: 367
Lancaster, Fredrick W.: 365
Landis, John F.: 167
Langenau, Freiherr von: 330
Langenau, Andraul von: 332
Langev, 335, 336, 337, 338
Laon, France, battle of: 343
Loos: 70
Laredo Army Air Field, Texas: 463
La Rothiere, France: 338, 339
Laurens, John: 162
Las Guasimos, battle of: 77
League of Nations: 109
Leahy, William D.: 113, 114
Lavelle, John D.: 550
Lebanon: 369, 519
Lee, Charles: 162
Lee, Harry: 3
Lehigh (Passaic class monitor): 416
Leigh-Mallory, Trafford: 465
Leipzig, Germany: 318-21, 325
battle of: 306, 333, 335, 349
bomblng of: 442
LeMay, Curtis E.: 32, 36, 92, 100, 309

Le Merchant, Gaspard: 283-84
Lenin, (Vladimir I. Ulyanov): 553
Leopold II, King of Belgium: 556
Lerchenfeld, Hugo von: 555
Lermontov, Mikhail Y.: 241
Lewensov, Mikhail Y.: 241
Leuthen, battle of: 305
Lewis, John L.: 587
Leyte, Philippine Islands: 150, 385
Lübeck, Germany: 326, 328
Ludendorff, Erich: 84-85, 237, 342, 511, 516, 545, 554, 560
Lufiwaflle: 446, 447-48, 453, 455, 458-64, 467-69, 546, 570. See also Germany; World War II
Lützen, Germany: 326, 328
Luxembourg: 556-62
Luzon, Philippine Islands: 183

Maastricht, Holland: 556, 557
MacArthur, Douglas: 47, 48, 92, 114, 130-44, 161, 170, 171, 179, 187, 511, 514, 516, 518, 519, 520
address to Congress: 217-18, 517
dismissal of: 223-24, 359, 368
disorders and issues on Japan: 222-23, 496, 499
move to Australia: 189
personality of: 222-23
in Philippines: 236, 385
politics of 1952: 228
and the press: 341
Superintendent at West Point: 293, 295
supreme commander in Japan: 227, 495
INDEX

and Truman controversy: 217-30
VFW message from: 222. See also:
United Nations command
Machiavelli, Niccolo: 272
Mackey, Piers: 475, 476
Mackinder, Halford: 361
Maclsaac, David: 36, 46, 104, 269
MacLeish, Archibald: 578
MacMahon, Marie Edene Patrice Maurice: 280
Magenta, battle of: 349
Maginot Line: 387
Mahan, Dennis Hart: 46, 56, 57, 60, 158, 159, 322, 530
Mahone, William: 63
Mainz, Germany: 319, 320
Malaya: 132
Malkov, Georgi M: 548-49
Mathews, Virginia, Second Battle of: 51, 59
Marchwino, 79, 218, 217, 489-91
Mandated Islands: 135
Mao Tse-Tung: 368, 374
Marmont, Auguste: 52
Mame, battle of: 545, 554, 557, 561
Marshall, George C.: 37, 47-48, 86, 92, 111-14, 132, 140-142, 146, 149, 155-74, 177-94, 204-5
aid to Pershing: 183-85
biography of: 156, 160, 163
Chief of Staff: 183, 184, 186, 188-94, 585
Chief, War Plans Division: 178, 186
in civilian posts: 171, 220
Churchill's assessment of: 194
Deputy Chief of Staff, Army: 178, 179, 180
in Far East: 183, 236
and National Guard: 172-73, 182, 186
in Philippines: 93, 177, 182
Secretary of Defense: 220, 224, 226-27
and unconditional surrender: 383-84
at Virginia Military Institute: 164, 181, 188
in World War I: 162, 178, 183
in World War II: 166, 168, 169
Marshall Islands: 135, 147
Marshall Plan: 160
Martin, Joseph W.: 223
Mason, Richard B.: 262
Matloff, Maurice: 6, 47, 107-27, 347, 378
Matlin, Bill: 579
Maurice of Orange: 348
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 39, 427, 434, 448
May, Henry F.: 491
McCarthy, Joseph R.: 229
McCarthysm: 221, 229
McClellan, George B.: 46, 53, 56-65, 161, 170, 511
McClelland, W. L.: 257
McClelland, John A.: 65
McDermott, Robert F.: 275
McDonald, Charles B.: 213
McClintock, W. L.: 257
McKean, Roland N.: 369
McLuhan, Marshall: 436
McNamara, Robert S.: 32, 38, 367, 369, 550
McNamee, Joseph T.: 142, 178
McNeil, William H.: 365
Meade, George: 53, 57
Merid, Hugh: 72
Merrill, Lesley J.: 142, 211
Messina, Sicily: 212
Métaphors and Scenarios: 371
Metternich, Clemens von: 328-30, 335, 337, 339, 340-43
Mexico: 280, 322, 335, 337
Meuse-Argonne, campaign of: 183, 201
Mexican War: 10, 13, 54, 529, 533
Middle Age: 510
Middle East: 178, 179, 188, 405
Miles, Nelson A.: 74, 257, 526
Military: 539-51
Military Airlift Command (MAC): 435
Militia, Dmitri A.: 242-45
Millet, Allan R.: 27
Illis, Walter: 7, 13, 14, 532
Mindanao, Philippine Islands: 77, 78
Mindoro, Philippine Islands: 182
Minsk, Russia: 562
Missiles:
ABM: 306, 372
AMCAAM: 102
LANTIRN: 102
Maverick: 102
Mississippi, race riots in: 584
Mitchell, Billy: 7, 17, 18-19, 22, 36, 92, 97, 177, 428
and bombing tests: 426
court-martial of: 99, 519
Mobile, Alabama, race riots in: 584
Molotov, Vyacheslav I.: 112
Moloko, Helmut von: 335, 342, 362, 364, 385, 507, 541, 5-4-56

601
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Molke, Helmuth von (the younger)</td>
<td>557-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mommsen, Theodor</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morny, William W.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montecleri, Raimondo</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery, Bernard L.</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moon, Odus</td>
<td>425-26, 427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreau, Victor</td>
<td>329, 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan, Daniel</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan, John P.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morison, Elting E.</td>
<td>392, 423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morison, Samuel E.</td>
<td>5, 6, 347, 423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan, Daniel</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morison, John F.</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortain, France</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morton, Louis</td>
<td>47, 152, 513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow, Russia</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mont Wilson</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muflling, Karl von</td>
<td>332, 339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich, Germany</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich Pact</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myrer, Anton</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People)</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napier, Sir William</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naples, Italy</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Act of 1916</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Act of 1920</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>172, 173, 186, 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Act of 1947</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)</td>
<td>32, 219, 225, 326, 343, 372, 374, 397, 520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navajo Indians</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval War College</td>
<td>26, 377, 378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Department</td>
<td>139, 145, 587. See also United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazism, See Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson, Lord Horatio</td>
<td>37, 414, 520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nesselrode, Karl R.</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>557, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Indies</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimitz, Chester</td>
<td>47, 130, 134-39, 142-50, 385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon, Richard M.</td>
<td>367, 497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normandy invasion</td>
<td>55, 119, 212, 469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>111-12, 113, 143, 166, 187, 206. See also Operation TORCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>217-30, 517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Pacific</td>
<td>139, 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
<td>356-57, 384. See also Viet Cong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northrup, Lucius B.</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>334, 352, 589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuremberg Trials</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oster, Alan</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Turks</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Facts and Figures (OFF)</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orwell, George</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outpost</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paez, Frank</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Ocean Area</td>
<td>135, 136, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Theater of Operations</td>
<td>47, 129-52. See also Central Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmer, Hyndick</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan American Goodwill Flight, 1926</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park, Robert E.</td>
<td>489-92, 498-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrman, Francis</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parrington, Vernon</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parish, Noel F.</td>
<td>3, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parton, James</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partidge, Alden</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partidge, Earl E.</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasley, Charles W.</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patton, George S., Jr.</td>
<td>48, 92, 190, 195-214, 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pew, Frank</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parry, Ysabel</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson, William</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paget, Sir William</td>
<td>200-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cadet at West Point</td>
<td>196-98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

in California: 198
at Fort Myer: 199, 204
Master of the Sword: 199
in Philippines: 236
in Punitive Expedition: 200
on tactics: 212-13
at Virginia Military Institute: 198
on warfare: 213-14
at West Point: 309
in World War II: 212-13, 469
Patrick, Mason M.: 98, 99
Peabody, Ilurne: 463
Pearl Harbor: 108-10, 130, 178, 508, 577, 584, 588
Pearl, Stephen: 493
Peirce, Franklin: 53
Peter the Great, Tsar of Russia: 239, 240, 242
Phan Keg Air Base, South Vietnam: 356
Pfuehler, John W.: 257, 261, 263
Philippine Islands: 70, 82, 132, 135, 148, 189, 492, 493
acquisition of: 71
garrison in: 179
insurrection: 182
Lake Lanao: 78-79
Moros: 78-80, 265
Phillips, Wendell: 525
Poe, see Franklin: 158
Polo, Morton F.: 76
Plutarch: 45
Pogue, Forrest C.: 37, 48, 157, 163, 173, 194, 227, 511
Poland: 122, 326, 562, 566, 568, 589
invasion of: 180, 395, 573
partition of: 239
in World War II: 352
Poland: 122, 326, 562, 566, 568, 589
invasion of: 180, 395, 573
partition of: 239
in World War II: 352
Polish Americans: 584
Political Action Committee: 588
Polotsk Regiment: 244
Pope, John: 53
Pon, Sir Charles: 114, 181, 452
Porter, David D.: 412
Porter, Peter B.: 529
Poundstone, Homer: 417
Pozzo di Borgo: 337
Prague, Czechoslovakia: 511-13
Preston, Richard A.: 236, 297
Princeton University: 347
Principles of War: 362
Project on the Vietnam Generation: 6
Proud Tower: 372
Prussia: 317, 364, 386
academies in: 277-78
in alliance against Napoleon: 326-42
army reforms in: 399
campaign of 1806: 318-21, 326, 351
defeat of: 401
militarism in: 235, 236, 277, 297, 540-45, 547-48
officer corps in: 269, 277-82, 541
See also Germany; German Empire
Public Opinion: 578
Puerto Rico: 70, 77
Punitive Expedition: 81, 82, 95, 200.
See also Pershing, John J.
Pursuit Hoards: 451-54
Pyle, Ernie: 579
Quarterly Review: 285
Quebec Conference: 115, 118, 119, 385
Quinn Times: 286
Question Mark: 99
Rahului: 143, 147
Radachy, Joseph: 330-33
RAND Corporation: 367
See also Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Red Stick Indians: 526
Regensburg, Germany, bombing of: 393, 442
Register of 1900: 264
Republic of Vietnam. See Vietnam
Reichsmarschall: 572
Reichsbank: 568-69
Remap, Frederic: 526, 532
Republican Party: 229, 587, 588
Rhine River: 319, 334
Richardson, Robert C.: 145, 146
Rickenbacker, Eddie: 465
Riley, Matthew B.: 161, 167, 185, 224, 227, 228
Rietzler, Kurt: 555, 561
Rise of American Civilization: 11

603
Rivires, Serède: 559
ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps): 6, 172, 186
Robert E. Lee: 11
Robinson, Thomas R.: 356
Rockwell Field, California: 93, 97
Roemund, Holland: 556, 557
Rogers, Will: 19
Roman Empire, legions of: 270
Rome, Italy: 187
Roosevelt, Eleanor: 584
appraisal of: 124-27
as Assistant Secretary of the Navy: 109
as Commander-in-Chief: 547
at Casablanca: 381
in cross-channel operations: 112, 117
and the Pacific command: 130
report to Congress on Yalta: 107
and World War II: 107-9, 116-18, 577.
See also Quebec Conference; Tehran Conference
Roosevelt, Theodore: 11, 30, 79, 83
Ropp, Theodore: 92, 306, 374
Ross, William: 55, 57, 72
Ross, Stephen T.: 305, 323
Rutlow, Eugene W.: 57
R.S. Air Force: 181, 142-71
Roya, lying Corps: 450-51
in 235-50: 317, 401, 510-11, 544, 553
in America against Napoleon: 326-42
in Africa: 248
in Europe: 247
of works: 238
discipline in: 243
discipline in: 243-45
in education in: 245-46
in military education in: 245-46
in military justice in: 244-45
in military life in: 245, 237-50
in Muscovy: 238, 240
in Napoleonic War: 316-19
in officers in: 241
reorganization of 1917: 354, 545
serfs in: 243
social groups in: 240
tradition of: 250
veterans in: 242
in World War I: 237, 249, 364, 380, 539, 540. See also Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Russo-Japanese War: 79, 242, 349
Russo-Polish Alliance: 326
Roosveld, Edward: 491
St. Cyr, France: 279-81
St. Petersburg, Russia: 241, 249
San Antonio, Texas: 96, 177
San Francisco, California: 137
San Gabriel, California: 215
Sand Creek massacre: 527
Sanmir, Académie, France: 199
Sawyer, Wallace "Buzz": 101
Saxe, Hermann-Maurice: 52, 56, 348
Schacht, Hjalmar: 568-69
Schaller, Michael: 493
Schalck, Gerhard von: 399, 400-401
Scheifftein, Alfred von: 365, 507, 554-60
Schlieffen, Alfred von: 95, 554, 555, 556, 559-60, 562
Schmude, Rudolf: 571
Schreyvogel, Charles: 526
Schutzstaffel (SS): 567
Schwarzenberg, Prince Karl: 326, 329-33, 335, 337-38, 339, 342
Schweinfurt, Germany, bombing of: 393, 442-445, 460
Scott, Charles: 206
Scott, Hugh L.: 206
Scott, Winfield: 54, 161, 322, 527
SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization): 381
Secretary of the Army. See United States Army
Secretary of Defense. See Department of Defense
Secretary of State. See State Department
Secretary of War. See War Department
Sedan, battle of: 349, 350
Selective Service Act: 192
Seminole, Oklahoma: 586
Seminole Wars: 532
Serbia: 380
Seven Years War: 247, 311-21
SHEAF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces): 512
Shearer, William R.: 76
Shays' Rebellion: 483
Sheridan, Philip H.: 53, 58, 257, 260, 525, 532
Sherman, Forrest P.: 224
Sherman, William T.: 45-46, 53, 56, 64, 65-66, 72, 161, 236, 258, 532
Sherwood, Robert: 108
Shap, U. S. Grant: 38
Shorter, Walter C.: 130
Shy, John W.: 393, 484-85
Sciulli: 187, 207, 211
Snip, Lance: 92
INDEX

INDEX

Silesian Army: 328-29, 332, 335, 337, 339, 340, 342
Simpson, William II.: 264-65
Singapore: 132
Sinuiju, Korea: 225
Sioux Indians: 527
Slessor, John C.: 372
Smith, Walter Hedell: 185
Smith-Cornally Bill: 587
Smith, Holland M.: 146
Smith, Kirby: 57, 58
Smith, Oliver P.: 228
Socrates: 270
Sokolovsky, V. D.: 371
The Soldier and the State: 3, 161, 505, 521, 541, 543
"Soldier Blue": 525
Solferino, battle of: 349
Solomon Islands: 135, 143, 147, 148, 579
Somervell, Brehon B.: 146
Sopwiths: 51
Sorel, Albert: 334
South Africa: 70, 287
South Pacific: 137, 139, 141, 144, 147-50, 580
South Vietnam: 356-57
Southeast Asia: 381-82, 397, 407
Southeast Asia Resolution: 371
Southwest Pacific Area: 135, 141, 143, 144, 148
Southwest Pacific Theater: 179
Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Spaatz, Carl A.: 31, 36, 39, 46, 92-104, 265, 458
in AEF: 96
in Pacific: 150
Spain: 348, 399
Spanish-American War: 10, 30, 75, 76, 188, 236, 264
Spanish Civil War: 568
Spaulding, Oliver L.: 169
Stalin, Joseph: 33, 369, 926
Stalin, V. Dzagashvili: 107, 110, 180, 237, 546, 548
Stark, Harold R.: 186
State Department: 115, 220, 225, 227, 49
Stein, Karl: 337
Stettin, Germany: 321
Stevenson, Adlai: 215
Stevenson, Adlai: 188
Stillwell, Joseph: 167, 179, 185, 190
Stimson, Henry L.: 26, 109, 189, 193, 199, 206, 583, 585
Stinson, Majorie: 96
Stone's River, battle of: 59
Strategic Air Command (SAC): 405, 435
The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1339-1945: 441, 448
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT): 514
Strategic Bombing Survey: 367, 444, 470
Strategy for Defeat: 38
Strategy for the West: 372
Street, St. Clair: 142
Strother, Dean C.: 139
Th. Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 362
Stuart, Jeb: 13, 58
Stuken, Friedrich von: 163, 165, 166, 188
Stormabteilung (SA) 566
Stuttgart, Germany: 319, 442
541, 548
Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia: 571
Suez crisis: 399
Summary of the Art of War: 54
Summer, William G.: 489
Supreme Court: 171, 583, 584
Suvorov, Aleksandr V.: 247-48
Sweden: 326-42
Syria: 519
Tactical Air Command (TAC): 432, 435
Tall, Robert A.: 228
Taiwan: 495
Tampa, Florida: 76
Tannenburg, battle of: 350
Tarawa: 150
Taylor, Zachary: 54, 161, 171
Teheran Conference: 112, 118, 121. See also Roosevelt, Franklin D.
Taylor, Edward: 33
Temoz, Eugene: 559
Thayer, Sylvanus: 290-93, 322
Theobald, Robert A.: 139, 140
Thinking About the Unthinkable: 367
Third Fleet: 147. See also United States Navy
Third Reich: 570, 573. See also Germany; German Army, German Navy; Hitler, Adolf
Thomas, George: 53, 58, 258, 568-69
Tientsin, China: 183
Time Magazine: 580
Tinker, Clarence L.: 130
Tirpitz, Alfred von: 563
Tobruk, Libya: 188
Todd, Johann Kristoffer: 330, 332
Tolstoi, Leo: 241
Tucholzberg, Germany: 340
"Trail of Tears": 527
Tunus, France: 338
Treasury Department: 581
Treaty of Tilsit: 334
Treaty of Versailles: 4, 85, 564, 566, 568, 569
Treuchard, Hugh M.: 22, 449
Trenton, New Jersey: 478

605
Trotsky, Leon [Lev Bronstein]: 237
Truk: 237
Truman, Harry S: 31, 48, 170, 171, 217-30, 359, 365, 512, 516, 519
Tukhachevskiy, Mikhail: 250
Turin: 348
Turkey: 237
Twiceon, Ernest: 491-92
Twining, Nathan: 32, 36-37, 139

Ukraine: 239, 389
Ulm, Germany: 317, 319, 322
in Asia: 490-98
Bolsheviks of: 237, 545
Communist Party in: 545, 548, 549
conflict with United States: 367, 369, 384, 495
containment of: 367, 497
and Cuban missile crisis: 370, 549
defense of: 371
definition of: 374
and extermination of ethnics: 589
ideology of: 374
and the Korean War: 218-19
in Middle East: 405
and the Revolution of 1917: 354, 545
and Vietnam strategy: 361
in World War I: 252, 512. See also Red Army
United Kingdom: 211, 412, 489, 494-95, 515, 518, 546-48, 557, 567, 571-73
academies in: 274, 283-90
in American Revolution: 393, 475-84
attacked at Casablanca: 143
and Chiefs of Staff: 182, 187
decadence influence of: 519
German Jews in: 589
Labour Party in: 589
military life in: 235, 236
naval ships of: 417
officer corps in: 269, 544
in World War I: 84, 207, 385, 544-45
in World War II: 110-27, 181, 352, 404-5

United Mine Workers: 587
United Nations: 31, 117-18, 227, 514
Command: 218, 223, 224
General Assembly: 219
United States: 357, 371, 383, 386, 402, 406, 47
culture and society of: 577-89
industrial base of: 364
relations with Asia: 489-508
Vietnam strategy: 361
as world leader: 513, 515, 520.

See also American Revolution; World War I; World War II
United States Air Corps: 428-29, 430, 434, 435. See also United States Air Service; United States Army Air Forces; United States Air Force
United States Air Force: 422, 432
Chief of Staff: 224
Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives: 435
headquarters: 459, 560
history of: 17, 36
leadership in: 8
missiles in: 421, 433
roles and mission of: 102, 431
strategy and doctrine: 37, 432-36
35th Tactical Dispensary: 356. See also Arnold, Henry H.; Korean War; United States Air Service; United States Army
in Asia: 490-98
35th Tactical Dispensary: 356

United States Army: 218-19
and the Revolution of 1917: 354, 545
and Vietnam strategy: 361
in World War I: 84, 207, 385, 544-45
in World War II: 110-27, 181, 352, 404-5

Chief of Staff: 144, 155-73, 224, 228
Commanding General of: 237
INDEX

on frontier: 255-62, 505, 525-37
hardships in: 258-61
manuals of: 305, 310, 311, 322, 378
officers in: 255-58, 266
recreation in: 261, 263
Secretary of: 224
World War II strategy of: 353. See also Marshall, George C.; MacArthur, Douglas; Musiles; Patton, George S.; War Department
United States Army Air Forces: 11, 139, 146, 178, 180, 392, 404. See also missile Operations
ANVIL-DRAGOON, ARGUMENT, CHROMITE, OVERLORD, POINTBLANK, and TORCH; United States Air Service; United States Air Corps; United States Air Force
United States Army Forces in Australia (USAUSA): 130, 134, 137
United States Army Force in the Far East (USAFIE): 130, 134
United States Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC): 149
United States Army Forces in the Philippines (USAFFE): 134, 150
United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAISPA): 139, 179
United States Army in World War II: 5
United States Army War College: 378
United States Marine Corps: 146, 148, 228, 579
United States Military Academy: See West Point
United States Naval Academy: 293-94
United States Navy: 18-19, 27, 411-23, 426
Assistant Secretary of: 109
in Caribbean: 425
Chief of Naval Operations: 224
gunnery in: 412-13
ordnance in: 414
in Pacific: 134-50
Secretary of: 30, 413
ship design in: 412, 413
See also ships by name; Naval War College
United States Services of Supply: 137, 184
University of Chicago: 347
Upton, Elrimy: 4, 168, 529, 530, 544
USS Essex: 415
USS Langley: 425
Utley, Robert M.: 505, 535
Vagts, Alfred: 38, 272, 539-40, 542, 550
Valley Forge, Pennsylvania: 165
Van Fleet, James A.: 167
Vandamme, Dominique Rene: 333
Vandenbeld, Hoyt: 30, 32, 36, 39, 92, 224
Vandiver, Frank E.: 46, 87
Varro, Terentius: 53
Vegesack, Germany, bombing of: 458
Verdun, battle of: 450
Vichy French Forces: 519
Vicksburg Campaign: 65
Vienna, Austria: 317-18, 511
Viet Cong: 384
Vietnam: 70, 360, 386, 397, 528
free election in: 406
U.S. interest in: 382
air superiority in: 384
cost of: 372
lessons from: 386
Villa, Pancho: 81-82, 200. See also Pershing, John J.
Virginia: 162, 164, 197, 198
Virginia Military Institute: 197
Waffen Ss: 546. See also Germany
Wagnum, campaign of: 341, 349
Wallinwright, Jonathan: 134, 137
Wake Island: 221, 228
Walker, Walton: 228
Wallace, Henry A.: 588
Wallach, Jehuda: 563
War Department: 137, 139, 169, 172, 178, 179, 190, 426, 581, 587
Secretary of: 82, 109, 189, 581, 585
See also United States Army
War of 1812: 10, 159, 322, 325, 526
War of Independence. See American Revolutionary War
War Labor Board: 585
War Production Board: 581
War Relocation Authority: 583
Warren, Frances: 79
Warsaw Pact: 432
Warsaw, Poland: 509
Washington, George: 47, 86, 155-74, 290, 348, 393
leader of Continental Army: 162, 164, 167, 168, 4/8-84
and Second Continental Congress: 162, 172
and views on war: 169
Washita: 532
Waterloo, battle of: 349
Watson, P. H.: 51
Wavell, Sir Archibald: 91, 132
Wayne, John: 526
Wayne, Anthony "Mad Anthony": 526
Webb, James: 91
Webster, Charles: 441
Wedemeyer, Albert C.: 142
Wehrmacht. See Germany Army; Germany
HARMON MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY

Weigley, Russell F.: 6, 90, 158, 505, 506-7, 532, 551
Wellington College, England: 286
Wellington, Duke of: 51, 285, 399, 441, 467
West Point Academy, New York: 22, 56, 159, 258, 260, 274, 288, 290-95, 522, 561, 530
Western Defense Command: 139
Western Task Force: 206
Wetrover, Oscar: 98
Wetzell, Wilhelm: 561
Weyland, Otto P.: 212
Wheeler Expedition: 534
Wheeler, Earle G.: 550
Wheeler, Joseph: 77
Whiskey Rebellion: 483
Whistler, William: 257
Whitehead, Alfred N.: 362, 365
White, Thomas D.: 32, 37, 39
Whiting, Ken: 35
Wiesner, Jerome B.: 371
Wigfall, Louis R.: 51
Wilhelm II, Kaiser: 380, 385, 562
Wilkinson, James: 255
William of Normandy: 305
Williams, T. Harry: 45, 68, 160, 161, 169-70, 173
Willkie, Wendell: 588
Willoughby, Charles A.: 226
Wilson, Benjamin Davis: 197-98
Wilson, Charles H.: 367
Wilson, J. II.: 58, 64
Wilson, Woodrow: 10, 30, 47, 81, 82, 83, 84, 109
Winston Churchill: 332
Withers, John: 260
Wonsan, Korea: 225
Wood, Evelyn: 288
Wood, Leonard: 199
Woolwich, England: 283, 285, 286-89
World War I: 9, 22, 162, 164, 351, 391, 402-4, 431, 542, 544
air power in: 18, 352-53, 428, 450
issues in: 380-81
mechanization in: 364
propaganda in: 578
strategy in: 84, 507
See also campaigns of World War I;
Pershing, John J.; United States Army
World War II: 4, 5, 9, 11-12, 14, 391, 404, 507-8, 546, 564-74, 577-89
air power in: 32, 212, 441-71
British in: 32
casualties of: 32
cross-channel operations: 112, 117
destruction of armies in: 352
document in: 392, 436
French in: 112
generals of: 36, 47-48
leadership in: 107-9, 120, 546
in Pacific: 129-52
strategy in: 55, 117, 353-55
victory in: 511
See also Allies; Axis; China; France;
Roosevelt, Franklin D.; United Kingdom; United States; United States
Air Force; United States Army
Wounded Knee, battle of: 527
Wright Brothers: 29, 89, 177
Wright, Monte D.: 275
Wright-Patterson Field, Ohio: 463
Wright, Quincy: 347, 371
Xenophon: 55, 270
Yalta Conference: 107-8, 122-23
Yalu River, Korea: 218, 219, 225, 227
Yap: 385
Younger, Charles "Chuck": 92
York, Hans David Ludwig: 332, 333, 334, 341
Yorktown, battle of: 59
The Young Carthaginian: 171
Zamboanga, Philippine Islands: 78, 80
Zhukov, Georgi K.: 546, 549
Zimmerman, Arthur: 555, 561
Zogbaum, Rufus: 526, 559
At the United States Air Force Academy, home for the annual presentation of the Harmon Memorial Lecture, a cadet squadron in a dress parade marches past the chapel, a well known, singular architectural landmark.