Under the direction of the Chief of Staff, US Army, the US Army War College and the Military History Institute have developed a program entitled "Division Command Lessons Learned." This program, to date, has resulted in interviews and resulting transcripts and summaries from over thirty division commanders throughout the US Army. This study examines and analyzes these transcripts to determine dominant problem areas that are beyond the division commanders' authority or capability to resolve. The analysis follows the identified Chief of Staff, US Army, interest areas of readiness, training, doctrine, field operations, organ-
ization, equipment, installation management, leadership, ethics and family action. The analysis concludes with a summary of determined problem areas, recommendations for solutions and follow-up actions, and conclusions.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

AN ANALYSIS OF DIVISION COMMANDER LESSONS LEARNED

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Gerdin, IN

James W. Williams, Ph.D.
Project Adviser

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
24 February 1989
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Richard L. Gerding, LTC, IN

TITLE: An Analysis of Division Commander Lessons Learned

FORMAT: Individual Study Project


Under the direction of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the U.S. Army War College and the Military History Institute have developed a program entitled "Division Command Lessons Learned." This program, to date, has resulted in interviews and resulting transcripts and summaries from over thirty division commanders throughout the U.S. Army. This study examines and analyzes these transcripts to determine dominant problem areas that are beyond the division commanders' authority or capability to resolve. The analysis follows the identified Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, interest areas of readiness, training, doctrine, field operations, organization, equipment, installation management, leadership, ethics and family action. The analysis concludes with a summary of determined problem areas, recommendations for solutions and follow-up actions, and conclusions.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBLEM AREAS AND FINDINGS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readiness</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Operations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation Management</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership and Ethics</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Action</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY OF PROBLEM AREAS</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III
AN ANALYSIS OF DIVISION COMMANDER
LESSONS LEARNED

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

In June 1984 the Chief of Staff of the United States Army directed that a technique be developed to capture the lessons learned from division commanders as they approached the end of their command tours. In the memorandum directive, the Chief of Staff expressed an interest in obtaining insights into the specific areas of training, doctrine, organization, equipment, leadership and ethics, and family action issues. As a result of this directive, the United States Army War College and the United States Army Military History Institute developed a program entitled "Division Command Lessons Learned."

The program has resulted in interviews and resulting transcripts and summaries from over thirty division commanders during the past four years. Each year since 1985 a summary of the lessons learned for that year have been produced using selected quotations from the transcripts and debriefings. These summaries then have been made available to provide insights to incoming commanders as well as practitioners and students of the art of command.

Other than providing information, the lessons learned summaries have not been used very extensively for other purposes such as obtaining insights into problem areas experienced by the commanders and analyzing the information for any positive or negative trends. The purpose of this paper is to analyze all the
division commander lessons learned that have been obtained through this program to determine any dominant problem areas that may require action outside of the division commander's authority or capability and to develop recommendations for solutions or follow-up actions.

The original areas of interest to the Chief of Staff have been expanded and the questions asked and division commander responses, as well as this paper, follow the following major subject areas: Readiness, Training, Doctrine, Field Operations, Organization, Equipment, Installation Management, Leadership, Ethics and Family Action. In this paper each subject area will be analyzed with emphasis on identified problem areas. Where possible, actual division commander responses will be used for clarity. The paper will conclude with recommendations for problem solutions and follow-up actions.

Since the sources for the quotations used in this paper are not for attribution, they will not be individually identified. The rules for access to the individual lessons learned are by permission of the interviewee; the DCSOPS, U.S. Army; or the CG, USAMHI, as the executive agent of the DCSOPS. Therefore, exact quotes will be used in this paper without specific citations.¹

PROBLEM AREAS AND FINDINGS

Readiness is the first major area addressed and the questions to which the division commanders provided responses dealt with actual versus reported readiness, needed improvements
in the readiness system and commanders' knowledge of Army readiness within the division. As far as actual versus reported readiness, there does not appear to be any perceived problem, in fact, a fairly typical response follows.

"I think the equipment and I know the strength was accurately reported. There was no undue pressure to make the Department of Army standard operational readiness rate just for the sake of making it which sometimes causes false reporting. As I talk to the young people, the company commanders and particularly battalion commanders, they felt no threat from what they were honestly reporting. Overall, I would say that the reporting system was honest and accurate and that subordinates felt no fear about reporting honestly and accurately."

With regard to needed improvements in the readiness system, there appear to be some problems. The problems seem to be focused on the complexity of the system and its reporting requirement procedures as identified in the most recent Army Regulation 220-1. One of the more straight-forward responses follows.

"From the standpoint of actual readiness and the reporting system, all I can say is that we're on target. Our battalion and brigade commanders are looking at their situations as they should and making the right and appropriate calls. The reporting system, as it has evolved most recently, is lousy! It takes a 'lawyer' to figure it out. If you don't believe it, just get the new 'reg' and try to figure it out yourself. How we could make something supposedly so easy, so complex, beats me."

Equipment and training issues will be discussed separately later in the paper but personnel issues and their effect on readiness seem to indicate another problem area that should be addressed. Unprogrammed turbulence within stateside units,
shortages of key personnel and lack of fully qualified senior noncommissioned officers appear to be the primary problems. It is perceived by some stateside commanders that they have become the bill payers for maintaining full strengths of personnel in overseas units. There does appear to be a tour length shortfall in stateside units as compared to those overseas in many of the enlisted military occupational skills and specialties. There is also a fairly common concern about the shortfall of Army aviators throughout all the divisions and their lack of capability to fully man all aircraft. Two of the more pointed stateside commander comments follow.

"There are personnel readiness problems. There is a tremendous unprogrammed turbulence in the division. We have soldiers leaving here after a little over a year on duty and going overseas to Germany and Korea. I realize that over 40 percent of our Army is overseas, and we have to keep our overseas units at a high level of strength, but when you get young soldiers out of training, it's difficult to bring them in here and only keep them for a little over a year. The noncommissioned officer and the officer leadership have a tremendous challenge. Just about the time they get them ready and trained to be a strong and cohesive part of the unit, they leave and the leaders have to start over again with a new batch."

"Warrant officer pilots for the Blackhawk helicopter; if we had to go to war today, I would have to leave aircraft on the ground because I don't have the warrant officer aviators to fly them."

As far as commanders' knowledge of readiness, there do not appear to be any significant problems or shortfalls other than a fairly common response of the commanders' desire to visit the Army Logistics Center at Fort Lee and other divisions prior to
taking command. It is perceived that those visits would enhance their knowledge in current technology, concepts and techniques as well as improve their fundamental understanding of maintenance and supply.

The questions and responses in the area of Training concentrated on techniques and methods of training, preparation prior to command, reduction of training detractors, and techniques and programs for professional development. An analysis of the responses to training issues indicate several external problems; but, for the most part, there appear to be a very positive and successful approach and result to training. First of all, the "25-series" manuals and Field Manual 100-5 are viewed as excellent and are fully implemented in the divisional training system. All divisions responded to train from a mission essential task list (METL) and extensively use the battalion training management system. Most commanders are using a green, red, amber, or variation of that, system to support units in their prime time training and in helping to eliminate detractors. Although some of the techniques and methods vary depending on unit location and amount and type of training area available, all units are training successfully. The most common response to preparation prior to taking command had to do with visiting the National Training Center (NTC), visiting various Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools, visiting Grafenwoer and Hohenfels training areas for European commanders, reviewing NTC lessons learned and reviewing the "25 series" training manuals.
The techniques and programs for professional development indicated no problem areas.

The more significant problem areas identified in training deal with personnel turbulence; training detractors; training area availability; and the prevention of major peaks and valleys in the training cycle with NTC, Team Spirit, REFORGER, Grafenwoer (Germany) and other major training events. Personnel turnover appears to have its major effect at crew level across the divisions, except in the COHORT units. Tour length stabilization will assist in decreasing this problem area but will not eliminate the leadership challenge of maintaining fully trained units.

Training detractors appear to be a problem, both externally and internally, to the division. First, one of the commander's concerns with external detractors follows.

"If you can do anything to take late taskings and surprise requirements off the backs of your brigade, battalion and company commanders, you will have served your division well. This requires your personal attention and sometimes it gets very edgy between you and your next higher headquarters. You have to be careful not to show a complete lack of support. You don't want to give your higher commander the impression that you aren't supportive; you are, but you have to work very closely with him and he with you, to knock out some of these taskings that come out of the blue that cause your training program to go off track."

Second, the internal training detractor problem is worthy of mention not only because of the devastating effect it can have on training but because of the solution that most commanders are coming to. A fairly typical response follows.
"You must eliminate training detractors to prime time training. Create as pure a training environment to operate in as possible. Establish a prime time training system where you protect units periodically so that they have no tasking whatsoever but training—no court martials, no hospital nor dental appointments, no schools, no nothing. We established the criteria that 90 percent of our soldiers would be available for training during those prime time periods, and we were very ruthless in the execution. After the system was working, we found that we could do better at civilian and military education and at all the other taskings because, once a unit came out of prime time, the priority went to those other things."

Training area availability was predominantly identified as a problem area for units stationed in Germany. With small or nonexistent local training areas, ever-decreasing German maneuver rights areas and only one major military maneuver area for a battalion size unit (Hohenfels), other than dismounted, maneuver at company level or higher will soon be extinct, except for external battalion level ARTEP evaluations once a year at Hohenfels training area. Although there are other training area shortfalls throughout the Army, none are quite so unique nor seemingly unsurmountable as those currently found in Germany.

The final training problem area to be addressed has to do with units who end up with tremendous peaks and valleys in the training cycles resulting from major training events such as the NTC rotation, Team Spirit, REFORGER, and Grafenwoer and Hohenfels rotations in Germany. The predominant comments follow a line of reasoning that, given the amount of resources devoted to these events, a unit cannot afford not to be at an absolute training peak at the time of one of these major training events.
Therefore, for those units involved in such major exercises the corresponding problem of peaks and valleys in training and readiness will never be solved. The dichotomy between thoughts on this by various division commanders are displayed in the following two quotes.

"The guidance that I have found to be successful is to say that I want these training standards achieved and maintained constantly rather than being event oriented. With three rotations to the NTC per year and the associated high visibility, you can fall into the trap of training to be successful at the NTC or, in a similar circumstance, on REFORGER. If you train for the standard, then it will hold true regardless of where you are or what you are doing. You will have a training program that instead of peaks and valleys will be closer to a constant standard."

"Do we peak to go to the NTC? You betcha. Just as high as we can get because it costs so much to take a brigade out there. If we are going to spend that kind of money, we want to get as good as you can before you go out there. We peak, but we try to never reach a really low level of training before or afterwards."

Doctrinal is the next subject area with questions and responses centered around doctrine troublesome areas, techniques or methods, studies and teaching of doctrine and needed doctrinal changes. Commanders are extremely positive about AirLand Battle doctrine and their efforts to implement it through studying, teaching and training. Subordinate knowledge of AirLand Battle doctrine, especially at the field grade level, was noted as lacking by several commanders. Troublesome areas and areas needing changes were where the doctrinal problems were found. Doctrinal problem areas were identified in the current organization of the divisional cavalry squadron, the organization
and doctrine for the divisional aviation brigade, the light infantry division logistical support, the light/heavy integration doctrine and the combat field feeding system doctrine.

The make-up of the aviation brigade and the doctrine to support its employment was analyzed as a specific problem area and a concern to many of the division commanders, and is summarized in the following comments.

"Probably the most troublesome doctrine has been in the aviation brigade and the doctrine for the divisional Apache attack helicopter battalion. Doctrine was published about the same time that the brigade was formed and the Apache battalion was deployed. Therefore we are trying to learn it as we field it. As you recall, we started with the brigade saying it was a maneuver brigade. Then the Chief of Staff of the Army made the decision that it was not a maneuver brigade and changed the way the people were developing the doctrine. We have a lot of work to do here."

In the light infantry divisions, there appears to be a significant disconnect between the logistics doctrine and the logistics units that are in the field during peacetime with which the unit can train. This disconnect is highlighted in the following commander response.

"There is a great deal of pass-back of maintenance and throughput deliveries of supplies and equipment, and a great deal of replacement rather than repair. In a routine day-to-day training environment, not being co-located with a corps and not having many echelons above division units present, we have been really stretched to try to establish in peacetime training exercises, those situations where we can train most effectively on the logistics system that will be in support of us in combat. I am not comfortable about the degree of understanding that I, my staff, and all my subordinate commanders have of the Army logistic system in the field in support of this division."
Also, there is a lack of doctrine to support light and heavy combined or mixed forces. The importance of this issue is highlighted in the following comment.

"The political military situation is the world today, the infusion of high-tech equipment into the Third World--the so-called 'low intensity areas'--makes low intensity warfare really a misnomer. We are going to get involved in a lot of high-tech, lethal operations in those Third World countries. There is going to be a requirement for heavy forces to be working with light forces if we are going to survive and win in a military sense in those parts of the world. So, it is not just a trivial issue but an issue of great importance. We have just got to get the heavy/light question sorted out. Then we must get a solid piece of literature out on service support so that we have that final piece of doctrine put in place."

The final identified problem area in doctrine is the combat field feeding system (CFFS) implementation. There is a clear disconnect between the concept for use, the organization to support it and, most importantly, the perceived lack of capability to fully support many of the units. The immediate solution to the CFFS problem is imperative.

**Field Operations** is the next area addressed and an analysis of the responses by the division commanders leads toward very positive field operations results. Most all commanders have their division headquarters on field operations at least twice per year, with many deploying more often. Very few are capable, however, because of various resource constraints, of deploying the division in its entirety. A typical response on the necessity of the division's deployment follows.
"When it comes to execution under the pressure of time, under the stress of the elements, under the pressure of not having your xerox machine, commercial telephone, proper lighting or freedom of movement, under conditions of the field--we need to practice it. In addition to tactical readiness of your personnel, it keeps your equipment up. One, you know the status of your equipment. Do you have it or not? Does it work? Can the person use it in the field? Are your generators working?"

Operating in the field at brigade and battalion level is fairly typically done throughout the year at various times, with various quantities of equipment and with various support slices depending on the geographical location of the division. The necessity to train as combined arms with the entire combat support and service support slice was a unanimous comment. Communications and field feeding were the only problem areas that dominated. The field feeding problem has been discussed earlier and in the area of communications, a fairly typical response follows.

"The most serious problem that we always have when we put the division in the field is communications. You have to be able to communicate with each supporting commander and you have to task the signal personnel and the signal battalion to develop ways to do that. We have been able to do that because we go to the field twice a year as a division, in a CPX mode, and we stress the system by placing the headquarters of the battalions and the brigades out at the appropriate distances. This has proved successful on 'team spirit.' We have been able to communicate very well in the field but only because we have trained so hard to do it."

The next area of discussion deals with Organization issues. An analysis of the responses to organizational questions revealed a strong reluctance to modify organizations in the field; rather,
the common solution seemed to be to take recommendations through TRADOC for consideration and possible implementation as a TOE change. Organizations were found to be slightly modified in locations such as Germany where combat battalions may be located as much as several hundred kilometers from their direct and divisional support units. Problem areas were identified in DISCOM, signal and engineer battalions, aviation maintenance companies, aviation maintenance personnel, organizations for new equipment fielding and structuring organizations for combat.

Although the signal and engineer battalions and the DISCOM were noted to have organizational deficiencies in several types of divisions, the problems were dominant in the light infantry division, as the following identifies.

"The engineer battalion for the light infantry division is just too small to support the division. The signal battalion was reduced by 50 percent and still has its same mission. The division support command also has a similar mission, with a 1,100 soldier reduction. We have tried to live with it, developing SOPs and techniques to enhance our capability. The engineer battalion remains the biggest problem, however. It does not have the capability to fully support the division."

With all the new equipment coming into the Army, commanders have found it necessary, in many cases, to create a new equipment fielding team or cell, in addition to force modernization authorizations. This is being done to ensure timely and accurate processing of equipment and appropriate schooling and training of equipment operators. Several commanders also recommended that units be organized as they will be expected to fight. This dealt primarily with armor and mechanized infantry divisions and
organizing their combat battalions with an armor/mechanized mix. Also, it was widely suggested that the aviation maintenance company be assigned to the aviation brigade rather than to DISCOM. The final problem identified had to do with a shortage of aviation mechanics—primarily, in the light divisions. This is highlighted in the following light infantry commander response.

"The aviation unit in the light division is a very fragile organization. The maintenance structure is not there. There are not enough mechanics and maintenance warrants, nor enough pilots to be able to sustain the number of aircraft in the division. This is a very serious weakness that needs to be corrected over time."

The issues now progress from organization to Equipment. Equipment problem areas that dominate are in three general areas: (1) new equipment fielding, (2) antitank capability and (3) the complete understanding of divisional equipment capabilities in the military intelligence and signal areas. Although new equipment fielding problems were addressed earlier under organizational issues, it is worthwhile to continue the discussion here. Two representative responses follow.

"The technique that I have found successful in new equipment fielding is to take a person from battalions who use that type of equipment and give him a little staff. This comes back to modification of the TOE where you kind of bring yourself together a little ad hoc group. They work on the problem of getting the equipment in, work with DISCOM on getting the equipment ready, processed and issued. At the same time, making sure that we have all of the publications, all the tools, all the components for it and all of the planning made."
"In the fielding of new equipment, long range planning has to occur. If you don't have a long range plan, then you can't bring together the barracks facilities, the maintenance facilities, the local training area requirements and new equipment training devices. The most successful method for us has been to be able to plan out to five years in advance so that we don't get inside the tunnel and not find any light."

As a general rule, it appears that divisions are forming the new equipment fielding teams based on problems identified earlier with the complete process. There were numerous positive comments about the training side of new equipment fielding.

The second problem area under equipment issues deals with the inadequate capability of our medium antitank system. This problem crosses the entire spectrum of units even though I chose the following light infantry quote to emphasize its seriousness.

"The antitank capability of the light infantry division is very weak. Seventy percent of the division antitank structure is tied up in the Dragon system. That is probably the most important weakness, as I see it, in the entire division."

Finally, the third identified equipment problem deals with the commander's knowledge—or more appropriately, lack of knowledge—of the capabilities of his military intelligence and signal battalion equipment. This problem spread across nearly the entirety of all commanders' responses and is reflected in the following representative comment.

"I was not familiar enough with the MI and signal equipment in this division to understand synchronization of all the systems and how best they could support me. I had a learning process. You really just have to know as the division commander precisely what the capabilities of those systems are in detail."
Installation Management is the one area where commanders, with that responsibility, found themselves most deficient in their preparation for command. Although the problems vary somewhat whether you are stationed overseas or not, they are similar enough to address them in general. An analysis of the problems shows three major areas of concern: (1) programming and budget execution, (2) facilities management, and (3) personnel management. Under programming and budget execution, the required reductions of funds and contracting appear to be the primary areas of concern as the following quotes highlight.

"The challenge was to maintain as many current initiatives as possible at a time when our RPMA dollars were being reduced by 40 percent and overall base operations dollars were being reduced by about 18 percent. That was a major challenge. It was not to get things better but to sustain their goodness, given a dramatically reduced budget."  

"You really need to be up to speed on contracting and contract administration. You need to be good at dealing with the civilian work force and have a good appreciation for union activities. You must have a good appreciation for what your authority is and what you can do with money that is allocated to you and make sure that you use that money for the purpose that it was allocated. You need to have a good appreciation for the benefits versus the cost of contracting."

Facilities management covers a vast area of responsibility from ranges and training areas to the post exchange and commissary. Although the problems are numerous, the solutions all lead to the primary responsibility of supporting the soldier. The responsiveness of engineers in maintenance of buildings and quarters, utility management, commissary and PX operations, the hospital, soldier support activities, civilian and military
schools and operation of ranges and training facilities are all examples of areas that occupy valuable time. These areas also require solid prior knowledge and expertise to manage them properly and efficiently. The support and management of personnel, as well as facilities, starts with having knowledgeable and experienced subordinate managers and advisers.

The garrison and deputy installation commander, the directors of housing and facilities engineer, directors of resource management and logistics, director of law enforcement and the director of post and community activities as well as your judge advocate, public affairs and inspector general officers were all identified as key to the installation management process. A fairly typical representative commander quotation follows.

"There are three guys that I would tell any installation commander that he needs to get into his hip pocket. One is his JAG; his lawyer. I don't mean in terms of court martiaiing, I mean in ensuring that you stay within the law of the state and the country as well as Army regulations. Two is your PAO. You need to make sure he has a good relationship with the people downtown to include the news media. The third guy is your IG. I want the IG meeting not only with soldiers but with family members, the civilian work force and anyone else who comes on this post."

Installation management was the single most often identified area of concern by all division commanders who also commanded their installation. The majority of installation commanders said that they spent at least, and often more than, fifty percent of their time working on installation problems and matters.
Leadership and Ethics are at the heart of a commander's profession and nowhere are they more evident than in the relationship with soldiers. There were no major problems identified in either of the areas of leadership or ethics; however, a few of the numerous positive comments are worth addressing. It was widely emphasized that a senior commander needs to articulate his command philosophy early on and to set goals and objectives that are attainable. He should be himself and display in all actions his own personal style of leadership. He has to tolerate mistakes as long as there continue to be learning and professional development. He has to create an environment that fosters ethical behavior. He must encourage honesty and truthfulness and allow his subordinate leaders to grow from their experiences. Most importantly, he must lead by example, spend time with the soldiers, and let the soldiers know who he is and where he is coming from.

The final area to be addressed is Family Action. Across the divisions a full and complete family action plan is implemented and supported. There is a wide recognition of a significant change in the need for family action as the following commander quotation signifies.

"Let's talk about the issue of families being a challenge. First, we have a lot more families today. Fifty-five percent of this division is married. That's more than we've ever had in history and compares with approximately 20 percent when I came in the Army. This increase in family members has brought about a radical change in how we go about supporting ourselves. Think about the increased size of PXs, schools, hospitals and commissaries. Think about the increased requirement
for housing. We made a commitment to our families and to the notion that we were going to maintain an army in peacetime with volunteers who came in believing that they could lead a normal life with their families. This is a major challenge at all levels of command. We want our families to know that we care for them, but caring for them takes time. You must keep an open door and open ear to family concerns. Be aware that most family issues are resolved at levels well below division—many at company level. And don't forget all that additional time that young company commander is now spending solving family problems. This is a family oriented army. It takes just as much determination and just as much commitment to making the family piece of our army work as it does the readiness piece.

SUMMARY OF PROBLEM AREAS

The purpose of this paper was to analyze the division commander lessons learned and identify problem areas and, where possible, solutions that appear to be beyond the division commander's sphere of influence for solving. The analysis of the lessons learned, as highlighted in this paper, provide fourteen such problems. It will be helpful, at this point, to summarize those previously identified problem areas.

Problem 1. The most recent version of AR 220-1 on readiness is too difficult to follow and interpret.

Problem 2. There appears to be a tour length shortfall in stateside units in many MOSs as well as a shortfall of Army aviators throughout most divisions.

Problem 3. There is a personnel turnover turbulence and it is having a negative effect on training.
Problem 4. There are too many external detractors to training.

Problem 5. There is a lack of sufficient training area in Europe.

Problem 6. There is a lack of adequate doctrine to support the divisional aviation brigade.

Problem 7. There is a disconnect between logistics doctrine and logistics units in the light infantry divisions.

Problem 8. There is a lack of doctrine to support a light infantry/heavy mix of forces for combat.

Problem 9. There is inadequate doctrine to support the use of the combat field feeding system.

Problem 10. There is a shortfall in the engineer battalion, signal battalion and DISCOM support capability of the light infantry division.

Problem 11. There is a shortage of aviation mechanics in the light infantry division.

Problem 12. The medium antitank weapon system, Dragon, needs to be replaced immediately.

Problem 13. Division commanders have a general lack of knowledge of military intelligence and signal battalion equipment capabilities prior to taking command.

Problem 14. Division commanders who are also assuming command of installations have insufficient knowledge of installation management in the areas of program and budgeting authority and execution, personnel management and facilities management.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are recommendations for solutions or further research and analysis to the above identified problems.

Recommendation 1. That the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, task the appropriate directorates to conduct further analysis into the possible revision of AR 220-1 on readiness (Problem 1), the personnel issues (Problems 2, 3, 10 and 11), the doctrinal issues (Problems 6, 7, 8 and 9) and the expediting of a replacement weapon system for the Dragon (Problem 12).

Recommendation 2. That taskings which effect a division's capability to carry out its short range training plan be considered carefully by higher headquarters prior to final implementation (Problem 4).

Recommendation 3. That Department of the Army, in coordination with CINC USAEUR, determine the adequacy of divisional training areas in Europe and direct action as appropriate (Problem 5).

Recommendation 4. That the division commander pre-command course at Fort Leavenworth be expanded to include options for installation management and MI and signal equipment capability instruction (Problems 13 and 14).

Recommendation 5. That division commander designates be afforded the opportunity, funded and allowed approximately two weeks, to visit desired TRADOC schools, any major training areas such as NTC and JRTC and any like divisions or installations.
CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, it is important to note that because of the format of the lessons learned (in other words, a one-on-one interview with the division commander), it is difficult to understand in detail many of the problems identified. All problems were identified by several to as many as all of the interviewees. Since it is not possible for this writer to do a complete analysis on the identified problems, further investigation and answers or solutions are warranted. It is further recommended that the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, be provided on an annual basis an analysis of the lessons learned for the recent year's group of division commanders. This analysis could be done by the U.S. Army War College and Military History Institute under the student Military Studies Project program. Finally, it is important and appropriate to note that each of the over thirty division commanders interviewed commented at one or more places that the current U.S. Army is, without a doubt, the best equipped, with the best soldiers and the best noncommissioned officers and officers that they have experienced in their entire service life, and that the challenge for them is to provide the appropriate leadership that allows their units to perform at an unprecedented level.
1. Although the bibliography to the study includes the general sources for information included as direct quotations, it does not identify specific division commanders because of the current attribution policy.

2. RPMA dollars are Real Property Maintenance Activity funds that are used for utilities, minor construction and maintenance as opposed to those funds used strictly for base operations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


