A Concept for Military Qualification Standards System Level V

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The Army's current system for the continuing education and leader development of its officers is called the Military Qualification Standards (MQS) System. At present, the system has standards and programs in place for level I (Precommissioning) and level II (Lieutenant). Level III (Captain) is under development and fielding while level IV (Major and Lieutenant Colonel) and level V (MEL-I Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel) have been put on hold. This study examines two divergent alternatives and proposes a concept for MQS-V,
20. ABSTRACT (continued)

senior level leader development. The paper provides the standards for level-V senior leaders and a program of active continuing education to reach those standards. The paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of each of the options and compares the options against nine criteria. The program recommends that senior leaders, in concert with their rater, produce a written, oral, or similar product on a periodic basis which demonstrates their continuing leader development. MQS-V would apply to the total Army senior level leader population.
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A CONCEPT FOR
MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS SYSTEM LEVEL V

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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A CONCEPT FOR
MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS SYSTEM LEVEL V

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This paper offers a program of continuing education to
Military Qualification Standard Level V (MQS-V) for senior
leaders: all Colonels and those Lieutenant Colonels who have
achieved Military Education Level I (MEL-1). To do so, it is
necessary in the course of this paper to review some aspects
of the recent history of officer education and leader
development, identify the MQS-V standards which the program
targets, and choose between competing education and training
alternatives.

THE ENVIRONMENT

Senior leaders work in a complex, vague, and often
uncertain environment, not only in war but in peace as well.
These officers face difficult problems, the solutions to
which often have no good answers. They face demands for
quick decisions without full and accurate information. And
they face understanding the broadest spectrum of issues and
interests with precious little time for study and research.

A senior leader will likely operate in joint and
combined environments addressing both strategic and
operational concerns. He will necessarily deal with both national and multinational interests. He must learn to see the long term while ensuring short term effectiveness. In performing in these realms, the senior leader assumes considerable burden for the Army's success.

Senior level leaders are able to function in this kind of environment because they have demonstrated the capacity and potential to do so. But as requisite as their demonstrated competence is for present success, so equally necessary is their continued professional growth. Leadership demands only increase as officers progress in rank and obligation. It is, therefore, axiomatic that senior leaders who face such uncommon challenges have a system which fosters their continuing leader development.

THE PROBLEM: CONTINUING EDUCATION

Although I will discuss the nature of the problem in greater depth in Chapter III, the fundamental issue of this study is to determine a program which provides these senior leaders with the opportunity and incentive to continue to grow professionally through the remainder of their military service. Concomitantly, it is necessary to establish the standards against which this development should be measured. The current Army system for establishing and meeting those
standards is called the Military Qualification Standards (MOS) System.

MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS

A Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study in 1978 defined the term Military Qualification Standard as "...a framework for officer education and training that links resident schooling, self-study and on the job experience. MOS provides for orderly and progressive training and qualification for each officer."1 The Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) in 1985 defined MOS as "An Army-wide officer training system that identifies the skills and knowledge which officers must acquire in order to perform his duties effectively. It involves the officer, his commander and the service school in his professional development."2 In 1987, the Leader Development Study (LDS) reinforced the MOS findings of PDOS by further emphasizing the officer, the school, and the commander as inseparable components of the MOS equation. It is important to clarify that MOS in these definitions implied both the standards and process of continuing education.

LINKAGE TO PREVIOUS STUDIES
The three studies just mentioned provide the basis for the Army's current education, training and leader development efforts. Those studies show the evolution of MQS and the programs now in place which drive the entire system. I will address some of the salient features of those studies in Chapter III. But it is important to note at the outset of this paper that my recommended solution is fully consistent with both the spirit and intent of those monumental and comprehensive studies.

THE BOTTOM LINE

This paper, then, identifies the Military Qualification Standards System for Colonels and MEL-I Lieutenant Colonels. I propose a system which directs these officers to demonstrate attainment of MQS-V standards by producing products which contribute both to the Army as a whole and the officer's individual professional growth.

ENDNOTES


CHAPTER II

STUDY FORMAT

I see this problem as one which has no clear, quantifiable solution. Therefore, I intend to approach it by exploring the nature of the problem, examining relevant data, establishing criteria for measuring the possible approaches, defining and analyzing discrete options, comparing the options against each other, and then drawing my conclusions and making appropriate recommendations.

Each of these steps is distinct and important for determining the best answer. In step one, I will provide the background and history of MOS and its components. Step two provides the facts and assumptions which are germane to solving the problem. Step three is particularly critical since it describes the framework for judging the options I'll consider.

Steps four and five are the core of the process: the identification and analysis of the options. In these steps, I'll compare the options against the criteria and against one another in order to draw conclusions and make recommendations as my final step.
It is imperative, however, that I establish the Military Qualification Standards-Level V following problem identification. I will do that in Chapter IV. Although the three other studies I've mentioned as well as FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, identify what tasks officers of the senior and other ranks should be able to do, I have opted to present my own judgements of the skills, knowledge, and attitudes requisite for Colonels and MEL-1 Lieutenant Colonels. This chapter, therefore, is the most important chapter in the paper since it establishes the goals which the education and training program I recommend is designed to meet.
CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

To understand the nature of the problem, it is necessary to review what the previous important studies on education, training, and leader development of officers have said. It is also necessary to understand the nature and intent of the Military Qualification Standards System across the various levels of the officer corps through the grade of Colonel. I will address only those aspects of the studies which are relevant to the purpose of this paper since each of the studies is voluminous. This chapter will provide the appropriate background.

WHAT THE RETO STUDY SAID

The genesis for much of the Army's current education and training initiatives derives from the RETO study. RETO emphasized a system of continuing education and identified both the standards and the process (the combination of which was the system) to achieve those standards. But it failed to specify standards or process for officers beyond the tenth year of service, implying that development needs through career completion would largely be satisfied by existing
schooling opportunities and self-development during field grade years. The study suggested that training of officers would predominate the early years while education would become increasingly important as time went on.

In defining MOS, RETO used the categories of knowledge, skills, insights, and values to delineate the standards. The study proposed three levels: precommissioning, Lieutenant, and Captain, and acknowledged two components: military skills and knowledge, and professional military education. Those components are still integral in the current MOS philosophy. Many of the standards were linked to specific tasks which officers at the various grades were to be able to perform. The lists were sizeable and specific; most were easily measurable.

The program for achieving those standards was to combine the efforts of schooling, self-study, and unit commander involvement to certify the officer's ability to perform within the appropriate MOS level. It targetted the end of the third year for completion of MOS-II and not later than the tenth year for completion of MOS-III. But there was much less clarity about the program beyond the tenth year.

The RETO proposal is the foundation of the current structure, particularly at the lower grades. However, its
inability to be more specific about the field grades left a void in the total continuing education and training system.

WHAT PDOS SAID

PDOS recognized that the philosophy and approach that the RETO group took was sound but in need of further specificity and expansion. PDOS emphasized the development of officers and recognized distinct developmental periods where a shift in an officer's frame of reference is necessary to meet the more complex and different tasks characteristic of each grade.

The MQS contained in the PDOS are comprehensive. They are framed in the "Be-Know-Do" categorization. Once again, however, they are quite specific for younger officers but less specific as years of service increase. PDOS reasoned that, as officers grow in rank, they do not do the same kinds of things they did before. As they grow, they must change their frame of reference to operate at the higher levels. While the lower levels tend to require more specific task-related and direct competencies, the higher levels demand more conceptual and indirect competencies.

For each of the seven developmental periods it selected, PDOS identified the policies, aims, and roles of
the schools, unit, mentor, and individual. The program for MQS levels I-III expanded on the RETO study and, for the first time, PDOS recommended MQS levels IV and V be added and linked to Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, respectively. What is important is that both the standards and the process for meeting the standards was not very specific above the grade of captain, illustrating the difficulty both the RETO study and PDOS had in synthesizing MQS at the higher levels.

**WHAT LDS SAID**

The intent of LDS was to focus the energy of the two previous studies and develop a strategy on the common theme of leader development emphasizing warfighting tasks. The study envisioned the MQS system as the sustainment slice of the leader development pie.

Of particular importance was that the study confirmed the need to link the MQS levels to grade levels as PDOS recommended. Hence, LDS linked MQS IV with Majors and MQS-V with Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels. Unfortunately, as with the previous studies, LDS provided few details.

Subsequent to the publication of that study, the Command and General Staff College was tasked to develop MQS-IV for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, and the Army War
College tasked to develop MQS-V for MEL-I Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels. The most recent concept in the evolution of the MOS System envisions a three-tiered approach which retains MQS-I essentially as is, consolidates MQS-II and III into a second tier, and sees field grade officers as a group in tier III. This uncertainty in approach, however, does not deter the fundamental purpose or focus of this paper since some form of continuing education for senior leaders remains a paramount concern.

THE NATURE AND INTENT OF THE MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS SYSTEM

The current MQS System, as evolved since RETO, charges each officer with the onus for his or her qualification. The System charges the Army’s schools with identifying what must be learned and for providing the resources. And, finally, the System charges commanders with mentoring the individual officers. The result of the MQS System is an officer who raises his standards of performance in his current grade and is better prepared to meet the standards of performance in the next higher grade.

The intent is well-stated in the Leadership Development Study: "...to qualify an officer to perform the duties required of his branch at a particular grade and to formally
integrate the training and education efforts of the officer." But, as I have alluded to in both the RETO study and PDOS, it is difficult to enumerate precisely the duties of senior level leaders; and without knowing what the Army requires of its senior leaders, we cannot design a continuing education program and fulfill the intent of the MOS System.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Leadership Development Study, p. iv (hereafter referred to as "LDS").

CHAPTER IV
DEFINITION OF THE LEVEL V
SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE, AND ATTITUDES

RETO called them requirements. PDOS referred to them as needs in a changing frame of reference. The LDS termed them expectations. The commonality is simply this: for each grade level, what do we want officers to be able to do to perform their jobs in both war and peace? This chapter identifies what I believe are the essential imperatives for officers to perform well as Colonels and MEL-I Lieutenant Colonels in the many and varied roles that they will assume. For the purpose of this paper, I classify this group of officers as senior level or senior leaders.

It may be fairly argued that the following senior leader standards apply also to Brigadier and Major Generals and some of the standards may even be evident in the lower grades. While that may be true, my purpose is to focus on the Colonel and MEL-I Lieutenant Colonel levels, not at other grades or other programs which complete the MQS System through career completion. It may be necessary and useful, subsequent to the establishment of MQS-IV and MQS-V (or Tier III), to examine programs for General Officers and ensure
their linkage within the entire continuing education framework.

THEIR IMPORTANCE

The skills, knowledge, and attitudes described herein are the professional behaviors and competencies essential for performance in the senior leader environment. Without identifying these characteristics, any program of continuing education has no end, only a means. Therefore, these characteristics become the target of the program. They are the very heart of the system.

It is for precisely this reason why all previous studies spend such a great deal of time and detail on this issue. It is why both RETO and PDOS are so voluminous in nature. But because of the nature of senior level responsibilities, the previous efforts were less than specific in characterizing these ends and thus had such a difficult time proposing a solution for the means.

What follows are six broad descriptions which describe what the Army asks all of its Colonels and MEL-1 Lieutenant Colonels to be able to do in both war and peace. They are based on a very important assumption on which all previous studies agree: that requirements, needs, and expectancies
change from grade to grade, becoming more global and conceptual as grade increases. Therefore, I have developed these skills, knowledge, and attitudes recognizing that senior level leader characteristics cannot be as specific nor task-oriented as those in the lower grades.

MATURE COMMUNICATIVE SKILL

While all officers must possess certain communicative abilities, it is at the senior level where those abilities must fully mature.

Characteristic of these skills is the ability to speak and write clearly and succinctly. Equally important yet often unnoticed is the ability to listen and read critically and efficiently.

Most important for senior leaders is the skill to argue, clarify, and justify a position or recommendation. It is the skill of persuasion. That ability entails being able to see all sides of an issue, anticipate opposing perspectives, and be sensitive to negotiation and compromise.

Mature communicative skill is knowing when to speak and when not to; it is knowing what to say and what not to say.
Finally, mature communicative skill implies an ability to present information adroitly. It is knowing the audience and articulating a position in the manner in which they most easily see your perspective.

Mature communicative skill is the basis for using the other skills, knowledge, and attitudes which follow. This skill is imperative in articulating vision and intent. It is a clearly distinguishing trait of the senior level leader.

DISTINCT DECISION-MAKING ABILITY

Most senior leaders are decision-makers; when they are not, they are likely in a position to influence very directly the decisions of the executive level officers (General Officers) who decide the most critical issues in the Army.

Distinct decision-making and problem-solving ability begins with identifying the real problems and the critical tasks. At the senior level, these kinds of issues are almost always complex and vague, the solutions to which require compromise, trade-offs, and some risk.

In this arena of decision-making and problem-solving, it is the senior leader who must establish the parameters and define the criteria for solution. Senior leaders must
also be able to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate solutions objectively, seeing all sides of the issue. Finally, they must be able to see the second and third order effects of solutions and decisions.

Because of their experience and professional education and training, senior leaders must take the lead in being creative. They must establish the environment for innovation. They are in the best position to be the Army's developers and lead thinkers.

Senior level leaders must recognize above all their responsibility to deal with the tough decisions and problems. They do not have the time nor should they the desire to act on matters best left to junior level officers.

And finally, the senior level leader must have the skill to know when (and when not) to act and how to implement decisions. It is the deciding and implementing which gets the job done.

**A DEVELOPING VISION**

It is at the senior level of leadership where officers must first demonstrate the skill and attitude of a developing, growing sense of vision. This kind of vision is not requisite below the senior level because the issues with
which junior officers deal are much less complex, vague, and determinant to the long-term readiness and structure of the Army. Further, junior officers will seldom have the opportunity to demonstrate vision because of the kinds of duties to which they are assigned.

Vision means an ability to see what's important and best, particularly in the long term and for the difficult issues. It is also seeing potential danger, calamity, or peril. It is a process of clearly seeing what you want and the alternative means to make it happen. Vision gives focus. It provides guidance, intent, and goals. It places things in the right priority.

Senior leaders must chart the direction of the major initiatives and establish the interim checkpoints. They must see and employ mechanisms to correct the glide path of events. They must know and use the right resources, linking those resources to the goals. They must integrate ends, ways, and means.

It is at the senior level that officers must begin to develop insight, to see the desired product at the end of the problem. They must deal with possibilities, ambiguity, and complexity, not certainty and predictability. They must be able to anticipate in an uncertain environment. Such
vision requires enhanced conceptual skill and intellect not developed nor required below the senior level.

Vision means seeing the broadest view—the Army vision and the vision of its executive leaders. It means seeing the organization holistically.

And finally, vision means recognizing the need to win in battle, to achieve the broad missions for which the Army was constituted. It means an understanding of achieving the national objectives by the use of military force, if necessary. It is a need and striving to succeed, both in war and peace.

**KNOWLEDGE OF SOPHISTICATED PROCESSES AND SYSTEMS**

It isn't possible to prescribe what knowledge every senior leader must have in every possible position. But there are certain processes and systems which are fundamental to know how the Army runs and fights which senior leaders must understand. These are the processes and systems which both prepare the Army for war and ensure our winning.

First, we must recognize that senior leaders deal predominantly in the joint and combined arenas and operate...
in the strategic and operational spheres in those arenas. In the warfighting environment, therefore, senior leaders must strive to know the command and control, intelligence, operational, and logistical processes and systems which apply in those environments. There are, of course, many such processes and systems across the services and nations with whom we will join to fight.

But much of our energy will be spent in a peacetime condition preparing to fight, or fighting in low-intensity or other unconventional conflicts where the Army's focus may also remain on longer-term problems. Such conditions will require senior leaders to understand the sophisticated resourcing and force integration processes and systems such as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES), the Army Force Integration System, the Concept-Based Requirements System (CBRS), and other similar systems across the entire spectrum of the Army.

Further, senior leaders must know the processes and systems of the other services and national branches of government, agencies and departments with whom we are likely to work and on whom our effectiveness often largely depends.

Senior leaders must become students of both national and international interests. They must learn to be
strategists. They must see the world from other than a parochial frame of reference.

There are two specific arenas which cut across our entire profession. The first is the technological sphere. Senior leaders must recognize and optimally use technology for the Army to succeed. We will continue to live in an age of technological revolution. Technology's processes and systems are sophisticated and complex, yet failing to master this sphere predicts failure in our ability to compete in both war and peace.

The second is the human sphere, possibly the most complex of all. Regardless of the force structure, the equipment, modernization, and other aspects of both near and long-term defense posture, senior leaders must recognize that we ultimately deal with leadership and the direction of human lives. At the senior level, it is not good enough to discharge the understanding of and dealing with human beings to junior level leaders. Our most difficult decisions are likely to lie in this sphere.

Finally, there are processes and systems unique to every senior level leadership position. Clearly, officers holding those jobs must be masters of their particular requirements.
It is important to note that the knowledge I've described targets broad and difficult processes and systems. Senior leaders no longer have time to operate with the kind of knowledge required of their subordinates. This is an important concept to which I will refer next.

EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY, AUTONOMY, AND POSITION

It is at the senior level, more than at any level before, that officers must learn to make things happen. But it is not the function of senior leaders to do the work; it is their function to cause the work to get done. And it is for this fundamental reason that they cannot afford time to spend in matters which are the rightful and appropriate purview of their subordinates.

Senior leaders must assume broad responsibilities and obligations and exercise the powers associated with their assignment. Theirs is the arena of demonstrating unequivocally a contribution to the profession.

In the exercise of their authority, autonomy, and position, one aspect stands above the rest: these leaders must provide the personal and professional ethical example of officership. They must, by their behavior, illustrate integrity and moral diligence. They must show both physical
and moral courage. They must reflect the Army's values, day by day, war and peace.

In the conduct of their work, senior leaders must actively seek constructive change and improvement. They must be discontented with simply meeting expectations. They must learn to take appropriate risk, to be prudently bold, and to be properly demanding of both themselves and those who do the work for them. Senior leaders must exhibit tenacity, particularly when faced with challenge.

Complementing an aspect of vision, senior leaders must use the organizational structure to its fullest potential. They must find ways to identify and eliminate inefficiency and waste. They must change the things which need to be changed. That kind of power does not rest in the hands of junior officers.

It is the senior leader who demonstrates a fervant and selfless service to the Army and the nation. He does it by action, not words; by performance, not intent; and by exercise of his role, not delegation to others.

ABILITY TO INTERACT WITH AND SUPERVISE AND CONTROL OTHERS
At the senior level, interacting with and supervising and controlling others takes on a new significance. It does so because of the breadth and depth of the kinds of responsibilities senior level leaders accept. Yet equally important, those looking at senior leaders from above, below, or at the same level have expectations of how senior leaders should function in the particular role they play.

This penultimate ability begins with knowing oneself. Without full and open understanding of one's strengths and weaknesses, a senior leader will likely fail to establish the foundation of trust and consistency necessary to accomplish the mission.

The senior leader is a standard setter and policy maker. It is the senior leader who creates a positive, growing environment for his organization. It is he who mentors, trains, and teaches. He is the team-builder. It is his vision which charts the direction, but his ability to work with and inspire people which gets the work done.

The senior leader, because of his diverse assignments, must be an astute judge of human limits and capabilities. He must recognize the roles others play both inside and outside his organization. He must know where and when to decentralize his efforts. He must exercise both compassion
and toughness—and know when to do either. And it is the senior leader who must know how to do the hiring and firing of his subordinates.

The senior leader often operates in environments which he has not seen before. He must learn the rules of engagement and how "to play the game." He must exercise moral and ethical professionalism in arenas which may challenge those principles. Senior leaders, unlike junior level leaders, live in a very real, difficult, and often frustrating business environment. That's the very essence of the world they join when they reach the senior level.

SUMMARY

The above, then, is my personal list of standards for Colonels and MEL-I Lieutenant Colonels to perform their many and varied roles. These are the areas for their continued professional development. They are applicable in both war and peace and should not be construed as favoring one condition or another. I believe their global perspective is a necessary one. Still, this list does provide the ends on which a program of continuing education can focus.
CHAPTER V

BACKGROUND DATA

There are certain facts which are germane to solving the problem of determining the continuing education program. There are also some assumptions which I believe are necessary to make. This chapter will address this data.

FACTS

The task for the Army War College is to develop MQS-V for Colonels and MEL-I Lieutenant Colonels. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the population of officers which the system affects. The following figures, although not precise in every respect, closely approximate actual numbers.

There are 5356 Colonels (and promotable Lieutenant Colonels) on active service in the Army. There are 1263 Colonels on the rolls of the Army National Guard and 4108 Colonels in the Army Reserve. These numbers account for all branches and all components of Colonels. All of those officers (a total of 10,727), whether MEL-I or not, are affected by the MQS-V system.
Of the Colonels on active duty, 2610 are not MEL-I qualified. In the Army National Guard, 1059 are not MEL-I, and in the Army Reserve, 3669 are not MEL-I. That total is 7338. These figures may have a bearing on the kind of continuing education program established. (see assumptions.)

The current population of MEL-I Lieutenant Colonels on active duty is 413. In the Guard, there are 91 and in the Reserve, there are 148. These 652 officers are affected by the system.1

As I have alluded to previously, the type assignments of these officers is both broad and multi-disciplined, varying widely both in scope and in location. Further, it may not be uncommon for senior level leaders to work at great distance from their raters and senior raters. The program must also account for assignments where raters are not Army officers but executive leaders of other services, nations or civilian leaders. These considerations are important in designing the program.

A final fact must be recognized: time is precious. Senior leaders have a great deal of work to do already in any of the positions they hold. Programs which add undue burden to an existing "full plate" must be examined closely.
ASSUMPTIONS

I believe it is fair to assume that to implement an MQS continuing education program for this population will require the acceptance of a formal system consistent with principles of the existing MQS System. I have pointed out that it is difficult to establish the standards by which this population should be measured; the previous studies implied just that. But to assume otherwise—that senior leaders will continue their professional development outside of a well-defined structure—may imply their growth is either less important than that of other officers or simply too difficult to classify and direct. It may also imply that the Army is confident that existing methods of senior leader self-development are adequate. I offer that the Army can afford none of those conclusions.

Second, I assume that the population I identified above will remain relatively fixed. That is, there will be no major or sudden change in the group of officers affected without sufficient warning to the implemented program.

We must also assume that the ends which the continuing education program serves—the contents of Chapter IV—are reasonable and accurate. We must achieve consensus on these skills, knowledge, and attitudes. Without a sensible
description of the level-V standards, any program is cosmetic and hollow.

I assume inclusion of all officers in the grade of Colonel and MEL-1 Lieutenant Colonel. In the population described above, I've included officers from all components and branches, paralleling those who are selected for Senior Service College schooling. That population includes Chaplains, Army Medical Department, and Judge Advocate General Corps officers as well as officers from the combat, combat support, and combat service support branches.

Because non MEL-1 Colonels will not have had the formal schooling of their MEL-1 contemporaries, I have assumed that any program must provide opportunity for those officers to achieve a baseline of the MEL-1 level of learning.

Finally, it is likely that we will operate in a resource-constrained environment for the near term. I have assumed, therefore, that the program should operate on as reasonable a cost as possible.

ENDNOTES

1. Sources of all strength figures from multiple telephone conversations with officers at Total Army Personnel Command and Reserve Components Personnel Center, 22 February through 17 March 1989.
CHAPTER VI

THE CRITERIA

In order to judge which of competing alternatives is best, it is necessary to establish the frame of reference for evaluating the options. This chapter identifies nine criteria against which I will compare each of the options.

PURPOSEFUL, USEFUL

For a program of continuing education to be effective, it must be seen by its participants as purposeful and useful. It must have aims and intentions. It must be determinant. It must have meaning.

CREDIBLE

The program must be worthy of belief and trust by its participants. It must be plausible and achievable.

PALATABLE, ACCEPTABLE

Officers must accept the program. They must see it as a satisfactory resolution of the problem and agree that it
fits reasonably within the many other requirements they have.

**AFFORDABLE**

The program must avoid unreasonable costs, both in terms of money to the Army and time to the participants and those who support the program. Money and time spent must be within prudent means.

**CONTINUOUS**

The program must be sustainable over the long term. Continuing education means a program not easily interrupted by external change, particularly in resources.

**MEASURABLE**

For the program to be successful and valid, the Army should be able to demonstrate that it is achieving the ends for which the program is established. Although it may be difficult to quantify results, the Army should be in a position to characterize participants' involvement and development.

**SIMPLE**

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A complex program full of details and instructions is self-defeating. The program must be straightforward, direct, and unambiguous.

**IN VolvEMENT OF THE TRIAD**

Consistent with MQS philosophy, the program must involve the individual, his commander and organization, and the Army school system. Previous studies recognized that, as officers grow toward the senior level of leadership, they assume a much greater share of the burden of development. Still, the other components of the triad should play important roles.

**ATTACKING THE HIGHER LEVELS OF LEARNING**

Senior level leaders require higher skills, knowledge, and attitudes than lower levels. Lower levels of learning consist primarily of knowledge and comprehension; much of MQS Levels I-III deal in this realm. The continuing education program for level-V should emphasize creative and critical thinking and cause officers to use analysis, synthesis, and evaluation as the primary components of their development.
I see two broad options in designing a program of continuing education to meet the ends described in Chapter IV. The first option I term the "passive" approach in which the Army establishes its requirements and the participants fulfill them. This approach is consistent with the methodology of MQS Levels I-III.

The second option I term the "active" approach in which the Army establishes a broad framework of possibilities and the participants choose a way of contributing professionally to both themselves and the Army.

There are also the possibilities of doing nothing new or combining elements of both options. I'll address those possibilities in Chapter IX. The following sections outline in some detail the characteristics of each of the two primary programs.

THE PASSIVE APPROACH

The passive program is essentially a centrally-directed and managed program. Impetus for the program comes from the
Since the population of officers who are participants are Colonels and MEL-I Lieutenant Colonels, the Army War College (AWC) should act as the program manager.

It becomes AWC's task to define the set of continuing education parameters which serve senior leader development and promote the standards as set forth in Chapter IV. I envision those parameters as following the AWC curriculum, in general, but AWC would necessarily have to coordinate with the other senior service colleges on complementary issues and with the Training and Doctrine Command to ensure consistency throughout the MOS System. AWC would have to develop an MOS-V directive which describes the details of the program and how it works. It would identify the standards described in Chapter IV as the ends for which the program is designed. I envision this directive as a relatively short and simple publication for use by both senior leaders and their raters and senior raters.

More specifically, each year AWC would publish and distribute to participants a compendium of recently published current and historical issues germane to senior leader development. Such a publication might well look like a condensed book. This is the first component of the program. The subjects would range widely and address issues across the entire spectrum of national defense as well as
issues which deal directly with the leader development skills, knowledge, and attitudes identified in Chapter IV. It would also contain references to other meaningful articles which the compendium opts not to reprint or summarize. I see the compendium as a relatively fixed array of material, since it would be impractical to include all the desirable issues in such a book.

As a minimum, the publication would encourage reading and study of the entire document and recommend review of some of the selected references. It would solicit feedback from the participants. It would also direct that the participant informally discuss at least some portion of the compendium with his boss during the current rating period. This requirement affords an opportunity for dialogue between the rater and his subordinate on what MQS-V identifies as the important current leader development issues. It also provides for a modest degree of certainty that officers are undertaking the program.

A second component of this approach is the establishing of an AWC teleconferencing network which would be used on a periodic basis to discuss issues between groups of participants and the faculty experts at AWC and invited faculty members from other Senior Service Colleges. There would be two possible ways to use the network:
participant-initiated and/or periodic-initiated. In the first mode, participants would set the agenda and arrange for the network with sufficient lead time so AWC could prepare the issues. In the second mode, AWC would announce and conduct sessions on a regular basis for any officers who wish to participate. The intent of this component is to establish face to face dialogue between the participants and those who are accountable for the program (AWC).

The third component of this approach is publication of a quarterly MQS-V issues digest which keeps participants informed on the most significant MQS-V-related issues of the day. Since some officers may not have time nor access to teleconferencing capabilities, this component would help bridge the gap between annual compendiums. While I envision the digest in printed form summarizing recent important articles and referring officers to appropriate publications, there is clear potential for using technology to provide officers with the same kind of information. Establishing a computer network— an MQS-V Digest Net—onto which the information would be entered would allow officers to access the material at any time via modem equipment. Further, it would also allow officers to provide input and feedback if they chose to do so. A second alternative is to produce audio tapes which officers may request from AWC. Using
existing cable television and facsimile equipment may also be practical where such facilities exist or are programmed.

I believe it is important that all three of these components be linked one to another. Eliminating any of the components reduces the impact of the educational opportunity in some way. The compendium provides the broad parameters and issues; teleconferencing ensures dialogue and a modicum of measurement; and the digest keeps officers current.

A final component of the program is the development and publication of a manual which assists non-MEL-1 Colonels to become familiar with the issues and imperatives of senior level leadership. The active approach would necessarily have a like component. Completing the manual prior to participating in MQS-V would be mandatory for these officers. To certify that they have completed the work, officers would notify AWC when they have done so and inform their rater at the same time.

To distribute all these documents, produce the resources, and monitor participation, AWC would have to establish an MQS-V cell. It would be the locus of all MQS-V efforts. The cell would have to keep a current list of participants and their assignments. The cell would be accountable for coordinating the compiling, printing, and
distributing efforts of material as well as recording the certification of non-MEL-I Colonels. It would also coordinate the teleconferencing activities and respond to any requests for support from participants or other executive level leaders.

The passive option emphasizes self-study in a non-directive approach. AWC provides the impetus for study and shapes the framework of the participants' efforts. Participants respond to the program at whatever level meets their particular needs.

THE ACTIVE APPROACH

The active approach is fundamentally a decentralized option, the impetus for and creativity of which comes from the participants and their bosses. This program would require much less management and direction from AWC, although some would still be necessary.

AWC's primary responsibility would be to publish and update annually an MQS-V directive which clarifies the broad parameters of the program's operation. This single document would emphasize the standards in Chapter IV as the frame of reference for participants' efforts. It would identify the kinds of difficult and complex issues suitable for
participants to address along with a list of appropriate references. It would also provide a list of resources and resource agencies which participants could use in meeting the program requirement. Again, this directive would serve not only to provide the framework for officers' participation but also to educate raters and senior raters on the program's goals and mechanisms.

The intent of this approach is to require participants to contribute thoughts and ideas to their profession in a relatively unconstrained way suitable to themselves and their boss. They should produce something orally, in writing, or in another appropriate manner which contributes to their leader development and adds to our professional understanding of the major issues facing the profession. The frequency of that effort should be no less than once every 24 months, although that can be adjusted somewhat by raters dependent upon the officer's last contribution. Two years is long enough for officers to find time to produce a product, but short enough to ensure continuing growth.

If the product of a participant's effort is written, that paper should be reviewed by the rater and senior rater who would determine, in concert with the author, who else within the Army should review its contents. Papers with the broadest interest might be forwarded to AWC as candidates
for publication in an appropriate journal. AWC would coordinate that effort. Papers with a very specific interest might be held and circulated only within the command or agency where the participant is assigned. Distribution would be largely dependent on the kind of audience for whom the effort is targeted.

If the product is an oral presentation, participants and raters may choose to use the product in meetings or conferences, either internal to the organization or external, if the contents are appropriate. Organizations with similar missions may choose to establish teleconferencing links to exchange presentations on issues of like interest. That form might be particularly useful in the more technical or special fields. Some organizations may find it useful to make videocassette presentations for distribution to a wide audience.

How the products are used and in what form they come is primarily the choice of the rater, who will most often be a general officer. Participants and raters should identify their intent in meeting the MQS-V program on the DA Form 67-8-1 (OER Support Form) as the primary method of targetting a mutually agreeable subject and tracking progress. Senior leader development would become an integral component of the "-1."
As in the passive approach, non MEL-1 Colonels would undergo certification. The process would be identical.

The active approach emphasizes an officer's responsibility to contribute to his profession beyond the bounds of his immediate assignment. It provides tangible evidence of effort to continue to grow as he and his rater see best. Participants drive this program within the broad MQS-V framework.
CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

This chapter examines the advantages and disadvantages of each of the two approaches against the criteria established in Chapter VI and compares the results of that analysis.

ADVANTAGES OF THE PASSIVE APPROACH

This approach is purposeful and useful. Its primary aim is to ensure participants remain exposed to the most current and pressing national defense and leader development issues. Its intent is to place the onus on each officer for self development.

The approach is credible. Its aims are achievable assuming that sufficient resources are available.

I believe participants would find this approach acceptable in light of the many other requirements they perform. They would essentially determine the pace. There would be little stress on the participants in accomplishing the aims of the program.
While there is some cost in time to the participants, I judge the time to be minimal. Since the program is non-directive, participants would be able to absorb any additional effort as they saw fit.

This approach clearly is a continuous one, with new input generated regularly by AWC.

The passive approach is relatively simple and direct for the participants; its very nature is to provide stimulus and allow officers to respond appropriately. It is somewhat more complex for AWC in developing and sustaining the program.

The school, the participant's organization and boss, and the officer are all involved to some degree. The preponderance of effort and involvement, however, is at the school in generating the issues and material. In this regard, this approach considers the possibility that the senior leader's boss is other than an Army officer.

**DISADVANTAGES OF THE PASSIVE APPROACH**

The program is costly for AWC. There will likely be substantial dollar and manpower costs for producing, printing, and distributing material and operating
teleconferencing and/or computer nets. There will be costs associated with establishing and manning an MQS-V cell within the school.

This approach is not very measurable. It will be difficult to ascertain the extent of leader development since the program requires no formal feedback from the participants.

It is likely that the approach cannot target the higher levels of learning. Reading and study alone will not necessarily improve these levels of learning. Analysis, synthesis, and evaluation are difficult skills. While there may be some evidence of applying these skills selectively, the program lacks a structure to ensure this kind of learning takes place.

ADVANTAGES OF THE ACTIVE APPROACH

This approach is also purposeful and useful. Its aims are clear and its intent is unmistakable.

The dollar costs associated with this approach are relatively small. There will be some printing and distributing costs and some additional manpower needed to
monitor the program, but on a much lesser scale than in the passive option.

The approach is continuous and sustainable. It should not easily be affected by external change.

This program is measurable. There will be tangible evidence of the program's worth. The Army and its officer corps will see how senior leaders are contributing to the profession.

This option is simple and straightforward in intent. Once in place, it needs little effort to sustain it.

The program involves each component of the triad to some extent. In this approach, the participant is the focal point, his chain of command is also fully involved, and the school is involved but to a lesser extent.

The active approach is designed primarily to attack the higher-level learning skills required of senior leaders.

DISADVANTAGES OF THE
ACTIVE APPROACH

Participants may likely see this option as not achievable. They may view the program with distrust and challenge what benefit they will derive and what the Army
will derive from their efforts. Some may see this option as little more than an attempt to get more articles for publication.

Because we recognize that there is already a great deal for senior leaders to do, participants are likely to challenge the requirement to be forced to do more. There will be an inescapable cost in personal time for the participants.

Although the program places clear onus on the officer, the rater and senior rater will likely be more involved in this approach. That circumstance would require that executive leaders who are not Army officers be particularly well-informed of the intent and mechanisms of the program and be able to respond appropriately.

**COMPARISON AND CONTRAST**

Both approaches are purposeful and useful. Each has aims and intentions and is determinant. Each provides for some kind of resulting leader development. The active approach has a somewhat greater advantage because of the visible contributions the participants will make for the Army and themselves.
Both credibility and palatability are important concerns from officers' perspectives. MOS-V must have trust and belief from its participants. It cannot be a hollow program which looks good on the surface but which has no support from those doing the work. I believe the passive approach would be fairly received and accepted by senior leaders; I believe the active approach would require firm salesmanship and positive impetus by the Army's executive leadership before participants would believe it to be a satisfactory solution for continuing education. One imperative of the active approach stands out: educating and convincing executive leaders that the approach is viable.

The dollar costs associated with the passive approach may be beyond what the Army should pay, particularly if we cannot measure the results very well. In comparison to other MQS levels, however, the dollar costs would be much smaller since the population is smaller. Of more importance, however, is the cost of time which is likely to be seen by the participants in the active approach as too great. Adding to an already "full plate" will be distasteful, at best.

Both programs are continuous. However, the passive program may be more volatile, particularly if resources are subject to cuts, because of high printing and administrative
costs which often are among the first measures targeted for cost savings.

One of the two marked differences between the programs is in the criteria of measurement. Because the active approach requires participants to produce some kind of product, there is visible evidence to make some judgements about the effectiveness and validity of the program. In the passive program, there is little ability to make assessments. This is a strong positive for the former approach.

Both programs are uncomplicated. The passive approach is simple since it requires no formal feedback. The active approach is almost self-sustaining, even though there may be initial uncertainty of what to do with the products of officers' efforts.

Both programs involve the triad, but the active approach places the preponderance of the effort on the senior leader and his boss which is highly consistent with both RETO and PDOS findings.

A second marked difference between the programs is that the active program specifically targets the higher levels of learning. While the passive approach may, in fact, encourage development of these skills, there would be some uncertainty
to what extent the program is effective in accomplishing this criteria since there is little ability to measure the results.

Finally, the passive approach has a potential for information overload. That would be distinctly disadvantageous. Correspondingly, the active approach may be too unstructured and too individual to produce thoughts and ideas on a full range of the important issues. Neither of those disadvantages, however, is particularly serious.

I have summarized my analysis in the decision matrix on page 51. The options are listed at the top and the criteria are listed along the side. I have weighted the criteria as follows:

"Purposeful" is the most important of the criteria and receives a value of "3."


"Affordable" (both categories), "Simple," and "Involving the Triad" each receives a "1" indicating that they are the least important of the criteria.
I have made subjective judgement of each of the options against the criteria on a scale of one to five.

A "5" indicates that the option is excellent.

A "4" indicates very good value.

A "3" indicates acceptable value.

A "2" indicates marginal value.

A "1" indicates poor value.

The totals show both the raw and weighted scores at the bottom of each of the option columns. In this matrix, higher numbers are better.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA (Weight)</th>
<th>OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Passive Raw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposeful (3)</td>
<td>4 = 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credible (2)</td>
<td>4 = 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palatable (2)</td>
<td>3 = 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Affordable in Time (1)</td>
<td>4 = 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Affordable in Money (1)</td>
<td>2 = 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurable (2)</td>
<td>2 = 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Continuous (2)</td>
<td>4 = 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simple (1)</td>
<td>3 = 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involving Triad (1)</td>
<td>3 = 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks Higher Learning (2)</td>
<td>2 = 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>31 = 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mathematical summary shows that the active option is the better of the two.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

The problem is to determine a program which provides Colonels and MEL-1 Lieutenant Colonels with the opportunity and incentive to grow professionally through the remainder of their military service. Having established the standards for that development in Chapter IV, this chapter draws a conclusion as to which of the two options just discussed best meets development of those senior leader standards.

Both programs have merit and both have drawbacks. Both will solve the problem. In my judgement, however, the active approach best serves the leader development of senior officer skills, knowledge, and attitudes for both war and peace.

The most important conclusion I draw from the analysis is that the active approach provides tangible evidence for the officer, his chain of command, and the Army as a whole of his growth. It provides results.

Secondly, this program is decidedly easier to measure for its ability to cause officers to grow professionally.
Not only will the officer know, but his chain of command and the Army will be able to better judge development.

Third, while the onus is clearly on self-development, the boss will play an integral role and the organization and Army will benefit from the efforts. The active approach is a sure catalyst for mentoring of senior leaders.

Finally, this program forces officers to address the higher levels of learning necessary for their development and performance. The fact that they must articulate these abilities will show strengths, weaknesses, and direction for future learning.

I see two major arguments against taking this option. First, senior leaders may believe this to be an unnecessary requirement on an already "full plate." Advocates of the passive approach may argue that senior leaders need only be challenged to grow and provided the kinds of resources a compendium, teleconferencing, and a digest provide. That argument, however, fails to account for a critical assumption: that senior leader development cannot take place outside of a structured, measurable system. There is no question that it will take additional time to study, research, and articulate an issue. But evincing any leader development necessarily takes additional time and
discipline. Growth will not occur without effort or by itself, particularly as it relates to the standards identified in Chapter IV. Senior leaders must manage their time properly to ensure that development outside their workplace continues.

Second, senior leaders may question the utility of their products—whether they are writing and speaking simply to meet the program or whether their efforts really do contribute to and beyond their own growth. The role of the raters and senior raters will determine, in great measure, how well and wide the Army uses the efforts of the participants. The simple fact that senior leaders in all branches Army-wide are contributing products across the broadest range of issues signals the intellectual and professional health of our institution.

The results of the decision matrix, while fully subjective, further support the active approach. At the same time, however, it is important to note that the matrix provides argument for either option, illustrating that both methods can solve the problem.

It is appropriate at this juncture to comment on two other possibilities. The first is to do nothing and allow existing broad leader development policy and goals provide
the basis for continuing education. As I have mentioned, that option falls outside the assumption of the necessity of a well-structured system consistent with MQS philosophy. It further negates the need for an MQS-V. I therefore discounted analysis of that approach.

A second option is the possibility of combining elements of both the passive and active approaches. I believe either the passive or active approach is viable in and of itself and therefore see little utility in joining some of the components. Such a combination would likely add to cost but gain little advantage beyond what either option now provides.

If the active option were selected, however, there may be some usefulness with little added cost in establishing an electronic mail and/or facsimile network as mentioned in the passive option. The intent of adding this single component would be to provide access to the latest issues of senior leader interest and invite officers’ thoughts and ideas on those kinds of subjects. The establishment of such a computer link and the use of other developing technology need not necessarily be a part of the initial MQS-V system. Such additions would be logical follow-ons once the primary program were enacted and operating.
In light of the total analysis, I conclude that the active approach by itself best solves the continuing education problem to meet the standards of senior level leadership.
CHAPTER X

RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend that the Commandant of the Army War College approve the concept of MQS-V; the senior level leader standards identified in Chapter IV, and the active program of continuing education identified in Chapter VIII.

I further recommend that the Commandant form a team of officers to expand this concept into a detailed format, the result of which would be an MQS-V manual explaining the standards and program implementation Army-wide.

As the logical follow-on to the above effort, I recommend that the Commandant be prepared to coordinate the results of the MQS-V manual with appropriate Army agencies with the intention of implementing the program not later than Fiscal Year 1991.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


