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ARNG PREMOBILIZATION COMBAT READINESS: TRAINING FOR MOBILIZATION AND TRAINING FOR COMBAT

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT C. EDWARDS

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**Author:** LTC Robert C. Edwards

**Performing Organization:**
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The Total Army's growing dependence upon the Army National Guard (ARNG) to meet our national security requirements has focused increased emphasis on quality training. This emphasis has resulted in a marked improvement in the combat capability of the ARNG. Programs such as CAPSTONE have contributed to this renaissance. But, can ARNG units survive the mobilization process in a condition that will allow them to function on the battlefield? This study examines recent ARNG mobilizations through the eyes of two units and then (Cont)
surveys the current regulations covering training for combat and training for mobilization at the unit level. The study concludes with a summary of findings and recommendations aimed at improving the mobilization posture of the ARNG.
ARNG PREMOBILIZATION COMBAT READINESS:
TRAINING FOR MOBILIZATION AND TRAINING FOR COMBAT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

LTC Robert C. Edwards, FA

LTC Charles S. Rousek
Project Adviser

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ABSTRACT

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...the activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparation for war and war proper.¹

Carl Von Clausewitz

On War, 1984 Ed.

National Guard commanders who seriously reflect on war must consider Clausewitz's dictum: today's national security environment requires us to train for two distinctly separate, yet totally intertwined, missions: mobilization and combat. The ultimate mission of National Guard commanders is to prepare their units for combat as part of the total Army team. Yet if the past is an accurate predictor of the future, the mobilization process through which Army Guard units begin the journey to combat is crucial to their ultimate success or failure. In spite of this fact, the Army training system does not require nor even encourage rigorous and realistic mobilization training at the unit, state, or national level. Consequently 50% of the combat power of the U.S. Army may not be efficiently called to the colors in a national emergency.
THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TODAY

Today we place a greater reliance on the reserve components than in any time of peace in our nation's history. As the largest component of the Army's reserve forces, the Army National Guard currently makes up 74% of the infantry battalions, 43% of the combat engineer battalions, 47% of the corps signal battalions, 57% of the armored cavalry regiments, 47% of the field artillery battalions, 25% of the special forces groups, 47% of the mechanized infantry battalions, and 43% of the armor battalions. Clearly the Army National Guard and the active Army are so totally integrated that never again, as in Vietnam, will we be able to fight a major war without the involvement of a significant number of Army National Guard units. This was precisely what GEN Crieghton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the Army, had in mind when he developed the "One Army" concept. COL Harry Summers, in his seminal work On Strategy, made the observation of the post Vietnam Army, "The National Guard and the Army Reserve returned to the importance they enjoyed in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. Because they had again become an essential element in American security, the melding of active and reserve forces into a totally combat-ready total army became a continuing priority task."^3

TRAINING FOR COMBAT

With the Army National Guard's re-emergence as a full partner in the defense planning of the country, the standards for individual and collective training have been raised.Individual
proficiency is closely monitored and officers and NCO's are required to attend active duty leadership schools and basic and advanced courses. Many military occupational specialties (MOS) which had previously been awarded with on the job training (OJT) are now earned only through attendance at an active army school or an approved course of study. Unit proficiency, especially in the tactical arena, has come under close scrutiny. Gone are the "bad old days" when Army National Guard units at annual training worked eight hours a day and took weekends off. This increased emphasis on training has paid off in a more professional Army Guard, but one must ask "Can it mobilize?"

TRAINING FOR MOBILIZATION

Mobilization training has not enjoyed the enhanced attention that mission training has received. Some attention has been paid to mobilization at the unit level but many of the early mobilization exercises (MOBEXES) have been primarily administrative in focus. Mobilization requirements are not as stringent nor as clearly focused as mission training standards. Are we looking beyond the mobilization station to the battlefield?

SUMMARY

Chapter II will present two case studies of units mobilized for federal service; one in Korea and one in Vietnam. Chapter III will examine the current mission training requirements while the current mobilization requirements will be studied in Chapter
IV. Chapter V will provide a summary and recommendations for synchronizing the training requirements for mobilization and the training requirements for combat. It is the belief that these two elements must be treated as related processes because they heavily impact on each other.

Mobilization is bringing the total Army force to a state of readiness for war or other national emergencies. Mobilization considerations are an inseparable part of peacetime training.

FM25-5, 1985
ENDNOTES

1. Carl V. Clauswitz, On War, edited and translated by Peter Paret, p. 131.


CHAPTER II
MOBILIZATION CASE STUDIES;
KOREA AND VIETNAM

We started to get replacements [Korea], most of them from the Reserve or the National Guard, and there definitely was a difference. They were guys who didn’t have to cover any asses at anytime because their careers weren’t on the line. They were real citizen soldiers that have always been the strength of this country. Later in Vietnam, we would fight a war without them, depending only on young draftees and the careerists as noncoms and officers. It would make a difference, a big difference.¹

LTC Anthony Herbert
Soldier, 1973

The mobilization process has historically had a significant impact upon the units affected. It would appear that a unit’s subsequent ability to perform its federal mission is linked to how well it "survives" this process. Indeed, mobilization is crucial to the success or failure of every activity the unit subsequently undertakes. In support of this thesis, this chapter will briefly examine the histories of two Army National Guard units that were mobilized during our last two "war time" mobilizations, Korea and Vietnam.

KOREA: THE 300TH ARMORED FIELD ARTILLERY (AFA)

On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Rapid progress was made by the invaders and President Truman ordered U.S. assistance, first in the form of advisers and supplies and eventually with U.S. combat forces. On 7 July the United Nations Command was formed to resist the North’s aggression.
In 1950 the U.S. Army end strength of 591,487 men and women was organized into 14 divisions. Most of these divisions, with the exception of the 82nd Airborne Division, were at 65% to 75% strength. The Army National Guard was organized into 27 divisions and 20 regimental combat teams (RCT) with an end strength of 324,761.2

Beginning 14 August 1950 1,457 ARNG units were mobilized, including eight of the 27 Guard Divisions (28th, 31st, 40th, 43rd, 44th, 45th, and 47th) and three of the twenty RTC's (196th, 278th, and 296th)....In addition to these units 43 battalions and 714 company size units of the Guard were also mobilized. In all 138,600 officers and enlisted men of the National Guard were federalized during the Korean War which was 34% of the Guard's strength.3

This mobilization was crucial in order to assure America's security needs were met at home, in Europe, and in Asia.

One of the battalions called to active service was the 300th Armored Field Artillery of the Wyoming Army National Guard. Organized in 1888 as the 1st WY Cavalry Regiment, the unit subsequently saw service on the Mexican border in 1916 and in Europe during WWI. In 1941 they were again called up for federal service for WWII. Following WWII the unit was designated the 300th Armored Field Artillery (today 1st BN 49th Field Artillery).4 On 29 July 1950 the 300th was alerted for mobilization on 14 August.5

Between alert and mobilization the battalion struggled with preparations for federal service. Most of the officers and NCO’s were veterans of WWII but many had served in branches other than
field artillery and thus required branch specific training. The massive task of moving the battalion to Fort Lewis, Washington, especially with little guidance and less assistance, doomed any hopes of training before their departure.6

The 300th arrived at Fort Lewis Washington on 31 August 1950 and was assigned to the 66th Field Artillery Group, Washington Army National Guard. At Fort Lewis the battalion conducted individual and collective training. In December 1950 the unit was rated as the outstanding field artillery battalion within sixth Army.7

Almost five months after first being alerted, still short a few personnel and equipment, the battalion was deemed ready for overseas shipment. Before they could face the "communist hordes," however, they had to face an enemy far more cunning, unrelenting, and dangerous -- the managers of the Army Personnel Replacement System at Fort Lewis. A few short weeks after coming into contact with this deadly foe, the battalion was combat ineffective and screaming to all quarters for relief.8

What happened? After training for months in preparation for combat, the personnel managers reassigned 40% of the 300th to fill earlier deploying units. Many of the levied soldiers were the Battalion’s senior NCO’s and experienced gunners. These troops were replaced with individual fillers, many of whom were not MOS qualified.9 The heart was torn out of the 300th, unit cohesiveness evaporated, and the Wyoming identity was weakened. Many studies have concluded that men in combat do not fight for country or cause but for the unit, for each other.10 A unit that
loses its cohesiveness, compounded by the reassignment of many of its trained personnel and skilled leaders, will not be an effective unit in combat.

In late January 1951 the 300th was notified that it would embark for Korea. The battalion commander, LTC Raper, was determined that his unit, which was now unprepared for combat, was to have time to retrain and rebuild its cohesiveness. His request for additional training time was denied. He then went outside regular military channels and involved the Governor of Wyoming and the state's Adjutant General. This resulted in the Army leadership promising six additional weeks of training in Korea before the unit would be deployed in combat.\(^{11}\)

The 300th AFA arrived in Korea on 16 February 1951. During the ensuing six weeks the battalion put itself through an exhaustive training program that culminated in the successful completion of the standard Field Artillery Operational Readiness Test.\(^{12}\)

It is beyond the focus of this paper to follow the 300th AFA beyond this point except to point out that the battalion went on to distinguish itself in Korea winning two Distinguished Unit citations, two Meritorious Commendations, two Korean Presidential Unit citations, and seven campaign streamers.\(^{13}\) This outstanding record came about inspite of the mobilization process, it could have been achieved earlier (six week delay for retraining) had not the unit's integrity at the mobilization station been destroyed.
VIETNAM. THE 29th SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE (SIB)

In the spring of 1965 the U.S. began to send maneuver units in significant numbers to Vietnam. Forty-four battalions were in country by year’s end. By 1967 President Johnson had established a troop ceiling of 525,000 however he refused to mobilize the reserves as he did not want to put the U.S. on a war footing and derail or postpone his great society programs. For three years the war drug on then in the spring of 1968 the U.S. was rocked by two crises in Asia, the seizure by North Korea of the USS Pueblo and the TET offensive in Vietnam. As a result of these two incidents a limited call up of reserve forces was approved by the President. A total of 12,234 Army National Guardsmen were mobilized for Vietnam (2,729 served in Vietnam as members of mobilized Guard units and 4,311 served in Vietnam as fillers).

One of the unit’s called to Federal service was the 29th Infantry Brigade (Separate) of the Hawaii Army National Guard. The 29th was alerted on 11 April 1968 and mustered into active service on 13 May 1968. They were officially mustered in at Fort De Russy and then trucked to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii for in-processing and post mobilization training. The 29th had units on all of Hawaii’s major islands. In addition, the brigades aviation company, a California National Guard Unit and its medical detachment, a unit from Phoenix, Arizona were mobilized at the same time as the brigade. Also, the 100-422 Infantry Battalion, a Hawaii based USAR unit was mobilized at the same time and attached to the 29th.
Prior to mobilization the Brigade and its subordinate units had a long history of successful service. Example: the 100-422 USAR was the well known "Go For Broke" all Nisei unit of European fame in WWII. The Brigade, because of its record, had been authorized extra weekend training drills which contributed to a relatively high level of training readiness. Its previous annual training period had gone well and "at a rate of 72 drills per year this provided some 20 field training sessions for the Brigade between annual training in 1967 and alert for mobilization in April 1968."21

The Brigade brought on active duty some obsolescent equipment. "At the end of February 1968 there were 12,611 items of equipment on hand within the Brigade; of them 919 or 7.3% were considered old or obsolete items. Most of these 919 items were radios, vehicles and howitzers...the brigade was short all of its tracked vehicles."22 The equipment mismatch and shortages, as well as retraining for new equipment, hurt the Brigade's readiness.

The Brigade mobilized with 3347 EM, 40 WO, and 233 officers. MOS qualification was above 70% in all groups.23 The Brigade was short of a total of 1,013 enlisted personnel, which were requisitioned during the alert phase. By October 1968 the Brigade reached 100% in personnel and MOS qualification was 100% for officers, 97.7% for warrant officers, and 91% for EM.24

After the initial mobilization and processing was completed at Schofield Barracks, the unit began an extensive training program that included sending personnel to specialist and branch
schools as well as unit training. The unit advanced rapidly and "by the end of the year (1968) all units had successfully completed operational readiness tests and were rated as combat ready."^25

The 29th Infantry Brigade was ready, and then:

There was a widespread belief in the brigade that the unit would be shipped overseas, possibly to RVN, maintaining unit integrity. When it became known that the Brigade was destined to remain in Hawaii and provide individual levies, a general reaction resulted... morale suffered, especially among those long term Reservist component members who wanted to serve with their friends.^26

As in the case of the 300th AFA 19 years earlier, the personnel ax fell quickly. By March of 1969 1,800 levies (individual fillers) had been taken from the Brigade and 2,000 replacements had been reassigned to the 29th.^27

Losses included all battalion commanders and most of the company commanders and key brigade and battalion staff officers. Overall in that period, personnel changes involved some 40% of the total strength. The magnitude of these changes resulted in reduced readiness status for the brigade.^28

In fact, many of the companies lost their readiness ratings and were forced to undergo continuous retraining and retesting to regain their combat proficiency.^29

The 29th Infantry Brigade's post mobilization mission was as a member of the nation's strategic reserve. This was a viable and important national security mission, however, the mobilization process so drastically altered the brigade's readiness posture that it is questionable if, after the spring of 1969 levies, they were much of a deterrent force.

The ability to perform the mission of Theater Army Reserve was down graded commensurately...the use of...
a STRAF unit as a personnel replacement and training center or depot constantly threatened unit readiness for the Theater Army Reserve mission.

SUMMARY

The ability to successfully mobilize is vital if the Reserve Components are to play their proper role in our national security strategy. Yet the strikingly similar mobilization experiences of the 300th AFA and the 29th SIB clearly show that the mobilization process as practiced in the past has had a negative, rather than a positive impact. Units often exit the mobilization station in a lower state of readiness than they entered it, and in some cases, units that had been mission capable early in the mobilization process were rendered ineffective by the very Army that so desperately needed them. As we prepare to enter the last decade of the 20th century the military and civilian leaders of our country must take note of the fact that the months and even years available to mobilizing Army Guard units of the 1950’s and 1960’s are no longer available. It is imperative that the ghastly mistakes of the past be corrected. This will require greater emphasis at the unit level on mobilization and a greater understanding on the part of the Active Army of the Reserve Component’s needs and capabilities.

For the integration of the Reserve Component into the active force to be accomplished in a timely manner a number of factors must be addressed. First, Regular Army planners must resist the temptation to break up Reserve Component units for use as fillers... second, it must be recognized that in the Reserve Components, unit cohesion does exist...third, while the implementation of plans and policies to accomplish integration remains a key challenge for both Regular
Army and Reserve Component leadership, Regular Army officers have an additional responsibility for understanding the unique capabilities and limitations of the Reserve Components.  

MAJ Thomas Grodecki  
*Powder River to Soyang, 1988*
1. LTC Anthony Herbert, *Soldier*, pp. 48-49.


7. Ibid, pp. 16-17.


15. Ibid, pp. viii-ix.

16. Ibid, p. 76.


18. Ibid, p. 28.


22. *National Guard*, p. 32.
27. Ibid, p. 25.
28. Ibid, p. 49.
29. Ibid.
CHAPTER III

TRAINING FOR COMBAT

The battlefield of the future will be an affair of sophistication, complexity, and intensity little understood and never before experienced. We can anticipate little or no prior warning before the conflict begins which dictates that RC units will be deployed essentially in a come-as-you-are posture with relatively little, if any, post mobilization time to train. 1

FORSCOM REG 350-2, 1986

An examination of the current regulations covering Reserve Component (RC) training supports the inevitable conclusion that this area of readiness has received a great amount of thought and attention. RC training is generally well organized and closely evaluated. Training guidance, in our not so distant past, was sporadic to non-existent. Today it is generally well thought out and focuses the RC commanders' attention on specific missions. However, mobilization is not one of those specific missions.

TRAINING GUIDANCE

An examination of the progress made in achieving the "one Army" concept, specifically in the area of training, clearly documents the national will to enhance our deterrence and combat capabilities. In 1979 the Department of the Army established the CAPSTONE program. 2 CAPSTONE aligns RC units with their gaining wartime commanders for the purpose of premobilization planning. 3

CAPSTONE is an organizational approach to managing the force. Under this program Active and Reserve component units are placed into a wartime organization of the Army designed to meet the enemy threat in a European, Southwest Asian, or Pacific contingency. The structure also includes the forces necessary to sustain the CONUS base. 4

17
RC commanders focus their training on the mission of their primary CAPSTONE trace. The wartime commander provides their CAPSTONE aligned units with a guidance letter, SOP’s, battlebooks, and reception plans. Also, CAPSTONE HQ’s are invited to observe the training of their subordinate CAPSTONE aligned units. Every RC unit is required to be included under CAPSTONE. There is currently a greater demand for units by wartime commanders than can be filled by the existing ARNG force structure.

RC commanders may also find their units assigned to one of six Directed Training Associations as a part of the CAPSTONE program. These are:

A. Roundout. RC units assigned to Active Component (AC) units to fill out their table of organization and equipment (TOE). Example, an AC Infantry division has two AC infantry brigades and one RC infantry brigade.

B. Roundup. Also known as Augmentation. RC units assigned to AC units in addition to their TOE to augment their combat power.

C. Affiliation. Designed to increase training readiness by associating RC units with like type AC units for training support.

D. AC/RC. Partnership Program. Establishes a formal training support relationship between major RC and AC units. This is primarily a brigade and division level program.
E. CORPS/Division Training Coordination Program (CORTRAIN). This program aligns RC Divisions and Brigades under AC Corps HQ’s for the purpose of participation in Corps level CPX’s.

F. Counterpart Program. Aligns RC attack helicopter units with like type AC units for year round training support.\(^8\)

CAPSTONE has had a tremendous impact on RC training and readiness. It has allowed for greater specificity and realism in the planning of training for combat. Just as CAPSTONE training guidance has told RC commanders where they will fight, it has also told them where they must deploy to which has placed more emphasis on mobilization.\(^9\)

From his CAPSTONE guidance the RC commander puts together his Mission Essential Task List (METL). The METL "identifies mission essential tasks at each level...based on the unit’s wartime mission."\(^10\) The METL tasks are the basis of the unit’s training program and are to be updated after each training assembly as well as form the basis for the unit’s annual training evaluation.\(^11\) The unit’s Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) provides additional guidance as well as providing the Army standard for completion of collective tasks.\(^12\)

CAPSTONE, METL, and ARTEP’s provide focus for the RC commanders training programs and allows him to evaluate his unit’s performance against Army standards.
ORGANIZATION OF TRAINING

All Federally recognized units will conduct not less than 48 paid unit training assemblies (UTA) and a minimum of 15 days annual training (AT) each fiscal year, unless an exception is approved by the Chief, National Guard Bureau on behalf of the Secretary of the Army.13

National Guard Training is structured around Unit Training Assemblies (UTA’s). UTA’s must be at least 4 hours in length. Multiple Unit Training Assemblies (MUTA’s) are commonly referred to as drills. A MUTA 4 would be two days where as a MUTA 5 would be 2 1/2 days. Thus, the average unit drills one weekend a month and attends annual training for two weeks for a total of 39 days a year. However, there are many cases where these minimum’s are exceeded by the unit cadres and other key unit members. An NGB study in 1984 found that Guard officers were paid for training an average of 66 days and enlisted personnel 45 days a year.14 During this limited amount of time the units must train for combat and prepare for mobilization.

Training is further broken down into individual training and collective training.

The soldiers manual (SM) and the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ATEP) are the cornerstones for training in FORSCOM. They outline the tasks, conditions, and standards which form the basis for a standardized approach to individual and collective training units.15

Individual training focuses on MOS or common tasks training. Individual training is usually conducted during the weekend drills with the section sergeant acting as the trainer.16 Because of turnover, the Army Guard has a severe MOS training problem. It is not unusual for units to experience a 50%
turnover of personnel below the grade of E-5 in one year. Many of the soldiers transferring into RC units from the AC or other RC units carry MOS's that cannot be used in their new units. Consequently, they must be retrained. Approximately 70% of all soldiers who join a unit during any particular year will require MOS specific training. MOS specific training must now be done at an active Army school or a United States Army Reserve (USAR) programed course of study. On the job training programs (OJT) are now limited to a few MOS's. Many of these soldiers will be lost to their units upon mobilization!

Limited opportunities for collective training are available during drills. These usually take the form of section drills, battle drills, or command post exercises (CPX). The prime collective training time especially above squad, section, and platoon levels is during annual training (AT). AT generally is allocated 15 days, although extensions may be authorized for traveling long distances. Units that train outside of the continental United States (OCONUS AT) are given three weeks for AT. Because of administrative and logistical requirements the average unit only receives 11 days of actual field training during the standard 15 day AT.

RC units are evaluated during AT by AC officers and NCO's. The METL and the ARTEP as well as the unit's CAPSTONE mission provide the framework for this evaluation. Also higher HQ's, STARC's, and FORSCOM provide guidance as to the amount of field training, continuous operations, NBC training, etc. that will be conducted during AT. The AT evaluators consider all of these
requirements in light of the unit’s demonstrated proficiency by completing the unit’s AT evaluation which is known as the 1-R. The 1-R then becomes another tool for the commander in planning and evaluating his next year’s training. In addition to the 1-R, RC units are required to take an external ARTEP also known as a Standard External Evaluation every three years. As an example, in 1983-84, 39 Army Guard Artillery battalions were administered external ARTEPS with all units exceeding the 80% standard for gunnery with an average score of 94%.

Annual training has increasingly become a time for extensive field training. In the author’s experience (13 AT’s) the wise and productive use of this time has resulted in vastly improved tactical operations. As a result of the CAPSTONE program, METL, and ARTEP requirements the Army National Guard has made significant improvements in tactical training.

TRAINING MANAGEMENT

Once guidance has been receive, priorities set, resources and time allocated, the RC commander must now manage his plan. The Army has done a commendable job in assisting the RC commander to manage his training.

Commanders Training Management System (CTMS)... is the process commanders and their staffs above battalion use to perform training management roles...consists of clear long range guidance and policies needed by the staff and subordinate commanders to plan, resource, and conduct effective training...Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) is the Army’s standardization model for training and training management in units.
BTMS and CTMS provide the guidance and the framework to manage training. Based on CAPSTONE missions, METL, ARTEP, previous AT 1-R's, and other evaluations (maintenance, supply, command inspections, etc.) the commander develops his training plans. Commanders above battalion level are required to have a two year training calendar (YTC) and a one year training plan (YTP). The YTP includes objectives, priorities, resources, and guidance. The YTC is a schedule of training events. At BN level, the commander is required to have a one year YTC and YTP. At company, battery, detachment level units are required to maintain a YTC, an updated METL (training status for each task) and monthly training schedules. Training schedules show individual and collective training and are to be completed 90 days ahead of schedule. Samples of all of the above are available for the RC commander in FM 25-2 Unit Training Management, Sept. 1984.

The YTC, YTP, and monthly schedules provide the base documentation for collective training. For the documentation of individual training the RC commander has the training schedule and the section books which contain the individual soldiers training records.

SUMMARY

Individual and collective training that focuses on mission capability has improved significantly. The CAPSTONE program is the driving force behind this improvement and has spawned a whole series of equally effective tools such as the METL. The
Soldier’s Manual (SM) and ARTEP have likewise driven training forward by providing both focus and standards. Have we, however, developed such a fixation with our combat mission that we have overlooked the mobilization process which takes us from being citizen soldiers to the battlefield? Can we really be mission capable without clearly demonstrating the ability to mobilize?

The United States Army exists to keep the peace and, should war occur, to defeat the enemy. This requires a total Army prepared to mobilize, deploy, fight and win anywhere in the world.  

FM 25-1, 1985
ENDNOTES

2. Griffin, p. 41.
5. Ibid, p. 4-0.
8. AR 11-30, p. 5.
11. FORSCOM Reg. 350-2, pp. 2-2 and 2-10.
17. U.S. Army Training Board, p. 5.
19. Ibid, pp. 43-44.
23. Ibid, pp. 2-10 and 2-11.
CHAPTER IV
TRAINING FOR MOBILIZATION

A simple but grand arrangement is discernible amidst what has been a commanding feature of America's early wars, namely that the history of the U.S. Army is a history of two Armies: A citizen Army (known as Militia, National Guard and Army Reserves) and a regular Army.

COL John D. Stuckey
COL Joseph H. Pistorius
Mobilization of the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve, 1984.

ONE ARMY?

Today we speak of "one army" as if to say it will make it so. Standards, training, and for the most part, equipment are fairly uniform. We may indeed be close to an era when we will have full time regulars and part time regulars. Two factors, however, are at work to keep the force from becoming in fact "one army." They are geographic dispersion and the part time nature of the National Guard.

The Army Guard is spread from one end of this country to the other. Few communities are more than a few minutes drive from an Army Guard Armory. Guard units themselves, especially at battalion level and above, are usually spread out over several counties and some even cross state lines. The Army Guard is also a part time force. Except for a relatively small cadre of full time guardsmen the soldiers come from every conceivable part of civilian life. They are farmers, teachers, policemen, factory workers, housewives, etc.
MOBILIZATION IN THE 20TH CENTURY

In order for an Army Guard unit to gather together its personnel, consolidate equipment, and enter federal service it must be mobilized. Mobilization is the process executed in times of crisis which creates "one Army." Mobilization is the critical first step of a journey that ends on the battlefield. Unfortunately, as a recent study of mobilizations in general and the 1968 Vietnam mobilization in particular found, "mobilization has never been adequately planned."\(^2\)

Since 1900 there have been six major federal mobilizations, four of them since 1940.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Guardsmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Mexican Border</td>
<td>156,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>379,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>300,034</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>183,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Berlin Crisis</td>
<td>50,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>12,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,082,342</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TYPES AND PHASES OF MOBILIZATION

Mobilization may take place at many levels. In its most basic formats it can consist of a full or total mobilization, a partial mobilization, a Presidential 200,000 call up, or a selective mobilization.\(^4\) In effect the President and/or Congress may tailor the call up to meet the threat they perceive endangers our national security. All Guardsmen and Guard units must be prepared at all times for mobilization.

The actual process of mobilization is designed in phases to bring order to what would otherwise be chaos. Phase I, the daily peacetime posture of the ARNG, is the preparatory phase during
which units train to accomplish their assigned mission and to undergo mobilization. Planning for mobilization is ongoing during Phase I.

Phase II commences with an alert to begin the preparation to enter Federal service. Cadre's, designated as early mobilization assets, will report to their armories to prepare for the unit's soldiers.

Phase III consists of mobilization at home station. The unit enters federal service, conducts home station training and in-processing, and loads equipment for shipment. Phase III ends when the unit departs for their mobilization station or for the point of embarkation in the case of direct mobilization.

Phase IV consists of movement to the mobilization station in accordance with the unit's mobilization plan. Personnel may move in organic wheeled transportation, military aircraft, commercial aircraft, or by bus. Equipment will move under its own power, military air, commercial truck, or rail.

Phase V begins when the unit arrives at the mobilization station (MS). At the MS replacements for missing equipment and personnel are expected to be supplied. The unit trains at the MS and is evaluated in accordance with its METL and CAPSTONE mission. Its equipment will also be loaded for shipment to the theater of operations. The goal is to produce fully mission capable units as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{5}

For many early deploying ARNG units there will be little or no post mobilization training time before their equipment is shipped.
MOBILIZATION EXERCISES

This five phased process may sound simple but, in reality, it is extremely complex. The Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) consist of 13 titles covering, every facet of mobilization. For the Army Guard commander it is a bewildering process, staggering in its complexity, and a process that can only be mastered through practice. Yet, the Army Training board found that on an average Army Guard units undergo "some type" of mobilization exercise only once every three years.6

Mobilization exercises in the Army National Guard are governed by NGR 350-3, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT EXERCISE PROGRAM. This brief regulation prescribes standards for mobilization exercises, their types, and frequencies. The three types of mobilization exercises are:

A. Mobilization and Deployment Readiness Exercise (MODRE). Like all NGR 350-3 mandated exercise, MODRE’s are conducted by State Area Commands (STARC). MODRE’s are conducted for units that are scheduled to deploy overseas for annual training. MODRE’s concentrate on preparing personnel for overseas deployment and do not, as a rule, focus on movement of equipment. Home station processing, alert rosters, and individuals’ records are all evaluated, and when necessary, updated.
B. Readiness for Mobilization Exercise (REMOBE). The STARC team in a REMOBE validates alert rosters, mobilization procedures at home station, load out of equipment, and where feasible movement plans. Only high priority units according to the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) are selected for REMOBE's. The minimum requirement being once every three years. High priority is defined as a unit with a Force Activity Designator (FAD) 2 or 3. FAD 4 units, of which there are many, are required to undergo a REMOBE once every five years.⁷

C. State Area Command Exercise (STARCEX). This exercise is designed to train the STARC staff in its own mobilization mission and to validate its mobilization plans. STARCEX's are to be conducted biannually.⁸

It is readily apparent from NGR 350-3 that the linchpin in the mobilization process (and in training for mobilization) is the State Area Command. Their peacetime mission is to "prepare for the mobilization of the Army National Guard units in support of FORSCOM, WESTCOM, and CONUSA Reserve Component Mobilization plans."⁹ Each State Area Command is organized by NGR 10-2 according to the number of Guardsmen that exist in that state. In other words the larger number of mobilization assets, the greater the STARC's responsibility and size. The STARC then is
dependent upon the mobilization process for its existence, whereas the units in the armories are dependent upon the STARC to take them through the mobilization process.

MOBILIZATION STATIONS AND IRR

The Mobilization Station (MS) is the facility (usually an Active Army installation) that the mobilized unit travels to for Phase V of the mobilization process. The MS reassigns excess personnel and equipment or fills shortages as required. The turmoil this process creates can have a long lasting effect upon the unit, as historical case studies in Chapter II have documented. Some Guard units are fortunate enough to be able to train periodically at their mobilization station. Familiarity with facilities and civilian personnel will be a great asset to these units upon mobilization.

A critical factor is the use of "fillers," or members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR consists of 285,915 officers and men. Many of these individuals will not be available to Army Guard units upon mobilization. However, some will be allocated to mobilizing Guard units along with fillers from other sources such as cross leveling from overstrength units. The result will be an influx of new personnel into the unit. These individuals will not share the same geographical background and unit heritage as those guardsmen who mobilized with the unit. This personnel turbulence will have a negative effect on unit cohesion and must be minimized.
During peacetime the Individual Ready Reserve is governed by two basic regulations. AR 140-1, Army Reserve Mission Organization and Training, outlines the components and responsibilities of each segment of USAR. On page 1-2 it states "The USAR mission is to meet DA mobilization requirements...trained individual officers, warrant officer and enlisted reinforcements will be provided."  

The second regulation affecting the use of IRR is AR 135-200, Army National Guard and Army Reserve; Active Duty for Training, Annual Training and Full Time Training Duty for Individual Members, and outlines the procedures for using IRR members during annual training. In the past, IRR members were called up to attend AT with Guard units but in recent years this process has stopped. During the 1970's and early 1980's the IRR shrank as the last draftees left the system. This trend has now been reversed by extending military obligations from six to eight years. However, with tight personnel budgets the funding to pay them was reduced. Nonetheless, the basic mechanism is in place to utilize IRR personnel during annual training which would stimulate the personnel turbulence of mobilization.

SUMMARY

Training for mobilization is a complex yet vital task. As this study demonstrates the framework for such training is in place. Although, as evidenced in this short synopsis, some of the regulations lack specificity (NGR 350-3 and 10-2) while others are quite detailed (FORMDEPS). What is required is an
emphasis on the need to practice the mobilization process in
concert with our combat mission. Only with practice will Army
Guard units become proficient at this most complex yet vital
task. Perhaps more importantly, practicing mobilization plans
and processes will allow STARCS and higher HQ's to train for and
validate their mobilization plans. Our mobilization history
proves beyond doubt that neglect only leads to chaos during
times of crisis which is when we can least afford it.

Mobilization of the RC has never been adequately
planned. Mobilization planning has been generally
nonexistent, and in cases when some plans were
prepared, they were based on grossly faulty
assumptions. A result has been the conduct of
mobilizations having the same errors, problems and
inefficiencies as previous mobilizations. It is
embarrassing at best and disgusting at worst to
realize that the U.S. Army must relearn the
lessons from past mobilizations upon each new one.
Mobilization planning is not intellectually
demanding work. It is time consuming and requires
a great deal of coordination, but it can be properly
accomplished if the OSD and the Service Secretaries
demand it...and only if that demand is enforced.\textsuperscript{13}

COL John D. Stuckey
COL Joseph H. Pistorius
Mobilization of the Army
National Guard and Army
Reserve, 1984

2. Ibid.

3. National Guard Association of the United States, 20th Century Mobilizations of the National Guard, p. 5.


6. Army Training Board, p. 50.


12. United States Department of the Army, Regulation 1350-200, p. 11-12.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The American approach to mobilization has been, and continues to be, all or nothing in character. Rather than being viewed as a viable instrument of national power, mobilization is seen as something to be undertaken only under the direst of circumstances.¹

Gregory D. Foster
Karen A. McPherson
"Mobilization for Low Intensity Conflict," 1985

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis of regulations applicable to training and mobilizing the Reserve forces, as well as an examination of the history of Army National Guard mobilization leads to several unavoidable conclusions.

A. Mobilization of the Reserve Components in times of crisis is critical to meeting our national security needs.

B. Past mobilizations have been inadequately planned, poorly executed, and have had, in many cases, a negative rather than a positive impact upon the mobilizing units.

C. This regrettable state of affairs is readily apparent to any who care to conduct even a cursory study at the history of mobilization. It appears that few at the senior leadership level have done
so. The lessons of the past have not been learned and will no doubt be repeated with any future mobilization. ²

D. We are looking beyond the mobilization station to the battlefield. The training FM's and regulations examined are precise, well written, and demanding. Any Army Guard officer with more than a few years experience can cite numerous examples of a wonderful renaissance in mission oriented training. The same cannot be said for mobilization training. The mobilization regulations and FM's are less precise and less demanding (the exception to this are the FORMDEPS volumes). In our zeal to prepare for the battlefield we have overlooked mobilization and as the 300th AFA showed us in Chapter II, that's a costly oversite.

E. Mobilization is a complex task but one that can be mastered if it is emphasized, organized, practices, and evaluated.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is a temptation to begin this section by outlining tangible programatic changes that could improve our mobilization posture. However tempting that might be, it would be an error. Instead we must begin with a sharpened focus on mobilization by our senior civilian and military leaders. Our current situation
is not an accident, rather it is an accurate reflection of our
leaderships’ concern with mission oriented training. Now more
than ever we need a more balanced view of readiness, one that
factors in mobilization. The first step then must be a
heightened emphasis by our leaders on mobilization. From that
emphasis will flow program changes. Program changes recommended
for consideration are:

A. The first mission essential task on every
commander’s METL should be "mobilize."

B. Just as we currently have a common soldier task
manual and a MOS specific soldier manual so we
also need a mobilization ARTEP and a mission
specific ARTEP. The mobilization ARTEP should
delineate the standards to be met to successfully
complete mobilization and would be used with item
A above. The Mobilization and Deployment
Planning, RC Unit Commanders Handbook (FORMEDEPS),
Vol. III, could easily be rewritten into a
mobilization ARTEP.

C. Each annual training period should be directly
preceded by, or begin with, a mobilization
exercise. In non-ARTEP years the unit should
undergo a Readiness for Mobilization Exercise
(REMOBE). In ARTEP years mobilization should be
added to the ARTEP evaluation. Instead of the
current 72 hours tactical field ARTEP, a 120 hour
two phased ARTEP would be administered. The first
48 hours would be conducted by the responsible State Area Command and would consist of a Mobilization and Deployment Readiness Exercise (MODRE). Current MODRE’s generally do not include equipment loadout, this would not be the case for ARTEP’d units. The ARTEP would then break while the unit traveled to the AT field training site and trained for several days. The ARTEP would then resume with the remaining 72 hour tactical field exercise as currently administered.

D. Army Guard Units should take this expanded ARTEP at 100% strength. When, as will usually be the case, this is not possible the unit should be filled to 100% with fillers from the Individual Ready Reserve. This will accomplish two ends. First, it will force the Guard unit to take the ARTEP with the same degree of personnel turbulence that it can expect to go to war with. Company/battery level leadership will have to cope with "strangers" in their midst just as they will when mobilized. It is far better to learn the skills necessary to deal with this now than on the battlefield. Secondly, it trains and tests the units' leadership in dealing with a full MTOE. Example: currently a 155 FA battalion can take an ARTEP with three 4 gun batteries instead of the full MTOE of three 6 gun batteries. Obviously it's
easier for a battalion HQ to control 12 guns than 18. But they are expected to mobilize and shoot 18 guns! It makes sense to train to the realistic standard of full MTOE's with IRR fillers.

E. Whenever feasible the unit should conduct its AT/ARTEP at its mobilization station. Currently this is the case for some units and never happens for others. Nothing checks out the movement plans to the mobilization station like loading up the battalion, squadron, or brigade and convoying to the mobilization station.

F. The changes outlined in A through E will fall primarily upon the states to execute. This will mean an enhanced role for the State Area Command (STARC). As the STARC is the key to the entire mobilization process this enhancement is long overdue. To some, these changes may appear to be burdensome to the STARC but, they are much less so than the burden they would bear during actual mobilization. Not only would the role and prestige of the STARC be heightened but they would be able to train on and evaluate their mobilization plans. A case in point is the North Carolina Army Guard MOBEX, Hickory Response, where the entire state was mobilized at Fort Bragg, N.C. This three day exercise demonstrated what
can be done at the state level with limited resources. With a federal focus even more could be accomplished.

G. Many Army Guardsmen, at least those who are aware of their history, harbor a resentment of the way the Army Guard has been treated during past mobilizations. Much of this resentment can be traced to the way Guard units were broken up or stripped of personnel to be used as fillers. CAPSTONE has helped the Guard in this area by assigning units to CINCS and giving them fixed and often early deployment dates. Unit integrity in Guard units must be respected. Units should never again have to go through the experience that befell the 300 AFA, the 29th Infantry Brigade, and many others.

H. This promise of never again must be supported with a meaningful change in the IRR system. Of the current 285,915 IRR members only 16,000 will undergo training this year. (Projections are that by 1992 the IRR will contain over 400,000 members). This resource must be used. At the same time we need to prepackage IRR members for Army Guard units. What is needed is a system where the IRR member knows who his unit will probably be and the unit will know him. Flexibility can be built into the program to allow
for unforeseen changes. Prepackaged fillers should be given the opportunity to train with their units yearly and be required to train with them during the ARTEP annual training period. Only by preassigning IRR fillers can we get off the devastating mobilization personnel merry-go-round. This will be a difficult task as the current IRR pool has high turnover rate. Also significant are the MOS mismatch problems (if the Army is short an MOS the IRR will be short also) and the frequent moves that some IRR members make, which compounds this problem. When the IRR annual muster day is held, a full 40% of its members do not show up.5

I. Finally, we need to mobilize the Army Guard, or segments thereof, during actual emergencies. Mobilization is a political act that demonstrates resolve to our people and to foreign governments.6 Perhaps as important, it also signals faith in the Army National Guard. Being ignored in times of national crisis is not flattering. Unfortunately current mobilization decisions are based solely on personnel needs (do we need more bodies?). Perhaps another criteria should be the credibility of our RC deterrent force. The perception of many civilians, as evidenced in the Dan Quail flap, is that we in the Guard are not needed and thus it's
not an honorable way to serve. This perception could be changed by mobilizing segments of the Guard in a crisis even if their "bodies" are not immediately needed. Grenada is a case in point, an infantry brigade could have been mobilized to replace the brigade sent to Grenada. The unit would have served, like the 82nd Airborne, as part of our strategic reserve, and could then have been demobilized in several weeks. The mission would have been a real one and the mobilization training would have been excellent. Also, the interface with active components would have been beneficial as would the tactical training conducted while waiting. Finally the credibility of the Guard would have been raised in equal proportion to our visibility. Friends and foes alike would know that our RC was a creditable deterrent force.

SUMMARY

Mobilization is our Achilles heel. Throughout history mobilizations have been poorly planned and executed. The current second class status given to mobilization training is in stark contrast to the vital role that the Army National Guard assumes in our nation’s war planning and deterrence. Time is short, defense dollars are constrained, and if we do not move decisively to correct these deficiencies disaster may yet overtake us! Mobilization in the Army Guard must receive a
higher priority at the national, state, and unit levels. Mobilization, in training and in fact, must become a more common occurrence. Mobilization must be evaluated regularly and with ruthless precision, and finally, mobilization must become a highly visible subject of focus for our senior leaders. Without reforms in mobilization the current percentage of our national treasury spent on the RC will be a waste and more importantly, our national security will be in jeopardy in times of crisis.

The Reserve component's primary purpose is to provide for rapid expansion of our military forces in time of national emergency. Since fiscal 1980, the National Guard and Reserve have grown by more than 282,000 men and women, an increase of 32 percent. Today, unlike 1980, our National Guard and Reserve forces are full fledged partners in assuring a credible and affordable defense.

Frank C. Carlucci
"Preserving the Common Defense," 1988
ENDNOTES


2. Stuckey and Pistorius, p. 93.


4. Interview (Telephone) with LTC Charles Heller, ARPERCEN, St. Louis, 21 Nov. 1988.

5. Ibid.

6. Foster and McPherson, p. 54.

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