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COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE KOREAN WAR

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT F. KEMP

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24 APRIL 1989

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
As the executive agent for the United Nations, the United States in the Korean War was responsible for commanding and coordinating the efforts of 21 nations committed to repelling the North Korean and Chinese armies. Of these nations' forces, eight national battalions and one brigade were attached directly to US combat regiments and divisions, and forces of five nations formed a British-led Commonwealth Division. In addition, Korean recruits in large numbers were attached as augmentees to US and allied companies and battalions, with mixed results. As the war was being fought, US Army
advisors worked to organize and rebuild the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. Valuable detailed information is available principally in accounts, including the results of a survey of senior commanders concerning allied attachments, by an officer in the Far East Command Historical Section. Whether in future conflicts the US Army will have allied forces similarly directly attached is debatable. It is almost a certainty, however, that any future fight will see us deeply involved with allies. This paper examines the lessons of the US in the Korean War in order to see if our doctrine has accommodated the key lessons learned.
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COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE KOREAN WAR
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
by
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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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ABSTRACT

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COMBINED OPERATIONS IN THE KOREAN WAR

CHAPTER I

Introduction

The Army must be prepared for combined operations with land, air, and naval forces of allied governments. ... (Other than in NATO and Korea) agreements on doctrine, principles, and operating techniques are only partially developed or do not exist at all. In such theaters, US and allied forces will have to work out procedures for combined operations under the pressure of imminent conflict or even while operations are under way.

-Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations

In June, 1950, and for the next three years, the United States was engaged in what has certainly been the most complex warfare of a combined nature in our history. As the executive agent for the United Nations, the United States was responsible for commanding and coordinating the efforts of 21 nations committed to repelling the North Korean and Chinese armies from the Republic of Korea (ROK). The Korean War was not anticipated and neither was the extent or nature of allied involvement. As the authors of FM 100-5 have described above, the procedures for combined operations had to be worked out under the pressure of fighting the war.

How well does our current doctrine hold up in the light of history? Have the lessons of the Korean War been learned
and included? Are there lessons which have been forgotten or lost with the passage of time? The purpose of this analysis is to answer these questions.

My focus will be on the first one and one-half years of the war, which were the critical formative months of the coalition known as the United Nations Command. The intent is not to retell history, but rather to examine how the coalition was created, organized, led, fought and sustained, and to determine what succeeded or failed, and why.

Due largely to the dedicated efforts of a young major in the Far East Command History Section, we have detailed accounts of many of the parameters and experiences of these multinational efforts, focused primarily on the experiences of the eight individual national battalions and one brigade which were all attached to US combat regiments and divisions. Also well documented in other accounts is an additional force which evolved from a two-battalion brigade into the 1st Commonwealth Division, formed of units from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and an ambulance unit from India. Of considerable importance to the ground component Eighth Army operations was the experience of concurrently developing and fighting with the fledgling ROK Army. Further complicating things in the Korean War was the integration of Korean
recruits into US battalions, a program called Korean Augmentees to the US Army (KATUSA), which was later extended to the Commonwealth Division. Air and Naval operations were also multinational affairs, however their coordination was less complex than the army's and is included only incidentally.

General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff at the time of the Korean War, reflected that a member of General of the Army John J. Pershing's staff remarked after the coalition warfare of World War I, "If you have to go to war, for God's sake do it without allies." For reasons which will be discussed below, this was unavoidable in Korea, and it seems clear that consensus and coalition may be the norm in the future.

Critics might claim that never again will we fight with such a disjointed organization, with battalions of one nation attached to regiments or brigades of another. As undesirable as this might seem, in today's complex and unpredictable world, warfare may again make strange bedfellows, and it would be prudent to understand the lessons of Korea.

ENDNOTE

CHAPTER I:
Background to Coalition War

Early on 25 June 1950 the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) launched an overwhelming invasion into the Republic of Korea. President Truman immediately authorized air force units which were based in Japan to provide support as required. On 27 June, under the leadership and prompting of the United States, the United Nations condemned the invasion and on 7 July asked member nations to assist the United States in repelling the invaders. Within the first week the ROK Army had lost over 40% of its fighting strength and was facing annihilation at the hands of the North Koreans. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Japan-based US Far East Command and ultimately commander of the United Nations Command, promptly began committing elements of the four US divisions in Japan to the fighting in Korea (24th Infantry, 25th Infantry, 1st Cavalry, and 7th Infantry).

Initially support from the 53 United Nations member states who endorsed UN intervention was promised in the form of food, materials and medical supplies, however with pressure from the United States eventually 14 of these nations provided
ground combat forces, and several provided navy and air force units. Appendix 1 lists the key ground combat units which participated, along with their arrival dates in Korea and the US unit to which they were attached.

The composition of units and extent of allied participation was a direct function of the nature of the warfare. Initially the situation seemed like a hopeless rout, but with the arrival of the Japan-based divisions and the organization of the remnants of the ROK Army the line was able to be grimly held at the "Pusan Perimeter." Then, with the 15 September landing at Inchon and the headlong retreat of the NKPA, it appeared that the war would soon be over. As a result, several nations either speeded up the arrival of their combat units, pared down the size of units to be committed, or both. Finally, with the 25 November counterattack by 300,000 troops of the Chinese Army, it became apparent that the Korean War would be a hard-fought and protracted campaign. This posed new problems for the US and allies in the form of such things as rotating units as well as providing replacements, and in the thornier area of negotiating the strategic and theater objectives—an obvious consideration but one which was determined almost as an afterthought.
Coalition warfare conjures up thoughts of Eisenhower and Montgomery and the US-British push toward Germany in World War II. In Korea, by contrast, the largest participant in the United Nations Command was the ROK Army, and indeed it paid the highest price as will be seen below. It will be useful to briefly examine the condition of the ROK Army at the outbreak of the war in our study of why and how the coalition was formed in the Korean War.

At the end of World War II, South Korea was occupied by the US Army and North Korea by the Soviets. After partition of the peninsula at the 38th parallel, the US Army pulled out and from June 1949 the ROK Army was advised by a 482-man US Army Advisory Group (KMAG), under the control of the US ambassador. This fledgling army was meagerly equipped. For example, each ROK division had only one 105mm howitzer battalion compared with three 105mm and one 155mm battalion per US division. Its most significant weakness however was the "quality and integrity" of its officer corps, led by 36 year old, 5'5", 250 pound Major General Chae Byong Duk. The limited capabilities of the ROK Army had been inexplicably masked in an orchestrated publicity campaign by the KMAG chief, BG Roberts, in an effort to convince the world that the ROK Army was capable of meeting the North Korean threat.
Despite repeated border skirmishes, the ROK Army had no indication of the invasion until it occurred on that Sunday morning. The KMAG was instructed to remain with their units as long as they were effective, but they often had to take command of their formations in the retreat to Pusan. According to one author,

Had the KMAG advisors not employed such measures in the time of crisis, the US aid from Japan and the United States might well have arrived too late to have saved South Korea.7

It would be some time before the ROK Army recovered enough for senior military leaders to have confidence in its expansion. In the interim much effort was devoted to organizing training programs and schools, both in the US as well as in Korea, in order to develop the necessary cadre of leaders. Ultimately the army grew to 16 combat infantry divisions.8

If the ROK Army was in a weakened condition, the US Army of occupation in Japan also had its problems. Its divisions, four of the ten on active duty, were understrength to the point that regiments had only two of three battalions, and artillery battalions had only two of three firing batteries.9

General MacArthur estimated in mid-July that he would need a total of eight infantry divisions and one additional army headquarters to accomplish his mission in Korea.10 With
Soviet-provoked tensions in Europe the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were committed to support MacArthur but were reluctant to commit the army's general reserve or to pull allied units out of Europe to go to Korea, so the US increased pressure on the United Nations to provide combat units from other nations. As a result General MacArthur, and specifically his Eighth Army commander in Korea, Lieutenant General Walton Walker, were faced with creating a coalition army of unique complexity in the history of US combat operations.

The price for participating in this military test of the United Nations was a high one for all armies on both sides. The following data shows the strength and distribution of ground forces at the peak of the war, and the casualties which ensued after three years of fighting:

**ROK and UN Ground Forces in Korea (July 1952)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>399,045</td>
<td>265,472</td>
<td>37,083</td>
<td>701,600</td>
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<td>57%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ROK and UN Casualties in the Korean War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
<td>58,127</td>
<td>33,629</td>
<td>3,194</td>
<td>94,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded/Injured</td>
<td>175,743</td>
<td>103,284</td>
<td>11,297</td>
<td>290,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured/Missing</td>
<td>166,297</td>
<td>5,178</td>
<td>2,769</td>
<td>174,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>400,167</td>
<td>142,091</td>
<td>17,260</td>
<td>559,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6. Ibid., p. 55.

7. Sawyer, p. 140.

8. Clark, p. 221.


10. Ibid., p. 156.


13. Ibid., p. 88.
CHAPTER III
Organizing a Coalition Army

Given the "come as you are" nature of the beginnings of the Korean War, much innovation and flexibility were needed to create an army composed of multinational units in the heat of desperate combat. There were no plans on how best to do this, but the solutions which were derived bear valuable lessons for the future.

United Nations Participation

On 25 July 1950 with General Order Number 1, General MacArthur established the United Nations Command (UNC). He received his direction from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and his Far East Command staff in Tokyo became the UNC staff as well. Reporting to the UNC was the Eighth Army (EUSAK), which by July 1951 controlled three combined US corps and one ROK corps with a total strength of more than 17 divisions (See Appendix 2). Initially EUSAK was completely responsible for its own logistics, however eventually the 2d Logistical Command, subordinate to UNC, was formed. One very key organization, created in October 1950 by EUSAK was the United Nations Reception Center (UNRC), to "clothe, equip and provide
familiarization training with US army weapons and equipment to United Nations troops." The British established a similar reception center for the Commonwealth forces.

In a letter dated 15 July 1950, President Syngman Rhee gave General MacArthur command of all South Korean land, sea and air forces for the duration of hostilities. EUSAK had already co-located with the ROK Army headquarters during the hectic withdrawal toward Pusan. Command of the ROK corps and the divisions attached to the US corps was accomplished through the KMAG link at each organization long before KMAG became officially assigned to EUSAK in January 1951. Simultaneous with fighting the war, KMAG was responsible for supervising and assisting in the organization of units, training of soldiers, and coordination of logistics. Although poorly documented, the heroic efforts of KMAG officers and soldiers made a critical difference in the smooth prosecution of coalition warfare.

The selection of allied units to participate in the war involved both political and military considerations. One of the first nations to volunteer, Taiwan, was rejected because of the potential provocation of Red China. In order to avoid the loss of "face" that might result from nonselection, the process that evolved was as follows:
Contributing nations approached the Department of State with a proposal. JCS weighed the offer against MacArthur's requirements. If favorable, then contributing nations made a formal proposal. If favorable, then contributing nations made a formal proposal.4

MacArthur's requirement, in answer to the JCS, was for foreign units of no less than a reinforced battalion of about 1000 men with organic artillery, to be attached to US divisions.5 This was modified later by General Ridgway to be "regimental combat team (RCT) or brigade size units with self-supporting components [artillery and engineers]."6

Although in a bit of one-upmanship the Australians were the first to promise ground combat troops, the first United Nations soldiers to arrive in Korea on 29 August were two battalions of the British 27th Infantry Brigade from Hong Kong. Eventually the allied units comprised eight infantry battalions from as many nations (Philippines, Thailand, Netherlands, France, Greece, Belgium-Luxembourg, Ethiopia, and Colombia), one brigade (Turkey), and the 1st Commonwealth Division (Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India). On 26 September the UNC published a policy for the integration of forces into the UNC, which provided that they become attached to and receive support from parent US units.7

Significantly, with the exception of the Commonwealth units and the Belgian-Luxembourg battalion, which arrived with
British equipment and training, all the allied units as well as the ROK units were issued US weapons and equipment. Eventually as uniforms became worn out most wore US uniforms in combat, and their soldiers normally wore, with great pride, the shoulder patch of the US division to which they were attached. Further, the latter units were reorganized according to US tables of organization, which simplified understanding their capabilities.

KATUSA

In the annals of warfare armies have often employed local nationals as laborers and the same was true in the Korean War. However, in those first anxious weeks when every available man was needed to fight, a program was born which is unique in its extensiveness within the US Army. Critical vacancies in the divisions in Japan were filled before they deployed to Korea by men of the 7th Infantry Division. When it became apparent that it too would be needed General MacArthur directed that Korean recruits be assigned on a one US soldier-to-one Korean basis under a program called Koreans Attached to the US Army, or KATUSA. The culture shock was understandably overwhelming on both sides, as the Koreans were largely of rural peasant stock and were completely unfamiliar with US language, customs, food, equipment and just about everything else. The program was extended to the other divisions, and by the end of
August 1950 the strength per division was as follows: 7th Infantry-8652; 1st Cavalry-739; 24th Infantry-949; 25th Infantry-240; and 2d Infantry (recently arrived from Fort Lewis, Washington)-234.

The KATUSA program was an initial failure but a later success and by the end of the war had been extended to the Commonwealth Division, with the troops called KATCOMs, or Koreans Attached to the Commonwealth.10 The reasons for the failure were directly related to the manner in which units were committed to combat with minimal training. There were several instances, at first contact with the enemy, when some of the Koreans, who were already alienated by language and culture, panicked and ran. The effect on the units involved was demoralizing and caused animosities. As US replacements became available, many of the Koreans were transferred to newly forming ROK Army divisions. Eventually the FEC changed the KATUSA assignment ratios from 100 per company to 25.11

Some units strictly followed the "buddy system" of assignment, but that was largely abandoned in favor of Korean squads and platoons with US noncommissioned officers and platoon leaders. In an interesting twist in the coalition "kaleidoscope" of the Korean War, KATUSAs were further attached to allied battalions with both positive (French and
Dutch) and negative (Colombian) results. A survey of key commanders, conducted in 1951, yielded mixed reviews of the KATUSA program. Lieutenant General Almond of the X Corps said "should the US find itself in similar need again, individual integration into US units should be avoided." Two division commanders noted that the program was neither efficient nor effective.12 The 3d Infantry Division commander noted, however,

They are well integrated, highly valued members of the Division. With time to train them and overcome the language difficulty, the KATUSAs make good, brave, reasonably intelligent soldiers with good esprit it.13

One author somewhat cynically proposes two reasons for the resurgence of the use of KATUSAs later in the war. First, the KATUSA soldiers recognized that better performance on their part helped ensure their retention in US units with better rations and logistics than Korean units; second, with the protracted stalemate US casualties could be lessened by including KATUSAs in the front lines.14

ENDNOTES

1. Flint, p. 92.
3. Flint, p. 98.
4. Ibid., p. 99.


7. Fox, p. 2.


13. Ibid., p. 137.

CHAPTER IV
Command, Control and Communications

Once organized, the next critical tasks for combined organizations are to determine who will be in charge, who will set the strategy, and how to control the forces to accomplish that bidding. The Korean War was principally a US-Korea operation, however the addition of so many allied nations made command and control a significant challenge replete with lessons to be learned.

Political Considerations

In the case of a military coalition, the problems of political guidance are increased geometrically. It is axiomatic that any nation furnishing support to such a coalition, particularly military forces, should have a say in the conduct of its operations.

A key consideration in prosecuting any type of war is the will and support of the nation or nations supplying the fighting forces. The obvious complexity and sensitivity of these considerations in combined warfare cannot be overstated. While it would be advantageous to have consensus on the political objectives of the war, this is probably difficult to achieve at the outset and even more difficult as the warfare changes course or becomes protracted. Our focus will address how national concerns during the Korean War were represented.
principally in military operations.

In the Korean War the top political voice was that of the United Nations, however its association with the executive agent, the United States, was primarily one of receiving reports. In turn, President Truman directed all actions through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who provided instructions to MacArthur and maintained contacts, although somewhat perfunctory, with the allied nations. While there was considerable dialogue about the details of sending troop units into the conflict, not much else was discussed. As one author describes it:

Periodically the Joint Chiefs consulted with some of the countries supplying troops and materiel to determine their attitudes toward certain operational matters. In the end, however, the JCS made up their own minds.2

The critical decision to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea was not approved by any other nation providing aid or troops to South Korea. Despite this lack of consultation the coalition survived intact until the armistice, over two years later.

Command Considerations

The personality of commanders and staff officers is, together with planning for interoperability, the most important factor in the establishment of effective interoperability.3
Initially there was no time to agree on the process of selecting a combined commander or his staff, therefore the US was very fortunate to have available a Commander-in-Chief of the international stature of General Douglas MacArthur, with a staff which was already operating in control of a multinational occupation army in Japan. Although the UNC staff was not a combined staff, each participating nation was permitted a liaison section of no more than three representatives, whose activities were coordinated by a Liaison Staff Section under MacArthur's chief of staff.4

As an interesting side note on the selection of commanders for combined organizations, the Commonwealth forces faced a delicate problem, as the nations were exercising their independence of Great Britain when the Korean War began. The commander of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in Japan, an Australian Lieutenant-General, became the CINC of the Commonwealth forces, and the British provided an Air Vice-Marshal as the senior representative on MacArthur's staff. When the Commonwealth Division was formed, the British, who had the greatest number of troops, provided a uniquely qualified commander who was "almost too good to be true." As the youngest division commander in World War II he fought alongside the Canadians; he had as a young officer served in India's Northwest Frontier; and he had just completed two
years as head of the UK Services liaison staff in Australia. Obviously Major-General Cassels was readily accepted by the Commonwealth nations, although he did have serious differences with an irascible US I Corps Commander to whom he reported.

Control Considerations

A single language should be established as the basic tongue common to all participants in the operation. This language should be that of the nation providing the largest share of troops and supplies.

This conclusion from the records of the Far East Command is understandable, however interestingly enough, the language barrier did not present as serious an obstacle as one might expect. The greatest potential impact would have been with the ROK Army, however the KMAG link and mutual familiarity prevented serious confusion. Many of the allied nation officers spoke acceptable English (Dutch, Belgians, French and Ethiopians); some had US advisory teams which deployed with them (Greeks, Colombians); but the rest had to resolve the problem. Efforts were made to attach units to US commanders who had some mutual language ability. Also, KATUSAs were of great value to US unit commanders in daily operations with refugees, prisoners, and intelligence.
Written orders became very important as a supplement to oral orders in the effort to avoid confusion. Often commanders were at the mercy of junior liaison officers (LNOs) who could speak the other language passably, but were limited by either their personal tactical knowledge or by US terms and operational concepts, or both. Generally US LNOs, selected as a result of duty proficiency and not language skills, represented the exception to this problem.7

The LNO challenge was a significant one for Eighth Army units because there was no provision within their structures for additional officers or equipment to do these tasks. LNOs were routinely provided by the allied unit to its parent US headquarters and occasionally to units on its flanks. In turn, US units incurred the same obligations. For ROK Army divisions this function was normally accomplished by the already overburdened KMAG staff. The Turks were similarly aided by their attached US advisors. In May 1951 EUSAK received an augmentation to provide LNOs to allied units, usually as they processed at the UN Reception Center, according to the following formula: battalions = one field grade and one company grade officer; brigades = one colonel, three field grade and two company grade officers.8
LNOs for tactical support, such as Field Artillery battalion fire support officers (FSOs) and company forward observers, were a more extensive burden because so few allied units had organic fire support (only the Commonwealth, Filipinos and Turks brought artillery), and the UN battalions represented a fourth battalion within each regiment. The US X Corps commander, Lieutenant General Edward Almond described the criticality of this dilemma:

The problem of providing US artillery and heavy mortar FO and liaison teams was the most critical and difficult posed by the attachment of UN battalions to US regiments.9 To complicate matters Korean divisions, as described earlier, had only one howitzer battalion instead of the usual four, and had to be supported not only with cannon units, but also with FSOs and FOs. Even after an overstrength became authorized, artillery officers were constantly on the road from unit to unit.

Another control problem with some of the UN units was a large (the Thai battalion had 300 additional men) and often rank-heavy overhead.10 While their intentions were good, as these personnel were brought to provide coordination, support and to be a ready source of replacements, the added layers only increased control problems for parent US commanders. The
French had a headquarters between their battalion and the US regiment, and the Turks had a Brigadier and staff sandwiched between their regiment and the 25th Infantry Division headquarters. As a consequence, for major operations the 25th's assistant division commander normally personally supervised coordination of the Turkish brigade's missions. Eventually all the overhead in EUSAK was either eliminated or moved to UNC headquarters.

Allied units were often specifically created for the Korean mission, and arrived in varying states of readiness. Normally this was corrected by tailoring the scope and length of training at UNRC. The Greek battalion, however, posed a unique problem when it arrived with no battalion staff. Its parent US regiment incurred the added burden of helping to select and train Greek officers into an effective staff.11

A control consideration of particular sensitivity to allies was that of access to the CINC and appeal to the unit's home government. The UNC policy was as follows:

The senior military representative in the theater for each nation would have direct access to the CINC for matters of major policy. In addition, he had the prerogative of direct communication with his own government on administrative matters affecting his own forces.12

Along these same lines, the respective commanding officers of
the allied units exercised discipline, law and order. One
delight is that ROK Army military police had no jurisdiction
over UNC troops because of potential deception by North Korean
infiltrators.13

**Communications Considerations**

The requirement to provide communications links to allied
units created the same dilemmas as that to provide operational
and artillery liaison. Not only did radios and switchboards
have to be provided, but also operators, codes, and at least
one US signal officer. Equipment was usually provided because
of the absence of adequate gear, and in some cases because of
equipment incompatibility with that of the US.14 Each ROK
Army division KMAG received a signal detachment consisting of,

One officer, a terminal with operators, 2 radios
with operators, a wire team, a switchboard with
operators, and a 5 man message center team.15

When one multiplies these requirements by the three corps and
sixteen divisions eventually in the ROK Army the impact be-
comes significant.

**ENDNOTES**

1. Frederick C. Bohannon, *Some Military Problems of Collective
   Enforcement Action*, p. 34.

2. Flint, p. 100.

3. LTC John Hixson and Benjamin F. Cooling, *Combined Opera-
   tions in Peace and War*, p. 352.

5. Greys, p. 105.

6. Far East Command, p. 65

7. Fox, p. 85.

8. Ibid., pp. 96-97.

9 Fox-Annex, p. 78.

10 Fox, p. 16.

11. Ibid., p. 70.


13. Fox, p. 119.


15. Ibid., p. 49.
CHAPTER V
Intelligence and Security

For operational and tactical purposes, it is essential that arrangements be made for the rapid dissemination of military intelligence and for the use of available intelligence assets by all partners in the operation. -FM 100-5, Operations

Information about intelligence operations in the Korean War is limited, however some useful insights into intelligence and security considerations in coalition warfare are available. One aspect of security operations, the processing of prisoners of war, is also discussed.

Nations' concerns with protecting intelligence seem to have two primary aims: first, concealment of knowledge and intentions from the enemy; and second, protection of sources from compromise. In combined warfare there must develop early on a founded sense of "trust" that the allied partners share these same concerns. Failure to pass critical information can compromise the partner's ability to accomplish his missions, and worse, can foster a retaliatory withholding of information from his sources which may be critical to US operations.

Initially in Korea there were two standards for sharing
information with the allies.

For the UN units, DA policy permitted release of all classified information, including top secret, ... as necessary to carry out assigned tasks. All units were aware of security regulations and were extremely security conscious.1

For the ROK forces, however, there was initially a perceived lack of security consciousness, so classified information was provided in one of three ways: it was sometimes delayed until its compromise would have little or no impact; it was sanitized and released; or it was given to the KMAG advisors, to hold until needed. Eventually, ROK security procedures improved and they were granted access as well.2

Intelligence from prisoners of war (PW) was not always forthcoming, for reasons of language or organizational differences, so US interrogation teams were attached both to the Commonwealth division and to each ROK Army division in X Corps.3 There was great concern for the possible mistreatment of prisoners of war, especially by the ROK Army, so the US retained responsibility both for processing PWs after their initial interrogation by the capturing unit and for operating all PW camps, although ROK troops and KATUSAs were used as guards.4 At one point UN units rotated through temporary guard duty tours at the major camp on Koje-do island. This produced an outcry in political channels because UN troops had been sent to fight, not to perform housekeeping details.
ENDNOTES

1. Fox, p. 83.
2. Ibid., p. 84.
3. Ibid., p. 71.
4. Ibid., p. 120.
According to FM 100-5 logistics is normally a national responsibility. While that may be preferable, the realities of modern warfare will probably require the rapid commitment of units over great distances across the globe. The logistical "tail" will no doubt receive second deployment priority to combat units and, for smaller countries not already in the area of operations, may take a long time to establish. In these cases the US will undoubtedly assume at least the initial burden of transporting allied supplies, if not of actually providing them.

Some of the most interesting anecdotes about combined operations during the Korean War derive from the associated logistical problems. However to the great credit of the Far East Command (UN Command) and the Eighth Army, aside from the expected initial difficulties in setting up the support system, logistics never became a "war stopper" for either the US or its allies.
Following as it did on the heels of World War II and in the new nuclear age when conventional wars were believed to be obsolete, the Korean War found many nations ill-prepared militarily, with armies largely disbanded and often poorly equipped. This was also true to some extent of the US divisions in Japan. These facts affected not only the size of units contributed by allied nations, but also their ability to equip and sustain those forces. As a result, with few exceptions the US provided all weapons, equipment and logistical support.

In exchange for support the allied governments agreed to pay the US for the cost of supporting their units. Today's military logisticians would cringe at the requirement US units faced,

to submit weekly and monthly reports on equipment, ammunition and supplies furnished to the UN units, plus an estimate of the handling charges.¹

Repayment was more simply agreed to than accomplished, as one author notes:

The reimbursement of the Americans by the Commonwealth after the Korean War was the subject of negotiations which dragged on into the early 1960's, and ... suggests that allies should not merely plan ahead to ensure effective cooperation in wartime, but should also plan for the amicable resolution of problems which arise ... after the hostilities have ended.²

Not surprisingly, the ROK Army was completely equipped with US
arms and equipment as well, and was sustained by the Eighth Army for virtually everything.

Of significance in the logistics of the Korean War was the Commonwealth's independence of the US logistics system, except for some rations initially, fuel, and other common supplies. One point of confusion was that the British conducted logistics and transportation functions through two separate staff sections, instead of within one section on the US staffs.

**Weapons and Equipment**

The US supplied weapons and equipment to all allies except the Commonwealth units and the Belgian battalion, until the latter was reorganized, equipped and attached to the US 3d Infantry Division. One of the greatest recurring problems was the need to establish a training program for vehicle drivers, most of whom had never driven before. This was generally accomplished at the UNRC for other than ROK soldiers. A minor problem occurred when the Ethiopians placed their rifles into fires in order to remove the preservative. One allied hospital unit which received a US field hospital set never erected the entire complex in training, and regretted that later when they attempted to do so while deployed and under the pressure of combat.
Most allied units wore their native uniforms at first, but as the uniforms wore out many switched to the US fatigues. A problem occurred with boots for the Thai soldiers, most of whom had EEEE-width feet and had to be individually measured for specially-made shoes. A very productive idea was the dispatch of a Quartermaster Clothing Team from UNC headquarters to train units in the proper wear of apparel, especially cold-weather clothing.

Rations

Most units ate the US field and combat rations, and here also some training was given at UNRC. There were some peculiarities about traditional menu items, however all accounts show that the problems were minor. Examples of considerations included: no pork for Turks; extra bread for the Europeans; extra rice for the Thais and Filipinos; no beef for the Indians; olive oil and wine for the Greeks; and a special combat ration made in Japan (!), for the ROKs. Most of the nations supplied their own special items. It bears noting that the 7th Cavalry Regiment, to whom the Greeks were attached, provided a person to the Greek kitchens to help with understanding the US menus.
Medical

The greatest problem with medical support was communicating at the evacuation and treatment facilities, which included Norwegian, Swedish, Indian, Danish and Italian organizations. Although many of these staffs spoke English, there remained the problem of understanding the Thais, Ethiopians, Greeks, Turks, Colombians, and others. The problem was eventually resolved when the nations involved provided nurses to these hospitals. It is interesting that language was generally a far greater problem with non-battle casualties than with battle cases. ROK forces had their own medical evacuation system. A minor inconvenience was that recovered KATUSAs were returned for duty to the Korean Army and not to their US units.

ENDNOTES

1. Hermes, p. 70.
3. Fox, p. 150.
4. Ibid., pp. 154-158.
5. Ibid., p. 142.
CHAPTER VII

Conducting Combined Operations

The commander of a combined force must plan and conduct his operations in ways that exploit complementary strengths and minimize problems of coordination. Habitual relationships between units should be established. --FM 100-5, Operations

During the Korean War allied units were combined for operations in three different ways. The ROK Army assigned two corps to Eighth Army and from one to three divisions to each of the US corps. ROK units were heavily dependent upon the US for artillery and armor support. The eight national battalions and one brigade (Turks) were attached directly to US regiments and divisions, and depended upon their parent unit for almost everything, although the Filipinos and Turks did have their own artillery. The Commonwealth Division, when it was formed, was a self-contained entity, with its own fire support and combat service support. Its principal reliance on the US was for transportation and close air support. Each type of combined operation will be discussed in order to derive lessons learned.
Tactical Operations Considerations

The ROK I and II Corps were responsible for the rugged central region and the eastern coastline of the Korean peninsula. Because these units were primarily foot mobile and did not have the weapons and artillery support that US divisions had, they were believed better suited to face an enemy constrained by terrain from having an advantage in those same categories. In addition, US commanders were wary of placing ROK units against the enemy's major forces in the West because of the ROK Army rout in the summer of 1950. The more the ROKs fought, the better they became, and in fact they were the first to cross the 38th parallel and to reach the Yalu River on the drive north. The incorporation of ROK divisions into the US structure simplified command, control and logistics, and enabled supervision of their development and progress by US commanders.

The first Commonwealth unit, the 27th British Infantry from Hong Kong, was initially attached to the 24th Infantry Division and was committed during the desperate Pusan perimeter defense. Bitter feelings resulted from that experience which made the British wary of depending on US support. In one instance a US artillery unit was assigned to support the 27th, because the New Zealand and Canadian artillery had not yet arrived, and was then suddenly withdrawn to
another mission a few hours before a North Korean attack. On another occasion two companies suffered heavy casualties to a misplaced Air Force napalm strike. One major complaint concerned an initial tendency for the Commonwealth to be given the mission of covering the retreating US divisions in their withdrawal from North Korea. Eventually it became Eighth Army policy that US divisions, not allies, would be the last out under withdrawal.

When the 1st Commonwealth Division was created in July 1951, it was attached to the US I Corps on the west flank. Because it had its own armor it was an excellent force for the relatively open terrain. Some British procedures which concerned the US were their favoring of holding ridge lines rather than the bases of hills for grazing fire; the sparse use of outposts; and a different minefield system. On one occasion the British had to keep their artillery in place when they were relieved by the US 3d Infantry Division, because the ammunition was incompatible and US ammunition had to be brought forward.

The most varied operations occurred with the national units attached below US division level. Although habitual association was a goal, some of these units were detached and reattached to other regiments and divisions with great
frequency, which serves to credit their flexibility in combined warfare. In every case the conduct of operations was tailored to fit the personalities, capabilities and mutual understanding of the units involved.

A survey of US commanders in 1951 explored what considerations were made in the employment of allied units. For some of the battalions no special consideration was made, because of their great effectiveness (Belgians, Dutch). Other responses provide a "flavor" for coalition warfare: the Thais were timid and not assigned difficult missions; the Greeks operated in the hills, where they excelled; the Filipinos dug in only when ordered and took "siestas"; the Turkish G3 was a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College; several of the Turkish artillery officers had been trained at the US artillery school at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; the Ethiopians were initially terrified of the cold, based on stories of the first winter fighting, but adapted well once they got into it; the French were opposed to night attacks, and employed artillery by allocating one tube per target; the Colombians were always late; and English-speaking allied officers often had to accompany their patrols if fire support were needed.4

A common concern with the battalion and brigade forces was the high impact of casualties on their combat effective-
ness, because their replacement streams were much slower than for the US or ROK units. Because the war was originally anticipated to be of short duration, some countries had provided for no replacements. Often the replacement problem was the main reason allied units were occasionally assigned secondary missions. The UN nations were therefore asked to maintain a 20 per cent overstrength, which eased the problem, but often with adverse political repercussions at home.

The Far East Air Forces, which consisted of elements from six nations (Australia, Canada, South Africa, Thailand, Greece and the US), provided tactical air control parties and close air support (CAS) to all nations as needed, so no serious interoperability problems occurred.

A key consideration, foreign to us, is the concern several other peoples have with "saving face." A regimental commander who worked with the Colombians wished for a "mechanism ... to prevent loss of face," and General Mark Clark noted that occasionally ROK commanders were reluctant to call for close air support because of the appearance of having to ask for help.

**Morale and Welfare Considerations.**

While morale and welfare issues never won a war, they are
important concerns, especially if, as in Korea, the conflict becomes protracted while armistice arrangements are conducted. The history of the Korean War offers a few good lessons to remember.

The greatest of morale factors is the soldier's perception that he has a fair chance of survival on the battlefield.

In a comment from the former commander of the 31st Infantry Regiment, to which the Colombian battalion was attached,

The practice of equipping the Colombians identically, in addition to the logistical advantage, also had a favorable impact on morale. Had they been required to fight with weapons which were inferior to those of US soldiers, it would have been disheartening.

The United Nations Command established a rest and recuperation (R&R) program in Japan for UN troops, not including ROK forces. Again, an important issue, especially in combined battalions was fairness in distributing spaces. Also, in order to offset the great disparity between the pay of US soldiers and the much poorer allies, all soldiers on R&R were provided billeting, meals, and civilian clothes. Interestingly, the Turks had little interest in visiting Japan.

A study during the war recommended that the Inspector General of the principal headquarters provide his services to the attached allied units in order to anticipate and head off
potential coalition problems. Another recommendation concerned clarifying the authority to receive and present awards. British units required their government's approval to receive foreign awards, and US commanders had to obtain authority to present awards to allies when the same was not required for US soldiers.8

Eighth Army gave equal access to the post exchange and special services, although some US shows held little appeal for many of the allied soldiers who could not understand English. In an excellent example of consideration for allies, the 3d Infantry Division used allied soldiers to help publish French, Flemish, Korean and Greek editions of its daily troop information newspaper.9

ENDNOTES

1. Grey, p. 73.
2. Fox, p. 71.
4. Fox, pp. 52-74.
5. Far East Command, p. 15.
CHAPTER VIII

What About Next Time?

Fighting in coalition makes the conduct of war infinitely more complex for the nations concerned, but fighting without allies is a luxury few can afford.¹

What, then, are the lessons for combined warfare which derive from our unique experience in Korea? Many are listed or implied in the previous chapters. Several are included in the works of Major Fox and others of the Far East Command's Military History section and in other contemporary accounts. Perhaps as pertinent, how well does our doctrine in Field Manual 100-5 (hereafter referred to as US doctrine) capture these lessons? The highlights will be described here.

Organizing a Combined Army

Doctrine stresses the importance of political cohesion in permitting and preserving military effectiveness. As one author notes,

From the military point of view, it is essential that (the synthesis of allied views) not take place at or below the level of supreme military command, except for perhaps minor details of administration.²

Korea must be considered a success because of the continued support of US allies for the duration of the war. Dissension
was subordinated to the common objective, but not without some resentment. It is unlikely that we will again see major forces so dependently subordinated to a single US commander and staff. As inefficient as it seems, in future the US will have to be a senior partner rather than in sole charge of a coalition.

It should be evident that the ideal size of allied forces should be either separate brigade or division, with its own combat support and service support elements. But these are not necessarily the most important considerations, as the Far East Command recommended,

UN members should provide units as large as can possibly be supported within their economic and political limitations. However, size should not preclude representation. The psychological advantages of having units from as many nations as possible is overriding.

In addition, the positive lessons of combining units with similar equipment, tactics, language and culture seem apparent.

The attachment of small units to larger ones was successful, however maintaining identical equipment and tactics is critical in these cases. The 7th Cavalry Regiment captured succinctly some outstanding guidelines in a standard operating procedure (SOP) for operating with allies (see Appendix 3).
The KATUSA experiment had many initial flaws which seem likely to recur should such an effort be undertaken again. It does seem critically important however to attach to each allied unit, down to company level, a small number of host nation troops to help with language, culture, prisoner interrogation, etc.

Command, Control and Communications

Doctrine recognizes the importance of unity of command and especially of personality and sensitivity considerations in combined operations, and it further encourages multinational staffing. In this regard the Korean War example is no help, because the UNC staff was all US and principally Army. Also, doctrine underscores the essential function of liaison officers who are familiar with the operations of the allied forces.

The Far East Command (FEC) policy of permitting the senior allied military representative access to the CINC and the prerogative of communication with his own government seems both wise and essential. In its recommendations, the FEC also stressed minimizing the added "layers" of supervision which forces tend to bring with them, and limiting parties of visitors and observers both in number and in duration of visits. The latter is probably a great concern in limited war and less so in a larger conflict.
FEC perhaps immodestly recommended that a single language, that of the nation providing the largest share of everything, be established, and echoed the importance of written orders and instructions in order to avoid misunderstanding and ambiguity.

The Korean experience with liaison and signal teams to allied units seems to have been a great success which should serve as a model for future conflicts. It is therefore important now to ensure the necessary equipment and personnel are identified, first so they can train for their duties, and second, to avoid stripping US units in order to provide the necessary elements.

Intelligence and Security

Doctrine recommends a combined theater intelligence staff in addition to the rapid dissemination of information among military allies. The Korean War experience, while not well documented, suggests positive results from policies of shared intelligence without restrictions. The perception of trust seems to be the key objective, without which "combined intelligence" may not occur.

The consolidation of prisoners of war (PW) seems to have achieved marginal success. There were significant problems in
securing the main PW camp. Guard forces were provided not only by the US, but by allies, KATUSAs and ROKs as well. While consolidation during processing and interrogation is valid, after that each nation should share the burden of caring for PWs. A joint civilian commission can monitor their treatment.

Logistics

Korea represents the two extremes in logistical support: units 100% dependent on US support; and the Commonwealth with a largely self-sufficient logistical system. Both operations were successful. Although the allied nation units represented only a small force to support, the 2d Logistical Command and EUSAK were deeply involved in supporting the ROK Army as well. Success was achieved through an effective combined coordination effort.

The doctrinal goal for logistics to be a national responsibility seems to be both worthwhile and simplistic. Future conflicts may join us with allies who have different equipment and limited resources, or more likely, with some equipment the same as ours. The possibilities are endless, but it is conceivable that we may provide major items of equipment as others experience losses, and we probably will provide ammunition, fuel and other resources. In addition, if deployment of
other nations is required, we will no doubt become involved in providing transportation assets both to the theater and in theater.

What this means is that US logisticians must plan now for how they will accomplish these tasks. The FEC recommended keeping data on diet and menus of allies in order to be able to anticipate requirements in a combined conflict. That is an example of how logisticians can get ready for the next war. Further, combined logistical exercises which emphasize the "worst case" in multi-national logistics are essential.

As a final thought remember the medical lessons of Korea. The system was complex, but very effective.

Operations

The best preparation for military operations is training; therefore the best preparation for combined military operations is combined training.

The Far East Command strongly recommended interoperability training through the exchange of students at military institutions and through combined field exercises. It also recommended the translation of principal US technical and field manuals into foreign languages.
US doctrine stresses the criticality of interoperability to combined warfare, and is implemented by efforts at commonality of weapons, ammunition, equipment, tactics and procedures (standard agreements - STANAGs). The experiences of the Korean War second these efforts, as Major Fox noted.

A significant lesson to be drawn ... is that, in order to function together, the armies of the UN likely to take active part in future international military campaigns should get to know each other intimately.  

If we become committed to conflict, one valuable lesson to remember is the United Nations Reception Center. That station was used for everything from a brief familiarization with items of US equipment, to major unit training. Liaison officers joined units at UNRC before the pressures of combat were felt. Equally important was UNRC's role as a coordinating point for EUSA for logistics, signal and other areas before a unit's arrival.

Finally, once combat operations are underway, leaders should remember the lessons of Korea: match unit strengths to the terrain; ensure procedures, missions and responsibilities are clearly understood; ensure the burdens of fighting and casualties are shared proportionately; and strive for rapid victory in order to avoid the frictions of a protracted conflict. 10
ENDNOTES

2. Bohannon, p 35.
5. Far East Command, p. 28.
7. Ibid., p. 20.
9. Fox, p. 188.
CHAPTER IX

Conclusion

US doctrine in Field Manual 100-5 captures the essence of combined warfare, but doctrine can seem like so many words without the poignant lessons of history to bring it to life. Between the doctrinal lines are many assumptions which may not materialize in the jungles of Central America or the blazing heat of Southwest Asia.

Combined operations in the Korean War were complex, unique, and successful. But how is success measured? One way is to look at the outcome. Another is to ask our allies.

In April 1951 the British 1st Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment was cut off by Chinese forces and fought valiantly for days while the US 3d Infantry Division tried unsuccessfully to break through. One tank company got close enough to rescue about 40 men who had exfiltrated; the remaining 622 Glosters were lost.

Each year, for the decade following the Korean conflict, on St. George's Day units of the British and Australian armies have sent telegrams of thanks and appreciation to certain units of the United States Army.
Each of the units so honored helped the British in a sticky place.

Each year, a telegram comes to one American tank battalion that gained great tradition and prestige in the bloody hills... Because of them, certain men now living in England and elsewhere are still alive. 1

ENDNOTE

APPENDIX I

Major Events and Allied Unit Arrival Times

25 Jun 50 North Korea Invades
5 July Task Force Smith makes contact
1 Aug Pusan Perimeter established
20 Aug 27th Inf Bde (British) [atch - 24th Inf Div]
15 Sep Inchon landing; breakout of Pusan
19 Sep 20th Bn Cbt Tm (Philippines) [atch - 1st Cav Div]
28 Sep 3d Bn Royal Australian Regt [atch - 27th Commonwealth Bde]
30 Sep ROK 3d Div crosses 38th parallel
17 Oct 1st Turkish Armed Forces Cmd [atch - 25th Inf Div]
3 Nov 29th Inf Bde (British)
7 Nov 21st Inf Regt/Bn (Thailand) [atch - 1st Cav Div]
24 Nov 7th Inf Div reaches Yalu River
Netherlands Det, UN [atch - 2d Inf Div-38th Inf]
25 Nov Chinese major offensive launched
29 Nov French Infantry Bn [atch - 2d Inf Div-23d Inf]
9 Dec Greek Expeditionary Force (brigade) [atch - 1st Cav Div-7th Cav]
13 Dec 2d Bn PPCLI (Canada) [atch - 27th Commonwealth Bde]
24 Dec  
**Evacuation of Hungnam completed**

26 Dec  
**LTG Ridgway assumes command of 8th Army**

31 Dec  
**New Zealand Field Arty Bn**
  (atch - 27th Commonwealth Bde)

4 Jan 51  
**Seoul evacuated for 2d time**

31 Jan  
**Belgian Inf Bn**
  (atch - 27th Commonwealth Bde)
  [July atch - 3d Inf Div]

21 Feb  
**Operation Killer: UN Counteroffensive**

15 Mar  
**Seoul retaken**

11 Apr  
**GEN Douglas MacArthur relieved**

25 Apr  
**28th Inf Bde (British) - relieves 27th Bde**

5 May  
**25th Canadian Inf Bde Gp**

6 May  
**Ethiopian Inf Bn**
  (atch - 7th Inf Div-32d Inf)

31 May  
**1st Bn Shropshires (British)**
  (atch - 28th Cmwlth Bde)

15 Jun  
**Colombian I..f Bn**
  (atch - 24th Inf Div-21st Inf)

23 July  
**1st Commonwealth Division formed**
APPENDIX 2

United Nations Command Organization - Ground Forces

U.N. Command/Far East Command, Major Ground Forces, 1 July 1951

CINCUNC and CINCPE
[General Matthew B. Ridgway]

in Korea

eight Army
[Gen. James A. Van Fleet]

in Japan

XVI U.S. Corps
U.S. 40th Infantry Division
[Gen. Daniel M. Matterson]
U.S. 45th Infantry Division
[Gen. James C. Sykes]

IX U.S. Corps
[Gen. William M. Urry]
U.S. 24th Infantry Division
[Gen. Frederick M. Bryan]
U.S. 7th Infantry Division
[Gen. Charles M. Farnsworth]

X U.S. Corps
[Gen. Edward M. Almond]
U.S. 7th Infantry Division
[Gen. George C. Thomas]
ROK 1st Marine Regiment
ROK 5th Division
ROK 16th Regiment
U.S. 2d Infantry Division
[Gen. Clark L. Ruffner]
Peacun Battalion
Netherlands Battalion
ROK 8th Division

Source: Finley, p. 84.
APPENDIX 3

SOP for Coalition Team Play

The 7th Cavalry Regiment developed this standard operating procedure (SOP) for dealing with an attached allied unit as a result of their association with the attached Greek Expeditionary Force battalion from December 1950 to May 1951:

- Whenever possible, make the attachment on a semi-permanent basis so that the smaller unit will feel itself a part of the larger one rather than a stepchild.

- Send liaison and orientation team at once to the new unit to demonstrate American vehicles, communications, weapons, etc.

- Provide the same type supporting weapons to the allied unit to give it equivalent fire power.

- Treat them as equals at all times in assigning missions as well as in giving support.

- Encourage and participate in observations of national customs and celebrations and assist in the preparation when requested.

- Assist in procuring special food items peculiar to their normal diet (for the Greeks it was raisins, figs, special Greek flour, extra macaroni, etc.).

- While emphasizing the high quality of your own unit, make it clear that the attachment is expected to be just as good.

- Spare criticism unless the case is absolutely clear; on the first occasion when the proof is adequate, lay it on.

- Encourage staff visits. Be quick with praise of any success, both to the commander and to the troops.

- Provide the attachment with two American officers who speak their language, one for their operations and one for their administration and supply; provide enlisted Americans who speak the language to assist the attachment in the kitchens and motor pool and on communications; maintain at least one bilingual American officer in the Regimental operations section.
o Conduct an information program within the Regiment to build up the attachment among American troops; this is needed particularly prior to the time when they first engage.

o Decorate their outstanding combat soldiers according to the same standard that applies elsewhere in the regiment.

ENDNOTE


Boiannon, Frederick C. *Some Military Problems of Collective Enforcement Action.* New York: Columbia University, Faculty of Political Science, 1953.


