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MANAGING, MOBILIZING AND TRAINING THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARTHUR L. BORTZ

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Upon mobilization soldiers of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) have the critical role to act as fillers for vacancies in the active force, mobilized ready reserve, and as casualty replacements. The IRR today, however, is not managed, mobilized, or trained to accomplish these mobilization missions as rapidly as required. This study examines various aspects of IRR management, mobilization, and training with the goal of identifying cost effective, yet efficient means to provide qualified IRR personnel as soon after mobilization...
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MANAGING, MOBILIZING AND
TRAINING THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
15 March 1989
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ABSTRACT

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Upon mobilization soldiers of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) have the critical role to act as fillers for vacancies in the active force, mobilized ready reserve, and as casualty replacements. The IRR, today however, is not managed, mobilized or trained to accomplish these mobilization missions as rapidly as required. This study examines various aspects of IRR management, mobilization, and training with the goal of identifying cost effective, yet efficient means to provide qualified IRR personnel as soon after mobilization as possible. The study concludes that ARPERCEN's automated data processing system must be upgraded to adequately manage the IRR, to include assigning IRR assets to meet the critical casualty replacement mission. However, assignment of IRRs must not occur until after MOSQ verification. MOSQ testing during IRR annual screening is the recommended solution, but if this is not possible IRRs must report for evaluation/training at a training installation before further assignment. Further, the 25% of the IRRs who will be reclassified into critical run-out MOSs must be identified prior to mobilization so that they may be trained prior to mobilization or enter training immediately upon mobilization. It is also recommended that mobilization ARPRINTs be modified to reflect the refresher/reclassification training of the IRR and that TRADOC program assets to accomplish this high priority training requirement.
MANAGING, MOBILIZING AND
TRAINING THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

Soldiers obtained from a post mobilization induction would not be available for service until they complete the statutory twelve (12) weeks of training. Therefore, upon mobilization soldiers of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) have the critical role to act as fillers for vacancies in the active force, mobilized ready reserve, and as casualty replacements. The IRR today is not managed, mobilized, or trained to accomplish these mobilization missions.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine various aspects of IRR management, mobilization, and training. The goal is to identify cost effective, yet efficient means to provide qualified IRR personnel as soon after mobilization as possible.

Methodology

Questions concerning the management, mobilization, and training of IRRs are being addressed by almost every staff agency in the Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Forces Command (FORSCOM). Since these issues involve reservists, the Chief of the Army Reserve and the Commander of the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) are also concerned. In researching this study interviews were
conducted, in person and telephonically, with key mobilization and training personnel in each of these various agencies. Materials provided as a result of these interviews have been assessed and incorporated in this study.

Conclusions

1. ARPERCEN's Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS) does not interface with the U.S. Army Personnel Commands (PERSCOM) Mobilization Manpower Planning System (MOBMAN) so that casualty replacement requirements are considered.

2. ARPERCEN's data base does not include accurate information on the MOSQ of IRR. Yet soldiers are mobilized and earmarked to fill vacancies for which they may not be qualified.

3. Up to 25% of the IRR will need to be reclassified to meet critical casualty replacement requirements, but mechanisms for identifying these soldiers and programming them for training do not exist.

4. TRADOC is aware of the IRR training requirements, but assets have not been programmed to accomplish this mission.

Recommendations

1. ARPERCEN's automated data processing system must be upgraded to adequately manage the IRR. This includes assigning IRR assets to meet the critical casualty replacement mission.

2. Assignment of IRRs must not occur until after MOSQ verification. Annual MOSQ testing during IRR annual screening is a possible solution. If this is not possible IRRs must report for evaluation/training at a training installation before further assignment.
3. Those IRRs who will be reclassified must be identified now so that they may be trained prior to mobilization or, at least, enter training immediately upon mobilization.

4. Mobilization ARPRINTs must be modified to reflect the refresher/reclassification training of the IRR. TRADOC must program assets to accomplish this high priority training requirement.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Since 1973, when the Total Army concept came into being, the Army's Reserve Components, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, have been afforded a heightened priority as an integral part of the Army's war-fighting capability. Troop program units (TPUs) within the Guard and Reserve are assigned critical combat, combat support, and combat service support roles. In addition to the reservists who are members of TPUs, there are several hundred thousand reservists in other programs; primarily the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), but also the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program, Inactive National Guard (ING), and Standby Reserve. The IRR soldiers, the principal subjects of this study, have the critical role to act as fillers and casualty replacements.

Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) of each war-fighting theater submit, on a regular basis, a "shelf" requirement for personnel needed to bring units up to war fighting strength. Also, before being deployed, active and reserve component units stationed within the U.S. are to be brought up to required strength. IRR soldiers are the primary manpower pool which will fill these vacancies.

Once conflict begins, theater casualties must be replaced to keep units combat effective. For at least the first 120 days IRR soldiers and soldiers already in the training base will be the only sources of casualty replacements. Soldiers obtained from a post mobilization induction would
not be available for service until they complete the statutory twelve weeks of training.

**PURPOSE**

There are a number of issues which impact upon whether the IRR will be able to fulfill the missions of acting as fillers and casualty replacements. Are there enough IRRs to fill the need? How rapidly can the IRR be mobilized? Are the IRR's skills current or will they require refresher training? Are there enough IRRs with the correct MOSs or will reclassification training be needed? If refresher training or reclassification training is required, who will conduct this training and how rapidly can it be accomplished?

The purpose of this study is examine various aspects of IRR management, mobilization, and training. The goals are to identify cost effective, yet efficient, means to provide qualified IRR personnel as soon after mobilization as possible.

**METHODOLOGY**

Questions concerning the management, mobilization and training of IRRs are being addressed by almost every staff agency in the Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Forces Command (FORSCOM). Since these issues involve reservists, the Chief of the Army Reserve and the Commander of the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) are also concerned. This study includes interviews which were
conducted, in person and telephonically, with key mobilization and training personnel in each of these various agencies. Information and materials obtained as a result of these interviews have been studied and incorporated in the findings.

ASSUMPTIONS

The rationale behind this study and the ultimate findings are based upon several key assumptions. First, manpower requirements can be generated by the Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) which are based upon the Defense Guidance, Illustrative Planning Scenario. NOTE: Both the DCSPER and TRADOC are skeptical of current requirements.

Second, there will not be sufficient time between Mobilization Day (M-day) and Deployment Day (D-day) to accomplish induction of civilians through a Selective Service draft and the subsequent training of these individual soldiers for the statutory twelve weeks.

Third, it is assumed IRR soldiers will report at or in excess of the current 70% planning figure and within two or three days of their reporting date.

Finally, it is assumed the Army will continue to experience significantly constrained resources for the indefinite future. This will preclude any large scale enlistment bonus programs or special recruiting efforts regarding the IRR.
END NOTES

1. Interview with Dr. H. R. Ludden, PERSCOM Mobilization Division, Alexandria, 8 December 1988.
CHAPTER II

UNDERSTANDING THE IRR

In order to appreciate the problems associated with managing, mobilizing, and training the IRR it is necessary to understand the nature of the IRR. Approximately 90% of the force, consists of soldiers who enlisted in the active army, completed their initial enlistment, and are serving the remainder of their military service obligation in the IRR. These individuals, who have approximately three years of active duty service, are mostly enlisted, grades E-4 and below, and officers, grades O-3 or below. The other 10% are career reservists.¹

In 1983, enlistment contracts were changed to lengthen the period of Military Service Obligation (MSO) from six to eight years. This change was instituted to increase the number of trained soldiers available in the IRR. As a result, the strength of the IRR will increase from 295,000 in 1989 to 489,000 in 1993.² Other programs were attempted in the early 1980s to increase IRR strength. One such program offered bonuses for direct enlistment in the IRR. The direct enlistment program was not successful, but another program which offered bonuses to encourage current IRR members to extend their enlistments has helped to retain a few thousand soldiers.³

Within the IRR there are different levels of readiness depending upon how long the soldier has been away from active service. Those soldiers who have entered the IRR from active duty or RC TPUs within the the last twelve
months are considered recently trained (RT-12) and fully qualified for deployment. Other soldiers who have been trained during the twelve months just prior to mobilization, are considered sustainment trained (ST-12). Upon mobilization, RT-12s and ST-12s will be ordered to report directly to CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs) to be processed for overseas deployment. These groups of recently trained individuals will be used to fill the theater CINC's shelf requisitions and, hopefully, constitute a few days worth of casualty replacements. The FY 89 projections for recently trained soldiers (RT-12 and ST-12) is 112.3 thousand. Currently, these groups of "ready deployers" represent nearly one third of the IRR, but as the eight year MSO begins to have its effect, the proportion will drop to approximately one fifth.

Another category of IRR is a relatively small group of approximately 14 thousand soldiers who are described as untrained. These soldiers were transferred from active duty to the IRR because they could not complete Initial Entry Training (IET), but were deemed worthy of retention. This group would obviously require at least Advanced Individual Training (AIT) before they could be deployed.

The remaining IRR soldiers have been away from military duty for more than one year. Eventually, as the longer MSO takes effect, soldiers in this category could be away from service for up to five years. These individuals will require refresher training, perhaps even retraining, and be required to complete an AIT program before deployment.
In addition, extensive reclassification training will be required in order for the IRR to accomplish the war-time missions as fillers and casualty replacements. The MOS structure of the IRR mirrors that of the active duty force. This is not surprising, because the vast majority of IRR soldiers have simply passed through the active force into the IRR. Upon mobilization, the filler requirements will basically mirror the active force, but the casualty replacement requirements are much greater in the combat MOSs. Therefore, there will be a MOS mismatch between the existing IRR force and the force required equaling approximately 25%. This 25%, along with those soldiers who hold MOSs which have been eliminated, are the logical candidates for early identification and programming for reclassification training to combat MOSs. The problem is to identify and train these individuals rapidly enough to make a difference.

Finally, peacetime training of the IRR is for the most part voluntary. Some of the obligated IRR soldiers do volunteer for training, but not enough to make a difference for mobilization. Most IRR training funds are expended on training officers and senior enlisted soldiers who are in the IRR system between RC TPU assignments or who hope to earn enough retirement points to qualify for reserve retirement by attending schools or doing short tours.

The Secretary of Defense has the power to order obligated members of the IRR to report for training for up to thirty (30) days per year. This, however, has not been done since the all volunteer Army came about in 1973, and it is doubtful that such involuntary service would be politically acceptable today. Also, significant funds would be required to support a base to conduct training and provide pay and allowances for the IRR soldiers.
while on active duty. Presently, post mobilization refresher/reclassification training appears to be the only logical and acceptable solution.

From this discussion of the IRR, an obvious conclusion can be drawn. Before the IRR can perform its mission, a significant amount of training must be accomplished, either before or immediately after mobilization. Many IRR soldiers will require refresher or reclassification training. In the remainder of this study, the systems established to manage, mobilize, and train the IRR to accomplish their war-time missions will be analyzed.
END NOTES


4. Interview with Dr. H. R. Ludden, PERSCOM Mobilization Division, Alexandria, 8 December 1988.


7. Interview with Dr. H. R. Ludden, PERSCOM Mobilization Division, Alexandria, 8 December 1988.

CHAPTER III

MANAGING, MOBILIZING AND TRAINING
THE IRR

The management, mobilization, and training of the Individual Ready Reserve involves so many agencies within the Department of the Army that coordination between them is extremely difficult. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) is responsible for planning and executing the training and deployment of the IRR. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel (DCSPER) and its subordinate command, Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), formerly called Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA), are responsible for forecasting the requirements for trained personnel. The Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR) has overall responsibility for all Army Reservists and the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) is responsible for maintaining IRR records, managing IRR peacetime training, and ordering individuals from the IRR to active duty upon mobilization. The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for developing the training base and the Programs of Instruction (POIs) required for training. Finally, Forces Command (FORSCOM) monitors all of these activities, because FORSCOM’s Mobilization Station Commanders will play a key role in the assignment of IRRs to deploying units. The Mobilization Station Commander is responsible for validation of the deployment status of these individuals and the units to which they are assigned.
Needless to say, with all of the above Department of the Army Staff sections, agencies, and Major Army Commands (MACOMs) involved with the management, training, and planned utilization of the IRR it is difficult to coordinate all of the planning that must take place. Interviews were conducted with key personnel on the mobilization staffs from all of the above organization. An analysis of the functions performed by each agency and the initiatives currently under consideration will be presented prior to providing an overall assessment and recommendations.

**PLANNING FOR IRR UTILIZATION**

PERSCOM uses unit strength reporting (both AC and RC), theater CINCs' shelf requisitions, and casualty estimates provided by the U.S. Army Concept Analysis Agency (CAA) to determine personnel requirements. PERSCOM then generates a report utilizing the Mobilization Manpower Planning System (MOBMAN). This system is a refinement of the previous Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). The MOBMAN system matches the trained manpower demand, based upon force structure requirements and expected net casualties, with the trained manpower supply consisting of force structure supply, pretrained manpower, and training base output. MOBMAN then determines the surplus/shortfall by MOS/SSI, occupational category, and aggregate in ten day increments to M + 120 and thirty day increments from M + 120 to M + 360.¹

The MOBMAN projections use the Total Army Analysis (TAA) for the last year of the current Program Objective Memorandum (POM) which is based upon the Defense Guidance (DG), Illustrative Planning Scenario.
MOBMAN, unfortunately has no way to take into consideration the training status of IRRs and recalled retirees, who are also in the pretrained category.\(^2\)

Using MOBMAN, PERSCOM generates and sends to TRADOC the Mobilization Training Base Output Requirement (MTBOR) based upon unfilled requirements. The MTBOR is used to construct the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOB ARPRINT) which projects the assignment of training spaces at TRADOC Army Training Centers and Schools. Refresher and reclassification training of the IRR are not included in the MTBOR or ARPRINT because the data needed to determine these requirements is not a part of the MOBMAN system.\(^3\) The MTBOR and MOB ARPRINT therefore reflect only the training base needed to support newly acquired soldiers, i.e., volunteers and draftees.

**MANAGEMENT**

The U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) is the command responsible for managing, training, and mobilizing the IRRs. Such an undertaking is very complex considering that each year between 80,000 and 100,000 soldiers enter the IRR from active and reserve component units. Approximately the same number complete their military obligations and leave the system.

In the past, the ARPERCEN data base was inadequate to manage the IRR force. The only information on record for IRRs coming off active duty were their active duty records and the address they provided upon discharge from active duty. The Defense Appropriation for FY 86 established a.
screening program whereby IRRs are ordered to report annually for one day of Active Duty Training during their birth month. During screening, IRRs' addresses and records are updated to help determine deployability. This screening process has greatly increased ARPERCEN's ability to keep tract of IRR assets.  

Even though the information on record is better, ARPERCEN does not have the automated system to integrate all of the data needed to manage this force adequately. Such a system is essential to accomplish the monumental management task of consolidating all of the existing stand alone systems into a common data base.  

Mobilization

ARPERCEN operates the Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS) for PERSCOM. MOBPERS is a set of procedures which prepositions essential personnel accession data on the IRR, Standby Reserve, and Retirees at the Mobilization Stations. MOBPERS earmarks IRR personnel and retirees as fillers for vacancies in both AC and RC units. USAR and ARNG requirements are updated monthly while PERSCOM provides active duty updates quarterly. MOBPERS tapes are transmitted to each Mobilization Station monthly.  

ARPERCEN will utilize MOBPERS data to generate mobilization orders for IRR personnel, retirees, and stand-by reservists. These orders will be in the form of a Mailgram Mobilization Order and a Two-mode Travel Warrant. The individual will be ordered to report to the mobilization station where
the vacancy for which they have been earmarked is located. The personnel identified as fillers by MOBPERS are not assigned against specific positions, instead they are assigned to the installation. The installation Military Personnel Office (MILPO) will then make assignments, as directed by the Mobilization Station Commander.

Under current policy, Mobilization Station Commanders will determine if an individual IRR member is trained, requires refresher, or complete retraining. Presumably this assessment will be based upon Common Task Testing (CTT) and MOSQ Testing. Many of the IRRs assigned through the MOBPERS process will end up being transferred to some other installation for training. This leaves vacant the slot for which they were earmarked, while increasing time and resource requirements to insure they are properly trained.

ARPERCEN also utilizes the MOPBPERS to develop the Mobilization Requirements for Trained Manpower (MOBPOWER) Report. MOBPOWER is a breakout of IRR and retiree assets by MOS and skill level as compared to the filler requirements. The MOBPOWER for each MOS provides the trained manpower requirements in four different categories; PR1 - deployment from M to M+30, PR2 - Essential CONUS Support Units (ECSU), PR3 - deployment from M+31 to M+60, and PR4 - deployment from M+61 to M+90. MOBPOWER also shows projected assets; total, RT-12, and total less RT-12. By comparing requirements against projected assets, by MOS and grade, MOBPOWER gives an excellent picture of where excesses and shortfalls exist in relation to unit vacancies.
The MOBPERS and MOBPOWER systems, unfortunately, fail to take into consideration the projected casualty replacements beyond what is included in the initial European Shelf Requirements. Consequently, the systems are earmarking IRRs against vacancies in late deploying units when they should be entering an accelerated training program to prepare for deployment as urgently needed casualty replacements.

TRAINING

TRADOC's U. S. Army Training Board (ATB) has been very active in studying IRR utilization. The board has constructed their own series of reports entitled "U. S. Army Training Board Working Papers/IRR Data Base". In this series they have incorporated data from ARPERCEN regarding IRR soldiers, their MOSs, and requirements from DCSPER/CAA. Using a $D = M + 14$ assumption they have determined shortfall/overages at various intervals. While the DCSPER is not satisfied with the figures generated, the trends show a shortfall of combat arms MOSs similar to that which PERSCOM has identified.

The ATB is also concerned about the lack of MOSQ verification for the IRR. ATB strongly supports the testing of IRR soldiers during the annual screening. This testing would indicate how much refresher training is needed and also could be used to determine likely candidates for reclassification training. The board has accepted LTG John S. Crosby's, TRADOC Deputy Commanding General for Training, position that reclassification training should be accomplished prior to mobilization.
TRADOC's ATB is also working with the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) to come up with a Rapid Train-up Program. The goal of this program is to be able to provide refresher training in a 2 to 3 day period for soldiers who are already MOS qualified. A pilot program at ARI's Fort Knox Field Unit has had promising results, however, questions remain as to who will conduct the training and when. It is likely that the Procedure Guides (flow sheets) and Training Guides will be included in the various soldiers manuals so that the soldiers squad leader could accomplish the training.

TRADOC's Plans, Operations and Mobilization Directorate (POMD) under TRADOC DCST is primarily concerned with post mobilization training. POMD Mobilization Branch is aware of the need for reclassification training of the IRR. However, current planning specifies that an individual will be slotted against a seat in an AIT course only after he/she has been identified for reclassification training. The entire process would take place after mobilization. No special programs have been developed for large scale reclassification training of IRR soldiers.

TRADOC Schools had been given the mission of determining how reclassification would be accomplished. Mobilization planners at the US Army Infantry School indicate that reclassification of IRR would be accomplished by inserting such soldiers into Phase II of the Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) Mobilization POI. Phase II consists of the MOS specific instruction comparable to an AIT. However, the Infantry School has not been directed to plan for large scale reclassification training upon mobilization. Current plans for training base expansion, upon mobilization,
are based on administering the complete OSUT Infantry Mobilization POI to non-prior service inductees and volunteers. The inquiry was directed to the Infantry School because major shortfalls in casualty replacements are in the Infantry Career Management Field (CMF).

TRADOC POMD is also responsible for planning for the utilization of the USAR Training Division upon mobilization. The twelve USAR Training Divisions are scheduled to do post-mobilization Initial Entry Training (IET) of volunteers and draftees. One or more brigades of most of the training divisions are not currently scheduled to begin training IET soldiers for up to 50 day after mobilization. Thus, these trained assets could be used to accomplish a good deal of the necessary IRR reclassification training before they would be needed to conduct IET training. There are USAR Training Divisions which are prepared to conduct Armor, Field Artillery, and Engineer OSUT, as well as Infantry.

TRADOC's Training, Operations and Management Directorate (TOMD), Mobilization Information Management Division, under TRADOC DCST, is responsible for taking the Mobilization Training Base Output Requirement (MTBOR) from PERSCOM and generating the MOB ARPRINT. The need to accomplish reclassification training of IRRs is recognized, but the requirements column was zeroed out because TOMD is not provided with the numbers of individuals to be trained.
INITIATIVES

The Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Carl E Vuono, has directed the development of a new coherent, comprehensive strategy for RC training. A Reserve Component Training Strategy Task Force was formed containing representation from all agencies concerned. The task force worked under the auspices of TRADOC's U.S. Army Training Board. The final product was DA Circular 350-88-XX (Reserve Component Training Strategy), a draft of which was approved in concept by GEN Vuono, 31 August 1988. The overall strategy is supported by a series of issues/actions intended to improve RC training in the years to come. Some of the issues deal directly with or impact upon IRR management and training.

Issue 4: Total Army Personnel Data Base (TAP-DB) Support to RC Training and Issue 5: ARPERCEN Management Support, would both greatly enhance automation support to ARPERCEN which would vastly improve ARPERCEN's ability to manage IRR assets.

Issue 29: Alignment of IRR to Mobilization Requirements, acknowledges the shortage of high attrition/early run-out combat arms MOS'. It proposes, first, that future enlistment contracts be modified to reflect a 3 week extension for reclassification training prior to ETS and secondly, quick train POIs would be developed for reclassification training.

Issue 31: IRR Training Evaluation, calls for regular Screening/Testing of IRR soldiers during their annual one day records screening. Common Tasks Testing (CTT) together with MOSQ testing would be included.
results of this testing would be incorporated into the ARPERCEN data base and be used to determine candidates for refresher as well as reclassification training.\textsuperscript{22}

Issue 32: IRR Annual Training Requirement, would include in future enlistment contracts a commitment by soldiers to attend up to 30 days per year of training while in IRR status.\textsuperscript{23} If reclassification training can be accomplished within the year prior to mobilization, the IRR soldiers involved become RT/ST-12 assets which could be rapidly deployed as part of the 10 divisions to Europe in 10 days (10 in 10) forces or as casualty replacements.

Whether any or all of the above issues are fully implemented remains to be seen. The fact that they were included as supporting the Reserve Component Training Strategy is encouraging. The cost of large scale peacetime reclassification (Issue 29) and the questionable political feasibility of peacetime mandatory training for IRR (Issues 32) make these two unlikely to be adopted. Also, soldiers trained in this manner would have minimal skill application and therefore probably would not retain the skills learned for even one year, hence either post mobilization or annual refresher training would probably be required, adding additional costs. Therefore, we must be prepared for a rapid reclassification training upon mobilization.

Another initiative comes from Dr. H. R. Ludden, of PERSCOM's Mobilization Division. He is well aware of the training shortfalls in the planning for the utilization of the IRR. In the briefing he gave me on 8 December 88, he emphasized the projected shortfall of casualty replacements in combat MOSs and the excesses in other MOSs. He encouraged me to
pursue this study of how reclassification training could be accomplished rapidly.\(^2\) I learned on 2 February 1989, that Dr. Ludden and his staff have begun a formal study of the requirements for rapid reclassification training.\(^3\) A concept paper was forwarded to ODCSOPS which points out the requirement for a needs assessment, the identification of soldiers to be reclassified, and the development of training programs to be executed immediately upon mobilization.\(^4\)

During my wrap-up communications with DCSOPS on 5 February 1989\(^5\), I first learned of a classified study on Pre-Planning the Employment of IRR Personnel which was prepared by Mr. Don Davidson, now retired, and presented to the DCSOPS in early FY 88. The unclassified portions of the study include an overall assessment and recommended policy changes. The study highlights the mismatch between MOSs on hand and required, therefore creating the need for reclassification training. It also points out the failure of existing systems to adequately address casualty replacements. Key recommendations include, determining the requirements for refresher/reclassification training (DSPER), maximum pre-mobilization training of selected IRRs (ARPERCEN), identifying and pre-assigning IRR members to training installations to receive reclassification training from overage skills into shortage skills, and incorporating into MOB ARPRINTs as first priority refresher/reclassification training.\(^6\)
END NOTES

1. Interview with Dr. H. R. Ludden, PERSCOM, Mobilization Division, Alexandria, 8 December 1988.
2. Interview (Telephonic) with Mr. Bob Wiesth, PERSCOM, Mobilization Division, 27 January 1989.
5. BG Paul L. Babiak, Commander, ARPERCEN, Comments to the U.S. Army Reserve Senior Service School candidates for TY 89, 16 May 1988.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
24. Interview with Dr. H. R. Ludden, PERSCOM, Mobilization Division, Alexandria, 8 December 1988.
27. Interview (Telephonic) with COL Newton F. McCurdey, Jr., DA DCSOPS, Mobilization Chief, 2 February 1989.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The IRR has the critical mobilization missions of providing filler and casualty replacement personnel. We must depend upon the IRR to accomplish this mission for the first 120+ days of any future conflict because volunteers and conscripts are by statute required to receive 12 weeks of training before overseas deployment. However, the IRR today is not managed, mobilized, or trained well enough to accomplish these filler/casualty replacement missions as rapidly as required.

MANAGEMENT

ARPERCEN does not have adequate data processing systems to manage the IRR effectively. Even if the computer system were completely updated, the key data element is not available to the system. This element is the accurate assessment of the MOSQ and deployability status of each IRR member. Issue 31: IRR Training Evaluation, of the Reserve Component Training Strategy, would correct this by calling for annual MOSQ testing. I endorse this suggestion, and would also recommend that a bonus system be planned and programed for budgeting to motivate IRR soldiers to maintain MOS proficiency. The cost of a bonus program would be minor in comparison to the cost of formal retraining for these soldiers.

Until we have an adequate system to assess the training status of the IRR in peacetime, a system must be established to rapidly determine their
status upon mobilization. Such a system is essential in order to program soldiers requiring additional training into that training as rapidly as possible. IRRs of questionable training status should report directly to an Army Training Center (ATC) for assessment and possible training before assignment to a mobilization station, thereby saving valuable time.

There is approximately a 25% mismatch between the MOS structure of the IRR and requirements upon mobilization. The IRR mirrors the active force structure. However, estimated casualties, in the event of hostilities, are far more numerous in the combat arms MOSs. Therefore, more combat arms soldiers will be needed as casualty replacements. To accomplish the critical casualty replacement mission of the IRR, it will be necessary to reclassify many IRR soldiers from Combat Support and Combat Service Support to Combat MOSs.

Methods for selecting the soldiers to be reclassified must be agreed upon. Obviously, one criteria would be to reclassify soldiers from overage MOSs to shortage MOSs. A second would be to take soldiers who do not qualify in their overage MOS. A third criteria would be to use soldiers who are qualified in MOSs which are no longer in the force structure. Another criteria could be to select those individuals who have been away from active service the longest. Of course, whichever criteria or combination of criteria is agreed upon, the soldier must be mentally and physically qualified for the new MOS. The annual screening process needs to incorporate effective means of assessing the technical, tactical, and physical status of all IRRs.
MOBILIZATION

Assignment of IRRs against existing vacancies and/or casualty replacement requirements should only be done after they have verified their MOS qualification and/or completed the required refresher or reclassification training. This training, ideally, should be accomplished prior to mobilization. Under the current system, with its political and fiscal constraints this will not be accomplished to a significant degree. It is, therefore, critical that soldiers requiring refresher/reclassification training be programmed to enter training as rapidly as possible upon mobilization. MOB ARPRINTs must be modified to reflect these training requirements. The soldiers identified for reclassification must go into the MOBPERS orders system in such a way that they report directly to a training installation. Also, these IRRs must be given first priority in assignment to available training seats.

TRAINING

TRADOC and its proponent schools have identified the training requirements for post mobilization training and have developed Mobilization Programs of Instruction (MOB POIs) for most MOSs. Most proponents have considered how to accomplish reclassification training of previously trained soldiers. The schools have not been tasked to prepare for the reclassification training of large numbers of IRR immediately upon mobilization. Without a MOB ARPRINT to provide the actual numbers to be trained it is difficult to accomplish serious planning.
One asset which could be of enormous support in this refresher/reclassification training are the USAR Training Divisions. There are, twenty-two Infantry OSUT, seven Armor OSUT, three CAV OSUT, three Engineer OSUT, and two Field Artillery OSUT Training Brigades in the USAR Training Divisions. These organizations have the mobilization mission to expand the IET Training Base. Many of these brigades are not scheduled to receive IET soldiers until several weeks after mobilization. These brigades should be given the mission to provide refresher/reclassification training to the IRR. USAR trainers are already familiar with the MOB POI and could accept this mission with very little modification of their current MOB PLANS. Utilizing the USAR Training Divisions would allow the existing training base to complete the training of the IET soldiers currently in training at the time.

It was beyond the scope of this study to assess the impact of large scale, rapid IRR reclassification upon existing and planned training facilities. It is understood that resources will be limited, however this training is essential and therefore a study of requirements should be initiated and supported in future Army POMs.

**SUMMARY**

The vacancy filler and casualty replacement mission of the IRR could make the difference between victory and defeat. Time, effort, and money spent today in upgrading our management, mobilization, and training capabilities would make a significant difference upon how rapidly trained IRR soldiers are available. A difference of ten days could be the margin of victory or defeat.
It would not be very cost effective to attempt to accomplish large scale IRR refresher/reclassification training prior to mobilization. Such training would require annual refresher training for the total IRR if it were to have maximum effectiveness. Rather, I would propose the following four actions as being more cost effective. First, ARPERCEN's data processing systems must be upgraded to effectively manage the IRR. Second, an effective system for conducting annual MOSQ testing must be implemented, with incentives for soldiers to remain qualified. Third, that soldiers requiring training must be identified and pre-assigned to training installations upon mobilization. Finally, that USAR Training Divisions be assigned the mission of preparing for and conducting the needed refresher/reclassification training.

END NOTES

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