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SENIOR LEADER MENTORSHIP

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN E. WILSON

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31 MARCH 1989

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
Mentorship is a popular subject in discussions within the US Army concerning leadership development. Senior leaders have a crucial role to play in identifying and developing the Army's future senior leaders. Current writings emphasize the requirement that leaders "mentor" their subordinates and "footlocker counseling" subsequently equates to mentoring in the minds of many. Mentorship, however, is much more than teaching and coaching. A great investment of resources is required by the participants. A successful mentorship benefits the organization since it allows for the development of potential in...
talented individuals. To better understand the concept of mentorship, a model was constructed from current literature and was then evaluated by analyzing it through two historic mentor relationships—Pershing-Marshall and Marshall-Eisenhower. The analysis supports the proposition that mentorship is more than just teaching or coaching.
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USAGC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

SENIOR LEADER MENTORSHIP

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen E. Wilson

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Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
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INTRODUCTION

As the Army approaches the 21st Century, its senior leaders--the three- and four-star generals--face many challenges complicated by the explosion of rapid technological, economic, and social changes. The requirement to find and develop future senior leaders of wisdom, vision, intelligence, and devotion to the Army and the Nation has never been greater. Once these potential Army senior leaders have been identified, one of the most important developmental tasks is for the present senior leadership to mentor them so that they are as well prepared as possible to meet tomorrow's challenges. Mentoring is a unique and often misunderstood process in the maturing of leadership.

The term "mentor" is derived from both the Greek language and Greek mythology. Mentor was the friend and counselor of Ulysses who, during Ulysses' 10-year odyssey, raised Ulysses' son. Mentorship is a dynamic, time-consuming relationship in which the mentee matures both professionally and personally under the tutelage of his mentor so that he can "...innovate, think, and adapt to the demands of a fast-paced, highly stressful, rapidly changing environment." Classic mentorship, because of its intense demand on human resources, is not suited for everyone. Some senior leaders will never become effective mentors because either their personalities, personal goals, or other variables will impede or prevent the close, interpersonal, open relationship which characterizes the classic mentorship model. A good understanding of what
constitutes true mentorship is crucial to the senior leader responsible for mentoring the senior leader of tomorrow.

The concept of classic mentorship will be developed in three steps. First, a mentorship model will be constructed, complete with definitions, functions, and phases. Second, the model will be compared with two successful examples of senior leader mentorship: "Black Jack" Pershing's mentoring of George C. Marshall from 1918 to 1945 and Marshall's subsequent mentoring of Dwight D. Eisenhower from 1939 to 1945. Finally, the model will be analyzed against the two case studies to determine its validity and adaptability to different personalities, styles, and circumstances.

THE MENTORSHIP MODEL

DEFINING MENTORSHIP

Kathy E. Kram, in her book *Mentoring at Work: Developmental Relationships in Organizational Life*, describes four common characteristics found in mentorships. First, individuals (mentees) are allowed to "address concerns about self, career, and family by providing opportunities to gain knowledge, skills, and competence (from their mentors), and to address personal and professional dilemmas (with their mentors)." Second, both participants benefit since the relationships "respond to current needs and concerns of the two people involved." Third, the relationships "occur in an organizational context that greatly influences when and how they unfold." Lastly, these
relationships are not readily available to most people in organizations.∗

LTG Charles W. Bagnal, Earl C. Pence, and LTC Thomas N. Meriwether, in their article "Leaders as Mentors" in the July 1985 Military Review support the common characteristics of mentorship by defining the mentor's functions as helping the mentee to:

- Clarify career goals and develop long-term strategy for career planning and advancement,
- Develop short-term individual development plans,
- Develop technical as well as leadership and management skills through instruction and knowledge-sharing,
- Develop the frame of reference, values, and skills required at higher organizational levels,
- Deal with job-related or personal problems through counseling, and
- Receive the assignments and experience required for advancement through visibility and, as necessary, intervention.4

Within the organizational structure, mentors "are typically eight to 15 years older than (and) two or more levels above their proteges.5 If the mentors are senior leaders, they usually have not only more power to influence careers, but they also have more experience and a broader vision to impart to their mentees than do more junior officers. Senior leaders are more experienced in dealing with the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity that exist in the upper organizational layers and are, therefore, more capable of equipping their mentees to effectively and successfully work in such an environment.

Another approach to identifying the characteristics of mentorship was offered by MG Kenneth A. Jolamore, USA, in his July,
1986 Military Review article "The Mentor: More than a Teacher, More Than a Coach," in which he listed 10 mentor behaviors (functions):

* Teaching - skills for job performance and future growth
* Guiding - unwritten rules, important people, organizational and social behavior, etc.
* Advising - experience of one 8-15 years older; wisdom
* Sponsoring - opportunities for mentee's growth
* Role Modeling Behavior - common values worthy of emulation
* Validating - goal setting
* Counseling - emotional support
* Motivating - encouragement to move on and accomplish goals
* Protecting - environment allowing risk-taking; buffer
* Communicating - candid, frank interchange of ideas

MG Jolemore further wrote that

A mentor can do all of the things outlined. That includes helping a mentee to develop self-confidence and grow, sharing his ideas and his values with the mentee, making the mentee visible to top-level leadership and giving the mentee an opportunity to share invaluable contacts.

In sum, teaching the mentee the mentee's job is a supervisory function; teaching the mentee the mentor's job is mentorship. Mentorship is more than just teaching and coaching, for it satisfies needs in both the mentor and the mentee. As an example, it would be tempting to classify MAJ John F. Morrison, who was a tactics instructor at the School of the Line in Fort Leavenworth when 2LT Marshall was a student, as a mentor. He certainly
influenced Marshall in the study of tactics. Morrison was a great teacher, but he was not a mentor. He had neither the organizational position nor the full range of mentorship functions to offer. He influenced Marshall; he did not mentor him.

MENTORSHIP FUNCTIONS

The functions of the mentorship model best suited for senior leaders was designed by Ms. Kram, who divided the mentoring functions into two subgroups: career and psychosocial (See figure 1). Career functions are "those aspects of the relationship that enhance career development" while psychosocial functions "enhance (the) sense of competence, identity, and effectiveness in a professional role." If the mentor is two or more levels above his mentee in the organization, his experience, rank, and influence within the organization make the career functions possible. If the mentor is eight to 15 years older than the mentee, a peer-like relationship is avoided and, with mutual trust and increasing intimacy, the psychosocial functions become possible. One may certainly add some of the previously identified mentoring functions to those of Ms. Kram, but her list fits the model admirably.

MENTORING FUNCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career Functions</th>
<th>Psychosocial Functions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sponsorship</td>
<td>Role Modeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure-and-Visibility</td>
<td>Acceptance-and-Confirmation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coaching</td>
<td>Counseling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Friendship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging Assignments</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1
In the career functions, sponsorship is the active nomination of the mentee for desirable lateral moves and promotions; for without it, the mentee could be overlooked for promotion despite his competence or performance. The exposure-and-visibility function enhances one's career development by assigning to the mentee responsibilities which allow him to develop relationships with key organizational figures who judge his potential for advancement. Additionally, the mentee is prepared for positions of increased responsibility and authority while he is visible to those who can influence his fate in the organization.

Coaching is the career function which increases the mentee's knowledge and understanding of how to effectively operate in the organization. The mentor performs this function by suggesting appropriate strategies for accomplishing work objectives, and for achieving recognition and career aspirations. The mentor also benefits from coaching since he confirms the values of his experiences by passing on useful knowledge and perspectives to his mentee. Coaching is the giving of instructions, while mentoring is providing the mentee with "a glimpse of the context in which the mentor makes decisions." Protection is a double-edged sword which can either support or smother the mentee. Nonetheless, protection shields the mentee from untimely or potentially damaging contact with other senior officials. A fine balance exists between this function and that of exposure-and-visibility. Protection also provides the environment in which the mentee can take risks without fear of career-damaging censure which could follow failure.
The last career function is that of challenging assignments. This function does not address only those career-enhancing jobs to which any future senior leader would aspire. The assignment of challenging work, coupled with technical training and ongoing performance feedback, allows the mentee to develop specific competencies and to experience a sense of accomplishment in a professional role;...It is critical in preparing the (mentee) to perform well on difficult tasks so that (s)he can move forward. Without (challenging assignments), a junior person remains unprepared for positions of greater responsibility and authority.15

The purpose of the psychosocial functions is not to allow the mentor to create a clone in his own image, but to assist the mentee in developing a sense of competence, identity, and effectiveness. Role modeling is the mentor's providing the mentee with attitudes, values, and behavior worthy of emulation. If the mentor sets a desirable example, the mentee will identify with it and, over time, develop his own identity by emulating "certain aspects of the senior person's style and...reject(ing) others."16 The acceptance-and-confirmation function is a mutually beneficial one in which both individuals derive a sense of self from the positive regard conveyed by the other. As the (mentee) develops confidence..., the (mentor's) acceptance-and-confirmation provide support and encouragement. In later years, a (mentee's) acceptance-and-confirmation provide support for the wisdom and experience offered the next generation.17

The mentee can experiment with new behaviors and becomes more willing to disagree with his mentor, thereby establishing a
relationship which "tolerates differences and thus allows self-differentiation." The mentor, when blocked from further advancement and faced with aging and obsolescence, is provided support and appreciation from his mentee which helps him find value in what he can still offer to his mentee and the organization.18

Counseling is the function which helps the mentee to explore personal concerns which may interfere with his achieving a positive sense of self in the organization. The mentee finds "a forum in which to talk openly about anxieties, fears, and ambivalence that detract from productive work." The mentor "provides a sounding board for this self-exploration, offers personal experience as an alternative perspective, and helps resolve problems through feedback and active listening." The mentee can share his fears, doubts, and concerns without risking exposure to others in the organization while the mentor satisfies important needs by helping the mentee to successfully cope with personal dilemmas.19

Friendship, the last of the psychosocial functions, is perhaps the most elusive, given the differences in age and organizational positions between mentor and mentee. Mutual liking and understanding, and enjoyable informal discussions about work and outside work experiences can lead to friendship.20 Friendship can amplify the other functions and helps the participants to better accept the differences between them.

A classic mentorship would provide to full range of the functions defined previously; however, many relationships contain
only a subset of the full range of functions and possibilities. The point to stress here is that every mentorship will be different because of the different personalities, backgrounds, capabilities, and talents involved. The absence of one or more functions does not disqualify the relationship from being classified as one of mentorship. This point will be clarified during the examination of the Pershing-Marshall and Marshall-Eisenhower mentorships.

MENTORSHIP PHASES

A mentorship can be divided into four phases: Initiation, Cultivation, Separation, and Redefinition (See figure 2).

**MENTORSHIP PHASES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Average Time Span</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>6 months - 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivation</td>
<td>2 - 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation</td>
<td>6 months - 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redefinition</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2

The Initiation phase averages six months to one year with the identification of the mentee as one whose potential is worthy of developing. Contacts between the two reinforce the idea that the mentor relationship is possible and, thus, it becomes important to both participants. The cultivation phase generally lasts from two to five years. During this phase, the
range of career...and psychosocial functions that characterize a mentor relationship peaks. Generally, career functions emerge first as the (mentor) provides challenging work, coaching, exposure-and-visibility, protection, and/or sponsorship. As the interpersonal bond strengthens with time, psychosocial functions emerge. Sometimes they include, primarily, (role) modeling and acceptance-and-confirmation. In instances of greater intimacy they include counseling and friendship as well. While career functions depend on the (mentor’s) organizational rank, tenure, and experience, psychosocial functions depend on the degree of trust, mutuality, and intimacy that characterize the relationship.

The relationship during this phase will change as the mentee grows in competence and self-worth. This phase ends when changes in individual needs and/or organizational requirements occur.

The separation phase, in Ms. Kram’s research, generally lasts six months to two years, “after a significant change in the structural role relationship and/or in the emotional experience of the relationship.” In the Army, this phase normally begins with the transfer of one of the participants to another locale. This phase is an adjustment period because “career and psychosocial functions can no longer continue in their previous form; the loss of some functions, and the modification of others, ultimately lead to a redefinition of the relationship.”

The redefinition phase covers an indefinite period after the separation phase. The relationship either ends or develops significantly different characteristics, evolving into a more peer-like friendship. While some functions stop or decrease, sponsorship from a distance, occasional counseling and coaching, and friendship normally continue. This phase can be marked by the
mentee's succeeding to the same or higher position in the organization as that held by his mentor.26

MENTORSHIP MODEL

The mentorship model developed by Ms. Kram appears to be well-suited for use by the Army's senior leaders. The model defines the phases of a mentorship, and the functions which can occur within those phases. The model is dynamic enough to accommodate the differences in personalities, positions, circumstances, and other variables. A comparison of the mentor relationships between Pershing-Marshall and Marshall-Eisenhower will be used to illustrate the model's utility.

MENTORSHIP COMPARISON

The common denominator in this comparison is General of the Army George C. Marshall. A mentee of General of the Armies John J. Pershing, General Marshall, in turn, mentored General of the Army (and later President) Dwight D. Eisenhower.27 All three served as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, the highest military position in the Army. If one accepts the premise that the true goal of a mentor is not to further his mentee's career, "but to help make the Army better by allowing mentees to develop to their full potential," then both mentorships, although very different, were successful.28

General Pershing was 20 years older than General Marshall and Marshall was 10 years older than General Eisenhower. When Marshall first became Pershing's aide-de-camp, Pershing was a
four-star general and Commanding General, American Expeditionary Force in France. Marshall was a brevet colonel who reverted back to captain (although promoted the following day to major) at war's end. Pershing was later promoted to five stars (General of the Armies) and eventually assigned as the Army Chief of Staff, while Marshall only advanced to lieutenant colonel before he finished being Pershing's aide. Marshall was the Army Chief of Staff (four stars) when he brought Brigadier General Eisenhower to the War Department as Chief of War Plans (later Operations) Division. Within less than a year, Eisenhower was a lieutenant general and commander of the European Theater of Operations. By war's end, both mentor and mentee were five-star Generals of the Army and Eisenhower replaced Marshall as Army Chief of Staff. Marshall had taken 15 years to reach that position after he had left Pershing; Eisenhower took only three! Both mentors were at least two or more levels higher in the Army than their mentees (both in rank and position) and were older by eight to 15 years (20 years in Pershing's case).

The initiation phase starts by the mentor's identifying the future mentee as a potential senior leader. Marshall first came to Pershing's attention on 3 October 1917 when he forced Pershing to listen to his explanation and critique of a new method of attacking entrenched troops. General Pershing had just finished humiliating Marshall's division commander and chief of staff for giving poor and ill-prepared critiques of the new method designed by Marshall, and then-Captain Marshall was determined that Pershing receive the facts behind the performance.29 For the rest
of World War I, Pershing monitored Marshall's performance, even recommending him on 17 October 1918 for promotion to brigadier general (although the War Department discontinued promotions after the Armistice). Thoroughly impressed by Marshall and his demonstrated mastery of operational planning, Pershing asked him to become his aide-de-camp on 30 April 1919. This initiation phase took 18 months.

Eisenhower became known to Marshall as early as 1930 when he talked to Marshall in the Office of the American Battle Monuments Commission in Washington, which resulted in Marshall inviting Ike to join his Fort Benning staff, which Eisenhower declined because of a prior assignment. In late 1941, Marshall needed a new Chief of Operations Division in the War Department. Eisenhower, now a brigadier general, had performed brilliantly as General Krueger's Third Army Chief of Staff during the 1941 Louisiana maneuvers. This performance, coupled with strong recommendations from Generals Clark and Gerow, caused Marshall to assign Eisenhower to the position. A few hours after Eisenhower arrived in Washington, he was seated in front of Marshall who, after describing the tense national and international situation one week after the Pearl Harbor attack, asked, "What should be our general line of action?" Eisenhower satisfactorily answered the question several hours later. Eisenhower recalled, "His tone implied that I had been given the problem as a check to an answer he had already reached." The initiation phase for Eisenhower had started and would last about six months until his reassignment as Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater.
The cultivation phase in the Pershing-Marshall mentorship began with Marshall's assignment as Pershing's aide-de-camp and ended with Marshall's reassignment to Tientsin, China five years later. During this period, the full range of mentoring functions grew and flourished. The cultivation phase in the Marshall-Eisenhower mentorship is less defined as it began shortly after Eisenhower reported to the War Department in December 1941 (thereby merging into the Initiation phase) and extended through the separation phase (which began in June 1942) to Marshall's retirement as Army Chief of Staff on 26 November 1945—a period of less than four years. This blending of the cultivation phase with both the Initiation and separation phases was caused by the wartime conditions which then existed; however, the mentorship functions that normally occur during the cultivation phase did occur, albeit conducted more by letters and messages than by personal, daily contact.

The separation phase in the Pershing-Marshall mentorship lasted 14 years until Marshall reported back to Washington in June 1938 as a brigadier general. Both men, however, had kept up a lively correspondence and visited with each other during the separation. Pershing provided a number of mentoring functions during this period, the most prominent of which was friendship. The separation phase in the Marshall-Eisenhower mentorship began in June 1942 when Eisenhower left Washington for England and ended when he returned in November 1945 to replace General Marshall as the Army Chief of Staff. This phase coincided with the cultivation phase and, by December 1944, began merging with the
redefinition phase when Eisenhower was promoted to General of the Army four days after Marshall.

In both cases, the redefinition phase formally began with the mentee achieving the position of Army Chief of Staff. The mentees had become "peers" with their respective mentors. One difference is that Eisenhower went on to become President of the United States and thereby achieved a position which surpassed that of his mentor. Although the Marshall-Eisenhower mentorship phases are less distinct, one can still discern them and the functions which occur within them. It should be noted that Ms. Kram's model was originally designed from a study of corporate mentorships and not those of the wartime military. The model remains viable despite the differences.

COMPARISON OF CAREER FUNCTIONS

Sponsorship is the first function to be compared. General Pershing on several occasions sponsored Marshall for promotion to brigadier general, the first of which was during World War I. On 24 May 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the Secretary of War which stated, "General Pershing asks very strongly that Colonel George C. Marshall (Infantry) be promoted to Brigadier." Marshall was not selected and, in a 10 June 1935 letter to Pershing thanking him for his support, Marshall wrote, "I can but wait--grow older--and hope for a more favorable situation in Washington." Pershing tried again by asking John C. O'Loughlin, publisher of the prestigious Army and Navy Journal and well-connected politically, in a 23 August 1935 letter to "put in a good word" for Marshall with the then Chief of Staff Douglas
MacArthur. O’Laughlin did talk with MacArthur and wrote back to Pershing that, although MacArthur felt Marshall should wait for the Chief of Infantry job, MacArthur would recommend Marshall for brigadier general on the next list to Secretary of War Dern. Pershing’s sponsorship helped to eventually produce the desired results and in a 26 May 1936 letter to Marshall, Pershing wrote, "...I had a conversation here in Washington after my arrival and found that you are positively and definitely on the slate (brigadier general list) for September." Pershing then recounted how he had tried to have Marshall placed first instead of last on the list of six, but had failed. He closed by writing, "...I am sure that you are destined to hold a very high place on the list of general officers before you reach the age of sixty-four."

Marshall also actively sponsored Eisenhower in his rapid rise from brigadier general to general of the army in four short years. This sponsorship began when Eisenhower, who was sensitive about not having served in France during World War I, passed yet another of Marshall’s tests in March 1942. As Eisenhower recalled,

I was in his office one day and he got on the (subject) of promotions. He said, "I want you to know that in this war the commanders are going to be promoted and not the staff officers." After letting go this homily for about two or three minutes, he turned to me and said, "You are a good case. General Joyce wanted you for a division commander and the Army commander said you should have corps command." He said, "Eisenhower"--this was a real loaded brick--"You’re not going to get any promotion. You are going to stay right here on this job and you’ll probably never move."

Finally I said, "General, I don’t give a damn about your promotion. I was brought in here to do a duty. I am going to do that duty to the best of my ability and I am just trying to do my part in winning the war." And I got up and left. It was a great big test. And for some reason...it was just one of those things...I happened to
Marshall nominated Eisenhower for major general on the next list and, three months later, selected Eisenhower as the European Theater Commander.

While Eisenhower successfully pursued his increasingly complex and difficult assignments, Marshall sponsored him for the North Africa command and subsequent four-star rank in the Mediterranean. As Marshall's distinguished biographer, Dr. Forrest C. Pogue writes, "Although it was true that Marshall had not (initially) selected Eisenhower in the beginning for the Supreme Commander's post (late 1943), he had certainly put him on the way to that position, and he as much as any other man was responsible for his reaching that goal." Marshall, when queried by President Roosevelt on what he (Marshall) wanted to do, refused to ask for the job and the President decided on Eisenhower. Marshall sent his handwritten draft of Eisenhower's appointment to Eisenhower, which the president had approved, as a momento. When Marshall submitted his retirement request to President Truman on 20 August 1945, he wrote, "If I may be permitted to propose a successor, I suggest that General Eisenhower is unusually well qualified for the duties of Chief of Staff at this particular time." Eisenhower was selected to replace Marshall.

Both mentorships were characterized by active exposure-and-visibility. While Marshall was Pershing's aide, Pershing took him on most of his visits to Congress, camps, factories, and cities.
During one of the Congressional visits in which Pershing testified on Army reorganization, Marshall recalled,

I know the members of Congress were so astonished when he was having his hearings that I sat next to him with General Fox Conner on the other side, that I could interrupt him and talk to him and tell him about something, and he could turn around and tell them.40

The exposure-and-visibility Marshall received as Pershing's aide served him well after he finally received his first star and was subsequently assigned as a very junior major general to the post of Army Deputy Chief of Staff. In Eisenhower's case, Marshall sent Eisenhower to England several times while he was in War Plans to study and report on the organization needed for the cross-channel invasion. In Marshall's words, "I sent Eisenhower and some others over so the British could have a look at them...and then I asked Churchill what he thought of them. He was extravagant in his estimate of them, so I went ahead with my decision on Eisenhower."41 Marshall also encouraged Eisenhower to personally meet and speak with the many delegations which visited his headquarters in North Africa so that proper impressions were made. Eisenhower learned to handle visitors very well throughout the rest of the war.42

Coaching was very evident in both mentorships. Pershing coached Marshall in the art of politics, which Pershing had learned from Senator Francis E. Warren, his father-in-law. Pershing not only coached Marshall in how to deal effectively with politicians and high-ranking members of the War Department staff, he also taught Marshall the importance of visiting camps and
factories to gain first-hand an idea for how the organizations were functioning. He taught Marshall the technique of inviting to supper (followed by a briefing) the older, retired military officers who lived near the area visited; an active attempt to make them feel still a part of the Army. Marshall also learned from Pershing the value of corresponding personally with soldiers' families. Two examples illustrate how Marshall coached Eisenhower. Eisenhower recalled his first interview with Marshall in December 1941 as follows,

Eisenhower (said Marshall), the Department is filled with able men who analyze their problems well but feel compelled always to bring them to me for final solution. I must have assistants who will solve their own problems and tell me later what they have done. I resolved then and there, Eisenhower said later, to do my work to the best of my ability and report to the General only situations of obvious necessity or when he personally sent for me.

In the other example, Marshall sent Eisenhower several messages coaching him on how to handle press releases during the TORCH campaign. In one, Marshall was concerned since "...press stories emanating from your theater with reference to you, Clark, Patton, and Fredendall and you in particular, played up the intimate stuff to the point of adversely affecting your prestige as a higher commander..."

Both Marshall and Eisenhower were protected by their respective mentors. General Pershing sent a letter to President Roosevelt on 16 September 1943 to express his firm conviction that Marshall should remain as the Army Chief of Staff. Pershing wrote, "To transfer him (Marshall) to a tactical command in a
limited area, no matter how seemingly important, is to deprive ourselves of the benefit of his outstanding strategical ability and experience. I know of no one at all comparable to replace him as Chief of Staff. Marshall was equally protective of Eisenhower. During Operation TORCH, Eisenhower, in an effort to keep the French neutral and with the support of Marshall and the President, negotiated an arrangement to allow Admiral Darlan, Vichy commander of the French armed forces, to serve as high commissioner in North Africa. Darlan, who had ordered a cease-fire for all French troops on 10 November 1942, was very controversial since he was an official of Vichy France. Fully supporting Eisenhower, Marshall wrote him on 20 November 1942:

...I am in thorough agreement with your point of view and I am doing my utmost to support you by meetings with the press, with members of Congress, with State Department and with the President. The Secretary of War is equally aggressive in his support of your position and the importance of leaving you undisturbed to pursue your campaign. Do not worry about this, leave the worries to us and go ahead with your campaign.

Marshall protected Eisenhower throughout the war.

Challenging assignments were also used by the mentors in both relationships. Pershing would send papers, which normally dealt with Marshall’s superiors, in to Marshall while he was the aide and request his candid opinion. In this way, Pershing groomed Marshall for higher assignments. In the fall of 1923, Pershing left for Europe and spent the next six months in Paris and on the Riviera working on his memoirs and relaxing. Marshall and MG John L. Hines, Deputy Chief of Staff, ran the Army during this period. Marshall wrote Pershing weekly to keep him abreast of
developments. In the case of Eisenhower, his performance as Chief of War Plans, coupled with his passage of Marshall's various "tests," led to his subsequent assignments as CG, European Theater of Operations, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and ultimately U.S. Army Chief of Staff.

**COMPARISON OF PSYCHOSOCIAL FUNCTIONS**

Role modeling is most apparent in the Pershing-Marshall mentorship. Although Marshall felt that Pershing was too harsh (ramrod straight) and stern, he was a model of self-discipline, integrity, and ability to separate work from play. Pershing was a womanizer, which was incongruous with Marshall's values; yet, Marshall probably overlooked this fault out of empathy for Pershing's tragic loss of his wife and three of four children in a fire in California. Pershing was also very discreet in his affairs. The most significant impact that Pershing had on Marshall was his ability to accept criticism. Said Marshall:

> I have never seen a man who could listen to as much criticism—as long as it was constructive criticism and wasn't just being irritable or something of that sort. You could talk to him like you were discussing somebody in the next country and yet you were talking about him personally...you could say what you pleased as long as it was straight, constructive criticism. And yet he did not hold it against you for an instant. I never saw another commander that I could do that with. Their sensitivity clouded them up, so it just wouldn't work. I have seen some I could be very frank with, but I could never be frank to the degree that I could be with General Pershing.

With Eisenhower, Marshall provided a role model who was devoted to the concept that duty performance, and nothing else, earns rewards. Marshall's feeling on performance and promotion was "if
he hadn't delivered, he wouldn't have moved up." Eisenhower respected this approach when he corresponded with Marshall regarding officers for promotion. Marshall's protection of and loyalty to Eisenhower also influenced his support of subordinates who were doing a good job; he emulated Marshall. Eisenhower wrote at the end of the Casablanca Conference that "(General Marshall) is unquestionably the great military leader of this war, a fact which the world will recognize before this war is over."54

Both mentors were exceptional in how they performed the acceptance-and-confirmation function with their mentees. Both encouraged the frank exchange of views and ideas without fear of censure. One incident involves the habit mentioned earlier of Pershing's sending papers in to Marshall for his comments. Pershing, in conjunction with General Harbord, wanted to change an action of General March's and asked Marshall for his opinion. Marshall nonconcurred. Pershing called for him and said, "I don't take to this at all--I don't agree with you." Marshall rewrote his nonconcurrence and Pershing called for him again. "I don't accept this," said Pershing. "I think Harbord and I are right." Marshall rewrote his nonconcurrence a third time and took it in to Pershing who, after reading it, "slapped his hand on the desk, which is something I had never seen him do before, and said, 'No, by God, we will do it this way.'" Marshall replied, "Now General, just because you hate the guts of General March, you're setting yourself up--and General Harbord, who hates him too--to do something you know damn well is wrong." Pershing handed the paper back to Marshall, replying, "Well, have it your own way."
Marshall recalled that "General Pershing held no (grudges) at all. He might be very firm at the time, but if you convinced him, that was the end of that. He accepted that and you went ahead." In Eisenhower's case, he was also encouraged by Marshall to speak his mind. In a message sent to Eisenhower prior to TORCH (The invasion of North Africa), Marshall wrote,

> When you disagree with my point of view, say so, without an apologetic approach; when you want something that you aren't getting, tell me and I will try to get it for you. I have complete confidence in your management of the affair, and want to support you in every way practicable.

Marshall later sent a message to Eisenhower telling him not to worry about submitting detailed reports; his job was to win the battle. Marshall's desire to instill confidence in Eisenhower succeeded as evidenced by a 3 March 1943 letter from Eisenhower to Marshall which stated,

> Please do not look upon any communication I send you as a defensive explanation. Not only do I refuse to indulge in alibis but, frankly, I feel that you have given such evidence of confidence in me, that I never experience the feeling of having to defend my actions.

Counseling of Marshall by Pershing normally was limited to keeping his spirits up regarding promotion to brigadier general. One of a series of letters between the two while Marshall was assigned to Chicago illustrates Marshall's disappointment: "I have possessed myself in patience, but I'm fast getting too old to have any future of importance in the Army." After Marshall became Chief of Staff, he would either write or visit Pershing at Walter Reed and receive advice on the conduct of the war and things in
general. With Eisenhower, Marshall was solicitous of his health and was constantly reminding him to exercise as well as rest. One amusing anecdote involved Marshall informing Eisenhower of a letter he had received from a citizen cautioning Marshall not to allow Eisenhower to continue drinking cold water with his meals as stomach problems could result. Eisenhower's reply indicated that he was heeding Marshall's advice to get more exercise by riding horses vigorously four-five hours per week. Marshall did order Eisenhower to return home in December 1943 to rest up prior to becoming the OVERLORD commander. Marshall wrote,

You will be under terrific strain from now on. I am interested in that you are fully prepared to bear the strain and I am not interested in the usual rejoinder that you can take it. It is of vast importance that you be fresh mentally and you certainly will not be if you go straight from one great problem to another.

Of the two relationships, only the Pershing-Marshall mentorship was marked to the end by a warm and deep friendship. Pershing thought enough of Marshall to make him the executor of his memoirs in 1925 should Pershing die prior to their completion. Marshall in turn asked Pershing to serve as his best man when he married his second wife, Katherine Tupper Brown, in Baltimore, Maryland on 15 October 1930. The visits between the two, especially when Marshall was Chief of Staff, were cherished by both. In contrast, both Eisenhower and Marshall were friendly and cordial to each other, but they never developed as warm a friendship as the one Marshall had with Pershing. The fact that Marshall and Eisenhower never worked together in the intimacy equal to the Pershing-Marshall mentorship was a factor. Any hope
of lasting friendship was later dashed by President Eisenhower's failure to come to Secretary of Defense Marshall's defense against Senator McCarthy's attacks in 1950. Although true friendship did not develop, both Marshall and Eisenhower had great respect and admiration for each other, especially during the mentorship's cultivation phase.

CONCLUSIONS

Both mentorships were successful in that the mentee was assisted by his mentor in developing to his full potential and subsequently serving with distinction in a position of great responsibility. The mentorship of Marshall by Pershing comes the closest to Ms. Kram's model. The full range of mentorship functions occurred throughout distinct mentorship phases. The Marshall-Eisenhower relationship was not a classic one in that the cultivation and separation phases were merged due to wartime requirements; however, the relationship span the gamut of the mentoring functions—some more strongly than others.

These two historical examples support the Kram mentorship model; which is dynamic enough to respond to different personalities, conditions, talents, and circumstances, and still develop future senior leaders. Some other key conclusions are also reached. First, the mentor must be prepared to invest a lot of time and energy in to his mentee's development. The voluminous correspondence between Marshall and Eisenhower during a world war speaks highly of their commitment to success—and the importance
of the mentorship. Second, the mentor cannot expect the mentee to become his clone. One of the prominent features of the Marshall relationships was the fact that neither one was characterized by the mentor actively trying to shape his mentee into a mirror image of himself; indeed, each relationship was striking in the freedom given to the mentee to develop his own leadership style. Third, both parties benefit from the experience. Both Pershing and Marshall derived great satisfaction, not just from the fact that their mentees succeeded, but that they succeeded while reinforcing the values of their mentors.

Fourth, successful mentorship can occur at any level in the Army hierarchy as long as it fits the model. Colonels can very effectively mentor captains to the limit of their experience; brigade commanders can mentor captains in how to become successful brigade commanders. As these colonels continue to advance, they can continue their mentorships with an increased experience base. Three- and four-star generals have reached the pinnacle of their profession; they should be able to offer more complete career and psychosocial functions, based on their experience, power, and outlook, than can more junior officers. Who is better versed to deal with the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity which exist in the highest organizational levels? Senior leaders should be able to offer more experience to those mentees who truly possess the potential to become the Army’s future senior leaders.

Fifth, the goal of any mentorship should be to allow the mentee to develop to his or her full potential, thereby making the Army better, rather than just furthering the mentee’s career. In
the Marshall examples, the mentors strove to allow their mentees to develop to their full potential. Based on their strict devotion to duty, the mentors would have looked elsewhere had their mentees failed to meet their expectations. Finally, one cannot dictate to leaders, senior or other, that they must mentor promising subordinates. Subordinates can be coached, taught, or counselled by superiors, but that does not establish the relationship which is mentorship. Mentorship should be encouraged, not mandated. All leaders have the responsibility to encourage the mentorship of those who possess the potential skills and qualities expected of senior leaders. Those leaders who possess the talents and skills required of a mentor should be encouraged to participate in a mentor relationship with selected mentees for the future success of the Army.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 5.


5. Ibid.


7. Ibid., p. 15


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 25.

11. Ibid., p. 27.

12. Ibid., pp. 28-29.


15. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

16. Ibid., p. 33.

17. Ibid., p. 35.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

20. Ibid., p. 38.
21. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
22. Ibid., pp. 51-53.
23. Ibid., p. 53.
24. Ibid., p. 49.
25. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
26. Ibid., p. 49.


30. Ibid., pp. 53-55.


32. Ibid., pp. 238-239.


34. Ibid., p. 475.

35. Ibid., pp. 492-493.


38. Ibid.


40. Bland and Ritenour, p. 194.

42. Interview with Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, 4 February 1989.

43. Ibid.

44. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, p. 337.


49. Interview with Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, 4 February 1989.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Bland and Ritenour, p. 189.


64. Interview with Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, 4 February 1989. Dr. Pogue explained that Eisenhower heeded the counsel of his political advisors not to defend Marshall against powerful Senator McCarthy since to do so could adversely affect his candidacy in the 1950 presidential election. Eisenhower felt that the counsel of his political advisors outweighed the loyalty he had toward his old mentor and, consequently, he remained silent.