Service roles and missions were historically well understood and accepted until around the 1940's. Although there occasionally arose some perturbations earlier over which service was responsible for what, the mid-forties brought with it several service role problems. After the war, President Truman vowed to correct the deficiencies that he and other leaders perceived in DOD. With the National Security Act of 1947 followed by the Key West Accords in 1948, service roles and missions were legislated. Despite this, service rivalry continued to shake the defense establishment over service missions. The
most notable of these was the "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949. Disputes and rivalries over roles and missions continue today. The thesis of this paper is that although there has been a history of interservice rivalry over roles and missions, de jure service functions will not change appreciably in the foreseeable future.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

ROLES, RIVALRIES, AND CHANGE
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
by
Lt.Col. James D. Majchrzak
Colonel Roger Jaroch
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
1 March 1989
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: James D. Majchrzak, LtCol, USMC
TITLE: Roles, Rivalries, and Change
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 1 March 1989  PAGES: 22  CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Service roles and missions were historically well understood and accepted until around the 1940's. Although there occasionally arose some perturbations earlier over which service was responsible for what, the mid-forties brought with it several service role problems. After the war, President Truman vowed to correct the deficiencies that he and other leaders perceived in DOD. With the National Security Act of 1947 followed by the Key West Accords in 1948, service roles and missions were legislated. Despite this, service rivalry continued to shake the defense establishment over service missions. The most notable of these was the "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949. Disputes and rivalries over roles and missions continue today. The thesis of this paper is that although there has been a history of interservice rivalry over roles and missions, de jure service functions will not change appreciably in the foreseeable future.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ....................................................................................... ii

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION................................................................. 1
  Background................................................................................. 1
  Scope of Research Paper......................................................... 2
II. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT of 1947.............................................. 3
  Key West Accords..................................................................... 5
  Revolt of the Admirals............................................................... 6
III. THE NEW LOOK.......................................................................... 9
  DOD Reorganization Act of 1958.............................................. 10
IV. DOD REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986....................................... 13
V. REVIEW....................................................................................... 16
  Status Quo................................................................................. 16
  Conclusions............................................................................... 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................. 21
ROLES, RIVALRIES AND CHANGE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Do you Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, take your missions, to have and to hold, for richer and for poorer, in sickness and in health, till death do you part? This rather facetious opening, serves to highlight a quote taken from a recent congressional staff report which stated, "While some Service witnesses have testified that the assignment of roles and missions is constantly under review, it is difficult to understand how, in light of the tremendous changes in technology, strategy and tactics over the past 40 years, there has been no major change in the roles and missions of the Services since 1948."¹ This statement takes on added significance when you consider it in light of the numerous interservice debates that have ensued since the National Security Act of 1947 was signed into law.

BACKGROUND

By the end of 1775, the Continental Congress had already authorized the formation of the Continental Army, eight ships for the Navy, and two battalions of Marines; all "to serve for and during the present war between Great Britain and the colonies."² Strangely enough the services did not have legally mandated specific functions until after World War II. It was generally understood until that time that the US Army would deal with enemy forces on land and the Navy would deal with enemy forces at sea. On 26 July 1947, the National Security Act of 1947, assigned functions to the Services for the first time.
SCOPE OF RESEARCH PAPER

This paper will look at the services thoughts about unification and then address the National Security Act of 1947 which laid out the functions of the Services and the Key West Accords which amplified those functions. Some of the rivalries which resulted from a conflict over missions, will be discussed from the perspective of how they were or were not resolved. A brief overview will be given on the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 and the pertinent sections of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 will be addressed. In all these areas, it is important to keep in mind that since the Key West Accords in 1948, no significant change has taken place in the service missions, regardless of the intensity of interservice rivalry or the amount of criticism from a variety of sources.

With this said, it is the purpose of this paper to show that although there has been a record of interservice rivalry over roles and missions, service functions will not change appreciably in the foreseeable future.

ENDNOTES

1. Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 16 October 1985, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change." p.432.


CHAPTER II

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 9877

World War II was not completed before the pressure mounted within the Truman Administration for unification of the services. President Truman pressed to modernize "the antiquated defense setup."\footnote{1} The Air Force leadership, who knew that they would be separated from the Army after the war, was in favor of unification because it was confident of its future. The Army favored unification. It "thought it could better protect its interests against the more glamorous rival services within a centralized defense department rather than in competitive appeals to Congress."\footnote{2} The Navy was opposed to unification because they feared subordination to commanders who did not understand sea power and were also concerned that an Army-Air Force partnership would dominate.\footnote{3} The Marines for their part "faced that under a single Department of Defense, they would be devoured by the Army and at the very least they would lose their air arm to the Air Force."\footnote{4}

The debates over unification continued for two years after WW II. On 26 July 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947.\footnote{5} The Act basically stated that the mission of the Army was to be "equipped, organized and trained for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land," the Air Force for "prompt and sustained combat incident to air operations," the Navy for "prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea," and the Marine Corps to "provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of naval campaign, and perform such other duties as the President may direct."\footnote{6}
Executive Order 9877, signed the same day that the National Security Act of 1947 was made law, elaborated on the Act by stating that the Army mission involved the "seizure, defense and occupation of land areas to include airborne operations;" the Navy mission involved "control of vital sea areas, protection of sea lanes, suppression of enemy sea commerce, support of occupation forces as required, naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping and seizure of shore positions capable of reduction by such landing forces as may be comprised within the fleet organization;" the Air Force mission involved "gaining and maintaining of general air supremacy, establishing local air superiority as required, conducting of strategic air warfare, air lift and air support, air support to land and naval forces, and air transport operations except as provided by the Navy."  

In summary, when you analyze what was written in the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 9877 it basically said that the Army fought on land, Air Force in the air, Navy at sea, and Marine Corps on land and in the air to support the Navy. Although these missions were written into law, tension still persisted among the services. The Navy still wanted a role in strategic atomic warfare while the Air Force stated that was strictly their role; the Army did not want the Marine Corps to become a second land army and demanded their units be no larger than regimental size; other problems began to emerge.  

Secretary of Defense Forrestal in his frustration sent the service chiefs (less the Commandant of the Marine Corps who was not a member as yet of JCS) away from the Washington D.C. area to Key West, Florida, in hopes they could define their respective service missions. Forrestal claimed at a press conference that "If the Service Chiefs fail to reach agreement, I shall have to make my own decisions."
KEY WEST ACCORDS

It was not that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not realize there was a problem. They knew that what was needed was to provide clear-cut guidance by removing all misunderstandings as to the tasks of each service. A JCS ad hoc committee proposed a change to Executive Order 9877. The committee stated, among other things, that making strategic plans must be preceded by meaningful assignment of roles and missions. JCS found the proposal unacceptable but did not comment on what should come first, plans or missions. Likewise the Service Secretaries were aware of the disagreements and rejected the proposal as inconclusive. On 29 January 1948, Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, sent a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Forrestal stating, inter alia, that the proposal did not "solve or decrease the outstanding difficulties occasioned by differing views as to roles and missions and responsibilities, but...might tend to increase these difficulties by the breadth and generalization of some of the language used." Forrestal, meanwhile, was receiving pressures from the press, the public, and most vocally from Congress. He did not understand why the services could not achieve consensus on their functions and disagreed with the JCS ad hoc committee in that he felt that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed their joint strategic plans then there would exist a firm basis for meaningful definition of service missions.

With mounting pressures, Forrestal could not wait for the strategic plans to be completed. On 11 March 1948, a meeting convened at Key West to iron out the following disagreements: Air Force-Navy over the role of carrier aircraft in strategic air operations; Air Force-Army over the conduct of air defense of land areas; Army and Air Force versus Navy over the size of the Navy "Air Force" and "Army" (i.e. Navy and Marine air and Marine ground forces.) Additionally,
the Army and Air Force wanted to include wording to the effect that "the service having responsibility for a primary function would determine the nature and extent of collateral participation by the other services as well as any requirements developed for equipment for the services furnishing collateral support."\(^1\)

The meeting at Key West ended after four days of blood-letting. To say an agreement was reached is an overstatement. A temporary truce would be a more accurate description with the following points (compromises) agreed to in principle:

1. Navy would retain air power and would be responsible for determining means required to carry out naval air missions but could not use this to justify creating a naval strategic Air Force.

2. Strategic bombing was the responsibility of the Air Force.

3. Collateral functions (missions) would not be used as a basis for establishing additional force requirements.

4. General Bradley dropped his insistence on limiting Marine Corps units to regimental or smaller size by an agreement to limit the Marine Corps to four divisions and no headquarters higher than a corps.\(^2\)

With the exception of the incident discussed in the following paragraphs, it is a major point of this papers thesis, that the pattern of compromise by the service chiefs to resolve conflict, was initiated during the discussions at Key West.

**REVOLT OF THE ADMIRALS**

Based on a Navy problem that would soon appear, the Key West Accords were not the "Blueprint for Teamwork" as heralded in the Army Information Digest
in May 1948. The problem was not lack of attention from the president. Truman in his memoirs recalls that the National Security Act and the resulting Key West Accords took a great deal of his time and attention to make it work efficiently. Truman studied the proposal made to Key West and on 27 March 1948, approved the promulgation of the new statement of functions with minor modifications. Nonetheless, it soon became apparent that dissension still existed in the Pentagon. Despite what was said in the Key West Accords about not having a strategic Naval air force, the Navy still desired that mission.

On 23 April 1949, new Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson announced that he was canceling the construction on the new super aircraft carrier, the USS United States. This cost-cutting move to bring economy to the defense establishment essentially would also serve to cut the Navy out of any strategic bombing mission since the longer flight deck of the new carrier was needed for heavy bombers to take off. The Secretary of Navy, John L. Sullivan, resigned over this issue because Johnson did not even consult with him prior to this action. President Truman concurred with Johnson's action. Johnson felt his actions had congressional support when in mid-August 1949, they passed amendments to the National Security Act, strengthening the position of the Secretary of Defense. Buoyed by this support, he advocated fiscal cuts of all Navy components, particularly carriers, carrier groups and a 50 percent cut for Marine aviation. This led to infamous "Revolt of the Admirals" who felt that the air arm of the Navy was being knocked out of the sky and if they didn't fight back they would not only lose their strategic air mission but their tactical air mission as well. Despite the testimony of Admirals Denfield, Radford, Kincaid, Halsey, Nimitz, King, Blandy and Bogan, the revolt failed for the Navy in that all of the actions that Johnson took were sustained by Congress. What is important for this paper, is that Congress during the "revolt of the admirals" upheld the basic tenets
of the Key West Accords by not legislating change. Today, forty years later, the Congress still has not changed the agreement made in Key West. 18

ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p.374.


5. Weigley, op cit, p.373.


7. Ibid., p.167


9. Ibid., p.286.


12. Ibid., p.175-180.

13. Ibid., p.182-183.


15. Truman, op cit, p.52.


CHAPTER III

THE NEW LOOK

The year 1953 brought with it many significant events: the death of Stalin in March, armistice in Korea in July, and the explosion of the first Soviet thermonuclear device in August. One of the less significant events in terms of world order, but important in terms of US Military force structure became known as the "New Look."\(^1\)

As is normal after any conflict or war, the public demands and administration seeks to reduce defense spending. One of the goals that President Eisenhower set out to accomplish was to insure that the functions of each service were distinctive enough to ensure that resources were not squandered on functions that were being or should be carried out by another Service. "I know from experience," he said "that there is much duplication among the services in research and development, in procurement, and even in roles and missions."\(^2\) If this were true, dollars could in fact be saved.

This precise statement led to a vague plan, Reorganization Plan No. 6 for the Department of Defense which was sent to Congress on 30 April 1953. The plan in essence stated that Secretary of Defense should have the authority to clarify service missions. It did not say what needed clarification nor did it suggest changes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged with reviewing the roles and missions, did not articulate any need for change and therefore no changes were made. Thus the Key West Agreement with regard to roles and missions of the services, withstood the Reorganization Plan No. 6 revision and only changes to certain functions of the Joint Staff were incorporated in the directive signed by Secretary of Defense Charles W. Wilson on 1 October 1953.\(^3\)
Soon, dissent again came about between services over their missions, not as public as the "Revolt of the Admirals," but almost as bitter. This time it was an Army-Air Force match-up over guided missiles and the attendant responsibility for developing and operating them. The Key West Agreement and its 1953 amendments essentially made the Army responsible for land operations, the Air Force for air operations and both services contributed forces for air defense. The Army position was that the missile was simply an extension of artillery. This stand was difficult for the Air Force to swallow because in June 1953 the Army was developing "Hermes" which had a 500-mile range. The Air Force argued that missiles with that range could be utilized for interdiction, close support or air defense operations— all of which were Air Force missions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in a memo to the Secretary of Defense that it was their responsibility to decide conflicts over mission responsibilities and that they would resolve the current problem involving roles and missions in the missile field.

In short, what evolved was a compromise by the service chiefs. The Army was allowed to develop and utilize guided missiles for a specific area with ranges up to 50 miles. The Air Force was given the mission to develop missiles with greater ranges to be deployed for blanket defense over wide areas. And so, another debate over roles and missions was ended by compromise.

**DOD REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958**

Without discussing the merits or flaws of the outcome, it seemed that every early Secretary of Defense was discontent with the power and stature of his office and sought of enhance it through proposed legislation. During his tenure, Secretary of Defense, Neil H. McElroy was no different. After three months in office, he wrote President Eisenhower a letter recommending various actions.
The letter requested that all restrictions be removed from the Secretary of Defense authority to transfer, reassign, abolish or consolidate combatant missions and roles of the Armed Services. This request was a matter of concern for the House Committee on Armed Services when it was found in the proposed DOD Reorganization Act of 1958. The House felt that this action was prohibited by law since changes in combatant functions must first have the approval of Congress.

"Congress must exercise its constitutional responsibility in this area...During the hearings no witness has been able to indicate any combatant function now performed by a military service which should be abolished, consolidated, reassigned or transferred."

Likewise the Senate was concerned about the transfer of power to the Secretary of Defense to change the roles and mission of the Services from the perspective of the separation of powers. Senator Richard Russell said,

"I want to give the Secretary any authority that is necessary...but I don't think we have ever authorized any Executive to abolish functions that were created by the Congress."

In short, this power was not given to the Secretary of Defense in the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958. While Congress did not want to give up the power to the Secretary of Defense to make changes, they did not want to propose changes to the roles and missions either.

ENDNOTES


2. IBID., p.178.


5. Memo, JCS to Sec Def, "Research and Development vs Roles and Missions," 25 Jun 54 JCS1620/89 CCS 334 Guided Missiles Conte, Sec 12.


7. IBID., p.67.


In June 1983, Senator John Tower and the late Senator Scoop Jackson, then the Chairman and ranking minority member, directed the staff of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to prepare a comprehensive study of the organization of the Department of Defense. The study was completed in May 1985. One of the sections was titled the "Limited utility of the current assignment of service roles and missions." The study lamented that "it was difficult to understand how, in light of tremendous changes in technology, strategy, and tactics over the past forty years, there has been no major change in the roles and missions of the Services since 1948." Despite this statement nowhere in this 635 page report, was a recommendation or suggestion made as to what those changes should be. What was recommended was a requirement for the President to submit to the Congress a one-time report on Service roles and missions and an annual report by the JCS Chairman to the Secretary of Defense on Service roles and missions.

These recommendations were considered, modified and then incorporated into provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433).

The stated purpose of PL 99-433 is:

"To reorganize the Department of Defense...to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and...to enhance the effectiveness of military operations."
More specifically, as it pertains to the topic of this paper, is section 153 of the law which refers to the missions of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Here the law states that:

"Not less than once every three years, or upon the request of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (roles and missions) to the Armed Forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces. In preparing each such report, the Chairman shall consider the following:

(A) Changes in the nature of the threats by the United States.
(B) Unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces.
(C) Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare."\(^6\)

In essence, what this law does is require the services to review at least every three years, their respective roles and missions; offers services an opportunity to articulate areas of dispute with sister services; requires the Chairman to give careful thought as to the content of the service submissions and their applicability to the current world situation, technological advances, and balanced by budget considerations. In turn, Congress has the opportunity to change legislation based on the recommendations made to the Secretary of Defense by the Chairman.

The services submitted a review of their respective roles to JCS, where they were considered by the Service Chiefs at the Pentagon in October–November 1988. The result was no substantive change was recommended to be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.\(^7\)
ENDNOTES

1. Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, October 16, 1985, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change," p.iii.

2. IBID., p.432.

3. IBID., p.432.

4. IBID., p.481.


6. IBID., p.1048.

7. Lt Gen Mundy, lecture at Army War College, 18 November 1988.
CHAPTER V

REVIEW

Reviewing what is contained in this paper thus far, it has established that the National Security Act of 1947 set down the basic roles and missions of the services. The Key West Accords, which amplified the service missions and is still in effect today, was the product of compromise by the service chiefs. The "revolt of the admirals" was the only serious service challenge to these accords, but Congress supported the agreement reached in Key West. Since that time, interservice debates continued to occur but these rivalries normally resulted in compromise resolution by the services. Congress, on its part, has the power to legislate changes in service missions, has guarded this power, but has made no major changes. In 1986, the latest Defense Reorganization Act, called for a report every three years to be submitted by the Chairman of JCS to the Secretary of Defense, containing recommendations for changes in the assignment of service missions that would enhance the effectiveness of the services. The JCS conducted a review in late 1988 and no substantive recommendations were made.

STATUS QUO

With this review in mind, possible rationale was sought to ascertain why the services, who through JCS could recommend change to the service missions, or Congress who could legislate change to these missions, had not done so. The services will be addressed first.

The Senate Armed Services Staff Report, referred to in Chapter IV, states that one of the causes for an absence of review of Service roles and missions
is "the desire of the Services to avoid reconsideration of these controversial issues." This causal factor was arrived at after a series of interviews, the main points of which follow: The Secretary of the Army said that he does not believe a need exists to examine the roles and missions at the present time. The former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins stated "I believe that if we try to formalize or institutionalize the process (review of service missions), it could be very unwieldy and debilitating. The former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Gabriel said that "service roles and missions are not a driving factor and that roles and missions issues cause us to bump into the parochial problems of the past."

These statements were made in late 1985 by some senior leaders of the services. Although research did not reveal what the stand of current senior leaders is, based on the result of the 1988 review of missions by the service chiefs, it is assumed that either they are content with current roles as written or they simply want to avoid conflict that change may bring.

The same Senate Staff Report mentions forces outside of DOD which inhibit change in what have become traditional service missions. The report states that "for each military uniform, there are formidable political allies ready to leap to the defense of the sanctity of service traditions. Foremost among these is Congress, which includes many partisans of the different services." So, Congress, as a body, is also reluctant to change service functions.

This is not to say that individual Congressmen or Senators do not advocate change. The following recent examples, one from a Congressman and another from a Senator, are cited:

An article written in "Defense News" on 28 November 1988, Representative H. Martin Lancaster (D-N.C.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, advocated that the Marine Corps in addition to its amphibious capability should
have assigned a mission of providing the primary forces in low intensity conflict. He feels that this would give a "more focused mission for the Marine Corps."

Senator Alan Dixon (D-ILL), took stronger measures than merely publishing his views as Representative Lancaster did. Senator Dixon, proposed an amendment to the defense spending bill to "assess the feasibility of transferring from the Air Force to the Army, the close air support mission beginning no later than 1992." This caused an Air Force major to lament that "we've finally begun to enjoy good relations with the Army and now they have to go and turn us back into rivals." At the time analysts stated that this close air support issue was a long shot and probably would not get in the legislation, and it didn't. But the issue did not die. Senator Dixon got this legislation included in the Base Closure Act which passed on 12 October 1988. Although the legislation only calls for an assessment, it undoubtedly has the potential to cause hard feelings. The Army, did not surface this as an issue, but rather it was an opinion of a Senator. Senator Dixon's defense advisor, Mr. Smith stated that passage of the CAS amendment "proves that the House Armed Services Committee feels...the lack of Air Force good will. Close Air Support has always been a stepchild to the Air Force." Mr. Smith went to say that "Congress is going to take increasingly serious looks at roles and missions of the services."

Articles, such as the one written by Congressman Lancaster, are frequently found in various newspapers or periodicals. They are a means for elected officials to air their personal views which may or may not be shared by the rest of Congress. An amendment, such as the one sponsored by Senator Dixon, is a much stronger signal that something could happen. However, Senator Dixon had great difficulty getting the Congress to support an "assessment" of the CAS mission. Logic would follow that a change of the close air support mission from the Air Force to the Army, might be more difficult than a mere assessment. Lastly, even if
you agree with Mr. Smith (Senator Dixon's military advisor) that Congress is going to take serious looks at the roles and missions of the services, stating that Congress will legislate changes to Service functions, does not necessarily follow.

CONCLUSIONS

Whether you discern a need for change in service missions or accept the status quo, is irrelevant. That idea, although part of the research, is not the primary focus on this paper. As stated at the outset, the purpose of this research paper is to show by historical example that, although there has been a record of interservice rivalry over roles and missions, service functions will not change appreciably in the foreseeable future.

Service chiefs will address roles and missions when required by law but evidence does not support the idea that they will offer or even support change. Individual Congressmen will write articles seeking change in missions, and some like Senator Dixon will initiate legislation proposing an assessment of service functions. Again, there is no evidence to support the idea that Congress, as a body, will support substantive changes in the foreseeable future to the current roles and missions, as embodied in Title 10, United States Code.

A final point on rivalries should be made. Rivalries will continue to spring up occasionally in the armed services. The service chiefs will probably continue to resolve the issues through compromise and Congress will watch but not participate to any great degree. When these rivalries do arise, it would be reassuring to keep in mind the words of General Matthew B. Ridgeway on that topic: "It is true that there are deep-rooted interservice differences that break out occasionally in seemingly bitter exchange. But they are the product of honest convictions by honorable men of deeply justifiable pride in all that their respective Services have contributed to the growth and security of our country."12
ENDNOTES


2. IBID., p.446.

3. IBID., p.446.

4. IBID., p.446.

5. IBID., p.443.


7. IBID., p.28.


9. IBID., p.4.


11. IBID., p.7.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


