TITLE IV--JOINT OFFICER PERSONNEL POLICY

QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD SORIANO

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**Title IV - Joint Officer Personnel Policy**

Quality versus Quantity

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**Abstract:**

The importance of the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act, known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, has been such that congressional and military leaders alike have termed it as "the most important undertaking regarding national security in the last 30 or 40 years." Title IV of this Act focuses on the Joint Officer Personnel
Policies of all the services. The provisions of this Title have far reaching implications in the way the officer corps is managed. The intent of this Title is to "improve the quality of the officers assigned to joint duty positions and in the long range, improve service interactions in the joint arena." This study explores the question of whether or not the services are meeting the intent of the law, or as a result of congressionally mandated numerical goals and timelines, merely meeting the numbers. Discussion is centered on requirements versus availability, what the quality implications are, and how the services are doing in complying with the law. Conclusions are presented and recommendations offered to assess the future implications.
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TITLE IV - JOINT OFFICER PERSONNEL POLICY
QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY?
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
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The importance of the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act, known as the Goldwater Nichols Act, has been such that congressional and military leaders alike have termed it as "the most important undertaking regarding national security in the last 30 or 40 years." Title IV of this Act focuses on the Joint Officer Personnel Policies of all the services. The provisions of this Title has far reaching implications in the way the officer corps is managed. The intent of this Title is to "improve the quality of the officers assigned to joint duty positions and in the long range, improve service interactions in the joint arena." This study explores the question of whether or not the services are meeting the intent of the law, or as a result of congressionally mandated numerical goals and timelines, merely meeting the numbers. Discussion is centered on requirements versus availability, what the quality implications are, and how the services are doing in complying with the law. Conclusions are presented and recommendations offered to assess the future implications.
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The importance of the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act is best characterized by the following statement....

"Defense Organization: The Need for Change," is the single most important body of work on national security matters done so far this century. The Senate’s deliberate action, conclusions and recommendations may well endure as the greatest contribution to America’s security we’ll see in our lifetimes." 1

In October of 1985, Senators Sam Nunn and Barry Goldwater, in their series of speeches and testimony before Congress on DOD reorganization clearly stated the magnitude of the reforms recommended in the DOD Reorganization Act.

Senator Nunn stated....

"....this legislation is probably the most important undertaking regarding national security in the last 30 or 40 years and perhaps longer." 2

Senator Goldwater stated....

"....the reorganization of the Department of Defense may be the most important thing that Congress does in my lifetime. It will be the most important thing that I tried to do in mine." 3

The multitude of changes resulting from the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act have been significant and has had far reaching implications in the way the Department of Defense manages its affairs. Of particular importance and significance has been in the area of
joint service operations and the services ability, or perhaps, the "inability," of the services to conduct joint operations. Senator Nunn, during the course of his testimony referred to the Grenada operation and clearly stated....

"....A close look at the Grenada operation can only lead to the conclusion that, despite our victory and success, despite the performance of the individual troops who fought bravely, the US armed forces have serious problems conducting joint operations. We were lucky in Grenada; we may not be so fortunate next time." 4

Clearly a concern by Congress and the civilian leadership was a perception that the services had a fundamental deficiency in joint operations. The Desert One operation has been cited as yet another example of this joint operation deficiency.

The reasons for this deficiency have been many. Much of the blame has focused on the problems in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and joint commands arena. The greatest concern as it applies to joint service performance has been the....

"....inadequate quality of political appointees and joint duty military personnel. DOD has given insufficient attention to the development of military officers capable of effectively performing joint duty assignments. In addition, the substantial disincentives to serving in such assignments have been permitted to persist." 5

Further testimony by the Honorable Lawrence J. Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, in support of joint officer management reform indicated that....

"By and large officers, assigned to joint duty, especially the joint staff, are not the "best and brightest." Nor are they prepared as they should be for joint assignments. Finally, they are not as competitive for promotion as officers who have remained close to their services." 6

It is against these concerns that Title IV of the 1986 DOD
Reorganization Act, commonly called the Goldwater-Nichols Act, was enacted. The Act covers a multitude of reforms which affect the management of the Department of Defense: the military departments, the office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Unified commands.

This study focuses on Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy and the implications regarding its implementation. Specifically, the question revolves around whether or not Title IV and its subsequent implementation is meeting the "intent of the law," that is, "to improve joint officer management policies, and a desire by Congress to improve what they perceive as the quality of the officer performing joint duty assignments." Or rather, are the services in their attempts to comply with the law, merely "meeting the numbers," without regard to improving the quality as intended?. This study will attempt to answer this question by exploring current services implementation of the law, their success or lack of success in meeting "the numbers," discussion of the current criteria for assignments to joint duty, and definitions of "critical" joint duty assignments. Further, a review of some of the problems associated with meeting the specifics of Title IV, such as promotions, career implications, and education will be conducted. Finally, a discussion concerning some of the "morale" implications will be offered. A list of recommendations will be presented in the final chapter of this study.

As a prelude to the foregoing discussion, an historical perspective of the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act as it pertains to Title IV will be presented in the following chapter. Several changes and amendments have occurred since Public Law 99-433, dated 1 October 1986, known as the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization
Act of 1986 was enacted. It is important for this discussion to understand the historical perspectives and progress this law has made in light of some of the constraints that were imposed early on in the implementation of the law. The fact is, service implementation of joint officer personnel management policies was faced with difficulties that required some modifications and amendments of the law in order for the services to meet the "intent of the law."

ENDNOTES


On October 1, 1986, Public Law 99-433, known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was signed into law. This Act prescribed significant changes in defense organization and procedures involving OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders and combatant commands, and the military departments. It represented the first major legislative change in defense organizations since the 1958 Defense Department Reorganization Act. Previous amendments and reorganizations date back to the 1949 National Security Act Amendment. The focus of these legislative changes was to enhance the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an effort to improve the effectiveness and efficiency in the military.

The period 1982 to 1986 saw extensive hearings by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC) on the reorganization of the Department of Defense. Numerous studies and proposals were presented throughout these hearings. Of particular significance was the staff study provided by the Senate Armed Services Committee Task Force on Defense Organization. Senators Sam Nunn and Barry Goldwater, more than anyone else, provided substantial testimony during these
hearings. The final report provided by the SASC, "Defense Organization: The Need For Change," probably provides the best set of documentation surrounding the issues, debates, and testimony in support of defense reorganization.

The focus of much of the debate was based on our experiences in Vietnam, Grenada, the Desert One operation, and joint training exercises which raised questions regarding the effectiveness of defense organizations and mechanisms for planning, managing and execution of combat operations - particularly in the joint arena. Of particular concern resulting from these debates were....

"- inadequate joint military advice, and
- inadequate quality of military personnel assigned to joint duty." 8

The SASC in particular focused on what was perceived to be the inadequate quality of military personnel assigned to joint duty and further defined the quality to mean....

"- the inherent skills and talents as professional military officers,
- the necessary education and experience, and
- a tour of sufficient length to become effective and to provide continuity." 9

The October 1985 SASC report made key recommendations which would ultimately form the basis for the present joint officer management system. The essence of their recommendations were....

"- to establish a system of military education, training, and assignments.....to produce officers with a heightened awareness and greater commitment to DOD-wide requirements, a genuine multi-service perspective, and an improved understanding of the other services. Additionally....., a joint duty career specialty should be established in each service." 10

The result of these recommendations was legislation directed to the
services to "reorganize its professional military education system
and revise officer career patterns." 11

After four years of debate and hearings, the 1986 Goldwater-
Nicholson Reorganization Act was enacted. Title IV of the Act....

"...establishes a system for joint officer management
with the goal to improve the performance of officers
in joint duty positions by establishing management
procedures for their selection, education, assignment,
and promotion." 12

The "intent of the law," as stated by Congress was to....

"...improve the military advice provided to the
President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense...to increase attention to
the formulation of strategy and to contingency
planning....to improve joint officer management
policies and to....otherwise enhance the effectiveness
of military operations and improve the management
and administration of the Department of Defense." 13

This formed the basis for Title IV implementation. The following
chapter continues this discussion focusing on the transition period.
It was obviously clear that implementation of this Act could not occur
in a short period of time. Transition provisions were allowed in the
legislation enabling the services to implement Title IV over time thus
insuring a smoother, less turbulent implementation. However, as will
be pointed out later in this study, implementation has been difficult,
casting questions regarding whether or not the services are meeting
the full "intent of the law."

ENDNOTES

8. "Executive Summary, Defense Organization: The Need For
Change," The Armed Forces Journal International, October 1985, Extra,
p. 41.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Officer Management, JCS Adm

10. Ibid., p. I-1,2.


TITLE IV - JOINT OFFICER PERSONNEL POLICY
QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY?

CHAPTER III
TITLE IV - 1986 TO 1989: IN TRANSITION

Implementation of the law and Title IV has been faced with some difficulties and challenges. Changes to the law were requested by the services, granting relief in some areas, making more restrictions in others. April and December 1987 allowed some changes to be made. August 1988 further saw changes being requested. Some of these changes focused on the services inability to meet Title IV requirements in a short period of time. Other requests for changes centered on the services inability to adequately meet established congressional "minimums" in terms of required percentages of joint specialty officers in joint assignments. In any case, the Title IV implementation was not without difficulties.

Title IV from the outset, "attempts to improve joint officer management policies." It is also clear that there is "a desire by Congress to improve what they perceive as the quality of the officer performing joint duty assignments." The major points of Title IV when it first became law were:

In terms of management policies:

"- establishment of an occupational specialty for officers of all services on active duty who are qualified in joint matters. Joint matters are defined in the Act as..."
employment of land, sea, and air forces including matters relating to:

-- national military strategy

-- strategic planning and contingency planning; and

-- command and control of combat operations under unified command.

- officers nominated for the joint specialty designation shall be at least senior captains, or senior Naval lieutenants, and must successfully complete an appropriate program at a joint professional military school,

- after formal education, the officer must complete a full tour in an acceptable joint duty assignment before being eligible to become a joint specialty officer." 14

This requirement posed significant problems early on because the services did not have an adequate joint professional military education (JPME) system in place to provide sufficient officers qualified to fill the joint duty assignments. Further, the law required that:

" - one half of all joint duty assignments must be filled by an officer nominated (and assumed qualified) for the joint specialty designation, and

- at least 1000 joint duty positions must be designated as critical positions and

- must be filled by an officer with a joint duty specialty." 15

In terms of promotion policy objectives, and in order to insure that joint duty was not career encumbering and that quality officers were assigned to joint positions, Congress directed that:

" - officers serving on the joint staff as a group will be promoted at the same rate as peers in the same service, grade and competitive category serving on the service headquarters staff, and

- that officers with joint staff experience will also be promoted at the same rates as their peers." 16
This particular requirement began to impinge upon the services' personnel management practices, previously held exclusive to the services unique and internal affairs. Congress went further to insure that this promotion directive be complied with by directing that:

"- a report be rendered every six months on the promotion rates of officers who are serving in or have served in joint duty assignments." 17

Educationally, Title IV required that:

"- every officer selected for general or flag rank will be required to attend a "Capstone Course" designed to prepare new general and flag officers to work with services other than their own and in the joint arena." 18

This particular requirement was not new since it was a program already in existence. Finally, in order to impose jointness in the officer military education system of the services, Title IV required periodic reviews of all service school curricula. As a final requirement in the area of joint professional military education, Congress dictated that:

"- each graduate of a joint professional military education school be detailed to a joint assignment immediately upon completing the course." 19

Length of joint duty assignments were also established by Congress. Of all the provisions outlined in Title IV, this particular one has caused probably the most consternation amongst the services. Specified joint staff duty tour lengths has been the most difficult requirement to comply with. Consequently, the services made tremendous efforts to have this changed. This requirement was one of the provisions ultimately changed. But the initial law required that:

"- joint duty assignments for general and flag officers will be at least three years, and for all
A provision did allow a reduction in the length of joint service necessary to qualify for a joint specialty designation from three and one-half years to two years if a nominated officer had a critical occupational specialty (COS) which were essentially the combat arms specialties. Thus, the length of tour became important for a couple of reasons, one it was necessary for promotion to general or flag officer rank, and two, the quality of the service is germane. An officer's evaluation now includes quality of service, and is a stipulation for promotion.

An additional provision requires that...

"- the promotion boards will contain at least one officer currently serving in a joint assignment." 21

This was to insure that officers serving in or who have served in joint position would be treated fairly on promotion boards.

The definition of joint service consequently takes on great importance. The careers of officers with ambitions for general officer or flag rank is dependent upon getting joint duty assignments. The criteria for identifying a joint duty assignment have been defined, although they are somewhat vague. Title IV defines joint duty assignments (JDA) as....

"....an assignment to a designated position in a multi-service; or multi-national command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea and air forces of at least two of the three military departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified command." 22

Joint duty assignments did not include....

"....assignments for joint training or joint education; and,
assignments within an officer's own military department." 23

Needless to say, and as will be pointed out later in this study, the number of joint duty assignments becomes important as the services attempt to fulfill Title IV requirements by placing "qualified" joint specialty officers in these positions.

As can be seen, Title IV established some fairly strict requirements that the services found difficult to accept and implement. Additional changes had to be made in order for the services to comply with the law. Of greatest concerns to the services were these provisions:

- establishment of tour lengths made it mathematically "impossible" for officers to meet joint duty requirements and subsequent promotion. There just wasn't enough time in an officers career pattern to fulfill joint duty. 24

The chief concern was the long range ramifications on overall force personnel management.

- the initial fill of joint duty assignments could not be carried out immediately without establishing an inventory of joint "qualified" officers; a transition period allowing an inventory to be established was necessary. 25

As will be pointed out later, the initial inventory has been established by all the services through a selection board process, screening and identifying qualified joint specialty officers. One of the questions in this study is whether or not this "first cut" of officers are necessary the quality that Congress was looking for. Understandably the need to establish and create an inventory was necessary, but, did it meet the "intent of the law?"

Still another concern focused on how joint duty assignments, in particular, critical assignments were determined. The initial guidance was vague. 26 In fact, while there appeared to be a
definition, no clear cut guidance was provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding what was critical. As a result, the Department of Defense agencies, including all the services, determined what were categorized as joint duty assignments, and what were critical joint duty assignments. What was deemed critical was left up to the agencies to decide. Therein lies a basic feeling that what may be critical to one agency may not be so in another. A review of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) will be made later in this study, as well as comments regarding the type of assignments. Intuitively, the question of quality can be raised regarding what type of officer and particular specialty has been determined as critical.

As of December 1988, the Reorganization Act has provided relief to the services in a number of ways. Waivers, tour lengths and extension of the transition period have been allowed. Concerns still exist within the services regarding ability to fully implement the law.

Generally speaking, all the services are fully committed to complying with Title IV. The consensus is unanimous that Title IV is good for all concerned. But the fact remains, while it is feasible in the long range to comply with the law, short term efforts to meet the intent of the law may appear to be a stop gap measure simply to meet the numbers and not necessarily provide the quality required by Congress.

With this rather lengthy background, this study now focuses on the major issue of "quality" resulting from the services' attempts to comply with the law. The question remains, what is the quality? Are the services meeting the intent of the law? Can the services provide
sufficient qualified joint specialty officers to meet the requirements? Further, as an add-on because it is important, what are the ramifications and impacts on the morale of the officer corps as joint duty becomes such an important milestone in an officer's career pattern, particularly for those with promotion ambitions?

The following chapter gets at the heart of the issue. The dilemma the services face is how to get there from here, without compromising the intent of the law.

ENDNOTES


15. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
16. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
17. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
18. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
19. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
20. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
21. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
22. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
23. Ibid., pp. 96-97.

24. Officer career patterns, promotion milestones and in-service requirements to perform certain jobs make it difficult for officers to perform assignments "out of the mainstream." Given the required joint duty tour lengths, the general consensus amongst services representatives is that it almost becomes mathematically "impossible" to get all the "right" jobs if one wants to get promoted.


26. Based on discussions and interviews with service representatives and from documents provided by POCs regarding
regarding Title IV implementation.

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
“Although there are a lot of conditions the services must meet in filling the letter of the new law, Congress has relented slightly, allowing some facets of the law to be implemented more gradually and letting the services use interim procedures....

....Still, the services find themselves scrambling to comply with not only the letter, but the spirit of the law intended to improve interaction between the services on tactical, logistical and strategic missions.” 30

The services were faced with two problems: the first was to create an inventory of qualified officers and the second, is to fill joint duty assignments, of which 1,000 are deemed critical billets.

The current joint duty requirements are these:

- Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) billet totals by Service (as approved by SECDEF in June 1988): 31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JDA</th>
<th>% JDA</th>
<th>CRITICAL JDA</th>
<th>% CRITICAL JDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3050</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1793</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3076</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>8363</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers represent those joint duty billets which the services
have determined to be joint duty assignments that require officers who are joint specialty officers. Those gross numbers are reflected in the JDA column. The critical joint duty assignment numbers reflect those billets which the services have deemed to be "critical" in nature.

"Criticality," has been an issue with the services, in that, the definition of what is "critical" has not been fully established. In general terms, it appears that "critical" means positions requiring higher field grade officer (usually 06 or higher and in branch, division, or directorate level supervisory positions) and many positions that are low density, highly technical and specialized, such as intelligence, signal, etc. The Air Force in particular has had consternation over this "criticality" issue since the impact on rated pilots is severe. This issue is one that needs to be looked at closer to determine just what is or is not a critical joint duty billet.

These numbers have fluctuated in the past and will probably continue to change over time. CINC requirements are submitted to JCS with subsequent rationale regarding criticality of billets. Additionally, input is also provided by other Defense agencies such as, OSD, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), some DOD field activities, and JCS controlled activities.

A cursory review of the current Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) reveals that the majority of the joint duty assignments are in the area of combat support and combat service support specialties, with the predominance of the critical billets occupied by senior grade officers (lieutenant colonels and above). A case in point is in the area of intelligence billets. Eight hundred and forty-eight (848) out of the 8363 JDA billets are in the intelligence fields and one
hundred and seventy-nine (179) out of the 1020 critical billets are intelligence related. Discussions with service representatives indicate that these JDA assignments, in fact, are comprised for the most part, of the technical fields - intelligence, signal, linguists, cryptology, etc.

Service efforts to comply with Title IV have been significant. An inventory of qualified joint specialty officers has been established by all the services. Title IV transition provisions allowed the services to conduct a series of screening boards to identify and award joint specialty designators (3L) from officer populations grown prior to the law. This meant that....

"....the SECDEF was allowed to waive either the joint professional military education or the requirement for a completed joint duty assignment following the education, but not both. Further the law allowed the SECDEF to consider as a joint assignment any tour of duty served by the officer before the date of the enactment of the ACT that was considered to be a joint duty assignment or a joint equivalent assignment under the regulations in effect at the time the assignment began." 34

Officers covered under this provision were awarded the joint specialty designation of 3L. This transition expires 1 October 1989. After 1 October 1989, officers will need the joint education and a full joint duty assignment to receive the designation.

Under this provision each of the services has been able to establish an inventory of officers qualified as joint specialty officers. Recent discussions with service representatives indicate that all the services have sufficient JSOs in the inventory. The Army has approximately 4000 plus in the inventory, the Air Force has about 3400, the Marine Corps estimates are 1000 plus, and the Navy about 3126. 35
The remainder of the JSO population will have to be provided via the service school education systems. Establishment of joint professional military education in the services is already in place. For the Army, a two phase education process is in place. Phase 1 begins at Command and General Staff College (CGSC), with Phase 2 being conducted at the Armed Forces Staff College, a three week temporary duty assignment. Additionally, the Senior Service Colleges, National Defense University (NDU), Army War College (AWC), and the Naval War College (NWC) have been given joint education accreditation. These education requirements are then followed by a three year joint duty assignment to qualify for the JSO designator of 3L. The requirement then is formal JPME, followed by a JDA. It is projected that the services will be able to continue to sustain and meet the numerical requirements. There may be an initial shortfall, particularly in the senior grade levels, but as the educational JPME system matures, output in terms of numbers should meet future requirements.

The greatest challenge is not the numbers required, but producing the officers with the specific qualifications. There already exists a critical shortage of officers possessing the right qualifications required for the joint duty assignments. Each of the services indicated that critical shortages in low density specialties (of which the JDAL has a predominance) exists, and attempts to fill these requirements have been difficult at best. One of Title IV’s directives is for the services to...

"...fill 80% of the identified critical JDA billets with JSOs by 1 October 1989. 100% must be reached by 1992." 37

The services are faced with the requirement to fill JDA billets with highly qualified officers in a short period of time. Some of the
services expressed confidence in meeting the requirements, although it would take time. A couple of the services did comment that they could not fulfill the requirement by 1 October 1989. The Army was not sure that it could meet this requirement in time. Projections for the Army were in the neighborhood of 68 - 72% by 1 October 1989. 38

The enduring requirement is to place the right officer in the right job - not the requirement to meet statistical goals contained in the legislation. In this author’s opinion, the services, while meeting the letter of the law (numbers), may not be meeting the spirit and intent of the law. The fact is, the services cannot "get there from here" in terms of qualified (in particular specialties) joint specialty officers. Shortages exist, and the output from the educational systems cannot, in the short term, meet current requirements. The spin-off from this is that the "desire to improve what Congress perceives as the lack of quality of the officers performing joint duty assignments," is not being met. The quantity is there, but is the quality?

The next chapter explores the dynamics associated with the reasons why the services cannot meet the requirements of Title IV.

ENDNOTES


33. OJCS, J-1, Manpower Management Division, "Memorandum For Record - Joint Duty Assignment List Intelligence Billets," 10 Jan 1989.

35. Based on discussions and interviews with service representatives and action officers and taken from documents provided by service POCs regarding Title IV implementation.

36. Ibid.


38. Based on discussions and interviews with service representatives and action officers and taken from documents provided by service POCs regarding Title IV implementation.
Generally speaking, all the services support Title IV and its objectives. In the long range, joint operations and service interaction will be enhanced and improved. Inter-service rivalry and parochialism will be reduced. The services are fully committed to supporting the provisions of Title IV. With the exception of a few issues, implementation and compliance are continuing.

Recent discussions with service representatives bear this out. 39 In the case of the Air Force, full compliance is well on its way. Internal arrangements in the management of officer resources have been made to ease constraints and reconcile competing provisions of the law. Initial analysis indicates that the Air Force can support the required JDA billets, but is dependent on JPME production. The main concern, and has been since enactment of the law, is the continuing question regarding exact definition of what is a critical billet. The Air Force, like the other services, is experiencing shortages in the low density, highly technical specialties required by the JDAL. The pool of officers that the Air Force must draw upon includes many flight rated pilots. The officer inventory in the Air Force is comprised of about 40% flyers and 60% non-rated officers. There is an
imbalance in the JDAL between rated and non-rated specialties. Taking pilots away from flying jobs over an extended period of time is "dangerous," for obvious reasons. The Air Force, like the other services, is looking for relief in the transition period in order to grow more JSO qualified officers, particularly in the low density specialties.

The Marine Corps, of all the services, is having the least problem in complying with the law. Internal adjustments have been made within their Manpower and Reserve Affairs departments in order to comply with Title IV. The number of JDA and critical billets is relatively small in number compared to the other services. As in the other services, the non-critical occupational specialty (COS) requirements far outweigh the critical occupational specialties. The latest figures estimate JDA requirements for combat arms officers was about 95, compared to about 146 for non-combat arms requirements. Conversely, the officer inventory in the Marine Corps is about 64% combat arms compared to 36% non combat arms. In particular, the area of signals intelligence is critically short. The Marine Corps does not, however, anticipate problems in meeting congressional goals.

The Navy made substantial progress initially to comply with the law. The 50% requirement to fill JDAL billets with JSOs was exceeded (53%). However, the requirement to fill 80% of the critical billets with JSOs was not met. Only 56% was filled. The Navy is not hung up on critical billets. Because of a number reasons, such as projected rotation dates, desire not to create turbulence, shortage specialties, and special considerations ("by name calls"), the Navy did not meet the required percentage fills. A particular problem, common to the other services, is the coding and designation of critical billets with
low density specialties. Intelligence communications (10.3%), intelligence specialists (14.7%), cryptologists (6%) are the predominant critical specialties. Shortages exist in the Navy also. Growing JSOs in critical specialties is a problem for the Navy. Only time and more relief in the legislation will help the situation.

The Army has the greatest requirements of all the services. As previously stated, the Army projects that only between 68 - 72% of the JDAL critical billets will be filled by JSOs by 1 October 1989. Once again, the reason is because of the predominance of low density specialty requirements. Only about 18% of the JDAL requirements are combat arms designated. The Army plans to resolve this problem by assigning officers who possess the alternate or secondary specialty required by the JDAL. While this will help in meeting the numerical goals, it may not completely meet the spirit of the law. This is not to say that these officers are not quality officers, it only says that they may not be fully qualified. The fact is, many of us, while we carry an alternate specialty, do not consider ourselves fully qualified in that particular specialty. The Army, in time, will meet the letter and intent of the law. The key point is "in time." Relief in the legislation is necessary to accomplish the intent of the law.

As can be seen, the services are fully committed to meeting the provisions of Title IV. None of the services are there yet. The caution is that we not be driven by the numbers and timeline established by Congress. Instead, the focus must be getting the right officer in the right job and getting qualified officers to joint duty assignments - over time.

ENDNOTES

39. Statistics enumerated were obtained during interviews and
discussions with service action officers and documents in the form of fact sheets, information papers, and memorandums provided by service POCs.
TITLE IV - JOINT OFFICER PERSONNEL POLICY
QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY?

CHAPTER VI
QUALITY IMPLICATIONS

The previous chapters have discussed Title IV, its history, the law in transition, and the dilemma the services face in attempting to meet the intent of the law.

The thesis of this study has been the opinion that the services have been driven to meet congressional statistical goals, not necessarily meeting the more enduring requirement of putting the right officer in the right job, thus meeting the intent of the law - to improve the quality of joint duty officer performance and in the long range improve joint operations. The implication is that the "quality" (read to mean "qualified"), at least in the short term, may have been compromised, simply because the services cannot comply with the law as currently stated. This is not to say that the services are putting lower quality officers in these joint jobs. The fact is, we're in a numbers game, at least for the time being.

Unless Congress allows for additional relief from the current timelines, the services may not have any other choice. It is encouraging to note that in discussions with service representatives, the trend is to "proceed with deliberate speed." Compliance with the law is being done so with caution.
The dynamics associated with the services' inability to meet these requirements are interesting. The entire spectrum of officer personnel management has been affected by Title IV. Service policies have experienced incredible turbulence since this law was enacted. The services have been prudent in their reaction to Title IV. The service's inability to provide sufficient quality joint specialty officer is a result of several things:

- shortage of low density specialties to meet joint requirements, 40

- officer availability, that is to say, timing in a particular officer's career. 41

The shortage conditions that exist within the services in terms of low density specialties have already been discussed in the previous chapter. We may not, as in the case of the Army, be putting fully qualified officers in some of the joint duty billets, simply because there aren't enough officers to do so.

Additionally, the right officer with the right specialty is not available because he or she may not have had enough time on station and cannot be moved or have a permanent change of station (PCS) at the particular time. The services do not want to move officers to arbitrarily meet joint duty requirements. PCS constraints, on-station requirements, and stability are but a few reasons why the services do not want to move their personnel.

Still another dynamic associated with this issue is:

- the skewed nature of the requirements; the coding of the "critical" billets were predominantly the technical specialties. 42

Coupled with the already stated shortages of low density specialties, the problem of trying to meet congressional objectives of 80% for critical joint jobs by 1 October 1989 and 100% by 1992 is exacerbated.
A discussion of quality implications cannot be made without commenting on career and promotion impacts. Officers may be hard pressed to meet service career requirements and also joint duty requirements. As previously discussed, there may be not enough time in an officer’s career to get all the “right jobs.” It’s no secret amongst the services that in order to get promoted, certain jobs must be performed. Joint duty becomes just one more requirement to be met or “ticket punched.” One thing to be sure, services in order to get their very best officers promoted will now have to assign them to joint duty billets. In the long run, quality will be met - a positive aspect of the law.

Other quality impacts are evident, not so much as it relates to the issue being discussed, but to the other side of the coin. By this I mean the non-joint officers among the services. Other studies have begun to differentiate between the “joint elite” and the non-joint officer. This distinction has far-reaching implications for the officer corps in general.

What exists now is a prime discriminator in terms of promotions. It fosters “careerism.” Officers inherently are ambitious and desire to do well and get promoted. This legislation establishes restrictions on upward mobility for a large number of officers who are not selected for joint duty assignments. If only the very best are designated for joint duty, then it stands to reason that these will be the officers destined for promotion to the highest levels. Some very qualified, and outstanding officers may be left behind. Each service must be attuned to the impact this has on the officer corps. Quality cuts, understandably, must be made. A system to do just that will be necessary if the services are to retain the highest quality levels...
they desire in their officer ranks. It stands to reason, that "non-
joint" officers may well decide to leave the services early or retire early. Potentially, many quality officers could be lost, particularly in the lower field grade levels (04 and 05).

This is an assertion that needs to be further qualified and discussed. Potential loss of quality officers as a result of Title IV must be considered. I don't believe that there will be a significant loss of the more senior field grade officers, particularly 06 level. Logically, these officers will already have more than twenty years of service and will probably not be influenced, at this stage in their careers, by the requirements of Title IV - particularly for further promotion. Certainly these officers will probably not decide to retire early as a result of Title IV. Again, as I have consistently stated, this does not question the overall quality of these officers. Many of these senior field grade officers will be promoted to general or flag rank. In fact, if they are to be promoted to general they must have had a joint duty assignment. Intuitively, Title IV requirements will not have the same impact on the 06 level officers that it may have on the majors and lieutenant colonels.

We may need to focus our attention on the majors and young lieutenant colonels. There are no statistics which support a great exodus of officers leaving the services because of Title IV, at least not yet. The services, however, must be conscious of the potential.

If one were to look at the Army officer promotion rates in the past two years of officers serving in joint duty assignments as compared to the rest of the Army, one would wonder about the advantages of being assigned to joint duty. The statistics do not look very encouraging. Understandably the ground rules have changed
and the effects of Title IV requirements have not been fully realized. If the services are serious about complying with the law, the promotion trend should improve. If we are putting highly qualified and the very best officers into joint duty assignments, then the promotion rates ought to improve. Only time will tell.

The following data was derived from promotion lists of the past two years. This data reflects Joint Service Officer Statistical Summaries for Army Competitive Category Promotion Selections for 04 to 05 and 05 to 06 in the years indicated. 43

### JOINT SERVICE OFFICER STATISTICAL SUMMARY

#### a. 05 to 06 (July 1987):

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Previously Considered</th>
<th>First Time Considered</th>
<th>Recap (AZ/FTC)</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ARMY STAFF</td>
<td>52 0 0</td>
<td>92 43 47</td>
<td>144 43 30</td>
<td>264 4 1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOINT STAFF</td>
<td>11 0 0</td>
<td>35 21 60</td>
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<tr>
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<td>208 2 .2</td>
<td>129 32 25</td>
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<td>ARMY WIDE</td>
<td>984 13 1</td>
<td>1008 454 45</td>
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<td>3547 25 0.7</td>
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#### b. 05 to 06 (March 1988):

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<tr>
<td>ARMY STAFF</td>
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<td>130 52 40</td>
<td>207 54 26</td>
<td>244 2 0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOINT STAFF</td>
<td>20 0 0</td>
<td>34 12 35</td>
<td>54 12 22</td>
<td>80 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT DUTY</td>
<td>117 2 2</td>
<td>231 61 26</td>
<td>348 63 18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY WIDE</td>
<td>1256 18 1</td>
<td>1598 634 40</td>
<td>2854 652 23</td>
<td>3529 53 1.5</td>
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It's interesting to note that promotion rates for officers assigned to joint duty were consistently below not only the Army average, but also in comparison to those assigned to the Army staff. This begs the question regarding the perceptions many officers have about joint duty (the disadvantages?) and more importantly, the quality of the officers assigned to joint duty compared to their contemporaries Army wide. Still further, what about the potential loss of some very outstanding officers as a result of these promotion rates?

The data for lower field grades is better. Officers assigned to joint duty fare better against the Army wide average, but are well below their contemporaries in the Army and Joint staffs. Additionally, below the zone selections for joint duty officers are below that of their contemporaries across the board. The following data reflects this analysis.

c. 04 to 05 (June 1987):

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<td>ELIG SEL %</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARMY STAFF</td>
<td>16 1 6</td>
<td>73 68 93</td>
<td>89 69 78</td>
<td>70 7 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2 0 0</td>
<td>10 10 100</td>
<td>12 10 83</td>
<td>7 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT DUTY</td>
<td>12 8 12</td>
<td>239 168 70</td>
<td>367 180 49</td>
<td>229 11 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY WIDE</td>
<td>1104 80 7</td>
<td>1904 1324 70</td>
<td>3008 1404 47</td>
<td>1742 95 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. 04 to 05 (September 1988):

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY STAFF</td>
<td>7 0 0</td>
<td>47 37 79</td>
<td>54 37 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT STAFF</td>
<td>1 0 0</td>
<td>12 11 92</td>
<td>13 11 85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This has been a discussion on the quality impacts of Title IV. While the issue at hand is the potential compromise of quality versus quantity in meeting Title IV requirements, an important consideration has been the impact this legislation may have on the rest of the officer corps in each of the services. The long term effects cannot be measured or felt this early in the process, but should be one that must be studied as the legislation matures.

ENDNOTES

40. Based on discussions and interviews with service representatives and action officers and taken from documents provided by service POCs regarding Title IV implementation.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. HGDA Promotion Lists provided by the Administration Officer, US Army War College.
The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 and Title IV have tremendous and far reaching implications. As has been stated, many congressional and military leaders feel that this Act is one of the most important pieces of legislation to affect our national security and the Department of Defense. The effects of this legislation will not be felt immediately - only time and experience will measure the effects.

The premise of this study focused on the quality impacts associated with the implementation of Title IV. The underlying thought is that the services are being driven by congressional language that establishes concrete timelines to implement a part of the law that must not be done in haste. In the services' attempt to fully comply with this law, potential compromise in the quality and qualifications of officers being assigned to joint duty is being made in order to meet numerical goals.

Efforts have been made in this study to point out the following:

- the intent of the law is to improve the quality of officers assigned to joint duty, thereby improving joint operations,
- Congress has arbitrarily established numerical requirements, i.e., 1000 critical billets, 50% of all JDAL billets will be filled by JSOs, 80% of all critical billets will be filled by JSOs by 1 October 1989, etc.,

- future inventory of JSOs must have JPME followed by joint duty assignments in order to qualify as a JSO,

- tour lengths have been established before officers can qualify for general or flag rank,

- promotions will be predicated on fulfilling a joint duty assignment at some point in an officer’s career,

- JDAL requirements are not only top heavy in rank structure, but are comprised of low density, highly technical specialties, of which all services are critically short,

- the quality implications are evident, in that the services have not been able to fill specialty requirements due to the shortages, and in cases where they have, it was only because the officer possessed the alternate specialty,

- service compliance has been slow at best, but a positive sign in terms of getting the right officer in the right job,

and finally,

- congressional language may be forcing the services to comply without regard to quality; compromising quality for quantity just to meet the letter of the law.

The intent of this study was not to say that the services are placing low quality officers in joint duty assignments purely to meet the law. The provisions of the law, particularly as it relates to promotion opportunities, forces the services to place their very best officers in joint assignments. The contention is that, unless we’re careful, we may potentially, be compromising quality for quantity just to meet congressional language.

I cannot prove, statistically, that the services are in fact falling in this trap. It is an intuitive feeling that can be logically surmised as one studies Title IV and its implications. The
requirements are fact, the timelines are established, the resources are for now, finite, the services are having difficulty meeting the law, and compliance is mandatory. The only way to precisely measure the quality impacts will be in the promotion rates of officers who have served in joint duty assignments. As stated in a recent article...

"....The underlying objective of the provision concerning promotion rates is to ensure that highly capable officers are selected for joint duty assignments....officers in other joint duty billets should be promoted at the same rate as their peers in grade and career category throughout their services.... The services are supposed to be assigning top-quality officers (to joint duty posts), and if they are, that will be reflected in their promotion rates." 44

There are several recommendations that can be made from the foregoing discussion. Clearly, more study needs to be made regarding quality versus quantity. In time the promotion rates will either prove or disprove the notion that we have compromised quality for quantity. If the promotion rates discussed in a previous chapter reflect a trend, particularly for 05 to 06, then we may have a problem. If in the final analysis we have, then efforts to correct the problem must be made.

Continued careful screening and selection of officers for joint duty is absolutely necessary. Consideration of selection boards, much like promotion and service schooling boards, for joint duty selection may be an effective way to ensure quality. I am not sure that assignment officers can make that determination at this time. A process ought to be established if we are concerned with sending the very best officers.

In terms of the Joint Duty Assignment List, a review, perhaps line by line, position by position, needs to be conducted. Clearly the
services are having difficulty meeting the low density specialty requirements. Are the critical positions really critical? Definitive guidance regarding what is joint related and what is critical must be made. Some of the services are still concerned about this.

Finally, continued efforts by the services to extend implementation of the law must be made. I know efforts are on-going. Congress, if it wants the services to meet the intent of the law must allow more time for implementation. Additionally, the arbitrary establishment of numerical objectives must be renegotiated. It is apparent that the services cannot meet already established percentages in the short term. Further study to determine what can be met and how long it would take to meet the requirements should be done with service representation. Obviously Congress understands this as they have allowed some extension. Additional time should not be a problem.

Off line, but of interest to the author, is the "morale" impacts that Title IV has on the officer corps, particularly the Army. I discussed previously the implications on the non-joint officer world. The potential loss of quality officers, particularly at the major and lieutenant colonel levels, is something that needs consideration. The restrictions imposed by Title IV in career development and promotion opportunities may influence some quality officers to leave the Army. This must be studied by the service leadership lest we have created a morale problem amongst the officer corps.

It is interesting to note, that during the course of my research, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) is conducting an assessment of the positive and negative implications of Title IV on the Department of Defense. The GAO is reviewing the DOD joint duty assignment list and assessing (1) what positions are on the list, (2) how the list
was established, (3) how critical billets on the list are determined, 
(4) whether the positions meet the criteria established by the Act, 
and (5) how joint assignment requirements impact on general/flag 
officer promotions. 45 This assessment is being conducted through a 
series of surveys and interviews. The results will be interesting.

This study was not meant to question the merits of Title IV. Nor 
does it explicitly state that the services are, in fact, compromising 
quality for quantity. All this study is asserting is that the 
potential is there. The study was conducted out of concern that if we 
are to meet the intent and spirit of Title IV, then we must do so with 
the full knowledge that it will take time. I am confident that the 
services are doing the best they can to meet Title IV requirements, 
with the intention to provide quality.

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45. Department of Defense, Inspector General, "Memorandum For 
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41. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Officer Management, JCS Admin
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45. "Joint Specialty Officers: Improving The Military During A
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46. Sherfield, Michael B., LTC, "The 1986 DOD Reorganization Act
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47. Many references were made in the text of this study that are attributable to and were the results of discussions and interviews with numerous service representatives. Additionally, documents in the form of information papers, fact sheet, executive summaries, internal service memorandums and statistical data were provided by the same service representatives.