DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
This is the fifth WRAIR quarterly report concerning research in support of the HQDA New Manning System (NMS) Field Evaluation. This report describes the realization of human dimensions expectations in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, California. The report contains sections cohesion; motivation; unit family relations; leadership; an internal assessment of leadership during transition; multidimensional change and the human dimension; discussion of issues developed in the October, 1985 Leadership Conference; and issues and proposed policies developed in the January, 1987 Leadership Conference.
Block #18 - light infantry division, motivation/morale; New Manning System, NMS, one station unit training (OSUT), soldier survey; military effectiveness; training.

Military psychology (etc.)
UNIT MANNING SYSTEM FIELD EVALUATION

Technical Report No. 5

David H. Marlowe, Ph.D., Chief
Department of Military Psychiatry
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
Washington, D.C. 20307-5100

PRINCIPAL AUTHORS

Faris R. Kirkland, Ph.D.
LTC Theodore P. Furukawa, Ph.D.
Joel M. Teitelbaum, Ph.D.
LTC Larry H. Ingraham, Ph.D.
LTC Bruce T. Caine, Ph.D.

EDITORS

Faris R. Kirkland, Ph.D.
Linette R. Sparzcino, M.A.

September 1987

NOTICE: The views of the author(s) do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense, (para 4-3, AR 360-5).

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited
FOREWORD

BY

LTG WILLIAM H. HARRISON
COMMANDING GENERAL, I CORPS

The attached report is important, and I hope you will read it carefully and think about its implications for our total Army. As the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and Fort Ord from January 1985 to July 1987, this report covers primarily "my watch." It presents the honest assessment of a group of dedicated professionals, both from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research and within the 7th Infantry Division (Light), who truly care about the soldiers and family members of the U.S. Army. Their observations and conclusions are strong reminders that if we set our goals high enough we may never accomplish all we want to achieve in the time allotted. But we must never stop trying. And that may be the most important lesson revealed by this study.

Combat is clearly one of life's most demanding experiences; and realistic preparation for combat is nearly as stressful, especially when performance expectations for both individuals and units are high. Our experience proves that excellence is a meaningful goal only when we set and enforce standards that stretch our capacities. This applies equally to training, readiness and taking care of soldiers and their families. With the changing composition of our
Army, the always difficult leadership task of balancing our concerns for mission and for taking care of soldiers has become even more demanding. As this report strongly argues, we should constantly reevaluate the content of our leadership instruction to ensure we are always developing "people skills" and operating values to match our strong emphasis on technical and tactical competence. Teaching leaders how to deal successfully with complex human problems is simply not something we can leave to chance. We must teach and live our values and ideals every day.

It is particularly significant that this report reflects the combined efforts of both internal and external observers. The close cooperation and effective exchange of information and interpretations between the WRAIR researchers and their Fort Ord points of contact are reflected throughout this report. Our awareness of the many frustrations experienced by soldiers, family members and some of our actions to address them, are summarized in Chapter 5. We did not and must not ignore our shortcomings and failures. We must learn from them as well as from our successes. I encourage you to use this report as the basis for professional discussions and sincere self-evaluation. We can achieve and maintain highly cohesive, combat-effective units if we, as leaders at all levels--squad to division--are willing to personally grow and change and help others realize their full potential.
Finally, an one reading this report must keep in mind these points:

1. Any failures listed here are Army failures – not failures of any particular unit or group of units, nor any particular segment of the observed organization.

2. Everyone involved tried their very best. It was through no lack of effort on the part of the soldiers, the NCO's or the officers that all expectations were not met.

3. The soldiers, NCO's and officers of the 7th ID (L) accomplished their assigned mission – they downsized, reconfigured, force modernized, reorganized, trained and certified the U.S. Army's first Infantry Division (Light) – in accordance with the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army's White Paper, in the time specified. They are a magnificent group of tough, proud, professional LIGHT FIGHTERS of whom I am very proud.

"To reach your full potential - you need a goal greater than yourself." - Anon.

William J. Harrison
WILLIAM H. HARRISON
Lieutenant General, USA
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The compilation of this technical report involved the efforts of a significant portion of the staff of the Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Associate investigators include Nancy Harrison, M.A., CPT Hilary Weiner, Ph.D., SGT Gary Killiebrew, and Suzanne Wood, M.A.

Contributors to data collection, statistical analysis, and manuscript preparation include LTC Michael Bain, M.D., CPT Paul Bartone, Ph.D., Doris Bitler, Matthew Chopper, Jill Davis, Denise Dickman, Elizabeth Hoover, Pearl Katz, Ph.D., SGT Joe Kuroczka, Victoria Leu, Sharon McBride, LTC James Martin, Ph.D., Gamine Meckel, Richard Oldakowski, SSG Helena Prince, Anna Robinson, Leora Rosen, Ph.D., Kathy Saczynski, Ph.D., Tina Sanicola, LTC Robert Schneider, Ph.D., Sheela Singh, Daniel Schubert, Adria Smith, CPT Mark Vaitkus, Ph.D., and SP4 Theodore Waz.

CPT David Hoopengartner and MAJ Michael McGee of HQ, FORSCOM, contributed to data collection and interpretation.

LTC Ferruccio M. Crocetti, Chaplain (LTC) Richard Goldsmith, LTC John T. Jaccard, M.D., LTC Michael Perrault, MAJ Diana M. Putman, and CPT Stephen Swan contributed to writing Chapter V.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary ................................................. 1
Introduction ....................................................... 4
Chapter I: Cohesion ................................................. 10
Chapter II: Motivation ............................................. 23
Chapter III: Unit Family Relations ................................. 33
Chapter IV: Leadership ............................................. 45
Chapter V: An Internal Assessment of Leadership During Transition: Multi-Dimensional Change and the Human Dimension .............. 56
Chapter VI: Conclusions ........................................... 68
References ............................................................ 79

Appendix A: Discussion of the Representative Issues Developed in the October, 1985, Leadership Conference ........................................ A-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report describes the realization of human dimensions expectations in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, California. Our findings point up deficiencies in small unit cohesion, leadership, and Army practice which have long been known and often addressed, but never solved. The critique provided, however, is not about the soldiers of the 7th, their leaders, their families, or their community, but of the way the U.S. Army does business. The central thesis is that while the Division succeeded in achieving all conventional criteria set for it, it failed in the human dimensions. That failure came not from want of caring and dedication, but from the way the Army trains and constrains its leaders.

In creating the first new light infantry division the Army launched two bold experiments. The first was to take a conventional infantry division, down-size it, refit it, train it, and certify it combat ready in 18 months. In this the Division experiment succeeded.

The second experiment was to generate fighting power in the new light division with greater reliance on people rather than on materiel and weapons systems. The COHORT battalions, intensive training, and a paradigm of positive leadership to develop high performance divisions, without recourse to volunteers, highly specialized and technical skills, or special personnel screening—in short, to create "high performance" units with ordinary soldiers. This attempt failed to meet its stated objectives.

"High performance" was defined in the human dimensions sense as highly developed focus, dedication, motivation, commitment, and proficiency. "High performance" was sought through attention to the development of cohesion, motivation, and mutually supportive unit-family relations—which were to result in "Soldier Power"—highly trained, disciplined, dedicated soldiers prepared and willing to win by using superior military proficiency and initiative rather than superior firepower and logistics. The 7th ID(L) was the first division to undertake the light infantry mission, all-COHORT configuration, and implementation of the CSA's new leadership paradigm.

The first WRAIR Unit Manning System Technical Report in this series (Marlowe, 1985) suggested the experiment was succeeding. Survey responses, interviews, and observations indicated the Division was superior in human dimensions to non-COHORT units and comparable to COHORT units in the extensive Unit Manning System research sample. This fifth report shows the Division could not sustain its early success within the constraints of its missions and conventional assumptions about leadership and leader/follower relationships. The problem lay not in the quality of soldiers or their leaders but in internally and externally generated pressures, and in basic cultural assumptions and leadership practices in the Army about how soldiers should behave toward one another.
The first light division had multiple missions which required immediate demonstration of error-free performance rather than progressive development. It was to convert to the light configuration without sacrificing combat readiness, while achieving certification and providing a blueprint for subsequent light divisions, and do these on a post lacking many of the necessary facilities (like housing) to support such a mission. Between our initial report of November 1985 (Marlowe, 1985) and the second survey administration in the spring of 1986 (Marlowe, 1986a), the Division added a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) commitment. To accomplish all of these missions something had to give, and the price was paid in the human dimensions. Most of the leaders were unable to break new ground in caring, empowering leadership and development of subordinates. Even when they knew their behavior undermined the trust and initiative they required for success in combat, they too often reverted to traditional and more familiar modes of interaction they had learned through their years of exposure to the larger Army culture. They did what they had to do in ways they had been trained to do it, and that is the central lesson of this report.

The issues are not unique to the 7th ID(L). They are pervasive throughout the American Army. In this natural experiment the multiple missions, fast training pace, and high visibility concentrated the pressure and made shortfalls in leader preparation obvious. The Army simply expected more from its soldiers than could reasonably be achieved within the time and resource constraints.

The reasons for the observed shortfalls in the human dimensions arena derive from outmoded assumptions of absolute leader authority in the larger Army culture. The new light divisions had to be fielded immediately. There was no time to do it right, to prepare the installation, think through the organizational structure, prepare the TO&E, teach leaders, patiently coach performance, and add missions as circumstances allowed. The Army staff threw money and people at the problem and said, "Do it." In good American soldier fashion the Division replied, "Can Do!" and set about its task. A continual parade of high ranking officers visited the Division and invariably left singing praise for its prodigious accomplishments. Nobody from the Army staff is known to have asked, "What about cohesion and the other human dimensions that lie at the heart of what we are trying to accomplish out here?" There is little wonder the Division seemed to lose sight of the human dimensions; nobody else in the Army was paying any attention to them either.

The reasons for such oversights originate in the larger Army culture. Previous reports in this series noted that in the American Army cohesion is presumed to be a by-product, not a core goal leaders need be trained to create and maintain. The experience of the 7th demonstrates the operational danger of that by-product assumption. Previous reports called attention to the deleterious effects on cohesion of rotating key company level leaders; the experience of the 7th confirms the folly of this Army-wide practice. Previous reports described the special skills required to lead self-motivated COHORT soldiers; the experience of the 7th further documents that a new approach to
small unit training is necessary. Previous reports noted the importance of technical and tactical proficiency in leaders; the experience of the 7th provides specific evidence of the absolute necessity of these capabilities.

One mission of the Division was to provide a blueprint of lessons learned for the Army in the creation of other light infantry divisions. The Division succeeded brilliantly in that mission. It is now incumbent on the rest of the Army to study that blueprint, learn from it, and try once more to build combat units worthy of the soldiers entrusted to them.
INTRODUCTION

Innovation in the 7th Infantry Division

The creation of the first light infantry division entailed significant changes from traditional practices in the U.S. Army in the spheres of tactical concepts, manning systems, and human relations. The officers and men of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) were the pioneering executors of all these innovations.

In the light infantry, combat potential comes not from the logistical and technological strength upon which the U.S. Army has relied since the 1860's, but from the military proficiency of small groups of lightly armed foot soldiers. "Soldier power," the foundation of the light infantry, is the product of synergistic interaction between intensive, progressive training rigorously focused on the combat mission, experienced leadership, horizontal and vertical cohesion, and supportive relationships between unit and family. The light infantry concept imposes unprecedented demands not only for professional competence but also for physical and psychological strength and stamina. Organized on an austere basis to have a high degree of strategic mobility, light infantry (once in action) is dependent on the infantrymen's legs, supplemented by organic aviation, for tactical mobility and logistical support.

A prerequisite for the development of the levels of military proficiency necessary to fulfill the light infantry concept is the Unit Manning System (COHORT). In COHORT units, first-term soldiers stay together from enlistment through one station unit training (OSUT), and for three years in their unit. The COHORT system makes possible the development of interpersonal cohesion essential to small forces operating independently in hostile environments. By stabilizing combat teams for three years, it makes possible progressive, "accretive" training that can produce substantially higher levels of military competence than could be achieved in individual rotation units. The strengths and potentialities of the COHORT system have emerged consistently from observations by WRAIR and are published in the New Manning System Field Evaluation Technical Reports 1 through 4 (Marlowe, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c).

Light infantry initiatives in human relations derive from the Chief of Staff (CSA)'s 1985 White Paper on Leadership (DA Pam 600-50). The principles enunciated in the White Paper on Leadership, many of which had already appeared in the White Paper on Light Infantry Divisions (Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1984), propose relationships between leaders and subordinates based on mutual trust, respect, affection, and dedication to a common purpose. The principles call for open, complete, and truthful communication both up and down the chain of command. The CSA recommends that leaders empower their subordinates by granting them discretion commensurate with their competence, involving them in decision-making, and relying on their ability to function autonomously within the boundaries of their missions. He advises commanders to take an active interest in their soldiers' personal, professional, and familial welfare.
The elements of this "positive leadership" model are not new. Most of them have appeared in treatises on leadership in the U.S. Army. They have not, however, been salient in the recent institutional culture of the U.S. Army. Evidence from research performed by Walter Reed Army Institute of Research and the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences since 1980 shows that centralization, social distance, and punitiveness are characteristics of leader behavior more often than close and supportive collegiality. Light infantry units, because of the hardship and isolation in which they operate and their dependency for combat power on the performance of men rather than machines, provided an intensive test of the kind of leadership the CSA described in his White Paper (1985). Although few officers and NCOs in the U.S. Army of the mid-1980s had experienced or received training in positive leadership, enough of the leaders in the Division practiced it to assess its value.

In addition to the challenge of spearheading changes in three fundamental fields, the Division was to create high performance units, bring them rapidly to maturity, and serve as a model for future light infantry forces—all the while maintaining a capability for rapid deployment. It was concurrently to organize family support structures to mitigate the stresses on families resulting from frequent, prolonged deployment. The Division was to accomplish its tasks using ordinary enlistees—soldiers who were neither volunteers nor specially selected. The CSA did promise experienced commanders, competent and physically fit NCOs, logistical priority, and lightweight equipment.

The Division undertook its mission with vigor and enthusiasm. The successes it achieved reflect great credit on its officers and troops. The sources of many of the shortfalls lie within outdated assumptions of our military institutional culture. Aspects of this culture impeded both adaptive change and effective command by increasing the stresses on leaders. It also was the source of regressive behavior into which leaders withdrew under stress.

Evaluating Human Dimensions in the Division

In 1984 the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) tasked the Department of Military Psychiatry of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) to evaluate human dimensions in the first light infantry division. The Department of Military Psychiatry has been a pioneer in research on cohesion, military social systems, sustained operations, and resistance to combat stress. Previous studies by the Department and other researchers found that willingness to fight depends upon soldiers' confidence in themselves, their fellow soldiers, their leaders, their training, and their equipment; a sense of caring among soldiers, and between soldiers and their leaders; and soldiers' trust that their families will be safe and cared for in terms of quality family time and perceptions of family economic, social, and psychological satisfaction.
WRAIR is carrying out this task by expanding its ongoing research on cohesion and its field evaluation of the New (Unit) Manning System to examine emergent soldier–soldier, soldier–leader, and unit–family relationships in selected units of the 7th Infantry Division (Light). The Division is the first to have all of its combat units organized under COHORT principles, and the first to have complete battalions in which all first-term soldiers in high density MOSs, and many of those in specialized MOSs, are trained in OSUT packages. The first four of these all-COHORT battalions are described in this report. Three are infantry rifle battalions; the fourth is a field artillery light howitzer battalion.

The sources of information were soldiers of all ranks in the four combat battalions, commanders, staff members, and specialists in headquarters above battalion, and spouses of soldiers in the four battalions. Data collection methods included interviews, participant observation, and surveys. Interviews with soldiers took place in natural settings in the field, garrison, and homes. During the first eighteen months of the evaluation, interviewers reached more than 900 soldiers in the ranks of private through major general. The research team usually interviewed family members in their homes, occasionally with the soldier also present. The team conducted formal, in-depth interviews with 106 spouses. Briefings and social events in which spouses participated yielded more than 200 additional informal contacts.

Commanders and key staff members at all levels in the Division cooperated with and supported the research team. Virtually all soldiers and most of the spouse cooperated as well. WRAIR assured interviewees and survey respondents that their comments and questionnaire responses would remain confidential and that only non-attributable grouped or trend data would be provided to the Army Staff. Most soldiers, leaders, and spouses discussed their perceptions frankly, constructively, and in detail. Most of the respondents in interviews took pains to provide a balanced appraisal of both negative and positive characteristics of their experiences in the Division. Soldiers in group interviews did not hesitate to support or contradict statements made by others. In addition to the interviews, soldiers had opportunities to express their attitudes and perceptions on closed- and open-ended questions on the WRAIR Soldier Survey. Their spouses also had opportunities to answer similar questions concerning human relations and family well-being.

**Findings from the Soldier Survey**

This report addresses principally the findings from qualitative observations and interviews in units of a light infantry division. Before assessing them, it is desirable to review the quantitative findings from administration of the Soldier Survey to light infantry units, other COHORT units, and conventional units.
The WRAIR Soldier Survey, developed in 1983-85, has been administered to more than 20,000 soldiers in CONUS and USAREUR. It includes a number of indicators of psychological readiness (Griffith, 1985, 1986; Griffith & Vaitkus, 1986). The measures which are of interest in the present report are indicators of horizontal and vertical cohesion, namely Unit Social Climate and Concerned Leadership. Both of these cohesion measures reflect positive affect (i.e., liking) towards the reference group and give little or no indication of the extent to which ties are based on the instrumental value of these groups.

Responses to the Soldier Survey were obtained from more than 70 percent of the soldiers in the four battalions of the Division in July-September 1985 and again in February-April 1986. This response rate is comparable to that obtained for other COHORT and for conventional units in the UMS sample. The life cycle age of each battalion at the first survey administration was between three and eight months, and at the second administration between nine and thirteen months. The average age of nonlight COHORT units was comparable to that of light units for the same time periods. For the sake of comparison, the average length of service for junior enlisted soldiers in conventional units was approximately two years at both points in time.

Two major trends are noted in the survey data. The first is a decline in the overall level of horizontal cohesion in light infantry units (see Figure 1). Examination of Figure 2 reveals that this decline is consistent across each of the four battalions. This compares with a rather stable level of horizontal cohesion for other COHORT units and conventional units across the two points in time.

The second trend is a slightly more severe decline in the overall level of vertical cohesion for light infantry units as opposed to other COHORT units (see Figure 3). This trend also occurs in each of the four light infantry battalions (Figure 4).

The survey does not explain the causes of these trends. The remainder of this report is dedicated to the detailed analysis of information gathered through observation and interviews, with the aim of providing insight into the trends observed in the survey data. The reasons for the decline in cohesion, the processes by which the behavior of commanders affects cohesion and other dimensions of psychological readiness, and the relationship between psychological readiness and combat potential are the foci of this report.

Organization of This Report

The aim of this report is, first, to compare the expectations laid out in the CSA's (1984) White Paper on Light Infantry Divisions with the findings of the research team; second, to explain how differences between expected and actual results occurred; and third, to draw conclusions and posit implications from the findings for the light infantry and for the Army. This report includes findings based on the first eighteen
months of data collection in a three-year project. The final report is due in the summer of 1988.

The CSA expressed four central expectations for the light infantry division--these dealt with cohesion, motivation, unit-family relations, and leadership.

The CSA's expectations with respect to cohesion were that

...COHORT...will allow horizontal and vertical bonding from initial entry training through deployment to combat...Cohesion, the powerful, intangible combat multiplier, will help produce tight knit, self-confident, competent units capable of withstanding the most demanding stresses of war. Training...must also facilitate the bonding that occurs when leaders and soldiers share stress and hardship (1984, pp. 5-6).

The CSA saw training and teamwork as the foundation of motivation.

Training...must produce highly motivated, physically fit, self-disciplined troops. Teamwork within squads, platoons and companies, teamwork between maneuver and supporting arms, and teamwork between ground and air elements will be the product. The result will be Soldier Power--the synergistic combination of concerned, competent leaders and well trained soldiers which will make light infantry forces uniquely effective (1984, p. 3).

The CSA expressed his expectations for unit-family relations in his 1983 White Paper, The Army Family. He reiterated his expectations in the Light Infantry White Paper (1984): "Initiatives to support our families must be developed to minimize the impact of frequent deployments and field training absences" (p. 9).

The CSA's expectations in the field of leadership were:

Leaders at every level will be masters of the profession of arms....They will demand the highest levels of performance and discipline....They will establish a challenging command climate and serve as the role models for tactical and technical proficiency, physical fitness, and ethical behavior (1984, p. 3).

The officers and men in the four battalions of the Division devoted long hours, great patience, and extraordinary amounts of energy to meet the CSA's expectations. They quickly reached high standards of military proficiency in a new tactical mode using a new manning system under conditions of intense physical and mental pressure. Their achievements again demonstrated the value of the COHORT system as a foundation for development of cohesion. The achievements of some units stand as a model for the Army on how COHORT units, expected to operate autonomously, can reach...
high levels of performance and psychological readiness. Those instances in which the soldiers fell short of expectations reflect problems endemic to the Army as a whole--problems which the Department of Military Psychiatry has identified in units worldwide.

The body of this report is a detailed discussion of findings relevant to the four dimensions of the CSA's expectations--cohesion, motivation, unit-family relations, and leadership. Each chapter includes a summary of expectations, evidence from the first year, evidence from the second year, and analyses of processes. The fifth chapter is a report by the planning committee for the 1987 Leadership Conference convened by the Commanding General of the Division to conduct internal assessments of human dimensions. The sixth and final chapter offers preliminary conclusions concerning all new light infantry divisions and the Army as a whole.
CHAPTER I

COHESION

Expectations

Cohesion is the product of bonding soldiers have with each other, with their leaders, and to their unit. WRAIR research, and studies by the Israeli Defense Force, have demonstrated that members of cohesive units are resistant to combat stress breakdown (Marlowe, 1985, 1986a; Gal, 1987). Six years of research by the Department of Military Psychiatry at WRAIR has confirmed findings by military historians that soldiers who develop cohesive bonds with one another (horizontal cohesion) feel supported and collectively stronger, and are protected against feelings of isolation on the battlefield (Marlowe, 1985, 1986a, 1986b; Marshall, 1947/1978). Bonding with leaders and the institution confers identity, security, purpose, feelings of personal significance, and a sense of unit strength and competency (vertical cohesion). Along with experienced leaders and accretive training, cohesion is the foundation of Soldier Power—the source of light infantry combat potential and a prerequisite for developing a capability for independent small unit operations.

Horizontal cohesion develops from shared experiences and interdependence in achieving commonly valued goals. One Station Unit Training (OSUT) and the COHORT system are designed to support the development of horizontal cohesion.

Vertical cohesion is a product of interactions between subordinates and their leaders. COHORT soldiers are prepared to accept the direction of leaders, and they want to be effective members of a strong unit—a unit having a vital mission that will give meaning to their lives and activities. The WRAIR research effort clearly shows that vertical cohesion develops in COHORT units to the extent that leaders convince their subordinates they are competent to lead them through danger, that they respect their subordinates and will take care of them, and that they share their subordinates' dedication to the mission. Identity of purpose, mutual commitment, and the soldiers' belief that they are valued by their leaders are the foundations of vertical cohesion.

Realizations: First Year

When the Soldier Survey was first administered, the four battalions of the Division scored substantially higher than other units in the Army on horizontal cohesion and somewhat higher on vertical cohesion, but companies varied widely in vertical cohesion. The research team sought to understand the processes at work in companies with high as compared to low cohesion.
**Horizontal Cohesion**

In the summer of 1985, the research team noted that the OSUT experience had produced evident horizontal cohesion. Observers reported that first term soldiers helped each other to learn military skills: "Joe is really sharp. He studies a lot and helps the rest of us get it." "We've got a guy in the squad, and like, you know, he's not too good in English, so we get together in the room and explain what he's got to know." Privates also took care of each other. A squad leader reported:

One of my guys came and woke me up and said Al was drunk and was planning to drive to San Francisco between now and morning. So I went and asked Al for his car keys, and his buddies put him to bed. He was pissed then, but next morning he thanked me and the guy who had come to tell me.

Taking care of each other applied off duty as well:

I was in a bar and this girl started making up to me. The guy she was with told me to get lost and I told him she might of come with him but now she liked me. Then he sat down with his buddies and they started talking about what they were gonna do. Then this guy I scarcely knew but who I went through basic with said, 'Don't worry, I'm with you.'

A striking aspect of horizontal cohesion was the extent to which first termers took responsibility for disciplining each other. One soldier reported:

So I had a buddy, a huge black dude. One day he saw me with a joint. He said, 'Hey, you little asshole, you want to do yourself in, don'tcha? Well lemme help. I'll just carry your little ass down to the CQ right now.' He grabbed me and we struggled and I go, 'Okay, okay, I'll knock it off.' I went and flushed the grass down the commode, and I've been straight since. I like to be with him. He keeps me straight.

In almost every squad and section there was a story about how members had talked one of their comrades out of going AWOL. The following is a typical account:

Porky was really down. He was on extra duty and the NCO's were dogging him out. He said, 'Who needs this shit? I'm splittin.' We told him he'd really fuck up his life and stuff like that. I think the big thing that convinced him not to go was that we gave a shit about him.

A first sergeant reported that when three soldiers went AWOL, the rest of the privates in their platoon got into cars, drove 100 miles, abducted the three AWOLs off the street, and brought them back to the unit. The first sergeant said, "We had some heartburn with the civilian authorities, but we were really pretty pleased."
A common value the first term soldiers in the four battalions expressed was intense interest in becoming proficient soldiers. They studied manuals in their off-duty time, judged each other on their abilities as soldiers, and were extremely self-critical of their own performance and that of their unit. The results were levels of knowledge and competence among soldiers with less than a year of service that senior NCOs and officers had never seen before. One observer reported that: "Privates in the artillery battalion know more after only six months in the Army than the section chiefs in my battalion in Vietnam knew." Leaders in the battalions were outstanding in their praise of the first termers' willingness to learn: "I have never seen such bright, highly motivated soldiers in my twenty years of service." "The COHORT system has given us superb soldiers. They're smart, serious, really put pressure on their leaders."

Vertical Cohesion

The potential for vertical cohesion was present initially because the brigade and battalion commanders were as enthusiastic as the privates about the light infantry mission. One said, "I've been waiting twenty years for a chance to do it right, and here it is." Another said, "This is an opportunity to create a really superb combat unit." Subordinate leaders, however, varied widely in their attitudes, preparation, and ability to build vertical cohesion.

Characteristics of Junior Leaders. The procedures that had brought NCOs to the battalions did not adequately consider human dimensions. Many NCOs were diverted suddenly to the Division from other assignments after having made other plans and formed expectations. Others were brought to the Division after many years away from line units. Most were told they would have to accept a bar to reenlistment if they did not take the assignment. No one in the Department of the Army told them of the importance of light infantry or expressed understanding about the inconvenience they would experience. A few sergeants, alienated by the treatment they had received, smothered vertical cohesion in their units. A larger number, not trained to lead by example and competence, sought to impose their authority through intimidation. The relief, transfer, or elimination of many NCOs initially assigned to the battalions made it difficult for first termers to find leaders with whom to identify: "Sergeant Green is our fourth squad leader. Just when we get to know our sergeant he gets chaptered or busted or falls apart physically."

Uneven preparation and a lack of training in positive leadership for lieutenants also worked against the development of vertical cohesion. Comments by enlisted soldiers revealed that when lieutenants lacked qualifications in basic military skills in which privates were proficient, were unable to perform physically, or failed to respect the privates as fellow professionals, the troops did not identify with them, and vertical cohesion did not progress above squad level.
Models for Success. Some NCOs and officers were successful in developing vertical cohesion. Soldiers described these leaders as sharing their interest in military skills. They knew about tactics, communications, movement, use of terrain—the processes of survival in combat and harming the enemy—and they talked to their lowest ranking soldiers about these matters. "I really liked it when the CO would come sit with me in my hole. He always had interesting things to say. He taught me a lot." An observer picked up a conversation between one captain and the communications NCO. The sergeant had thought up a way of extending the range of an antenna system, focusing its directionality, and rapidly shifting directions. The ensuing discussion was one between two professional colleagues, not between a superior and a subordinate. They explained, argued, and sparked new ideas in each other. Ultimately the captain told the NCO that he would find funding to implement the sergeant's idea.

Effective leaders continuously experimented. They explained their experiments in advance, then sought their soldiers' views afterwards. "He tried some stuff that didn't work. We told him it sucked, and he dropped it." Their soldiers, talking about their commanders, used words such as "tactical genius" and "wizard." In reality these commanders were not exceptional people. They were knowledgeable and interested, and by sharing their knowledge and interest with their troops they demonstrated their respect for them. They created an intense spirit of company identity. They asserted the independence of their companies, protected their troops from higher headquarters, and insisted on doing things the company's own way. These are characteristics usually found in high performance units. They are also characteristics that sometimes disturbed senior commanders operating on traditional Army cultural assumptions.

Effects of Battalion Command Climate. Relationships between the subordinate unit commanders and first sergeants on the one level, and the battalion commander, staff, and command sergeant major on the other, affected vertical cohesion. One of the captains who had a cohesive unit was openly critical of the battalion staff. "The S3 is incompetent. His orders and plans are unworkable and usually arrive too late for us to implement them. I volunteered to do the plan for one operation because he just can't get the work out." His battalion commander did not tolerate independent or outspoken subordinates, and got rid of the company commander. The commander of another battalion in which a cohesive company emerged had two independent subordinate commanders and encouraged them to operate autonomously. Cohesion in a third battalion was obstructed by company commanders whom their soldiers perceived as being more intent on making a favorable impression than on "getting us ready to fight." In a fourth battalion the commander, by intimidating subordinates and by issuing orders they saw as deviations from their understood priority on combat training, prevented vertical cohesion from growing within the battalion's companies.

All four of the battalion commanders said they initially had some way of sensing the moods and needs of their privates—bitch
sessions, joining groups of soldiers in the mess hall, or chatting informally in the chowline. Each colonel expressed the opinion that it was essential to keep in touch with his troops, but efforts to keep in close touch fell by the wayside as the first year wore on. The commanders cited such problems as repetition of the same complaints, complaints they could not do anything about, irritation among subordinate leaders who felt that the colonel was going around them, and reluctance of privates to complain about their immediate superiors. As interviews with privates proceeded, WRAIR observers learned that important casualties of the collapse of the commanders' efforts to communicate were that privates never learned of the esteem in which their colonels and command sergeant majors said they held them. A colonel's withdrawal from informal contact with privates reinforced soldiers' feelings that higher leaders were out of touch.

In spite of initially favorable attitudes of privates and senior leaders, during the first year only two companies evidenced high levels of vertical cohesion—and the commanders of those units did not keep their commands for full tours. By the summer of 1986 the four battalions were well into their second year. Most of the NCOs who had stayed on were accepted by their commanders as at least marginally satisfactory. Most platoons were on their second rotation of lieutenants, and company/battery commanders were about to change or had recently changed. No battalion commanders had changed.

Realizations: Second Year

During the first year initial enthusiasm, and the soldiers' need for guidance, drew subordinates to their leaders. There were comparatively few obstacles to vertical cohesion, yet it did not flourish widely. During the second year the intensity of missions increased, while personnel strength declined through attrition without replacement of privates. Differences in the interests of members of each echelon became more pronounced, and communications across echelons lost clarity. This section includes separate discussions of horizontal cohesion in the peer group and vertical cohesion at squad platoon, company, and battalion levels.

Horizontal Cohesion

Observations of horizontal cohesion indicated that behaviorally it was as much in evidence as it had been during the first year. The survey data, which showed a decline in horizontal cohesion in the second year, reflected more negative attitudes toward the unit social climate. In the second year privates perceived the unit climate as less supportive, but they clung to each other as a defense against the unit and the dangers of combat. Privates in most units expressed their belief in the importance of cohesion in combat. A characteristic remark was: "When we go to war together, we will know what we can expect of each other." Cohesion was not necessarily treated as friendship, but it still provided psychological support: "I don't like Smedley, and Smedley doesn't like me. But we know what each
other can do, and we'd rather go to war together than with some hotshot we don't know."

With positive horizontal cohesion went a sense of responsibility to each other and the mission. A typical comment on a long march was, "Hey George, gimme that radio. You've carried it long enough and it's my turn." WRAIR observers watched privates come in from the field, unload vehicles, clean vehicles and equipment, and store equipment without an order being voiced by NCOs or officers. Everyone knew what was to be done and did it. This responsible performance was most striking under stress. An observer accompanied a company during three days of cross-country marches and airlifts culminating in a very difficult climb at night. At each halt the soldiers went into defensive positions and set to digging in at once without anyone telling them to. No matter how hot the weather, hard the ground, or crushing the fatigue, the soldiers we observed generally knew and did their duty. An observer reported that artillery howitzer sections, most of which had only four people, installed camouflage, dug fighting positions, and laid out fields of fire quickly, efficiently, and without orders despite frequent moves. Senior NCOs expressed admiration at the amounts of work done unquestioningly by the small crews. "They believe in the mission and know what has to be done." Unfortunately there were many battery officers who seemed to take their troops for granted and did not recognize that their soldiers worked unusually hard.

The privates' sense of mutual responsibility was continually in evidence even when they were exhausted. In one squad when the soldiers were extremely fatigued, and half the group were sleeping, the squad leader came around to show the troops how to sight in final protective fires. In each position the soldier at work woke up his foxhole mate. "Hey Sid, you wanna see this. The Sarge is showing us something new," and the sleeping soldier invariably said "Yeah, yeah," and roused himself. In an artillery section near the end of two weeks of maneuvers, an observer heard cannoneers urging their chief to explain the calculations necessary to do a sweep—a mission in which the gun crew computes on its own a variety of quadrants and deflections around base figures. As the privates spoke of their interest in technical matters it was clear that their interest united them and bound them to their leader.

The privates' sense of vulnerability and tight bonding combined to make them sensitive to the welfare of each other. Mistreatment of one soldier by a superior brought on the collective hostility of all the privates:

Sergeant Pike of 3rd Squad is a lying sack of shit. When Smitty was acting squad leader his squad was attached to Pike's. Pike told him to set up an outpost on a knoll. The battalion commander didn't like it, and Pike told him Smitty had picked the position contrary to orders. So Smitty lost his acting corporal stripes and got a rehab transfer. Pike smells like a rose. No one trusts Pike any more, and no one will give him the time of day.
On the other hand, if a soldier was in trouble because of his own inappropriate action, his peers told him. A college graduate complained about how all the NCOs were down on him. His squad mates said, "Yeah, Arch, they're down on you, but you make it easy for them." Another added, "You screw up and get their attention, then you run your mouth at chem. You bring it on yourself."

The closeness and trust the soldiers had with each other caused them great distress when one member of a primary group misbehaved: "Bill went AWOL just before we came out in the field. I didn't know, nobody knew, that he was hurting. Christ, it's bad when a guy has to keep it all in like that." There were constant efforts to bring the hard-core loners into the group. "Hey, before we talk, lemme go find Ted. He ought to be part of this."

The privates were also concerned about each other's physical injuries:

They had no business bringing Ron out on this FTX. He twisted his knee falling off a hill on the last exercise. The PA wouldn't give him no profile, and he hurt it more on the PT test. It swelled up to hell and the PA finally got him an appointment with a doctor, but we had to come to the field so he's missing his appointment. He's drivin' on but it's still swollen and I hear him groaning when he tries to sleep.

The evidence of defensive bonding arising in response to negative leadership complicated the assessment of horizontal cohesion. The defensively bonded soldiers were still dedicated to the mission, but they were alienated from command. How effective this form of horizontal cohesion would be in sustaining units in combat is unknown. Wartime studies of cohesion include examples of effective sub-units in poorly led companies, and the research team replicated that finding in the Division. But strong horizontal bonding in combination with active alienation from command could be the source of serious indiscipline, such as fragging.

**Vertical Cohesion**

During the second year the development of vertical cohesion proved to be a still more complex process than the development of horizontal cohesion. The four subsections that follow include the processes of primary group cohesion observed in several squads, descriptions of the pivotal role of lieutenants and platoon sergeants in either fostering or thwarting the spread of upward cohesion, the general void of cohesion at company level, and the ways in which battalion-level policies undercut or supported the development of cohesion in the companies under study.

**Squad/Section.** While most of the primary groups—the squads, sections, and fire support teams—were still cohesive in mid-summer 1986, their cohesion was not necessarily fully
supportive of institutional objectives. The observers noted three patterns in primary groups. The most positive pattern was vertical cohesion in which the privates bought into their sergeant's values and thereby made their squad available for further vertical integration. Soldiers in those squads/sections expressed themselves like this: "Sergeant Black knows his shit. He's a fox, and he'll get us through. And what's more, he cares about us. He has clout with the platoon sergeant when one of us needs some time off."

The second pattern was at the negative end of the spectrum; a few primary groups disintegrated. The sergeant and the privates became alienated from each other. On a long march the following incident occurred:

Private No. 1: "Fuck it, I ain't gonna carry this mother-fucking machine gun no more." (Threw it on the ground).

Sergeant: "Just leave it there. Someone will pick it up."

Private No. 2: "Not me. I carried the fucker yesterday."

Private No. 3: "Like hell. You only carried it on the flat. I carried it up the fucking hill."

Sergeant: "Somebody better fucking pick it up, or I'll kick somebody's ass."

Private No. 4: (muttered) "Bull shit."

We observed that when squad leaders lost authority it was because they seemed to lack competence and/or confidence in their ability to lead. The result was anxious behavior demonstrated by bluffing, bullying, and otherwise interacting defensively with the troops. Yet, few NCOs openly lost their authority, mainly because their subordinates wanted them to succeed. For example, in one squad with an insecure and uncertain sergeant, two first term acting corporals made all the decisions, and conducted all necessary checks and inspections. But before giving any order to the privates, a corporal would come to the sergeant and say, "Sarge, shall I tell the men to dig their positions by that tree, at the head of that draw, and behind that boulder? We're tied in with 3rd squad on the right, and with Bravo company on the left." The sergeant would grunt consent, and the corporal would give the order. A few NCOs lost their authority after a repetitive history of abusive behavior, incompetence, and refusal to take care of their men.

The third pattern noted in most of the squads, sections, and fire support teams was privates and their sergeant embracing a common set of values to protect themselves against harassment from above. The archetypal comment made by sergeants and privates was: "We have to hang together, man. Shit rolls
downhill, and there is some crazy shit coming down." This defensive cohesion reflected the privates' and sergeants' perceptions that higher echelons did not share their values and priorities, and were indifferent to their needs. These perceptions, and the behaviors they provoked, bloomed the development of further vertical cohesion. However, even in these groups the troops were solidly committed to the mission and to the development of combat proficiency. Their resistance to higher authority focused on the picayune inspections, the non-mission-related matters, and the overwork resulting from poor time management, or capricious punishment.

**Platoon.** The research team identified several platoon-sized units that seemed to be vertically cohesive. Some were islands of cohesion in disintegrating companies. We found this cohesion to be founded on agreement between the platoon NCO and platoon officer or warrant officer on three points: priority to the combat mission; protection of the soldiers in the platoon; and consideration of the personal, professional, and familial needs of the privates. The privates expected their platoon sergeants to be technically competent but recognized that lieutenants were often as inexperienced as they were, and they had different expectations of these young officers. "Our lieutenant is amazing. He's fresh out of West Point, but he ain't on no high horse. He listens, man." Accessibility, interest, and respect for their subordinates were characteristics of the lieutenants in cohesive platoons. If they knew how to lead infantry, it was a bonus, a bonus that was frequently evidenced during the second year:

Our platoon was detached on an independent night mission. Nobody else found any OPFOR, but our L.T. led us into the middle of 'em. We shot up a command post, a truck unit, and a mortar platoon. We even burst into a RATTrig and woke up the whole crew to tell 'em they were dead muthas. The L.T. just kept finding enemies, then he'd form us up, and we'd overrun them.

In contrast, we identified a number of lieutenants whose behavior was inimical to vertical cohesion. Most frequently it was verbal abuse of subordinates: "There was three of us setting up a mortar, and we were overrun by two enemy squads. The XO called us a bunch of goddam worthless, cowardly assholes, and said he wished it had been real war so we would be dead like we deserved." In another unit: "Our lieutenant is so foul mouthed it makes us sick. It's one thing to curse, it's another thing to curse a person. We got no respect for that man." A lieutenant talking to an observer about his privates said: "The problem with this Army is that we can't do enough to punish those dumb shithheads." Also destructive were lieutenants who thought they knew it all and undercut their NCOs' authority. As one officer put it, "In the process of demonstrating how little they really know, they not only discredit themselves, but also compromise the NCOs they denigrate." The most destructive behavior occurred when an officer was viewed as trying to further personal ambitions at the expense of the soldiers. "He's always trying to
get us to win this or win that. He don't care if we can fight long as he gets his railroad tracks."

Rapid turnover of platoon leaders made both officers and their troops feel that the lieutenant was not really part of the platoon. One lieutenant, near the end of his tour, said "I'm really depressed. Here I am leaving just as I was getting to know the men and starting to build something." A private spoke for all: "Platoon leaders aren't members of the unit, they're just passing through." NCOs were particularly distressed: "The lieutenants are younger than we are, but we have to stay in the platoon while they just spend a year, then rotate to a staff job." The perception most often present when vertical cohesion was absent was that officers' careers mattered more to them than did the welfare of the unit.

Company. The latter charge was also applied to a majority of the company commanders. "The way I see it, the old man just rotates in. He has to get his ticket punched and please his highers, and so he sweats us so he'll look good." "We're just like tools he'll wear out and throw away." "Our company commander? He's got his nose so far up the colonel's ass he can't see us for shit. We're nothing to him."

Few of the company commanders we observed during the second year were perceived as mentors by their subordinate officers or NCOs, though some were optimistic that their captain might shape up in the future. "He's young, he needs to wet down his bars." Only a handful of the privates, NCOs, or lieutenants interviewed in the summer of 1986 considered their company commanders qualified to lead their units in combat. A few NCOs said of their commander: "He'll get a lot of men killed." Privates' comments typically were pessimistic: "He's worthless in the field. He's a good administrator, though, he really knows how to ruin careers." Privates tended to perceive their company commanders as agents of capricious punishment: "He's out to burn us," and "We're new, we don't know what all the regulations are. They can always get us for something." The privates we interviewed did not credit their commanders with taking an interest in their professional development, health, or families: "He's got a quota of so many guys to take to the field, and he'll look bad to his highers if he doesn't make his quota. So we can go suck." Vertical cohesion at company level was not possible when the commander and his subordinates had adversarial relationships.

Captains' treatment of their lieutenants ranged primarily from benign neglect to persecution. We found, as we have found Army-wide, that most captains did not know how to serve as supportive and constructive mentors (Rock & Schneider, 1982a, 1982b). Their lieutenants had to train themselves, and not infrequently lost their bearings. Some lieutenants had more difficult times. An observer witnessed a captain who was annoyed with one of his lieutenants tell him, "You're dead, lie down there on your back." The lieutenant lay down in the sun on a 110 degree day, and the captain berated him in front of an assemblage of enlisted soldiers. Then the captain called a couple of privates over and said, "Lieutenant Blank is dead. Drag his worthless ass
away." The privates dragged the lieutenant off. Another lieutenant who served under a captain who boasted that he used fear as a means of commanding said:

I dreaded going to work. He bullied, denigrated, and abused me and everyone else in the company. He kicked a private, and he made us do illegal things, but he always managed to sidestep any heat that came down. I shook every day before going to work, but I told myself when the bell ended the 15th round I was going to be on my feet. It was the most awful experience of my life, submitting to humiliation, and looking aside when he did something illegal, but I was not going to let that bastard defeat me.

In the summer of 1986 we observed a few captains holding commands who were technically knowledgeable and cared about their troops, but whose efforts to build vertical cohesion were undermined by their first sergeants. One first sergeant was abusive. An observer listened to him for an hour during morning wash-up and breakfast, and he maintained a steady steam of verbal abuse to every private who came by the company CP. Another first sergeant described his commander as "a bleeding heart" and added, "The only thing these men understand is threats. When I have the men alone, I let 'em know what I'll do to 'em if they don't comply. I really had to get tough about turning their wives out for family support group activities." A captain in another battalion said despairingly, "My first sergeant is from the old school. He's authoritarian, and that's that." However, in other companies the first sergeants were the primary leaders who created the possibility of vertical cohesion taking root. One first sergeant said, "Somebody has to protect the soldiers. They don't like me at battalion because I stand up to their crazy shit. I started this damn unit, and I think I ought to finish it." A first sergeant in another brigade expressed similar feelings: "I had planned to retire, but if I do there's nobody to take care of these soldiers. They will do anything we ask them, and the officers take advantage and abuse them."

Battalion. Diffusion of the mission was often a serious obstacle to cohesion at company and battalion levels. Privates expressed their willingness to make any sacrifices demanded by the mission as they understood it. As commanders broadened the mission to include collateral activities—best squad competitions, physical training streamer qualifications, barracks inspections—and accorded each activity the same high priority as combat training, they and the mission began to lose credibility. A junior NCO said, "They call anything on the training schedule mission essential, and no one can miss it." Another said: "They are so tight and scared about people. I have no authority to let my people attend to personal errands. I do it, but if I get caught it's my ass."

The most galling aspect of mission diffusion for privates, junior NCOs, and families, was the indeterminate length of the duty day:
We stand around the barracks all day, then at 1600 the first sergeant goes to battalion to meet with the sergeant major. None of the NCOs have the authority to dismiss anyone. When the first sergeant comes back he calls for the platoon sergeants. Maybe we get the word to knock off at 1730 or 1800, or maybe we have to do Mickey Mouse details late into the evening. Our wives have no idea when we'll get home, and they are usually pissed off when we finally do show up.

A similar story came from a group of artillery soldiers:

One day we hung around the motor pool til 1630 doing nothing, then suddenly we got word that we had to prepare twelve vehicles to be turned in for scrapping, and they had to be ready by 0730 the next day. So we work all night on trucks that are to be junked. Is this the mission?

Soldiers usually attributed these problems to the battalion commander's desire to make favorable impressions on superiors. An NCO said, "The colonel wants to look good, so he makes us make a formal report and line up all the men to be introduced whenever a visitor comes by, even when we are working on the position." During a major exercise one company got orders: "Cut the grass around the foxholes so visitors can see them." Particularly resented were demonstrations for special visitors. A sergeant said, "I don't know how good my men are as soldiers, but they are damned good actors." Another echoed, "We don't train for combat, we rehearse for the colonel's dog and pony shows."

Officers, NCOs, and privates at company level complained that many battalion commanders and staffs micro-managed the precise and detailed preparations required for Rapid Deployment Force exercises and for demonstrations. Micro-management interfered with the development of cohesion because it conveyed the message that superiors did not trust or respect their subordinates, and that superiors assumed that subordinates would not do their utmost. We observed that under this kind of close supervision, subordinates did not feel that they owned the mission, and they did not have a sense of commonality of purpose with their leader.

Field data show that during the second year the battalion commanders in our sample began to lose touch with their troops. As a consequence it was difficult for soldiers to identify with the battalion, and in some cases this process undercut company commanders' efforts to build cohesion within their companies. One company commander told a researcher: "You have walked more with my company in two days than the colonel has in eighteen months." In one battalion we observed the commander create a sense of mistrust among the company commanders, then intimidate them by relieving the captain reputed to have the most cohesive, highest performing, and most independent company in the brigade.
Analysis

The second administration of the soldier survey revealed a significant drop in the vertical cohesion scores in the battalions under study. Alienation across echelons appeared pervasive and profound in spite of the expressed wishes of all soldiers, private through colonel. Senior officers and NCOs who had led prior COHORT companies argued that all COHORT units have a mid-cycle slump. Some leaders attributed it to a natural "pause" after 12 to 18 months of all-out effort; others attributed it to the soldiers belatedly discovering drugs, alcohol, and sex. WRAIR found the so-called "mid-cycle crisis" in these battalions to be the result of a widening gulf between the privates' values and their perceptions of the values of their leaders. There was no evidence that such significant mid-cycle deterioration in morale, cohesion, and commitment was a naturally occurring or self-correcting phenomenon. Analysis shows that the processes that undermined cohesion in these units resulted from four unofficial, implicit, but traditional Army cultural practices. First is the "can do" mentality of commanders who push every mission down on their subordinates rather than taking responsibility for assigning priorities. Second is the belief that subordinates do as little as they can get away with. Third is the punitive response for failure or error. Fourth is the emphasis on looking good for the duration of every command tour. Many of the leaders we observed initially resisted these cultural practices. But as pressure mounted, most conformed to the organizational culture in which they had been trained. These individuals had neither the necessary training nor actual experience in developing or preserving cohesion required to achieve success in the face of impossible military demands.

The compromises Division leaders felt obliged to make ignored consideration of the processes that support cohesion. Long days in the field, high attrition that quickly reduced squad/section strength to 60 percent, and insufficient time to learn fundamentals led to fatigue, frustration, and error. Under such pressure, we observed commanders becoming fearful, and we saw them view their subordinates' failures as potentially fatal to their own careers. These leaders then resorted to micro-management, subordination of soldiers' interests to an ever-broadening interpretation of the mission, and coercion. Community of purpose and mutuality of commitment, the foundations of cohesion, became impossible in this atmosphere poisoned by adversarial relations across echelons.

In short, the COHORT system provides horizontal cohesion and a readiness among first term soldiers to become members of vertically cohesive, high performance units. But unless the leaders know how to build and sustain cohesion, and work at it, vertical cohesion does not progress beyond the peer group. COHORT is a necessary, but not a sufficient, prerequisite to unit cohesion and high performance.
CHAPTER II
MOTIVATION

Expectations

The combat potential of light infantry as described in the Chief of Staff's White Paper (1984) depends on Soldier Power--highly motivated, technically proficient, resourceful fighters. The division commander stated that the objective was a tough, disciplined combat division. He explained that by disciplined he meant that every soldier should know how to behave correctly in accordance with ethical and military standards, and would so behave in the absence of orders or supervision. The purpose of the training program in the Division was to develop motivation based on confidence, understanding, skills, and unanimity of purpose that would realize the general's definition of a disciplined division.

The training program succeeded initially to a substantial degree, particularly in arousing the first-termers' motivation, building their skills, and confirming their unanimity of purpose. Unfortunately, as time went on there was an apparent decline in levels of soldiers' motivation. This chapter discusses the leadership behavior that appears to explain this decline.

Realizations: First Year

Commanders of new COHORT battalions used three-month, cadre-only shakedown periods to train up, unite, and motivate the leaders and the staff. The commander of a rifle company reflected the spirit of the leaders during their train-up periods in a memorandum to all battalion officers and senior NCOs: "There is no such thing as satisfactory in the light infantry; there is only excellence." A battalion commander invited captains and key staff to write their own unit history. He challenged NCOs to delay drafting SOPs based on prior experience and instead to devise their own Lightfighter ways of doing things.

During the first year, unit leaders enjoyed high credibility among all ranks. Officers, NCOs, and first-term soldiers appeared to share key ideas. They agreed on their mission to train for combat. Soldiers valued compliments by their commanders as an accurate measure of training progress. Commanders reported the training accomplishments of their units with pride. The commander of a newly formed infantry battalion observed, "When our battalion finished squad ARTEPS, it was better prepared for combat than the best units I had seen at Fort Campbell just a few years ago." Another battalion commander remarked, "We reached the skill level of a conventional unit in 60-90 days and just kept going up." The achievements were not just hyperbole. One infantry battalion went from activation through Company ARTEPS in only 90 days. An artillery battery completed its ARTEP within 67 days. Soldiers in another battalion earned 135 Expert Infantryman Badges within nine months of activation. Artillery sections achieved a response time of 30
seconds from receipt of a request for fire to getting rounds on the way.

The spontaneous motivation of the first-term soldiers played an important role in their achievements during the first year. Senior commanders and NCOs were unanimous in their opinion that their privates were exceptionally intelligent, eager to learn, interested in the Army, and dedicated to the light infantry mission. One NCO said, "These young soldiers will do anything we ask of them. So you have to be careful, watch and train them until they're not so naive--both as soldiers and as men." Very few leaders understood as well as this sergeant that they were dealing with a new and unfamiliar phenomenon--soldiers who were self-motivated, who needed and wanted to be taught and guided, not driven. The history of the first two years of the four battalions evolved progressively into an account of clashes between the spontaneous motivation of the first-term soldiers and the motivation their leaders sought to impose on them.

Realizations: Second Year

The division had on its list of missions for its first year reconfiguration, training toward certification, and battalion or brigade-sized training deployments. Toward the end of the year, the division added the mission of joining the Army's Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). The RDF responsibilities required frequent Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDRE), restockage of equipment at a distant air terminal, and the general need to be ready for combat. Toward the end of the first year the assumption of these rapid deployment duties imposed a training pace that unit leaders described as requiring "two weeks of work in one, and two days in one." Company and battalion leaders described the pace since October 1985 as one that never permitted full unit or individual recovery. Increased rates of injuries, chapterings, and desertions during this period reduced company/battery strength by almost one third. The multiplicity of missions forced commanders to call on their subordinate leaders to do more and more with fewer and fewer people. As exhaustion mounted, spontaneous motivation lessened. Leaders, feeling the pressure of the mission, began to rely more heavily on external authoritarian motivational methods--threats and punishments.

During the first year the officers and enlisted soldiers we observed seemed to have boundless enthusiasm and energy. The four battalions broke one record after another. But the second year provides lessons on how not to motivate COHORT units on a long-term basis. Under the stress of never ending requirements, leaders resorted to practices that reduced motivation. The discussion that follows deals with two categories of behavior that reduced motivation--coercion and centralization, and two consequences--loss of command credibility and diminution of combat proficiency.
Regression to Coercive Motivation

Mid-level NCOs described an increased use of punishment under Article 15 for NCOs as well as for troops. NCOs were bewildered by sudden punishment after years of unblemished service. Privates said: "The CO is out to burn us, so he'll look strong in the eyes of his own highers." Soldiers of all ranks referred to the efficiency report as a weapon rather than as a counseling tool. A senior NCO said, "They can't get rid of me, but they got me on the EER." An officer said, "They didn't actually relieve me, but the OER did the job. My career is dead in the water now."

A few soldiers responded positively to legitimate punishment. "I knew I was gonna be busted, and I figured, what the hell, I'll just split. But the captain told me he had confidence in me and needed me. You know, after I was busted I felt better about the Army than I had before." Not all commanders used negative motivation in such a positive way. "What happened to Joe was he got busted, then he got depressed. He kind of like, you know, gave up. I've seen several guys just go downhill after an Article 15."

The examples of two company commanders demonstrate how negative motivation can neutralize the spontaneous enthusiasm of privates and subordinate leaders. One commander terrorized his troops: "The basis on which I command is fear. It's the only way." This officer was technically competent; subordinates said they respected him for his knowledge, and they learned from him. However, they also said that he systematically denigrated, harassed, and brutalized them. The NCOs felt emasculated: "He runs everything. The only time I'm treated as a leader is when something goes wrong, and he needs somebody to hang. Then I'm in complete charge." Every person in the unit believed this captain had struck a soldier, and the battalion commander had hushed it up by buying off the victim with a transfer out of the unit. The captain's troops said they detested him as a person and as a leader: "In combat, I'd kill that bastard." "He cares nothing for us; he treats us like dirt." By driving rather than leading, this commander smothered spontaneous motivation and forfeited the potential for developing a cohesive, high performing unit.

The second captain believed in ostentatious displays of motivation. His unit yelled louder than any other in the battalion, and senior commanders said they believed it to be the most spirited. Privates said, "Sure we make a lot of noise because the CO tells us to--but that's not an expression of how we feel. We feel this unit sucks." "Nobody knows what we're doing, nobody organizes anything, nobody takes care of anybody. We just yell a lot." "The captain calls it motivation, but it's false."

One of the platoon leaders in this company developed strong vertical bonds with the NCOs and privates. The soldiers described their lieutenant's concern and empathy: "He doesn't talk down to you or act like he's a better person than you." "When my girl left me, he told me about a similar experience; he really understood." The lieutenant's troops were especially
impressed by his respect for the NCOs' field and troop experience. The company commander (who opposed "fraternization" of officers with enlisted soldiers) announced his intention to relieve the lieutenant during a field exercise, accusing him of poor field techniques and of not supporting his approach to motivating troops. The members of the platoon confronted the captain and asked him to keep their lieutenant on at least through the platoon ARTEP. The captain reluctantly agreed. The NCOs and privates then made the platoon leader look brilliant during the ARTEP, and it became organizationally impossible for the captain to relieve him.

The captain's authority evaporated--not merely because he had been forced to back down, but because it was plain how much his values differed from those of his soldiers. Their dedication to being competent and to taking care of each other was something with which he was unfamiliar. His training had not adequately prepared him for these spontaneously motivated soldiers dedicated to developing their combat skills. He understood tactics, but misunderstood group process. He was not exceptional; many of the leaders we observed had learned from the traditional Army culture that looking good to superiors was what mattered.

Centralized Training Management

Several officers made comments such as, "You only get one crack at command, usually, so you have to pay careful attention to details." And, "A commander who wants to continue to move up dares not entrust operations to subordinates who are still learning." The observers noted that under this pressure commanders tended to centralize functions, particularly training functions. As officers and NCOs in subordinate commands looked to senior commanders for models of behavior, they reported seeing the arm of the division reaching down to direct the training schedule for even the smallest elements.

Soldiers in subordinate units resented centralized control. Company leaders accused battalion of micro-managing. Some first sergeants complained, "The sergeant major thinks the barracks are his. He countermands my instructions and destroys my credibility." One battalion commander said after the division certification that only then did he feel he could turn over coordination of ranges, ammunition, and transportation to platoons rather than have his S3 make all the training arrangements. NCOs and junior officers perceived centralization of training as a manifestation of lack of trust. Squad leaders in particular were frustrated and confused. "I'm responsible for training my squad, but I have no input to the training schedule. I know what my men need to practice, but I get no training time." Another said, "We're supposed to do hip-pocket training in the field, but we're kept in the dark. How can I train when I don't know how much time I'll have, or whether the slack time at the moment is the last chance I'll have to rest my men for three days?"

A number of company commanders said that their bosses constrained their autonomy, punished independence, and compromised their credibility: "I can't even shift my positions..."
around without first clearing with battalion." One platoon leader complained that after positioning a machine gun in a defensive maneuver he was required to change its location three times after successive visits from the company, battalion, and brigade commanders. The lieutenant, noting that the weapon ended up in about the same position where he had first placed it, lamented, "You'd think after two years they'd realize I know where to put the damned thing." An NCO, after a similar series of command visits each resulting in contradictory orders, said, "Don't these guys ever talk to each other? How come they all disagree? Doesn't anybody know how to do it right?"

Privates and subordinate leaders became skeptical of the motives of centralized training managers. Most training was on 17 to 21 day exercises away from post at Fort Hunter Liggett and Camp Roberts. After several trips to these posts during the first year, soldiers began to complain: "We spent 21 days at Hunter Liggett last month to do a 5 day problem." Or, "This is a 10 day FTX, right? Well, we've had 7 days of dead time. We could have been with our families." Or, "You know what it is? The colonels are competing and the one who keeps his men in the field the longest gets the most brownie points." Or, "We could do everything but the live firing on East Garrison, and not have to be away from our families." Several said, "It's money. If the colonel spends the money to bring us down to Hunter Liggett, he'll get flack if he doesn't keep us here for a couple of weeks, even if we spend most of the time sitting around."

The higher the echelon at which training management was centralized, the less dynamic the soldiers in the line companies found their training. Exercises oriented toward testing brigade logistical support offered the riflemen nothing. "We aren't training. We're just walking. It's an exercise in misery." The opportunity for accretive training was lost—and sorely missed by the privates, who wanted new experiences. Officers and NCOs in companies perceived that light infantry-specific training—raids, ambushes, long-range operations—got lost in the big FTXs. Centralized training management demoralized troops because the planners did not maintain a continuing focus on development of individual soldiers, junior leaders, and basic combat teams.

The harshest critique of training was that centrally directed field problems lacked realism. Soldiers wondered why there was so little apparent integration of evaluators and opposing forces (OPFOR) into the exercises. Soldiers described the OPFOR as minimal, weak, and ill-coordinated. Members of one company were unanimous in saying that they had seen only one 10-person OPFOR element in 15 months. Small unit commissioned and non-commissioned leaders joined their privates in expressing frustration that evaluators' actions seemed unrelated to the combat scenario or the unit's situation. Casualties were often assessed when there was no contact, and when there was contact there were no evaluators at hand. Company and battalion leaders observed that field exercises neglected the opportunity to test and integrate intelligence, logistics, and operations as they would be required in combat. For example, in one exercise the ammunition supply rate, which was based on lift capability, was to control the number of fire missions that could be provided.
But operationally, there were many more calls for fire than the supply system could support. So everyone assumed an unlimited supply rate, and the real fire capability of the division was not tested. The officers and NCOs aware of this change in ground rules felt it was insulting, because it made the exercise seem like a farce.

Loss of Command Credibility

Our analysis of soldiers' comments led to the conclusion that pressure on commanders at all levels to perform multiple and exotic missions, and to show visitors how well they performed them, pushed the emphasis from gradually developing combat capabilities to giving an immediate impression of having already mastered those capabilities. Seasoned NCOs and officers said they saw the training focus shift after the first year from preparing for future action—allowing units to "work out the bugs" and soldiers to "make expected learning errors"—to one that demanded polished performance at a moment's notice. Often that performance was a demonstration for VIPs. NCOs and privates complained that demonstrations were not training and therefore detracted from the combat readiness of the unit: "No, we don't do in the demonstrations what we train to do. The battalion commander and staff are there for the rehearsals, and they introduce scores of changes to make it look good." COHORT soldiers and their leaders shared a sense of indignation about such corruption of the primary mission: "We're together to learn to fight, not to put on shows so the Old Man can impress his superiors. We have to be good, not just look good."

It was not only the privates and NCOs who complained. A staff officer said, "We're good, but we can't do all they ask without fudging the numbers." Another said, "Doesn't anyone have the guts to set priorities? Everything is number one priority, and we're just using up the troops." Still another, "We do our best, we fake the rest." Soldiers said they felt their commanders were often out of contact with reality. Our own observations suggest that impaired confidence in command was one factor that undermined the enthusiasm and spontaneous motivation the privates and junior leaders had brought to the light infantry task.

Soldiers of all ranks complained that, along with punitive behavior, centralized control, and the shift in emphasis from being good to looking good came a diminished quantity and quality of leader-follower communication. They said that decision processes in which they had been included during the first year were now rigidly centralized—even though they felt that they were better fitted to participate than they had been earlier. Leaders who seemed to welcome comments during the first year told us that the pace was now too fast to listen to their troops or to bring junior leaders into the discussion. We saw first-termer's initiatives stifled with a curt, "At ease, private!" Some battalion commanders admitted that they lacked the time to clarify their objectives at the company and battalion levels.

Soldiers also commented on discrepancies between what senior leaders said or wrote and what they experienced. Delays in
acquiring essential infantry equipment belied commanders' claims that the Division had an urgent mission and that the Army was fully supporting it. Pronouncements about a caring Army were undermined by the perceived inadequacy of medical services, long waits for housing, high rents, and repetitive, prolonged, and nonproductive field training. One group of soldiers told an observer that they realized their unit had badly messed up a field operation: "Then the colonel came down and told us we had done great. We would of all been waxed! How stupid does he think we are?"

Diminution of Combat Proficiency

During FTXs WRAIR observers noted that centralized training, oriented toward rapid achievement of ambitious objectives, had made headlines, but left gaps in fundamental skills, teamwork, and understanding of tactical situations. Observers repeatedly remarked upon the smooth, silent proficiency with which rifle platoons fell into combat formations, established security, and responded to leaders' arm and hand signals. But in most of the actions observed, when the shooting started, the same observers saw team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon sergeants and leaders lose control. It appeared to be every person for himself, and teamwork fell apart.

In one engagement, the platoon leader collected four soldiers and made a flanking movement through dead ground. He was not observed by the OPFOR, but the platoon sergeant, who was with the main body and unaware of what the officer was doing, began yelling for everyone to fall back. Some did, some kept fighting, and some were unsure. The platoon sergeant finally got everyone moving back just as the flanking party engaged the OPFOR—which promptly wiped it out since there was no longer pressure from the main body. Centralized decision-making, emphasis on ritualized activities rather than on fundamentals which could be adapted to new situations, and lack of evaluator/commander critiques of actual engagements left most infantry units unable to learn to function as coherent teams under simulated combat stress. This pattern was not unique to infantry companies.

During our observations of three artillery batteries we saw a loss of coherent functioning when tanks approached. In one instance tanks came over a ridge 4000 meters away from a battery. No officer or NCO gave orders either to engage the tanks or to evacuate the area. The tanks milled around, and the artillerymen ignored them. After about ten minutes the tanks moved toward the battery position. Still no one did anything. At about 1500 meters range the tanks charged the artillery. Neither the battery commander, lieutenants, first sergeant, chief of firing battery, nor gunnery sergeant gave any order. Two howitzer section chiefs ordered direct fire, and their crews engaged the tanks. Two chiefs yelled "march order" and began dismantling their positions. Two sections did nothing. Three minutes later the tanks were at point blank range hosing down the battery, and none of the senior leaders had yet given an order. Because they had become accustomed to being told what to do rather than being
trusted to initiate action, none of these leaders appeared confident enough to make a decision.

In a second battery, warning came of tanks at a distance of 6000 meters. The battalion TOC told the battery to march order. Then in the battery everyone gave orders. The principal issue was base plates. Our observer heard six or seven orders and counter orders to "dig them up" or "leave them." Section chiefs and crewmen were frantic as they changed from one procedure to the other while the senior NCOs and officers argued. Each leader showed his apparent fear of being criticized for making the "wrong" decision in an ambiguous situation.

The third battery learned of a tank attack by radio and march ordered without incident. However, the commander did not think through the relationship between his location and that of the tanks, and raced down the road toward the tanks. They met at about 400 meters range. The issue here was not indecisiveness, but high anxiety. The commander, eager to comply expeditiously with orders, lost sight of the fundamental issue.

Integration of fire support and maneuver was another sphere in which the fundamentals of combat got lost in the hustle to look good. Only one rifle company out of twelve prepared a fire plan for its 60mm mortars at any stage in the exercises observed. Infantry leaders appeared to be totally dependent upon the initiative and knowledge of artillery fire support team personnel for the use of mortars, artillery, or aerial support. Anti-tank personnel in most companies made comments such as, "Usually they just use us as fillers in rifle squads." "Only two men in our anti-tank section have fired their weapons." Observers noted that either lack of equipment or lack of knowledge made most MILES equipment for the anti-tank weapons useless.

The organization and functioning of battalion staffs also appeared to be focused on putting on polished briefings rather than facilitating the action of subordinate units. In one briefing we attended, briefers looked at the colonel more often than at the junior officers who would have to understand and execute the action. Several of the staff officers and NCOs we questioned and observed seemed to be unaware of their responsibilities as coordinators of action and transmitters of information. One of our observers was with a battalion headquarters while it was moving into a new Command Post (CP) location. While the headquarters staff was on the road, one company made a radio report that an OPFOR battalion was setting up positions at a location that was 800 meters from the intended CP. No one in the command group or S2/S3 group compared the reported coordinates of the OPFOR with the coordinates of the CP. They went ahead and routinely set up the CP. It was not a decision; no one was aware that a decision was necessary.

Members of a scout platoon complained that the battalion intelligence staff did not transmit their sighting reports to maneuver elements quickly enough for the information to be useful to them. Other scouts reported that when they tried to reenter friendly positions, "They usually fired us up, even though we were talking to the battalion S2 on the radio at the time."
scout platoon leader said: "My men are discouraged. They bust their humps to find the enemy, and no one acts on our information. The staff seem to be too busy."

While attending a briefing at a battalion CP a research observer heard a radio report from the reconnaissance platoon that two OPFOR companies were digging in around a meadow. Shortly thereafter, the battalion commander and S3 briefed a company commander to make an aerial movement into that very meadow. The S3 said nothing about the LZ being defended, or about reconnaissance, fire support, or artillery preparation. This was not a test of how the company would react under fire; it was clear that the battalion commander and the S3 expected the landing to be unopposed. No one had paid any attention to the sighting by the reconnaissance platoon. The S2 did not even participate in the briefing. The S2 had told us earlier that his duties were concerned with security of equipment and that intelligence came from higher headquarters. He said he was not involved in gathering, analyzing, or disseminating information about the enemy. One of our observers landed in the meadow with the first wave of the company and recorded the horrified comments of the soldiers as they were met with a hail of fire and were overrun by OPFOR machine gun jeeps. The general feeling in the company was one of great uneasiness over muddling by the "highers" who would send them into combat.

Another incident occurred when an observer was with a rifle company guarding an LZ against an expected OPFOR aerial assault. Helicopters landed, and the defenders opened fire into the dust cloud. It turned out that the helicopters were bringing in another company of the same battalion. The privates, whose commitment to the mission was almost visceral, were appalled; they reacted as if they had actually killed their comrades. They expressed stunned disbelief that higher command could let such a thing happen.

Analysis

Mistakes on the part of leaders facing new situations are an inevitable aspect of training; indeed, training managers should endeavor to present leaders with surprises to develop their ability to think creatively and adapt rapidly. The issue here is not to find fault with members of the Division. The issues are, first, that small unit leadership and control were effective only in routine situations, and second, that neither evaluators nor staff observers were usually present to review actions with the participants. We did not observe unit leaders conduct after action reviews following any of the operations described above; commanders were always under pressure to get on with the next problem. They were also reluctant to call attention to their loss of control—especially in the "zero defects" command climate that had come to prevail by the summer of 1986. This unwritten, unintended zero defects approach generated a zero learning posture. Errors being unacceptable, they were denied, and were thus unavailable as examples for improving unit performance.

At the time of the divisional certification exercise, while senior officers expressed the expected optimistic sentiments
about their battalions, equally experienced senior NCOs had grave reservations about the competence of their units. "Compared to other units I've been in, the state of training in this battalion is average, even after almost two years of stabilization." Or, "We would suffer heavy casualties in the initial stages of combat." Or, "My men can do some things well, but not others. We're not ready for a combat mission." Or, "We have emphasized quantity in training, not quality." Or, "The men can put on a show, but they have not mastered the fundamentals. That would cost us lives."

Analysis provides three motivational lessons that can be drawn from these experiences. We observed that NCOs and officers who functioned as teachers and supporters generally had more active, productive, and competent units than those who drove their troops. The privates brought strong internal motivation to their roles. Adding punitive external motivation was unnecessary and often created conflicts that produced resentment and apathy rather than learning and work. NCOs who had not learned how to lead privates who wanted to give their all did not know how to interact constructively with these soldiers.

The second lesson is that centralization, while it can bring efficiency, speed up operations, reduce error, and alleviate commanders' anxieties, has costs. One set of costs--loss of a sense of proprietorship among junior personnel and feelings of not being trusted by command--can lead to a decline in motivation and commitment. Another set of costs arises when subordinate leaders do not have opportunities to test their own judgment. This can lead to a paralysis in non-standard situations.

Thirdly, soldiers of all ranks, including field grade officers, attributed the decline in motivation to a loss of focus on readiness for combat. Command acceptance of training distractors--such as visitors and competitions unrelated to combat skill development--led to a widening divergence of purpose. While the preponderance of soldiers remained oriented toward training for combat, their officers tended to be distracted by other requirements. Looking good, flashy training rather than mastery of fundamentals, and exercises, competitions, and carefully choreographed demonstrations weakened leaders' authority and power to motivate. That soldiers began to see commanders' compliments as hollow and self-serving suggests the extent to which leaders had lost credibility. First-term soldiers continued to believe that their initial achievements were not lost. They insisted that their units could be superb fighting forces if they and their leaders could recover commonality of purpose.
CHAPTER III

UNIT FAMILY RELATIONS

Expectations

In his initial concept of the light infantry division the CSA recognized that soldier families would be affected by "...frequent deployments and field training absences," and directed commanders to develop "initiatives to better support families...to minimize the impact..." (1984, p. 5). In his White Paper, The Army Family (1983), the CSA made it clear that concern for families is an operational as well as a humanitarian matter. Families that can cope, combined with family-unit bonding, raise combat readiness by supporting the fighting soldier and freeing him from concern for his family's welfare.

The rationale behind family support initiatives is that a reasonable effort by leaders to organize spouses to support each other, and to develop unit-to-spouse information systems, pays for itself many times over in reduced anxiety among wives, fewer distress distractions for husbands, and diminished demands by family members on unit rear detachments. Wives' organizations have demonstrated their effectiveness among families of nuclear submarine crews and other military units that deploy for protracted periods. This discussion focuses on the dynamics of relationships among command structure, soldiers, families, and Family Support Groups (FSGs) in the 7th ID(L) at Fort Ord.

Realizations: First Year

A typical COHORT battalion in this Division had, upon activation, about 20 married officers, 75 married NCOs, and 50 married first-term soldiers. More than half of the officers' families moved into on-post quarters within a few months of arrival. Most of the NCOs' families lived off post for the first 12 to 18 months. About a fourth of the NCOs did not initially bring their families with them. When the first-termers arrived, about two thirds of the married soldiers (25-35) brought their families. A number of privates came with ready made families—a wife and one or two children. Almost all of them had to find housing off post.

We found that wives of unit eagerly welcomed the families of COHORT soldiers. First termers' wives were delighted to find older unit wives hospitable and helpful. However, the realities of establishing households in the Monterey Peninsula area were harsh. During the first year Fort Ord was still in the process of transformation from supporting a low priority training division to a base for a full-strength division of the Army's Rapid Deployment Force. As a consequence of the incomplete state of transformation, families experienced frustrating deficiencies in housing, medical care, and other facilities. This section describes the conditions families encountered, the structure and accomplishments of unit Family Support Groups (FSGs), and actions by command to improve living conditions for families.
Initial Experiences

Irrespective of rank, new arrivals found the installation guest house facilities inadequate to handle the large influx of families when a COHORT battalion was activated. Soldiers and spouses described the guest house facilities as crowded, dirty, shabby, and depressing. Wives said that medical facilities were inadequate. Getting appointments for some services required long waits. Clerical personnel in some medical departments were seen as rude and indifferent. In spite of the limited capacity of Fort Ord medical facilities to carry the overload, soldiers and their spouses found it extremely difficult to get non-availability statements so that family members could go to civilian doctors. Many first-term soldiers and their spouses said they did not understand CHAMPUS rules, and had difficulty finding anyone to explain them. There was a shared sense of indignation among wives of both career soldiers and first-terms about these problems.

Soldiers and their spouses reported that off-post housing conditions were inhospitable. Rents for minimal one-bedroom apartments were in the six hundred dollar range, and nearby housing was scarce. Wives of both NCOs and privates living off post said they found themselves isolated from other wives, stuck without transportation or telephone, and unable to use installation facilities. First-term families in particular soon accumulated burdensome debts. Many wives tried to find jobs, but their efforts were hampered by not having contacts, references, transportation, or knowledge of the area. For those who found regular employment, having a job was an important stabilizing factor for the wife and the family.

Family Support Groups

The most effective sources of support for spouses in the initial stages were the Family Support Groups (FSGs). Organized by small unit leaders and their wives, FSGs helped to establish a sense of unit identity among the cadre families and welcomed newcomer wives of COHORT first-terms. Fort Ord's Family Support Group Guideline dated 28 May 1985 (Regulation 608-2) offered limited resources to company-based FSGs and urged battalion commanders to encourage unit wives to organize them on a volunteer basis. The guideline stipulated that FSGs be at company level, rank-free, and avoid mirroring the chain of command. FSGs were to respond to perceived needs of the wives in each unit. They were to be primarily self-sustaining rather than rely on Army funds or resources. They were considered affiliates of the units, not components of the installation support structure.

From the outset, officers and NCOs in the four battalions embraced the purposes and methods of company-level FSGs with enthusiasm. Wives of officers and NCOs organized themselves into teams to welcome, orient, and assist clusters of wives accompanying incoming privates. Typical of the FSG volunteers was a company commander's wife who said to newly arrived wives, "We are your family! When your husbands are away in the field..."
it's to us you'll turn. We all have the same problems, and we can help each other." FSGs were effective in helping the new Army wives set up housekeeping, and they were successful in bonding soldier families to the units. Typical comments by wives of first-term soldiers were: "The Family Support Group volunteers in this unit make you feel like they want you to belong. I just didn't expect that at all..." "The Family Support Group will look after you. They are a good bunch who really care."

FSG volunteers introduced newly arrived wives in small groups to the installation and the surrounding communities. Family-unit identification developed through personal contacts, group information-sharing, and a climate of caring. Unit leaders and FSG volunteers sought to protect family members from military and civilian bureaucratic demands and red tape and to help them find housing, buy or rent furniture, obtain transportation and child care, and meet other settling-in needs. A seasoned NCO wife commented, "I am working in our Family Support Group so I can be helpful to other women who have problems with their children like I did at first, and who are so young that they don't know how to manage their lives."

Initially, FSG volunteers were wives of officers and NCOs. As the units shook down, wives of first-termers volunteered, and the most active wives emerged as leaders. In one unit the wife of a specialist-four was the FSG leader; in a few, platoon sergeants' or platoon leaders' wives led the groups. In most units FSG wives did not act as if they wore their husbands' rank. Wives of privates, officers, and NCOs interacted rather freely on a first-name basis. Wives of soldiers in the same unit took care of one another, and many developed friendships. Some of the wives of junior enlisted men told us that these informal, in-unit support networks helped reduce stress, alleviate loneliness, and solve problems they could not have handled easily alone. The FSG contributed to the new family's adjustment to military life; over time, most families of light infantry enlisted personnel adjusted successfully to the military way of life.

FSGs at the company and battalion levels bonded wives to their husbands' units in two ways. First, they developed a relatively efficient and effective information distribution channel to all unit wives. Communications through FSGs supplemented or took the place of information provided to soldiers by the unit leaders. FSG communications included newsletters and flyers mailed to wives at their home addresses, telephone trees for unit alerts, and informal gatherings. FSGs were a dependable means of providing information and assistance to families before and during off-post deployments. In addition, FSGs organized unit-family get-togethers, "welcome-home parties, and fund-raising events--such as flea markets, car washes, and group outings. These activities gave spouses of soldiers of different ranks within a company opportunities to meet, exchange ideas, and work on projects that gave them feelings of being part of the unit and linked to one another by a common cause.

Rear detachment commanders and headquarters staff provided assistance and information to spouses directly or through the
FSGs during the frequent unit field absences. In most battalions, the chaplain served as an informal advisor to FSGs and unit leaders on family matters, and performed a counseling role with soldiers and their wives. A small council of company FSG leaders (wives) advised the battalion commander and staff of family members' needs and recommended unit-family policies. Each company FSG was relatively autonomous, and each battalion FSG council operated largely without interference from higher echelons in the chain of command. Innovations by an FSG in one unit were shared with leaders of other unit FSGs by word of mouth and through informal contacts among senior commanders' wives.

**Action by Command**

The Division introduced several initiatives to improve post housing and services. The Commanding General arranged to have in-processing simplified, organized a one-stop in/out processing facility, and provided incentives to civilian employees of garrison agencies to serve soldiers' families courteously and efficiently. The Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) spearheaded efforts to establish cooperative relationships with regional elected officials, apartment landlords, and businesses. The 1985 Fort Ord Leadership Conference brought out numerous problems and laid the foundation for community wide improvement for families (See Aix A). Military consumer facilities adjusted their hours to make them more convenient and accessible to families.

The number of available housing units was expanded by means of new construction, refurbishing of substandard houses on post, leasing of off-post apartments, and garrison-initiated rent deposit reduction and lease-agreement guarantees with private apartment owners off post—all of which reduced out-of-pocket costs to soldier families. An innovative enlisted family mobile home park was built on post, then leased through a private contractor to accommodate enlisted families quickly. Off-post housing referral assistance to new families was strengthened. The garrison organized an installation orientation program for newly arrived married soldiers and their spouses, and set up a Family Support Center manned by an NCO on a 24-hour basis and staffed by FSG volunteers from all units on a rotating basis. This one-stop in/out processing facility coordinated with the post exchange to open a rental program for essential household needs.

WRAIR survey and interview data indicate that spouses of soldiers in the four COHORT battalions perceived unit social support more favorably during the first year than did spouses in other units Army-wide. Most spouses of soldiers perceived the FSGs as positive sources of support. They did not see them as rank-conscious or intrusive. NCOs and first-termers became more willing to bring their geographically separated families to post as the supply of housing caught up with demand, and the housing assistance programs took effect. In addition, the marriage rate among first-termers rose dramatically during the first year. New marriages, plus the influx of wives who had previously lived apart from their husbands, more than doubled the number of families living on or near the post in the first year of the life
cycle of each battalion. These family members 'trickled in' one by one rather than arriving in batches like the COHORT soldiers' wives who appeared at Fort Ord at the start-up of a unit life cycle.

Realizations: Second Year

As the first year ended and the second began, several factors led to a significant deterioration of unit-family bonding—in spite of the efforts of command, the warmth of FSG volunteers, and the resourcefulness of young enlisted wives. Four primary factors that emerged from analysis are: growing demands on soldiers as the weight of missions grew and unit strength fell; disruptions of family relationships resulting from frequent and prolonged separations; centralization of FSGs; and influence of command behavior on spouses' attitudes toward the unit.

Conflicting Demands of Unit and Family

Social-psychological conflicts between unit and family took many forms. The initially positive attitudes of most NCO and first-termer wives toward their husbands' units and leaders evolved toward skepticism and mistrust as wives perceived that command subordinated any soldier's family problems (no matter how significant) to any official task. Particularly frustrating was the inability of unit leaders to control the length of the duty day in garrison. A sergeant's wife said: "I have no idea when he'll get home. I can't plan dinner, the kids want to know when he'll be home, and I don't know." A private's wife said, "The unit always keeps my husband late but doesn't give him anything to do. The NCOs hassle him and make everyone in the platoon come in on weekends. What kind of a family life is that?" A private said, "My wife gets on me because she never knows when I'll get home. She thinks I like the Army better than her. But we never know when we'll get off, and we aren't allowed to phone home."

Many soldiers reported that unit leaders were perceived as unwilling to give soldiers time to deal with familial commitments. As one private told observers, "I got married on my lunch hour because I couldn't get no time off." Another complained bitterly,

My wife was coming in one afternoon, and we had a mandatory class scheduled that no one could miss. I went right up the line to the company commander. No one would give me time off to meet her plane. So a friend said he would meet her. Then, at the last minute, the whole afternoon's training was cancelled so we could go to the Monterey Rodeo. I still couldn't get out to meet my wife at the airport.

Mandatory training and FTXs precluded soldiers from helping their wives face initial encounters with health care facilities, financial institutions, and housing offices. "My wife and kid arrived on Friday, and I left for the field at 0430 the next morning." The unpredictability of the availability of their
husbands drove wives of soldiers of all ranks to distraction. One frustrated spouse put it in no uncertain terms.

I've just given up planning anything! Meals, movies, vacations. To hell with it! We plan it, and get it all set up, and they send him off. I don't trust his commander. He just wants to look good, and he'll volunteer Jack for anything that comes along. And Jack is afraid to say anything.

Often, command attitudes toward sickness and injury denigrated soldiers who became ill or incapacitated, irrespective of whether the problem was incurred in the line of duty. Sick or injured soldiers were taken to the field, were segregated in "Profile Pens" and referred to as L.D.s (Limp Dicks). There was a presumption that sick or injured soldiers were malingering. "We're just part of a throw-away army; they don't care; they just use us up." The spouses of sick or injured soldiers, helpless to do anything, became infuriated or depressed.

Privates' wives had a widespread perception that they were at the mercy of an indifferent command structure. Many NCOs' wives felt that their husbands were unappreciated, and indeed, often in danger of losing their careers. We found very few wives who perceived their husbands to be esteemed, respected, or to feel needed in their present unit. Meanwhile, family size increased as many young wives gave birth to their first or second child, and pregnancies became major family concerns across all units.

Separations

The second factor involved in deterioration of unit-family relations was the persistent, frequent absences of the soldiers on field exercises. These exercises put a progressively greater strain on husband-wife and father-child relations—especially when the soldier reported to his wife that the training had been uneventful or repetitious. Interviews revealed that families did not become accustomed to frequent and prolonged absences of the husband. Rather, the disruptive effects on familial relationships became cumulative. Intra-familial understanding, support, and communications suffered. Several wives of officers, NCOs, and privates made comments such as: "When he is home he is so exhausted all he does is sleep." Psychosocial isolation of wives during their husbands' absences was evident in rising appeals to the rear detachment command for help with crises such as broken household appliances, sick children, "peeping Toms," and harassing phone calls.

Families with problems sometimes experienced organizational double binds which contributed to their sense of conflict and alienation. A soldier brought back from field duty at the initiative of a post social service agency because of a family problem might be perceived in his unit as a sham or complainer. He was usually returned to the field as soon as the family member was seen by the agency, regardless of whether the problem was solved.
In addition to the wife's loneliness and anxiety during her husband's absence, soldiers reported additional problems. A few soldiers volunteered that they were too exhausted after field exercises to engage in sexual relations with their wives. "I dig my wife, you know, but when I get back from the field, I'm just not interested, you know what I mean?" Many soldiers became irritable or uncommunicative at home. One private recalled, "I'm really short-tempered after an FTX. I get mad real easy. My wife and I have had a lot of fights. I try to control myself, but I just go off. Everything gets to me." Wives also described problems associated with soldiers' psychological reentry into the family: "When he's away, I have to do everything. I'm responsible, and I'm in charge. When he comes home, he wants to take over. But he's not in the picture; he doesn't know what the hell's going on. So we fight." As individual respondents identified specific problems, the research team members sought to find out if they were general in nature. They found that many families experienced one or more of these disruptive processes, and that the family disruption, in turn, had negative effects on soldiers' attitudes toward, and performance of, military duties.

Perceiving command to be indifferent to familial needs and experiencing stress that exceeded their coping skills, some wives went home; a few divorced their husbands. First-termers frequently mentioned that their spouses had temporarily left them. Maritally separated, some soldiers moved back into the barracks. In one company all three platoon leaders were either recently divorced or about to be divorced. Although most families did not actually break up, tensions induced in the soldier by a physically stressful and mentally distressing training schedule, and those induced in the spouse by isolation and unpredictability, interacted to the detriment of both the unit and the family. A combination of family distractors reduced the readiness of soldiers to perform their military duties. There were increasing incidents of indiscipline and misconduct, including substance abuse, DUI's and AWOLs. Several soldiers said their wives encouraged them to desert. Said one soldier, "She's begging me to go AWOL. She says I don't need this shit and neither does she." One group said of an AWOL comrade: "His wife was after him to leave. He didn't want to, and we helped him stand up to her. But I guess he finally saw her point."

Company FSG members redoubled their efforts to help new wives cope with military separations. An NCO wife pointed out, "Young wives sometimes give up too easily. They should listen to others who have more experience and learn to take care of themselves. There's an Army culture out there; you learn how to get what you want out of it." Most young wives followed her approach, but some became overly dependent on FSG volunteers. A company commander recounted:

While we were in the field a soldier's wife called my wife at 2 AM in tears to say her car had broken down on the road from San Francisco while she was bringing her sick child back from a hospital visit. She had no money. My wife got out of bed, got her, and brought her to the hospital. Then she had to drive over to another private's house to pick up a wife she had
promised to take to a plane at 7 AM. Then back to the hospital where the first wife was stranded. She had to lean on the AOD to call someone in to look at the kid. Then she helped the woman get her car towed. Meanwhile our kids made their own breakfast and got off to school. That very morning she had a coffee for some of the wives to meet a new private’s wife.

In spite of their dedication, FSG leaders gradually acquired reputations among enlisted soldiers and their wives as being ineffective in sheltering spouses from unit pressures. By the second year a growing burden of psychologically dependent spouses, a constant trickling in of new families, and additional complications as most of the first-term families started having babies overwhelmed the capabilities of the FSG volunteers to alleviate the effects of intense military stress. Concurrently, some FSG volunteers began to resent psychologically needy family members they were trying to help.

Centralization of Family Support Functions

The third factor that undermined family-unit relations was an installation-wide effort to organize a standardized Family Support System that mirrored the military chain of command from company to battalion to brigade to division. Fort Ord Regulation 608-3 of April 10, 1986, a new Family Support Group Guideline that replaced the May 1985 version, placed unit family support under the garrison's new Family Support Program Division and the DPCA. This regulation imposed requirements on company FSGs to keep written records and accounts of fund-raising and expenditures. Salient provisions of the regulation are shown in the following excerpts:

The Family Support Group Program begins with a Family Support Group at each company and then connects these groups through a series of councils to provide installation-wide information sharing and mutual support...The unit commander and spouse (command team) is responsible for overall direction of the Family Support Group...The next level is the Battalion Family Support Group Council...The Battalion Commander and Command Sergeant Major spouses are the primary choices for the battalion representatives...The major subordinate command (brigade) Family Support Council is the third level of interconnection... The Installation Family Support Group Advisory Council is the final level and has general oversight advisory responsibility for the Family Support Group Program...

No fund raising activities will be conducted without written, advance approval as prescribed below...The Unit Family Support Group will be the only group within a unit allowed to conduct fund raising and maintain bank accounts for family activities...Each major subordinate commander will have overall responsibility for his/her Family Support Group fund. Family Support Groups within each brigade level unit will send requests for fund raising activities to the
Colonel commander. The Commander will approve or disapprove requests, issue prenumbered controlled forms, and monitor monies raised. The Commander will forward information copy of the approval to DPCA. Request for fund raisers held at various on-post locations outside the brigade area must be coordinated with DPCA to reserve the location. On a quarterly basis each major subordinate command will prepare a consolidated report on the FSG fund's existence, purpose and financial status...This will be forwarded to the DPCA for review. DPCA will forward the reports to the Installation Commander for final approval.

Their organization into a centralized FSG hierarchy with bureaucratic reporting requirements tended to dry up the spontaneity and atmosphere of equality among most unit volunteer wives. It became increasingly difficult for FSGs to function autonomously or in an egalitarian fashion at the company level and below. At the battalion level and above, FSGs became formal organizations with multiple top-down requirements on members. Family members no longer perceived themselves as belonging to a face-to-face group of wives in which they could work out solutions to their shared problems. Active volunteers felt increasingly helpless and alienated as the new hierarchy was put into place. The new regulation also created an accounting and reporting paperwork burden for volunteers and small unit leaders that could not be handled at the company level. Some company FSGs collapsed. Others were merged into battalion level FSGs led by the commander's wife—with a corresponding loss of intimacy, equality, and bonding among the declining membership.

FSG leadership coalesced around the commander's wife at each level in the chain of command, based on the notion of a "command team." Unit volunteer leaders organizationally were tied into battalion, brigade, division, and installation level councils, which diverted them from attending to the primary networks of family support at company level. Already overworked volunteers found themselves tasked to serve as members of committees and as unpaid workers on projects generated by family support councils at higher echelons. "Burnout" among the most active senior NCO and officer volunteers became commonplace. It became known as the "Light Fighter's Wife's Stress Syndrome."

Most FSG volunteers interviewed said they felt forced to maintain their participation, believing it would count in their husbands' rating for promotion. They said they resented this obligation to volunteer. A junior officer's wife said, "Our FSG is not a democracy anymore. What the commander's wife says, goes! This FSG work is something I have to do for my husband's career. The command mandated FSG, and I have to volunteer for it or else." One company commander's wife took a job on the economy and used it to make herself unavailable to the FSG hierarchy. Other volunteer spouses sought to find ways to reduce the personal participation without offending their husbands' commanders' wives.

Command-centered organization of FSGs contributed to further reduction in enlisted wives' participation. NCOs' wives resented
the "command team" approach to the leadership of FSGs by unit commanders' wives as too "rank-structured." By mid-1986, most junior enlisted soldier's spouses had dropped out of FSG activities. A typical explanation was, "I began to feel out of place at FSG meetings so I just stopped going. I felt officers' and NCOs' wives were trying to tell us what to do, and they never hear what we have to say." The inverse of the enlisted spouses' perceptions is revealed by an acerbic comment by one officer's wife to another: "These privates' wives say they don't want to work in the FSG because they have nothing in common with us. They are right, they don't have anything in common with us!"

Also, many married soldiers grew wary of the role of the FSG as they saw it becoming a "wives' chain of command"--an additional channel for further controlling their lives. Many a junior enlisted wife reported that her husband told her not to associate with officers' wives at FSG meetings because of his concern about 'fraternization.' In the most extreme example of misunderstanding about 'fraternization,' a corporal reported: "The colonel's wife came to my wife and told her, 'If you continue to socialize with your husband's first sergeant's wife, your husband's application for OCS could be disapproved.'" A more common reaction is expressed in a private's comment, "My ass may belong to the Army, but I don't want the Army to get nowhere near my wife."

During the second year the effectiveness of the FSG as a source of stress buffering and as a social mechanism through which wives could draw strength from and provide support to the unit declined. A contributing reason was the centralization of FSG functions and their evolution into a perceived wives' chain of command. With the development of a hierarchy came reporting burdens, taskings for additional volunteer work outside the company, and a sense that, by volunteering, the wives were competing with each other to strengthen their husbands' career status. As a result of these distractors some FSGs tended to exacerbate the distress initiated by separations and unit-family conflict rather than moderate it.

Command Behavior and Informal Networks among Wives

Results of interviews with wives showed that what they needed most were friends with whom they could develop mutually supportive relationships to solve problems, buffer stress, and alleviate loneliness. Whether they found their friends among the wives of other soldiers in the same unit, the wives of soldiers in other units, or women outside the Army was strongly influenced by the behavior of the unit commander. Commanders who cared for their men, respected them, and kept them informed--in other words, who fostered vertical cohesion--also fostered the formation of friendships among the wives in the unit. One brigade commander said, "I can tell when a captain is a positive leader when the wives do things with the company. He can't command the wives, so if they come out I know his men love the unit and believe in what they are doing."

But soldiers' wives found sources of friendship support other than wives of other soldiers in the unit. They had daily
contacts with neighbors, co-workers, sharers of children's day care responsibilities, and church or recreational peers. These linkages and informal network groups helped integrate families into the post and civilian communities in the Fort Ord area. Networks of friends outside their husbands' unit met some of the needs the FSGs sought to meet and helped the wives to cope. In most cases networks of friends outside the unit were desirable adjuncts to the FSG and friends within the unit, facilitating family member adaptation. Indeed, over time the majority of unit wives achieved their own adaptations to light infantry and military life stressors.

However, when commanders alienated their soldiers, those soldiers' wives grew to hate the Army and the unit, and shunned association with the FSG. The social networks they did join were helpful to them, but were not necessarily sympathetic with the Army and did not bond wives to their husbands' units. One private's wife asserted, "We women see each other a lot when the guys are in the field. We sleep at each other's houses, cook for each other, and spend a lot of time taking care of children. I don't need help from his unit or FSG. I have my own friends."

Wives who remained aloof from the FSG did not have the ready access to information about unit schedules and missions FSG members had. They did not know unit wives with whom to discuss the implications of military actions and policies for the well-being of their families. They were vulnerable to becoming alarmed by false rumors. Negative spousal attitudes toward the unit tended to grow as their soldier husbands were pulled to and fro by their units, and the wives were left in ignorance. The results were aversive for the wives and the soldiers. They led to family-unit conflict and loss of communications.

Analysis

During the first fifteen months of the four COHORT battalions, it was evident that the senior leadership of the Division sought to enhance the quality of life for all soldiers' families. Ironically, measurable declines in family members' feelings of well-being and in their perceptions of unit social climate took place despite the growth of divisional and installation family and community support initiatives. We concluded that neither senior commanders nor unit leaders fully understood the depth of the human costs of military stress among soldiers' families. Therefore, many of their well-meaning efforts to mitigate those costs did not accomplish what the leaders intended.

The primary costs were separations that were perceived to be excessive in frequency and length, and conjugal psychological disruption. The psychological disruptions arose from fatigue, soldiers' conflicts about their duties to their families and to their units, anxiety about living costs, limited access to installation facilities—particularly health care facilities—and uncertainty. Family members and soldiers were unable to predict when they would have time together because unit commanders were indecisive in structuring duty hours in garrison. Soldiers felt conflicted about trying to fulfill their commitments to their
military duties while also looking after their family's needs. They could not satisfy both. Wives perceived themselves to be in competition with unit leaders for their husbands' time. These pressures contributed to family dysfunctions that distracted some married soldiers, and these distractions affected unit readiness. Most families, however, successfully coped with the stressors of military life by informal adaptations without recourse to unit or installation support structures.

Action by command to improve physical living conditions and the accessibility of post facilities was vigorous, comprehensive, and effective. Many installation-level problems were addressed, but the small unit-family problems proved to have serious impacts. Light infantry leaders said they knew that familial distress and decrements in familial functioning were likely during the train-up and certification period. They did not understand the importance of family satisfaction to the success of light infantry development. By accepting high levels of cumulative stress among families they vitiated their efforts to mobilize families in support of "high performance units." Instead of unit-based, mutually supportive families contributing to soldiers' psychological readiness, we found individually adapted spouses, some of whom drained soldiers' energies and concentration, and many who felt alienated from their soldier's unit.

Light infantry leaders said they anticipated that during the train-up and certification period familial distress would be high. They did their best to mitigate the distress through FSGs, unit-family activities, and communications efforts. But leaders did not understand the mutual feedback loop linking unit, soldier, and family. The way the unit treated the soldier affected his feelings, which he expressed to his spouse, who responded by expressing her feelings to the soldier and toward the unit. Unit commanders who were caring and respected their troops could expect soldiers to bond with the unit and spouses' positive feelings to strengthen that bonding. Negative feedback exacerbated alienation processes when commanders did not care for and respect their subordinates.

Efforts by command to improve conditions for families were further compromised by the assumption of RDF mission that drove mission requirements to levels no one had expected, by dwindling unit strength, and by the decision to centralize FSGs. The latter action transformed FSGs from a partial solution into part of the problem. The results during the second year were that instead of contributing to "high performance," and facilitating resistance to stress, families were disrupted, and many expressed aversion to their units. Family members' dissatisfactions distracted soldiers' energies and concentration, and led a few to desert.

Success and failure with families paralleled vertical cohesion and motivation. The feedback processes were the same; the families amplified the feelings, whether positive or negative, aroused in the soldiers by unit climate.
CHAPTER IV
LEADERSHIP

Expectations

The logic behind the expectation that light infantry divisions will be effective combat forces is based on stabilized assignments and high quality leadership. These two factors are to make it possible to develop cohesion and conduct accretive training. The effects of stabilization have been noted in the chapters on Cohesion and Motivation. In those chapters, and the one on Unit-Family relations, it is evident that leadership affected all three expectations. The purpose of this chapter is to examine leadership processes. The Army Chief of Staff (CSA), in his White Paper on Light Infantry Divisions (1984), specified that officers and noncommissioned officers would be selected for their experience, competency, and concern for their soldiers. The CSA further specified that leaders in light infantry forces would "serve as role models for tactical and technical proficiency, physical fitness, and ethical behavior.... But above all, the leaders will have the high personal courage to inspire in their subordinates the respect and daring essential for victory under arms" (1984, p. 2).

In a subsequent White Paper on Leadership (DA Pam 600-50, CSA, 1985), the CSA prescribed a leadership paradigm for the Army as a whole. In it he reiterated the guidance given in the White Paper on Light Infantry Divisions and added instructions concerning respect for subordinates (listening, empowering, communicating); development of subordinates (self-discipline, tactical and technical proficiency, sense of responsibility and accountability); and caring for subordinates (personal, familial, and professional welfare). The CSA also urged commanders to foster innovation and to seek to develop among their personnel a common dedication to the mission and to each other. Officers and NCOs whose military socialization included exposure to older authoritarian military cultural norms varied in their attitudes toward the CSA's conceptions of leadership, and in their ability to implement them.

Realizations: First Year

During the first year commissioned and non-commissioned leaders confronted the tactical and physical demands of light infantry, and the interpersonal demands of COHORT battalions and positive leadership. None of them had been trained in the peculiarities of this mix of innovations because they were the first to implement it. In spite of the fact that the COHORT climate, light infantry tactics, and physical demands of light infantry were new to them, some officers and NCOs quickly developed ways to fully exploit the potential of the COHORT system to develop extraordinarily cohesive and competent units. This section focuses on ways in which several unit leaders solved human problems facing all commanders and blazed a trail for subsequent leaders.


Respect and Trust

The first crop of company commanders in the four battalions comprised many of the most experienced captains in the Division. Though most of them found the going difficult, and four of the sixteen were relieved for cause, two developed models of vertically bonded, "high performance" units. These commanders put into practice the CSA's vision of leadership. The trust and respect with which they treated their subordinates are evident from representative comments made after they had left their commands: "He listened to what we had to say, and he'd act on it." "The captain treated me like a colleague even though I was only an E-5." "He didn't bring in piss tests and dogs. He told us he didn't want any drugs, and he counted on us to back him up." "He trusted us (NCOs) to run the unit. If one of us fucked up, he would sit down with the guy and, man to man, work out a better way." "He never raised his voice." "He always seemed glad to see me." "He really knew his stuff."

The successful company commanders conferred "ownership" of the mission and the unit on almost every soldier in their units. An NCO observed: "I couldn't believe all the stuff the captain would try. We got as excited about the experiments as he did. We were making history." A couple of privates stated: "Well, you see, we're the best unit. We don't make a lot of noise; we just win everything. The Old Man shows us how, then we do it." Another soldier put it, "The guys don't like to talk about being the top unit and all that. We just want to be good at what we do, because that's what'll bring smoke on the enemy and keep us alive." The NCOs and privates saw their company/battery as special, and sometimes as embattled: "This is a weird battalion, but it's okay in our unit." "We do things our own way. Sometimes the CO has to take a lot of heat." "The other units have a lot of Article 15 punishments and chapterings. We've only had two, and those guys were real slugs."

Carin:

Soldiers said their captains were genuinely concerned about their personal, familial, and professional welfare: "If a guy has a problem the Old Man gives it first priority. He doesn't want nobody on the gun with his head somewhere else." "He takes care of us, man." "The CO doesn't like to burn guys, he wants us to get straight." Observers were present during two interactions that illustrate the ways in which these captains approached their soldiers' welfare. In the first the captain encountered one of his soldiers whom he had punished with extra duty for a drunken rampage. The officer's comments were:

How many more days of extra duty do you have? Okay, you'll work those out and that's the end of it. Were you able to get an appointment with the (alcohol treatment facility)? Fine. You want to follow through with them. I wrote to your folks yesterday to tell them what a fine job you're doing. I told them about how you are our best gunner and about the confidence I and Sergeant Jones have in you.
In another incident, one of the captains received a phone call from the mother of one of his soldiers who had run off leaving him with two small children. The captain reassured her that the soldier would receive a compassionate discharge as soon as he had assurance of a job in his hometown. He said: "Could you have his new employer send me a letter promising him a job? I don't want to discharge him and stop his income until he is certain of employment. He has those two kids to take care of."

"High Performance"

The two units possessed the style of work, interpersonal transactions, and patterns of achievements that fit the profile of "high-performance" units as described by Malone (1983) and by Simonsen, Frandsen, and Hoopengardner (1985). We concluded that leaders in these successful units understood and implemented the CSA's guidance on leadership. They respected, trusted, and liked their troops. They understood that the way to build a high-performance unit was to develop the professional competence of their troops, to share the mission with them, and to take care of them. Their concern for their soldiers' welfare appeared to the observers to spring from genuine interest in them. Their effectiveness as mentors came from this interest coupled with their own passion for and mastery of the tactics and techniques of their branches. They multiplied their effectiveness as leaders by empowering their subordinates; rather than diluting their control they strengthened it. By the time six months had passed, the commanders of these units had relationships with their men that mobilized and linked their creative energies to the missions, and thereby enabled the units to outperform all others.

First Sergeants

The effective unit commanders each had a first sergeant who supported his commander's policies of respect, trust, caring, and empowerment. The first sergeants stayed in the units under new commanders and were perceived by their subordinates as the primary reason why the units were able to maintain a substantial portion of their earlier efficiency under newer and less experienced commanders.

Another company commander had more experience and an even warmer approach to his people than the captains of the outstanding units. But his first sergeant believed in bullying his subordinates. "I kick ass. That's why we have a good unit." The unit was good but not outstanding. (Two of the lieutenants in the company were primarily career oriented and remote from their troops. The third, who was assigned in mid-cycle, cared about his soldiers but had not been in the unit long enough to have an impact.) The strength of the company lay in the company commander and three platoon sergeants who thought as he did. Destructive behavior by the first sergeant, and lack of commitment by the two senior lieutenants, compromised the focus of purpose within the company and kept it from becoming a "high performance" unit. The attitudes, behavior, and unanimity of purpose of company leaders were the basic ingredients in the
development of psychological readiness and high performance. However, the climate created by battalion commanders proved to be a decisive factor in their success or failure.

**Command Climate**

Battalion commanders and their key staff officers expressed exuberance over their assignments to the new light infantry division. Most field grade officers and senior NCOs described their assignments to the Division as "the high point of my career" or "a dream come true." One battalion commander told his officers and NCOs, "We are a family. We'll take care of one another." Battalion commanders, staff officers, and NCOs spoke with enthusiasm about implementing "power down" leadership in the light infantry setting. Most of them understood and approved of the notion of developing small unit leaders who could function autonomously. They said they were prepared to take the heat when subordinates erred. One battalion commander described trust between a commander and his subordinates as "a fragile bubble" that can easily be burst. He described trust as essential for effective command and cohesion: "I nurture it carefully, but I am always fearful that a higher echelon will pull the plug on me and force me to break my word to my men."

The battalion commander of one of the captains described in this section was like an older brother with his subordinate commanders. An observer saw them argue, joke with and enjoy each other. Though they would tease their colonel, the captains never forgot who was in charge. They expressed admiration and respect for him as a brilliantly qualified officer and as a leader whom they would follow anywhere. They also said he was a loyal friend and supporter. The colonel expressed confidence in the captains and demanded no rituals of deference. Questioned on his staff, he said, "The staff exists to serve the subordinate units."

While a few officers and NCOs were able to lead their units superlatively, most were uncertain. As the units evolved, cross-rank human relationships were cut short. The two outstanding captains were transferred early in their tours, so it is not possible to assess how their units would have fared in the second year had they remained in command.

**Realizations: Second Year**

While reviewing the evolution of leader behavior during the second year, it is essential to keep in mind the circumstances leaders faced. The Division had added the Rapid Deployment Force mission to an already overcrowded agenda and was driving toward brigade and division certification. By the 18-month point, we determined that most units had lost 30 to 50 percent of their NCOs and 25 to 35 percent of their first-term soldiers. Though about half of the missing NCOs were replaced, only about one in ten of the privates were replaced. At the time of the brigade and divisional certification exercises in the summer of 1986, we reviewed deployment rosters with company and battery first sergeants, then rechecked the rosters in the field against the soldiers actually on the guns or in the squad positions. Most
infantry rifle squads had five or six people, and most artillery howitzer sections had four or five. One platoon fielded only two squads. The third squad was zeroed out because the platoon had barely enough people to carry the equipment of two squads.

It became evident that while virtually every soldier gave his utmost, many NCOs and officers at all levels were lacking in skills necessary to lead chronically over-committed and understrength units. The field situation on Celtic Cross IV resembled combat in more ways than most FTXs, yet unit leaders felt constrained by the parade-ground, rank-ordered formalism of the ambient Army culture. They had not formed the close and mutually supportive relationships characteristic of units engaged in combat. By the second year, unit vertical cohesion had declined sharply, and soldier morale had floundered. Officers, NCOs, and privates soldiered on, but they expressed depression and alienation: "I'm just trying to hang on. I don't want to get chaptered/busted/a crippling injury/a bad efficiency report, but I'm finished with the Army after this tour," was a common comment.

The first subsection chronicles strengths and weaknesses of the NCO corps in the four battalions. The second describes the special problems inherent in commanding COHORT companies. The third subsection looks at the effects of command climate on the ability of subordinate officers to command effectively.

NCOs

Squad/section leaders, as always, had the toughest job. They had to ask more and more of their dwindling numbers of soldiers, and most perceived that they could do less and less for their charges. Some junior NCOs described themselves as caught in double binds: "We have to make the guys do it, but we can't take care of them." Many privates said, "It does no good to tell our problems to our sergeant because the platoon sergeant/first sergeant/company commander won't listen to him."

Less capable NCOs worried about preventing men from "getting over." We concluded that "getting over" was not a pervasive problem because it was at variance with the COHORT privates' group norms of becoming expert soldiers. In most cases they were the ones who brought the slackers into line. The problem appeared to be the NCOs' fears that they were losing their professional ascendancy over their troops. Officers and some of the more experienced NCOs saw that by the second year many squad leaders were being overtaken professionally by their privates; "Those troops are nipping at their sergeants' heels. They really put the pressure on, and some NCOs have resorted to bullying and bluffing.

WRAIR observers verified that a significant number of the surviving NCOs were deficient in key professional capabilities. A typical illustration occurred when an observer was with one rifle platoon in a firefight on a prominent terrain feature with several identifying characteristics. The platoon sergeant called for artillery fire using markedly incorrect coordinates. After the battle, all the squad leaders and team leaders gathered
around and argued about the coordinates. Only one NCO, a junior team leader, had the position located correctly—and no one listened to him. On another occasion, a squad leader, told to organize an ambush, had to ask a COHORT corporal how to prepare a warning order, operations order, and terrain model. To his credit, he knew he needed help, and he knew where to get it. But he had twelve years of service, and the corporal had one.

As leaders, the junior NCOs varied widely. Some earned the admiration and trust of their subordinates even though the latter generally were much better educated. One sergeant had under him a man with a graduate degree, another college graduate, a "flower child," and a street-wise city boy. This sergeant was a "hillbilly" with almost no formal education, but he was a superbly qualified NCO. He took care of his troops and treated them with respect. They supported him and were constantly asking him to teach them from his extensive store of military knowledge. The privates teased their sergeant, and he teased them back, but everyone knew who was boss. The sergeant was constantly shaping and honing his soldiers' skills, understanding, and alertness, but he never raised his voice—even to correct a blunder. "Smitty, you don't want to lay your rifle on the ground. Here it is under the truck. If we move out and run over it, you'd have a whole shitload of problems." The privates were immediately responsive to him, and the unit functioned smoothly and quietly. The observers reported a sense of warmth, trust, and deep friendship among these five markedly dissimilar men.

At the other end of the spectrum were a few NCOs, uncertain of their ability to command respect, who were arbitrary and sometimes abusive in interaction with privates. One platoon sergeant told an observer, "Some of them (his privates) are college boys but you can't let them think they're better than you are. If they lip off, I tell them I'll go behind the barracks with them; that shuts them up." The privates did not react positively to threats or abuse: "We know we have to do what Sergeant Blank says, and we'll do it, but he's got no right to curse us. We got no respect for that man."

In most units during the second year, subordinates described platoon sergeants as bastions of competence and concern. Sometimes they were able to make their units cohesive islands of efficiency and strong morale. One platoon sergeant said, "We're all outcasts here. None of my squad leaders would last a week in another platoon. We support each other and fight for our men, and we have the best platoon in the company." In a few companies various events conspired to neutralize the effectiveness of the platoon sergeants. In one unit the platoon sergeants had each been punished under Article 15 for arguing with lieutenants and were totally confused about their roles and authority. In another, political maneuvers by the battalion command sergeant major had put the platoon sergeants at swords' points with each other and with their first sergeant. They felt alienated, and their energies went into resentment rather than caring for their privates and mentoring their subordinate leaders.

First sergeants, because of their long and varied experience, were difficult to describe as a group. Some, who had
felt comfortable with their jobs and respected their subordinates, found themselves in the second year with rigid, punitive commanders, and were deeply distressed: "I'd like to retire and get out of this mess, but who would protect my soldiers?" A few were rigid and authoritarian themselves, and undercut their commanders. A captain said, "My first sergeant is from the old school. He sees the men as animals to be driven."

Most platoon sergeants and first sergeants complained that battalion commanders neither served as their advocates, mentored them, nor unified the NCO corps. They said that their CSMs did not communicate enlisted concerns to the battalion commanders or warn their colonels of counterproductive second and third order effects of their policies on NCOs and privates. These senior NCOs saw their CSMs as "wanting to be one of the colonel's staff officers." Some first sergeants said their CSMs thwarted "...my efforts to take care of my troops." Indeed, the role of command sergeant major was always defined idiosyncratically.

Problems of Commanding COHORT Companies

By the middle of the second year the majority of the company commanders were new. Their subordinates expressed the sense that they were not adequately prepared for command. Very few soldiers thought their commanding officer was "highly proficient" or "competent to lead us into combat." Privates and NCOs described some officers whose ineffectiveness would increase casualties if the unit went into combat and who should be left behind when the unit deploys, or even "shot before he gets us all blown away." These soldiers described their captains as primarily interested in "burning the troops" and said, "Caring for the men is a bitter joke in this unit." One athletically gifted private, capable of earning maximum points on the Army physical readiness test, said that he had purposely achieved only barely passing scores on the test to reduce the chances that his company would receive a physical training gold streamer: "The captain doesn't deserve a gold streamer. He does nothing for us; he just uses us." Fellow COHORT soldiers applauded this act of subtle insubordination because they, too, felt the commander did not merit receiving the award. Several soldiers described the captain in this unit as "worthless in the field." The observer with the company on an FTX noted that as the captain dealt with various situations he demonstrated that he was incapable of taking even minor action without clearing it with higher headquarters, and that he demonstrated a lack of basic military judgment.

It is easy, but not productive, to criticize officers for errors in judgment or flaws in leadership. It is difficult, and potentially productive, to reexamine the dysfunctional aspects of our military culture in which the officers have been socialized and trained, and that have led them to misperceive their roles and to behave in ineffective ways. Based on our previous work in other units and this field study we conclude that COHORT units place special pressures on company commanders for which the majority have not been prepared (Marlowe, 1985, 1986a).
The first of the four special pressures comes from COHORT soldiers' commitment to a highly focused definition of the mission. The credibility of their commander rests on his cleaving to the mission, or clearly explaining and validating any deviation. COHORT soldiers also demonstrated shared intolerance of tactical and technical incompetence, administrative and logistical shortfalls that compromise combat capability, and corruption of the unit mission. Though these appear to be reasonable expectations on the part of privates, they were hard for commanders to live up to. The reasons were that many requirements from higher echelons often did not appear to bear on the primary mission. Not realizing the sensitivity of COHORT soldiers to corruption of the mission, most captains simply imposed all and sundry requirements on their subordinates. In so doing, they lost them.

Similarly, administrative and logistical breakdowns were usually beyond the company commanders' control. But they did not realize that to maintain their credibility they had to explain the external reasons to their men, and take action to correct the problems. Further, lack of tactical and technical knowledge compromised most commanders' authority. Since they are not rated on what they know, and examinations are not part of the promotion process, young officers quickly get the picture that knowing how to set up a machine gun to achieve grazing fire, knowing mortar fire direction, or knowing how to inspect a vehicle for mechanical operability are not matters for which they are responsible. As a result, they do not have "expert power" (Henderson, 1985, p. 114) to help them win their subordinates' confidence.

The second pressure commanders of COHORT companies face is near-unanimity of viewpoint among the privates. A perceived injustice to one is felt by most of them. They will support the commander in punitive actions against a soldier they agree is a "slug," but they will resent as a body perceived mistreatment of one of their number. Successful commanders sensed and reinforced the positive collective opinions in the company, and considered them in arriving at decisions. When they decided to act against their soldiers' shared views, they were skillful and thorough in communicating the reasons for their decisions. To do these things a captain must be trained to value group process skills in communicating with troops.

A third demand the COHORT system puts on commanders is the requirement for progressive training over a three year period. It is not hard for commanders to keep their men challenged and interested for the first year, but to do it in the second and third years requires comprehensive and growing technical knowledge, fertile imagination, and access to resources.

Finally, COHORT soldiers implicitly expect to be junior colleagues of their commander. They desire his respect and trust, they are eager for him to pay attention to them, and they count on him to develop them professionally and to take an interest in their personal and familial welfare. These expectations put additional pressure on the commander's time.
attention, and emotional resources; it is more demanding to be an accessible leader than a distant one.

The four special pressures commanders of COHORT units face are not unique to a light division. We have found that these same issues operate in COHORT units in other divisions in CONUS and USAREUR. No one has yet developed a lesson plan to prepare leaders to cope with them, but the experience of leaders in this Division suggests that the most promising approach to underwriting the success of COHORT leaders is a supportive command climate. The outlines of such a climate emerge primarily from analysis of strengths and deficits in the relationships observed between commanders at company, battalion, and brigade.

Command Climate

We noted that during the second year, fear was a dominant characteristic of the interface between battalion and company. Inability to predict the consequences of their actions made many company commanders fearful of using initiative or innovation. One company commander was observed agonizing over whether or not to let his tired, hot troops cool off and wash in a creek at the end of a two-week FTX because he was afraid of what his battalion commander might do. Another company commander expressed his dilemma: "Superiors say they trust you and want you to power down, but with the first mistake they're all over you. How can I learn, or develop my subordinates' abilities, if I can't afford to take a chance?" In summarizing the command climate in his battalion and its effect on the units, one officer exclaimed, "Good soldiers go in fear, commanders go in ignorance, and the mission goes down the drain." For example, a brigade commander was observed receiving an update from one of his battalion commanders during Celtic Cross IV. When the battalion commander described the difficulty of distinguishing between friendly and OPFOR helicopters from the ground because the markings were similar, the senior commander responded, "Is that a problem, colonel?", in a tone that clearly implied, "I don't want to hear about problems." The observers noted that intimidating behavior by commanders at any level can instill fear in subordinates and discourage honest upward communication.

A second aspect of command climate was that soldiers in companies perceived battalion commanders and staff officers as imposing requirements on, rather than providing support to, subordinate unit. Some battalion commanders, having lost touch with their troops, behaved in ways that made it harder for their captains to command effectively. A group of privates said: "We had been humping in the dust for three days, and here comes the colonel down the road in his vehicle, covering us with dust. You know what that son of bitch has the nerve to say? 'How's it going, men?' Jesus."

Company leaders perceived battalion staff people as often rigid and obstructionistic in handling soldiers' personnel problems. Company commanders and first sergeants described battalion as imposing arbitrary requirements that were obstacles to their efforts to take care of their people. In some battalions the personnel staff would not even consider leave
requests unless they were submitted a month in advance. First sergeants said privates' pay problems seemed to be resolved no faster with the battalion's intervention than without. Sometimes battalion requirements presented double binds: Company commanders approved soldiers' requests for civilian school attendance, but it became impossible for the soldiers to complete courses and still be present for battalion details and demonstrations. One soldier said,

I managed to get official approval to take an intensive four-week course off duty. Then the company was levied for a sentry detail at the rapid deployment Air Force base. I missed a week of classes and was thrown out of the course. Then I got a form saying that my eligibility for financial aid was terminated because I had failed to complete the course.

Battalion efforts to get the maximum number of soldiers to the field led to command pressure to keep people off profile and out of medical channels. The soldiers usually perceived this as commanders' wanton disregard of their physical welfare in order to look good to higher headquarters. One first sergeant described the Division as "...producing a 'throw-away Army.' The injuries, frustrations, and family pressures will result in most of the men in the units being incapacitated or eliminated during their tours, or declining to reenlist if they complete their tours."

Analysis

The leaders and soldiers of the four battalions under study gave their utmost during the first two years of the unit life cycles. They achieved high levels of proficiency early, but after the first year leadership shortfalls hobbled their efforts to develop "high performance," vertically cohesive organizations. Leadership shortfalls were not the result of ill-will or incompetence; they were outcomes of Army-wide systemic processes. These deficiencies are likely to occur again to vitiate the efforts of other leaders, so they are worth examining for lessons learned.

In the first place, NCOs and officers were not prepared for the interested, self-motivated, horizontally bonded soldiers coming out of OSUT. That they were not prepared reflects no discredit on Army leadership training systems because few leaders have had experience in COHORT units. The lesson is that the architects of our training system need to modify their instruction in leadership to teach leaders how to behave most effectively with COHORT soldiers.

In the second place, many leaders in the Division conveyed through their frustrations that COHORT units are extremely demanding of their leaders. It is not easy at first to be trusting, respectful, and candid; to take the time that is inherent in developing and empowering subordinates; and to give subordinates ownership of the mission. Junior leaders need
training in these processes, and they need psychological support from their superiors if they are to command effectively.

In the third place, most officers and NCOs were enthusiastic about power-down leadership, trust, and cancer. But only a small minority were able to implement them as they tried to cope with a growing load of mission requirements, dwindling strength, and continuing exposure to public scrutiny. Most regressed to more familiar and less stressful modes of interpersonal relationships—those they had learned from the old Army culture. The few who succeeded with the new leadership style were experienced, had appropriate role models earlier in their careers, and were profoundly interested in and knowledgeable about the tactics and techniques of their branches.

The soldiers in the Division performed an important service in bringing these problems into clear focus. From the perceptiveness of those who led their units effectively, and from the struggles of the others, it is possible to derive guidelines for success of future leaders of COHORT and light infantry units.
CHAPTER V
AN INTERNAL ASSESSMENT OF LEADERSHIP DURING TRANSITION:
MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CHANGE AND THE HUMAN DIMENSION

By
LTC Bruce T. Caine, Ph.D.

The preceding chapters of this report have focused on the responses of soldiers, leaders and family members to the experience of two years of multi-dimensional and interactive change as observed and reported by external researchers from WRAIR. This chapter provides a participant-observer's perspective on the transition and certification of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord as these influenced and were influenced by the New Manning System Initiatives. By describing two of many leadership actions taken in recognition of the unique circumstances we faced at Fort Ord, I hope to provide a frame for the picture sketched by the WRAIR reports.

Our experience was "incredible" in the purest sense of that over-used word, and, although the emerging difficulties and leadership failures previously described might have been prevented with clearer foresight and more widespread understanding of group dynamics, I believe we simply asked for too much, too fast.

Concurrently, the people of Fort Ord, military and civilian, soldier and family member, leader and follower, were expected to rebuild an installation suffering from years of budgetary neglect; to restructure a division into "something new" called Light; to modernize equipment while downsizing; to define and refine new tactical doctrine; to support a new strategic concept by becoming rapidly deployable without a contiguous airfield; to test a new system of manning; and to implement a leadership philosophy that emphasized stability and cooperation. We also promised soldiers opportunities to "be all you can be," preached continuing education, exposed them to modern barracks and a reasonable quality of life in OSUT, and told them they were special. And they believed us.

Each of these change dimensions affected the others, often in unpredictable ways. Rather than always being mutually supportive, missions were often competitive and even mutually exclusive. And despite the influx of dollars and other resources, many constraints built into "The System" could not be bypassed, and the time to completely change people who had lived in that system for years was always in short supply. But we did try to make the brave experiment called COHORT work.

It is important to note that the emerging human system difficulties and leadership "malpractices" that produced the dysfunctional trends described previously were independently identified and addressed by members of the Fort Ord Army Family. Each of these internal observers, in his or her own way, tried to influence the flow of events. Many of these efforts were acts of
one-on-one mentoring and personal encouragement. Some involved bucking the tide, often at considerable personal risk. All were based in a gut level understanding that taking care of people was the real basis for cohesion.

**Caring and Cohesion**

It is entirely possible that the most difficult leadership challenge during periods of multi-dimensional change is taking care of people. This mission may be viewed by some as secondary, but just as logistics is often a more than equal partner to tactics in the winning of battles, caring may be seen as the storehouse from which the missions of training, maintaining, leading, and resource management are sustained.

High intensity change produces levels of uncertainty and frustration well above that normally experienced in a "steady state." Caring nurtures the feelings of tolerance, acceptance, and trust that allow us to weather disappointment, failure, and even success. Success itself, especially in a climate of rapid change, high expectations, and close observation, is a significant stressor. Even in an initially cohesive group, if leaders do not recognize and satisfy the legitimate needs of those who made organizational success possible (that is, the troops) over time, soldiers will lose faith in the system and withdraw their psychological commitment to the mission and the unit, even as expectations for their continued success increase.

Clearly, caring is a value-laden term subject to many interpretations. That is why the term "legitimate needs" is used above. Effective and comprehensive training for war is a legitimate need for soldiers. Their personal survival depends on how well they know their individual jobs and how well they are integrated into the team. If leaders fail to provide unit and individual training that meets the "preparation for battle" expectations of soldiers, the leaders will be perceived as uncaring. Similarly, inaction on identified deficiencies in facilities, insufficient concern for: families, late or incomplete personnel actions, poor time management, and inadequate recognition will cause substantial withdrawals to be made from the responsible leader's bank of credibility, affecting both cohesion and ultimately readiness despite the best in tactical training.

**Power-Down Leadership**

To encourage proper emphasis on all legitimate needs, the senior leaders at Fort Ord sought to implement Power Down Leadership. This philosophy has four characteristics. First, the leader empowers his subordinates by granting them resources, authority to act, and responsibility. Second, he encourages information to flow upward by being receptive to innovations, expectations, and statements of needs from his subordinates. Third, the leader develops a sense of personal responsibility at all levels for actions and their consequences. He emphasizes that "We do what's right because it is right, not because someone
is watching or checking." Finally, leaders centralize decision making on priorities, goals, missions, and standards while decentralizing detailed planning and execution authority.

For a time at Fort Ord these were the operative norms, but during the period from March to October 1986, the compound effects of transition, certification, the RDF mission, and a major event-driven training calendar created what, in retrospect, may be viewed as a dysfunctional competition for time, energy, and resources. Detailed centralized direction and an emphasis on larger unit training (company and above) became a command imperative. Given the expectations for the Division, this may have been unavoidable. But it had costs that are reflected, I believe, in the decline of vertical and horizontal cohesion observed during the Division Certification exercise in August 1986.

Change and Cohesion

One of the greatest dangers posed by rapid multi-dimensional change is the tendency to view events and missions as isolated and independent rather than interactive and interdependent. If leaders fail to take a total systems view, the missions of training, maintaining, leading, caring, and resource management can become competitive or even mutually exclusive, rather than reinforcing and mutually supportive. Centralization of decision power and executive authority is the typical organizational response to a competitive environment. In such an environment, there is strong pressure to retreat from delegation and decentralization. The perception, if not the reality, that there is no time for errors can be translated at the bottom into belief that there is no flexibility in execution, no opportunity for innovation, no real impact on plans from below, no autonomy at the small unit level. Reflection, self-evaluation and multi-echelon critiques may be seen as too risky and time consuming. As a result, junior leaders come to know exactly what will get them in trouble, but do not know what will produce meaningful rewards and recognition. To phrase it in a commonly used analogy, the fast moving train cannot handle detours or local stops. Yet stop is what we must do every so often, if only to make sure we are on the right track.

The real threat to productive organizational cohesiveness and effectiveness in a fast-paced climate is that leaders may not see the unintended negative consequences of their decisions and actions—especially when they are surrounded by success and external affirmation. But the best of ideas has unwanted and unforeseen results, and since it is natural for us to think of ourselves as good people who do good things, it is difficult for us to accept contrary information. Senior leaders are frequently protected from such negative information especially by those with whom they have a close personal and professional relationship. Therefore, leaders of complex, rapidly changing organizations must establish mechanisms by which fair and balanced assessments can be provided to them, and they must stop themselves long enough to listen.
Each subordinate leader must be a critical evaluator of past, present and proposed programs and policies. Their assessments must be actively sought, carefully considered, and judged with an open mind by their superiors. External evaluations are also useful, but the credibility of trusted participants in the change process makes internal evaluations particularly powerful. One such assessment mechanism that has clearly altered our history was inaugurated at Fort Ord in 1985.

**Internal Assessment: The 1985 Leadership Conference**

In early October 1985, the senior leadership of Fort Ord, both soldiers and civilians with their spouses, met for two days in San Jose, California. We had completed most of the major transition actions and had just assumed our role as a member of the Rapid Development Force. In a very real sense, this conference was a high risk endeavor. It proved to be a remarkable after-action review and climate of command sensing session, as well as a planning forum. Our goal was to produce a Declaration of Excellence, and to commit ourselves to solving the problems that were keeping us from achieving our destiny as an Army Family. We debated, analyzed, and produced a Declaration which was, in large measure, translated into reality over the next 15 months.

In 1985 there was a clear and dysfunctional schism between the division and the garrison—especially at the staff and senior leader levels. Many commanders and general staff officers clearly believed that the installation staff was not supporting them effectively, and did not share their sense of urgency about readiness and the Rapid Deployment Mission. There were questions about priorities, standards and expectations, and the civilian workforce felt alienated and misunderstood. There were barriers to communication and inter-staff coordination. Despite their obvious interdependence, cooperation between garrison and division staffs and units was lacking.

Many post agencies were seen as uncaring and unresponsive to soldiers and families. Limited affordable housing, high cost of living, inconvenient hours of operations for post services, indifferent hospital care, and many other quality of life issues begged for attention but appeared to many to have been neglected under the pressures of transition to light infantry and readiness for deployment. We were not doing a good job of welcoming new soldiers and their families, and even "old timers" were not well informed about activities and services available on post and in local communities. Leaders received extensive preparation for the arrival of COHORT units, but the priority was on tactical skills, not on quality of life issues.

By the end of the October 1985 conference, we had developed 15 issue statements, supported by 89 specific actions or objectives, which we grouped under the mission headings of TRAINING, MAINTAINING, LEADING, CARING, AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. While none of these issues or actions was specifically aimed at enhancing COHORT cohesion, each affected the environment within
which WRAIR conducted its surveys and interviews. Highlights included coordination between the division and garrison staffs, automation of resources management, expanded on-post housing and subsidized off-post housing, awards to garrison employees for courtesy to new arrivals, and improved accessibility of medical and shopping facilities. A detailed discussion of several of the salient issues appears in Appendix A.

A comparable group met again in San Jose in January 1987. Some of the faces had changed, but what had changed most was the climate in which the group met. Fort Ord was a very different place in 1987 than in 1985, and the first item on the agenda was to remember what we had been and to trace how we had changed.

Internal Assessment: The 1987 Leadership Conference

The agenda for the Leadership Conference held in January, 1987 emerged from an analysis of the climate of the command and the prevalent perceptions of the Fort Ord community. While there were documented cases of leader "malpractice" and support system failures, the vast majority of the emerging problems could be linked to the pace and complexity of change, and the varied stressors produced by the Fort Ord experience.

Perceived Problems Addressed by the Conference:

-- Poor time management on the part of the leadership—unpredictable duty day; hurry up and wait; long field exercises with lots of dead time.

-- Lack of effective communications up and down the chain of command.

-- Lack of rewards or special status for the additional hardships of being a Light Fighter.

-- Physical profiles not respected by leaders; lack of effective development/reconditioning programs; remedial PT viewed as punishment.

-- Untimely or negligent processing of chapter discharges.

-- Overcrowding, poor maintenance, and lack of privacy in barracks.

-- Hours of support activities and recreational services not attuned to soldier's schedule.

-- Educational opportunities promised but not allowed—leading to a sense of leadership hypocrisy and to beliefs among some soldiers that they were intentionally misled and given false expectations.

-- Junior leaders not permitted to make meaningful contributions to training plans and not trusted to execute training independently.
-- Excessive reliance on punitive actions rather than effective coaching and mentoring.

-- Unrealistic expectations for volunteer participation in unit and post support activities by junior enlisted spouses; belief that the Army sent junior soldiers with families to Fort Ord knowing they could not afford to live in a high cost area on a single income.

-- Perceived linkage between the level of officer and NCO spouse participation in volunteer activities and husbands' efficiency reports.

-- Lack of flexibility in annual leave (e.g., block leave) program which prohibited soldiers from attending special family events.

-- Unit level disregard for installation/division policy which permits soldiers to remain back from field exercises to be present for birth of child or to get newly arrived family settled.

-- Frequent weekend and holiday deployments and training seen as unnecessary and disruptive of family life.

The Theme

While we were convinced that the experience of the vast majority of soldiers, leaders and families at Fort Ord had been positive, perceptions do influence behavior; consequently these issues and others demanded our attention. The theme of caring emerged as the logical one for our conference. When we presented our recommendations to Major General Harrison, he agreed but cautioned us to be aware that this theme could be seen as unwarranted criticism of the sincere concern for soldiers and soldiers' families that had permeated all of our efforts. It could also be seen by some as an indicator of a slackening of standards or a retreat from the essential toughness demanded of light infantry. Further, it could create unreasonable expectations that we had neither the resources nor the freedom of action to meet. Our real world missions had not changed and neither would our standards.

In preparation for the conference General Harrison re-emphasized the following priorities for 1987, the year of "Honing the Bayonet":

-- Get the 7th ID(L) and Fort Ord Units ready to go to war.

-- Take care of the 7th ID(L) and Fort Ord soldiers.

-- Take care of 7th ID(L) and Fort Ord families.

-- Get the most out of constrained resources.

-- Develop subordinates.

-- Accelerate Fort Ord base development.
Organization

We organized the attendees into twelve carefully configured small groups of senior military members, civilian managers, and spouses. Each group would be charged with evaluating the recent past and the current environment, and then drafting policy statements to guide corrective action on confirmed deficiencies.

Eight broad topic areas were drawn from the Commanding General's priorities:

- Time: work day in garrison, compensatory time, hours of operation of service facilities.
- Recreation and quality of life.
- Recognition and volunteer services.
- Leaders' commitment to education.
- Profiles and developmental physical training.
- Stress reduction.
- Leave and taking care of ourselves.
- Employed spouse recognition and family care plans.

Presenting the Challenge

In his opening remarks, Major General Harrison challenged the assembled leaders with the following:

Clearly, 1986 was a year of major accomplishments. We have shown in many ways that we truly care about our soldiers and their families. I sincerely believe the quality of life has improved at Fort Ord. Yet I am distressed by some of the indicators that suggest that our goal of making every day a great day to be in the Army at Fort Ord has not yet been fully realized.

It is because of this sensing that I have chosen as the focus of our conference CARING HONES THE BAYONET. As we conclude the Year of Values, it is essential that we remember that each of our professional values includes a component of caring. Our goal must be to exercise caring leadership throughout our training and maintaining efforts.

When I think about caring, I remember General Omar Bradley's admonition: "Far from being a handicap to command, compassion is the measure of it. For unless one values the lives of his soldiers and is tormented by their ordeals, he is unfit for command."
This applies to peacetime ordeals just as it does to those in war. We must search for ways to reduce the stresses that threaten to damage the team we have built. We must hone the bayonet without dulling its edge or weakening its blade. Excellence through challenging training and high standards of discipline and fitness—these are still my expectations for they reflect our concern for soldiers, but we must now build for the long term.

The ideal soldierly values of COMPETENCE, COURAGE, CANDOR, and COMMITMENT are remarkable guidelines for us as we strive to accomplish our five missions of TRAINING, MAINTAINING, LEADING, CARING, and RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.

Just as these values are mutually supporting, our missions are interdependent. We cannot train without maintaining; we cannot lead without caring. By what you have done, I know you care. But there are things we haven't done or have done poorly that suggest to me a need to consider the balance among our key missions.

On Training:

- It is my judgment that we have done a great job training. Your commitment and that of your soldiers and civilian workers has been incredible. But we can still train smarter. We must plan more carefully, making better use of our limited resources, especially time. Do we need to put some policy limits on the length of the duty day?

- I am well aware of your concerns about weekend and holiday training. We haven't done a good job of explaining why we must frequently conduct deployments on weekends. The answer is simply money. We save millions of training dollars each year through the use of weekend training flights by the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.

- Some weekend deployments then make sense. What doesn't make sense is our reluctance to provide compensatory time to soldiers and leaders. We promise time off to our folks and somehow it doesn't happen.

- We may need to consider if the currently scheduled hours of our recreational facilities are suited to the needs of our soldier and our training schedule.

On Maintaining:

- We have improved our skills in maintaining equipment, but I wonder how much attention we have paid to our work of maintaining people. We have modernized our equipment but have we upgraded our thinking about people and improved our COMPETENCE in solving human problems?
I am distressed by the frequency of spouse and child abuse cases we are seeing. These, along with continued drug and alcohol abuse, reflect family strife and a perceived decrease in quality of life. Extensive absences may compound other family stresses, such as the cost of living. We need to improve our awareness of the warning signs of excess stress and support preventive treatment.

Since our job is to produce winners, we must relook at how we treat those who have failed to meet our standards. We need to be sure we and our subordinates are able to differentiate between a training deficiency and a motivational deficiency. Not knowing how is very different from not wanting to try.

Many of our Chapter discharges are taking too long. With the actions dragging on for months (and in some cases of medical disability, years), soldiers find themselves in a "neither here nor there" status that creates frustration for both the soldiers and the chain of command.

I am keenly aware of the frustration many of our soldiers experience as a result of injury or illness. Rather than helping them rebuild their bodies and spirits through a positive program of progressive reconditioning and emotional support, we all too often have lumped them together for our own convenience with healthy soldiers who lack the motivation to meet our standards for fitness. We treat them both as losers and they eventually come to think of themselves that way.

Most of you are well aware of the problems we are having with the consolidation of barracks. We need to consider how we can make an uncomfortable situation more livable. What are the special needs of our single soldiers?

On Leading:

I have watched you lead successfully in many demanding situations, but I am concerned that we may not yet be mentoring as we should. Have we taken the time and applied the energy to helping our junior leaders grow as caring professionals? Have we modeled a COMMITMENT to human growth and development?

How well are we doing as leaders to encourage others to take considered risks, to be innovative, to learn from failure? How tolerant are we of those subordinates who disagree with us on a professional issue? How accepting are we of constructive criticism? This is a matter of moral COURAGE.

As leaders, we set the expectations by which our subordinates measure their performance. We need to
consider what values we portray with our expectations. What behaviors do we reward? How do we divide our time and what message does that send to our subordinates and to their families?

We must be seen as honest and caring if we are to retain the loyalty of our soldiers. If we as leaders knowingly bend or break the rules, or worst, act in ignorance of them, we set the wrong example for disciplined soldiers. If we overlook an act of indiscipline by one of our subordinate leaders or peers and yet punish the same act in a junior soldier, we validate an unacceptable double standard.

Do we as leaders have the stamina—the psychological reserves—to take this division to war? Are we burning ourselves and our junior leaders and soldiers out? When do we sit back to think and reflect on our profession?

On Caring:

Can we be caring leaders and still be tough? Can we accept the concept that caring is a combat multiplier? Do we have the COURAGE to become deeply involved in caring for others?

Many of our soldiers sense a leadership hypocrisy—the Army's recruiting push, DA educational emphasis—but they perceive their leaders here as unwilling to protect them from taskings and missions that encroach on their possible educational time. Do we have a training schedule that precludes any realistic educational program? This is a question of CANDOR. Can we find new and innovative ways to manage time and resources so that we can help fulfill the educational expectations of many of our soldiers?

Are our recognition programs fair and equitable? Can we do a better job of recognizing the contributions of soldiers, civilian workers, and especially volunteers? How well are we showing our concerns and our commitment to the employed spouse? Have we unintentionally made the employed spouse a second class citizen?

Have we done all we can to provide the best possible child care services? Have we taken the time to evaluate Family Care Plans to insure they are feasible and consistent with legal documents such as wills and powers of attorney?

Outcome

In response to Major General Harrison's challenge, the conference developed, during the initial group sessions, over 140 issue statements or policy "one liners." Cross-fertilization of ideas during the second set of group sessions allowed
participants to refine their proposal. A summary of issues and proposed policies is in Appendix B.

This management of change effort did not end in San Jose. Over 100 old division and installation policies were scrapped or modified. Conference policy proposals and comments were reviewed, consolidated, and synthesized into a formal policy format. These draft policies, which reflected the clear consensus of the conferees, responded to the principal concerns presented to Major General Harrison by the conference planning group and incorporated into his introductory speech. Each received a detailed review in the "cold light" of reality back at Fort Ord. As each was approved, an article on the new policy was published in our post newspaper, The Panorama. This public commitment to quality of life and to slowing the pace renewed expectations that, in the Year of Honing the Bayonet, cohesion could be rebuilt through caring.

Conclusions

The results of both our internal assessments and the WRAIR study show how COHORT units at Fort Ord have evolved over time in response to both internal changes and external pressures. As relatively closed, long-term primary/reference groups, new COHORT units responded positively to leaders who espoused and behaved congruently with well-established group norms. Leaders who succeeded, from the Commanding General on down, were those who linked organizational goals with group and individual goals. High levels of proficiency were rapidly achieved. As organizational demands increased in response to the compounding missions of transition, deployment, and certification, some individuals reached their limits of tolerance for change. Firmly held expectations among COHORT soldiers, particularly with regard to increased free time, predictable duty days, and reduced field duty once they had met the established performance standards, strongly influenced their perceptions of their leaders. Vertical cohesion was affected by the departure of trusted leaders and the demands of a short-term, events-driven training program.

Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall (1947/1978) wrote in his classic study, Mer Against Fire, that "the quality of the initiative in the individual has become the most praised of the military virtues". The Fort Ord experience has clearly confirmed this assertion. Initiative, backed by candor, courage, competence and commitment, characterized each stage of the transformation of the 7th ID(L) and Fort Ord. The COHORT concept is anchored in these virtues, and when they are strong, COHORT is strong. Whenever they are lacking, the true potential for cohesive units cannot be reached. Power-down leadership remained a strong theme throughout the Fort Ord experience, but the unique demands placed on the Division during its certification year required a more severe limitation on the power sharing concept than had been anticipated when the Light Infantry White Paper was drafted. The first priority was to accomplish the assigned missions, which was not to make COHORT work but to field a combat-ready, rapidly deployable light division.
Clearly AirLand Battle doctrine, and Light Infantry operations in particular, requires the mutual trust and professional respect that encourage initiative which in turn also help establish and maintain both vertical and horizontal cohesion. As cited in the condensed version of the Fort Hood Leadership Study (Center for Army Leadership, 1986):

An important aspect of the HLG implementation effort at Fort Hood was to allow each level of command to develop the habit of acting promptly and creatively on its own initiative to control operations, to solve problems, and to do what was needed to achieve realistic and reliable operational readiness to win an AirLand Battle. (p. 1)

Operational habits and human relationships established in peacetime and followed in daily routines are those that are likely to prevail in battle, since it is the well-learned pattern of behavior that will not be abandoned under stress. The incredible complexity of modern battle and the requirement for a Rapid Deployment Force to transition swiftly from peace to war demand that our peacetime habits be good ones. We must develop thinking soldiers who are combined into effective teams through patience, tolerance of mistakes within limits, and consistency between policies for war and peace. As noted in the Fort Hood study, commanders must be ready and willing to see solutions and programs not of their own design successfully implemented. If, as leaders, we advertise for others' ideas and comments and then habitually find those ideas less worthy than our own, we destroy the very basis for initiative. Our leadership conferences, and the day-to-day activities of the Fort Ord Army family, demonstrated a fundamental openness to new ideas.

If we are to institutionalize the power potential of COHORT and light infantry, the successful aspects of our experiences must be reinforced and the detractors eliminated. A recent DAIG Assistance Team visit to Fort Ord confirmed that our strengths far outweigh our weaknesses. The Light Fighter Spirit remains strong, but to keep it so, programs such as the Annual Light Leaders Course (where NCOs and officers are retrained in the key fundamentals of tactical leadership without their soldiers) and comprehensive professional development activities focusing on people skills must be sustained. Standards must remain high and the emphasis on coaching and mentoring reconfirmed daily. We must also implement those policies drafted by the second San Jose Conference that have been ratified by careful review. And we must prepare for the major impact of the many changes of command programmed for the summer of 1987.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

Achievements by the 7th Infantry Division (Light)

Based on our research data we conclude that most of the members of the four battalions we studied did their utmost during the first eighteen months to fulfill the expectations inherent in carrying out concurrent revolutions in tactical doctrine, manning procedures, and human relations; and in bringing units rapidly to maturity, maintaining deployability, and serving as a model for future light divisions. To perform perfectly all of the challenges they faced was beyond human capability. Since many tasks in combat are also beyond human capability, the experiences of the Division are a valid source of information for those who will lead light infantry divisions in the near term and for those who set values for the Army in the longer term.

Though shortcomings and mistakes made by members of the Division have served as examples in this report, unit-bashing is not our purpose. Recognition of problems and defects is as important as citing achievements in identifying the processes that lead to "high performance" units--particularly when the problems are the result of Army-wide values, policies, or procedures. The division achieved many expectations. It converted to the light infantry configuration, carried out the most extensive implementation of the COHORT system, became a part of the RDF early in its history, and improved housing and community services for Army families.

The most important expectation that it met was to blaze the human dimensions trail for subsequent light infantry divisions and, in many respects, for the Army. Through their travails as well as their triumphs, the officers, NCOs, and privates of the four battalions studied have taught the Army three lessons of major import. First, they have shown that the vast potential inherent in the COHORT system can be realized—that units manned with average personnel can become high performance organizations. Second, they have illustrated more clearly than ever before the powerful demands COHORT units make on leaders. Third, they have revealed the characteristics of command climate that can make it possible for leaders to function effectively as leaders of COHORT units.

Together, these findings constitute a blueprint for human relations that can make an order of magnitude improvement in the combat performance and psychological readiness of U.S. Army units. An analysis of what worked at company and below, and of the command climate that supported effective leadership, is the focus of this chapter.

What Worked

The most important achievement the members of the four battalions made was a series of discoveries, or confirmations of existing concepts, that enabled them to capitalize on the
potential of the COHORT system to build light infantry and artillery units capable of high performance—in both human and combat proficiency dimensions. This section is a review of leaders' behavior that worked to strengthen cohesion, support motivation, foster supportive relationships between units and families, and meet soldiers' psychological needs.

Cohesion

Horizontal cohesion built upon the COHORT organizational principles and the OSUT training program. Eager to learn, ready to help each other, and prepared to accept the values of their new unit, the first-term soldiers were psychologically prepared for integration into their units. But vertical cohesion does not take place automatically. Those officers and NCOs who successfully integrated their first-term soldiers did so by meeting those soldiers' needs for competent leadership, focus on the mission, and respect.

Competent Leadership. The OSUT graduates expected their NCOs and officers to be masters of their profession and knew enough to recognize whether they were or not. They perceived that technical knowledge about mission-related matters such as land navigation, employment of weapons, how to keep equipment operating, formations, camouflage, tracking, and marksmanship was essential to their effectiveness and survival. Those leaders who were knowledgeable were usually successful in building vertical cohesion. The most successful were those who assumed their subordinates shared their interest, and not only taught their men but also talked informally with them about their new profession. Another behavior that bonded soldiers to their leaders and their unit was experimenting with new methods—especially when the leader explained the experiment in advance and solicited his subordinates' views afterwards. The observers noted that existing Army culture, as represented by the officer and NCO training system, did not emphasize technical expertise, leading to shortfalls in the perceived competency of leaders.

Focus on the Mission. There were several processes at work here. The first-term soldiers came out of OSUT believing they were in the Army to wage war. The oft-documented decline in morale and commitment during the first post-AIT assignment (Griffith, Meglino, Youngblood, & Mobley, 1979; Porter & Steers, 1977; Youngblood, Laughlin, Mobley, & Meglino, 1980) did not occur in the Division because leaders sustained the focus on combat. They described the Division as the most likely to be the first force committed to any one of a number of combat zones. The soldiers of the Division felt that hard work and sacrifice of other values to develop a solid combat capability was a mission that dignified, or even ennobled, them. Leaders who shared this deliberately narrow focus, who worked to strengthen their own and their subordinates' combat capabilities, and who were able to shield their subordinates from non-mission-related details, strengthened bonding within the unit.

Respect. The captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and COHORT corporals who led cohesive and competent units fundamentally respected their subordinates. Respect did not make these leaders
blind to their subordinates' limitations, but there was a basic sense that leaders and followers were all worthy members of the fraternity of arms. Leaders saw their subordinates as colleagues who were doing their best; they were not afraid that their subordinates would ruin their reputations unless their behavior was closely circumscribed. The centrality of this point is so obvious that it is almost embarrassing to make it. But it is precisely this factor that has reliably differentiated vertically cohesive units from noncohesive units, not only in the Division but in other units in CONUS and USAREUR studied over the past five years, and in units studied by Stouffer and his colleagues during the Second World War (Stouffer et al., 1949).

Leaders and followers in vertically cohesive units respected each other for their abilities, eliminated rituals of subordination, and felt no need for the arbitrary imposition of capricious requirements. Yet there was no question of who was boss; leaders who could give respect demonstrated beyond question their right to receive it. Leaders in the vertically cohesive units were particularly careful about keeping their men informed not only of plans, schedules, and decisions, but also of the reasons behind them. They gave their subordinates responsibility for missions as soon as they were capable of taking them on, and they treated them as valued members of the military profession. The officers, sergeants, and privates in the vertically cohesive units liked each other, and sometimes the affective levels were intense. The relationships resembled those of tightly integrated units in combat.

A critical trial of vertical cohesion was demonstrations for VIPs. The soldiers resented these for many reasons, the most salient of which was that what they did for the demonstrations differed from what they intended to do in combat, and therefore was a waste of their energies and a dilution of their proficiency. Commanders who leveled with their men not only about the purposes and consequences of the "show" demonstrations, but also about the theatrics and baloney in them, showed their respect for their subordinates and held their allegiance.

Motivation

The first-term soldiers who came to the four battalions from OSUT were self-motivated. They expected to have to fight, and they wanted to become effective members of combat teams—for their safety, their self-respect, and their sense of obligation to their colleagues. Leaders and commanders who harnessed this self-motivation to develop highly proficient units did so by guiding, challenging, and trusting their troops.

Guidance. The OSUT graduates did not need to be driven—they had their own drive—but they needed, they even craved, orientation and focus for their energies and interests. The NCOS at the squad and section level who had the most effective units were usually quiet, friendly, and professionally well informed. They assumed that their subordinates needed information, not prodding, most of the time. The most successful NCOS were those with inexhaustible stores of military knowledge that they would impart to their soldiers as they grew ready for
It. Their men had faith in those sergeants, were confident that they would take care of them in combat, and felt sure they would enable them to fight effectively. These NCOs had no hesitation about criticizing or disciplining their subordinates, but they did so when it was appropriate, not gratuitously.

Challenge. One of the most severe demands COHORT units put on leaders is a progressive training program that will keep their units growing in proficiency and interested for three years. The higher the echelon, the more heavy this burden is, but every leader from fire team to division faces it. Almost no one in the Division had prior experience designing three-year training programs. Those commanders and staff officers who were able to look at the life cycle of the unit—to take a three-year perspective rather than an event-oriented perspective—were most successful in stimulating motivation for training. Similarly, those leaders who defined challenge as stimulus to develop greater proficiency rather than as endurance of higher levels of misery were better able to focus and sustain motivation.

Trust. The leaders who were most effective in fostering and building motivation did it through reposing trust and confidence in their subordinates. NCOs who showed their privates a procedure, then turned it over to them; company commanders’ wives who hosted inaugural family support group coffees, then gradually relinquished direction of the various activities to volunteers; S3s who showed platoon leaders how to arrange for training areas and equipment, then gave them discretion; commanders who developed subordinates by emphasizing the learning process rather than early demonstration of superficial capability—these leaders built competence, confidence, and cohesion—the foundations of commitment and motivation. They did it at a cost to themselves, because if one of the junior people made an error, the senior was still responsible. In spite of the enormous pressure on leaders to do a great many complex things correctly the first time—in a climate of intense competition—a few still found the moral courage to let their subordinates own the mission. This kind of experience proved to be the most effective of motivators.

Units and Families

The concept of establishing mutually supportive relationships between combat units and the families of the soldiers in those units promises both humanitarian and military advantages. Spouses who feel they matter to unit leaders, who are confident that the unit will look after them, and who believe the unit values their soldier are happier and more confident. They can support the soldier’s morale rather than be a source of anxiety. Families satisfied in this way can be a combat multiplier. The process is a circular one in which the feelings the soldier has about his unit are reflected back to him by his spouse and intensify his attachment to (or alienation from) his unit. Leaders who were most successful in supporting spousal identification with units emphasized command commitment, communications, development of friendships, and maintenance of small spontaneity in family support groups (FSGs).
Command Commitment. Commanders who established a pattern of dedication to family well-being, and who provided a modicum of logistical and administrative support for FSGs, created a positive family-unit culture. This culture encouraged discipline, identification with the unit, and enhanced psychological readiness among married soldiers.

Communications. Commanders found that the more completely informed spouses were, the less anxious and more supportive of their soldiers they were. Commanders who used all possible media to get complete, candid information to families, and who conducted comprehensive pre-deployment briefings, were the most successful in developing networks of wives who coped well, took care of each other, had positive attitudes toward the units, overcame worries, and controlled rumors.

Friends. The most pressing need many Army spouses have is for reliable friends to whom they can turn for information, assistance, sympathy, and company. Supportive friendships are the indispensable buffers of stress. Spouses who organized FSGs to function as face-to-face contexts in which other spouses could make friends met this need most effectively. To the extent that spouses were able to keep their FSGs small in scale, the possibilities for spouses to find friends were broadened.

Spontaneity. The most effective FSGs were those in which membership was truly voluntary, in which the only activities were those the members wanted to undertake, and in which there was a minimum of structure. Wives of senior soldiers who initiated the groups, then stepped back into supporting roles, created the most enduring and effective FSGs. FSGs which avoided compulsion, formality, rank structure, and hierarchy and focussed on mutual support and providing good times flourished and attracted widest participation.

Leadership

1) The COHORT system; 2) the light infantry mission, with its emphasis on competence, teamwork, and the ability to operate autonomously; and 3) positive leadership proved to be both mutually reinforcing and indispensable to each other. COHORT provided the basis for both horizontal and vertical cohesion—which together made independent small unit operations possible—provided there was positive leadership. The challenge of the light infantry with its requirement for exceptionally strong and skillful soldiers and its promise of independent missions provided the kind of experience COHORT soldiers crave. Light infantry missions early on confirmed their horizontal and vertical cohesion—but the requisite levels of skill could only be achieved with the stability that COHORT provided. Further, the light infantry concept could be implemented most effectively by leaders who were prepared to respect, trust, and empower their subordinates. Most important, members of units with clearly independent missions had to believe that their leaders would stay with them and die before abandoning them on the battlefield. The CSA (1985) described the kinds of leader behavior most likely to realize the potential of the COHORT system and to bring the light infantry concept to fruition. The mix was complex and many of
its components unfamiliar. Nonetheless, some leaders were able to bring it all together. The things they did that worked were to emphasize caring, to adopt a sophisticated view of discipline, and to accept heavier loads of interactive responsibility than were current in contemporary Army culture.

Caring. The most effective leaders were able to strike a series of compromises between the intensive demands of the missions, which took first priority, and attention to their soldiers' health and welfare. Those leaders looked at their units as organisms to be developed and strengthened over the long term with a view to eventual combat action, not as a resource to be used up in training during their command tours. They took an active interest in the personal, professional, and familial welfare of their men. Frequently they fought higher headquarters, or took a "chewing," to get something for their subordinates or to protect them from exploitation. For example, sensitive commanders organized fast-acting systems, that often included helicopters, to return soldiers from the training field to their families if a familial crisis arose.

Complicating the process of caring was the soldier's ever-present subliminal desire to minimize hard duty, and his wish to exercise a measure of control over the system by evading a requirement. The effective commanders and leaders exercised good judgment about what constituted a serious personal concern and what was an effort to get over. Their task was simplified by their soldiers' sense of being trusted and respected, and feeling of being part of the system. The observers noted more cases of soldiers understating physical or familial problems than overstating them.

The way effective commanders cared for soldiers in no way resembled coddling or currying favor with them; nor was caring incompatible with discipline. Caring consisted of keeping promises, conserving soldiers' physical and psychological strength, and at times subordinating the mission to the soldier in those cases when it was appropriate.

Discipline. The most successful NCOs and officers understood that caring included punitive action; a soldier who misbehaved expected to be punished. Caring commanders fenced off the misconduct and the punishment; one offset the other, and the commander did not withdraw his esteem from the soldier. He expected the soldier to continue to merit the respect the commander accorded him. An important corollary effect of punitive action was that it was a form of indirect reward for the soldiers who resisted temptations and controlled their impulses. To fail to punish misconduct was to trivialize the efforts of the good soldiers. Bearing all this in mind, the most effective commanders were slower to punish than they were to praise.

A special characteristic of discipline in the Division transcends punitive action. The commanding general defined discipline as proper behavior in the absence of supervision or ordnance. Though not new, this definition was clearly at variance with current practice in the Army. It was, however, ideally suited to a COHORT light infantry division—for which the
expected missions included independent operations by the smallest units, manned by soldiers who craved ownership of the mission. The most effective subordinate commanders sought to develop this internalized self-discipline in their sub-units, and in individuals.

Assumption of Responsibility. The NCOs and officers who sought to develop capabilities for independent action and the CG's kind of inner discipline stuck their necks out repeatedly. To develop subordinates' abilities inevitably entailed a lag in time and a certain number of errors and accidents—for which the boss must be responsible. Trusting people with independent missions caused commanders intense anxiety; those who did it showed a high level of moral courage. Similarly, a commander who excused an able-bodied soldier from a major FTX had to take hits from the chain of command. Developing subordinates, caring for them, and protecting them were investments in the long-term strength of the unit; that they often redounded to the short-term detriment of the NCO or officer is a reflection of their resilience. It also highlights the presence of a counter-productive short-term climate of convenience in Army culture that fends off the assumption of responsibility for the consequences of leadership decisions.

Command Climate and Leader Effectiveness

The COHOT system offers military leaders the opportunity to develop units that are not just good, but superb. The challenge to the senior leadership of the Army is to create a command climate in which subordinate commanders can make the promise of the COHORT system pay off. The soldiers of the Division demonstrated the kind of command climate that will most effectively support leaders' efforts to develop cohesive, high performance units. This section is a discussion of two characteristics of such a command climate—support for subordinate leaders and acceptance of responsibility at intermediate levels of command.

Support for Subordinate Leaders

The most effective junior leaders and commanders were those whose superiors created a climate in which they felt they enjoyed their boss's trust and confidence, and could count on his support. Being supportive, rather than tough and demanding, toward subordinate leaders was contrary to implicit Army culture. Support did not mean coddling or compromising standards; it included emphasis on substance, understanding the pressures on junior leaders, and candor.

Emphasis on Substance

The probability that NCOs or officers leading squads, platoons, or companies would be successful was highest when their immediate superiors emphasized developing substantive combat capabilities rather than giving the appearance of such capabilities. Most soldiers, regardless of rank, wanted to work on their skills, their teamwork, and their equipment in order to
build their combat capability. But the plethora of missions and requirements tended to disperse their effort and attention. Those commanders who allowed their junior leaders to focus narrowly on combat-related activities—to be good, not just look good—were rewarded with high performing subordinate units. However, these commanders took substantial career risks. To specialize in being good at fighting entailed a relative de-emphasis of such high visibility activities as inspections, administration, demonstrations, and competitions—activities scored numerically and therefore providing an easy basis for comparing commanders. The units that had the most solidly developed combat capabilities usually performed these non-mission-related tasks satisfactorily, but did not wear themselves out trying to grab the headlines in what were, by their standards, secondary fields of endeavor.

Understanding Pressures. The commanders who had the most successful subordinate leaders recognized that COHORT units place exceptionally consuming demands on junior leaders with respect to accessibility, credibility, and collegiality. They conserved their subordinate leaders' time to be with their troops by controlling demands on their time for meetings and details. They protected their subordinates' credibility by focussing on mission-related activities and buffering sudden changes in schedules and priorities. They set the example for their junior colleagues by treating them with collegial respect, and they warded off complaints by exponents of the traditional taboo-ridden Army culture who decried, as "fraternization," greater familiarity across ranks. They also used their staffs and their own standing to absorb or ward off requirements.

Candor. Commanders perceived that trust across echelons of the military bureaucracy was the foundation of vertical cohesion, and that this trust is laboriously earned and easily lost. They took pains to avoid putting their junior leaders in a position which would compromise their soldiers' ability to trust them. They explained the real reasons behind decisions and policies, and when they did not know the reasons, they said so. They demanded honest reports from their junior leaders and accepted news—good and bad—with equanimity. When junior NCOs and officers believed they could level with their superior, and that he would tell them the truth, they were markedly more at ease in their leadership positions.

Commanders who encouraged and rewarded honesty were well informed about conditions in their sub-units and were in a position to act to alleviate emerging problems. A delicate point in this connection proved to be the effect of a senior commander talking to privates concerning the authority (and anxiety level) of the junior commander. The research team concluded that if the senior commander had created a climate of fear, his junior leaders would put pressure on privates not to tell the senior commander anything that could embarrass the junior leaders. When the senior commander encouraged candor, supported his subordinate officers and NCOs, and had developed a sense of unity of purpose, everyone told the truth, and no one was embarrassed. A private's problem was considered his sergeant's problem, his lieutenant's
problem, and his colonel's problem—and vice versa. Everyone had a stake in solving everyone else's problems.

Command Responsibility

Commanders who provided supportive climates and a focus on substance for their subordinate leaders were able to accept responsibility. It was on this issue that they went head-to-head with the dysfunctional psychological foundations of the old Army culture. The purpose of the old Army culture is to avoid or deflect responsibility. Commanding military units is risky business, not only because of the possibility of death or injury, but because the commander is dependent for success on the efforts of his subordinates. An Army culture of fear reduction evolved to protect the commander from exposure to these risks by generating fear in his subordinates and by shifting responsibility onto them. Those commanders who confronted their fears and accepted responsibility created a risk-taking climate in which their subordinates could command effectively. But their openness threatened those of their colleagues who were dependent on old Army culture to protect them. Some of the spheres in which commanders who accepted responsibility were outstanding was in making personnel decisions, offering compliments and criticisms, and setting priorities.

Personnel Decisions. Those commanders who overtly faced the need to relieve a destructive subordinate leader usually enhanced the possibilities for leaders further down the line to function effectively. Frequently such decisions required courage because of the serious adverse impact on the person relieved, and because they antagonized others who had made favorable decisions about the leader. It also required courage on the part of a commander to maintain in position challenging subordinate leaders who, though difficult to get along with, built cohesive and effective units.

Compliments and Criticism. Those commanders who were not afraid to give their soldiers critical reviews of their performance provided a realistic framework in which junior commanders could learn to function better. Similarly, commanders who gave unstinting encouragement for good work simplified their subordinate leaders' tasks by strengthening unity of purpose. The old Army cultural norm of senior leaders publicly praising soldiers irrespective of how good or bad the performance to keep their morale up weakened junior commanders in two ways. Indiscriminant praise raised questions in the privates' minds about whether the senior commander knew what he was doing, and also complicated the junior leaders' tasks by raising doubts about what the standards were. Privates through generals need to share complementary goals and coherent standards. Members of the units thought seriously about what would work in combat, and had reasonably clear ideas about what effective combat behavior was. For example, when a colonel praised a lieutenant for charging a tank on a motorcycle while armed with an M16, NCOs and privates lost confidence in the colonel's judgment. When senior military and civilian visitors repeatedly praised the Division without reservation, officers, NCOs, and privates saw that no one above
company level had any idea what was going on, and they felt isolated and hopeless.

Priorities. Commanders who set priorities and stuck to them enabled their subordinate leaders to focus their efforts and achieve high performance. They also strengthened their subordinates' devotion because there was a sense of long-term unity of purpose and commitment to worthy objectives. Those who established clear, mission-specific priorities were in conflict with old Army culture, however. Unwritten Army customs had taught most professional soldiers in the Division that the way the game is played under pressure is to pass everything down as a No. 1 priority, and let the junior commander try to sort out what to emphasize, what to ignore, and what to lie about. The junior has no choice, there is always someone waiting in the wings to take his command.

This practice relieves the senior commander of difficult choices; it also puts him in an excusable position if his subordinate's allocation of priorities does not find favor with his own superior—he can "hang" his subordinate. This has the insidious effect of eliminating trust and denying vertical cohesion. The commander who eschewed it did so at his peril, because his competitors looked better than he. But under commanders who broke the mold to set priorities; to focus on substance; to protect, develop, and support their subordinates; and to reward being good rather than looking good, subordinate leaders were better able to forge superior units that would remain cohesive and effective in combat.

Commentary

The pleasure with which most officers assumed command of brigades and battalions in the Division derived primarily from the atmosphere of trust, autonomy, mutual support, and focus on the combat mission that emanated from the commanding general. At first the Division's combined senior leaders eagerly assumed responsibility for a heavy load of missions. As pressure mounted, so did fear, and responsibility grew more burdensome. However, the continuing trust and mutual support by the senior command structure (battalion and higher) conferred resiliency, and the Division posted an extraordinary record of achievement.

Organizing an RDF-capable division in less than eighteen months, with some battalions starting from scratch in that period; implementing a three-part revolution in organization (COHORT), tactical doctrine (light infantry), and human relations (positive leadership); and making quantum improvements in housing, services, and family living conditions both on and off post reflect great credit on the officers, NCOs, and privates of the Division. As they did it, they took steps to evaluate themselves. This makes the 7th ID(L) experience particularly valuable not only to leaders of the new light infantry divisions but also to all leaders who expect to take U.S. soldiers into combat (see Chapter V). It is in the latter sense that the
achievements of the Division can provide the most lasting and valuable contribution to our Army.

Many of the initiatives undertaken were revolutionary in that they rediscovered principles of organizational behavior once understood in the U.S. Army but set aside by current Army culture. Resistance to developing subordinates, substituting intimidation of subordinates for acceptance of responsibility, punishment of inter-rank friendships, indifference to soldiers' needs, treating replacements as if they were inanimate spare parts are anti-high performance behaviors no one would put in a manual on effective leadership. But all of them invaded the operating culture of the U.S. Army following its twenty-fold expansion in the early 1940s. In 1985 and 1986, the inappropriateness of many facets of Army culture were revealed in bold relief as the Division sought to create a high-performance, soldier-based combat formation using an average slice of military personnel.

The Division met its missions, even where it failed to achieve its human dimension goals. The challenge for the Army command is to generate a level of psychological integrity throughout the ranks of its leaders adequate to accent the responsibilities of providing a climate that enables leaders at company and below to command effectively. The COHORT system provides the personnel potential for exceptionally effective units. A few junior leaders throughout the Army have shown the magnitude of that potential. It can be more fully realized throughout the Army by appropriately trained NCOs and officers confident of the support of their senior commanders.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A: DISCUSSION OF REPRESENTATIVE ISSUES DEVELOPED 
IN THE OCTOBER, 1985, LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 
7th Infantry Division (Light)/Fort Ord

ISSUE: Resolving the Division-Installation Schism

The Commanding General now has a monthly breakfast with the installation staff directors just as he has with his divisional colonels. This simple act eliminated the impression that the senior garrison officers were "second class citizens," and reinforced the reality that the installation was a critical part of the light infantry team. It also provided a second informal senior forum within which issues could be analyzed.

Actions at lower levels in the organization provided solid reinforcements to this campaign. Frequent counterpart coordination between general staff and installation staff has become the norm. Installation staff representatives attend many divisional planning meetings and vice versa. Quarterly joint staff meetings are held to insure cross-fertilization of programs and plans. The Division Chief of Staff and the Garrison Commander have developed an effective working relationship. We have improved our two-way flow of personnel between the division and installation; these crossovers have broadened the experience of officers and NCOs and improved understanding and appreciation of the "other half of the team."

A top to bottom effort was made to educate the Installation civilian work force about the realities of the Rapid Deployment Mission and their essential role in it. Constant reminders are given that we are all Lightfighters, and the Commanding General opened each and every speech or presentation he made with the words, "It's a great day to be in the Army and a great day to be in the Army at Fort Ord, California." One additional innovation has come to symbolize the new spirit of togetherness at Fort Ord. Retiring civilian employees are honored side by side with soldiers at the monthly retirement ceremony. Their special contributions and lengths of service are highlighted, and each receives the Commanding General's personal thanks.

ISSUE: Long Range Planning and Resource Management

To insure continuity of effort, we published a comprehensive 5-year plan that provides a solid guide for our long range management efforts. Coordinated fiscal planning has insured the best possible use of available funds. A tremendous end of year effort, made possible through advanced planning, allowed us to satisfy many quality of life and operational needs. A special effort to reduce deobligations was particularly successful. TDY budget targets were instituted for major subordinate commands and separate battalions to allow them to manage their military schools programs without burdensome forecasting and review procedures.
ISSUE: Reduce Bureaucracy/Enhance Efficiency

We have greatly expanded our use of modern technology with over 100 new personal computers, new phone systems, a higher capacity copier for Martinez Hall, our consolidated in and out processing center, and an upgrade of the Fort Ord computer mainframe and software. We made major strides in achieving a paperless supply system; requisitioning will soon be done entirely by computer. We have computerized both our range and training area scheduling procedures and our military schools management system. Finally, we upgraded our Battle Simulation Center with additional automation, and further improvements are still to come.

The Installation's basic guide for operations and functions, Fort Ord Regulation 10-2, has been completely rewritten to conform with the Army's Standard Installation Organization. Commercial activities studies are underway in a number of directorates with positive impact on in-house performance.

Unfortunately, there are some goals in this area identified at the 1985 conference that we have been unable to accomplish, mainly due to very real resource constraints. Civilian employment level limitations will not allow us to fund a civilian secretary for each battalion and brigade level commander. We have also tried to keep limits on special duty (SD) requirements to reduce the diversion of soldiers from their primary duties, but as the last of the excess personnel generated by the transition to the light structure depart Fort Ord, the demands for SD are likely to rise. Similarly, we cannot support, from appropriated funds, a Family Support Group Coordinator at battalion or MSC level. We must continue to rely on volunteers to perform these essential services.

ISSUE: Housing

Although we cannot claim that all of Fort Ord's achievements in the housing area resulted from the 1985 conference, the intensity of feeling expressed then on this issue certainly reinforced our efforts. We now have a one-stop housing information desk and receptionist in Martinez Hall whose efforts are supplemented by a step-by-step slide briefing on house hunting in the local area that is shown twice daily for new personnel.

To insure a personal touch, our housing personnel are now trained by the Monterey Apartment Managers Association in marketing and customer service, and in conflict resolution by the Seaside Community Boards. In addition, we have established an Ombudsman position in the Housing Division to address complaints. The incumbent is a former Fort Ord community mayor.

We have doubled our local leased housing, filled Brostrom Park--our contractor-operated mobile home park--and have broken ground for 600 new sets of quarters on post. Our Rental Deposit Reduction Program has grown to 197 landlords with saving to
soldiers exceeding $500,000 in 1986, and we have been nominated as a test site for a federal governmental rental deposit guarantee program. We are continuing to upgrade substandard housing on post. It is a number one priority for FORSCOM in FY 87. Guest housing also improved with the opening of the Lightfighter Lodge. Negotiations for additional expansion of this essential temporary housing is underway.

Our Community Mayors Program has truly made a difference in the quality of life in our on-post housing area. Assisted by sponsoring units and drawn together by a Community Action Council chaired by the Assistant Division Commander (Support), community mayors provide an immediately responsive link to the chain of command and installation agencies. In the area of crime prevention, each community is served by specially trained precinct officers from our Federal Police force who work with their mayor on Neighborhood Watch, Project Helping Hand, and other community based programs.

**ISSUE: Welcoming Programs**

With the opening of the refurbished Martinez Hall and the establishment of the Family Support Division of DPCA, we have made major strides toward resolving this issue. Martinez Hall is an attractive and well run facility providing a full range of newcomer services to include dental screening. The Family Support Division also publishes a regularly updated reference chart listing points of contact and phone numbers for community services and activities.

Newcomers receive a series of welcomes, briefings, and orientations to include viewing a taped message from the Commanding General early on in their processing. A two hour Newcomers Orientation with slides and live narration is presented monthly for soldiers and spouses. Introductory remarks are made by both the Commanding General and his wife. MSC and separate battalion commanders and their sergeants major personally greet soldiers and their spouses outside the theater prior to the orientation.

Assignments for newcomers are made in an expeditious manner, with the unit of assignment confirmed and orders published normally during the second day after arrival—while the soldier and family are getting acquainted with Fort Ord and the Monterey area.

Our newcomers and outgoing Lightfighters now fill in a customer survey to provide us feedback on both in and out processing. We also ask them to nominate the most courteous civilian and military persons working in Martinez Hall. Each month we award $100.00 in cash to the most courteous civilian employee and a DA Certificate of Achievement to the most courteous soldier at the special ceremony. Their pictures are placed in the lobby for further public recognition.

The Personal Property Shipping Office has recently moved into two refurbished buildings to provide an attractive and
uncrowded facility so soldiers can complete the inherently traumatic processes of shipping and arranging for delivery of household goods in comfortable surroundings.

**ISSUE: Support for Family Support Groups (FSGs)**

Concern for the development, maintenance and support of unit level Family Support Groups generated many suggestions at our conference. We were fully cognizant of the risks of perceived centralization of this essential company/battalion level program when we published Fort Ord Regulation 608-3 to provide guidelines for FSG organization and functions. We feel we have struck a workable balance in this essential area. A Fort Ord services handbook has been compiled to serve as a consolidated reference for FSGs, and Fort Ord Regulation 600-29 was revised to authorize FSGs to raise funds to support activities. An installation FSG Advisory Council was established to provide policy guidance and to serve as a forum for discussion and resolution of FSG issues beyond the individual unit's abilities and resources.

A family Support Group Coordination Office has been opened in Martinez Hall to facilitate contact between newly arriving families and unit Family Support Groups. It is manned by a full time NCO and family member volunteers. This office is collecting a reference library of videotapes from workshops and "how to do it" ideas. In response to one final concern, FSG volunteers were recognized at the FSG leaders workshop in November 1986 and will be included in our annual Volunteer Recognition Ceremony.

**ISSUE: Medical Care and Service to Patients**

In response to numerous criticisms, over 40% of the MEDDAC staff have already received a 20 hour block of training on "Investing in Excellence" to improve interpersonal skills and professional performance. For example, increased efforts have been made to contact patients in advance to notify them of a doctor's absence that requires cancellation of an appointment, thus preventing an unnecessary trip.

Although it has not been possible to open an additional pharmacy, we have increased the number of pharmacists and are now filling a prescription every 21.6 seconds. Hours of operation have been expanded to include Saturdays. Additional personnel are now manning the General Outpatient Clinic and Emergency Room during the late afternoons/early evenings to improve service for working spouses, families, and soldiers who do not wish to miss duty to receive medical treatment. A Family Practice Clinic serves a substantial portion of our community, further personalizing medical care.

To better inform the Fort Ord community, numerous articles on changes to CHAMPUS have been provided to the PANORAMA, our post newspaper, and briefings on CHAMPUS are available for unit and community groups.
The heavy demands of training and deployment readiness put a premium on soldiers' time, and the cost of living made it necessary for most spouses to hold jobs. In response to these recognized needs, our commissary is now open seven days a week, and the post exchange now has evening hours to complement its seven day a week schedule. A modern car care center and parts store and a number of new services are in operation. The Installation Civilian Personnel Office has staffed a One Stop Employment Center with special emphasis on family member employment services.

Enhanced financial counseling and consumer affairs service are being provided by AER volunteers and paid staff in coordination with ACS. Efforts are underway to hire a financial planner/consumer affairs staff member to further improve these services.

A wide variety of educational services and programs are available to soldiers and adult family members on post. In an effort to align programs with unit training cycles and Rapid Deployment Force Alert statuses, many classes are conducted in 4 or 6 week blocks. While this has improved potential availability, high intensity training and schedule unpredictability have prevented many soldiers from achieving their educational aspirations.
APPENDIX B: ISSUES AND PROPOSED POLICIES DEVELOPED IN THE JANUARY, 1987, LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
7th Infantry Division (Light)/Fort Ord

ISSUE: TIME

POLICY: WORK DAY IN GARRISON
- 10 HOUR DAY
- 50 HOUR WEEK
- PROTECT DISCRETIONARY TIME
- FLEXIBLE WORK HOURS
- COMPENSATE FOR EXTRA DUTY TIME
- MINIMIZE WEEKEND WORK

POLICY: COMPENSATORY TIME
- OFFICIALLY SCHEDULED ON TNG SCHEDULE
- AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER EVENT
- TWO DAYS FOR 1ST WEEKEND LOST
- ONE DAY EACH ADDITIONAL WEEKEND LOST
- COINCIDE COMP TIME WITH FREE WEEKENDS
- SCHEDULE TRIPS, ACTIVITIES, PERMISSIVE TDY IN CONJUNCTION WITH COMP TIME

POLICY: NORMAL HOURS OF OPERATION FOR MILITARY SERVICES
- NORMAL HOURS 0800 TO 1630 MON, TUE, WED, FRI
  0800 TO 1900 ON THURSDAYS
- HIGHER STAFFS & CDRS DO NOT CALL SUBORDINATES OUTSIDE OF THESE HOURS
- LIMIT WEEKEND OPERATIONS TO MISSION ESSENTIAL
- GARRISON CDR AUTHORIZED TO CURTAIL SERVICES FOR MILITARY TNG

ISSUE: RECREATION AND QUALITY OF LIFE

POLICY: WEAR OF PT UNIFORM
- LIBERALIZE ON POST WEAR OF PT UNIFORM

ISSUE: RECOGNITION PROGRAM

POLICY: AWARDS PROGRAM
- MILITARY AWARDS
- CIVILIAN AWARDS
- VOLUNTEER AWARDS
- RECOGNITION OF SERVICE IN PUBLICATIONS
- PUBLIC DISPLAYS, PARKING, MONETARY AWARDS
- TIMELY AWARDS PUBLICITY AND RECOGNITION

ISSUE: LEADERS' COMMITMENT TO EDUCATION

POLICY: COMMITMENT TO EDUCATION
- MAKE INDIVIDUAL EDUCATION TOP PRIORITY DURING DRB 3

B-1
- Do not plan unit TNG and activities that will divert soldiers from planned educational programs during individual TNG cycle

- Strive to meet minimum Army education goals

- Work with DPT and DPCA to coordinate TNG and educational opportunities that are complementary

- Put max number of classes on weekends and evenings

**ISSUE: PROFILE AND DEVELOPMENTAL PHYSICAL TRAINING**

**POLICY: DEVELOPMENTAL PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING**

- Design individual recognition programs

- Protect profiled soldiers

- Develop positive, supportive stamina-building physical fitness programs

- Read and adhere to regulations and field manuals

**ISSUE: STRESS REDUCTION**

**POLICY: STRESS REDUCTION**

- Use backward planning sequence

- Commanders & leaders: to attend annual stress management workshops

- Send subordinates to meetings

- Question priorities that create stress and are counterproductive

**ISSUE: LEADERS TAKING CARE OF THEMSELVES**

**POLICY: LEADERS TAKE LEAVE AT FORT ORD**

- No one to lose leave

- Periodic review of LES

- Program leaves by quarters

- Treat leave as normal military duty

- Whole chain of command involved
ISSUE: WORKING SPOUSES / MILITARY CARE PLAN

POLICY: WORKING SPOUSES TREATED AS 1ST CLASS CITIZENS

- WORKING SPOUSE IS A CONTRIBUTOR TO MILITARY LIFE
- CONTRIBUTES TO RETENTION, FAMILY, AND INSTALLATION INCOME
- FILL ON-POST CIVILIAN NEEDS AND HELP OTHER FAMILIES COPE WITH STRESS

ISSUE: HUMAN RESOURCES COUNCIL

POLICY: ESTABLISH A QUALITY OF LIFE COUNCIL

- INCLUDE ALL AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR QUALITY OF LIFE ACTIVITIES AT FORT ORD
- RUN BY GARRISON COMMANDER
- MEET ON A MONTHLY BASIS
- ELIMINATE DUPLICATION
- PREPARE COMMUNITY STATUS REPORT (CSR)
- CONDUCT QUARTERLY CSR FROM CG, CDRS, PRIMARY STAFF OF INSTALLATION AND DIVISION, COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR OF ALL SUPPORTED ORGANIZATIONS
- REDUCE REDUNDANT COUNCILS AND MEETINGS
- TAKE ON RESIDUAL ISSUES FROM LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE THAT WERE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION