HOW TO THINK ABOUT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL: A FRAMEWORK

VOLUME I

Final Report

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COMMENTS

Comments pertaining to this study are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050.
FOREWORD

This document has been prepared by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. It does not reflect the official position of the Army War College, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans or the Department of the Army.

Members of the study team were Lieutenant Colonel David F. Shaver (Study Manager), Dr. Michael F. Altfeld, Dr. Regina Gaillard, and Mr. John Scott. Secretarial support was provided by Mrs. Susan K. Blubaugh. The study benefited from valuable assistance from faculty of the U.S. Army War College, especially Colonel Edward A. Hamilton, Jr., Colonel Jay C. Mumford, Colonel David Jablonsky, Colonel John J. Hickey, Jr., Colonel Charles A. P. Woodbeck, and Dr. Alan N. Sabrosky; and from DA and other Service staffs, OJCS, OSD, ACDA, State Department, CIA and DIA.

This document has been cleared for "public release" by the Department of Defense.

KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, IN
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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The opposing alliances in Europe stand at the threshold of renewed conventional arms control (CAC) negotiations. These talks might produce results that echo the positive tone of Mr. Gorbachev's rhetoric, or they might prove to be as unproductive as the moribund MBFR negotiations. NATO must be ready in any case. This study of "how to think about CAC" is intended to present a candidate concept.

STUDY ORIGIN

In early March of 1987, the Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, ODCSOPS, DA, commissioned the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College to do a six-month study on "Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Army Perspectives." A working draft of the study was used by ODCSOPS and OJCS in June of 1987 and the study was published on 1 October 1987. As many additional conventional arms issues emerged after the President signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the ODCSOPS tasked the Director of the Strategic Studies Institute to support the U.S. Army's preparations for CAC. On 26 February 1988, the Commandant, U.S. Army War College, tasked SSI to prepare a briefing for presentation to the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) and to the senior Army leadership. This study, "How to Think About Conventional Arms Control: A Framework," was initially prepared to provide data from which the briefing could be drawn.

STUDY APPROACH

The study is intended to identify critical strategic variables for CAC in Europe, propose positions on important issues, and consolidate the results in a candidate U.S. Government position on CAC.

Numerous conventional arms control proposals seem to lack strategic context. Methodologically, a proper context should provide means to connect the results of arms reductions with implications for security both in the Alliance and in independent foreign policies. A strategic perspective which provides context should focus on those interests and implications that cannot be explained solely by either military or political reasoning. The study's context includes CAC principles appropriate for Europe, precedents and lessons from other East-West arms talks, and aggregate variables which index connections between possible outcomes and implications. A series of issues with recommended positions on each issue contributes to the context and is used to propose an approach to CAC sensitive to implications for the Army in the near and long term.
CAC MOMENTUM

The current momentum towards CAC talks began with the following recent events:

- A Gorbachev proposal in April 1986 for substantial reductions (from the Atlantic to the Urals) in land and air forces, including tactical nuclear weapons.

- NATO establishment of a high level task force to consider the Soviet proposal.

- The Warsaw Pact's Budapest Appeal of June 1986 which added detail to Gorbachev's earlier announcement. The Appeal suggested troop cuts of 100,000 to 150,000 on each side as well as cuts in air forces and theater nuclear weapons.

- NATO's Brussels Declaration of December 1986 calling for negotiations to establish a verifiable, comprehensive, and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels from the Atlantic to the Urals.

- Preliminary mandate talks for new negotiations which began early in 1987.

CAC PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

Selected principles of conventional arms control in Europe constitute one way to organize our thinking about this important subject:

- Arms control is a component of defense.

- Nuclear and conventional arms control are interdependent because of the role of nuclear forces in NATO strategy.

- Conventional arms control is more complicated than nuclear arms control and its results are more difficult to verify.

- NATO political solidarity will be tested in CAC by necessary reexaminations of compromised issues, regardless of whether Soviet intentions include placing this strain on the Alliance.

- NATO's CAC objectives are clear; the means to achieve them must be developed.

- NATO military institutions should provide advice, analysis, and judgment pertaining to CAC proposals and positions.

- Public and government support and understanding are essential ingredients for CAC agreements and for adjusting to the results.

- CAC lacks successful precedents.
NATO objectives for the CST were announced as part of the Brussels Declaration in December 1986:

- Establish a stable/secure level of forces by eliminating disparities.
- Conduct step-by-step talks so that security is maintained throughout the negotiating process.
- Eliminate Pact surprise attack capability.
- Expand Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) toward more visibility.
- Expand the focus from the old NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) to the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) area to address regional imbalances and to prevent circumvention.
- Establish an effective verification regime that includes detailed information exchanges and on site inspections.

ISSUES

Major CAC issues, including pros and cons of the existing arguments and the positions of the relevant actors, are developed as strategic issues and operational issues which may impact on the CST. Recommended positions are presented later in this summary.

USG POSITION

There is more to developing an overall position than adding up the decisions on individual issues. A consensus USG proposal is a function of the principles of CAC, lessons from past negotiations, individual issue decisions, selection of strategic criteria, and a vision of the future.

A position, rather than a specific proposal, is more appropriate in the pre-negotiating phase of CST. A position allows the negotiator to state a declared issue decision above-the-line, while shielding an undeclared decision from view. This approach is analogous to the strategic concepts of initiative and deception, although its intent is not to deceive but to protect.

Seven core criteria are essential to the development of a USG position. A psychometric technique known as subjective pairwise comparison was used to determine the seven core criteria which form the basis for the development of the USG position, future proposals, and evaluations.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conclusions. The question—how to think about conventional arms control in Europe—asks for an informed perspective, not a set of rules or laws. The conclusions of this study, moving from the general to the specific, are the following:
a. CAC should be seen in the context of Europe and of contemporary international politics and military strength. Lessons from the past and from the modern history of U.S.-USSR arms negotiations are valuable but limited in application. Like the principles of war, those lessons must be applied to each situation, with a view to consequences and initiatives for the future.

b. The NATO objective for CAC of reducing or eliminating Pact surprise attack capabilities should be the focus for U.S. Army participation within NATO and in NATO-Pact conventional stability talks. Additional objectives are important but lack purpose without this focus.

c. The objective of placing the Pact in a position where it must mobilize visibly before major conventional attacks is a corollary to eliminating surprise attack capabilities and will become of first-order importance if and when the primary objective is realized.

d. Reductions and control proposals in the CST will necessarily expose long-standing, unresolved issues of strategy within NATO. The expected debate has the potential for the loss of political cohesion whether or not this effect is intended by the East and whether or not an agreement actually is reached in the CST.

e. Although NATO nations will view CAC proposals and consequences in terms of current Alliance strategic guidance, the allies should also include analyses of proposals in terms of adaptation of the strategy, of new strategies, and in terms of a variety of possible operational concepts to defend in the post-CAC situation. Alliance military analysts should ask how remaining NATO assets could be organized and employed to deter and fight the remaining threat.

f. Substantial U.S. force redeployments from Europe will change the distribution of political power in NATO. One or a few leading European nations are unlikely to attract a strong commitment to a common defense from other members. The United States must ask what it wants to see as the future of NATO and specifically ask about its own role in the Alliance.

g. The possibility that U.S. Army forces will be returned from Europe as part of a CAC agreement requires thought about new missions for these forces to retain them in our force structure. Potential missions are:

(1) Activate Air Defense Initiative (ADI). The Army should consider participation in the U.S. Air Force ADI program by applying Patriot to critical CONUS defense installation protection and using a reduced U.S. target base—in concert with recent paring of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.

(2) Support National Anti-Drug War. Army resources could be devoted to interdicting illegal drugs without acute conflict with other Army missions.
3. Nationbuilding. Active Army units could play a greater role in this mission and meet needs expressed by CINCs for appropriately structured forces.

4. U.S. Space Command Force Structuring. Forces redeployed as a result of CAC could be included in the force structure needed for establishing a U.S. Army Space Command (USARSPACECOM).

5. Integration of Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Units. New units with an equal AC/RC mix would allow daily training for AC members, improved training for RC members, and a more ready unit overall compared to current marginal units in the Reserve structure.

6. Fill Light Division and Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) Shortfall. Although this mission might not utilize all forces returning under a CAC agreement, it is one of several possible post-CAC uses and has some support in the Congress.

2. Recommendations.

a. Recommendations concerning the strategic issues for CST are:

(1) The autonomy of CST within the framework of the CSCE process must be preserved in the new forum.

(2) Understand that a post-CAC world will find a new competitive political and psychological game with the East.

(3) Keep nuclear and conventional forces at moderate strength, as opposed to primary reliance on one or the other to deter conventional war.

(4) Understand that the Soviets will attempt to increase their advantages through CAC.

b. Recommendations concerning the operational issues for CST are:

(1) Determine bargaining assets to reach an equitable agreement with the East.

(2) Discuss Dual Capable Systems (DCS) in CST.

(3) Define modernization and limit introduction of new hi-tech weapons in theater, not elsewhere.

(4) Select weapons in large units as the unit of account.
(5) Destroy and demobilize Soviet reductions; remove or POMCUS U.S. reductions from theater.

(6) Insist on a Central European subzone.

(7) Reduce forces and equipment by alliance rather than by nation.

(8) Model the verification regime after INF and Western proposals in MBFR.

(9) Do not regulate remaining force structure since weaponry will be greatly reduced. Keep flexibility—our strength.

(10) Do not allow POMCUS stocks to be counted; use them to make up for geographical disparity.

(11) Do not phase the negotiations. Get a whole product.

(12) Phase the implementation.

(13) Include air forces.

(14) Do not include naval forces (which are strategic, not regional).

(15) Shift Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM)s to the proper forum—Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE II).

(16) Insure that weapon system quality is accounted for so that the Soviets cannot trade off obsolete equipment.

c. U.S Army input to the JCS position going into CAC should include the following core criteria:

(1) We must maintain our theater nuclear deterrent by establishing nuclear parity, including development of a Lance replacement.

(2) We must enhance our conventional deterrent by developing and improving our tactical mobility and survivability; our reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) capabilities; our conventional weapons accuracy and lethality; and our command, control and communications.

(3) We must demand compensation for our geographical asymmetry with the USSR on the land with U.S. POMCUS and destruction of Soviet weaponry and demobilization of units, and in the air by parity, not only in numbers and capabilities, but also by air reinforcement travel time.
(4) We must maintain the ability in NATO for forward defense to the degree and extent necessary for the post-agreement situation.

(5) Any agreement reached must contain stringent compliance/verification measures including permanent and on call inspections, National Technical Means (NTM), risk reduction centers and sanctions for violations.

(6) We must focus on Soviet forces. We will not accept anything less than parity between U.S. and Soviet forces in the NGA nor will we accept a trade for outmoded weaponry.

(7) Any proposal for reductions of NATO forces will not impose a disproportionate obligation on any one NATO nation.
1. Origins of Study. In early March of 1987, the Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, ODCSOPS, DA, commissioned the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) to develop a study on "Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Army Perspectives." A working draft of the study was used by ODCSOPS and OJCS in June of 1987 and the study was published on 1 October 1987. As many additional conventional arms issues emerged subsequent to the presidential signing of the INF Treaty, the Director of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, was tasked by ODCSOPS to provide issue papers in support of the development of a U.S. Army position on conventional arms control (CAC). On 26 February 1988, the Commandant, U.S. Army War College, tasked SSI to prepare a briefing for presentation to the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) and senior Army leadership. This study, "How to Think About Conventional Arms Control: A Framework," is the basis from which the briefing was prepared.

2. Background.

   a. Conventional arms control in Europe demands renewed interest and attention. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations have been in progress since 1973 but produced no treaty. Fundamental disagreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact concerning exchanges of military information and methods of verification contributed significantly to the failure of MBFR. A new forum for conventional talks is now pending. These potential negotiations have been labelled Conventional Stability Talks (CST) and they are to cover military forces from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU), a much larger area than that covered in MBFR. The region covered by MBFR is called the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) and is shown in Appendix B, page B-1. The ATTU is depicted on page B-2. The CST await a mandate but both NATO (including France, which did not participate in MBFR) and the Pact have indicated their willingness to enter into them. Clearly, understanding conventional arms control is a necessary and timely undertaking.

   b. The U.S. Army will be expected to provide military leadership to develop initial U.S. Government positions for submission to NATO, to assess NATO's conventional arms control options and proposals, and to evaluate Warsaw Pact proposals.

3. Objective. This study is intended to identify critical strategic variables for CAC in Europe, assess and propose positions on important issues, and recommend essential points for a U.S. Government position on CAC.

4. Scope. This study is confined to issues and problems of conventional arms control negotiations in Europe and their implications for the Army.

5. Limitations. The study has been prepared as an unclassified volume. Classified discussions have been reported in a separate classified volume for release to only those individuals and organizations as authorized by the Director, SSI.
6. **Methodology.** The study team developed principles of conventional arms control in Europe; summarized the significant historical background; described, discussed and assessed each important issue; developed those individual positions into a comprehensive U.S. Government position; further developed the position into supportive proposals; designed an evaluation regime for use in initial proposal development and counterproposal assessment; and recommended an approach for preparing the environment and the alternative options for the near and long-term future.

7. **Assumptions.**

   a. The United States will engage in NATO-to-Warsaw Pact Conventional Stability Talks beginning as early as Fall 1988.

   b. The course of negotiations will be long; at least two to three years before any agreement will be reached.

   c. The U.S. Army will play an important role in the development of the U.S. Government's initial position and in the evaluations of both NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) proposals.

   d. The U.S. Army's principal interest is in an agreement which increases U.S. and NATO security.

8. **Definitions.** The terms "parity" and "stability" are used throughout this study in the sense that seems to be consistent with U.S. and NATO usage prior to actual CAC negotiations. Parity is being used to denote equal numbers of some specified military assets. Sometimes in the CAC literature, parity refers to a close equivalence of military capability, a much more complicated concept than equality of numbers. Stability, defined in Chapter 2, refers to a situation where neither side feels it must attack the other preemptively or deliberately—it is the absence of incentive to attack.
1. **Introduction.** Arms control principles are better stated as propositions because of the ambiguous record of previous efforts to control and reduce arms in this century. Perhaps the only "principle" attracting consensus is that we should use arms control to promote our national security interests when arms negotiations are an effective means to do so. If the propositions in this chapter are not principles, they constitute one way to organize our thinking about conventional arms control.

2. **Roles of Arms Control:** Arms control is a component of, not an alternative to, defense.
   
   a. We would not need a defense unless we perceived threats from hostile nations. Arms control--limiting the use of arms, the growth of arms, or reducing and eliminating arms--also makes sense only if we perceive threats that could be lessened by agreement with politically hostile nations. Arms control is necessary only because defense is necessary.

   b. This view of arms control reflects our own national security strategy and the ambiguous record of arms control results. A 1986 study completed for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) contained findings of little comfort to people predisposed for or against arms control negotiations and agreements. The evidence from U.S.-Soviet negotiations spanning 40 years suggests that neither side's interests were served more than the other's. "Both sides have benefitted from the reduced uncertainty and enhanced predictability" of the process. "Neither has been forced to compromise important interests or capabilities." If the arms control age has seen a shift in the strategic balance towards the Soviet Union, "this may indeed be a correct assessment, but to point out that arms control reflects this change is not to hold it responsible." Moreover, arms control negotiations and treaties are "unlikely to lull the country into military complacency."

   c. "What emerges above all," the study concludes, "is the modesty of what arms control has wrought. Expectations, for better or worse, have not been realized. . . . If history reveals anything, it is that arms control has proved neither as promising as some had hoped nor as dangerous as others had feared." Since that study of arms control history was completed, President Reagan and Party Secretary Gorbachev signed a treaty to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) worldwide. The INF Treaty establishes precedents by specifying the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons and by including intrusive inspections heretofore rejected by the Soviet Union. The President's 1988 National Security Strategy document also notes that:
The INF treaty provides that the systems the Soviets must eliminate are primarily based within the Soviet Union, where they are not particularly vulnerable to conventional attack in a possible NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. In contrast, the U.S. systems to be eliminated are high-priority targets for Soviet conventional attack.7

e. But the treaty does not remove the large Soviet conventional and chemical threat to Europe. Therefore, the next NATO priority for arms control is to redress existing imbalances in conventional and chemical warfare capabilities which favor the Warsaw Pact.8 In effect, a treaty that will eliminate intermediate-range nuclear weapons worldwide has a generally acknowledged, immediate bearing on conventional forces and their ability to perform their missions in Europe.

3. Nuclear and Conventional Arms Control Connections: Negotiations and treaties to control nuclear arms and conventional arms are interdependent.

a. Nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense are interdependent and mutually reinforcing within our national security strategy concepts of forward defense and alliance solidarity.9 It follows, then, that agreements to reduce and control either nuclear or conventional forces will affect the other and, in sum, affect our security and that of our allies.

b. It may be argued that of three kinds of contemporary treaties--Strategic (Nuclear) Arms Reductions Talks (START), INF, and conventional--a conventional treaty should have come first because the greatest disparities between forces are in conventional forces in Europe. But, conventional agreements probably will require much more time than the INF treaty to construct, negotiate, and implement. And, with the end of the Reagan Administration in sight, it is plausible that the Soviets made concessions to conclude the INF treaty before a new U.S administration took office.10

c. In any event, if U.S. intent in INF was not only to eliminate weapons according to NATO's 1979 pledge to attempt to do so, but also to set precedents useful for future negotiations, INF was the most practical means to these ends.11

d. Although nuclear and conventional arms control need not be linked, they are linked in Europe because nuclear and conventional forces are essential elements of NATO's strategy. The Alliance has been unwilling to match the Warsaw Pact's massive conventional forces and has relied on a conventional-nuclear deterrent triad12 that includes "extended deterrence" provided by U.S strategic nuclear forces.

e. From an arms control perspective, the side with superior nuclear forces should offer to trade some of its advantage for its opponent's conventional forces. Unfortunately, in Europe, the Soviets match or exceed both the nuclear and conventional forces of NATO, which eliminates that trading option. However, even current circumstances provide a basis for
linking nuclear and conventional arms control. The Soviets want to 
denuclearize Europe,\textsuperscript{13} which means they could want to "pay" more for the 
removal of NATO nuclear weapons than a simple nuclear-for-nuclear trade. 
But, as noted earlier, NATO needs its nuclear forces, especially those 
stationed in Europe, primarily because of the Soviet conventional 
advantage. Theoretically NATO could trade the denuclearization of Europe, 
which the Pact wants, for conventional parity, which NATO wants. (This is 
"theoretical" because French and British leaders have indicated consistently 
that their countries will not relinquish their independent nuclear forces; 
nevertheless, the removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from the European 
continent could be tantamount to denuclearization.)\textsuperscript{14}

f. None of this is to suggest that nuclear and conventional weapons 
must or should be discussed in the same negotiating forum, as that would add 
to the complexity of talks which are already extremely complicated.

4. Complexities of Conventional Arms Control: Conventional arms control is 
not analogous to nuclear arms control.

a. The importance of nuclear forces and their missions cannot be 
exaggerated, but conventional forces bear more directly on aggressions which 
are more likely to occur than nuclear war, and conventional force 
capabilities for deterrence and defense are more difficult to measure and 
predict.\textsuperscript{15}

b. Conventional arms negotiations are more complicated politically. 
Nuclear talks, with the exception of the Non-proliferation Treaty, have 
directly involved only the United States and the Soviet Union. The coming 
Conventional Stability Talks (CST) in the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) forum 
will include at least 23 nations from two alliances. During the Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, some 200-300 NATO officials had a 
role in approving each move in negotiations.\textsuperscript{16}

c. Conventional negotiations deal with a great variety of military 
resources whose effectiveness depends on their coordinated, "synergistic" 
relationships. (The importance of artillery, for example, depends on the 
existence of mobile armor and troops to exploit artillery's effects. 
Indeed, the essence of the term "combined arms" is that the several forms of 
arms in proper combination will "multiply" force to make the whole greater 
than the sum of its parts.) Conventional arms talks deal with resources 
that are more difficult than nuclear forces to verify and monitor. They 
deal with forces where it is more difficult to assess the consequences of 
reductions on deterrence and defense. In sum, conventional talks must 
include a great variety of armaments, types of equipment, deployments, and 
numbers. Conventional talks include questions of mobilization and readiness 
of the forces involved; and information, predictability, and confidence 
about those forces.\textsuperscript{17}

d. Finally, one of the most important and certainly the most 
contextually specific factor in conventional arms control in Europe is 
geography. NATO's north-to-south range of area to be defended is very long 
and its depth is very shallow. Warsaw Pact countries are contiguous and
NATO's countries, such as Norway, Turkey, Canada, and the United States, are separated from the European continent. The eastern United States is over 3,000 miles from the inter-German border; Soviet Russia is less than 600 miles from that same border.

e. These differences played no small part in the failure of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks to produce tangible results after many years of negotiation.

5. Lessons of Conventional Arms Negotiations: Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks provide lessons but not precedents for new conventional negotiations.

a. MBFR talks began in 1973 and produced no agreements to reduce forces after almost 15 years of proposals and counterproposals. The two sides could not agree on exchanges of data on numbers and kinds of military forces in the area of negotiation, and they disagreed on verification measures. NATO wanted detailed information and intrusive inspections; the Warsaw Pact denied the need for precise data and said verification should be limited to the means available to each side.

b. Other important points of disagreement were these:

- NATO wanted initial reductions by the two superpowers; the Pact wanted to reduce national and foreign troops at the same time.

- NATO wanted to confine reductions to ground forces; the Pact wanted to include air forces.

- NATO wanted to limit reductions to conventional arms; the Pact wanted to include nuclear arms.

- NATO said the Pact should make bigger cuts because of the force imbalance; the Pact refused to recognize an imbalance and wanted both sides to make equal cuts.\(^\text{18}\)

c. U.S. theater nuclear forces were included in Western proposals, primarily to break the existing impasse, but these proposals were not accepted as such by the Pact which wanted to include NATO's non-U.S. nuclear forces, contrary to NATO's position.

d. Lack of progress in MBFR must be seen in the context of developments in the later years of the talks. First, many of the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) agreed to at Stockholm in September 1986 originated as NATO proposals for "associated measures" in MBFR.\(^\text{19}\) Second, the Pact seemed to accept the principle of parity—that troops should be reduced to equal residual numbers. Finally, a strong suggestion that the Pact acknowledged asymmetries in its favor was evident in an exchange of proposals in 1985. NATO proposed a reduction of 5,000 NATO for 11,500 Pact ground troops; the Pact counterproposal differed (6,500 for 11,500) but reflected asymmetry. At the time, Ambassador Robert Blackwill asserted that NATO's proposed figures "reflect the ratio of U.S and Soviet forces in the reductions area."\(^\text{20}\)
e. Although Pact negotiators showed that they are amenable to changing their positions, MBFR set no clear precedents. The acknowledged asymmetry of troops referred only to U.S. and Soviet troops, not to both alliances' forces in Europe. In the Atlantic to the Urals forum, the Pact is likely to adopt the position taken by Mr. Gorbachev in Prague in April 1987, when he said that asymmetries existed in Europe "due to history, geography, and other factors," and that "we are in favor of removing disparities . . . by reducing their numbers on the side that has superiority in them."21

f. As NATO enters the new negotiations it will do so by focusing on military capabilities rather than on troops as the medium of exchange. The Alliance's initial perspective for judging the value of possible force reductions is likely to be their effects on its strategy of flexible response.

6. NATO's Strategic Concept: NATO's strategy of flexible response provides the Alliance a common but problematic perspective for judging the value of conventional arms agreements.

a. The member nations of NATO agree that the strategy they adopted in 1967 requires their forces to have nuclear and conventional forces to deter or to fight in a variety of possible crises and wars in Europe. As expressed by U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger in 1975, during the early years of interpretation and implementation of the strategy, the 1967 guidance called for doctrine and planning which could accomplish the following objectives:

To deter [Warsaw Pact] aggression.

If deterrence fails, to defeat aggression at any level of attack (conventional or nuclear) made by the enemy.

If direct defense fails, to use deliberately increased military force as necessary to make the cost and risk disproportionate to the enemy's objectives and cause him to cease his aggression and withdraw.

In the event of general nuclear war, to inflict extensive damage on the Soviet Union and other WP countries. This objective would be accomplished in conjunction with the strategic forces of the NATO nuclear powers.22

b. NATO members differ about the necessary strength of the conventional and nuclear components of the forces required to accomplish these objectives. This difference tends to be most pronounced between the United States and some European states. The United States holds that:

Allied ground forces, supported by tactical air power, require the capability to halt a Pact attack and restore the integrity of Alliance territory if NATO political and military objectives are to be achieved. Absent such
capability, Alliance strategy becomes heavily dependent on the threat of resorting to nuclear weapons to achieve essential deterrence and warfighting objectives. ²³

A European view, as expressed by David Yost, an American analyst, places emphasis on nuclear deterrence:

An attitude widespread in government circles in Western Europe. . . may be summarized in the following propositions: conventional defense preparations beyond a certain level would be detrimental to the credibility of the nuclear retaliatory threats on which deterrence of Soviet aggression truly rests; being prepared for a conventional conflict of more than a few days in duration would imply a willingness to accept a longer conflict, which would entail unacceptable levels of destruction in Europe; while improved conventional capabilities based on emerging technologies should be pursued, partly because the United States favors them, [only] marginal increases in defense spending are politically tolerable or strategically necessary. ²⁴

c. Senator Nunn has graphically described some consequences of these different views.

Under the Long-Term Defence Programme, the United States pledged to send to Europe within 10 days a total of about six divisions . . . and more than 1,500 of our first-line aircraft. Yet General Rogers' [former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe who retired from that position in 1987] assessment was that he could not hold out conventionally long enough for these promised US reinforcements to reach the European theater and make their presence felt in combat. The main reason was that most of our allies were woefully short of munitions. . . Running out of ammunition in the midst of a pitched battle. . . is definitely a nuclear escalator.

If NATO could not fight and fight well with conventional forces for its own 30-day declared goal, we would not have a flexible response capability to match our strategy. If US forces are merely a delayed trip wire connecting American nuclear might to NATO defense, the United States should recognize that and adjust accordingly. . . . America should not plan and pay for a robust conventional defense when our allies are planning for and paying for a trip wire strategy. ²⁵

d. This reasoning has been taken a step further by the British strategist Michael Howard who wrote that the forces of the Alliance should, ideally, present the "distinct possibility that the conflict might escalate to nuclear war and the certainty that, even if it did not, their [the
Pact's armed forces would suffer casualties out of all proportion to likely gains.\textsuperscript{26} Nuclear weapons should be put in the context of the "fundamental task which only non-nuclear forces can effectively carry out--the defense of territory. Nuclear deterrence needs to be subordinated to this primary task of territorial defense, and not vice versa."\textsuperscript{27}

e. Given these views of the relative importance of nuclear and conventional forces in NATO's strategy, all under the rubric of flexible response, the current dispute about the consequences of the INF treaty was to be expected. Generally, the INF debate is about interpretations of flexible response in today's conditions of threat and response in Europe, and specifically about the credibility of NATO's threat to strike targets in the Soviet Union. In summary, the European-based Pershing IIIs are believed by many Europeans and others in the West to be a credible deterrent because a major Soviet attack would have to take them under attack quickly, thereby provoking their use. Others see advantage to NATO from eliminating SS-20's and Pact medium-range missiles while seeing Pershing II's "early use" as a symbol of NATO's conventional weakness and an impediment to improving conventional forces' staying power. Also implied and usually unstated is the idea that the decision to strike Soviet territory with nuclear weapons must be deliberate and not automatic, consistent with political control.\textsuperscript{28}

f. As the Alliance enters conventional arms negotiations, then, it must ask, among other things,

- Whether it can improve its conventional force component if reductions are not negotiated, or if reductions are negotiated.

- Whether it can simultaneously negotiate for reductions and modernize and even increase conventional forces.

- Whether it can reconcile mutual reductions which are prima facie progress toward conventional stability while retaining force elements and doctrines necessary for flexible response.

- Whether it can retain current numbers of U.S. forces in Europe if reductions are not negotiated or if conventional force improvements are not made toward expanding the conventional option of flexible response.

- Whether it can bargain with the Warsaw Pact on issues of contention within NATO and retain political cohesion and confidence.

7. Soviet Motives and Intentions: The Soviets may want conventional stability in Europe or they may not, but they need not intend to undermine NATO security and cohesion for conventional negotiations to have that effect.

a. A number of European and U.S. strategists believe that Soviet long-term strategy is to go from missile reductions (the INF) to troop reductions "which could further lessen U.S. ties to the continent."\textsuperscript{29} Because the Pact has a large advantage in numbers of conventional forces in
Europe, reduction proposals are easy for the Soviets to make and have wide popular appeal in West Europe "while posing a dilemma for NATO leaders."  

b. NATO's dilemma refers to the perceptions of its own publics who may favor further reductions in nuclear weapons and who will be the objects of Soviet claims that an overall military balance in Europe does exist, contrary to NATO claims. The Poles are repeating the Soviet insistence that balance, not disparity, between eastern and western forces "more or less" exists, and have announced force reduction ideas with four main aspects:

- Gradual reduction of all "operational and battlefield nuclear weapons";
- Similar reductions of conventional weapons, first those representing the greatest potential for surprise attack;
- Mutually binding changes in military doctrine to the "strictly defensive"; and,
- Intensified negotiations about confidence-building measures and strict verification.

The Poles have also offered to negotiate reductions in the Pact's tank forces in return for cuts in NATO's bomber aircraft based in Western Europe.

c. Although such proposals have surface appeal, they gloss over the western view on disparities in conventional forces. The Pact will probably point to the overall balance of troops in the Atlantic to the Urals region to discredit NATO's argument. NATO's negotiators, on the other hand, will point to the disparities in equipment in both the ATTU and the NATO Guidelines Area (see Figure 1), as well as to the Pact's capacity for surprise or short-warning attack across the inter-German border. This capacity is unaffected by NATO forces in Greece and Turkey which are counted in the ATTU balance.

d. Soviet intentions are unclear. They may not want reductions at all but want to use negotiations to divide Europe and the United States through diplomacy and propaganda. Another view is that attempts to split NATO will be counterproductive; the European far left is not strong enough in Alliance circles to make the attempt work. The Soviets may have been successful in the past on a few occasions in influencing NATO decisions through NATO publics. But heavy-handed public relations also have backfired. In dealing with Mr. Gorbachev, NATO may face a different challenge. Jack Snyder suggests that, "the Gorbachev reforms see a world in which the defense has the advantage and aggressive opponents can be demobilized by Soviet concessions and self-restraint." Certainly the Soviets will enter conventional arms talks to improve their own security; the question for NATO is whether it can improve its security in those same negotiations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATO Guidelines Area</th>
<th>Atlantic to Urals</th>
<th>Global</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>NATO</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total active ground forces</td>
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<td>48-2/3</td>
<td>107-1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Ground Force Equipment</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Armed Helicopters</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1987-1988, London: Autumn 1987, p. 231. "This table presents aggregated data for a large number of national forces, divided on the basis of their geographical deployment. The level of confidence as to the many components varies; the aggregated figures therefore embody a measure of estimation."

Figure 1. Conventional Force Data: NATO and Warsaw Pact.
e. Differences are suggested by Snyder in the following line of reasoning:

Of course, even Khrushchev understood that superficial concessions could demobilize the West, buying time and preparing the ground for a strategy of offensive detente. But the articulation of the correlation of forces theory by Khrushchev and Brezhnev clearly signalled their intentions from the outset of their detente diplomacy. There is nothing analogous to the correlation of forces theory in Gorbachev's strategic arguments. On the contrary, he insists that this kind of one-way approach to security constitutes a "world of illusions."35

f. It is worth speculating that the Gorbachev view includes an attempt to revise the Soviet "conventional strategy" in Europe by restructuring Pact forces to defensive postures and to a defensive doctrine, thereby defusing the West's perception of objective aggressiveness. The current Soviet conventional strategy dates from about 1967. The Soviet Exercise Dnieper, 24 September to 1 October 1967, "in essence . . . set the tone for future exercises"—reflecting the notion that war in Europe would be fought with conventional arms after a "long march" and that airborne forces would be used to paralyze and confuse the enemy's logistics system.36 The idea, the driving rationale, was that the Soviets should be prepared to go to war if necessary without provoking the destruction of the Soviet Union.

g. If the Soviets wish to move away from their offensive and expensive doctrine and force structure, it seems sensible that they would prefer to do so while NATO reduces and redeploy some of its own forces, thus reinforcing those Soviets who advocate the change, and confirming that the defensive orientation would not risk Soviet security. Whether this Soviet approach will prove evident in negotiations or whether any other approach comes to the fore, it remains for NATO to see to its own interests; to know what it wants of the Pact; and what it would be willing to give up to get what it wants.

8. **NATO Objectives for Conventional Arms Talks:** NATO's broad arms control objectives are clear, but the changes needed to achieve them are not.

a. NATO's aim in pending conventional arms negotiations is stability, which means an absence of incentives for war as these incentives may be manifest in military capability. Or, as John Borawski defines it, "conventional stability, like nuclear stability, means a situation in which neither side has to fear that the other is able to take it by surprise and to launch a large scale offensive."37

b. NATO announced its objectives in its Brussels Declaration of December 12, 1986.38 These objectives were to:
- establish stable and secure levels of forces, a key to which is the elimination of disparities;

- negotiate in a step-by-step process so that security is undiminished at each step;

- eliminate the Pact capability for surprise attack, or force the Pact to mobilize visibly to initiate any large-scale offensive;

- expand and improve measures to build confidence, openness, and calculability about military behavior;

- negotiate measures that apply to the whole of Europe, but in a way which addresses regional imbalances and prevents circumvention; and

- establish effective verification with detailed exchanges of information and on-site inspections which insure compliance with agreements and guarantee that limitations on forces are not exceeded.

c. In his 1988 National Security Strategy document, President Reagan echoed the NATO ministers' objectives and added an American idiom to our approach to conventional arms talks.

We seek alliance-to-alliance negotiations to establish a more secure and stable balance in conventional forces at lower levels from the Atlantic to the Urals. Any steps ultimately taken in this area must be effectively verifiable and must recognize the geographic and force asymmetries between the two sides. Alliance policy in this regard, which we fully support, is quite clear--increased security and stability, not reductions per se, are the objectives of Western conventional arms control efforts. Given the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority in certain key areas . . . even modest reductions in NATO forces, in the absence of larger reductions from the Warsaw Pact, would reduce NATO's security and would not promote stability. The challenge is to synchronize NATO's force improvement plans and conventional arms control efforts toward the long-term goals of increased security and stability.39

d. NATO must devise control and reduction proposals to achieve its objectives while not giving up military capabilities that would have the net result of reducing its own military strength or sundering its political cohesion. What the Pact might want in the form of NATO reductions to satisfy NATO objectives may not be what NATO is willing to give up, even to achieve better conventional stability. Phillip Karber suggests these principles for NATO:
focus on militarily significant issues—the process of negotiation is not more important than the product;

focus on stability—what kind of reductions, and where, would reduce the danger of preemptive incentives in a crisis?

focus on asymmetry in offensive, conventional weaponry (MBFR proved that manpower—troops is the wrong focus); and

start with U.S. and Soviet forces which, reduced at an equal rate, would have the Soviets reducing five times more than the United States.40

e. Senator Nunn recently suggested a negotiated withdrawal of about half of the U.S. and Soviet ground forces in the NATO Guidelines Area (Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) that would include:

withdrawal of complete combat units, "including the appropriate slice of helicopter aviation assets."41 Removing entire units simplifies verification, as opposed to reducing tanks or manpower;

withdrawal of forces to beyond the Atlantic to Urals region. A unit withdrawn would be monitored at its new location and the site from which it moved would also be monitored;

withdrawal of equipment to distances that would equalize reinforcement times. "With US troops returned to CONUS, even if their equipment remains prepositioned...in Europe, we are looking at 10 days to two weeks for their return—at best;"42

establishment of an intrusive verification regime to verify that withdrawn units have not been returned, and to provide early warning of Soviet mobilization.

f. If the Soviets should agree to proposals of this nature, the consequences could support NATO objectives, but other consequences could be ironic for both East and West. Withdrawal of substantial numbers of Soviet units from East Europe could affect the East European and Soviet governments in terms of how they might permit "internal reforms and greater cooperation with the West."43 In other words, the Soviets will have to worry about reform getting out of hand at a time when their occupation force has been considerably reduced. Political considerations also apply to the credibility of the U.S. commitment to NATO Europe. The United States must ask what it wants to see in Europe in the 21st century.44

g. Of the several NATO objectives, the one most clearly the centerpiece for military planning and analysis is to eliminate the Pact capability for surprise attack or to make the Pact mobilize visibly. To this end, military advice and judgment will be essential to possible agreements of value to NATO.
9. Military Standards for Arms Control Agreements: Military criteria, judgment, and analysis should be the primary arbiters of the military value of mutual arms control and reduction agreements.

a. Any conventional force reductions agreement should meet military standards for a confident defense in a manner that supports national policy. The defense ministries of the member countries of NATO must put forward criteria and conditions to be satisfied before agreements are signed. Potential treaties must be analyzed by the military to uncover those effects not immediately visible as well as to assess the consequences of change through treaties for each country's national military mission. The United States most obviously has worldwide interests and commitments and the capacity of our armed forces to carry out the national strategy outside Europe must be studied for sensitivity to arms agreements.

b. Military standards must be realistic and qualified. Realistic standards are those not impossible for negotiators to meet, other things equal, and are those which are not mutually contradictory. Qualified standards are those subject to political decisions such as force modernization or infrastructure changes for the post-agreement situation. An agreement that gains much for NATO's balance in terms of Pact reductions in exchange for redeploying aircraft to the United States, for example, depends for its military worth on NATO commitments to provide sufficient airfields and aircraft shelters for rapid redeployment and support of the aircraft. In effect, almost any provision of a potential agreement is subject to qualified advice because the military value depends not only on the elimination of threatening resources but also on the post-agreement changes necessary to adjust to the new situation, changes which may only be possible with political action.

c. The following general military criteria may be expected in NATO circles going into the conventional stability talks:

- Data on forces must be exchanged before we sign a treaty;
- Verification is the sine qua non of any treaty;
- NATO units withdrawn from current locations must be retained in the force structure;
- Force modernization must not be affected by a treaty;
- Nuclear, naval, and chemical forces should be excluded from conventional arms negotiations;
- Units of account should be weapons in units;
- Parity is the goal of reductions; until parity is achieved, reductions must be asymmetrical.

d. Generally, military advice and judgment must focus on estimates of how well the territory of NATO would be defended in war, before and after arms agreements. The final arbiters of the value of possible agreements are the elected political leaders of NATO and the people of NATO countries.
10. Support of Governments and Publics: The support of governments and publics is necessary to ratify a treaty, carry out its provisions, and adjust to the new military situation created by the terms of the treaty.

a. Although ratification and implementation are obvious needs, support for adjustments, as noted in the previous section, is not. One example of an adjustment to be expected if agreement is reached to reduce conventional arms in Europe is that our European allies would be very reluctant to agree to the removal of U.S. forces from Germany unless they are assured that the removed forces will remain as an active strategic reserve for NATO contingencies, at least for some unspecified time. Clearly, this is ultimately a political decision and one that must be made before a treaty is signed.

b. Discussions of public support tend to lapse into platitudes about public education and counterpropaganda campaigns. A more sensible meaning of public education is to provide NATO publics with information so that they can understand the stakes and issues in conventional arms control. Judging by the public debate through most of 1987 about the INF treaty, education will be extremely difficult. It is part of the character of the West to be contentious in public about national and international issues. We can, however, identify a few specific areas of public doubt and division pertinent to conventional arms reductions.

- A growing nuclear "allergy" in the West. West Germany is particularly affected. Many Germans seem to favor negotiations on short-range nuclear arms and question the need to modernize them.

- Changing public attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union. This may be transitory, in the wake of Mr. Gorbachev's public relations offensive, but it suggests the value of initiative. Germans who believed the Soviet Union was a threat five years ago compared to last year went from 55 to 24 percent. The Soviets receive the most credit from Europeans for recent progress in arms control. Other polls show growing skepticism in Europe about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee.

- Budget realities. Governments and publics may expect short-term savings in defense spending after an arms reduction agreement, but there is as yet no evidence for this. Initial costs to carry out negotiated changes probably will be high, as will the continuing costs of verification. Substantial reductions should mean savings in the long run, of course, but this is a benefit which may be very difficult to communicate to governments and publics.
Summary of the Arms Control Challenge.

a. Arms control is a political process; it deals with the distribution of power and it affects the general welfare. Politics, Aristotle said, is the highest art because it includes everything else; each proposition advanced in this chapter raises political challenges and obligations.

b. Arms control can supplement defense in achieving national security. Although they involve dealing with politically hostile nations, arms control treaties do not change ideologies or necessarily reduce hostility. If treaties reduce confrontation and improve predictability, they support diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions.

c. Nuclear and conventional arms controls affect each other. They interact not only in how they affect the distribution of military options but also, and often more dramatically, in how their interaction affects the perceptions of national leaders concerned with their countries' security.

d. Conventional arms control is more complicated than nuclear arms control. The military resources at issue in conventional talks are complex components of military capability. But the character of conventional negotiations is that they are coalition undertakings, with many nations' political and economic institutions involved in and affected by the results.

e. Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks provide lessons, not precedents. NATO and the Warsaw Pact disagreed about the fundamental issues of exchanging data on military forces and necessary measures of verification. Still, the MBFR talks are the only example in the nuclear age of many nations in two alliances negotiating with and among each other about the reduction of conventional forces, a process that is, by definition, political.

f. NATO strategy is likely to be the NATO perspective for judging conventional arms control. Both the retention of the strategy's main elements and the modification of those elements stemming from arms agreements bear directly on the principle of political control. Nuclear weapons are and will remain a critical component of NATO's deterrent, and their possible use depends on decisions of political authorities.

g. Soviet intentions are unclear but fundamentally political. The possibility that Soviet objectives may be served by reducing Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, thereby possibly improving the stability of the military balance in Europe sought by NATO, is no guarantee that NATO will remain politically cohesive. NATO ministers and parliamentarians must think beyond the immediate effects of arms treaties to the kind and quality of Alliance they want in the next century.

h. Military criteria and judgment are essential elements of conventional arms control negotiations. Strategy joins political and military considerations. Beyond the details of military hardware and tactics, military advice is always subject to political decisions because it is subject to the availability of national resources. Where strategic goals
and security risks depend on calculable warfighting outcomes, unvarnished military advice should be the essential consideration.

1. **Support from governments and publics is needed to make arms control worthwhile.** Military advisors and arms control negotiators can propose; political leaders must dispose in an atmosphere of an aware and alert public which, in a democracy, is the final arbiter of the value of all political processes. Conventional arms control is a legitimate force for improving national security when it supports, but does not replace, diplomacy and defense.
CHAPTER 2

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. President Ronald W. Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House: January 1988, p. 15 (Hereafter, NSS-88); and U.S Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Army Perspectives, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1987, (SECRET). The latter is a study of conventional arms control issues and problems from a strategic perspective. This chapter draws extensively on unclassified portions of the Army study. (Of course, the idea that hostility is the problem and that arms are a symptom of hostility must also yield the logical inference that if arms are reduced, hostility may also be diminished in intensity, at least in the sense that hostility is a product of one’s perception of another’s arms.)


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


7. NSS-88, p. 16.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., also see p. 18.


(printed and distributed by U.S. Department of State).

13. Denuclearization is a Soviet intention rather clearly inferred from
Soviet words and behavior dating back at least to the "Rapacki Plan" to make
Europe a nuclear-free zone. The Soviets have tried to include British and
French nuclear forces in reductions in the SALT talks; they have, of course,
worked to eliminate INF; and now, in light of the pending Atlantic to Urals
talks, they have said that they would like to reduce battlefield nuclear
weapons and nuclear-armed aircraft in Europe. References to denucleari-
zation are in Paul Lewis, "The Soviet Missile Strategy Makes the French
Nervous," The New York Times, May 24, 1987, p. 3E; and James M. Markham,
"Soviet Bloc Seeks Battlefield Nuclear Arms Talks," The New York Times,

Experts," The New York Times, April 24, 1987, p. 1, mention is made of the
"psychology" of denuclearization which refers not to the actual absence of
nuclear weapons but to the perceptions of European NATO countries if and
when the Alliance's nuclear arms might be so much reduced as to make them
inconsequential for deterring conventional war.

15. Alexander George and Richard Smoke showed the difference among
strategic nuclear, theater, and other deterrence problems in their
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, New York: Columbia University Press,
1974, especially the chart on pp. 52-53.

16. Jonathan Dean, "East-West Arms Control Negotiations: The


Atlantic Treaty Association, August 1974, p. 11.

19. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Security and
Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace, Washington, DC:
September 1984, recounts MBFR proceedings, pp. 44-57.


Moves for Stability," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1987,

23. NSS-88, p. 18.


27. Ibid., p. 324.


30. Ibid.


33. Ibid.


35. Ibid., p. 120.

37. Borawski, p. 20.


39. NSS-88, p. 17.


42. Ibid.

43. Borawski, p. 27.

44. Ibid.

45. See Nunn, *Remarks to Wehrkunde Conference*.

46. Ibid., p. 3.


CHAPTER 3
THE BACKGROUND OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

1. Introduction.

a. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks that began in 1973 are the only history we have of NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations to reduce conventional forces. Although MBFR has not produced a treaty, we have learned from it and it has supported our efforts in other arms control negotiations. MBFR remains in effect as a forum until it might be superseded by the Conventional Stability Talks (CST) which are to deal with forces from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU). Activity in MBFR may stop, but the forum may remain as a fall-back option for the two alliances if the CST fail to receive a mandate or reach an impasse.

b. This chapter contains a summary of the interim and latest results of MBFR talks in the context of other significant events and simultaneous negotiations, and a summary of lessons from MBFR with possible relevance to the coming CST negotiations. The countries and conferences and their relationships in CAC are depicted in Appendix B, figure B-3.

2. Brief Descriptions of Negotiations.

a. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) convened at Helsinki in July 1973.1 Except for Albania, the talks include all European countries, the United States, and Canada—35 nations. CSCE began primarily as political negotiations about unresolved political issues since WW II. Its agenda developed into four areas, called “baskets”: Basket I covers interstate behavior, human rights, and the use of force. Basket II addresses cooperation in economics, technology, and commerce. Basket III applies to humanitarian practices and to the flow of information, ideas, and people. Basket IV provides for the continuation of the CSCE at follow-up meetings and conferences which are held in one or another major city in the member states.2

b. The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) was established within the CSCE at the latter’s Madrid meeting, November 11, 1980—September 9, 1983. CDE began at Stockholm on January 17, 1984, to negotiate militarily significant, politically-binding, verifiable confidence- and security-building measures for the whole of Europe, including the European portion of the Soviet Union.3 Participants are the same 35 nations as in CSCE. The CDE forum has not been used to negotiate force reductions; its purpose is to place restrictions on the activities of military forces.4

c. MBFR is a NATO title meaning Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. The complete title is Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe. Talks began in Vienna on October 30, 1973, after preliminary discussions about terms of reference which began on January 31, 1973. The forum was a NATO initiative and the purpose of the talks is to reduce Eastern and Western military manpower in Central Europe to equal but significantly lower levels. Participants include only the
members of NATO (less France) and the Warsaw Pact. The talks cover the region that NATO calls the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) which is made up of Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.5

d. Conventional Stability Talks (CST) in the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) region have not yet begun, although preliminary negotiations are in progress to develop a mandate. Participants and agenda have not been decided, but expectations are that the talks will include all NATO countries, including France, and all Warsaw Pact countries.

3. Evolution of MBFR.

a. The first postwar proposals to reduce forces in Europe began as NATO efforts to bring the FRG into the Alliance near completion. The Soviet Union proposed a conference on security in Europe at a Foreign Ministers' meeting of the Four Great Powers in Berlin on February 10, 1954. The Soviets called for the withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany and a 50-year treaty on collective security in Europe. The West rejected this proposal which did not provide for U.S. participation. The Soviets presented other draft treaties in 1955, 1957, and 1959, but NATO found them unacceptable.6

b. The Soviets renewed their call for a conference in the late 1960s and, in June 1968, NATO spokesmen said they were ready to discuss force reductions. Two months later, the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia, interrupting the process leading to negotiations. The Pact proposed again from Budapest on March 17, 1969, a conference to "strengthen political, economic, and cultural links."7 On May 5, 1969, the Finnish government offered Helsinki as the conference site for what was to become the CSCE. NATO responded favorably to the Pact on December 5, 1969, but insisted on progress in German relations (FRG Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik) with the East and on Berlin-related issues as prerequisites. The FRG and the USSR signed a treaty on August 12, 1970, in which they agreed to regard the frontiers of all states as "inviolable." On December 7, 1970, the FRG signed a treaty with Poland to give up any claim to territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. On December 21, 1971, the two Germanies signed an "inviolable" borders treaty, concluding territorial issues that delayed the start of the CSCE.8

c. MBFR also had its genesis in ideas expressed as early as the 1950s, but it was not until the NATO Ministers' report (known as the "Harmel" Report) in December 1967 on the Future Tasks of the Alliance that the process began to move toward a conference with the East. The report recommended that NATO should try to arrange a forum for mutual arms reductions. In 1968 NATO ministers formally proposed force reduction talks with the East.9 Although the Pact showed no enthusiasm for MBFR, the United States and its allies in NATO would not agree to the CSCE until and unless the East agreed to meet in the MBFR forum.
d. Indeed, various coincident pressures and events moved both sides to MBFR in addition to the quid pro quo for the CSCE. First, Senator Mansfield introduced legislation in 1966 designed to bring about substantial U.S. troop reductions in Europe; his efforts continued to 1975, two years into the MBFR talks. The Mansfield Amendments, as they were called, were clear incentives for NATO-Europe to negotiate for mutual reductions and, at the same time, to use the potential of MBFR to ward off unilateral cuts by the United States.

e. Second, NATO developed new strategic guidance at the end of 1967. Flexible Response, compared to the replaced guidance, demanded that NATO countries improve their collective conventional defenses. Conventional forces would no longer be a limited defense against large-scale conventional aggression, a "trip-wire" to set off NATO nuclear use. The new strategy set as the objective for conventional forces the capability to stop and repel limited conventional attacks, and to sustain a conventional defense in the forward areas of NATO territory against large-scale conventional aggression. In the face of the formidable task of meeting this objective for conventional forces, mutual arms reductions were attractive possibilities.

f. Third, America's extra-NATO interests and commitments were an issue that waxed and waned (contemporarily manifested in Vietnam), an issue that implied that U.S. forces currently in Europe might be put to use elsewhere. America's interests, and its strategy to safeguard those interests, exceeded its military resources. This point was in fact one of the elements of Senator Mansfield's reasoning. (Incidentally, the extra-NATO issue became stressful for NATO as soon as MBFR began, during the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973. Some of our European allies denied us overflight rights and were generally uncooperative about redeployments of U.S. troops and materiel.)

g. Finally, the SALT I treaty was negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union from October 1969 to the signing in Moscow on May 26, 1972. President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev also endorsed the goal of force reductions in Europe, clearing the way for MBFR and CSCE to begin.

h. In summary, the MBFR talks that began in Vienna on October 30, 1973, were, with some exceptions, proposals and counterproposals to reduce the numbers of troops on both sides to an equal level. The exceptions were NATO's attempts to break a negotiating impasse in 1975 and 1976 by proposing reductions in some nuclear forces. The talks foundered on disagreements about providing information on forces and about verification measures. Where initial proposals would have required reducing close to 100,000 troops on each side, the latest proposals in 1985 were for the reduction of 11,500 Pact forces for about half as many NATO troops. (Table I shows areas of disagreement in early talks and into the 1980s.)
1. Early Positions (1973-74)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>WARSAW PACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FORM OF AGREEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial reductions should be</td>
<td>Initial reductions should include</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>made by the two superpowers.</td>
<td>national and foreign troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR AND GROUND FORCES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reductions should be confined</td>
<td>Reductions should include ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to ground forces.</td>
<td>and air forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMAMENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reductions should be limited</td>
<td>Reductions should include conven-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to conventional arms.</td>
<td>tional and nuclear arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BALANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Warsaw Pact should make</td>
<td>There is no existing imbalance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bigger cuts because of the</td>
<td>and therefore both sides should</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existing military imbalance.</td>
<td>make equal cuts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Later Positions (1980s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>WARSAW PACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FORM OF AGREEMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial agreement with U.S.-</td>
<td>Initial agreement with U.S.-Soviet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet reductions, a no-</td>
<td>reductions, a no-increase commit-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increase (freeze) commitment</td>
<td>ment for 3 years with follow-on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for 3 years.</td>
<td>reductions to be negotiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At end of freeze period, West</td>
<td>Equal alliance ceilings of 700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reassesses satisfaction with</td>
<td>ground forces and 200,000 air forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance and decides whether</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to proceed with further nego-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tiated reductions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. NATO and Warsaw Pact Positions in MBFR.
CONSTRAINTS

No exercise limitations are acceptable. Limits on exercises in an area to 40,000 to 50,000 men.

ARMAMENTS

Each side should determine the disposition of armaments of withdrawn forces. Withdrawing units take organic armaments with them.

SIZE OF INITIAL REDUCTIONS

5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet ground forces. 6,500 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet ground forces.

CEILINGS

Subceilings on U.S.-Soviet ground force personnel only; no national ceilings but collective freeze on force size. National subceilings on ground force personnel.

AIR FORCES

No limit on air forces but, within the 900,000 overall ceiling, air forces over 200,000 would come at the expense of ground forces. Limited to 200,000 troops in whole alliance.

EXCEPTIONS

Residual ceilings may be temporarily exceeded to cover rotation, training and exercises. No exceeding of residual limits would be allowed.

Table 1. NATO and Warsaw Pact Positions in MBFR (continued).
3. Later Positions on Associated Measures.

**NATO**

**WARSAW PACT**

**EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION**

- Detailed exchange of information on forces being withdrawn and annual exchange on residual forces at a battalion level of disaggregation.
- Detailed exchange of information on forces being withdrawn and annual exchange on residual forces; detailed disaggregation not required.

**NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM)**

- Noninterference with NTM of verification.
- Noninterference with NTM of verification.

**CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION**

- Permanent commission for all participants.
- Joint commission for direct participants only; meets at regular intervals.

**INSPECTION**

- 30 annual, mandatory on-demand inspections conducted from ground or air, or both.
- Inspection on request; other side has right of refusal.

**OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES**

- Advance notification of division-size, out-of-garrison activities in wider area of application than other provisions.
- Advance notification of military exercises; firmly opposed to any extension of the notification area.

**OBSERVERS**

- Mandatory invitation for observers to attend notified activities.
- No provisions for observers.

Table 1. NATO and Warsaw Pact Positions in MBFR (continued).
MOVEMENTS

Advance notification of movements into the MBFR area.

Prenotification of movements into, within and out of the MBFR area.

EXIT AND ENTRY POINTS

Permanent troop entry and exit points to observe all nonindigenous troop withdrawals and movements into and out of the MBFR area.

Permanent troop exit and entry points to observe unit movements into and out of the MBFR area.


Table 1. NATO and Warsaw Pact Positions in MBFR (concluded).

1. During the course of the MBFR talks, these events influenced their pace and content:

-SALT II negotiations began immediately after the signing of SALT I in 1972 and continued until June 1979 with the signing of a treaty.15

-The Soviets began to deploy SS-20 intermediate-range missiles and Backfire bombers in 1977. NATO then stopped offering to include nuclear weapons in its MBFR proposals and in 1979 formulated its dual-track Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) decision to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe while being willing to negotiate with the Soviets to reduce INF.

-INF negotiations began in October 1980 and resulted in a treaty signed on December 8, 1987 designed to eliminate INF worldwide.

j. The information-exchange and verification issues were never resolved. Near the end of active negotiations in 1985-86, when the West proposed to reduce 5,000 U.S. troops for 11,500 Soviet troops in Europe, the proposal included verification measures that would include yearly exchanges of detailed information on units down to battalion level, 30 annual on-site inspections, and permanent exit-entry points for the reductions zone. The East reacted with statements that seemed to hold promise for a reasonable verification regime, but the Pact's draft agreement of February 1986 showed no signs of change from the Pact's refusal to open its territory to inspection and monitoring.16
k. The wisdom of retrospect is that the Soviets and their allies probably did not intend to reach an agreement in MBFR. They were maneuvered into the talks by the West in exchange for the CSCE that the Soviets wanted (but which was shaped substantially by the West), and they may have believed that NATO was acting out a process to avoid U.S. troop withdrawals. The Soviets tried to use the talks to establish the belief that numerical and geographical disparities did not exist between the two alliances. Jonathan Dean, once the U.S. negotiator at the MBFR, said later that the USSR "showed the low priority it assigned to MBFR when it pushed for a follow-on conference [of the CSCE] on European security despite its knowledge that this rival conference, which ultimately took the form of the Stockholm CDE, would undermine the authority of the MBFR forum."17

4. CDE.

a. The CDE was established in 1983, but the French had proposed such a conference as early as 1978.18 The forum was to have two stages, the first to build trust among the countries of Europe through measures to provide information about armed forces and notification of their activities, and the second to reduce weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals. These two stages have taken the form of the CDE conference that produced an agreement on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that was signed in September 1986,19 and the forthcoming CST negotiations. The CDE remains an active forum for the possible expansion of the CSBMs.

b. NATO had three objectives for the CDE: (1) to reduce the risk of surprise attack, (2) to diminish the threat of armed conflict in Europe resulting from misunderstanding and miscalculation, and (3) to inhibit the use of force for political intimidation.

c. The September 1986 treaty moved the parties toward these objectives. The parties agreed on (1) prior notification of certain military activities, (2) mandatory observations of certain military activities, (3) the exchange of annual calendars of planned military activities, (4) constraining provisions such as 15 months prior notification about activities involving 75,000 or more troops, and (5) inspections for compliance and verification.20 The agreement was a modest advance. But the treaty was significant because the Pact agreed to a degree of intrusive monitoring and inspection that it had avoided in past negotiations.

5. CST.

a. Although the roots of the pending Conventional Stability Talks are in MBFR and CDE, they began to take form with an exchange of announcements between East and West in 1986. In April 1986, Gorbachev proposed substantial reductions in all components of the land and air forces of the European states and of the U.S. and Canadian forces in Europe. He included tactical nuclear weapons in the proposal and specified that the area to be covered should be from the Atlantic to the Urals.21

b. NATO answered with its Brussels Declaration of December 11, 1986, agreeing that the area should be the ATTU and the negotiations should aim to
establish a verifiable, comprehensive, and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. The NATO declaration also called for continued negotiations in the CDE to build on the treaty of September 1986.22

c. NATO currently is negotiating among its own members about the terms of the CST and its representatives are talking with the Pact's about a mandate. The CST seems likely to include 16 NATO states and 7 Pact members. The neutral and nonaligned states of Europe may not be direct participants but probably will be kept informed and perhaps consulted.23 (The neutral and nonaligned states will continue as participants in the CDE.)

d. Premature comments about CST are unwarranted here, but we should note a few of the significant differences between MBFR and what is shaping up as the CST:

- The CDE confidence- and security-building measures suggest greater Soviet openness to verification, a major, unresolved issue in MBFR;

- The INF Treaty of December 1987 also may have inspection and monitoring precedents useful for possible agreements in the CST;

- The French will participate in the CST;

- Gorbachev seems, so far, to add a new element to Soviet thinking and possibly to Soviet negotiating approaches. It remains to be seen if his activism will outlast President Reagan's term in office.

6. Lessons. Although the JCCE and CDE provide context, and CDE produced related arms control measures, MBFR is the logical source of possible lessons for arms control negotiations on conventional arms. The following observations might have value for the forthcoming CST.

a. MBFR's primary focus on troops rather than on units, equipment, and weapons only added to the data and verification issues separating the alliances.

b. Late in MBFR, the Pact recognized disparities between U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe, and its proposals reflected acceptance of the principle of parity. However, this Pact recognition did not extend to the forces of the two alliances as a whole. The Pact has never admitted to having overall net advantages.

c. Both sides recognized the importance of the two superpower members and accorded their forces first priority in force reduction proposals.

d. When nuclear and conventional talks were simultaneous, the nuclear talks had priority on both sides.

e. Persuasive evidence is not available to support a conclusion that either side was sufficiently motivated to accomplish tangible results in MBFR. NATO lacked consensus on key issues. Reductions in the GGA were not likely to improve NATO's security because the depth of the Eastern GGA
allowed nearby stationing of removed Pact troops. And, the Pact was intractable on key issues.

f. MBFR talks lacked continuity in negotiators and in top political authorities. The United States had six different delegation heads in the first 12 years; the Soviets had three. Each new administration in the democratic countries brought a wholesale turnover of key people involved with MBFR. About 200-300 NATO officials had to approve each important move in negotiations. Eastern negotiators were even less flexible than NATO's.

g. MBFR produced positive results even if it did not produce a treaty:

- It continued and sustained the NATO consensus that arms control negotiations are a necessary component of Alliance defense strategy.

- The talks contributed to a developing East-West dialogue and mutual understanding of some key military issues.

- When the Soviets walked out of INF talks in November 1983, the MBFR forum gave both sides an opportunity to show their continued interest in improving relations through arms control. MBFR also helped offset European pressures on the United States to make concessions in START and INF as a way to get the Soviets back to the bargaining table.

- MBFR gave NATO's European members direct participation in arms control, and in that way played a complementary role in East-West relations in nuclear and space negotiations.

- As a continuing, active negotiation, MBFR was important for maintaining public support for conventional defense spending.
CHAPTER 3

ENDNOTES


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 29.


17. Quoted by Darilek, p. 6.

19. Ibid., p. 643.

20. SSI, pp. 6-7.


22. Ibid.


CHAPTER 4

ISSUES IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

1. Introduction.

a. In attempting to understand conventional arms control, a number of issues emerge for discussion and debate. These issues comprise two types: those which might be called "strategic" and those which might be called "operational." Strategic issues generally involve the role which conventional arms control can and should play in the strategies of the two blocs. Strategic issues are important to assess because they enable us to gain insight into the overall willingness of our adversary to do what we want him to, the price we might be willing to offer to persuade him to do what we want him to, and the consequences of the success or failure of the negotiations for the future course of the strategic competition.

b. Operational issues generally deal with the mechanics of arms control. They concern what should be controlled, how it will be controlled, and the regime to monitor the agreement and prevent its circumvention. It is clear, of course, that these two types of issues overlap because one's position on strategy will often play a controlling role in deciding one's position on the final form which an agreement will take. Nonetheless, the distinction holds up well enough for analytical purposes.

c. This chapter will discuss both strategic and operational issues associated with conventional arms control. The strategic discussion will serve the purpose of introducing some of the problems which NATO faces in deterring war and coercion in Europe in the wake of the INF treaty, the role which conventional arms control can play in ameliorating those problems, and the kinds of trades which the West might be able to offer in exchange for conventional parity in the Atlantic to the Urals region. The discussion of operational issues will serve to illustrate the complexities inherent in attempting to obtain effective arms control as well as to introduce theoretical variables defining any arms control agreement. These variables will be encountered again in the discussion of proposals in Chapter 5. At the end of this chapter we will also briefly discuss other issues which, though obvious in most cases, may impact on mandate development and future negotiations. The study team will take a firm position on all issues presented.

2. Issue 1: East-West Mandate.

a. Description.

Should the United States agree to negotiate conventional arms control in the CSCE/CDE forum, an expanded MBFR, or a new forum? At one extreme the CSCE includes the Neutral and Nonaligned Nations (NNA) and at the other is a direct alliance negotiation without the NNA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSCE/CDE</th>
<th>MBFR Plus</th>
<th>New Forum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

35
b. Discussion.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its arms control creation, the CDE, have been discussed in Chapter 3. CSCE's primary purpose is to address nonmilitary issues such as human rights, information flow, technology, and trade. CDE's purpose has been confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). CSCE/CDE consist of the 16 NATO members, the 7 Warsaw Pact members, and 12 NNA members (in sum, the United States, Canada, and all European countries except Albania). The NNA are:

- Austria  
- Cyprus  
- Finland  
- Ireland  
- Lichtenstein  
- Malta  
- Monaco  
- Sweden  
- Switzerland  
- The Vatican  
- San Marino  
- Yugoslavia

With the exception of Yugoslavia, the NNA obviously are not major military powers. But they have a deep security interest in NATO-WP confrontation and competition in Europe. The principal argument for including negotiations in the CSCE/CDE is that outcomes of CAC could have significant impact on the NNA.

Arguments for a forum that includes the NNA in the CSCE/CDE are:

- Most are pro-West (culture, tourism, etc.).
- Few are directly influenced by the WP.
- Many have had bad experiences with the USSR since WW II.
- Yugoslavia is seeking closer ties to the West.
- Most perceive the USSR as a threat.

Arguments against negotiating in CSCE/CDE are:

- NNA are not militarily relevant to the threat facing the West.
- NNA input is not germane to military issues.
- NATO might lose control.
- An Alliance/NNA forum is too large; too much delay for all to be heard.
- NNA do not have nuclear weapons; may desire denuclearization.

An expanded MBFR is another choice open to East and West. The expansion refers to geographical scope and to membership. The scope could be ATTU and France could join. Arguments for this MBFR-Plus forum are:
- It is essentially already established.
- It excludes the NNA, which could still be consulted.
- MBFR was a Western creation.

Arguments against the MBFR-Plus are:

- The East would lose face if it changed positions it took to block progress in the past in MBFR.
- It would have to build on a history of failure.
- It would confuse and complicate negotiating mandate issues.

A third choice, a new forum that includes only the two alliances, could have possible links to the NNA through the continuing CDE discussions of CSBMs. Arguments in favor are:

- A fresh start; allows both sides to save face on positions taken in the past that they would rather forget or change.
- It allows concentration on force reductions and associated measures.
- It provides the Soviets and the French a forum they seem to favor over MBFR.

Arguments against are:

- The Soviets will claim credit for the idea.
- It may alienate NNA sympathetic to NATO.
- In the context of MBFR, CDE, and CSCE, it may confuse Western publics, especially if on some issues the West seems intransigent because those issues belong in another forum.

A new forum, perhaps entitled "Conference on Conventional Stability" (CCS), can be offered as a compromise. A forum could be established which includes representatives of the three groups--NATO, WP and NNA--but does not consist of "full house" participation. Proposals presented by the West, for example, would be discussed by selected representatives; removed from the forum for separate consultations and position determination within each group; and returned with the consensus position or counterproposals during the course of the conference. Only the eventual agreement between alliances would be binding, but the inclusion of the NNA in the political process will be beneficial to overall successful conclusion. Within the NNA capitals, a political sense of importance in the process could have a positive, significant impact on the final agreement.
c. Positions of Relevant Actors on This Issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSCE/CDE</th>
<th>MAFR Plus</th>
<th>New Forum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NNA</td>
<td>U.S.*</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*U.S. in this chapter refers to the incumbent Administration.

France wants CAC negotiations in the CSCE for two reasons. First, since France is not a member of NATO's military command structure, more autonomy from NATO would be provided in CSCE. Second, France would have substantial influence with the NNA. The United States and UK favor a new, 23-nation forum for the reasons outlined in the previous discussion, but both nations recognize the need for consultative links with the NNA. The Soviets may want a CSCE forum because they proposed the ATTU area specifically to allow participation of all Europeans in what the Soviets consider a European-only issue. The NNA want, obviously, to participate.

d. Study Team Position.

We believe that a new forum (as described above) with specific rules of engagement on selection and participation of NATO, WP and the NNA is the right solution, and very similar to the U.S./UK position of consultative links. Mandate talks are in session today. This is why we have selected this as the first issue. Let the NNA have a say in what happens in Europe. Build up their importance in the political process of negotiation, but do not let them fog the issues between the alliances.

3. Issue 2: The INF Treaty and Strategic Coupling.

a. Description.

Has the INF Treaty resulted in significant decoupling of the United States from its NATO allies? At one extreme is the view that the INF Treaty has thoroughly decoupled the Alliance and that the damage is irreparable. At the other extreme is the view that the INF Treaty has resulted in no significant damage to the coupling of the alliance. Between these positions is the view that the INF Treaty has done damage to coupling but that this damage is repairable. These positions are shown in the diagram.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Massive Damage</th>
<th>Some Damage/Repairable</th>
<th>No Damage</th>
<th>Repairable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

38
b. Discussion.

The view that the INF Treaty has done major and irreparable damage to coupling is based on the unique nature of the systems affected by it, especially the Pershing II (PII). It is argued that these missiles, targeted on the Soviet Union itself and based in the path of a Pact invasion of the FRG, placed a level of pressure on the NATO leadership to escalate, which is essential in a strategic environment in which the United States has lost escalation dominance at the strategic and theater nuclear levels. Furthermore, no other system can recapture the pressure provided by the PII.

The position that the INF Treaty has resulted in no damage to coupling is based on the view that these forces represented only a small portion of the total NATO nuclear force, including long-range dual-capable aircraft and the 400 Poseidon warheads allocated to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Thus, this position argues that there will still be plenty of American nuclear weaponry in Europe even after the removal of the Pershing IIs (PII) and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM).

The middle position is based on the view that coupling can be continued with remaining and new weapons deployments to cover the targets covered by PII and GLCM, although, admittedly, the confidence of West Europeans in coupling may be less following the INF Treaty. The likelihood that these replacement systems will actually be used will be less than that of the PII because of the absence of pressure. But the likelihood of crises escalating out of control also will be less.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Massive Damage</th>
<th>Some Damage/Repairable</th>
<th>No Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRG (Mil)</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>FRG (Pol)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-----Key Congressmen-----

The position of the U.S. Administration, including the JCS, SECDEF and SACEUR, is that there is little or no damage to repair. The elimination of an entire nuclear weapons class, as asymmetrical as INF was, helps, not damages, NATO's ability to deter and defend. Senator Nunn spoke favorably of the INF accord at Wehrkunde, but he warned of the "slippery slope" we might be on en route to a demuclearized Europe and the need, therefore, to improve NATO's conventional option. Senator Quayle feels we should have negotiated CACE first. The FRG has a political and a military position. Politically, the FRG has wholeheartedly supported nuclear reductions and wants to consider reducing Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF), Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA), and Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM) now so that a nuclear battlefield will not be confined to the territory of West Germany. Large segments of the FRG public fully support this view. The FRG military
believe that we have taken a giant step towards decoupling as a result of
the INF Treaty. France supported the INF Treaty politically, but believes
we have made a big move to decouple from NATO, although French lack of
confidence in "coupling" helped to move them to leave the military
organization of the Alliance in 1966. France's current efforts in promoting
the Western European Union and her lack of an arms reduction constituency
tend to confirm her position. The UK privately acknowledges damage but
politically supports the INF treaty; Mrs. Thatcher has insisted that
remaining nuclear weapons and conventional weapons should be modernized.

4. Study Team Position.

The study team position is that the INF treaty has damaged
coupling but that the damage is repairable. Repair could take the form of
the modernization and increase in U.S. nuclear SSls, nuclear-capable
aircraft, and air-launched, stand-off nuclear systems not outlawed by the
INF Treaty. These measures could not fully recapture what the PFI does, but
they are more consistent with long-standing U.S. policy on the release of
nuclear weapons which, in effect, that release will not be predelegated
and, therefore, not be automatic.

4. Issue 3: Strategic Consequences of Successful CAC.

a. Description.

What happens to the U.S.-Soviet conflict of interests in Europe if
Conventional Stability Talks are successful—from NATO's perspective? At
one extreme is the view that the conflict ends; that successful CAC amounts
to a declaration of stalemate. At the other extreme is the view that after
successful CAC the conflict will simply enter a new phase in which it
becomes a contest for the allegiance of the European electorate.

| Stalemate/ Conflict Ends | New Phase of Conflict |

b. Discussion.

Those holding the first view base their position on the assumption
that the Soviet Union is transforming itself, under Gorbachev and glasnost,
into a normal nation-state rather than a revisionist power standing at the
head of a world-wide revolutionary movement. They thus believe that CAC will
be successful and that the Soviets will cooperate to deconstruct the
East-West conflict in Europe.

Those who hold the opposing view believe the Soviets have not abandoned
their goals of revolution and dominance in Europe. Instead they will
replace military competition with political and psychological warfare, the
best supplement to which is an apparently nonthreatening military posture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stalemate/</th>
<th>New Phase</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Ends</td>
<td>of Conflict</td>
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</table>

Publics          Governments

The opinions of some Western publics may be that successful CAC will be the end of serious conflict in Europe. But all governments, East and West, know that if the CST succeed, we will still have a qualitative arms race on our hands, as well as the strong possibility of a new game introduced by the USSR. Moreover, we cannot predict the extent of possible arms reductions agreements, and "successful" has yet to be defined.

d. Study Team Position.

CAC agreements that meet NATO's objectives will not end the U.S./Soviet conflict over Europe. We believe agreements simply transform that conflict from one dominated by military competition to one dominated by political and psychological warfare.


a. Description.

Should NATO continue to maintain a strategy to deter conventional war that relies heavily on nuclear escalation, or should it attempt to shift to greater reliance on conventional defense? The extreme positions on this issue are, on the one hand, to emphasize nuclear escalation with relatively weak conventional forces, or, on the other hand, to emphasize conventional forces with relatively weak nuclear forces. Between these extremes is the view that NATO should maintain moderately strong conventional and nuclear forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Nuclear</th>
<th>Both at</th>
<th>Strong Conventional</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak Conventional</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Weak Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Discussion.

The nuclear emphasis view is based on the premise that any strategy emphasizing conventional forces is doomed to failure. Advocates of this view argue that conventional deterrence requires a capacity to win, and that NATO cannot achieve that capacity. NATO must place its reliance on
nuclear forces and, especially, on either the possession of escalation dominance at the theater and strategic levels or the creation of a situation in which escalation to those levels is made virtually automatic.

Advocates of the conventional emphasis approach argue that to deter, NATO does not have to show that it can win; in any event, to “win” a conventional war is to destroy the NATO countries in which it occurs, an event which is hardly a persuasive deterrent. In addition, they argue that NATO’s loss of escalation dominance can never be reversed and that the INF Treaty and the possibility of a third zero make clear that automatic escalation is impossible. Thus, they argue that there is no alternative to a conventional emphasis approach.

Those advocating moderately strong conventional and nuclear forces base their position on uncertainty. Moderately strong conventional forces (relative to Pact forces) mean that the Soviets could believe that the risks of conventional failure are reasonably high. Moderately strong nuclear forces mean that NATO might decide to escalate. In this view, escalation to nuclear use, although not automatic, is more credible when a conventional attack is met by a stalwart conventional defense rather than a “tripwire” conventional effort that lacks credibility. A conventional defense force in NATO should be large enough to force an enemy to mobilize before a major attack or to doubt the success of a short-warning attack.

c. Positions of the Relevant Actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Nuclear</th>
<th>Both at Moderate</th>
<th>Strong Conventional Weak Nuclear</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak Conventional</td>
<td>Moderate Strength</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NATO (–) U.S. FRG
France
Key Congressmen
UK

NATO will have to choose which of these positions, under flexible response, it prefers with or without CST that reduce forces in Europe. The Soviets are likely to maintain their position of strong nuclear and conventional forces. Until NATO agrees to trade off some nuclear strength in CST, the talks may be held hostage. The Soviets adamantly prefer a position of a denuclearized Europe but will not unilaterally fall off an escalation dominant stance. Costs drive all actors to the middle left of the continuum with the exception of the FRG, which is calling for additional reductions of nuclear weapons after INF, especially in SNF deployed in the FRG.
d. Study Team Position.

Both nuclear and conventional forces must be strong enough to carry out the strategy of the Alliance. As long as flexible response remains the Alliance strategic concept, NATO will require conventional forces strong enough to sustain a defense against major attack as well as nuclear forces for deliberate escalation. The relative strengths of nuclear and conventional forces in NATO became an issue only because Alliance members did not live up to that strategy's own requirements. But relative requirements also are a product of the threat. If the threat is changed through CAC agreements, NATO's need for nuclear weapons will depend on how it sees the threat and how it uses its own capability for conventional defense. NATO faces a dilemma on this issue.


a. Description.

What do the Soviets want from conventional arms control? At one extreme is the view that they genuinely want conventional parity. At the other extreme is the view that CAC is simply another tactic to improve their conventional position and decouple the Western alliance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Want Stability/Parity/Economic</th>
<th>Want to Increase Adv/Decouple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restructure</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

b. Discussion.

Those who argue that the Soviets genuinely want parity emphasize Soviet economic difficulties. These difficulties, it is argued, have driven the Soviets to seek arms control to reduce their military burden, so that they can concentrate on domestic development.

Those who argue that CAC is another Soviet tactic do not deny that the Soviets may have economic difficulties. They do not, however, believe that the Soviets are prepared to simply surrender the massive advantages which they have worked so hard to achieve. Thus, they argue that the Soviets probably would like to cut their forces, but not in any way that would reduce those advantages, at least not without compensation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Want Stability</th>
<th>Want to Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parity/Economic</td>
<td>Advantage &amp; Decouple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USSR

NATO

Key Congressmen

Because it is possible and is consistent with Soviet behavior for them to have multiple objectives, it would serve no purpose of the West to believe that Soviet aims in CAC are benign. Soviet negotiators and public spokesmen could, at the same time, make deals leading to genuine parity, while raising issues for NATO that could threaten the cohesion of the Alliance.

The Soviets should be expected to maintain nuclear parity or nuclear advantages not denied them by treaties; try to remove nuclear weapons as factors in deterrence and war; return the emphasis on war to conventional forces; decrease the West's perception of threat; undercut SDI research and development; improve the Soviet position on the correlation of conventional forces; and increase Soviet political influence in Europe and elsewhere.

d. Study Team Position.

The Soviet Union will not give up its advantages without compensation, but will attempt to use the CAC process to increase those advantages and separate the United States from its European allies. The Pact's Budapest Appeal calls for equal percentage cuts, whose effect would be negative for NATO. The Jaruzelski proposal involves the further deconstruction of NATO's escalation capability. It may also involve the trade of one Pact advantage (on the ground) for another (in the air) with no net reduction in the overall balance of forces. These early Pact proposals are consistent with the idea that reductions that can move the central European conventional balance closer to parity also are not enough and not of the right kind for NATO to improve its position militarily or, in dealings within NATO, politically.


a. Description.

Should the West be prepared to give up anything to get what it wants from the Pact in CST? At one extreme is the view that the West should not offer the East any compensation at all. At the other extreme is the
view that the West should actively search for assets or create bargaining chips which it can trade for conventional parity.

No Compensation  Compensation

b. Discussion.

Those advocating the no trade position tend either to believe that the Soviets are sincere in their motives or that Soviet economic difficulties are so great that the only exchange the West needs to offer is a respite from the conventional arms race. On the other hand, the position that the West must give up something is justified on the grounds that the Soviets will not agree to genuine parity without compensation, even if it means that less money will be available for their domestic development. In addition, it is argued, even if the Soviets want arms control very badly, it still could not hurt to have a few chips in reserve to sweeten the pot at a propitious moment in the negotiations.


No Compensation  Compensation

NATO          USSR
Poland
Key Congressmen

The Soviets have offered to trade off advantages. They say they will make cuts in their conventional forces to eliminate asymmetries if NATO will cut its advantages, specifically in what they call "tactical strike aviation." Jonathan Dean's thought that we ought to consider such a trade appears to have some support on Senator Nunn's Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense. The Soviets have told us that we do have bargaining assets, when many on the NATO side thought we had none.

d. Study Team Position.

The West will have to sacrifice certain assets of value if it wants genuine parity on conventional forces. This position is based on our view of Soviet goals and motives in CAC. Thus, we believe that NATO should act now to begin to develop bargaining assets. Examples include a separate agreement on DCS that would reduce U.S. and Pact nuclear forces from Europe
and a conventional "dual-track" strategy in which, like the INF deployment, reductions may be negotiated while improving the forces of the Alliance.

8. **Issue 7: Dual-Capable Systems (DCS).**

   a. **Description.**

   The question here is how to deal with dual-capable systems including dual-capable aircraft (DCA) and short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). The diagram shows the continuum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Separate</th>
<th>CST</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>But Linked</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

   At one extreme is the position of dealing with such systems in a totally separate forum. At the other extreme is the position of including such forces in the CST. A middle course would be to deal with these forces in a separate forum which would be linked such that progress on DCS would be connected to progress in the CST.

   b. **Discussion.**

   There are fairly clear reasons why individuals might hold each of the major positions noted on the issue continuum. First, totally separating the fora would allow NATO to avoid making any concessions to the Soviets on DCS in exchange for Soviet concessions in CST. Indeed, this position would allow NATO to avoid talking about DCS at all, if it so chose.

   Discussing DCS in a forum linked to CST would require NATO to discuss DCS but would link agreements reducing such weapons to Soviet agreement to parity in conventional forces. This position would be adopted by those who hope to increase the likelihood of achieving conventional parity in Europe by offering the Soviets something they want in return.

   The third position, that DCS should be "thrown into the same pot" with conventional forces, would be taken by those who feel that the main capability of DCS is conventional and that all conventional weapons should be available for trades. They would argue that the treatment of DCS in a separate forum linked to CST would place too many limitations on the possible trades which might be made.

   c. **Positions of Relevant Actors on the Issue.**

   To the extent we have been able to glean them, the positions on this issue of the relevant players in the arms control game are depicted notionally on the next page.
The Soviets, who have the advantage in SSM and DCA, want all such systems included in the CST. NATO has agreed to discuss DCS in the CST but does not want such systems singled out for separate treatment. Within NATO, the FRG appears to want the elimination of SSM and is willing to discuss them in the CST. The FRG position on DCA is less clear. France wants to keep DCS totally separate from the CST. Indeed, the French appear to prefer that no negotiations take place on such systems at all, at least until conventional parity is a reality. The British position is similar to that of the French.

In the United States, administration officials regard a mix of nuclear and conventional forces as essential even if conventional arms control is successful. Within Congress, the statements of Senators Levin and Nunn would appear to place them in opposition to the inclusion of DCS in the CST, but not as vehemently as the administration.

d. Study Team Position.

We should discuss DCS in a separate but linked forum. First, we do not believe that the Soviets are likely to give us conventional parity for free. We will likely have to give them something they value in exchange. Unfortunately, NATO does not currently have available to it a very broad array of military resources with which to compel Soviet interest in our proposals for parity. Convening separate but linked fora offers the Soviets the prospect of achieving something like "zero" on DCS, but only if they give the West something like "parity" on conventional forces.

Second, we believe that the primary strategic value of DCS are their nuclear capability which helps to couple NATO by the threat of escalation and strikes against the Soviet Union in the event NATO faces conventional defeat. Thus, we view the option of including DCS as highly dangerous on two counts. First, it allows offers, such as the Jaruzelski proposal, which would result in NATO giving up its SSM for compensation in Pact tanks while Pact SSM remain intact. Second, it allows trades of SSM for SSM while leaving the Pact's conventional superiority intact.

The concept of separate but linked fora appears to be the most appropriate from a strategic standpoint. The reasons why nuclear weapons were emplaced in Europe were the Soviet nuclear threat to West Europe and as
compensation for NATO's conventional weakness. Should the Soviets be willing to grant NATO parity with the Pact on all major measures of capability, there would be no further reason to maintain nuclear weapons as an escalatory threat. They could, therefore, be eliminated within the context of a genuinely equitable conventional arms control agreement, but not under any other circumstances.

Mandate wording has now made this study team position moot. Therefore, the recommendations at the end of this chapter, in Chapter 7, and in the Executive Summary have been changed to accommodate the fact that DCS are implicitly in the initial mandate by virtue of their conventional capability.


a. Description.

Should a CAC agreement regulate the extent and/or pace of modernization of each side's equipment? As depicted in the diagram, there are two main views on this issue. At one extreme is the view that the modernization of forces in the ATTU region should be highly regulated, perhaps even banned. At the other extreme is the view that modernization should be left totally unregulated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Regulated</th>
<th>Some Regulation</th>
<th>Unregulated</th>
</tr>
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</table>

b. Discussion.

The case for detailed regulation of modernization is simple. There is no sense in taking the time and effort to obtain a successful CAC agreement only to have the purpose of that agreement circumvented by arranging for a new and expensive qualitative arms race (similar to the one begun by the Washington Naval Agreements of 1922) which would have unforeseeable consequences.

The argument for leaving modernization unregulated is just as simple. Since technology is the main strength of the West, a qualitative arms race would tend to favor NATO. As a result, over the long run, leaving modernization unregulated would tend to place NATO in a superior military position relative to Pact forces.

c. Positions of Relevant Actors on the Issue.

Although this issue is being addressed by analysts outside the USG, the study team did not find any other relevant positions within the USG on this issue besides our own. At the present time there is no serious effort in the USG to limit modernization, including new physical principles.

d. Study Team Position.

Our recommended solution to these problems is to permit modernization so long as it does not involve the emplacement in ATTU-Europe.
of weapons embodying so-called "new physical principles." Such weapons including, for example, electromagnetic guns, laser weapons, and particle beams could be built by each side and deployed anywhere but in Europe.

In general, the West does tend to lead the Pact in basic technology relevant to military use. However, there has also been a tendency for the East to actually field new systems before the West does. This may be due to the East's more rapid pace of modernization or the West's political unwillingness to translate its technological prowess into fielded weaponry until forced to do so. Whatever the reason, there appear to be few instances of the West's technological advantage resulting in major superiorities in fielded equipment. Thus, it would appear that there is no significant advantage for the West in leaving modernization unregulated.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that the advance of technology can be stopped or that we would want to stop it if we could, even for application to weaponry. The question then becomes how to regulate modernization in the ATTU arena without attempting the impossible.

An additional problem is just how one defines "modernization." If a tank employing a diesel engine is replaced with another one identical in every major way except that it uses a turbine, should that be "modernization" for our purposes?

10. Issue 9: The Unit of Account
   a. Introduction.

   Defining the unit of account for conventional arms control is not an easy matter. The reason for this is that, to decide on a unit of account requires that a position be taken on each of three separate subissues: equipment, personnel, and units. We will discuss each of these subissues in this section.

   b. Equipment.

      (1) Description.

      There are basically two main choices when dealing with equipment. One can attempt to limit one or two major types of equipment (say, tanks or tanks and artillery), or one can attempt to limit many types of equipment including, perhaps, even equipment which is not itself weaponry, such as trucks or communications equipment.

      (2) Discussion.

      The case to be made for limiting only one or two types of equipment is clear. The fewer items limited, the easier it should be to agree on data. In addition, the fewer items limited, the easier it should be to verify compliance since monitoring resources can be concentrated on those few items.
The case for limiting a large number of equipment types rests on the belief that, unless the Soviets are tightly regulated, they will attempt to circumvent the treaty. This can be done in two ways. First, armies could be reorganized and doctrine rethought to emphasize systems which have not been controlled. Thus, limitations on tanks and artillery alone might well lead to a Pact army just as large as before but now heavy in Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) and attack helicopters.

Second, the way weapons and other equipment are defined could also leave loopholes to be exploited. For example, a tank could be defined as a tracked vehicle weighing at least 50 tons and carrying a main gun of at least 90 millimeters. If so, we might find the Soviets building large numbers of tracked vehicles weighing 49 tons and carrying a main gun of 89 millimeters. Ingenious modifications might even be made to supply trucks. As a result, this argument goes, virtually all types of equipment must be defined and regulated.

(3) Study Team Position.

We should take a middle course between the dangers of extreme simplicity and extreme complexity. We recommend that all conventional weapon systems which have offensive potential should be limited. This would include, at least, tanks, artillery, self-propelled artillery, IFVs, armored personnel carriers and attack helicopters. In addition, we recommend that weapons be defined not by their physical characteristics, but according to their capability in attack or defense. Thus, for example, a tank could be defined as any vehicle whose armor cannot be penetrated by the lightest anti-armor weapon currently in use. Then, if the other side wished to build many easily destroyable tanks, that would be up to them. In addition, we would recommend a very tight noncircumvention regime to prevent the Soviets from, for example, doing ingenious things with supply trucks and cargo helicopters.

c. Personnel.

(1) Description.

In dealing with personnel, there are also two major positions. One is to place an explicit ceiling on the number of personnel which each side may have. The second is to ignore personnel, concentrate on weapons, and allow each side to deal with personnel as it sees fit.

(2) Discussion.

The case for an explicit personnel ceiling is that, without it, the personnel liberated by weapons cuts might not be demobilized on the Pact side or even moved east of the Urals. Instead, they might be formed into new units or inserted into newly enlarged old units and armed with unregulated weaponry. This, in turn, could undermine the purpose of a CAC agreement by providing the Pact with additional usable combat capability.
The case against an explicit personnel ceiling, in essence, is that it is more trouble than it is worth. First, one of the lessons of MBFR is, or should be, that even had the Soviets been cooperative, the difference in personnel practices on the two sides would have made agreement on these numbers very difficult. There is no need to broach this problem yet again.

Second, it is not at all clear that such a ceiling could be adequately monitored. But, attempts to do so might take valuable resources away from monitoring compliance with other, more important aspects of the agreement. Further, a ceiling which can’t be monitored is an open invitation to cheat and, as a result, creates a generally bad climate between the parties to the agreement. Third, if we have done our homework and limited all of the major weapon systems we are concerned about, the additional offensive capability obtainable by the use of any personnel liberated by weapons cuts in unregulated ways ought to be minimal.

(3) Study Team Position.

We should not attempt to impose any explicit ceiling on personnel. We recommend, however, that NATO make clear to the Soviet/Pact delegation that NATO will carefully monitor what the Pact does with personnel liberated by the proposed weapons cuts and will (1) make public any attempt by the Pact to achieve unilateral advantages by utilizing these personnel to circumvent the purpose of the agreement, and (2) take action to prevent the Pact from achieving any such advantage. We view this as, again, a middle course between attempting to impose a ceiling which cannot be made to stick and ignoring personnel entirely, which is, after all, probably dangerous since there may be unforeseen ways to employ such personnel to achieve real advantage.

d. Units.

(1) Description.

Basically three main positions can be identified on whether cuts should be taken by units. First is the position that cuts should be taken by “thinning the line” with units per se left untouched. Second is the position that cuts should be taken by very large units, say armies. Between these two extremes is the position that cuts should be taken by modestly-sized units, say battalions (bns) and regiments (rgts).

(2) Discussion.

The case for cutting by thinning is based, in essence, on flexibility. Cutting in this manner would allow each side the greatest flexibility in determining where and how to cut. In addition, it would allow each side to cut in ways which would reduce combat power least and would enable each side to adapt best to changing objective circumstances including enemy deployments and requirements for force modernization.
Those opposed to cuts by thinning base their argument on two points. First, cuts by thinning may be much more difficult to monitor and verify than cuts by units. Second, they do not believe that too much flexibility in the matter of cuts is necessarily a good thing. Instead, they would like to reduce flexibility that otherwise might add to the attacker's power.

The difference between cutting by smaller units and cuts by larger units is the degree of equipment in addition to the specifically regulated weapons which are "captured" by the cut. When cuts are made by regts or bns, little or no additional equipment is eliminated. However, as the size of the unit goes up (division, corps, army), the amount of additional, "attached" equipment required to be eliminated also increases. Thus, those who favor cuts by smaller units would tend to feel that there is no need to capture additional equipment or that it might even be dangerous to us. On the other hand, those who advocate cuts by larger units would argue that eliminating all of the equipment associated with the larger units is a good thing.

(3) Study Team Position.

Reduce by divisions on the NATO side and by divisions and "new army corps" on the Soviet side. Given the possibilities for unforeseen developments with unregulated systems as well as the possible dangers of the lack of a strict personnel ceiling, it may be best if arms control were to eliminate at least some equipment in addition to that which is strictly regulated. On the other hand, we do not wish to go too far with this as it may result in too much equipment and flexibility being lost. Reductions by divisions on the NATO side (assuming NATO is required to cut as many weapons as are found in a NATO division) and so-called "new army corps" on the Soviet side seem to be our best option. Such cuts, however, should not be required to include SSM on either side. To the extent SSM are attached to division or (in the Soviet case) corps headquarters, these would be allowed to reattach to the next higher headquarters (corps or army).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Tanks/Arty</th>
<th>Offensive Weapons</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Key Congressmen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Dean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJCS</td>
<td>FRG</td>
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The FRG wants to limit many offensive systems, but has steadfastly opposed unit reductions as they want to maintain their current structure at lower levels of readiness.
The Soviets do not seem to be against any of the possible units of account, but are primarily interested in trading to reduce existing advantages. They want the United States to trade DCS for their conventional superiorities. NATO is on record as preferring tanks and artillery, a position supported by OJCS. Jonathan Dean has testified before Congress that if we and the Soviets agree to tanks and artillery, we should go further and offer to negotiate our air power as well. Senators Nunn and Levin have expressed frustration with the lack of military input to this equation and want offensive weapons, in general, cut. Levin professes a capabilities cut, as opposed to a weapons cut, a position more favorable to SACEUR's desire to address capabilities rather than "bean counts." No one, after MBFR's failure, wants a troops-only cut.

f. Study Team Unit of Account.

To summarize the previous discussion, the overall unit of account can be characterized as "weapons in units." The "weapons" consist of a moderate number of weapon types which possess some significant offensive potential. The "units" are divisions for NATO and divisions and corps for the Pact with all associated equipment except for SSM. Supporting this unit of account would be a set of definitions of weapons which are crafted to limit circumvention as well as a generalized noncircumvention regime combined with a pledge by NATO to watch Soviet actions vis-a-vis personnel very closely, to call attention to any questionable Pact activity regarding personnel and to take action to insure that the Pact cannot gain any advantage from the use, in whatever manner, of personnel liberated through weapons and equipment cuts.

11. Issue 10: Fate of Reduced Forces.

a. Description.

Assuming that conventional arms control is successful, what is to be done with the forces which the agreement mandates eliminating? As shown below, there are two primary positions on this issue.

Demobilize and Destroy

At one extreme there is the position that the equipment cut should be destroyed, with associated manpower demobilized. At the other extreme is the view that all equipment cut be removed from the the theater with manpower disposed of as each side sees fit.

b. Discussion.

The reasons why each major position might be adopted are as follows. The first extreme position--equipment destroyed and personnel
demobilized—ensures that no equipment cut by treaty will ever again enter the controlled region. In addition, the demobilization of associated personnel ensures that personnel liberated by equipment cuts cannot be used to circumvent the agreement in any of the ways alluded to in the section on Unit of Account. It also results in the highest probability that any savings obtained by cutting forces will not go back into military expenditures.

The second extreme position—removing equipment from the theater but making the disposition of that equipment and any personnel liberated by equipment cuts a matter of national discretion—can be adopted on the basis of flexibility. This position allows each side the greatest flexibility to adapt to the cuts most effectively from its perspective.

c. Positions of Relevant Actors on the Issue.

The positions are not clearly defined on the West's side:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demobilize and Destroy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remove from Theater</td>
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</table>

USSR  U.S.

The Soviets are clear in their position. They have publicly stated that forces and equipment subject to reduction agreement should be demobilized and destroyed, respectively. We have taken the position that troops are not verifiable and that U.S. equipment disposition should be a U.S. decision based upon the outcome of final agreement and its positional stance on geographical disparity. The United States, if it wants to POMCUS equipment, will take a strong position. But the United States may want to use the equipment elsewhere, depending upon CAC results. Although an important issue, NATO and the Congress have not taken positions, but are deemed supportive of a U.S. decision on this issue at the appropriate time.

d. Study Team Position.

All Soviet equipment mandated cut by a CAC agreement should be destroyed and theater totals of all regulated equipment types should be capped on both sides at the theater totals possessed by the Soviets after such destruction. Any U.S. equipment mandated cut by such a treaty can be removed from the theater or placed in POMCUS. However, so long as the U.S. theater equipment totals were less than or equal to the Soviet totals, destruction would not be required. This issue is very complex, reflecting the geographical disparities between the United States and Soviet Union as well as the differences between the overall sizes of their armed forces. We argue that these differences provide a basis to treat the two sides differently with respect to the fate of equipment cut by a CAC treaty and any personnel liberated by those cuts.
A problem with the first position is its view that personnel should be demobilized. In fact, as has already been noted, personnel levels are extremely difficult to monitor and verify. As a result, it would be difficult to know if Soviet personnel had really been cut as far as mandated. Recall that the difference in personnel estimates in MBFR was about 150,000 troops.

On the other hand, the major problem with the other extreme position from the U.S. standpoint is that, if the United States and the Soviet Union remove any equipment they must cut from the theater, it will take far longer for the United States to return it to the theater than for the Soviet Union to do so. Furthermore, it will be far less risky for the Soviets to interdict that return than it will be for the United States to interdict any attempt by the Soviets to return their equipment. The reason for this is that the Soviets can interdict U.S. shipping and cargo aircraft over the Atlantic. The interdiction of Soviet transport, however, would require strikes deep inside of the Soviet Union itself. An American President could well be self-deterred from ordering such strikes for fear of escalation.

Another problem for the West is that simply allowing the Soviets to withdraw their equipment east of the Urals would create a major threat to China and Japan since we do not believe that there is any way to store or base such equipment without them perceiving such a threat. This could result in these nations feeling increased pressure to accommodate rather than oppose Soviet interests in the Asian region. To allow Soviet equipment to simply be withdrawn east of the Urals (regardless of what happens to personnel) could be to improve the situation in Europe at the expense of Asia.

Disposition of personnel would be a matter of national discretion. As a result, the United States could maintain (in the United States or other theaters) any units withdrawn from Europe while both the Soviets and the United States could form new units armed with unregulated equipment.


a. Description.

Should a CAC agreement mandate subzones within the ATTU arena?

There are two major positions on this issue. One extreme is that any cuts mandated by a CAC treaty be allowed to be taken by each side from anywhere within its portion of the ATTU arena. The other extreme is that the location of cuts should be regulated by an elaborate set of subzones.

\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{No Subzones} & \text{Many Subzones} \\
\end{array}\]

b. Discussion.

The case in favor of the first position is again one based on simplicity and flexibility. This position would allow each side the
greatest flexibility in dealing with the impact of cuts. The simplicity of this position would also present the least difficulty to negotiators attempting to reach agreement. The requirement for an elaborate set of subzones will raise problems in defining them, obtaining data for each subzone, etc., which may make negotiating a final agreement difficult.

The case in favor of an elaborate set of many subzones is one based on safety. If it can be agreed to, this position allows each side to attempt to direct the other's cuts to its greatest advantage and insure that monitoring resources are employed most efficiently by being concentrated on the subzones of greatest concern. Additionally, the existence of many subzones implies that movement between them would have to be monitored. This in itself would greatly facilitate monitoring of compliance.

c. Positions of Relevant Actors on the Issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Subzones</th>
<th>Subzones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The United States favors a single zone and the most anyone in NATO has considered is three.

d. Study Team Position.

Any successful CAG agreement should include a "Central European Subzone." Without such a subzone, the Soviets might be able to take most or all of their cut from their reserve military districts. NATO, on the other hand, due simply to the distribution of its troops, will have to take the bulk of any cut that may be mandated for it from the FRG or the Benelux nations. Thus, without a central subzone the balance of forces at and near the inter-bloc border could be worse after arms control than before.

With a Central European subzone, however, the Soviets could be required to cut in such a manner that the balance in the central region is rectified. This would reduce the Pact's capacity for surprise attack by improving NATO's conventional position where it needs improvement most.

More complex schemes for subzones might also be considered. However, a judgment must be made as to the trade-off between the additional safety derived from further zoning and the complexity which further zoning would inject into the negotiations.

With regard to the exact nature of the Central European Subzone, our judgment is that it should include the old NGA plus the Soviet Union's Western Military Districts.
13. **Issue 12: National vs. Alliance Reductions.**

a. **Description.**

This issue involves how any cuts mandated by a CAC agreement should be applied to the alliances. As illustrated below, there are two main positions on this issue. At one extreme is the view that cuts should apply to each alliance as a whole. On the other hand is the view that limits should be placed on the forces of each specific member of each alliance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Cuts</th>
<th>U.S./USSR Requirements</th>
<th>Alliance Cuts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviets</td>
<td>FRG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **Discussion.**

The argument for collective limits is that this approach allows each side the flexibility of taking its cuts where it will find them least damaging. Thus, the Pact could take its cuts mainly from, say, Hungarian and Bulgarian forces while leaving Soviet and GDR forces untouched. NATO, on the other hand, might choose to take its cuts from, say, the Danish, Belgian, and Dutch forces while leaving the U.S., FRG, and UK forces pretty much alone.

The argument for individual limits is that they would allow each side to press for large cuts in the forces of their most capable adversaries. Thus, we could press for the Pact's largest cuts to come from the forces of the Soviet Union and GDR. The Soviets, on the other hand, could press for NATO's largest cuts to come from the forces of the U.S. and the FRG, which they did during some phases of MBFR.

c. **Positions of Relevant Actors on the Issue.**

Throughout MBFR talks, NATO and WP negotiations focused on U.S./USSR reductions. The Pact gave strong indications, however, that it wanted reductions in FRG as well as U.S. forces and strongly supported national cuts. NATO was willing to fully support U.S./USSR cuts, but hedged when alliance cuts were discussed. NATO seems to prefer Alliance cuts with U.S./USSR cuts as the primary focus, while individual members within NATO prefer not to "show their hands," politically or militarily. The U.S.
Administration prefers NATO Alliance cuts and USSR cuts, due to the higher caliber and mass of USSR weapons in comparison to WP capabilities—the real threat in Central Europe.

d. Study Team Position.

The best solution appears to us to be mandating that a certain percentage of each side's cuts come from U.S. and Soviet forces, although this issue presents a dilemma between conveniencing ourselves and inconveniencing our opponents. Such cuts, to the extent we had to make them, could come from theater stocks and so avoid the appearance of decoupling. The Soviets, however, would be forced to withdraw, perhaps beyond the Western Military Districts. As a result, their ability to hold their "allies" in thrall might diminish somewhat, thus allowing for the possibility of "reverse decoupling."


a. Description.

This issue involves the extent and intrusiveness of any verification regime adopted in support of a CAC agreement. There are two main positions on this issue. At one extreme is the view that an extremely elaborate and intrusive regime is required. At the other extreme is the view that such a regime is not required and that National Technical Means (NTM) of verification can do the whole job.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nonintrusive</th>
<th>Highly Intrusive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

b. Discussion.

The argument in favor of an extremely extensive and intrusive verification regime rests on considerations of safety. Only such a regime, it is argued, can insure sufficiently against Soviet cheating to justify assenting to a CAC agreement.

The argument for the position taken against such a regime is twofold. First is the problem that any such regime would have to be reciprocal. Thus, it is argued that such a regime would enable the Soviets to do too much "snooping" around our installations and those of our allies. In addition, it is argued that a very extensive and intrusive verification regime is not really necessary since, so long as cuts concern only equipment and are taken by units, so-called NTM can provide sufficient insurance against cheating.
c. Positions of Relevant Actors on the Issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nonintrusive</th>
<th>Highly Intrusive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Congressmen</td>
<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Soviets objected to highly intrusive verification measures in MBFR, but accepted them in INF and will likely accept them in CST. They will also accept nonintrusive measures. There are those in the United States who think that if the cuts are substantial, intrusive measures will not be required, but not many. Congress must be fully satisfied that verification measures are highly intrusive.

d. Study Team Position.

In general, we favor a fairly intrusive regime modeled on provisions which the Soviets have already agreed to in the INF treaty as well as those proposed by the West (but not agreed to by the Soviets) in MBFR. This regime should entail, at least, a detailed data exchange, the establishment of agreed entry/exit points to any subzones, on-site inspection of factories producing regulated equipment types, challenge inspections of units and locations where contraband equipment might be hidden, and full observation of the disposition of withdrawn equipment at both the old and new locations.

We recognize that these provisions will entail the presence of large numbers of Soviet/Pact personnel in the West. However, we believe that this is a price which must be paid if we are to obtain an agreement in which we can believe.

15. Issue 14: Organization of Residual Forces.

a. Description.

Should a CAC agreement regulate the ways in which the forces remaining after cuts can be organized and with what equipment? As shown below, there are two main positions on this issue. At one extreme is the view that, after cuts, TOEs should be frozen. At the other extreme is the position that no restriction at all should be placed on how units are organized or reorganized after cuts.
b. Discussion.

The position favoring a freeze on TOEs is based on the view that without it the manpower liberated by equipment cuts could be used to reorganize units with large amounts of unregulated equipment. The position which favors leaving unit organization unregulated is based on the principle that each side should be allowed to organize or reorganize in any manner it wishes so as to accommodate arms control and force modernization. Those favoring no regulation would also argue that, if we have done our homework and regulated all the equipment types we fear, we should have no qualms about reorganization to emphasize equipment which we did not fear enough to limit.

c. Positions of Relevant Actors on the Issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Regulated</th>
<th>Unregulated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Positions on whether or not to place severe limitations on remaining organizations are not well developed on either side. It is the study team's best judgment that the highly structured Soviets will attempt to regulate residual organizational structure while the United States, which places a high priority on flexibility, will refuse such restrictions. Future restrictions over time will surely not work well if implemented.

d. Study Team Position.

There is no need to regulate organization if all weapons have been significantly reduced. However, there may be some problems associated with it such as the fielding of many new units emphasizing new equipment which does not meet the definition of regulated equipment but can perform its mission. This problem, however, can be eliminated through a combination of a strong noncircumvention regime with the kind of force modernization regime suggested above.

16. Other Issues.

Strategic and operational issues such as those detailed above are the issues which the study team deems most important in developing its suggested overall USG position. Other issues affect our negotiating position; however, one can take a simple stance on each without describing the issues in detail, specifying who stands where, and without incorporating strategic analysis. A list of the study team's positions on these issues follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count POMCUS stocks</td>
<td>NO—Needed to offset geography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase the negotiations</td>
<td>NO—Go for complete agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase the implementation</td>
<td>YES—Central Europe first</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include air power</td>
<td>YES—Great contributor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include naval power</td>
<td>NO—Strategic in nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include CSBMs</td>
<td>NO—Pass to CDE II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include weapons quality</td>
<td>YES—Don't trade for junk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in final formula</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. **Summary.**

a. In summary, we have discussed what the important issues in CAC are, who stands where on each issue, the arguments for and against, and a position on each one. A recap of our positions is presented below:

1. Develop a new forum for CAC which includes representatives from NATO, WP and NNA.
2. The INF treaty has caused repairable damage to NATO coupling.
3. A post-CAC world will find a new competitive game with the East.
4. Nuclear and conventional forces must be kept at adequate strength.
5. The Soviets will attempt to increase their advantages through CAC.
6. We will have to use bargaining chips to reach an equitable agreement with the East.
7. We should discuss DCS in CST.
8. Define modernization and limit introduction of new hi-tech weapons in theater, not elsewhere.
9. Select weapons in divisional units as the unit of account.
10. Soviet reductions should be destroyed; U.S. should remove its reductions from theater or to POMCUS.
11. Insist on a Central European subzone.
12. Mandate that a certain reduction percentage comes from both U.S. and USSR forces.
13. Model the verification regime after INF and Western proposals in MBFR.
14. There is no need to regulate remaining force structure since offensive weaponry will be greatly reduced. Keep flexibility--our strength.

15. Do not allow POMCUS stocks to be counted; use them to make up for geographical disparity.

16. Do not phase the negotiations. Get a whole product.

17. Phase the implementation to insure step-by-step security.

18. Include air forces; great contributor for bargaining.

19. Do not include naval forces (global).

20. Shift CSBMs to the proper forum--CDE II.

21. Insure that weapon system quality is accounted for so that the Soviets cannot trade off their junk.

b. The next chapter deals with U.S. Government position development and evaluation.
CHAPTER 4

ENDNOTES

1. Developed by study team from numerous newspaper articles and trade periodicals. Throughout this chapter the descriptions of the issues, the pros and cons of each argument, and the recommended positions were developed from research during the October 1987 to March 1988 time frame.

2. Developed by study team from numerous newspaper articles, periodicals, political speeches, and open literature pertinent to national defense. Throughout this chapter the "positions of relevant actors on this issue" paragraphs have been derived by the study team. The intent is to record what is normally common knowledge within the defense analytical community.

CHAPTER 5

DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF A PROPOSED U.S. GOVERNMENT (USG) POSITION

1. Introduction. This chapter describes the outlines of a proposed U.S. Government position for the Conventional Stability Talks (CST). The chapter includes what the position should contain; how to derive its substance; and how to evaluate its effectiveness. The basic argument is that what is needed is not a U.S. proposal, but a consensus U.S. Government position for use in a NATO negotiating strategy.

2. The Whole Is More Than the Sum of Its Parts. There is a lot more to developing an overall position than adding up the individual positions. A consensus USG proposal should be a function of the propositions on conventional arms control in Europe, lessons from past negotiations, individual issue positions, the selection and priorities of criteria, and a future vision en route to discovery of a U.S. strategy. Depicted below is a formula:

\[
\text{Position} = \text{function of principles, lessons, individual positions, variables, criteria, future vision, strategy}
\]

We have previously discussed the principles, lessons learned, and individual issue positions. In this chapter we will concentrate on looking at strategy, NATO objectives, and some criteria relevant to CAC.


   a. In the determination of the U.S. arms control strategy or analysis of the Soviet strategy, a postulate exists concerning the aim or objectives of all strategy, which is universal in its application: the aim or purpose of a strategy is to dislocate your enemy. The tools of the dislocation process are initiative and deception. Acceptance of the aims or objectives of strategy includes the "given" that you and your opponent both have the ways and means to dislocate each other. Converted to a CAC context, initiative and deception become initiative and "cover," the latter being analogous to denying an enemy access to information about your capabilities and plans.

   b. Ambassador Jonathan Dean, former U.S. representative to the MBFR talks, in hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, on November 3, 1987, incorporated both tools of initiative and cover when he stated:
We ought to approach the Eastern bloc with relish, with a strategic plan, and explain to them what it is that bothers us (about their deployments and force structure). . . . Then let us hear from them what it is they want us to do about it. That is then the time to get into the interesting intra-alliance, intra-bureaucratic debates on what is acceptable . . . . If we focus on trying to come up with a proposal . . . we give away our own bargaining position.1

The Ambassador says it all. Tell the Soviets what we don't like; ask them what they are going to do about it; and quietly study and develop a strategy which is shielded from others.

c. Unfortunately, the Soviets are using the tools of dislocation. They have seized the initiative of the moment in INF, START, chemical and conventional talks. If they are in fact using initiative and deception—if their aim is to disrupt and dislocate us—then they appear to be succeeding. Consider the Reykjavik and Washington summits and their impacts. NATO hurriedly called a summit to show Alliance cohesion, but we have seen the outcome of that cohesion in the break away position on SNF which the FRG has firmly expressed. NATO is reviewing its doctrine; we are reviewing ours. Should we develop a Lance replacement and will the FRG permit fielding? A quick review of the issues in the previous chapter reveals a strain on cohesion, an attack on coupling, and complexity of contentious issues. There is both optimism and grave doubt among different segments of the U.S. Congress and public.

d. To counter Soviet strategy, we must develop a simple but comprehensive strategy which dislocates the other side. Our strategy will depend on whether we really want conventional arms control or not. Some U.S. conservatives inside and outside the government want conventional and nuclear improvements, leading to greater battlefield strength. Some U.S. liberals want to reduce U.S. conventional forces in Europe, and to reduce U.S. defense spending. Both groups seem to want NATO-Europe to increase its share of the alliance burden.

e. If we are to develop a strategy of initiative and deception, we must consider the Soviet/Warsaw Pact version of the threat. Clearly, the Soviets view nuclear war as the greatest threat, as we do. Their extensive civil defense preparations, hardened construction of command and control facilities, expansive missile production, and the current admission of a Soviet SDI program indicate that their fear of nuclear war is real. Perhaps this is an important reason for their active rhetoric concerning INF, START, and SNF. If we view Soviet nuclear fears as a weakness, then how do we exploit them? Our "Dual Track" strategy worked in INF negotiations. If we really and truly want conventional arms negotiations, in which we will demand massive WP asymmetrical reductions, then it is in our best interests to "threaten" the Soviets to agree. The Soviets, Germans and French are all studying the battlefield of the future. Ample evidence suggests that small, anti-tank forces, properly equipped, can wreak havoc on an attacking tank army. The Yugoslav militia model, which encompasses a small, standing
army and a seven million person militia has deterred the USSR for decades. Even an announcement of force restructuring in USAREUR may be enough to temporarily dislocate the Soviets and divert their attention from their current strategy.

f. The strategies presented in this section are not meant to be answers, but merely "food" for policymaker consumption. Whatever strategy is ultimately selected for CAC must have a simple, easy-to-understand exterior and a shielded interior.

g. Another important role and tool in strategy development is the establishment of negotiating "stop points." The SALT I negotiators in 1971 lost control of their position due to political pressures for a speedy conclusion. If the negotiators had stop points as part of this overall strategy, we would have a better treaty.

h. In summary, the aim of the negotiating strategy must be the dislocation and disruption of our opponents through frank and honest discussions. We can use initiative and deception as tools in strategy construction. We must revisit the essence of competitive strategies policy to find the exploitable weaknesses. We must build in "stop points" to insure we consolidate on the right objective. There are no brakes in the process unless we put them there.

i. We have thus far developed only the inputs to the process depicted in Figure 2 by which we will construct and evaluate a USG position and an accompanying negotiating strategy. These inputs are the principles, lessons learned, and issues involved in the arms control process. These inputs will now be "processed" by means of a psychometric technique known as subjective pairwise comparison to create variables and weight criteria. The output of the process in this case will be a set of seven core criteria. These ordinally ranked criteria will be used to form the basis of a recommended USG position and a set of negotiating proposals to which action options can be added. They can also be used to evaluate competing positions and proposals.

Figure 2. The Human Computer.
4. **Criteria.**

a. Overall, an arms reduction agreement or a series of agreements should move the military situation in Europe toward conventional stability (and by implication to unqualified stability, nuclear and conventional), by reducing Pact capability for surprise attack in return for reasonable compensating changes. Neither side would have incentive to attack.

b. But this definition of what is an obvious NATO criterion for a good arms control agreement is too abstract for use even at an aggregate level of analysis. The task here is to propose a set of criteria that breaks down the broad aim of NATO into more useful parts for analyses.

c. Two potential criteria for arms reduction proposals have been excluded from the list that follows. The first is that a proposal should appeal to the positive opinions of Western publics as understandable, fair, and therefore sincere. This is necessary to gain support for NATO's overall approach to negotiations through its publicly known proposals as against possible Pact proposals with surface attraction but whose unfairness will be evident in comparison with NATO's proposals. Although this is a sensible criterion for democracies, it places too low a priority on the life and death consequences of not satisfying other criteria that bear on NATO's ability to defend itself. We shall instead assume that any NATO proposal will be fair and understandable as a precedent condition for bringing it to the bargaining table.

d. The second excepted criterion is that, if our intent is to reach any agreement, our proposals must take into account the legitimate security concerns of the Warsaw Pact, as we can best determine them. If a proposal does not have this quality, then of course it will not be negotiable and there is no need to subject it to a set of criteria. Therefore, we assume that any NATO proposal will be reasonable to the Warsaw Pact if our intent is to improve our security in Europe through arms control.

e. The following set of criteria is derived from NATO's objectives for CAC as stated in the Brussels Declaration (see Chapter 2), and from other expositions and analyses in this study. Criteria to evaluate a proposed agreement are that the proposal should:

1. compensate for NATO's geographical disadvantages by asymmetrical reductions in Pact forces with emphasis on Pact armor and artillery;

2. impose no disproportionate obligations on any one NATO nation;

3. be verifiable to the satisfaction of NATO depending on the extent and type of reductions or controls;

4. maintain the ability in NATO for forward defense to the degree and extent necessary for the post-agreement situation;
(5) permit NATO to modernize forces not excluded by treaty;

(6) maintain theater-based nuclear weapons for defense and to couple the theater by nuclear means to U.S. strategic nuclear forces to the degree necessary in the post-implementation situation;

(7) focus on the reduction and removal from the ATBU of Soviet forces; move to parity in U.S. and Soviet forces.

5. Priorities Exercise.

a. A maximum outcome, as judged by criteria such as these, is impossible because maximization assumes that each and every criterion would be satisfied to its greatest degree and the opposition would agree to such a proposal. It is unlikely that the security concerns of the opposition would be satisfied at the same time that all of NATO's criteria are met fully. An optimum outcome is one in which many if not all criteria are met. This raises the question of which criteria are more important than others. A study can only approximate what policymakers decide as the preferred priorities.

b. Testing the effort to assign priorities revealed that it is first necessary to stipulate alternative, governing conditions. One should assign priorities to the set of criteria under more than one governing condition. Two conditions are used here, as follows:

(1) Condition A - The proposal, if it became an agreement, will have the net effect, after NATO's compensating move to achieve a Pact reduction or change, of improving NATO's capability to defend in conventional war.

(2) Condition B - The proposal, if it became an agreement, would have the net effect, after NATO's compensating move to achieve a Pact reduction, of allowing NATO to defend as well as before the change but at a lower level of forces and associated long-run costs.

c. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show examples of priorities assigned to the criteria under one governing condition. Appendix A suggests relevant factors for any U.S. analysis, and discusses how they might be used.

d. Since Condition A signifies the most favorable results, the ordinal priorities were reordered below in position, with "action" options. We have added in appropriate "action" options below in presenting the following USC position:

(1) We will maintain our nuclear deterrent by establishing parity, including development of a force requirement.

(2) We will improve our conventional deterrent by developing our forces rapidly and survivability; our intelligence, surveillance, and targeting (ISTAR) capabilities; our conventional weapons accuracy, survivability; and our command, control and communications.
**Governing Condition A:**
NATO's ability to defend is improved

### CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Ordinal Rank</th>
<th>Weight</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographical compensation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Verifiable</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain forward defense</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Permit modernization</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain nuclear deterrent</td>
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<tr>
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### RESULTS

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<tr>
<td>Proportionate obligations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note on method: Compare each criterion to each other criterion and record which of each pair is more important (the marks after each criterion show how many times they were the more important of a pair). The result gives the ordinal rankings, and the number of marks gives the weights. When two or more criteria have the same total rating, break the tie by comparing them in a second round to establish their ordinal rank, but do not change their weight. A final rule is that every criterion must have a weight of at least 1 because the weights will be used as multipliers in analyses.

Figure 3. Estimating the Relative Priorities in a Set of Criteria.
Governing Condition B:
NATO's ability to defend is the same,
but at lower levels of forces and costs

CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>Condition A</th>
<th>Condition B</th>
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RESULTS

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</table>

RANK OF CRITERIA UNDER EACH GOVERNING CONDITION

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<th>Condition B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1. Geographical compensation</td>
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<td>2. Proportionate obligations</td>
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<td>3. Verifiable</td>
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<td>4. Maintain forward defense</td>
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<td>5. Permit modernization</td>
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<td>6. Maintain nuclear deterrent</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Focus on Soviet forces/U.S.-Sov. parity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Estimating Priorities Under Different Governing Conditions.
(3) We must demand compensation for our geographical asymmetry with the USSR on the land with U.S. POMCUS and destruction of Soviet weaponry and demobilization of units, and in the air by parity not only in numbers and capabilities, but also in air reinforcement travel time.

(4) We realize that at the center of any agreement there will be asymmetric reductions of both U.S. and USSR forces, but we must continue to deploy a significant number of U.S. forces in Europe in positions that maintain forward defense.

(5) Any agreement reached must contain stringent compliance measures including permanent inspection teams and on call inspections, National Technical Means (NTM), risk reduction centers and sanctions for violations.

(6) Warsaw Pact cuts must come primarily from modernized Soviet forces. We will not accept a trade for outmoded weaponry, nor will we accept anything less than parity between U.S. and Soviet forces in the NGA.

(7) Any proposal for reductions of NATO forces will not impose a disproportionate obligation on any one NATO nation.

e. By combining both the focus on Soviet cuts with a firm position on U.S./USSR parity in the NGA, we have developed a USG proposal of seven simple components--each easy to understand. Because of its seven components, which arose to the surface, we have nicknamed this position the "7-Up" position for use in the media in much the same way that the "zero" option and its siblings "double zero" and "triple zero" have been associated in nuclear arms control.

f. As presented, this USG position is of little value without a negotiating strategy for its acceptance at NATO position and proposal development talks prior to East-West negotiations. A review of strategy tells us we must have a simple, easy to understand proposal. Our USG position meets that standard. We will now add below the line options to each of the components of the USG proposal:

(1) Maintain the nuclear deterrent.
   (a) Trade off DCA for both nuclear and conventional parity.
   (b) Insure SLCMs and developing ALCMs are excluded from negotiations.
   (c) Establish stop point at 1,000 warheads per side.

(2) Permit modernization.
   (a) Refuse discussion of SDI; refer to Defense in Space talks.
   (b) Refuse to discuss SSM; continue with Lance replacement research.
   (c) Express concern for emerging technologies; but only agree to limits on theater fielding, not development.
(3) **Geographical compensation.**

Establish European cooperating air and naval basing in neutral countries.

(4) **Maintain forward defense.**

(a) Consider conversion of NATO unmodernized combat forces to support forces.

(b) Insure that USAREUR is granted the highest priority in issue of modernization assets.

(c) Establish stop point of reductions at one U.S. division.

(5) **Verifiable.**

(a) Propose density limits for post-CAC environment.

(b) Include NNA in the inspecting, not NATO-WP alone.

(c) Let NNA establish the sanctions for violations.

(6) **Focus on Soviet forces.**

(a) Press for reduction of all offensive weapons to avoid circumvention.

(b) Take initiatives on tough associated measures, e.g., centralized storage of ammunition, bridging, and limitation on numbers of Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET)--all are asymmetric in Soviet's favor. Don't let associated measures of this type be relegated to a CDE forum; only CSBMs limiting military activities should be shifted for discussion to the CDE.

(7) **Disproportionate obligations.**

(a) Establish reduction plan by priority with U.S. cuts first and unmodernized combat forces second.

(b) If NATO agrees to a 50 percent cut in NGA for equality on the WP side, a priority reduction plan could look like this:

-1 U.S. Division

-2 Dutch Divisions (1 active, 1 reserve)

-1 Belgian Division (reserve)

-3 French Divisions (small brigade-like)

-2 UK Divisions (1 is stationed in UK)

-4 FRG Divisions (1 is mountain)
(c) Then restructure the U.S. Reserve Component to compensate for lost divisional capabilities.

g. The negotiating strategy as discussed in subsection f could be the surface USG position, the concealed or subsurface action options and tactics and the stop points. Three questions remain. Can we reach a USG consensus in the military, the interagency group and in Congress? Can we market the position to NATO as the NATO position, or what must we modify? And will the WP agree to it?

h. We think that this "7-Up" position or something very similar is marketable. Consensus on the surface positions is attainable in the USG. The negotiating strategy to include the subsurface options, tactics and stop points will certainly receive close scrutiny and undergo several iterations in the process of consensus-building. NATO reactions are less clear and a second, classified volume of this study presents a "real world" look at the positions of all the significant participants. A review of where the open literature places the relevant NATO players on the issues serves to indicate that only the FRG may object to our position. Current sentiment within the FRG is to reduce or eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.

i. We now turn our attention to the development of proposals. We independently developed three hypothetical proposals, the core of which will be used to test our candidate USG position.

6. The 70 Percent Proposal.

a. This proposal consists of a 70 percent reduction of WP forces in the NGA with zero percent reduction from the NGA to the Urals; and a 50 percent NATO reduction in the NGA and a 20 percent reduction in NATO external to the NGA. The objective of this proposal is to substantially reduce both sides to parity and inhibit surprise attack capabilities. The planned results are 15 NATO divisions vs 15 WP divisions in the NGA and 60 NATO divisions vs 52 WP divisions in the area outside the NGA (the lower number of WP divisions is an attempt to compensate for "unity of command" capability on the Soviet side). Let's evaluate it against our USG position.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USG Position</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Maintain nuclear deterrence</td>
<td>Implied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Enhance conventional deterrence</td>
<td>Modernization not constrained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Allows geographic compensation</td>
<td>To some degree because of better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>force balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Maintains forward defense</td>
<td>Deployment locations of remaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>forces not covered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Verifiable</td>
<td>Reducing whole divisions should aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Focus on Soviets/achieve parity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. No disproportionate obligations</td>
<td>Implies NATO-wide participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. The 70% Proposal Evaluation.
b. As a counteroffer to this proposal, using our negotiating strategy we would:

(1) Demand U.S. POMCUS and Soviet destruction of weapons.
(2) Limit U.S. reduction to one division.
(3) Add unit of account—weapons in units.
(4) Propose our verification measures to include NNA inspectors and noncompliance sanctions.
(5) Propose our NATO priority reduction plan.
(6) Insure 70 percent WP reductions include 70 percent Soviet forces.
(7) Add a ceiling on theater nuclear weapons to preclude escalation dominance.

c. This proposal could be that "bold" proposal that Senator Sam Nunn has been looking for the West to advance or counteroffer. We will now examine another proposal.

7. The "20-4" Proposal.

a. This proposal consists of reduction of 20 USSR divisions in exchange for four NATO divisions. This would obviously be one which would be put forward by the West since it is a 5:1 reduction when the military balance is closer to 3:1. The area is NGA. The objective of the proposal is to substantially reduce the Soviet threat in the GDR. The planned results are reduction of one Belgian division, one Netherlands division, one FRG division, and one U.S. division in exchange for 20 USSR divisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USG Position</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Maintain nuclear deterrence</td>
<td>Implied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Enhance conventional deterrence</td>
<td>Reduces capability for surprise attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Allows geographic compensation</td>
<td>Asymmetry contributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Maintains forward defense</td>
<td>Maintains, does not improve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Verifiable</td>
<td>Whole divisions aid verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Focus on Soviets/achieve parity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. No disproportionate obligations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. The "20-4" Proposal Evaluation.
b. At first glance, this proposal is very favorable to the West. With the addition of nuclear parity, verification measures and fate of residual forces added, the "20-4" could quickly be formed into a very positive proposal. A likely Soviet proposal follows:

8. The "80-50" Proposal.

a. This proposal consists of a 50 percent NATO reduction and an 80 percent WP reduction in ATTU of all units and offensive weapons systems. It offers full parity over the ATTU region and equality in the NGA. It also offers complete denuclearization of Europe with an option of a 500 warhead ceiling. Its verification procedures match the NATO criteria. It allows for equal ceiling POMCUS of retiring units at asymmetrical distances with Soviet equal POMCUS at a distance selected by NATO. Its objective is political in nature. Its planned results include a 50+ NATO division reduction and an 80 WP division reduction. An evaluation follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USG Position</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Maintain nuclear deterrence</td>
<td>Probably not to satisfaction of NATO-Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Enhance conventional deterrence</td>
<td>Can expect Soviets to want modernization constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Allows geographical compensation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Maintains forward defense</td>
<td>Subject to details of allowable positioning of NATO units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Verifiable</td>
<td>Units verifiable; weapons may be difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Focus on Soviets/achieve parity</td>
<td>Implied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. No disproportionate obligations</td>
<td>Implied by its extensiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. The "80-50" Proposal Evaluation.

b. The 80-50 Proposal is potentially what the Soviets will offer. A proposal such as this one certainly would have public appeal. To meet the needs of our USG proposal only the following options must be added:

(1) Nuclear weapon ceiling raised to 1,000.
(2) No limits on emerging technologies; only on theater fielding.
(3) Only one U.S. division reduction to preserve coupling.
(4) Propose conversion of some Dutch and Belgian units to CS/CSS.
(5) Seize initiative with NNA verification and sanction.
(6) Propose our USG position associated measures.
c. We seek to attain our positional stop points. We must now reexamine our shielded positions. The magnitude of the reductions directly impacts on many of them. We, perhaps, are stuck with this proposal, which seems to answer all our stipulations. But will we accept such a deal? What if we could not stop the momentum generated on the political side which could result in a true 50 percent reduction of our land and air forces (a movement well beyond our stop point)? We may be forced by events to take the actions in our forward defense subsurface position (consider conversion of NATO unmodernized combat forces to support forces), which would be costly. This scenario does show the importance of stop points and shielded positions.

d. As we will see in the next chapter on preparing the post-CAC environment, these 80-50 or 70-50 Proposals are likely ones. A great deal of planning effort must be accomplished prior to commencement of the negotiations.
CHAPTER 5

ENDNOTES


CHAPTER 6
PREPARING THE POST-CAC ENVIRONMENT

1. Introduction. The U.S. military leadership has an essential role in the Conventional Arms Control process and in its potential outcomes. Critical concerns, scenarios for those outcomes, alternative missions, and visions for the post-CAC future are presented in this chapter.

2. Critical Concerns. At the outset, the Army must address at least seven critical concerns:

- Loss of U.S. force structure
- Defense budget cuts
- A denuclearized Europe
- NATO Alliance decoupling
- Public view of diminished threat—a new détente
- New Soviet hi-tech weaponry—gap closing
- Warfighting—outnumbered and lose

a. Loss of U.S. Force Structure. The loss of current force structure is perhaps the greatest concern of our military leadership. This year the U.S. Army will lose 10,000 soldiers as a result of budget cuts, while the Soviets maintain their current strength. Mr. Gorbachev is indicating that he will table a bold, new CAC proposal which may cut his own force structure by 50 percent or more. U.S. bargaining assets may not be necessary to bring the Soviets to agree to huge asymmetrical cuts as previously stated in this study. Mr. Gorbachev probably will seize the initiative, similar to the 80-50 Proposal discussed in the preceding chapter. What do we do then? Since the U.S. Army will soon be no larger than the North Korean Army, there is genuine cause for alarm in facing the realities which CAC may bring—a substantially reduced force structure, while the demands of our national strategy remain the same.

b. Defense Budget Cuts. The second greatest concern is undoubtedly future defense budget cuts. As early as August 1986 Senator Sam Nunn, in a speech to the Senate entitled "The Defense Budget Squeeze," graphically projected the dangers and the budget reality of substantial defense cutbacks. The 1988 and 1989 Army budgets contain no real growth and, when adjusted for inflation, may contain a slight decrease. This appears to be a substantial reason why the Army and the OJCS are so cautious and concerned with the CAC process: in addition to necessary spending to carry out a CAC agreement, U.S. forces remaining in Europe must be modernized and CONUS forces will require additional strategic lift for European contingencies.
c. Denuclearization and Decoupling. The third and fourth major concerns are interrelated. If CAC produces parity and lower levels of forces both in conventional and in nuclear forces (to triple zero), our policy of extended deterrence will seem even less credible to NATO-Europe. Denuclearization and decoupling of the United States from its NATO allies seem to be one and the same. Regardless of the benefits of the INF Treaty, there is real concern on both sides of the Atlantic that decoupling has begun; that a giant step towards the Soviet goal of a denuclearized Europe has begun. We must provide input to exert some control over the security aspects of the process.

d. Diminished Threat. Whether or not an agreement is actually reached in CAC, there is a strong possibility that a new period of detente is blossoming. Cultural and sports activities between the United States and the USSR are cropping up everywhere, including establishment of countrywide Little League baseball in the USSR next year. If the United States and NATO reject the probable sweeping reduction proposals of Mr. Gorbachev, the strong possibility remains that the Soviets will make unspecified unilateral withdrawals to politically appear to raise the threshold of war in Europe. Since the United States and its major NATO Alliance partners rely heavily on a threat-driven strategy to construct military budgets, the diminishing threat may logically lead to diminishing military budgets, which in turn lead to diminishing force structure, and the ever smaller budget spiral continues unabated as the threat continues to diminish.

e. New Soviet Hi-Tech Weaponry. There is another concern, unrelated to those which we have so far expressed—the concern for the rapid development of Soviet technology on the battlefield. We develop the technology faster, but the Soviets field technology faster. The sudden appearance of Soviet reactive armor and a blinding laser have concerned us considerably. There is always a shroud or fog covering Soviet intentions, generic to their closed, secret society. In 1971 Mr. Brezhnev shot the arms control puck to our end of the ice while he changed his lines. Detente and arms control initiatives then shielded his strong tactical nuclear and conventional buildsups. Mr. Gorbachev may be doing the same thing. Analysts at the Soviet Army Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, boldly state that the Soviets are shielding the restructuring of their forces while we are deliberating and concentrating on arms control. The only way we are going to understand what is under or behind the fog is to use all of our senses, not just sight. We have to smell the fog; feel it; taste it in addition to just looking at it. If for example the Soviets have developed a new hi-tech weapon, it logically will not work against large troop concentrations, since the Soviets are trying so hard to reduce large troop concentrations in Europe as well as simultaneously through CAC on the Korean Peninsula. This thesis is one that uses "feel" as opposed to "see." We must use all our senses in the discovery process before we enter CAC negotiations to alleviate this major concern.

f. Warfighting. The final concern is that NATO is faced with the possibility of having to fight outnumbered, and lose. The present and former SACEURs both agree that NATO cannot accomplish its warfighting mission without resorting to nuclear weapons. The SACEURs say that NATO can only fight a conventional war "for days, not weeks," with current firepower.
Their rationale considers the overwhelming superiority of WP numbers of offensive weapon systems and the 60-90 days of ammunition which is stockpiled well forward on the potential battlefield, as well as the lack of modernization and fair share defense budget commitments of certain NATO partners to produce the numbers of systems and ammunition stockpiles necessary to counter a WP offensive. Senator Nunn wants to switch around days and weeks to be able to fight for "weeks, not days," and has proposed a simple program to reverse the conventional weakness in NATO:

- Eliminate automatic escalators
- Increase NATO member ammunition stockpiles
- Build aircraft shelters and refuel/reloading capabilities
- Continue the Balanced Technology Initiative
- Expand cooperative research and development

Such a program would certainly improve our conventional deterrent, but the WP massive numbers and closing technology gap still raise concerns as to whether the NATO Alliance, with its very independent member-state convictions, can fight outnumbered and win, even with solid improvements in capabilities.

3. Possible CAC Outcomes and the Army. Now that we have presented the major concerns of military leaders and defense analysts, our discussion will turn to the possible outcomes of CAC talks. As we view the outcomes, we only see four alternatives: no agreement, token agreement, agreement to U.S. Army and Air Force reduction of up to 50,000 in the process, and a very large U.S. reduction of up to 100,000 or more. To facilitate ease of expression we will term these alternatives none, symbolic, significant, and very large, respectively.

a. No CAC Agreement. The possibility that no CAC agreement will be reached is a very real alternative. The potential for complications arising from the complexities inherent in this arena is substantial. Due to the many concerns which U.S. military leaders have in approaching CAC, it may be very doubtful that we actually reach an agreement. If we make the general assumption that we will not reach agreement, there are subassumptions which may logically follow.

(1) First of all, if there is no agreement, there will be Soviet improvements and expansion only at the margins. Based on unclassified Soviet production data, this appears to be true. NATO will only be a little worse off tomorrow, in the post-POM years, than today. NATO buildup and increased expenditure by non-U.S. NATO members, although doubtful, could result in an improvement in the correlation of forces.

(2) Another possible consequence of no agreement is that the Soviets will make significant unilateral withdrawals to attain parity,
reduce the threat, improve their political leverage in Europe and hasten the decoupling process.

b. Symbolic Agreement. A symbolic agreement may be important politically, if not militarily. Such an agreement may be useful, if only marginally, if it is linked with substantial confidence-building measures. Confidence-Building Measures (CSBMs) developed in the GDE. Tough CSBMs which we addressed in our previous study, e.g., centralization of forward-deployed bridging storage, removed from the NGA; centralization of storage of ammunition, well removed from the NGA; and placing a ceiling on heavy equipment. Transporters (HET), used in transport of heavy armored vehicles, may accomplish a substantive step in reducing the threat of surprise attack. If CSBMs developed in the CSCE-CDE conference procedures result in increased transparency of military operations, the Soviets, masters of deception, will be little-affected. A symbolic agreement may consist of one similar to the MAPR proposal presented by NATO for reductions of 5,000 U.S. troops in exchange for 11,500 Soviet troops. Such an agreement does little to reduce the threat; subsequently, military concerns about force structure loss and deep defense budget cuts would be relaxed.

c. A Significant Agreement. A significant agreement does present cause for alarm. The study team envisions that a significant agreement would consist of:

- reductions to NATO-WP parity
- theater nuclear warhead ceilings
- reduction of at least 1 U.S. division and its corps support силе
- reduction of 1 or more DCA wings
- some restrictions, perhaps fielding, on emerging technologies

1. Very Large Agreement. One possible outcome of CAC is the very large agreement of from 50,000-100,000 or more. This could be the Gorbachev proposal. Looking to Northeast Asia, the North Koreans seized the initiative in CAC on the Korean Peninsula with a proposal to reduce conventional force structure on either side of the 38th parallel to just 100,000 soldiers. Under such a bold proposal, both armies would have to reduce their standing armies by more than 500,000 each. The North Korean proposal may well indicate what NATO will be offered by the Warsaw Pact. Our discussion and evaluation of one such proposal, the 80-50 Proposal, point out the difficulty in defeating or countering such a proposal without huge reductions in force structure. Once offered, NATO will have few choices in response, since such a proposal can be constructed to meet or exceed all of NATO's declared arms control objectives, including the shielded negotiating strategy of the United States. A Soviet proposal of this magnitude will nearly force us to lay all of our cards on the negotiating table and also to examine development of new NATO doctrine. Under such a potentially large reduction agreement, the U.S. Army will lose force structure. After filling potential missions or uses for the reduced
forces, there may still be significant leftover forces which exit the military or convert to other military service force structure needs. There is nothing comfortable about this magnitude of reductions to defense proponents. What we have in this potential outcome is achievement of all NATO goals and increased risk. Our stop points in the USG negotiating strategy must not be exceeded without complete agreement as to the effects on U.S./NATO deterrent posture. Such an agreement is indeed significant and, unlike the previous alternatives, will require new strategies, doctrine, and development of new missions for the retiring forces.

4. Alternatives for a Post-CAC World. A significant agreement is the most likely option and must receive first priority for study. We must be creative in our approach to the near-term future. We must use backward planning to develop uses and missions for a reduction in European forward defense of up to 50,000 U.S. soldiers and airmen. Once we determine what alternative missions and uses we have for the returning forces, we must aggressively market the selected missions to the Congress and to the American public. Failure to do so will mean loss of force structure, partially or in entirety. This mission search and decision and marketing process will be crucial. We can understand the principles of CAC, know the lessons of the past, identify the major issues, develop the USG position and an evaluation regime, but still lose this important game because of a failure to visualize the future.

a. Recommended potential uses and missions for the reduced forces are as follows:11

- Activate Air Defense Initiative
- Support anti-drug war efforts
- Resource Nationbuilding
- U.S. Space Command force structuring
- Integration of AC/RC units
- Fill Light Divisions and CS/CSS shortfall

b. We will discuss each potential mission briefly.

(1) Activate Air Defense Initiative. With the termination of Safeguard, the emergence of SDI, and the gradual buildup of Soviet air-breathing cruise missiles (to circumvent SDI), there is certainly justification for development of the Air Defense Initiative (ADI). Use of CONUS Air Defense Enhanced Patriot Missile Systems appears politically marketable, militarily significant, but economically prohibitive. The current $600M cost to equip one battalion of Patriot quickly adds up.12

(a) Previous ADI study concerning use of Patriot in an anti-cruise missile CONUS Air Defense System encompassed missile range fans of the existing Patriot in a mission role similar to SDI. As a result of
attempting border and coastal coverage, a significant number of firing batteries were required, pressing costs beyond budget reality. With the recent decision to downshift SDI from nationwide defense to protection of critical military installations, perhaps the same logic should be applied to enhanced Patriot coverage, so that the number of firing batteries is dramatically reduced to a number within budget reality.

(b) The Air Defense Initiative (ADI), an Air Force program, should be revisited by the Army to apply Patriot in a reduced role of significant defense installation coverage and to develop this viable mission for use of troops returned as a result of the CAC process.

(2) Support Anti-Drug War Efforts. The Posse Comitatus Act Revision of 1981 and the Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1986 both authorize the loan of DOD equipment to civilian agencies for use in anti-drug operations. In summary, the enabling legislation allows the U.S. Army to share intelligence, provide military facilities, and participate in anti-drug operations short of capture and seizure. The support provided by DOD has increased substantially every year. Both the liberal and conservative sides of Congress and state and local governments seem to be in harmony in their desire for greater military involvement in the anti-drug war. Mayor Ed Koch and Senator Bob Dole have both recently called for a strong military role to the point of subordinating civilian agency responsibilities to military leadership. Both Republicans and Democrats think that illegal drugs and porous borders are a threat to our national security, and therefore, the military obviously must take the lead. Secretaries of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and now Frank C. Carlucci have stated emphatically that the military should not take the lead and that a military role in this war is proscribed by law. Outside the military, only the southwestern border states seem to side directly with the SECDEF. Conservative legislators seem to be considering greater military involvement in what may turn out to be a powerful bipartisan position in favor of increased military involvement and perhaps lead on this issue.

(a) The Air Force is taking advantage of this issue. Currently, the Air Force is establishing a Reserve SOF squadron in Tucson, Arizona, with a primary mission of anti-drug operations support. The equipment was paid for with federal anti-drug funds. The Air Force is also involved in the purchase of seven Aerostats (stationary, cable-tethered, lighter than air radar platforms) for installation along the 2,000-mile U.S./Mexican border. Sophisticated radars and force structure support are helping the Air Force to receive kudos and real dollars from Congress. There are traditional, historical roles for the military in border security. With the passage of enabling legislation or providing support within the restrictions of existing legislation, there are real world missions in the anti-drug war effort, missions that can easily justify and consume returning Army force structure. The incumbent administration now seems to understand the increased role of the military in accomplishing this important mission, as evidenced by the recent Presidential reversal on use of the military in the anti-drug war.

(b) The presentation of creative thought in the abbreviated scenario below is considered appropriate for purposes of generating
discussion on both sides of the issue of military support in the anti-drug war:

- The U.S. Coast Guard is integrated into the Department of Defense to enhance its budget competitiveness with the other military services. It will no longer directly compete with mass transit.

- The JCS designate two new unified commands, Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ)-Eastern Command and Maritime Defense Zone-Western Command. Each new command is headed by the existing MARDEZ three star USCG admiral currently on site. The new commands are each given land, air and sea component commands from the other services.

- The Army convincingly argues for a new divisional-size force for each new Maritime Defense Zone. The new land component command restructure includes emphasis on SOF, intelligence, communications, and aviation.

(c) If this nation is publicly and politically committed to winning the drug war, then such a scenario is possible. This mission is an alternative which could absorb all reductions of a significant CAC agreement.

(3) Nationbuilding. There is considerable support both inside and outside the military for a nationbuilding force. Recent and current SOUTHCOM CINC's have talked with anyone who would listen to recommend that the United States needs a force structure capable of fighting a different kind of war in the Third World. These leaders want a nationbuilding organization rather than mechanized infantry to help fight an insurgent war. The voices of these CINC's were heard and RC Engineers and other units involved in the nationbuilding business were dispatched to Central America. But the unsettled political conditions and hot LIC environment have caused a backlash of state governor protests over the use of National Guard troops to accomplish nationbuilding in potentially hostile environments. Rather than mount political opposition to state house protests, we recommend that AC nationbuilding units be structured and sent to the CINC's as requested. The force structure for such a mission could certainly come from returning USAREUR units at a low political cost given the current Central American crisis. Nationbuilding as a mission for returning U.S. troops is certainly politically acceptable and a well-needed mission.

(4) U.S. Space Command Force Structuring. The Army has initiated an Army Space Master Plan (ASMP) to:

- Posture the Army for operations in the space age
- Exploit current space capabilities
- Develop additional space-related capabilities
This initiative involves accomplishing many tasks en route to establishing a U.S. Army Space Command (USARSPACECOM) as the Army component to U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), with the mission of coordinating, integrating and executing Army space activities. This new command is a long-term necessity but requires short-term organizational action now, much in the manner and timeliness of development of the U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command. We recommend that the Army Space Master Plan be completed faster than currently envisioned, to create the force structure needed for this new command from returning European troops. The Army should not wait until after the returning troops are eliminated from overall force structure.

(5) Integration of AC/RC Units. There has been ample criticism from inside and outside the Army concerning the readiness condition of our Reserve components. The General Accounting Office, Congressional Research Service, and internal FORSCOM evaluations point to continued equipment and training shortfalls which impact on wartime reinforcement preparedness. One way to improve readiness in early reinforcing RC units is to integrate RC and AC force structure. What is envisioned here is the elimination of units in poor recruiting areas which have continuing readiness problems, regardless of the quality of leadership (even high quality leadership), and the establishment of new units in high growth areas of the Sunbelt and industrial northeast which have a one-to-one ratio of AC/RC mix. The logic, other than demographic, is that the TOEs of Army units build in the capability to match the mission to perform 24-hour-a-day operations at the Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) One. Every platoon has both a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant to carry out operations at different locations simultaneously or for on-off continuous leadership. The creation of a new unit with an equal AC/RC mix would allow for daily training of the AC unit members and enhanced training for the RC members. Leadership positions could be constructed to allow for a mix, not a dominant AC to RC structure. Such a structure, particularly for early arriving TPFDL units, would enhance readiness and consume force structure available from European reductions. Although this use of force structure is politically "iffy," it should be considered a potential, if not a preferred, option.

(6) Fill Light Divisions and CS/CSS Shortfall. General Maxwell R. Thurman created a minor uproar in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in March 1987 when he admitted upon questioning that the Army was then 125,000 soldiers short of requirements to man the force.¹⁹ That was when our force structure was 10,000 more than it will be on 1 October 1988. There is definitely political concern that the Army may return to the posture of "hollowness" it occupied in the mid and late 1970s. Filling Light Divisions and CS/CSS shortfalls is a viable mission, one that may be supportable in the Congress, but it will not consume the anticipated magnitude of the returning forces. This proposal would be in addition to one or more of the missions discussed above.

(7) Summary. Under a potentially significant NATO-WP CAC agreement, the United States may reduce up to 50,000 or more of its current forward deployed forces in Europe. Before such an agreement is negotiated, a strategy and a plan must be developed which analyzes uses and missions for the returning forces and includes a marketwise, politically feasible
recommendation. The study team has provided six alternative uses/missions, integrating pros and cons of each alternative. There are other viable alternatives. We need to analyze them and establish our preferences before we lose the force structure, as a result of a significant agreement.

5. **Doctrinal Vision.**

   a. When considering either the significant or very large agreements, there is a need to reexamine both U.S. and NATO strategy. The tendency to judge CAC agreements only in terms of current NATO strategy can limit both our judgment of an agreement and our preparations for a post-CAC Europe. NATO should begin to study new strategies as well as the adaptation of flexible response to the post-CAC threat. Revised deployment locations, warning and response procedures, improved interoperability, and even revised campaign plans for European defense are all obvious potential adjustments to CAC.

   b. For example, both the FRG and USSR are currently studying a series of cluster defenses, centered on performance by small antitank forces, with a strong reserve counterattack force and increased reliance on SOF and intelligence.

   c. The United States, if such a defensive posture is adopted by NATO, will have little choice in its defensive strategy. We envision that U.S. contribution to NATO strategy will become its counterattack force. To perform that role, the United States must continue to support development of rapid, efficient sea and airlift to carry out our new European strategy. The same rationale for support of lift development is appropriate for virtually all possible CAC outcomes. This is one of the few comforting thoughts about CAC and the future: what we are doing today in support of increased air and sea lift development is exactly what we must continue to do under virtually any scenario for the future. Whether the results of CAC are as dynamic and as influential as we have expressed them or not, the need for improved lift support will remain the same.

   d. In summarizing preparation for the future environment, we have provided military concerns about CAC, discussed potential outcomes, presented alternative uses and missions to match returning force structure, and provided an overview of doctrinal issues to consider in post-CAC Europe.
CHAPTER 6

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Army War College Nonattribution Policy protects the remarks of visiting guest speakers. The 50 percent Gorbachev proposal possibility was mentioned by a distinguished guest speaker. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Academic Year 1988.


7. Developed by study team.

8. Strategic Studies Institute, Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Army Perspectives (U), Carlisle Barracks: October 1987, p. 38. SECRET NOFORN

9. Developed by study team.


11. Developed by study team.

12. Developed by study team as a result of interviews with many Air Defense artillery officers.


CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conclusions. The question—how to think about conventional arms control in Europe—asks for an informed perspective, not a set of rules or laws. The conclusions of this study, moving from the general to the specific, are:

   a. CAC should be seen in the context of Europe and of contemporary international politics and military strength. Lessons from the past and from the modern history of U.S.-USSR arms negotiations can be valuable. Like the principles of war, these lessons must be applied to each situation, with a view to consequences and initiatives for the future.

   b. The NATO objective for CAC of reducing or eliminating Pact surprise attack capabilities should be the focus for U.S. Army participation within NATO and in NATO-Pact conventional stability talks. Additional objectives are important but lack purpose without this focus.

   c. The objective of placing the Pact in a position where it must mobilize visibly before major conventional attacks is a corollary to eliminating surprise attack capabilities and will become of first-order importance if and when the primary objective is realized. Although this is obvious, evidence is not yet available that NATO is thinking beyond the focus of its current strategy and the current threat.

   d. Reductions and control proposals in the CST will necessarily expose long-standing, unresolved issues of strategy within NATO. The expected debate has the potential for the loss of political cohesion whether or not this effect is intended by the East and whether or not an agreement actually is reached in the CST.

   e. Currently, NATO lacks a political foundation for consensual positions in the CST on force reductions. Because of various members' special positions, potential NATO reductions cannot be fairly allocated among members in the zones or regions of reduction.

   f. Although NATO nations will view CAC proposals and consequences in terms of current Alliance strategic guidance, the allies should also include analyses of proposals in terms of adaptation of the strategy, of new strategies, and in terms of a variety of possible operational concepts to defend in the post-CAC situation. Alliance military analysts should ask how remaining NATO assets could be organized and employed to deter and fight the remaining threat.

   g. Substantial U.S. force redeployments from Europe will change the distribution of political power in NATO. One or a few leading European nations are unlikely to attract a strong commitment to a common defense from other members. The United States must ask what it wants to see as the future of NATO and specifically ask about its own role in the Alliance.

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h. European NATO nations are unlikely to agree to negotiated reductions unless U.S. forces redeployed to CONUS remain in the force structure, preferably as a strategic reserve for NATO contingencies.

1. The possibility that U.S. Army forces will be returned from Europe as part of a CAC agreement requires thought about new missions for these forces to retain them in our force structure. Potential missions are:

- **Activate Air Defense Initiative (ADI).** The Army should consider participation in the U.S. Air Force ADI program by applying Patriot to critical CONUS defense installation protection and using a reduced potential target base—in concert with recent paring of the SDI program.

- **Support National Anti-Drug War.** Army resources could be devoted to interdicting illegal drugs without acute conflict with other Army missions.

- **Nationbuilding.** Active Army units could play a greater role in this mission and meet needs expressed by CINCs for appropriately structured forces.

- **U.S. Space Command Force Structuring.** Forces redeployed as a result of CAC could be included in the force structure needed for establishing a U.S. Army Space Command (USARSPACECOM).

- **Integration of Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Units.** New units with an equal AC/RC mix would allow daily training for AC members, improved training for RC members, and a more ready unit overall compared to current marginal units in the Reserve structure.

- **Fill Light Division and CS/CSS Shortfall.** Although this mission would not consume large numbers of returning forces, it is one of several possible post-CAC uses and has some support in the Congress.

2. **Recommendations.**

a. **Recommendations concerning the strategic issues for CST are:**

(1) Develop a new forum for CAC which includes representatives from NATO, WP and Neutral and Nonaligned Nations (NNA), but only NATO-WP agreement would be binding.

(2) Understand that a post-CAC world will find a new competitive political and psychological game with the East.
(3) Keep nuclear and conventional forces at moderate strength, as opposed to primary reliance on one or the other to deter conventional war.

(4) Understand that the Soviets will attempt to increase their advantages through CAC.

b. Recommendations concerning the operational issues for CST are:

(1) Determine bargaining assets to reach an equitable agreement with the East.

(2) Discuss Dual Capable Systems (DCS) in CST.

(3) Define modernization and limit introduction of new hi-tech weapons in theater, not elsewhere.

(4) Select weapons in large units as the unit of account.

(5) Destroy and demobilize Soviet reductions; remove from the theater or POMCUS U.S. reductions.

(6) Insist on a Central European subzone.

(7) Reduce forces and equipment by alliance rather than by nation.

(8) Model the verification regime after INF and Western proposals in MBFR.

(9) Do not regulate remaining force structure since weaponry will be greatly reduced. Keep flexibility—our strength.

(10) Do not allow POMCUS stocks to be counted; use them to make up for geographical disparity.

(11) Do not phase the negotiations. Get a whole product.

(12) Phase the implementation.

(13) Include air forces.

(14) Do not include naval forces (which are global, not regional).

(15) Shift Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) to the proper forum—Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE II).

(16) Insure that weapon system quality is accounted for so that the Soviets cannot trade off obsolete equipment.
c. U.S. Army input to a U.S. Government position going into CAC should include the following core criteria:

(1) **We must maintain** our theater nuclear deterrent by establishing nuclear parity, including development of a Lance replacement.

(2) **We must enhance** our conventional deterrent by developing and improving our tactical mobility and survivability; our reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) capabilities; our conventional weapons accuracy and lethality; and our command, control and communications.

(3) **We must demand compensation for our geographical asymmetry** with the USSR on the land with U.S. POMCUS and destruction of Soviet weaponry and demobilization of units, and in the air by parity, not only in numbers and capabilities, but also by air reinforcement travel time.

(4) **We must maintain the ability in NATO for forward defense** to the degree and extent necessary for the post-agreement situation.

(5) **Any agreement reached must contain stringent compliance/verification measures** including permanent and on call Inspections, National Technical Means (NTM), risk reduction centers and sanctions for violations.

(6) **We must focus on Soviet forces.** We will not accept anything less than parity between U.S. and Soviet forces in the NGA nor will we accept a trade for outmoded weaponry.

(7) **Any proposal for reductions of NATO forces will not impose a disproportionate obligation** on any one NATO nation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


I. Introduction. Relevant factors are the important variables to be considered in any analysis of arms control, from pre-negotiations to post-treaty effects. These factors include the known or assumed objectives of the two sides in the pending Conventional Stability Talks (CST) in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. In its simplest form, conventional arms control consists of two categories of factors: the objectives of the players, and those factors limiting what is possible or probable when the players and their objectives interact. In the following scheme, NATO objectives are established as the independent, unchanging factors and the remaining variables, including Pact objectives, are established as the limiting factors.

2. Relevant Factors. (The number of each factor corresponds to its number in the accompanying figures; the numbers have no other significance.)

   a. NATO Objectives. The aim of NATO in CAC is to produce conventional stability (reduce or eliminate the Pact's capabilities for surprise attack, or cause the Pact to mobilize visibly before being able to attack, with agreements applicable to the entire ATTU area, and able to be effectively verified). Instrumental objectives are to:

      1 - reduce Pact material advantages (reduce asymmetries);
      2 - revise Pact force deployments;
      3 - compensate for geographical disadvantages to NATO;
      4 - improve the transparency of Pact forces;
      5 - revise Pact offensive doctrine;
      6 - establish stable, secure levels of forces; and improve security at lower levels of forces in the ATTU.

   b. Pact Objectives (assumed).

      1 - maintain or improve security at lower levels of forces;
      2 - maintain confidence in the manageability of change in Eastern Europe at lower levels of deployed Soviet forces;
      3 - eliminate or reduce NATO nuclear weapons in Europe;
      4 - move East-West competition away from a military focus;
      5 - slow technological competition in conventional and nuclear weaponry;
6 - weaken European ties to the United States in long run;

7 - use CAC for gains in other areas of East-West relations such as credits, trade, SDI.

c. Other Limiting Factors.

1 - Positions on issues of arms control or reductions peculiar to any one country;

2 - consensual positions in NATO;

3 - what will and will not be subject to negotiation;

4 - the opinions of publics in each Alliance nation, and the opinions of other publics and governments which may influence the two sides;

5 - the strength of ruling coalitions in parliamentary player-governments;

6 - the stability and expected durability of leadership in the communist player-states, especially in the Soviet Union;

7 - the influence of government agencies within each NATO government;

8 - pressures to reduce or expand defense spending in each NATO country;

9 - competition from other national security missions for the forces at issue in CAC;

10 - forces able to be brought to bear during a war or crisis in the ATTU, depending on assumed length of the war;

11 - dual- and tri-capable weapons systems;

12 - the force structures of armed forces as subjects of revision after force reductions;

13 - the doctrines and strategies of opposing forces for war;

14 - estimates of amounts and capabilities of the forces at issue;

15 - distances, and the technology to shorten closing time, from critical defended areas to a defender's military reserve strength;

16 - depth of the defended area in West Europe compared to East Europe;
17 - demographics of military service population;
18 - urban-rural characteristics of defended areas;
19 - LOC's and their vulnerability or durability;
20 - terrain, in the sense of whether it favors defender or attacker;
21 - national policies on support and infrastructure:
   -- availability of French territory;
   -- Norwegian policy on stationing nuclear weapons;
   -- limited access to Iceland;
   -- Spain's limited role in NATO;
   -- access to bases in Portugal over long term;
   -- access to bases in Greece;
22 - forward defense;
23 - coupling theater forces to U.S. strategic nuclear forces;
24 - strength of NATO's conventional forces;
25 - reliance on nuclear forces to deter major conventional attacks;
26 - assumptions about warning, alert, and political decisions to mobilize.

3. Criteria. Seven criteria by which to evaluate proposals and to shape policy were derived mainly from the list of NATO objectives. These criteria are discussed in the body of the study. They are used here in Figure A-2. The criteria are:

   a. Compensate for NATO's geographical disadvantage.
   b. Impose no disproportionate obligations on any one NATO nation.
   c. Verify to the satisfaction of NATO's post-reduction situation.
   d. Maintain forward defense.
   e. Permit NATO to modernize its forces.
   f. Maintain NATO's nuclear deterrent.
   g. Focus on reducing Soviet forces in the ATTU.
4. Uses of Data.

a. The figures that follow are intended to show how the relevant factors can be aids to thinking. The first use shown here (Figure A-1) is the placing of NATO objectives against assumed Pact objectives to see which combinations are in conflict and which seem compatible.

b. Figure A-1 can be understood in several ways, but the most pertinent perspective is to see it for what it may tell us about NATO's ability to achieve its CAC objectives in the face of assumed Pact objectives.

   (1) First, the objectives of increasing the transparency of Pact forces in the ATTU and arriving at stable, lower force levels in the ATTU seem to be compatible with Pact objectives. Pact openness and compromises on these points might even serve its own objectives of changing East-West competition and opening the way for rewards in other negotiations and relations. (The reasoning is based on the idea that any yielding by the Pact to NATO demands is a source of a trade for something else the Pact wants to satisfy in its list of objectives.) Stable, lower force levels might also help the Pact wring concessions from NATO to slow technological competition in weaponry.

   (2) Second, the largest obstacle to changing the Pact's offensive doctrine could be fear of the West's technical potential to improve NATO forces after achieving some measure of parity with the Pact. Connected to this is the insecurity that the Pact could face at lower force levels in Eastern Europe, where the Soviets, and at least some East European leaders, might insist on a continuing Soviet military presence large enough to deter political unrest. But revising their doctrine might also gain for the Pact a weakening of U.S.-European ties because the perceived threat to NATO would be less, challenging NATO to continue its close connections and sacrifices for defense.

   (3) Third, reducing Pact material advantages is incompatible with the Pact's determination to reduce NATO's nuclear arsenal and slow technical competition. In effect, these two Pact objectives are what the Pact might very well want in return for giving up its material advantages.

   (4) Fourth, revising Pact force deployments and compensation for the Pact's geographical advantages run into several obstacles. Current Pact force deployments in East Europe probably are most sensitive to what the Soviet Union and other Pact countries believe to be necessary as the East European countries change in the "spirit" of glasnost and perestroika. Or, even if these movements were irrelevant, just the fact of change itself after forty years is something the Soviets and their allies in East Europe probably must worry about. They might be willing to risk more redeployments the more successful they are in getting rid of NATO nuclear systems. Finally, if the Pact makes large changes to compensate NATO for its geographic disadvantage, then that could serve to loosen Atlantic ties because of the lessening of a threat to NATO.
### NATO Objectives vs. Pact Objectives

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<th>SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS</th>
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*+ means, to the degree one side wants to achieve its objective, its objective is compatible with the other's objective.
- means, to the degree one side wants to achieve its objective, its objective is incompatible with the other's objective.

Figure A-1. Compatibility of NATO and Pact Objectives
(5) What tends to break through these subjective analyses is the idea that if the driving philosophy of the Soviets in CAC is to change the nature of East-West competition away from the military sphere, then it must act to cause the dissipation of NATO as a military alliance by removing the threat that keeps the Alliance together. The Soviets could try to remove the reason for NATO as a defensive alliance.

(6) Although at great risk in some Soviets' eyes, the Soviets could remove unilaterally from the ATTU all but a minimum watching force in East Europe, change the doctrine of the remaining forces to a clearly defensive one, and thereafter simply dare NATO to hold together after a few years of testing the permanence of the Soviet changes.

(7) To do this, however, would threaten Gorbachev's hold on his office. Soviet military leaders and skeptical political leaders could point to NATO capabilities, now the dominant force after the Soviet pull-out, and say that NATO intentions could change at any time and that the East would be in constant danger.

(8) Consequently, it would be better, and certainly more politically acceptable for the Soviets, to reduce their forces through CAC negotiations that also reduced NATO forces. In either case, the Soviets would be secure at home in Soviet Russia while risking loss of Soviet influence in East Europe needed to bolster favored regimes and prevent political unrest.

c. Another use shown in Figure A-2 is to compare the criteria one chooses to use to evaluate an arms control proposal with each of the relevant factors for NATO. As an aid to thinking, this series of juxtapositions simply says that when considering how criterion X should be applied to the terms of a potential agreement, take into account that it is sensitive to, or the product of, some series of factors. Conversely, any one factor, or any factor someone may believe is pertinent, can be traced to the criteria of which it is a part.

d. Figure A-2 shows how any one analyst might estimate how sensitive each criterion is to the set of relevant factors for NATO. Although each criterion might be sensitive in some way to all of the factors, the aim here is to try to identify the most important factors for each criterion.

(1) The criterion of Geographical Compensation is sensitive to the expected Eastern concern about Pact country stability during and following an arms reduction process that could drastically change Eastern force deployments. This should probably be understood as an Eastern limitation on how much it would be willing to compensate NATO for geographical disadvantages. On the other hand, spending pressures might limit how firmly NATO can stand against marginally acceptable Eastern offers. And, doctrines/strategies positions in NATO could limit agreements on geographical compensations if the Pact insists that NATO renounce, for example, Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) and AirLand battle.
### CRITERIA

1. GEOPOLITICAL POSITIONING
2. PROPORTIONATE OBEDIENCE
3. VERIFIABLE
4. MAINTAIN FORWARD DEFENSE
5. PERMIT MODERNIZATION
6. MAINTAIN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
7. FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES PARITY

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**S** = The likelihood of satisfying a criterion is especially sensitive to conditions within the factor.

**Figure A-2. Criteria and Factors**
(2) Another example is Verification, which here refers to the rigor of the verification regime. Verification would have to be more rigorous, from NATO's point of view, the more that other military missions (outside NATO) make a claim on Alliance members in the post-CACE. Verification is more important when NATO's strength in reserve is weak, and when NATO is less confident in its estimate of Pact capabilities. Also, verification might be more or less relaxed depending on NATO's warning/alert assumptions.

(3) A final example is to Permit Modernization as a component of CAC agreements. The scoring in the figure suggests that modernization will be a subject of talks and therefore a subject of trade-offs; that public opinion could play a role in NATO's position, especially on the modernization of theater nuclear systems; that some government agencies can be expected to strongly advocate modernization; that spending pressures and other military missions may limit modernization directly and indirectly through competition for the same budget, and so on.

e. Figure A-3 indicates NATO and Warsaw Pact objectives set against the list of relevant factors to try to uncover clashes between an objective and a factor.

f. This figure shows NATO and Pact objectives with these factors that tend to push for or against reaching any one objective. Here is one example from each of the two sets of objectives, discussing only the negative or constraining factors.

(1) The NATO objective of Revising Pact Offensive Doctrine could be a problem if NATO tries to establish it as a subject for CAC talks unless NATO's military doctrines also are subjects of the talks. Further, Pact country stability, to the extent this is a worry for the Soviets, is a greater worry if NATO is allowed to keep a doctrine the Soviets claim is offensive—or, to put it bluntly, one that looks like it would help NATO forces cross the border and exploit local troubles in East Germany or Czechoslovakia. Dual-capable systems, force structures, and doctrines in NATO are negatives in the sense that they are things the Pact would want revised in return for changing its doctrine to satisfy NATO. Finally, forward defense, coupling, and the reliance of some NATO members on nuclear weapons as the Alliance's principal deterrent will be unpersuasive inducements for the Pact to change its doctrine. Forward defense, in the NATO use of the term, means being close to the border in strength. It may be difficult to persuade the Pact to reduce its forces, withdraw many of them from the old NGA, and revise doctrine too, while NATO insists on maintaining a visible forward defense even though it also reduced overall forces.

(2) The Pact objective of weakening U.S.-European ties should run into obstacles from strongly held country and Alliance-wide positions on this feature of NATO strength; public opinions in Europe should be against it, excepting minority opinions; coalition governments such as the FRG's may not be able to stay in office if the ties are weakened; and Pact country stability plays a role in a reverse way in the sense that the Pact is
### FACTORS

**Key:**

- + Supports Objective
- - Does not support objective

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**Figure A.3 Objectives and Factors**
unlikely to persuade the United States to reduce its role in Europe unless it gives up a great deal in terms of Soviet deployments in East Europe. Dual-capable forces, a factor in coupling the United States to Europe, and the distance from North America to the central European borders are constraints on NATO's willingness to gain something from the East if the costs mean weaker ties. Similar reasoning applies to the self-perceived conventional strength of NATO compared to the Pact that would make NATO cautious about depleting the U.S. presence in Europe. In effect, the Pact may weaken U.S.-European ties only by making dramatic changes in its own forces in East Europe so that NATO could feel confident and assured even with markedly reduced U.S. forces in Europe.

Finally, in Figure A-4 an analyst can come back to the factors-against-factors matrix after using some other matrix to trace any one factor's connections to others. Explanations and examples follow each figure.

In Figure A-4 the factor interrelationships are, as might be expected, many and complicated. Consequently, by forcing a choice, the relationships were narrowed somewhat by identifying only the most influential components.

1. Country positions, for example, are thought here to be most sensitive to dual-capable systems in the sense that some Allies might be much more willing than others to include them in the negotiations. Country positions would be subject to positions, as in the United States, on doctrines and strategies such as FOFA and Airland battle, the latter of which remains a U.S., not a NATO, doctrine. And, country positions, especially the FRG's, should be strongly influenced by what has become a principle in NATO of forward defense.

2. Using this matrix in conjunction with one of the previous figures might go like this: Some objective or criterion seems to be dependent on the availability of allies' territory. Going to Figure A-4 and to availability of allies' territory on the A Axis, one finds that it is most sensitive to public opinions (because the majority publics in France and Norway, for example, presumably support their governments' positions). Next, going to public opinions on the A Axis, one finds them to be most sensitive to the dual-capable issue, to doctrines/strategies, and to forward defense. Theoretically, this tracing through the matrix could go on in a search for insights and ideas that might not otherwise have occurred to us. In this example, one of the obvious insights turns up—that forward defense is a principle that is very important in NATO because, among other reasons, French territory is not available to the Alliance for defense in depth and for the location of lines of communication (LOC). It is true that forward defense was a NATO principle long before France left the military organization of the Alliance, but the absence of French territory as a factor in the post-CAC situation also underlines the FRG's attachment to the principle.
ATLANTIC TO THE URALS (ATTU)

CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS (CST)
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

NATO CAPITALS

NATO

WARSAW PACT

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
1973-1975 35 NATIONS (CSCE)

BELGRADE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
1977-1978

MADRID FOLLOW-UP MEETING
1980-1983

VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING
1984-

STOCKHOLM (CDND)
1984-1986

HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE

GROUP OF 23

CONVENTIONAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS
73 NATIONS
AUTONOMOUS

CSCE NEGOTIATIONS
35 NATIONS

LEGEND
--- FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS
DIRECT RELATIONSHIP
NATO GUIDANCE
WARSAW PACT GUIDANCE

--- WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE PROCESS BUT AUTONOMOUS
APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY

ABM - Anti-Ballistic Missile
AC - Active Component (Army)
ACDA - U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ADI - Air Defense Initiative
ALCM - Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ALO - Authorized Level of Organization
ARSTAF - U.S. Army Staff
ASMP - Army Space Master Plan
AT - Anti-tank
ATTU - Atlantic to the Urals
BNS - Battalions
CAC - Conventional Arms Control
CDE - The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CINC's - Commanders-in-Chief (of Unified or Specified Commands)
CONUS - Continental United States
CSA - Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
CSBM(s) - Confidence- and Security-Building Measure(s)
CSCE - Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CS/CSS - Combat Support/Combat Service Support
CST - Conventional Stability Talks
DCA - Dual-Capable Aircraft
DCS - Dual-Capable Systems
DFE - Division Force Equivalent
DOD - U.S. Department of Defense
FOFA - Follow-on Forces Attack

FORSCOM - Forces Command

FRG - The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

GDR - The German Democratic Republic (East Germany)

GLCM - Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

HET - Heavy Equipment Transporters

IFV - Infantry Fighting Vehicle

INF - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

JCS - U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

LAW - Light Anti-Tank Weapon

LIC - Low Intensity Conflict

LOC - Lines of Communication

LRINF - Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces (see INF)

MARDEZ - Maritime Defense Zone

MBFR - Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction

MC 14/3 - (NATO) Military Committee Document Number 14/3

MICV - Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle

MRL - Multiple Rocket Launcher

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGA - NATO Guidelines Area

NNA - The Neutral and Nonaligned Nations of Europe.

NTM - National Technical Means

ODCSOPS - Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

OJCS - Organization of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

PIL - Pershing II, an intermediate-range, land-based ballistic missile.

Pact - The Warsaw Treaty Organization, or Warsaw Pact
POM - Program Objective Memorandum

POMCUS - Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets

RC - Army Reserve Components (National Guard and Army Reserve)

RGTS - Regiments

RSTA - Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SALT - Strategic Arms Limitations Talks

SDI - Strategic Defense Initiative

SECDEF - U.S. Secretary of Defense

SLCM - Sea-Launched Cruise Missile

SNF - Short-Range Nuclear Forces

SOF - Special Operations Forces

SOUTHCOM - U.S. Southern Command

SSM - Surface-to-Surface Missiles

START - Strategic (Nuclear) Arms Reduction Talks

TOE - Table of Organization and Equipment

TPFDL - Time-Phased Force Deployment List

TRADOC - U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

UK - United Kingdom

USAREUR - U.S. Army Europe

USARSPACECOM - U.S. Army Space Command

USCG - U.S. Coast Guard

USG - U.S. Government

USSPACECOM - U.S. Space Command

WP - Warsaw Pact
**Title**: How to Think About Conventional Arms Control: A Framework

**Authors**: Lieutenant Colonel (P) David E. Shaver, Dr. Michael F. Altfeld, Dr. Regina Gaillard, Mr. John Scott

**Performing Organization**: Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

**Report Date**: 1 October 1988

**Number of Pages**: 128

**Abstract**: A new "Atlantic to the Urals" (ATTU) conventional arms control forum, currently known as "Conventional Stability Talks" (CST) will be replacing the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks. This study examines the background of conventional arms control; establishes principles for "how to think about conventional arms control" (CAC); discusses 21 major issues in CAC to include the positions of the relevant actors on each issue; describes a framework of seven core criteria to be used in USG position development and proposal and counterproposal evaluation analysis; projects probable outcomes of the CST.
20. Abstract (cont.)

process; and presents possible uses for returning force structure in preparing for the post-CAC environment.