LEO MARQUEZ: AIR FORCE LOGISTICIAN

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
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TITLE: Leo Marquez: Air Force Logistician

AUTHOR: Ronald M. Nipper, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Remarks on the career of Lieutenant General Leo Marquez identify some techniques of effective leadership which he used and lessons learned from his experiences. The paper is based on an oral interview with General Marquez which was conducted in January 1988, six months after his retirement. The paper traces his career chronologically from his early childhood in New Mexico, his training as a fighter pilot, his logistics leadership positions, and his final position as the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Engineering. It concludes with a short summary of some of the lessons learned.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald M. Nipper (M.A., Webster University) has been involved in logistics since he was a Second Lieutenant. His first logistics duties were with the Strategic Air Command as a Munitions Officer. After serving in Thailand and at two CONUS locations, he spent one year in the Pentagon in the Air Staff Training (ASTRA) program and then spent three years at the San Antonio Air Logistics Center. He served as a maintenance officer with the Third Tactical Fighter Wing in the Philippines. Following graduation from the Armed Forces Staff College, he spent four years in the Logistics staff at Headquarters Air Force. Lieutenant Colonel Nipper is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1988.
This paper would not have been possible without the kindness and cooperation of Lieutenant General (Ret) Leo Marquez. On 20 and 21 January 1988, General Marquez took the time to participate in a lengthy interview with the author; this interview is the basis for this paper. Unless otherwise noted, all information and quotes in this paper are from this interview. The original tapes of the interview are located at the Reference Division of the Air Force Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

It was the author's privilege to work for and with General Marquez while at the Air Staff from 1983 though 1987. During this time, General Marquez demonstrated his excellent leadership abilities on a daily basis to those of us who were his action officers. His open communications with us and his keen vision of the future will long be remembered as key ingredients in his leadership. This paper is an attempt to document some of his contributions to the Air Force and to honor a great Air Force Logistician.
LEO MARQUEZ: AIR FORCE LOGISTICIAN

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

During World War II, Leo Marquez and his brother watched as fighters and bombers took off from Albuquerque's runway 18 and flew over their father's farm. It was then that he decided that was what he wanted to do -- fly airplanes. Little did he know that within 45 years he would be one of only 40 Lieutenant Generals in the Air Force and would be working in the Pentagon as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Engineering, Headquarters United States Air Force. How does a rural farm boy become a senior leader in the Air Force? What lessons did he learn along the way? What can we learn from his experience? These are some of the questions that will be answered in this paper.
CHAPTER 2

ASSIGNMENTS

EDUCATION AND COMMISSIONING

General Leo Marquez learned the value of work early. The seeds of effective leadership took root early in his life. Many of the lessons learned on the farm from his father would help him throughout his life. When General Marquez was ten years old, his father gave him a brush and told him to paint the garage. It wasn't that hard if one had the right attitude.

After graduating from high school in Belen in 1949, he headed south for Las Cruces and attended what is now New Mexico State University. After five years of enjoyable study, he had earned 180 credits and a degree in zoology. He was preparing to become a medical doctor, but when the opportunity came to join the Air Force and fly, he couldn't pass it up. He was a member of the Reserve Officer Training Corps and entered the Air Force in the fall of 1954 just after his marriage in July.

Pilot training started in the Piper Cub and then moved to the T-6 Texan prior to earning wings. General Marquez then went to the basic fighter program at Greenville,
Mississippi, and spent over 140 hours in the T-28 and the T-33 aircraft. After additional combat crew training, he was recalled to Greenville and was assigned there for three years as an instructor pilot. He finally got his wish when he was assigned to the F-86.

BITBURG AIR BASE, WEST GERMANY

While the overseas family housing of today is not always the best in every respect, it is much better than what the Marquez family had in 1958. Their off-base family quarters in Germany had no hot running water and only a tub in which to wash clothes. Making the situation more difficult was the fact that the family had two children under two years of age and one more on the way. Fortunately, the exchange rate was very favorable and the Marquez family could afford to hire the help of a local maid.

General Marquez flew the F-102 with the 525th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Bitburg Air Base for two years.

FROM FLYING TO LOGISTICS

In 1961, General Marquez was grounded for medical reasons and had to choose a new career field. Since he was still in love with airplanes and had spent many hours with the maintenance troops on the flightline, the choice was easy. In October of 1961, he returned to the United States and entered the Aircraft Maintenance School at Chanute AFB. This was just...
when the Air Force was pushing a centralized maintenance concept as defined in Air Force Manual 66-1. When he completed school, he was a walking 66-1 missionary; he later was thankful that he had had some prior maintenance experience and remembered how it used to be done before the strong centralization emphasis. General Marquez left Chanute AFB in the spring of 1962 and went to Washington state.

MCCHORD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

His first job as a maintenance officer was at the F-106 interceptor unit at McChord AFB. He started working in the propulsion branch as the assistant officer-in-charge. After the Chief of Maintenance noticed that he had cleaned up the bench stock area, General Marquez was selected to replace the materiel control officer as the new supply officer. While he did not like this, he was promised that there would be no mention of it on his records.

This was the time of the Cuban missile crisis. In October 1962, the F-106 interceptors were launched to several bases for survival; most of the time was spent just waiting to see what would happen. One of the significant impressions of this period was the lack of information. The idea of adequate communications and information flow would stay with General Marquez throughout his career.

General Marquez, then a captain, became the Organizational Maintenance Squadron Commander in 1964. This was a bad time
for people programs. There had been only minimal pay raises and some Air Force people were living in poverty. Truant officers would call and ask why some school-aged children of squadron personnel did not come to school. Upon investigating, it was found that the families could not afford shoes for their children, and the kids didn't want to go to school with bare feet.

This was also the time of the draft and some people were in the Air Force just to avoid the Army. Motivation was difficult because some personnel wanted nothing more than to be released from their commitment to the Air Force. After trying to work with a first sergeant who believed in the big hammer method of motivation, General Marquez eventually exchanged him for an individual who believed that people would respond if they were treated right. The new first sergeant started to help people and believed like his commander that you must take care of your people if you expected them to work. This change in leadership produced wonders. Within six months, the squadron had changed from one with multiple delinquency problems to the top squadron on the base. General Marquez had focused on his people and the results were outstanding.

While a commander at McChord, General Marquez clearly learned the crucial importance of talking to his people and keeping them informed. When he had his first commander's call, the original first sergeant spent about 20 minutes berating everyone for a variety of minor problems. General Marquez decided that that would be the last time that ever
occurred. The first change was to have commander's call
three or four times on the same day so squadron personnel
could select the one which fit their work schedules. The
location was changed from the base theatre to the hangar. It
was basically an information session where the results from
last month were reviewed and the plans for the next month
were explained. Before long, people from other squadrons
were coming to his commander's calls just because they
received information that they could not get from any other
source.

In the fall of 1963, the F-106s from McChord were sent
north to help in the defense of Alaska. General Marquez led a
group of 75 maintenance workers as they took nine aircraft
and set up a two-aircraft alert at three different locations.
It was during this temporary duty that the great earthquake
of 1964 occurred. On 27 March 1964, Alaska fell victim to
the largest earthquake ever to hit North America -- 8.6 on
the Richter scale. Within ten minutes, all the deployed
workers were in the hangar in which the aircraft were parked.
The large overhead lights had fallen down on the aircraft
wings and there was fuel leaking onto the hangar floor. After
the power was turned off, which was accomplished just before
all power went dead, the maintenance crew began to mop up
the mess. Within five hours, the area was under some sort of
order again -- even though aftershocks of 3-4 on the scale
were still occurring approximately every 20 seconds. When
General Marquez walked over to the host unit, he found a
different situation. They had not been able to contact any of
their people who were not at the work site; they were more concerned about their families and homes and not with fixing airplanes. "If we ever have to fight before evacuating non-combatants, we would really have a tough problem", was a thought that quickly occurred to General Marquez. (1-26)

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

General Marquez was selected to go to Squadron Officer School while he was assigned at Greenville as a flight instructor; this was delayed one year because he was on the standardization board. When the next year rolled around, he was in Germany and could not return for school. However, he was able to attend Air Command And Staff College (ACSC) in the fall of 1966 following his duty at McChord AFB.

When he started this ten-month course, he set two goals: to graduate as a Distinguished Graduate from ACSC and to be on the Dean's List in his master of science degree in business administration from the George Washington University. He achieved both. He agreed with two other carpool members that they would work each day as a normal 8 to 5 duty day regardless of the ACSC schedule. This resulted in many hours spent in the library reading and completing work early. When not in the library, there were always the classes for the advanced degree two nights a week. The accomplishment of these goals was basically a time management effort. It was possible to do but required a high degree of self-discipline. There was also a cost. The amount of time
required to accomplish these objectives reduced the time allowed with his family. Since his follow-on assignment to Vietnam was known at the time, there was a real concern that he should spend more time with the family.

With his experience with the maintenance squadron at McChord as a backdrop, it was natural that his thesis at ACSC should be on motivation. He recommended that the training of maintenance managers include the study of human behavior and that the management philosophy of the Air Force reflect an awareness of the needs of individuals and the conflicts induced by the organization. (2-68)

BIEN HOA AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

It was very interesting fighting a war and doing it with peacetime rules. At Bien Hoa, Vietnam, there were Inspector General (IG) teams coming over to be sure the rules were being followed. In the midst of a war, there was a very difficult maintenance organization; the Chief of Maintenance had the maintenance staff, and the specialists in the Field, Munitions, and Avionics Squadrons. But the 17 different squadrons all had their own aircraft crew chiefs and bomb loaders. Half of the maintenance people worked for the Chief of Maintenance and the other half worked for the Deputy Commander for Operations through the Squadron Commanders. The way it was made to work was to get all the line chiefs together and let each man run his own area; if they had any problems, they were to call the Chief of Maintenance. Central
control was stopped. This was so hard for some of the die-hard centralized maintenance people that one chief master sergeant actually had to be sent home. A major lesson learned was that you must be organized to support the mission; the mission should drive the organization.

Another unique organizational change was the establishment of a flightline supply point. Since such a thing was strictly prohibited in a centralized maintenance concept, it had to be set up without the knowledge of the Chief of Maintenance. Even then, it was called a pre-issue point. When the quick response of the supply point became an obvious reason why the sortie production was going up, the concept was finally approved. It was just another example of doing what you can to make the man on the flightline able to do his job. "Get the responsibility down to the lowest level and get the system off his back so he can do his job".

In January 1968, Bien Hoa was locked in a garrison mentality. There had been no attack on the base since September 1967 and in that instance a few mortars had landed a long way off with little or no damage. The base was totally unprepared for the massive rocket attack at 2 AM which announced the start of the TET offensive. Since the ground attack didn't start until one hour later, the perimeter forces had some chance to get ready. Without this one-hour delay in the ground attack, it is doubtful that the base could have been defended. This was the beginning of several days of mass confusion. The rumor mill was rampant. The base cleanup effort was finally started around 6 AM, but there was
no information on what could be expected next. The following evening the rumors began again. Someone had started issuing M-16 rifles to everybody. Fearing that these would just result in self-inflicted casualties, General Marquez ordered all his maintenance folks to turn in the weapons. "The lesson to be learned here is that we don't think much about confusion and the actions that must be taken after an attack." (3-22)

CANADIAN EXCHANGE OFFICER

General Marquez learned a lot from the Canadians during his next tour as an exchange officer in Ottawa in 1968 and 1969. He had seen many Air Force activities which involved people spending a lot of time running around in a frenetic activity cycle. Everybody was busy doing something. The fetish was that the busier you were, the better you were. The lesson came home when General Marquez went to work the first morning around 6 AM and finally found an open side door. After he groped through the dark building, found his desk, and was busy reading, a warrant officer came in and asked what he was doing there. When General Marquez explained that he was just working, the warrant officer said he thought someone had left their lights on. After three days of this type of work, the Canadian Lieutenant Colonel called General Marquez (now a Major) down to his office and said that he had heard some bad things about the American exchange officer.
When it was explained to General Marquez that he was coming to work too early, his response was that the US Air Force did it that way. The Canadian responded that he had watched Americans work and knew that was true, but that in Canada they did things more slowly but they only did them once. This was the way the system worked: The warrant officers came in around 7:45 to turn on the lights and get organized. The captains come in around 8:00. Major Marquez should have come in around 8:15 and the lieutenant colonel around 8:30. By the time the colonel came in at 8:45, the staff had sorted through all the distribution and were ready to go to work. General Marquez's comment was that that was a novel way to work. "In the US Air Force, the captains came in at 5:00 and wait for the NCOs to show up -- because they are smarter than we are. There is an important lesson here; activity for activity's sake is not worth much."

The Canadian experience also taught General Marquez another lesson. Instead of solving our problems, Americans tend to overpower them with dollars. The American solution to solving the Canadian F-104 and F-101 problems was always too expensive. "Instead of always pulling our dollar arrow out of our quiver, we must pull out the brain arrow."

A rare opportunity came when the Canadians were trading their old F-101s for the newer US F-101s. This exchange required almost $38M, which had to be approved by the Canadian Treasury Board. As the system manager for the F-101, General Marquez was the one chosen to present the briefing to the Board. The newly elected Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau,
was a member of the Board and was amazed that an American
officer was working on his staff. The briefing was a success.

After working in Canada for two years, General Marquez
decided to extend. Prior to his request, he received a call
from his former wing commander at Bien Hoa. Major General
George W. McLaughlin had been promoted to Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics at Headquarters Tactical Air Command
(TAC). When advised that Marquez planned to stay another year
in Canada, the general sent word not to submit any extension
request. Orders came quickly for an assignment to TAC.

HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

When General Marquez arrived at Langley AFB, he was
tasked to try to solve some of the multiple F-111 support
problems. While the aircraft overall was a very capable
system, there were many logistics problems. The D models were
now in storage because the avionics system was not on line.
The windshield, among other things, was breaking when a
birdstrike occurred. Working with the Flight Dynamics
Laboratory, he helped develop the first bird-impact-resistant
windshield. There were also major problems with fuel leaks.

At this point in General Marquez's career, he was a
16-year major and had pretty well decided that the Air Force
did not appreciate his talents. Some of his contemporaries
were wearing silver lieutenant colonel leaves and some were
even selected for promotion to colonel. He had therefore
decided to complete his Air Force work at the twenty-year point and then to teach school. After his arrival at Headquarters TAC, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and then was selected for below-the-primary zone promotion to colonel a short nine months later.

SACRAMENTO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

Shortly after his selection for promotion to colonel, he followed General McLaughlin to the Sacramento Air Logistics Center at McClellan AFB. It was here that he again worked on the F-111 system and eventually became the System Program Manager. During this time, he traveled extensively to try to support his system. After briefing people from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the TAC Commander, Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), and the other Air Logistics Centers, he eventually received the support he needed to resolve many of the F-111 problems and in the process became well known.

Of particular interest were the briefing sessions with the "tidewater alligator", General Robert J. Dixon. On General Marquez' first occasion to brief the TAC commander, General Dixon started the briefing by urging anyone who couldn't stand the site of blood to leave. When it became apparent that General Marquez knew what he was talking about and was accepting personal responsibility to fix the identified problems, the briefing went well. In fact, through
the next several years, General Dixon and General Marquez made eight friendly wagers on specific support problems. General Marquez was pleased to win seven of those wagers. In addition to these friendly victories, he was also recognized with the System Manager of the Year Trophy in 1974.

WARNER-ROBINS AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

While thoroughly enjoying his job in the summer of 1975, General Marquez received a call one afternoon which told him that he would be moving in 10 days. The next day he found out that it would be to the Director of Materiel Management position at Warner-Robins Air Logistic Center.

It was here that he observed Bob Short solve problems. Bob Short was a civilian; he was not in the Air Force. His simple idea was to have a group of problem solvers walk around identifying problems and then fix them. Quite simply, he would get good ideas from Air Force people, use his money to identify a fix, and then sell the fix back to the Air Force.

About the same time, General David C. Jones, USAF Chief of Staff, started the Productivity, Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (PRAM) program. There was $100M in this program for the first year, and it was a way to take Bob Short's system and make it work for the Center. General Marquez made speeches all over the Air Logistics Center (ALC) urging people to submit ideas because the money was now
available to implement them. Since many of the other ALCs did not have any immediate projects ready for PRAM money, the Warner-Robins Center received nearly 90% of the first year money. This experience identified a wealth of good ideas that were within the workforce; all that was needed was to get the ideas out into the open so they could be implemented.

General Marquez did not attend any Senior Service School. When he was selected to attend, he was deeply involved with the problems of the F-111 and could not be released. As a back-up, he did complete the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) course by correspondence. After he arrived at Warner-Robins, he was selected by the AFLC commander to attend the Executive Course at Carnegie-Mellon University. This was a very good school, but seemed to General Marquez to have an overemphasis on the next profit and loss statement. The planning horizon seemed to be only six months; as a result, many good ideas were thrown out of the management process.

Returning to Warner-Robins, General Marquez started a program to make the Materiel Management Directorate the best in AFLC. When comparing his directorate with the others in the command, he found that his was on the bottom in every indicator except one, and in this one his was number four out of five. The first task was to educate everyone that they were not doing very well. This came as a shock to many people because they simply did not know; no one had told them. Once everyone knew what the facts were, there was a natural tendency by many of them to do better. But there was a group
In middle management, referred to as "the wall", that simply would not support the efforts of rapid improvement. Meetings with this group would bring polite responses but no change in action. General Marquez realized that only peer pressure would bring "the wall" around. He bought hundreds of round pin-on stickers that had printed on them, "You gotta believe." Whenever anyone did anything remotely above and beyond the call of duty, they were presented with one of these stickers by their division chief. Eventually, the majority of the people had these on their desks. Slowly the charts started to show movement.

The next step was to have a specific goal by a specific date. Another order for stickers went in and this time the slogan was, "Number One by One Sept." The whole base was soon involved in this effort towards being the best. When the first of September came around, Warner-Robins led in 10 out of the 11 categories and was a close second in the last area. When October came, they led in all areas. "The key to this motivation was to get people's interest, make a challenge, and make it meaningful."

The F-15 was also fielded when General Marquez was at Warner-Robins. The problems on this aircraft were minimized by a coincidence. When General Marquez had worked on the F-111, the aircraft Program Manager was General Robert C. Mathis. General Mathis had been named the F-15 Program Manager at the same time that General Marquez was at the ALC which was responsible to support and manage the fielding of this new system. One of the first things that these two did...
was to get together and review their joint experiences on the F-111. There were many lessons learned that they identified and applied to the F-15. As a result, the transition of the F-15 aircraft to the active Air Force was very smooth.

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE

After spending two short years at Warner-Robins AFB bringing the Directorate of Materiel Management to the top spot in the command, it was time for the Air Staff. It was another quick move with only seven days notice before he was expected to be working in the Pentagon.

General Marquez started as the Deputy Director of Maintenance and Supply (AF/LEY). After eight months, he was moved to the Directorate of Logistics Plans and Programs (AF/LEX). It was now the summer of 1978, and since the Director of LEX had not arrived, General Marquez, a colonel at the time, was the primary defender of the logistics portion of the budget. The fiscal year 80 budget was the issue of the day. It was the worst budget year in US Air Force history, with major cuts across the board. The total budget was only $37B. In this environment, General Marquez found himself the logistics advocate in the Air Staff Board filled with brigadier and major generals. Despite the terrible struggles with the cut drills, General Marquez never received unfair treatment due to his relatively junior rank. During these extremely difficult times, General Marquez
realized that some sort of integration shop needed to be established in LEX to track the multiple changes that occurred in any budget formulation process. It was then that the Budget Integration Office (LEXI) was established.

The budget was extremely painful that year. There was no funding for war reserve spares and less than half of what the Air Force needed even for peacetime spares. In the midst of this situation, General Marquez was so concerned that he ended up speaking with Secretary of the Air Force Hans Mark on the issue. While the funding priorities were not changed, it was clear that General Marquez had done all he could to try to save the support areas of the budget.

"There was no immediate effect on the readiness levels of the Air Force, but in three years the full impact of the poor support funding became very evident. This was the time that the F-15, A-10, and the F-16 were bought and delivery started. Unfortunately, the dire predictions all came true; because of inflation, it was even worse. We were flat on our backs in 1981 and 1982. We were losing people left and right and we didn't have the spare parts for our aircraft. It was only through the full funding of the early Reagan years that we were able to come out of that difficult time."
Another challenge was waiting when General Marquez, now a brigadier general, was welcomed to AFLC by General Bryce Poe II in June 1979. As the deputy chief of plans and programs, General Marquez was given the task of fixing the old computer systems. With the failure and cancellation of the Advanced Logistics System in 1974, AFLC had no comprehensive program to resolve the growing problems with the various computer systems. The efforts to resolve the problem were continuing, but they were going nowhere. After struggling a year with this effort, it was decided that the only way to solve the problem was to start with a clean blackboard and identify each of the many distinct logistics flows that were computerized. Eventually, 16 distinct processes were identified which could be broken up into manageable pieces. Once an overall structure was identified, it was taken to the Air Staff and presented as a potential program. By this time, the AFLC computer problem had been dragging on for over five years, and the Air Staff was sick of hearing about it. General Marquez presented the plan and said he was responsible to make it happen. To the surprise of many, it was approved as a program. This program became the AFLC Logistics Management System (LMS).

The area of planning had been of particular interest to General Marquez when he was the Logistics Planner and Programmer at the Air Staff. Unfortunately, the overwhelming
workload associated with the budget process prevented any action on the long-range planning process. When he got to AFLC as the planner, he remembered that there wasn't much happening in this area. After searching all over the country for an effective long-range plan, he found none that was suitable. Most plans were put on the shelf once they were printed. General Marquez recognized that what was needed was a planning process and not a specific plan. "We needed an ongoing process that would change with the times and not just sit on a shelf and collect dust." Eventually, the concept of a revolving planning process was developed that would be continual. This process was institutionalized in Future Look, logistics long-range planning; this is an annual meeting at which Air Force logisticians look 15 years ahead and try to adjust what they are doing today to prepare for the future.

COMMANDER, OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER

Another sudden move came when General Marquez was selected to command the Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill AFB, Utah, in July 1981. He was advised on a Thursday and moved on Sunday. The chance to command an Air Logistics Center is the high note of a logistician's career. Here would be the opportunity to try to do all the things that had been thought about through the years.

General Marquez was excited about this opportunity. His approach to command was very different than when he was last a commander -- way back in the 60s when he had a maintenance
squadron. The first thing to do was to get rapport with the people. It was very important to be forthright with them in the beginning. He told them clearly what he wanted and what he believed in. He knew that to accomplish the mission, one must establish good working relations with the civilians since they were the vast majority of the work force.

Any large organization needs slogans or a theme that it can identify with and rally around. In Ogden, the theme selected by General Marquez was Spruce Log. The whole idea was to spruce up the logistics area. It involved a major cleaning up of the entire base. Working with the union, each organization had a committee which planned what specific action would be taken to clean their area once the snow melted. When the spring finally arrived, everyone was ready and jumped on the effort.

Approximately 700 young people were employed at Hill AFB every summer. Instead of placing them in make-work jobs throughout the base, nearly all of them were placed on painting details all around the base. There were some who initially quit because they did not like the hard work, but the overwhelming majority eagerly sought to make their work meaningful. The project was a success because everybody was involved from the beginning.

Working with the union was a different experience. When a new union president was elected, General Marquez invited him for an informal lunch at the Officers' Club. While there was some concern by the labor relations people that this would set a precedent, the meeting was held anyway. This was the
start of monthly meetings between General Marquez and the union president. In addition, a quarterly meeting was held with the union stewards. The primary reason for these meetings was to keep the lines of communication open. Of the first nine union complaints, eight of them were the fault of management. Once management recognized that General Marquez would not tolerate a management whitewash of a genuine problem, the attitude changed. There were no more union problems.

Shortly after General Marquez' arrival at Ogden, one of the local television stations started reporting that the base was a den of thieves and that people had no control over their assets. When General Marquez' phone calls to the reporter were not answered, he called the station manager. Finally, the manager agreed to identify the witnesses to this story and allowed General Marquez to respond. It turned out that there were three disgruntled former employees, one that had been retired for twelve years, that were saying these things. Their facts were nothing more than old fables. "The message to be heard is that whenever we are criticized for something, we should not automatically hunker down and go on the defensive. Face the charges, find the facts, and go on the offensive." General Marquez wrote an editorial in the base paper in which he stated the findings and told the people they should be rightfully outraged that someone could tell lies about them and accuse them of stealing. Despite the initially bad publicity, it was used as an opportunity to support the people who were performing admirably year after year.

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DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, LOGISTICS AND ENGINEERING

In the spring of 1983, General and Mrs. Marquez were called to Washington to be interviewed by Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr because the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Engineering position was to be vacated that summer. In June, General Marquez was notified that he had been selected for the job and that he would be moving to the Pentagon again.

The first major issue that needed to be solved was the spare part horror stories. The day General Marquez arrived and walked into his new office, his predecessor was working on a paper dealing with the spare parts issues. After making some changes to the paper, it was quickly carried to the Secretary of Defense and it became the SECDEF's 35 Point Program to fix the spare parts problem. Instead of trying to defend the way the Air Force went out and looked for the problem. An Air Force Management Analysis Group (AFMAG) for spare parts was formed and headed by Major General Dewey K.K. Lowe. With over 100 fellow logisticians, General Lowe studied the entire spare parts system in 60 days and produced a report that contained 173 specific recommendations. Another study was conducted on support equipment and an additional 128 recommendations were identified. The long and tedious process to implement these recommendations then began. A General Officer Steering Committee, chaired by General Marquez, was formed to review
each specific action prior to closing any recommendation. The entire system was changed. However, because the Defense Department cannot always buy its products in a competitive market, the cost accrual system is still used. The potential for abuse is always there as long as we use this cost accrual system.

A second major issue was Reliability and Maintainability (R&M). There was a growing frustration by many that the parts the Air Force used simply should not fail as often as they did. General Marquez asked the RAND Corporation to do a study to find out what would be the savings in spare parts and manpower if the Air Force was able to increase the reliability of any given system by any amount. The findings were startling. If the reliability of the engine propulsion system and the fire control system were doubled, the Air Force would have a reduction of fifty percent in spare parts requirements and forty percent in manpower requirements. All of a sudden the forty TAC fighter wing goal was possible with the same amount of money. Working with General Russ, General Leaf, and General Welch, a letter was prepared for signature by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force. This letter established Reliability and Maintainability as important parts of the acquisition process. The next step was to convince the world that the Air Force was serious. The word quickly spread that no program manager could go to the Air Force Council and not talk about R&M. The contractors started to believe when the ALR-74 system was cancelled due to lack of reliability and the LANTIRN navigation pod was
deferred due to low reliability.

There are three things critical for good R&M: good design, good piece parts, and then good workmanship in the assembly process. This message was carried across the nation as General Marquez spoke to many audiences concerned with Air Force capability. To ensure the proper emphasis was given to this area, General Marquez established a new office at the Air Staff to work nothing but the R&M issue. This office is led by a general officer.

Another major theme that General Marquez constantly worked was the idea of Blue Two. The concept recognizes that the individuals at the lower end of the organization frequently have brilliant ideas about how to improve what they are doing. We must bring those ideas to the foreground so they can be evaluated and implemented. "There is a vast reservoir of good ideas that must be tapped. If we can do it, there will be a rising tide that will lift all ships."

Working with Congress was another challenge. The same principle of effective communication was used again. General Marquez started a system where the key members and their staffs were provided logistics information. The Logistics Coalition included members from eleven states. (4-8) The key thing was to keep them informed -- both good news and bad news. While he did not lobby Congress, he took their staffs to Air Force depots to educate them about our logistics systems. Whenever he had a problem, he made one phone call to the Hill and soon had congressional staffers from eleven states working on the issue.

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RETIREMENT

General Marquez retired from active duty in July 1987. When reflecting back over a long career, he stated that he believes in the value of trench time. He would limit the number of below the zone promotions to only one in each career. Only by spending time in the trenches, the low levels of the organization, can one develop the toughness that is required in many future assignments.

Upon his retirement, he stated that he was highly privileged to have been given the opportunity to spend 33 years serving his country in a way that was meaningful and satisfying to him. The highest honor to him would be if some of the ideas that he started would be of such value that they would last a decade.

While General Marquez is no longer an active duty general, his example will long be active in the minds of the officers who worked with him.
When one looks at the successful accomplishments of General Marquez, one theme consistently comes through. In any organization, he had a clear perception of the mission and the ability to focus the efforts of his subordinates on this mission. Once he was sure that the mission was clearly understood, he then used effective management and leadership techniques to motivate people. Many of these techniques are lessons learned that are applicable today.

General Marquez used some principles of leadership that have recently become very popular. The idea of effective communications repeatedly comes to the forefront of his successful leadership. In every organization, he was concerned about telling the troops what he knew and passing the word to the people at all levels.

Through numerous combat experiences and natural disasters he learned that Air Force members must think about what they would do in these situations. While the uncertainties will be many, a basic plan of action is still required.

In Vietnam he learned that the only way to accomplish the mission was to let the man on the scene run the show. Give him the responsibility, the resources, and get out of his
way. In addition, the organization must be driven by the mission, not the reverse.

His Canadian experience highlighted the fact that Air Force managers must use more brainpower and less dollars. In addition, activity in itself should not be the goal; it may be time to slow down, first think through the process, and then do any action just once.

Because of his performance in Vietnam, he was selected by his former boss to work a difficult problem at TAC Headquarters. The best job he ever had was the one he was in. The emphasis should always be on the current job, not the one five years away.

General Marquez frequently attributed much of his success to outstanding people that worked with him. It is important to select the best people.

Personal responsibility makes things happen. General Marquez achieved where others failed because he stood up and said he was personally responsible.

When criticized in the press, a good Air Force leader takes the offensive. "Get the facts, solve the problem, and let your people know what is really going on."

The experiences of General Marquez provide clear examples of how to get the job done. For those of us still in the Air Force, the responsibility is ours to learn from him and "continually renew the Air Force."
NOTES


BIBLIOGRAPHY


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