CINCs AND PPBS: PARTICIPATION OR INFLUENCE?

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1988
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by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
May 1988
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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: CINCS and PPBS: Participation or Influence?

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CINC participation in the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System has recently been increased, but whether CINCs can influence their programs remains at question. Following a review of the historical evolution of PPBS, the author describes the participants from the Military Departments and the OSD staff, to Congressional committees. Then the entire process is reviewed in sequential steps with emphasis on what needs to be done by CINC staffs to influence the outcome of their programs. It is structured to provide a background knowledge to the staff action officers working PPBS related activities for the CINC. Four specific recommendations are presented to assist the CINC staffs in setting up the environment to influence the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel John F. Bridges (B.S., The Citadel; M.Ed., South Dakota State University) has served consecutive joint tours at HQ USCINCPAC and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At each he served under the Director, Command, Control, and Communications as a facilitator for actions progressing through the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. Previously, he has been assigned to a variety of other positions from C-141 transports, to Computer Operations at the NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex, to H-1 helicopter missile site support.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"PPBS is not an embodiment of rationality; it is irrational. If the goal is to alter the allocation of resources in a more productive way, or to generate better analyses than those used, PPBS does not produce these results. ... PPBS sacrifices the rationality of ends to the rationality of means." 1

Regardless of Aaron Wildavsky's opinion of 1975, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is the method used by the Department of Defense to determine the defense budget to be forwarded to the President. The process starts with planning of long range objectives to meet national security policy and the anticipated threats. Next, it defines the resources required to meet those objectives. It then allocates fiscal resources to selected objectives. This process has been the basis for PPBS since its implementation in 1961 by then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and has undergone only evolutionary changes since that time. But despite these changes, one problem has been the involvement of the Unified and Specified Commanders-in-Chief.

In 1984, the "participation" of the CINC's in the PPBS was formally increased, at least to the extent that the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum stating such. 2 This paper takes a look at PPBS history, and then proposes that the "increased participation" of the CINC's in PPBS, as outlined since 1984, has not really increased the Unified and Specified Commands "Influence" in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The bottom line is that the new "participation" does not necessarily equal "Influence."

Just like a tree grows its root structure to support itself, so must the CINC's develop a sound basis for their requirements. The failure is that CINC staffs tend
to grow their structure like the tree which always experiences a west wind, only to be blown over when a wind suddenly comes from the east. Most people would say that the major battle for program resourcing is in the Service's Program Objective Memoranda (POMs), and the requirement to fight that battle is justified. But what is forgotten are the other winds: the planning inputs to Defense Guidance; the number balancing budget review by OSD and OMB; and more importantly, the congressional committee hearings and conferences for defense authorizations and appropriations.

In order to improve CINC influence in PPBS, this paper is directed to the CINC staffs. Its objective is to build a background knowledge in the PPBS process and to make recommendations to CINCs and their staffs, that will help them understand and better influence the system. It will do this by outlining the ground rules for the process. Chapter II provides a brief historical look at PPBS. The important events which must be understood by staff officers are discussed. The purpose is to show that throughout the history of PPBS, the changes have been evolutionary, not revolutionary. Chapter III provides background on the participants which are significant to the process. It also defines the DOD system as well as the Congressional budgeting process. Chapter IV establishes a stated goal and then steps through a sequential flow of the system, with emphasis on the influence points to accomplish that goal. It is a PPBS road map and shows how the CINCs might participate more effectively.

Finally, some specific recommendations are offered for increasing CINC influence.

**ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE**

"The ultimate objective of PPBS shall be to provide the operational commanders in chief the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints." 3
CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF PPBS: 1960-1987

People like to operate in the "here and now." But, history is important when you want to understand why something is the way it is. The PPBS of today just didn't happen yesterday; but neither was it like today's process.

In 1960, the involvement of the Secretary of Defense in the Department of Defense budget was largely limited to dividing budget ceilings among the military departments and reducing the budgets if the services exceeded the allocation. The programs built by the military departments were prepared in line with their own individual interests, with little outside guidance. Likewise, when reductions were made, there was little action on the part of the Offices of the Secretary of Defense to review the "programmatic" aspects of the military departments budget submissions.

A Joint DoD/GAO working group on PPBS noted this lack of involvement by the Secretary of Defense and identified several weaknesses, including major flaws related to the current CINC participation problem; highlights include:

- Budget decisions were largely independent of plans.
- There was duplication of effort among the services in various areas.
- Services felt they were entitled to their fixed share of the budget regardless of the effectiveness of their programs or overall defense needs.
- There was little analytical basis on which the Secretary of Defense could either make choices among competing service proposals or assess the need for duplication in service programs.

Congressional officials also saw some problems and were applying pressure for a system to be developed that could provide a better understanding of issues which concerned them. Namely:

- The long term commitments that they were making to new, and qualitatively different weapons systems. ... There was no systematic way to assess or
control the outyear costs of these decisions.
- The appropriate balance of resources allocated among missions.
- The divisive competition among the services for new missions as new weapons blurred the traditional delineation of roles and missions.

The Sixties: McNamara Era

It was this environment Robert S. McNamara met when he became the Secretary of Defense. From his own centralized management style he knew that he could not accept it and set out to make changes. His first step was to recruit Charles Hitch and Alan Enthoven. The first elements of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System which they came to install in the Department of Defense were actually borrowed from a product which they developed in earlier research at the Rand Corporation.

The problem facing Hitch and Enthoven was to introduce cost considerations into planning. They were searching for a way to stop "blue-sky planning" and to integrate planning and budgeting.

"They wanted to use the program budget to bridge the gap between military planners, which cared about requirements but not about resources, and budget people, who were narrowly concerned with financial costs but not necessarily with effective polices." 6

Philip Odeen, who worked with Charles Hitch, saw PPBS, as it was implemented, designed to do five things:

1. Lay out the multiyear impact of decisions made this year (no more "buy-ins").
2. Look at the defense program in mission or output terms, not in service or budget input terms. It was to focus on what we were trying to do, not on who would do it.
3. Provide a way to tie missions, strategies, forces, and budgets together. The hope was for integrated plans, programs, and funding.
4. Facilitate cross-service or comparative analyses where missions overlap, and output oriented analyses (cost-benefit) for service-unique missions.
5. Make resource decisions according to a rational sequence, looking first at broad plans, the multiyear programs, and finally at the one year budget details.  

So the intent then was to introduce "cost-benefit analysis" and other qualitative techniques to derive "output oriented programming." To do this, programming was organized into functional mission areas and a five year projection put into the budget. The mission areas and the five year projection became what is known today as the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). So strong was this document that, unless a program was contained in it, the program had no official status in DoD and would, therefore, not be eligible for inclusion in any budget proposal. The effect was to "centralize planning", and to provide program guidance to the military department. The goal was to "make the budget a more effective instrument of policy." Regardless of what some veterans of the McNamara era think about him, he saw a problem, and "took advantage of his central role in the Defense-budgeting process to exercise what he believed to be his authority over military policy."  

"In many aspects the role of the public manager is similar to that of a private manager. In each case he may follow one of the two alternative choices. He can act either as a judge or as a leader. As the former he waits until subordinates bring him a problem for solution, or alternatives for choice. In the latter case, he immerses himself in his operations, leads and stimulates an examination of objectives, the problems and alternatives. In my own case, and specifically with regard to the Department of Defense, the responsible choice seemed clear. (SECDEF Robert S. McNamara, 1961).

THE SEVENTIES: EVOLUTION CONTINUES

In the early 1970's, the detailed "program guidance" was replaced by broader "fiscal guidance." Believing program development belonged to the military departments, Secretary Melvin Laird returned to the Services responsibility for
Identifying needs and defining, developing, and producing the systems to satisfy these needs. 11

Along with this action several other significant events occurred in the 70s. Secretary Laird developed the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) to provide more "specific oversight of major procurement programs;" the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 was passed; the Carter administration introduced Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB); and in 1979, Secretary Brown created the Defense Resources Board. 12 As part of history, a short description of these events is required. Their current roles, if any, will be detailed in Chapter III.

**Defense System Acquisition Review Council**

Although the DSARC is not a part of the integral PPBS process, it is important to understand a few facts about it. The acquisition of weapon systems require some relative correlation to the planning and programming of fiscal resources. Under Secretary Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard found the acquisition process to be inadequate in its ability to "estimate and control costs," and almost totally inflexible. The DSARC was established to advise on the "status and readiness of each major defense system" to move forward in its acquisition. Membership included most of the senior managers within the Department of Defense. 13

Hence while the Military Departments were the programmers, OSD maintained responsibility for acquisition of major programs through the DSARC process. This shift returned the Department of Defense to decentralized authority, and responsibility for the Services as the individual program managers. 14 In the early 1980s the DSARC evolutionized to the Joint Requirements Management Board (JRMB) and then to its current title, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). Membership has
changed but its role has not.

**Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974**

Besides changing the start of the fiscal year to 1 October to gain three months for "deliberations and decision making," the Budget Act of 1974 provided benchmarks against which PPBS participants could "measure broad congressional support both for defense in general and for specific programs."  

Prior to the act Congress, like DoD, was concerned primarily with individual appropriations and was devoting "little or no time" to revenues, outlays, or deficits. Using a piecemeal approach, Congress never focused its attention on the total aggregate of the many individual actions. Unfortunately, as with many good thoughts, Congress hasn't lived up to the expectation of the Budget Control Act. Chapters III and IV will discuss how "a lot more people got a chance to get their fingers in the pie," which has resulted in marginal improvements to both the congressional and PPB systems.

**Zero Based Budgeting**

Instituted with limited success by the Carter Administration, Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) was to "more clearly identify marginal programs through an array of decision packages at three different resource levels." It was designed to analyze each program from the ground (zero base) up. In each budget no item was automatically included. Each item was considered as a new program, each and every year, in light of its relative priority at that time. Instead of a historical base, there was no base at all. It was replaced in 1981 at the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci beginning with the FY 83-87 cycle. According to Carlucci, "The idea of reexamining the
necessity and desirability of continuing each program is a good idea. The process by which we have done this is not." 21

Defense Resources Board

Finally, in 1979, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown created the Defense Resources Board. The primary purpose was to direct and supervise the OSD review of the Service POMs and Budget Estimate Submissions. Examining major issues raised in the reviews, it was to present recommendations to the Secretary. 22 Starting with five formal members, one ex officio member (the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), and six associate members, it has grown to 20 formal members and five de facto member. Although it has functioned with broad and less clear management and decision making responsibilities, it has served the styles and preferences of the Secretaries of Defense for the past nine years and today remains the senior organization for planning and resource allocation reviews within the PPB system. 23

THE EIGHTIES: INCREASING CINC PARTICIPATION

Right after their appointments in 1981, Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger and his first Deputy, Frank C. Carlucci, set as an overall goal to "strengthen U.S. defense posture in the most efficient manner possible." Based on a decade of lower defense spending, President Reagan proposed defense increases. Secretary Weinberger followed suit with major increases in the FY 81 and FY 82 budgets submitted to Congress by the outgoing Carter Administration, and Congress passed the appropriations. To assure Congress that the new funds would be "used rationally and with the highest return," Secretary Weinberger undertook several management initiatives, two of which were: strengthening and emphasizing long-range planning; and streamlining the defense planning, programming, and budgeting system to stress planning, reducing paperwork.
clarifying the roles of central staffs and the Services, and enhancing the role of the Defense Resources Board. 24

There was some quick success in most of these. Paperwork required for the PPBS process was cut in half; budget documentation was reduced; the Services were given greater responsibility for the day-to-day management of the resources under their control; and the DRB was strengthened, making it the principal governing body of the Department's program review process. 25 However, the strengthening of long-range planning remained as a weak link in the system. This, along with the lack of input by the Unified and Specified Commanders-in-Chief, resulted in separate actions being taken.

In October 1984, Carlucci's successor as Deputy Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft, IV, issued a memorandum which acknowledged that despite the previous PPBS changes, two areas of concern remained with respect to the role of the Commanders in-Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands. Specifically, "the CINCs' participation in the Services' POM preparation process and the CINCs' role in the program review." 26

Earlier Mr. Taft had written to each of the CINCs to solicit their views on the problems they encountered with the system, and methods for enhancing their roles. Some of the problems identified can be summarized below:

--- The CINC's direct participation in the POM process was limited to providing what was essentially an "after the fact" assessment. Hence, issues which may be of major importance to operational commanders did not always receive priority consideration from the services. 27

--- Except for those items which the component commanders were able to achieve through their POM inputs, the CINCs has no "direct mechanism" through which they could influence a Service program early in its development. 28

--- In some cases, the CINCs learned about major decisions by the Services after the fact during POM deliberations or in the news media. Too late for the CINC to have any serious influence, the Services' decisions had "torqued
or redirected" strategy oftentimes in an "operational vacuum." While it may not have been the intent of the Services, the end result was the same.29

More important than the problems identified were the recommendations:

--- Early in POM development, the CINC should identify major program issues in writing to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services via a formal written submission.30

--- The CINCs should submit annual resource requirements documents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.31

--- During the POM Review Issue cycle, the POMs performance on CINC requirements should be addressed in "perhaps an annex for each CINC." 32

Following a review of the CINC comments by members of the DRB, Deputy Secretary Taft issued his 14 November 1984 memorandum, "Enhancement of the CINC's Role in the PPBS." He identified four major areas addressed in the responses: "the CINCs' submission of prioritized requirements, the relationship between the CINCs and the Military Departments during POM development, the visibility of responses in the POMs to CINC requirements, and the participation of the CINC in the DRB Program Review process." 33

In the development of the FY 1987 POMs and the upcoming Program Review (Summer CY 1985), Secretary Taft directed the following actions:

--- The CINCs were to submit through their component commanders, clearly identified requirements. Additionally, the CINCs were to build what became Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). These were to be their "higher priority needs, prioritized across Service and functional lines and with consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints." They were initially submitted to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 34

--- Reaffirmed that the POM development belonged to the Services; that the primary interaction between the CINCs and the Military Departments would continue to
be through the component commanders, but that direct communications with the Military Departments should be used to resolve CINC problems and concerns during POM development. To provide greater visibility of CINC requirements, the POMs were to contain a separate annex which clearly identified the CINCs' requirements "as submitted through their component commanders," and whether they were met in the POM, with supporting rationale if not met.

- The CINCs were given the right to submit POM review issues independently. (Previously CINCs had to raise issues through a DRB member as issue sponsor.)

Although these initiatives brought the CINCs more participation in terms of visibility, as will be pointed out in later chapters, their influence in the system was not increased significantly.

While Deputy Secretary Taft was making changes, Congress was making its own changes in the form of two different sets of legislation. The first was the requirement for the Department of Defense to submit a two-year budget; the second, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Both of these play significant roles in the PPBS process, especially in view of how to influence the system. The impact of both will be examined in detail in Chapter IV, but their history needs to be briefly introduced now.

**The Introduction of Two Year Budgeting**

Acknowledging that the annual budget process had become too cumbersome for both the Department of Defense and the Congress, the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC), recommended that the Department of Defense use its "comprehensive
and multi-year planning, programming, and budgeting system" to submit a two year budget beginning with FY 1988/1989. Forcing nearly 2,000 procurement programs and over a thousand research and development programs through an annual review had become unnecessarily disruptive to the Congress and the Department of Defense. Agreeing with this position the House proposed essentially the same legislation and later it was passed into law. Far from being a cure-all solution to the ills of the budget process, biennial budgeting was considered to be an improvement.

Biennial budgeting at first glance, would allow DoD to spend the "off year" planning, and indeed DEPSECDEF Taft directed a change to the PPB System. Emphasis was to be on better definition of national and military strategy in planning and an implementation review during the fall. The latter was to check the progress of the current five year program, and determine if it was meeting its defined requirements.


As early as 1983, it was recognized by the Senate (Senators Tower and Jackson) that another study of the Department of Defense was needed to look at the organization and decision making procedures. After an initial period of hearings, interviews, and research, a more vigorous study effort was initiated in January 1985 at the direction of Senators Goldwater and Nunn. The study accomplished by the staff of the Committee on Armed Services was submitted 16 October 1985 and titled *Defense Organization: The Need For Change.*

It was one of the most comprehensive reports on the Department of Defense (645 pages long) and became extremely controversial because of what was considered to be its narrow view and radical recommendations. Nonetheless, the major
findings and recommendations can be seen reflected in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Addressing a wide range of issues affecting the performance of the Department of Defense, the study analyzed four major organizational elements: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commands, and the Military Departments. It also looked at two key decision and management procedures: the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, and the acquisition process. The findings and recommendations of the study and subsequent changes by law did not change PPBS per se, but did change the way the players participated. These changes will be looked at in Chapter III.

The study found several key trends in the “continuing evolution of the PPB system.” They were: (1) increased participation of senior military officers in the Defense Resources Board; (2) greater interest in requirements of operational readiness and support costs; and (3) more emphasis on budget execution and oversight. The first, is of significant value to whether the CINCs participate or influence PPBS.

**Participation by Senior Military Officers**

Secretary Weinberger had taken (through his deputy) two steps in two forms, “a change in practice and a change in procedure.” In practice, the Service Chiefs became de facto members of the DRB and “are now more capable of influencing DRB outcomes than with previous membership rules under which Service positions were represented only by the Service Secretaries.”

In practice, the DRB began receiving “formal comments from the unified and specified commanders.” The trend, as recognized by the staffers...
was "toward providing greater input into PPBS" (emphasis added) from those responsible for fighting the war. 46

**More Influence or Just Input?**

Herein lies the position of this paper. Throughout the history of PPBS, none of the evolutionary changes really brings the CINCs into the system, such that they (the "war fighting commanders") have any influence on the types and mix of weapons and support systems to be procured by the Department of Defense to fight the war with tomorrow. The changes have increased Service Influence, and more formal comments by the CINCs. But even with the Chairman and Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff as spokesmen for the CINCs, their inputs have difficulty in influencing. The remainder of this paper will build on these historical changes and develop a "game plan" to create an environment where a CINC's "input" can become influential. Looking first at the players (Chapter III) then the flow of the entire system (from planning to Congressional appropriations) and how it works and how it can be influenced, it will suggest that the CINC and his staff must have a battle plan, a strategy, to not only introduce requirements, but to reinforce and support them every step of the way through to Congressional appropriation of resources.
CHAPTER III

KNOWING THE BATTLEGROUNDD

If you are going into battle you must know and understand your enemy. Ironically, the same is true of PPBS. Each player in the process can be your enemy if you do not understand what his/her function is. This chapter looks at the participants from the Military Departments to Congress; and then one the battlegrounds outside PPBS where you will encounter them; the Joint Strategic Planning System. We will also look at the important factor for all participants to influence the system: credibility.

THE PLAYERS

Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense, assisted by the DRB, exercises centralized control of executive policy direction by concentrating on major policy decisions, defining planning goals, and allocating resources to support these objectives, including joint, DoD-wide, cross-DoD component and cross command programs.1

Providing the primary support is the Deputy Secretary of Defense who chairs the Defense Resources Board.2

Defense Resources Board (Chairman and members)

Since its establishment in 1979 by Secretary Harold Brown, the Defense Resources Board has been the primary means of directing and supervising the OSD review of the Service POMs and Budget Submissions. As such they have management and oversight of all aspects of the entire DoD planning, programming and budgeting process. It commences the process with management of the planning process which develops the DoD Defense Guidance. In this area, the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) serves as the Executive Secretary to the DRB. In the programming phase the Director, Program...
Analysts and Evaluation serves as the Executive Secretary and leads the POM review process to ensure adherence to the fiscal and other mandatory guidance. In the budgeting phase the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) becomes the Executive Secretary and oversees the budget review process.

What this means to someone who wants to influence PPBS is that three different offices (and people with their own personalities and views) control the process as a program passes through the system.

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

By mandate of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is now "the principal military advisor" to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

But more important are those functions dealing with PPBS activities. The CJCS is now responsible for:

**Strategic Planning.** Preparing strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.

Performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed services of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.

**Advice on Requirements, Programming, and Budget.** Advising the Secretary on the priorities of the requirements identified by the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.

Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defense for a fiscal year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands.

Submitting to the Secretary alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary, in order to achieve greater conformance with the priorities referred to in clause.
Assessing military requirements for defense acquisition programs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chairman; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and supported by the Joint Staff constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense.

When DoD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its major Components" was republished on 3 April 1987, a new era emerged. Reflecting the DoD Reorganization Act 7 it moved the responsibilities of the collective body called the JCS, and placed them, along with some new ones, upon the Chairman, JCS. Today, the “other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisors.” 8 This is important to understand. Between the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 and the DoD Directive 5100.1 change, the Chairman, JCS has all of the previous JCS responsibilities, the Joint Staff now works for the Chairman, JCS, not the JCS, and the JCS have been relegated to a simple status of "military advisors."

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

To assist the Chairman, JCS in his new responsibilities the Reorganization Act also created the new position of the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 9 Performing such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman (with the approval of the Secretary of Defense) the VCJCS functions related to this paper are:

Assisting CJCS in serving as a spokesman for the CINCs in areas of assigned responsibility.

Acting for the Chairman in all aspects of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

Attending meetings of the Defense Resources Board.
Serving as Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

Assisting CJCS in the tasks associated with reviewing war plans and more closely coupling national military strategy and resources.

Assisting in correspondence with and testimony before the Congress in assigned areas of responsibility.

From these duties it becomes obvious that the VJCS will be the "main" OJCS participant in influencing the PPBS. The VCJCS has become a "single player" who can input at almost every point in the processing of a requirement from identification to production delivery.

**The Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands**

In the PPBS process, the CINCs have two roles: to exercise forces to be prepared to execute contingency and war plans for a crisis and to prepare their respective commands for an uncertain future.

In a real sense, a CINC's goal is to leave a legacy by which his successors will possess the military capabilities to deter war and fight to win if hostilities breakout.

As previously discussed, the participation of the CINCs in PPBS has increased in the past few years. The roles which they currently participate in revolve from submitting their requirements to the Joint Strategic Planning System, to testifying before the DRB for Defense Guidance preparation and the Program Review.

In the view of the author, they do not yet execute their roles in a manner which provides a consistent and credible foundation for engaging in the PPBS and Congressional budgeting process.

**The Joint Staff**

Prior to the passage of the Reorganization Act, the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency (SPRAA) was created within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This agency was to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff by providing
Independent analysis and recommendations concerning the impact of DoD program budget proposals upon the warfighting capability of the Armed Forces. The major PPBS activities were to be done by the Program and Budget Analysis Division (PBAD).

Following a 6 November 1986 OJCS restructuring, PBAD was moved to the new J-8, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate. Today, this division, with an O-6 division chief, is a prime artery for PPBS communications between the unified and specified commands, VCJCS and the OSD staff. They facilitate actions from inputs to Defense Guidance, to the POM review DRB meetings, to the budget review, and to responses to congressional action on the DOD budget proposals. To be effective in influencing PPBS, close coordination must be maintained with the action officers in this division. Likewise, for the early JSPS documents, close coordination is required with the other OJCS directorates.

**The Military Departments**

Besides the historical functions of the Military Departments, specific functions are detailed in DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components." (3 April 1987) Two of these are:

1. To recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to unified and specified combatant commands.

2. To prepare and submit budgets for their respective departments; to justify before the Congress budget requests as approved by the President; and administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping, and training the forces of their respective departments, including those assigned to unified and specified combatant commands. The budget submissions to the Secretary of Defense by the Military Departments will be prepared on the basis, among other things, of the recommendations of CINCs and of Service component commanders of forces assigned to unified and specified combatant commands.

In building their respective budgets, each of the Services, in their own way, mix requirements and fiscal resources. But the one thing that is common is that in
the long run everything is prioritized and/or weighted, and the bottom of the list is not programmed.

Problems arise in this area because of the priority given to programs. In some cases it may be the lack of clear national military strategy which compels the Services to be "parochial in their approach." 13 In others it may arise from the weakness of organizations that are responsible for joint military preparation and planning. 14

Congressional Committees

To many who have worked in the executive and legislative branches, the intense, often redundant scrutiny by Congress is the costly result of too many people having too much time and freedom to delve into too many defense programs and operations. To others, micromanagement is a valid congressional reaction to the vast expansion of defense spending. With so many dollars at stake, too much oversight is impossible; any less would be irresponsible." 15

Congress, by deliberate constitutional direction has the power of the purse. Only Congress can authorize the government to collect taxes, borrow money, and make expenditures. Specifically, Article I, section 9 states: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." So in understanding this participant, we need to know how they work, what pressures they can apply, and what pressures are being applied to them.

The first point is that Congress' overall concern is the total federal budget. And that budget is first:

"... a political instrument used to satisfy social wants and needs in accordance with a nation's political philosophy and attitudes toward the role and responsibility of governments. Of no lesser importance is the fact that it is also an economic instrument that may assist in the management of a nation's economy." 16

What this means is that Congressional members must represent the needs
and concerns of his/her constituents while balancing them with the broader interests of the nation.

A second point is that Congress has less control than you think over the budget. Roughly one-half of federal expenditures are relatively uncontrollable under existing law. This is to say that the national government is required to spend money automatically because of previously enacted laws. The uncontrollables include interest on the public's debt; entitlements (laws that require benefit payments to all eligible individuals, such as Social Security and Medicare); and contract obligations that must be paid when due (some DoD procurement arrangements are under this). And, "there are serious political risks" for members of Congress who try to subject uncontrollables to annual budgetary scrutiny. What this means is that Congress only controls 50% of the federal budget.

Congress divides its work by creating committees to look into specific areas and then sending bills to their respective houses for a full vote. Following passage of separate bills, there is a conference to settle differences, and then a single bill is voted on by the House and Senate. The battlegrounds for the Department of Defense (CINCs Included) are in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. The difference between the two sets is that the Armed Services Committees work authorization of the programs, and the appropriations committees work on paying the bills.

As mentioned in Chapter II, the 1970s brought about the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Important to our discussion is that Congress added another procedure to "the existing revenue and appropriations process" of the House and Senate. This procedural change was in the form of the House Budget
Committee, Senate Budget Committee, and the Congressional Budget Office. 18

The two budget committees essentially have the same functions of:

... 1) preparing annually at least two concurrent budget resolutions, 2) reviewing the impact of existing or proposed legislation on federal expenditures; 3) overseeing the Congressional Budget Office; and 4) monitoring throughout the year the revenue and spending action of the House and Senate." 19

The last function is shared with the CBO as it is "Congress's principal informational and analytical resource for budget, tax, and spending proposals." 20

THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is governed by JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 84 (MOP 84), and "is the formal means by which the JCS carry out their responsibilities to provide strategic plans and strategic direction for the Armed Forces." Intended to complement the DOD PPBS, it provides the means to assess the environment, evaluate the threat, and propose the national strategy necessary to support national security objectives. As programs are developed and resources allocated, the JSPS provides a means to evaluate those programs in light of the developed strategy and to apply the resources to operational objectives. 21

Under revision to reflect the DoD Reorganization Act requirements, the JSPS currently consists of eight documents. While only two of them directly related to PPBS, the system is the starting point for processing a requirement and you must interact with five of them to be influential.

1) Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA)
2) Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP)
3) Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis
4) Joint Strategic Planning Document
5) Joint Program Assessment Memorandum
The most important factor for success in PPBS is to establish credibility. One must be seen as someone who not only understands his own profession and requirements, but also how they interact with other areas. In PPBS, a CINC must be able to present his requirements not simply from his own theater perspective but also from the perspective of the other participants and national defense.

In presenting a case for a requirement, the tone and positions taken must be tempered with reality. To dramatize how this may hurt someone, take the testimony of Secretary of Defense Weinberger before the House Budget Committee (Hon. William H. Gray, Chairman) on 21 January 1987.

The CHAIRMAN. The question I would like to ask, in light of the Administration's request and in light of what Congress has done, is that often, when you were before the committee, you talked about the fact that if we did not meet the Administration's request, that there would be significant impacts upon our defense readiness, upon our ability to protect our freedoms and our liberties, and that if Congress made such reductions, we were actually asking for the Pentagon to give up some defense commitments.

Could you please tell us in specific today, what exactly has occurred in terms of commitments that the Pentagon had to give up as a result of the reduction in 1986 and 1987, for instance, where we didn't meet your request? Would you tell us what weapons systems were terminated?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir, I can, indeed. I hope I have about an hour, because it will take almost that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I interrupt you for a second?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I could go on for a very long time.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you could, I want to ask you about a couple of specific programs. Have we cut an entire division from the Army?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, we have tried our best not to weaken readiness, our existing strength. We have tried to--

The CHAIRMAN. How about the C-17 aircraft program?
Secretary WEINBERGER. The C-17, we have begun that. We have begun it later and more slowly than we think is desirable.

The CHAIRMAN. Amount of termination?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am sorry?

The CHAIRMAN. Not a termination?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Not a termination, no, sir. We have slowed it down because...

The CHAIRMAN. How about the AV8B and the A6EF attack aircraft?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have had reductions in both of those.

The CHAIRMAN. Have we terminated them?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, because they are systems that we have validated and regard as very necessary. ...

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, what you are saying is we stretched out some of our procurement. The reason I asked those specific programs, is because I have before me a letter dated May 15 of 1986, which was last year, as you commented, to a colleague here in the House, on what would happen if we passed a budget like the one which eventually became law, and it says those programs that I just named would be terminated.

An entire division would be cut out, there would be other programs terminated, such as the AV8B, new 120-millimeter mortar, and ammunition, AV8B, and the F-15. What has really happened as a result of our not granting the request, you have had to stretch out --

........

The CHAIRMAN. ... My point simply is that in the past, we have been told that if we did not support a certain level of a request, there will be certain terminations, and what I am hearing you say is that there have been stretchouts, reductions but not those terminations. 22

You can avoid this type of conflict be insuring that the requirements which you intend to push through are well thought out, have a solid cornerstone in the Joint Strategic Planning System intelligence documents and threat analyses, are supported in Defense Guidance, and are not in contradiction with national interests and objectives as seen by the Congress. It requires that prioritizations be made on long
range planning with near term fiscal constraints (reality) considerations. It requires a continuity and consistency in every prioritization listing, every POM input, and every testimony, whether before the DRB or Congressional committees.
CHAPTER IV

REFINING PARTICIPATION TO INFLUENCE

It is not possible to be effective unless one first decides what one wants to accomplish. It is not possible to manage, in other words, unless one first has a goal. It is not even possible to design the structure of an organization unless one knows what it is suppose to be doing and how to measure whether it is doing it.”

THE GOAL

Formulate and execute a strategy to define and defend a programmatic requirement, resulting in the authorization and appropriation by the U.S. Congress.

The first step in reaching “the goal” is to determine the objectives which must be met for any program requirement. These will be (in chronological sequence):

1) definition of the requirement; 2) the favorable addressal of the requirement in Defense Guidance; 3) funding of the program, at a satisfactory level of capability, by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Program Decision Memoranda; 4) satisfactory budgeting of the program as it is stated in the President's Budget sent to Congress; 5) Congressional authorization for the execution of the program; and 6) Congressional appropriations of funds for the program.

The second step is the determination of what the requirement really is (a clear definition), the current fiscal environment, and whether the requirement is of enough importance to fight the battles over it. Among the considerations which must be considered is whether the program requirement will support national security objectives as well as national military strategy. Is there a documented requirement to be able to employ your proposed program?

And third, is the recognition that all of the steps needed to reach the objectives have what might be called “negative aspects.” Doing them will not guarantee
success; but failing to do them will definitely weaken your chance for success.

**PLANNING: PRE-PPBS**

The starting point for any programmatic requirement occurs before the planning phase of PPBS; in the early documents of the Joint Strategic Planning System. It starts with the definition of the threat.

**Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning**

One of the documents which helps in this process is the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP). It is what the JCS uses to identify the principal threat and in later planning, to build recommendations on strategy to meet that threat. It is not a well known document; most action officers on the Joint Staff of the JCS and the unified and specified commands have never seen it. Yet, it is one of the first bricks of the JCS planning cycle.

The JIEP gives "detailed estimative intelligence" on possible worldwide scenarios and developments that could affect U.S. security interests. It does it through global and regional appraisals, and estimates of potential threats in specific regions. The point that needs to be remembered is that the threat base is developed principally from inputs from the JCS, the Services and DIA. And, although it is approved by the "Chiefs" and Directors, it is drafted by staff action officers. The JIEP threat will be used in the development of the Joint Strategic Planning Document and the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum.

What this means to the CINC staff is that intelligence staff officers must be identified to work with the JCS, Services and DIA staffs to 1) identify potential trouble areas for study; 2) evaluate the potential threat; and 3) validate the threat (as well as the scenarios). The end result will be a threat analysis that either supports a
requirement, or shows that for the short to mid range (10 years) the threat is not significant enough to warrant expenditures of time and resources on the requirement to counter it.

Will it matter if this is not done? Maybe not; but when the requirement is identified by the CINC staff for inclusion in the JSPD, the first question that will be asked is: "What is the threat that drives this requirement?" Having it in the JIEP (or a joint validated threat analysis) lays the cornerstone to the foundation.

**Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis**

The next step in preparing to enter the PPB system is to work with the Joint Staff as they prepare the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA). It is an internal OJCS document that provides the principal supporting analysis for development of the JSPD; and is produced in three parts: 1) Strategy and Force Planning Guidance, II) Analysis and Force Requirements -- Minimum Risk Force, and III) Analysis and Force Requirements -- Planning Force.

Part I, provides military planners the positions of the JCS on national military objectives and national military strategy. It also "includes specific guidance with respect to the scope, format, phasing, and forwarding of inputs" to support the other two parts of the JSPDSA, as well as the JSPD annexes. Since you have an identified threat and program to meet the threat, you need to work with the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) to ensure that you will not be kept from identifying it because of that "specific guidance." You need to shape the arena to your advantage.

Part II, JSPDSA develops force levels required to achieve national military objectives with "virtual assurance of success." This minimum risk force is developed based on two factors: 1) analysis of the projected threat at the end of the mid-
range period; and 2) "on the CINC's assessment of forces needed." 5 If you have done a good job of identifying the threat, you can input to this portion with a sound, logical program requirement. That input should be clear, concise, and in "operational warfighting" language. It should be technical only to the extent to define the basic capability required.

Part III, JSPDSA continues the development of the force levels the JCS consider necessary. In this part, however, although the planning force is a "fully structured, manned, and supported force (active and reserve)" it is that force considered necessary "to provide reasonable assurance of success." 6 It now becomes obvious that something is going to be cut. This happens primarily because Part III moves toward a fiscally constrained planning force, and that is synonymous with prioritization and allocation of dollars to programs.

THE PLANNING PHASE

The next step will enter you into the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, the first part being the formal planning process [Appendix A]. Here, the focus is on four major objectives:

1) defining national military objectives,
2) planning the integrated and balanced military forces needed,
3) ensuring the necessary framework (including priorities) to manage DoD resources effectively, and
4) providing decision options to SECDEF. 7

The process will culminate with the Secretary of Defense issuing Defense Guidance. In approaching this arena, two thoughts must be kept in your mind at all times. The first was made by Philip Odeen in 1985:

"...military planning must be constrained by realistic estimates of future resources if it is to be helpful in the programming and budgeting process." 8 (Emphasis added)
The second is by Col Robert P. Meehan, USAF, in his 1985 monograph "Plans, Programs and the Defense Budget."

"... if planning is less than adequate, the success of programming in translating planning to military capability requirements cannot be measured, and programming becomes an object in itself." 9

**Joint Strategic Planning Document**

The first PPBS document that you will input to is the Joint Strategic Planning Document. A part of the Joint Strategic Planning System, it provides to the Secretary of Defense the "position of the JCS on matters of strategic importance to the security of the United States." 10 In doing this it serves as a foundation for the development of the Defense Guidance. The problem encountered however is that in the past it has been fiscally unconstrained, and...

"... using a fiscally unconstrained document as the principal, joint military input to the formulation of the Defense Guidance, which is resource constrained, provides an unsound foundation for subsequent strategic planning." 11

It is developed as a basic document with six annexes:

A. Intelligence
B. Nuclear
C. C2 Systems
D. Research and Development
E. Mapping, Charting and Geodesy
F. Manpower and Personnel

It is in the annexes that specific programs start appearing to support the national military objectives. And it is here that the major action officer work appears. Each annex is developed by its responsible agency/directorate, and again the majority of the work is done by the staff officer.

It becomes the responsibility of the CINC's staff to insure that they justify their programs to the Joint Staff. Remembering that the JSPD is the military's position...
to the SECDEF, a failure at this point could seriously jeopardize your chances of getting direction to the Services to program your capability.

**Defense Guidance**

The last step in the Planning phase, but by far the most important, is the publication of Defense Guidance (DG). It is the only OSD "guidance" document for the planning and programming phases and serves as "an authoritative statement directing defense policy, strategy, force and resource planning, and fiscal guidance for development of the POMs." 12

OSD takes the recommended strategy, staffs it, and forwards it to the President for approval. It then creates from it a resources constrained strategy in the Defense Guidance. Although it has undergone some structural format changes over the past few year, it has in some type of format contained:

- near and long term threat assessment and opportunities
- policy and strategy guidance
- force planning guidance
- resource planning guidance
- fiscal guidance
- and unresolved issues requiring further study 13

The Importance of the DG, then, is that the Services develop their program proposals (POMs) by its requirements and OSD and the JCS use it as a basis to review those programs. If you are unsuccessful in getting OSD to support your requirement by addressing it in Defense Guidance, the process stops here. However, if success is gained, you now have an authoritative document which will support your position before the DRB.

What do you want DG to say about your program? Depending on the seriousness of the threat and how fast you need to improve your capability, you want DG to state your program as a goal or a mid-term objective.
Goals are those things the Services are to program ten years beyond the FYDP. Mid-term objectives on the other hand are those things which the Services are to "program" during the FYDP. The significant point is the term "program" does not equate to "fully funding." Nevertheless it is the mid-term objectives that you want.

THE PROGRAMMING PHASE

In the programming phase [Appendix B], the DoD Services/Agencies develop "proposed" programs consistent with the Defense Guidance. They will reflect "systematic analysis of missions and objectives," alternate methods for accomplishing them where they are available, and allocation of the resources provided to them in fiscal guidance. The CINC's, per direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, submit their inputs 1) through their component commands and 2) in the Integrated Priority Lists.

Once the Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) are submitted to OSD, the JCS analyze the programs and provide a "risk assessment based on the capability of the composite force level and support program" of the U.S. Armed Forces to execute the planning phase approved strategy. The POMs then undergo an extensive/intensive review, the final decision being issued in Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs).

CINC Inputs to Components

Remembering that the Services retain POM develop in DEPSECDEF Taft's 14 November 1984 memo, you must identify your needs to your components for inclusion in their POM inputs to their respective Services. This can create a problem if you have not identified your requirements carefully. While the CINC's IPL is submitted in December, just before D&O publication, the Service components start work on their POM submissions as early as May and June, almost a full year prior to the next POM.

Working with the components, you must walk a two way path which
supports both theirs and your capability requirements. And when you forward your IPL, you must be consistent, in your support and prioritization.

**CINC Integrated Priority Lists**

Originating in November 1984 for the FY 1987 POMs, the integrated Priority Lists were part of Deputy Secretary Taft’s direction for enhancing the CINC’s role in PPBS. They are submitted separately from the component inputs and should list only the higher priority needs, “prioritized across Service and functional lines and with consideration for reasonable fiscal constraints.”

Submitted at a date determined by the Executive Secretary to the DRB (Programming Phase), they should contain only those items which “require the highest-priority attention” by the senior leadership of the DoD. The format, as prescribed since December 1984, has been the prioritization of major warfighting “problem areas,” with suggested solutions. To use the IPLs effectively, your inputs must be consistent and credible with your planning, and particularly with your inputs to Defense Guidance and Service Component POM submissions. They cannot be a shopping list or wish list.

When the IPLs were first submitted, they were considered by many to be too long and detailed. The average was for about nine problem areas with a total of about forty suggested solution areas. In the next two submissions the number of suggested solutions grew tremendously. This author does not consider this to be in the best interest in maintaining credibility.

An acceptable reason for this increase, however, is that the CINC annexes were to include all those suggested solutions. And they became a quick and easy way for a CINC’s staff to learn the funding status/profile of programs.
Program Objective Memoranda

It is not the point of this paper to address how each Service prepares their POMs (although that might be interesting research). The intent is to introduce the POMs as a prioritized listing of programs as the respective Services view the effective allocation of the fiscal resources provided to them in terms of Total Obligation Authority (TOA). Enough said that they are prepared in accordance with the OSD published POM Preparation Instructions (PPI) and are to be consistent with the strategy and guidance, both programmatic and fiscal, as stated in Defense Guidance.

Two items are actually submitted. The first is the POM, which is a narrative description in some detail of the second which is the updated FYDP that matches it. The Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) is actually a computer tape database of the submission and is at the Program Element (PE) level.

The difference may seem slight, however, when you try to uncover information about your specific requirements, the problem appears. Program X may have funding allocated to it in several program elements across more than one service. That in itself is not bad, except that seldom do you find a PE which has only one program that it funds. More often than not, PE's have funds for allocation to several programs. The FYDP is not at a level which it can tell you "program funding."

So where do you find it? The first place to look in the POM is the CINC Annex. As noted above, the IPLs submitted by the CINCs form the framework for the annexes. Although each Service has used different formats in the past to identify the funding of CINC priority items, a more standardized format is being introduced.

If a question arises from the CINC annex information, or if the program is not addressed in the POM, the only recourse is to find the appropriate Service staff.
action officer for the program. In the Air Force, Program Element Monitors (PEMs) are assigned to programs and can tell you what funds are allocated for the programs. In many cases, the PEM will have all of the PEs associated with several programs under his control and can identify the entire funding profile for specific program.

Following the submission of the POMs, the process accelerates, and only if you have a clear, defined set of priorities can you ever hope to maintain pace and influence results. It is here that it will be beneficial to have representatives from your staffs to be in the Pentagon, working with OJCS counterparts in determining POM achievements and shortfalls.

In the C3 systems arena, this has been done since the early 80's. The Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate (J-6) hosts a CINCs C3 POM Review Conference the week after POM delivery. At the conference the Services brief programs from lists which were provided to them. Each program is described in a brief statement, then the funding profile is given for the FYDP associated with the last President's Budget and the current POM FYDP. A delta in the funding is described in terms of "lost capabilities." This quick identification of problem areas and the availability of the Service "experts" can keep you ahead of the process.

Joint Program Assessment Memorandum

The JPAM is submitted by the JCS to OSD for consideration in reviewing the POMs, developing Issue Books, and drafting the Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs). In order to meet the 45 day post-POM delivery submission to SECDEF, the OJCS staff starts work on the JPAM up to five months BEFORE the POMs are submitted. It starts with the preparation of the "Guidelines for Development of the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum." In the guidelines "a single set of data bases of programmed
If you are on track with the PPBS process, you will be making sure that your highest priority requirements are identified in that database. Again, the effective channel is through the staff action officers who put the guidelines together. Therefore, it is important that the CINC's priorities be known to the Joint Staff.

Once the POMs are submitted, the OPRs for the sections of the risk assessment database obtain the POM "achievements" for the identified programs. Through a variety of methods, from sophisticated computer modeling to gut reactions, a "risk" is determined.

Before the risk assessments are completed, the Joint Staff OPRs will have submitted draft narrative assessments. In them will be a one or two page summary of their respective sections. Logically, you can see that there won't be enough space to list every item, so only the more important ones will gain highlighted attention.

What is meant by "highlighted attention"? The narrative assessment of the JPAM becomes the second section of Issue Book 1, Policy and Risk Assessment. The purpose of this document is discussed next.

**Issue Books**

After the POMs are reviewed, issue outlines are prepared by the DoD Components and OMB, using the Defense Guidance and the JPAM as a base line. Initially they are one-page summaries of "proposed major issues" and are submitted by any DRB member or CINC. They are to have "broad policy, force, program, or resource implications," and emphasize "cross-Service issues that have not been adequately, or consistently, addressed in the POMs" CINC influence in this portion of the review.
will be directly proportional to the amount of participation in the issue development and the consistent credible positions taken.

The proposed issues (which a CINC can submit) are reviewed by the Program Review Group (PRG) which is a working group subordinate to the DRB. The PRG recommends whether or not each issue is appropriate for DRB consideration, and in which Issue Book it will appear. The selected issues are then developed by an issue team comprised of staff members representing each DRB member. Leadership of the team is determined by the PRG, who appoints the lead office (DRB member) which, in turn, appoints an 0-6 or equivalent civilian to be the issue author. 23

Representation on the issue teams is very important. The team will take the issue outlines assigned to it and develop a comprehensive picture of the program(s) covered. It will then prepare up to five alternatives for the DRB to consider. Alternative 1 is always the POM position, i.e. the funding profiles offered by the Services. Each of the succeeding alternatives increases the POM positions until the most expensive increase in Alternative 5.

In most cases, the entire team will be involved in developing the issue and the alternative(s). However, some issue authors will only have one meeting of the team and hand out a completed issue paper with alternatives.

You want team interaction, and you need CINC representation. By doing so you can work to get an alternative written which is acceptable to your CINC's position. Although the DRB can modify alternatives, or choose combinations, the inclusion of an acceptable alternative supported by a CINC will often gain favorable DRB attention. Even if your CINC has no specific interest in the issues being developed, it is important to have some sort of representation. Why? Issue papers must be submitted
with offsets amounting to 50% of the largest alternative funding. The offsets are usually from the same general mission area, however, occasionally airplanes become offsets for tanks.

Once the Issue Papers are submitted to the appropriate OSD staff office, an interesting transformation occurs. The issue books have three sections: 1) the table of contents, 2) issues, and 3) issue offsets. The offsets are removed, literally and figuratively, from the issue.

The timeline for completing the issue papers coincides with its Issue Book. Book 1, Policy and Risk Assessment is addressed first by the DRB. There are no specific issues in this book, but remember that the JPAM narrative assessment becomes Section 2 of Book 1. Book 2, Nuclear Forces is next and considers both Strategic and Theater Nuclear Force issues. It progresses on to Book 8, Management Initiatives which are addressed last. (A complete listing of the Issue Books can be found at Appendix F)

**DRB Meetings**

The DRB Program Review meetings which address the issue books are closed door meetings with members only (except by specific invitation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense). They follow a specific agenda to include an ordered list of the issues to be discussed. With only a few exceptions, the list is ordered so as to address the issues first, and then the offsets to "pay" for the plus-ups of the issue alternatives chosen. The DRB will make recommendations on the issues, and have a tally done on how much more it will cost to do them. Then from the offsets, they will account for 50% of the "plus-up." It is conceivable to submit an issue paper with an offset for your alternative, and 1) not get a plus-up in your issue program, and 2) lose the funds offered up in the offset to support another issue alternative.
“Tentative findings” of the DRB sessions are sent to DRB members the day after each meeting to insure the agreed upon recommendation is correctly noted. You do not receive any information on what was said, or who did or did not support the issue. If a gross mistake has been made, the DRB member can have it brought to the attention of the DEPSECDEF, however, this seldom happens.

What is an Issue?

Your first indication of a possible problem with POM action in regards to your program will probably be in a dollar delta or shortfall between the previous President’s Budget FYDP funding profile and the POM year profile. This may or may not be a problem.

The FYDP associated with the President’s Budget contains 5 years. The first being the budget year, then the next the POM year. That second year will invariably have a “bow wave” or increase in funding to counter inflation. When the POM funding is provided, it will be based upon more current economic conditions/assumptions. The dollar delta does not constitute a valid issue unless there is a documented capability shortfall accompanying it. An issue must remain capability oriented first, and dollars second.

Program Decision Memoranda

The final decisions of the program review are made by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the form of four letters (one each to the Services and one for all the Defense Agencies). These Program Decisions Memoranda (PDMs) have, for the past few years, started with a paragraph similar to the following:

This memorandum transmits my decisions regarding the Department of the (Army, Navy, etc) Program for fiscal years (FY) 19xx-xx. I approve the programs submitted within fiscal guidance in your Program Objective.
Memorandum (POM) as modified by the specific changes described in the following pages.

The second sentence is important to understand. If you don’t see your program in the PDMs, then it was “approved” (if it was within fiscal guidance in the POM). If it is in the PDMs, the program was “modified by the specific changes” outlined in the PDMs.

The PDM memo is arranged by Issue Book issues, then offsets. You need to look at both parts, and one of the first things you will notice is the number of offsets. It will be longer than you expected, and will contain offsets that were not submitted with the issue papers.

One source of the additional offsets is the “other 50%” of the issue alternative plus ups. At the end of the DRB sessions, the DEPSECDEF issues a bogie to each service. The bogie represents the respective portions of the additional funds required to fund the plus-ups and they come from other programs. This guidance will invariably be issued on Friday with a suspense of Monday morning, and the OJCS and OSC staffs will have until Monday evening to review them and brief their respective DRB members. The DRB will meet the next day and wrap up the program review. It is a very fast process and if you do not know what your bottom line is for your requirements, you will not be able to rebut the offsets. Additionally, if you do rebut an offset, you can expect to be asked for a substitute program.

The second source of the additional offsets is the rollover affect on the previous budget as it passes through the congressional authorization and appropriations process. When the previous budget undergoes a reduction in TOA, it has a rollover affect on the next year's projected TOA targets. OMB will generally realize that the next budget will not be realistic at the projected TOA being used by DOD and send over a change.
This delta has been as much as $12 billion. Again, the DEPSECDEF will allocate a portion to each Service and Agency. These offsets however do not go toward another program, but rather are straight cuts to the Service POMs.

**THE BUDGETING PHASE**

About this time, most people consider their activity in PPBS to be waning, and they lose interest. But you must continue to participate -- because the process is far from over. The purpose of PPBS is the President's Budget, not the PDMs. In the budgeting phase (Appendix C) participants external to DoD start playing a more active role.

**Budget Estimate Submissions**

The Services will take their POMs and accommodate the changes directed by the PDMs. Each program will be costed with detailed estimates which reflect the latest economic data, and any increases must be "zero balanced" with offsets. The Budget Estimate Submission (BES) is then submitted for an OSD and OMB joint review. While the POM was reviewed by "program," the BES is reviewed by "appropriation." And whereas the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPA&E) led the Program Review, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (ASD(C)) leads the budget review. The focus of this review is not so much on whether the program is valid as much as whether the funding of the program is efficient: are the program and dollars correctly matched.

Conducted in joint hearings, the review is used to educate the budget analysts concerning the rationale and assumptions used in developing the budget. The review committees are formed by appropriation categories (O&M, Procurement, R&D, etc). A program can be looked at by as many as 3 or 4 different committees, who
communicate their decisions in Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). Here again, you have to review every PBD to watch over your program(s). PBDs can address large areas, such as strategic forces; or more definitive items such as KC-135 reengining. The PBD will describe the area, identify the service estimate, and provide an evaluation and recommended alternative. Once the PBD is staffed by OSD, either ASD(C) or DEPSECDEF will sign it. This starts the clock for the reclama process.

You will hear about three types of PBDs: signed, advanced, and draft. It is the signed PBD which is official. The advance PBDs have been staffed by OSD and forwarded for signature. They are provided to the affected Services/Agencies so as to allow more time to develop a reclama if necessary. The draft PBDs are Internal papers and are generally not released outside the OSD staff. When the Services/Agencies, or the OJCS staff, do receive a draft copy of a PBD it is guarded with great care. No action is taken which might: 1) shut off action officer lines of communications, or 2) cause an embarrassment to the senior leaders. You do not want your power structure calling an Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) and complaining about something that the ASD has not seen or approved yet.

The reclama process is initially a three day suspense to the affected Service. As the deadline for the DOD budget to be forwarded to the President moves closer, this suspense compresses to 24 hours or less. Time permitting, major budget issues are addressed to the DEPSECDEF before the budget is put to rest in its final form.

How can you influence this part of the process? First, keep your priorities clear and consistent. Second, you must have already done your homework on the effectiveness of prior year funding and procurement schedules for your program. And third you have to be willing to talk and listen to the ASD(C) staff's rationale for
their recommended reduction (either funding or procurement, etc).

Why would a program, which just survived the DRB program review, have a reduction in funds in the budget review? Didn't the BES make the PDM changes to the POM and zero-balance any increases so as to maintain the established TOA?

The answer is simply, "The TOA was reduced again." This reduction came from the refinement of what OMB considers appropriate to send to Congress and it is made by the budget review process. It has been as much as $30 billion dollars (DoD TOA).

Once the PBDs are reclama'd, the major budget issues resolved, and time runs out, the budget is forwarded to OMB and then to Congress. The PPBS process is concluded, but the next battles begin. And here, the participants often have completely different perspectives of what DoD should be doing.

**CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS**

In a democracy with shared legislative and executive powers, national economic considerations are essentially political and policy judgments by the President and the Congress that determine the amount of resource available for defense. 24

In the late 60s and early 70s, complaints of micromanagement were seldom heard. But as the defense budget grew, so did the complaints. This defense growth, coupled with increasing budget deficits, has caused the scrutiny to become more intense. 25 And this is the environment that you face in Congress.

As described in Chapter III, the three types of committees are the budget, authorization, and appropriations. [See Appendix D] All six committees (a House and Senate for each one) will be working at the same time and it is important to keep them straight so you can focus your attention to the correct area. Since the Budget Committees are responsible for setting limits, we will address them first.
The "core" of Congress's annual budget process centers around the adoption of the "concurrent budget resolutions," referred to as the first and second budget resolutions. They are composed of two basic parts, the first is "fiscal aggregates" which reflect total federal spending, total federal revenue, and the public debt for the upcoming fiscal year. The second part breaks the aggregates into 21 functional categories, one of which is national defense.

The budget resolutions are considered under special procedures in the House and Senate. This allows them to be passed with little delay. For example, the budget resolutions "carry a 50-hour statutory debate limitation," and imposes a "germaneness requirement" on amendments. Additionally, they are concurrent resolutions and are not submitted to the President, hence they cannot be vetoed, but they also do not carry legal effect.

The First Resolution provides Congress with nonbinding revenue and spending targets. To get the targets, the budget committee panels use fiscal plans for programs from other committees, "informal consultations with members and staff, CBO analyses, and assessments of what the national interests and the economy require." When the House and Senate pass their respective versions of the budget resolutions and they have different findings, the disagreements usually have to be resolved by a conference committee. This conference compromise is then submitted for a vote by both the House and Senate.

Unless the House and Senate both specifically waive the budget resolution, Congress cannot take up any "spending, revenue, entitlement or debt legislation" without the first budget resolution. They can hold hearings, but not report it to the floor for a vote. What can this resolution tell you and why is it important?
When the President forwarded the FY 84 budget to Congress in January 1983, the request for Defense was $245.3B. The House Budget Committee recommended in the first budget resolution $235.4B be spent, the Senate $241.6B. Because of the difference it went to Conference and the final version set a target of $240.0B. Hence, the authorization and appropriations committees were “targeting” a $5.3B cut in the defense request.

The second resolution is completed in late summer and “may affirm or revise the budgetary totals” of the first resolution. Revisions to the first resolution generally reflect changed economic conditions; decisions made by Congress during the summer; or updated budgetary information. But this resolution is binding on Congress. When the Defense Appropriations bill is introduced to the Congress, it will be at or below this final level.

The budget committees pass resolutions which target/limit defense spending. But which programs are going to be authorized and appropriated are determined by the other committees.

Authorization Process

To approve and fund a program, the first step is for Congress to pass an authorization bill that “establishes or continues an agency or program and provides it with the legal authority to operate.” For the Department of Defense, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC) develop their respective authorization bills. Through their subcommittees (see Appendix D) they become the “policy-making centers” on defense. In passing their respective bills, they review each “line item” of the defense budget and authorize it at the proposed levels of funding, set a limit on the funds, or call for “such sums as may be necessary.” But, they cannot.
stipulate the dollar amount to be spent on the program. (They can of course cut all funds and not authorize the program.)

If the House and Senate versions of the bill differ, and they almost always do, a conference committee is appointed. The conference action is held without hearings, and looks only at the differences.

If the requested funds for Program X was $60M, and the House cut $10M and the Senate $5M, the conference only considers the $5M difference. The program has lost $5M. Whether it loses more depends on how you play in the system. What is that play?

The HASC and SASC don't make their decisions in the blind. The senior DoD civilian and military leaders testify before the committees and subcommittees in formal hearing (as do civilian "defense experts" who have the ear of committee members and staffers).

How do you influence this action? The CINCs testify before the committee. And when they testify, they must remain consistent with their priorities and address the issues from an operational warfighting position.

Once the authorization bill is passed (by both the House and Senate) the program is authorized to be executed. But no federal funds can be spent until the program is appropriated.

**Appropriations Process**

Appropriations provide "budget authority" and it is that authority that "allows government agencies to make financial commitments up to a specified amount."32 Walter J. Oleszek, in his book *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process* provides a quote which explains the confusion of authority, obligations, and outlays.
Congress does not directly control the level of federal spending that will occur in a particular year. Rather, it grants the executive branch authority (referred to as budget authority) to enter into obligations, which are legally binding agreements with suppliers of goods or services or with a beneficiary. When those obligations come due, the Treasury Department issues a payment. The amount of payments, called outlays, over an accounting period called the fiscal year (running from October 1 to September 30) equals federal expenditures for that fiscal year. Federal spending (outlays) in any given year, therefore, results from the spending authority (budget authority) granted by Congress in the current and in prior fiscal years.

Budget authority figures indicate agency growth or decline. Outlays are reflected in each year's national deficit levels. A pictorial description of this can be found at Appendix E.

The House and Senate Appropriations Committees (HAC and SAC) and their 13 subcommittees recommend how much "federal agencies and programs" should receive for the next fiscal year. For each of these, the committees have three options:

1) provide all the funds recommended in the previously approved authorization bill; 2) propose reductions in the amounts already authorized; or 3) refuse to provide any funds.

Again, it is done in both the House and Senate, each passing its own versions. A conference committee meets to resolve differences, then both houses of Congress vote in the single bill. It is this bill which is supposed to be passed prior to the start of the next fiscal year.

If you started with a well-defined requirement, which meets a validated threat; developed a plan to enter the requirement into the JSPS and PPBS; and used a consistent and credible process, your chances of being successful are high. Congress isn't the enemy, but they do take their responsibilities seriously. And that means that they will make sure federal dollars are spent wisely.

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CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASING INFLUENCE

Consistency and credibility occur when the actions that a CINC and/or a staff take are thought and carried out in a conscientious manner. To accomplish this in the PPBS arena, there are four things which can be done. Each will help to influence PPBS, but if there is coordination and consistency between them, your chances of success will increase.

1. Develop a coordination office or planning and resourcing activities.
2. Develop staff interfaces with OSD, OJCS, and the Service staffs.
3. Work more closely with the Service components.
4. Prioritize your requirements well in advance and stick to them.

COORDINATION CELL

Planners, programmers, and budgeters do not think alike. They view things from different perspectives, and at different times in the process. To overcome this, a coordination cell needs to be formed to review the actions of these offices as they pertain to the resourcing of priority PPBS requirements. This office should provide, for the CINC, an independent analysis of how each program fits into the strategy defined by the command and OPLANs.

It should be manned by a 0-6 Chief, with three 0-5 officers (one each from the Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force), and a secretary. The specific individuals must have as a first prerequisite a knowledge of, or the willingness to learn, the entire PPBS and Congressional system. Only secondly do they need an in-depth knowledge of the specific capabilities of programs. In this way, the staff must be able to
"sell" their programs to people who can look at them from the perspective of the players outlined in Chapter III.

It is vitally important that each message, letter, report, testimony, etc., be looked at to insure consistent, credible positions are taken.

**STAFF INTERFACE**

The coordination cell, by its nature, will develop a working relationship with the OJCS J-8 staff. But equally important is for the entire staff of the CINC to develop contacts with their counterparts on the OJCS and Service staffs, as well as the OSD staff. The contacts are not for decision making, but rather information sharing. It is the way Washington works, and a staff officer can save his superiors from embarrassment if he is able to know in advance the mood of the OSD and congressional staffs.

**SERVICE COMPONENTS**

The November 1984 memo from the Secretary of Defense, and Change 1 to DoD Instruction 7045.7, have made it clear that the prime method for communicating CINC needs to the Services is via the Service Components. To do this effectively will require early planning and close coordination. The Service Components start preparing their POM inputs almost six months before Defense Guidance is issued, and a full year before the Service POMs are released. CINC staffs must identify priorities early and work with the Component staffs, and then not change the priorities every step of the way later on.

The priorities should support and be supported by the Service Components. If they submit a priority listing which is not reflected in the CINC IPL, a break down in credibility will occur.
PRIORITIZATION

In a resource constrained environment prioritization is a must. To prioritize critical areas such as the four pillars (readiness, sustainability, etc.) is not satisfactory. There are programs in each area, and they are at the level which is funded. You don't fund pillars, you fund programs.

To influence the participants in the PPBS and Congress, you need to present a short list of priorities (a maximum of 10 programs). This list should be at the program level. This means at the most specific level you can use to identify your priority requirements.

The best place to do this is the CINC IPL. They should not be used as shopping lists with 150-plus programs to be identified in the Service POMs CINC annexes. This will require a great deal of discipline, but it must be done if you intend to communicate your highest priorities and to influence the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
Appendix C: The Budgeting Phase

BUDGETING PHASE

CINCS

OJCS

OSD

SVC

COMP

REVIEW

REVIEW AND COMMENT

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

JSCC

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

PDM

BUDGET ESTIMATE SUBMISSION

OSD/OMB

BUDGET SUBMISSION

PROGRAM BUDGET DECISIONS

PRESIDENT'S BUDGET TO CONGRESS

PBD

RECLAMA CYCLE

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

Appendix C: The Budgeting Phase
APPENDIX E: BUDGET AUTHORITY

RELATION OF BUDGET AUTHORITY TO OUTFULLS
1981 BUDGET

New Authority
Reconciled
for 1981
696.1B

Outlays in 1981
615.8

To be spent in 1981
472.5

To be spent in
Future Years
143.3

Unspent Authority
Enacted in
Prior Years
775.3

Unspent Authority
for Outlays in
Future Years
623.1

To be spent in
Future Years
846.7

Authority written off, stopped, and adjusted
(wa) 5.9

Source: OSD/DPA&E
APPENDIX F

ISSUE BOOKS

DEFINITION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
Source: DoD Instruction 7045.7

Book 1. Policy and Risk Assessment. Intended to focus attention on broad Defense-wide policy, strategy and resource allocation issues; and to estimate the risk associated with the proposed programs submitted by the DoD Components. It contains two major sections. The first is a broad overview of the effectiveness of the proposed programs in carrying out the force planning priorities stated in Defense Guidance. The second is an evaluation of how well the POMs carry out the strategy. The second section draws heavily from material presented in the JPAM. Risks and shortcomings affecting the success of the strategy are identified. USD(P) and the JCS are the main contributors to Section I and DPA&E and the JCS to Section II. USD(P) is responsible for assembling the book.

Book 2. Nuclear Forces. Includes both Strategic and Theater Nuclear Force issues. USDR&E, ASD(ISP), and DPA&E are the main contributors. DPA&E is responsible for assembling the book.

Book 3. Conventional Forces. Includes General Purpose Forces issues. USDR&E, ASD(ISA), and DPA&E contribute with DPA&E being responsible for assembling.

Book 4. Modernization and Investment. Includes issues which are predominantly of a modernization and investment nature that are not appropriate to include in the Nuclear and Conventional Forces Books. USDR&E, ASD(MI&L) and DPA&E contribute, with USDR&E being responsible for assembling the book.

Book 5. Readiness and Other Logistics. Includes readiness and logistics related
issues. ASD(MI&L) is the main contributor and is also responsible for assembling the book.

**Book 6. Manpower.** Manpower related issues, with ASD(MI&L) and ASD(HA) as the main contributors with ASD(MI&L) responsible for assembling the book.

**Book 7. Intelligence.** Issues confined to Defense elements of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP) and other compartmented Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). DUSD(P) and ASD(C3I) jointly prepare the Intelligence Book, while USDR&E has responsibility for assembling the book as called for by the schedule. Due to the classification of this book, it is reviewed by selected members of the DRB in executive session.

**Book 8. Management Initiatives.** Reviews acquisition management initiatives and economies and efficiencies submissions in the POMs. Reviews Justification for Major Systems New Starts (JMSNS), multi-year contracts. USDR&E, ASD(MI&L) and ASD(C) are the principal contributors with USDR&E being responsible for assembling the book.
NOTES

CHAPTER I (Pages 1 - 2)


CHAPTER II (pages 3 - 14)


2. Ibid., 484.


7. Odeen, 376.


12. Ibid., 485.
13. Ibid., 532.


25. Ibid., 13.


28. Ibid.


32. Ibid.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid. (Also see: Implementation of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), Department of Defense Instruction 7045.7. (Washington: Department of Defense, 23 May 1984), p. 8-1.)

37. Ibid.


40. Riley, 27.


42. Congress, Senate, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, iii.

43. Ibid., iii.

44. Ibid., 486, 487.

45. Ibid., 487.

46. Ibid., 487.

Chapter III (Pages 15 - 24)


5. Ibid.


10. Memorandum, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of Defense, subject: Duties of the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 April 1987. These duties were approved by Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: Duties of the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 April 1987.


18. Ibid., 56.

19. Ibid., 56.

20. Ibid., 57.


**CHAPTER IV (Pages 25 - 46)**


3. Ibid., 25.

4. Ibid., 25.

5. Ibid., 26.

6. Ibid., 27.


12. *Implementation of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System*

13. Ibid., 2-1.


18. Ibid.


20. Ibid., 8-2.


23. Ibid.


27. Ibid., 59.

28. Ibid., 59.

29. Ibid., 61.

30. Ibid., 60.
31. Ibid., 44.
32. Ibid., 45.
33. Ibid., 45, 46.
34. Ibid., 46.
35. Ibid., 46.
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>ASD(C)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)</td>
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<td>ASD(C3I)</td>
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<td>ASD(HA)</td>
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<td>BES</td>
<td>Budget Estimate Submission</td>
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<td>C3</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-In-Chief</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAB</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Board</td>
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<td>DEPSECDEF</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>DG</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
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<td>Director, Program Analysis &amp; Evaluation</td>
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<td>DRB</td>
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<td>DRSP</td>
<td>Defense Reconnaissance Support Program</td>
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<td>DSARC</td>
<td>Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYDP</td>
<td>Five Year Defense Program</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
GAO  Government Accounting Office
HAC  House Appropriations Committee
HASC  House Armed Services Committee
IPL  Integrated Priorities List
J-5  Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (OJCS)
J-6  Command, Control and Communications Systems Directorate (OJCS)
J-8  Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (OJCS)
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIEP  Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning
JLRSA  Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal
JMSNS  Justification for Major System New Start
JPAM  Joint Program Assessment Memorandum
JRMB  Joint Requirements Management Board
JROC  Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSPD  Joint Strategic Planning Document
JSPDSA  Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis
JSPS  Joint Strategic Planning System
MOP  Memorandum of Policy
NFIP  National Foreign Intelligence Program
OJCS  Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
O&M  Operations and Maintenance
OMB  Office of Management and Budget
OSD  Office of Secretary of Defense
PBAD  Program Budget Analysis Division
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>PBD</td>
<td>Program Budget Decision</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Program Decision Memorandum</td>
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<td>PE</td>
<td>Program Element</td>
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<td>PEM</td>
<td>Program Element Monitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System</td>
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<td>PPI</td>
<td>POM Preparation Instruction</td>
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<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
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<td>Senate Appropriations Committee</td>
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<td>SECDEF</td>
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<td>Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency (OJCS)</td>
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<td>TIARA</td>
<td>Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities</td>
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<td>TOA</td>
<td>Total Obligational Authority</td>
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<td>USD(P)</td>
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<td>USLANTCOM</td>
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<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>USOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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<td>VCJCS</td>
<td>Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>ZBB</td>
<td>Zero Base Budgeting</td>
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