BEYOND THE ILLUSION OF SYMMETRY: HOW TO THINK ABOUT ARMS CONTROL

COLONEL LANCE W. LORD

1988

AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

89 1 09 262
BEYOND THE ILLUSION OF SYMMETRY:
HOW TO THINK ABOUT ARMS CONTROL

by

Lance W. Lord
Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Colonel Robert R. Gifford

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1988
This research report reflects the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government and is not to be produced in whole or in part without permission of the Commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Loan copies of this document may be obtained through the interlibrary loan desk of Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5564 (telephone: [205] 293-7223 or AUTOVON 875-7223).
AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Beyond the Illusion of Symmetry: How to Think About Arms Control

AUTHOR: Lance W. Lord, Colonel, USAF

Examines the historical divergence in US and Soviet approaches to nuclear arms control and its implications for future nuclear force reduction agreements. The study questions arms controls' "illusion of symmetry" and its simplistic assumptions about each side's motivations and objectives for arms control. The study outlines the changing context for arms control, identifies the traditional goals of arms control measures both sides' arms control "behavior" against those goals, interprets some of the criticisms of arms control in light of this analysis and offers some suggested improvements for future arms control efforts. The author concludes that US and Soviet arms control interests have always been asymmetrical and, consequently, US arms control efforts are unnecessarily constrained by an "illusion of symmetry." As a result, US arms negotiations planners and strategists are likely missing some excellent opportunities for reducing arms while improving US national security. He recommends moving beyond the "illusion of symmetry" to a broad and integrated national strategy of arms control initiatives.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Lance W. Lord (B.S. Education, Otterbein College; M.S., University of North Dakota) has been interested in US national security strategy and nuclear policy since he entered active duty in 1969. A career missile officer, he has served at wing, major command, Air Staff and DOD levels. He has been a MINUTEMAN missile crew member, a missile operations staff officer, missile squadron commander and a deputy combat support group commander. He has also served as a Military Assistant to the Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Colonel Lord was also assigned as an Air Force Research Associate in the Program for International Security and Military Affairs, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. He recently completed an assignment at Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany as the Ground Launched Cruise Missile Program Manager responsible for the deployment of the cruise missile in NATO. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School in residence, a distinguished graduate of Air Command and Staff College, and a graduate of Air War College, Class of 1988.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem of Arms Control</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II ARMS CONTROL IN CONTEXT</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Current Situation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Control Objectives</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Arms Control Agreements</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Additional Explanation</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework for Evaluation</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III ARMS CONTROL MOTIVATIONS AND PURPOSE</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The basic Differences</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Arms Control &quot;Behavior&quot;</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Arms Control &quot;Behavior&quot;</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Do Both Sides Measure Up?</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV BEYOND THE ILLUSION OF SYMMETRY</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Arms Control Failed?</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What About INF and START?</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Asymmetries Really Matter?</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX: US and Soviet Nuclear Force Status</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"...and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nations shall not lift up sword against nation..."

ISAIAH 2:4

"Americans have had a hard time making up their minds about arms control. To some people arms control is the last best hope of mankind, the only exit from the shadows of the nuclear cloud. To others it is an insidious threat to military preparedness, limiting weapons while tranquilizing national will. Still others see arms control as theater or, worse, as fraud; the arms race, now perpetuated and legitimized in the guise of international restraint." (48:193)

JOSEPH KRUZEL

"We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles--Soviet and American--from the face of the earth by 1996...we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons." (70:34)

RONALD REAGAN

As the US Senate deals with the monumental ambiguities, aspirations and hopes of arms control, the ratification process will most likely produce some chilling moments. In the aftermath of all the charm, euphoria and warmth of this past winter's Reagan-Gorbachev
summit in Washington, the Senate must coldly come to grips with a most critical set of questions.

Is an INF Treaty in the best interests of US and NATO? Will such an agreement lead to greater security? Are Soviet motivations for what could be an historic arms control agreement sincerely rooted in desires to reduce the dangers and risks of war? And, perhaps more importantly, are we, in the US, fully aware of our own motivations for seeking a treaty and do they properly serve US national security interests?

Whether or not the answers to these questions are ultimately significant and a major step toward a safer world is about to occur, only history will tell us. Yet, the "temperature" of arms control has become the central indicator of US-Soviet international relations, and it is hard to miss the evidence of a thaw. For every pair of "cold feet" currently worried over the implications of the treaty, many more feet are warming in front of the rich glow of improving superpower relations stoked by the prospects of an impending agreement. Despite the serious security questions that are fundamental to the treaty, there is little doubt that we both have some other compelling reasons for wanting the political weather to change.

As each side looks toward the beginning of the next century, tremendous economic and foreign policy complexities loom on the horizon. Although we have been nuclear adversaries, each of us has arrived at this mutual point in history via quite different sets
of societal circumstances but with a shared set of basic interests. So unique is this point in our relationship with the Soviets that some are seriously suggesting setting aside or significantly altering the adversarial nature of our relationship. Others argue just as strongly for maintaining a more traditional and competitive attitude toward each other. Nevertheless, it's hard to escape the conclusion that both sides appear burdened on the eve of a ratified INF treaty with some large challenges. As a result, both of us could benefit from some time to prepare for the future with the relaxation in international tensions which would seem to accompany a ratified arms control agreement.

Consequently, the sudden nearness of an INF accord raises the hopes of many that a genuine opportunity for far-reaching reductions in East-West tensions is ready for the price of a treaty. But, as this paper argues, because our current arms control strategy is guided by past thinking and its deeply rooted illusions, misperceptions and misunderstandings about what can be achieved through arms control, the actual outcomes of an INF treaty may not match our expectations. It may be that we have proposed a good treaty, in an environment certainly conducive to arms control, that just does not go far enough toward testing Soviet rhetoric and motives.

By assuming that US and Soviet motivations for an INF treaty are somewhat symmetrical, we may be ignoring some important security problems and setting ourselves up for some dangerous times ahead. While there are no doubt tremendous immediate benefits of a treaty,
our longer term interests may suffer. Worse yet, by limiting our arms control proposals to areas that appear mutually agreeable, from our perspective, we are probably unprepared to take full advantage of the ensuing respite in tensions likely to follow a ratified treaty. Because we naturally tend to think symmetrically, we may be misinterpreting Soviet motivations for seeking agreement. As a result, we may miss or badly fumble what could be an excellent opportunity to probe and test Soviet interests with innovative and creative arms control initiatives in areas that will contribute to our future security.

If all this is plausible, then the purpose of this research paper is to help us think about arms control from a new perspective and then discard old and worn habits. Our goal is to develop an arms control strategy that can contribute more effectively to US national security objectives, especially as we confront the uncertainties of the future. As a result, arms control can become a more effective foreign policy lever at times when security problems are quite likely to be much more complicated and difficult than the situations we face today.

The Problem of Arms Control

As the title implies, this paper argues that the principal barrier to effective arms reduction stems from the "illusion of symmetry" perpetuated by common misunderstandings of the arms control process. We need only to refer to one of the simplistic side-by-side comparisons of the US-Soviet Nuclear Balance (see Appendix) that
accompany many arms control papers for evidence of the illusion. After looking at these kinds of tabulations, it's been fairly easy for many to believe the implicit conclusion of the comparisons: both sides are equally responsible for the current state of the nuclear situation.

It's a natural step in this paradigm or set of mental images and values to assume that both sides are equally motivated for similar political and military reasons to pursue arms control. To the contrary, US and Soviet motivations and objectives for arms control have always been quite different. Any symmetrical abstraction of the problems we face is probably dangerous and disastrous. This insidious and subtle "illusion" ignores an entire set of differing and certainly evolving US and Soviet national styles, strategies, objectives and doctrines leading to the choices to acquire nuclear weapons. As such, it's reasonable to believe that these same national characteristics influence subsequent attitudes about reducing weapons stocks.

Herein lies the crux of the problem this paper is trying to deal with: a knowledge of these differences ought to inform and motivate our arms control proposals, but do they? This paper asserts there is an overwhelming tendency here in the US to ignore these differences or act as if they don't exist and, therefore, don't matter. If so, are our arms control efforts leading to less security and missed opportunities for contributing to reducing the likelihood of war?
If this perspective on the way many think about arms control is valid, then as we become more and more optimistic about the prospects for a ratified INF treaty and look beyond to substantial reduction or elimination of strategic nuclear forces, we ought to be cautious. It may be that neither an INF nor some kind of far-reaching strategic agreement will reduce the risks or damages of war. By continuing to adhere to the "illusion of symmetry" we may be tempted to seek negotiations based on what we think is mutually agreeable, not necessarily on what is agreeable that also will contribute to our long term security interests.

So despite all the current indicators that point to a mutual desire for reaching quick agreements, the true motivations for the reductions of arms are likely to be rooted deeply in the substantial and different doctrines, styles and strategies of the major competitors. To assume that these determinants are identical for both sides leads one to have high expectations for arms control with very low chances of success.

Methodology

Since the rubric "arms control" often connotates a set of feelings and references inimical to many military members, this paper boldly asserts there are important benefits to be gained from critically thinking through the arms control process. The overall purpose of the argument contained within these pages is to analyze where we've been in arms control, identify the implications for the future and then outline how we might move "beyond the illusion of
symmetry" toward an alternative and ultimately more effective arms control strategy. Support for the overall argument rests on answers to three critical questions:

a) What are the substantial differences between US and Soviet motivations for arms control?

b) What are the implications of these differences?

c) What might be a better arms control strategy?

If these questions can be answered satisfactorily, then the results ought to provide some useful insights worthy of additional consideration.

The first step in dealing with the "illusion of symmetry" is to understand arms control within the context of the changing international environment and how arms control policy will affect the US-Soviet political/military competition. Here we will discuss the changing role of arms control in a dynamic environment. Chapter II also establishes the basic challenges for arms control and outlines traditional goals and objectives. Some lessons learned from past agreements validate the discussion.

These explanations set the framework for Chapter III's display of the substantial differences existing between US and Soviet arms control purposes and motivations. This discussion considers US arms control "behavior" up through SALT and examines Soviet "behavior" via evidence that their nuclear doctrine is shifting. Given a knowledge of these differences, Chapter IV then interprets some of the current criticisms of arms control in light of this analysis. A look at the
implications of the INF and STAR-I situations plus some thoughts on whether or not asymmetries really matter round out this chapter. Some conclusions and recommendations in Chapter V close the paper.
CHAPTER II

ARMS CONTROL IN CONTEXT

"One of the greatest of all errors of arms control is that it presupposes an underlying symmetry between "the two superpowers" (as does the phrase "the two superpowers"). Arms control serves the Soviets more than it serves us because it makes us moral equivalents...at every step, the arms control process plays into Soviet hands by enshrining the premise of symmetry." (6:30)

TOM BETHELL

"Arms control is the only intermediate means at hand between the extremes of unilateral steps toward arms reduction and unfettered arms competition...arms controllers are the realists while both the unilateral disarmers and the military hardware enthusiasts are visionaries. It is no less visionary to propose that a new generation of technology will make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete than it is to propose that a new international order that would obviate the need for such weapons be established. We must have arms control before either vision can conceivably lead to reality." (65:38)

WOLFGANG K. H. PANOFSKY

"What is most striking about the arms control experience...is what it did not do. If history reveals anything, it is that arms control has proved neither as promising as some had hoped nor as dangerous as others had feared." (13:355)

ALBERT CARNESALE
RICHARD N. HAASS
Having seen Soviet forces strengthened significantly during detente and the era of the early 1970s' arms control events, there's a good bit of skepticism about what might happen in the aftermath of the recent Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. Because of these experiences, we should be suspicious of the Soviets, but not blinded by our skepticism to the opportunities arms control may present. If we are creative, we may be able to use this "centerpiece of East-West relations" (52:252) to lessen tensions while simultaneously probing Soviet intentions.

Additionally, we badly need time to solve some nagging national economic problems and also to adjust and retune US national security policy in line with new global responsibilities and fiscal realities. It's becoming apparent in US foreign policy, as Richard Lugar recently argued in Foreign Affairs, that "there is a potentially dangerous disparity emerging between the vital interests the American public is willing to support with forces and the kind of military force they are willing to buy and employ." (52:249) This trend feeds back into expectations for arms control.

The confluence of these factors in the US and some similar conditions in the Soviet Union provides powerful incentives for both sides to work toward getting as much out of the upcoming opportunities as possible. For as much as we are different, the changes in the global strategic situation are inescapable and now we share similar problems, interests and expectations for arms control. Yet there is a thin line between mutually beneficial political compromise and detrimental military concessions. It is arms control's role to help
us successfully negotiate that narrow path. A quick look in a little more detail into the current context for arms control just sketched out above offers some compelling evidence for moving beyond past practices to more creative strategies.

The Current Situation

Magazine headlines recently captured Gorbachev's problem, "Can Mikhail Gorbachev drag the USSR into the modern age and still keep the Communist Party's monopoly on power?" (72:31) Secretary Gorbachev assumed control of a system strangled by hardening of the economic arteries and in much danger of collapse, all at the very start of what promises to be a capital intensive technological race that will extend well into the next century. The Soviet economic model has been steadily losing its luster while at the same time Soviet military might has become less and less useful as an instrument of international power. (3:41-42) (72:38-39)

The net effect of all this is a military/political agenda that demands exceeding Soviet economic capabilities. A current problem for sure, but one with disastrous longer-term consequences. Gorbachev plainly sees the situation in terms of national survival. Consequently, the openness of "glasnost" and restructuring of "perestroika" can be interpreted as means for buying repair time for the economy and as a strategy for returning as quickly as possible the Soviet state to its legitimate place in international relations. (4:80) Although "Soviet foreign policy is never dictated by economics" (81:256), a new and more sophisticated Soviet realism about
what it might take to compete in the coming world of international politics is beginning to take shape.

The US has its share of stark economic pessimism too. "Our greatest international vulnerability today is economic rather than military and the central foreign policy problem of any future US administration will be economics." (78:281) (36) (82) Noted analysts also argue that the US is a "basket case" and at the "end of its global leadership because we've let our infrastructure crumble, foreign markets decline, productivity slacken, savings evaporate and budgets burgeon. The day of reckoning is at hand." (67:43-45) Paul Kennedy in an August 1987 Atlantic Monthly article previewing his book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, argues the problem from an historical perspective. He thinks we are witnessing in America a current case of "imperial overstretch" not unlike those of Imperial Spain and Great Britain, where the military burden of maintaining the empire eventually exceeded economic capacity and international power declined dramatically. (44)

As a result of similar thoughts, many within the US are questioning the utility of military force in what they see as a changing international environment increasingly characterized by negotiation and compromise. Their unstated conclusion is striking: US forces are excess to needs. In contrast to those that see the world as dangerous and military power as useful, some argue that the traditional confrontational model underpinning defense requirements—US/Soviet ideological conflict—has all but faded away. (38:12-13)
The defense and foreign policy consequences of these kinds of economic and political assessments are rather easy to predict. We shouldn't be surprised at the corresponding pressures on arms control in this kind of environment.

To many, the first step toward financial solvency and renewed political strength is to "tame the federal deficit." (67) Even though the defense budget is often blamed for most of the red ink--actually the residue of fiscal not defense policy--there are immense pressures for defense to share in the deficit solution. By seeking cuts in force structure as potential savings, Secretary Carlucci is implicitly admitting his programs are too large, a statement his predecessor would never make. In this regard, there are some cost reduction or cost avoidance incentives on both sides for arms control but reductions in the US case sufficient to cure a $150-200 billion deficit would require more than halving the defense budget, an unlikely event that exceeds even the highest hopes of the most liberal of disarmers.

Nonetheless, there are enormous and complicated economic reasons for both sides to be interested in some breathing space to sort all this out. For we, like the Soviets, understand the security value of a strong economy. This view is reflected in Peter Peterson's argument, "arms control aimed at high cost Soviet conventional forces may help stimulate our allies to assume a greater share of the defense burden once these threatening Soviet forces are reduced." In this sense, Peterson feels that a great deal can come from arms control and
that "we may be at a crossroads in foreign policy which permits both sides to make substantial future savings in national security." (67)

But, should we join the Soviets in a cooperative economic endeavor and perhaps take the pressure off with some far-reaching arms control initiatives? Before you answer, let's review some additional factors propelling us toward change.

The discussion so far has already hinted that the traditional US-Soviet political/military competition is taking on some additional and perhaps frightening dimensions. Just as the Soviets are apparently recognizing the limited nature of the military's contribution to the international power of the Soviet state, some are arguing US political ambitions substantially exceed our military grasp. (10:257) This situation has emerged gradually over the years.

Our post-WWII policy of "containment" promised to shape and influence future Soviet behavior in ways that, in retrospect, placed great demands on both our political will and military forces. As the rhetoric of containment was not matched by US actions and deeds, Soviet military power and adventurism flourished and US international leverage gradually declined. Consequently, instead of a world dominated by a bi-polar arrangement, we and the Soviets now find ourselves as the senior partners in a new "global equilibrium" demanding a new set of foreign policy strategies. (29:61-66) Short of some kind of international catastrophe, it's unlikely that we could ever match the price tag of a true "containment" policy, especially in the current economic and political climate.
Given all this and having never confronted each other militarily, except with limited results through proxies in Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan, there seems to be a "growing pessimism on both sides about what the use of force can accomplish." (25:94) In this respect, it can be argued that the decline of American power and influence we began to take notice of in the 1970s was not the fault of "strategic passivity" resulting from arms control, but rather the results of a broad diffusion of military and economic power, all brought on by the growth of domestic international constraints and limitations on the use of military force. (29:42)

Although the world situation just described appears to be changing, there are some constants in the equation of international power. The US and Soviets still retain their top places in this "bipolar equilibrium" because of their nuclear weapons. For this reason, there is a shared need to perpetuate the stability of a bipolar as opposed to a multipolar nuclear environment. The deployment of nuclear arsenals has led to the "emergence of vested interests among Russians and Americans in the survival and even prosperity of each other's admittedly very different institutions." (25:94) Then it naturally follows that our arms control strategies ought to be informed by both an appreciation of the changing environment and an understanding of the fundamental nature of the US-Soviet nuclear relationship.
Given the complexities of the changing world, there is an increasing tendency to ignore the larger issue and catch what Henry Kissinger recently termed as "arms control fever." In a recent article, he argued the point quite well:

"The nuclear superpowers concentrate on their reciprocal nuclear arrangements seemingly oblivious that new power centers are emerging which, by the next century, are certain to reduce superpower dominance....The most conservative US administration of the postwar era is preoccupied--almost obsessed--with arms control and personal appeals to the Soviet leadership....Agreement has become its own reward." (47:15)

Mr. Kissinger does not dismiss the validity of arms control as an important tool of foreign policy, quite the contrary. He feels that we ought not to go further with nuclear arms control efforts without some sort of linkages (we'll discuss past linkage policies in the next chapter) to the conventional force imbalance and the risks it poses to the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war. The zest for an agreement feeds more on the political processes, oftentimes at the expense of what could be some positive and prudent military outcomes. This criticism was emphasized in the recent Ikle and Wohlstetter "Discriminate Deterrence" study,

"...the lure of the agreements is that they enable us to engage Soviet leaders in a "process" expected to develop a "momentum of its own, that will lead to understanding about the other contentious matters and serve broadly to reduce international tensions. This perspective could be a recipe for disaster." (40:41)

This study asserts that arms control can contribute to security, but it must be fully integrated into updated defense and foreign policies.
So, without too much imagination we can see an ambiguous world environment which presents competing and perhaps contradictory economic, political, and military objectives. A situation much more complex than the past and apparently demanding new national security strategies. On the one hand, the threat of ultimate Soviet hegemony will most likely be held off for the predictable future by the fears of nuclear war. On the other hand though, the legitimate use of military forces in support of national interests within a new environment, where other players are emerging, are certainly not as clear cut.

What arms control should look like and where it fits within the changing environment are excellent questions. The first place to start in beginning to answer those questions is to challenge our past arms control approaches. With that in mind, the next section of this chapter briefly reviews the traditional and often contradictory objectives of arms control and surveys various perspectives on lessons learned from past agreements. Even though this study focuses on the nuclear relationship between the US and the Soviet Union, there are some useful observations to draw on from other types of limitations. From the discussions in this chapter, we will develop a framework for displaying the substantial differences that characterize US and Soviet approaches to arms control.

Arms Control Objectives

A useful way to begin thinking about the importance of objectives to our understanding of arms control is to recall Bernard
Brodie's 1976 criticism of the quantity of arms control writing. He argued that the single greatest flaw in the literature and its resultant dis-service to the policy maker and student, as well was the "persistent failure to clarify and analyze objectives." (8:420) As a result, he stated,

"The volume of literature on arms control contrasts sharply with the dearth of results in actual armaments limitation or control. This huge disparity between fullness of advice and leaness of practical results suggests a good deal about the character of that advice and the magnitude of the practical difficulties--and especially about the failure of the former to adjust to the later." (8:420)

Given this serious disconnect, it should not surprise us to find him arguing for bold statements of purpose. He then establishes the basic reference by equating arms control "with some degree of limitation or reduction of particular armaments, and it implies also explicit rather than merely tacit international agreement." (8:421)

From all this, Brodie steps back and summarizes three important, though not value free as we'll see in the next chapter, objectives for arms control: 1) reducing the probability or likelihood of war, 2) reducing or limiting the damage or destructiveness if war should occur, and 3) reducing the economic costs of armaments. (8:421-422) These three objectives form the basis of the framework we will use for evaluating US/Soviet arms control purpose and motivations. However, before we begin, a somewhat broader treatment of the purposes of arms control can help us temper our judgments about the past performance of the US and Soviet Union.
For some interesting insights into a more expanded view of arms control, we will return to Joe Kruzel. He feels that those who disputed the value of arms control, especially in the early 1980s, probably focused too much on the "negotiations which are inputs and paid little attention to the outputs." (48:193-195) He seems to be arguing for maintaining a clear perception of the objectives throughout the process and even though "this effort involves formal negotiations aimed at producing treaties, but more generally it is an intellectual effort to anticipate and avoid the most dangerous aspects of military competition." (48:193)

Precisely because it is difficult then to determine the true outputs of the arms control business, depending on one's point of view, seems to substantiate further the need for some clear understandable objectives or desired outcomes. Without such explicit statements ahead of time, arms control is likely to "fail" and be criticized from both sides of the political spectrum: on the left for not going far enough with force reductions to alter political tensions and on the right for going too far and undermining necessary military capability. (79:119-120)

If as a result of all this it is important to understand US arms control goals and objectives, we must also expand our thoughts and pay equal attention to Soviet goals and objectives. (74) But, as we'll see in the next paragraphs, understanding the objectives--both US and Soviet--is only a portion of the solution to better arms control efforts.
Previous Arms Control Agreements

By looking at some previous arms control efforts, we can begin to develop some important judgments about what is achievable in limitation agreements. For the purpose of our argument, we'll briefly consider the following list of agreements and attempted agreements: the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, the Baruch Plan of 1946, the "Open Skies" Proposal of 1955, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the "Hotline" Agreement of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and the SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972.

(48:206) It is significant to point out as Joe Kruzel recalls that of these "ten agreements or attempts, one was abrogated, two were rejected by the Soviets and the remaining seven are still in force."

(48:206) Setting aside until the next chapter a discussion of the particular motivations and purposes for the agreements remaining in force, let's concentrate our analysis on the other three. They contain some pertinent evidence about both the "products" and "processes" of arms control.

The decision to abrogate and the "demise of the treaty regime" of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 was the product of several factors as pointed out by Dr. Robert Hoover,

"The arms control regime...was a set of agreements that attempted to slow the arms races among the powers [US, Great Britain and Japan] as well as to stall the political conflict that fueled the competition...[However] the increased Japanese and
American naval war fighting strategy...assisted by the political difficulties that plagued relations between them...produced an arms race in areas of naval technology uncontrolled by the treaty...when this was coupled with the decline of the political accommodation...the powerful forces set loose led to demise of the regime." (33:105-114)

Although many ships were scrapped and a 5:5:3 ratio of existing US, British and Japanese battleships were codified by the politics of the treaty, naval developments could not be stifled and an arms race in cruisers began and aircraft carrier development was encouraged. The Japanese "furiously resented the short end of the asymmetrical ratio" and their decision of 1934 to abrogate the treaty in two years signaled its difficulty in constraining its own internal politics. During the period of the agreement, the US had become somewhat passive and after abrogation we proved to be unprepared for the ultimate consequences. (96:91) (91) Despite its noble attempts to constrain the naval rivalries and mute emerging political difficulties, the treaties ultimately proved incapable of doing either.

With respect to the Baruch Plan of 1946, and the "Open Skies" Proposal of 1955, we see two opportunities, from the US view, rejected by the Soviets for reasons not totally dissimilar to those that led to the demise of the naval treaties just mentioned. In the aftermath of WWII we wanted to deal with the burgeoning Soviet nuclear problem through some "mutual or cooperative forms of behavior, despite the building antagonism." (23:194) In this sense, the attempts to eliminate nuclear weapons under international auspices in 1946 and
Eisenhower's proposal almost ten years later to "open" nuclear facilities and maneuvers to aerial reconnaissance (26:4) seemed quite reasonable requests. Yet when the Soviets linked the future military consequences of these agreements to their emerging political needs in the years following the war, these initiatives were incompatible with Soviet political objectives and the treaties were summarily rejected.

The bottom line of all three of these events just discussed begins to become clear: arms control cannot be removed or viewed separately from its political and foreign policy context. As Professor Sam Huntington more eloquently states it, "Arms limitation is the essence of politics and inseparable from other political issues." (37:460) His point seems to validate the general trend we've seen so far: specific asymmetrical political/military differences are likely to prevail eventually over whatever symmetrical purposes led to the initial agreement. In this regard, Huntington would advise us to limit or "narrow" our purposes for arms control if we are to stand a better chance for success. (37:471) We'll test more thoroughly his assertion in the next chapter.

As a means of summarizing some of the "lessons learned" from these previous arms control initiatives, let's return to Dr. Hoover's analysis. To accompany our prior admonishment to clarify the objectives of arms control, it's useful to remember Dr. Hoover's major conclusions about the "conditions that led to and sustained arms control and those conditions that led to breakdown." In this regard, for arms control to be successful it requires the "sustained
commitment and ingenuity of both political and military leaders within a favorable international environment. Arms control is likely to breakdown as the pressures for evasion or obfuscation increase because of declining political accommodation and support and/or a deterrent structure weakened by technical improvements unchecked by the original accords or agreement." (33:106-114)

An Additional Explanation

Since these discussions of the objectives and the political aspects of arms control are important in helping us begin to set aside the simplicities of the "illusion of symmetry," then there ought to be a way for us to stop and audit the logic of this approach to make sure we are headed in the right direction. One way to do just that is to set the previous discussions aside for a moment and think about the complexities of the arms control process in another way. To help gauge our thoughts, let's dig a little deeper and consider some perceptions about the factors which drive the "arms race" and the weapons acquisition process arms control seeks to limit and/or eliminate. For if we don't understand the forces that drive the process we are seeking to limit, then it's logical to assume our efforts to control the situation may be misguided.

As one might suspect, the motivations of a nation to participate in an "arms race" are complex and elude most analytical attempts to collapse them neatly into deterministic models or constructs. At best, it can be said that our understanding of the
determinants of nuclear force structure is evolving. However, there are some relevant comments and observations that can be made.

First of all, many explanations of the factors which shape and influence US force structure decisions are cast in the rational-actor paradigm. This model, somewhat akin to the predictable action and reaction of the "billiard-ball" model (7:22) (42:202) of international relations, pictures force acquisition as a purposeful reaction to strategic problems. This interpretation of events quite naturally yields the "action-reaction" syndrome as the principal means for explaining the strategic arms competition. (50:75-76)

However, actual case studies of US weapons acquisition programs performed by Graham Allison, Morton Halperin and others do not match up with the orderliness one would expect from the rational-actor or "value maximizing--cost minimizing" model. Instead, from the US point of view, the military arms competition appears to be only loosely coupled with Soviet actions making the more simpler descriptions of the process incapable of rendering accurate predictions. As a result, the bureaucratic and organizational process models and their insights into how organizational pressures influence acquisition decisions may provide more nearly accurate judgments on the determinants of force structure. (50:75-76)

So, like our previous discussion of the objectives and processes of arms control, the broader political context seems to dominate and effectively dash any hopes we have of a simple and easy to follow description. Given these complexities and it all this is
plausible then, we can take the next step—especially since we are now
more informed—and see arms control efforts and arms acquisition
decisions as inseparable components of an integrated solution to the
tough political problems of how a nation best meets its security needs.
Yet, how often do we think of arms control and acquisition as
inter-related? An interesting question we'll return to later as we
think about future arms control strategies.

This brief discussion of some of the determinants of nuclear
force structure seems to validate the worth of the momentary diversion
from the central argument of the paper. The logic that argues arms
control should not be abstracted from its political context seems to be
equally valid for the convoluted political/military relationship that
exists in determining nuclear force structure. It appears we are on the
right track. However, with what we know now, if we assume that US and
Soviet arms control goals and objectives are symmetrical, we're likely
to be wrong.

Framework for Evaluation

Returning to our earlier discussions, here's the framework of
traditional arms control objectives we'll use for displaying the
substantial differences which characterize the US and Soviet approaches
to arms control. Each side's arms control "behavior" will be measured
against these objectives:

1) reduce the probability or likelihood of war:
2) reduce or limit the damage or destructiveness if war should occur; and,

3) reduce the economic costs of armaments.

Note: for the purposes of our analysis, objective number one is defined as the "stability" objective. The greatest threat to stability is the development of strategic systems that are perceived capable of significantly degrading an adversary's retaliatory nuclear force. The inherent military utility of deploying systems that threaten an opponent's retaliatory force often carries with it an advantage in striking first. As a result, the "stability" of the nuclear balance is weakened and the probability or likelihood of nuclear war increases, especially in times of crisis. We'll deal with this objective in more detail as we examine US arms control "behavior" in detail in the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
ARMS CONTROL MOTIVATIONS AND PURPOSE

"Most Americans assume that the West has sought the mutual limitation of strategic nuclear weapons while the Soviets have obstructed negotiations. The record of the last two decades argues otherwise....American misperceptions about Soviet motivations have almost certainly resulted in missed opportunities for meaningful arms control agreements." (57:10)

MICHAEL MccGWIRE

"In the modern era, as in earlier times, the most important components of national security have been deterrence and an active defense should deterrence fail. Arms limitation agreements have not contributed significantly to security and in some cases have undermined it. This has been true especially of arms limitations divorced from wider political settlements." (31:32)

WILLIAM R. HAWKINS

"There are major differences between Soviet and American strategic thought. American thinking has laid particular emphasis on the ability, under all circumstances, to inflict widespread destruction on the enemy's society. Soviet thinking, on the other hand, has been concerned to limit the damage to Soviet society in the event of nuclear war." (32:376)

DAVID HOLLOWAY

Let's begin our discussion of the contrasting US and Soviet purposes and motivations for arms control by dealing with the contradictory opinions highlighted in the first two quotes cited..."
above. Perhaps the basic differences expressed in the first two statements could stem from the significant divergence in strategic thought argued in the third quote. The next section of this chapter takes a look at some perspectives on why US and Soviet attitudes differ. From there we will see how each side measures against the traditional objectives of arms control.

The Basic Differences

While US strategic doctrine seeks to deter central war at the "lowest level of arms and strategic risk through credible threats of catastrophic damage to the enemy should deterrence fail," (16:596-597) Soviet doctrine is apparently different. They, according to experts, acquire strategic forces in order to "enhance the survival of the Soviet Union and in some meaningful political way to defeat the enemy should deterrence fail." (16:595-597) These two brief statements of strategic doctrine highlight some fundamentally different perspectives on how each nation approaches the questions of how nuclear weapons contribute to national security.

In the US, we have generally viewed nuclear weapons as the guarantors of East-West deterrence through mutual societal vulnerability. This, in turn, is based on the maintenance of an assured retaliatory force capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on one's opponent. Thus, the prospects for nuclear war are diminished as long as the military characteristics of either side's deterrent capabilities don't upset the stability of this delicate arrangement.
The Soviet logic is arguably different. In contrast, they question the military wisdom of mutual vulnerability and see nuclear war as a threat to state survival and the most important of all political/military problems. As a result, they acquire systems and make plans to mitigate the destructiveness of nuclear war, should it occur. (49)

While US doctrine concerns itself with the concept of stability and limiting or eliminating offensive-defensive options that could undermine retaliatory capability, (88) the Soviets take a much different attitude. "Soviet military theory stresses the critical importance of minimizing Soviet susceptibilities to nuclear war through rigorous pursuit of offensive-defensive damage limitation capabilities." (49:190)

It should be obvious that some basic tensions naturally result from these two quite different strategic approaches. Returning momentarily to our list of arms control objectives, we can see already that both sides have chosen different points for emphasis.

However, before we dig deeper into the significance of these divergences, let's take a look at another important aspect of strategic thought where US and Soviet views are likely to differ. For the sake of adding to the argument, we'll take a quick run through what Michael MccGwire calls the "insidious dogma of deterrence" (56) and its implicit influence on the arms control process.

MccGwire's critique raises serious questions about the West's acceptance of its most fundamental theories of "punitive deterrence or
deterrence by denial" and these attitudes are central to US strategic thought about arms control. He suggests the "real danger of war lies in the adversarial nature of the US-Soviet relationship, not in the size and shape of nuclear arsenals." (56:24) Coming from a similar perspective but going a little further, George Rathjens states that, "deterrence and arms control...are, at best, both weak reeds on which to rely in trying to escape from the threat of nuclear war." (69:103) Both imply serious criticisms of US strategic thought and see the US possessing excess nuclear forces.

McCwire feels the US concepts of deterrence are poor excuses for what could be well thought out defense and foreign policies. The "pious overtones of deterrence obscured the radical nature of the underlying principle" as we sought to "prevent war thought the threat of punishment instead of avoiding war through negotiation and diplomacy." All this stems from two critical assumptions that the "Soviets were expansive in nature and would be deterred only by the threats of punishment." (56:24-25)

As the US developed its military capability, the dilemmas of stability emerged. The forces required to deter—an assured second strike capability—had to also reassure the Soviets the US would not strike first. These contradictions of deterrence and reassurance "become a recipe for arms racing, as each side seeks to insure that it can absorb a first strike and still retaliate." (56:24-25) To make matters worse, the "insidious dogma of deterrence" is mostly devoid of any political context.
Because of its inherent contradictions, deterrence has not been well served by arms control according to George Rathjens. For reasons similar to those of McGwire, Rathjens states, "deterrence is morally repugnant, pragmatically flawed and can't prevent third countries from drawing the US and Soviets into conflict." (69:103-105) Moreover, buying deterrent forces and capabilities that ignore the political context of East-West relations and make the Soviets less secure is probably not in our long term interests.

Our critics seem to regard the current concepts of deterrence as seriously lacking and to favor shifting our emphasis in other directions. They see us moving away from deterrence's worst case analyses that drive military requirements for nuclear forces to a broader set of options directed at political solutions to the basic problems of East-West relations. Although we may not be ready to go as far as they would appear to be arguing, it may be that arms control has a role in facilitating this shift in thinking.

Another fault of US deterrence theorizing worthy of mention at this point in the paper is the tendency to ignore Soviet perceptions of the problem. Long called "mirror-imaging" but by any name just another facet of the ethnocentric nature of the "illusion of symmetry." Professor John Erickson, a noted Sovietologist from the University of Edinburgh, outlines this common omission when he compares early 1960s Soviet strategic thinking to the "supposed intellectual superiority of American sophistication in matters of deterrent theory of the day." (17:242)
"It soon became apparent that the USSR needed no tutoring in matters pertaining to war in general and nuclear war in particular, that there was a singular cogency to Soviet strategic thinking and that Russians did not necessarily think like Americans. While Western specialists in strategic theory refined their concepts of "deterrence" into even more complex (and arcane) theorems, a kind of nuclear metaphysics, the Soviet command had worked much more closely within classically configured military concepts, including those with a much greater degree of military and political realism." (17:242)

An ample argument for folding an assessment and understanding of Soviet perceptions into US strategic decision making.

On the matters directly related to arms control and disarmament, Professor Erickson adds some additional emphasis for going "beyond the illusion of symmetry" with a study of US and Soviet motivations and purpose.

"Indeed, it is becoming ever more apparent that improved mutual understanding of [strategic] "doctrine" is a prerequisite of effective arms limitation and arms control as opposed to confining the matter to technicalities of weapons systems: this is where true asymmetry may lie, in "doctrine" (and perceptions) rather than in disparate number of weapons and characteristics of their presumed performance." (17:242)

Now that these brief discussions of strategic thought and deterrence theory have added grist to our argument that there are indeed some major asymmetries influencing the overall nuclear weapons process, let's move on to the next section of the paper. The following analyses separately describe the arms control "behavior" of
As we cover the period from the close of WWII up through SALT II we will be looking for how each side emphasizes the traditional objectives of arms control outlined in the previous chapter.

**US Arms Control "Behavior"**

"The pursuit of stability, a condition of political and military affairs which reduces the possibility of war between the superpowers, has been a major goal of post-war US nuclear arms control policy....Underlying this pursuit of stability through nuclear arms control is the concept of assured destruction...stability based on the concept of assured destruction, in effect, sets the stage for nuclear arms control policy."

(24:58-59)

This extract from "the Goals of US Nuclear Arms Control Policy" study prepared in late 1986 for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives highlights an enduring and important objective of US arms control efforts. By tracing US arms control "behavior" in light of the concept of stability from the close of WWII up through SALT II, we can characterize and demonstrate the interests and themes which dominate policy. For the purposes of our analysis, we'll break down the past into the four periods surveyed in the report mentioned above: the Truman Administration, the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy and Johnson Years and the SALT Negotiations. (24:62)
The Truman Administration

The initial US yearnings toward the concept of a stable US/Soviet political/military relationship are by-products of the early stages of the Cold War. In response to the Soviet moves to consolidate their holdings in Eastern Europe, and their pressures on Turkey and Greece, "the American image of the Soviet Union steadily darkened during the first postwar years. The American attitude toward Soviet-American relations became increasingly alarmist." (14:116) George Kennan's articulation of the Soviet Union as the "leader in a long term and irreconcilable competition with capitalist states" crystallized the threat to the US. (90:145-147)

Truman's resultant policy of "containment" considered nuclear weapons as offsets or "equalizers" (24:63) for the large Soviet conventional forces remaining immobilized in Europe. National Security Council (NSC)-68 "codified containment" (24:63), and the US mapped out a comprehensive political and military strategy which took a tougher stance against the gravest threat to US national security: "international Communism and its leader the Soviet Union." (43:157) Our congressional report offers some excellent insights into the beginnings of the Cold War that bear on our problem.

"There are two legacies from this time period that have special relevance to arms control: 1) the intrusion of massive Soviet political and especially military power into the center of Europe; and 2) the determination [by the US] to offset this fact with extended deterrence. The first is the source of those political tensions that underlie the arms race; the second established an overall dependency on the use of
nuclear weapons to achieve political goals that tend to limit the options for nuclear arms control." (24:63)

These two judgments seem to account for the unsuccessful attempts of the United Nations and the Baruch Plan of 1946 to eliminate nuclear weapons as the hopes for an East-West reconciliation faded rather quickly.

Comprehensive arms reduction proposals of the last 1940s attempted to "link nuclear and conventional force reductions so neither side retained an advantage which was conducive to aggression." These were the "first attempts to form a negotiating strategy based on the concept of stability" but these initiatives proved unworkable. As we turn to the Eisenhower Administration in the early 1950s, we see "more movement toward rearmament in the West than real progress toward arms control." (24:65)

The Eisenhower Administration

Eisenhower's election in 1952 was a criticism of the Korean War and a strong indictment of Truman's policy of containment. (91:167) The search for a more robust strategy, one that would "reconcile the costs of security with the solvency of the nation" (77:384, 390-392) led to NSC-162/2 in October 1953. The "determination of the US to use atomic striking power as a major deterrent to aggression in Western Europe" (95:185) was articulated. This strategy was emphasized in John Foster Dulles' "Massive Retaliation" speech (51:151-153) on January 12, 1954 before the prestigious Council of Foreign Relations.
Mr. Dulles' threats that the US would use "its great capacity to retaliate at places and times of our choosing" announced Eisenhower's version of containing "Soviet Communism." (51:151-153) He implicitly underscored the deterrent role the threat to use nuclear weapons would play in US national security strategy and spoke of a defense plan that now "successfully balances military costs and risks as a force against despotism." (15:354)

All this declaratory strategic rhetoric was highly charged and set the stage for some serious policy choices amidst a sea of contradictions and counterarguments. Craig and George's analysis of the Cold War as played out in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations is particularly illustrative of the predicaments of stability.

"American foreign policy pursued two basic objectives: first to prevent (or contain) the further spread of international communism (and, if possible, to roll it back); second to avoid World War III. High priority was attached to both of these objectives, but there was a built-in conflict between them that emerged sharply in certain situations." (14:118-119)

These conflicts--risking nuclear war to stop communism or yielding to communism to stop a nuclear war--became more and more evident as Soviet adventurism and nuclear forces developed and the US adopted its early strategies of deterrence. Criticism of US nuclear policy, initially energized in the immediate aftermath of Secretary Dulles' speech, "continued to question the real power of massive nuclear threats to deter attacks or threats on US interests." (24:67)

Yet, "Khrushchev's boasting about conventional superiority in 1954-56"
the launching of Sputnik in 1957 and the "missile gap" of the late 1950s led to a "massive buildup of US nuclear capabilities, leaving the Soviet Union in a position of relative inferior strategic power." (24:67)

The rapid development of nuclear forces on both sides led to increased concern for stability. The Gaither Committee's report in 1957 on the vulnerability of US retaliatory nuclear forces to Soviet surprise attack energized President Eisenhower to agree with Secretary Khrushchev to discuss "measures to safeguard against surprise attack." Although, "nothing concrete came of the negotiations," the occasion was crucial in identifying the vulnerability problem and its effects on "strategic stability as the pivotal issue," from the US perspective at least, "in arms negotiations for the next decade." (76:220-221)

The Kennedy and Johnson Years

If the preceding administrations' nuclear weapons programs worried the technical components of stability, "Kennedy's close brush with the real likelihood of nuclear war had a sobering effect on subsequent political policymaking." (24:70) A thaw in East-West relations contributed to the culmination of some arms control efforts started in the 1950s. Negotiations that contributed to reducing tensions and increasing political stability were the "Hotline" Agreement and Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. (24:71) (For treaty texts see (1).) It's probably fair to say that the US
incentive for seeking agreement on each of these was to add some predictability and certainty to the environment of foreign affairs.

At the same time, both sides were proceeding down a contradictory track and establishing nuclear forces which exacerbated the problems of strategic stability. While we'll deal with Soviet specifics in the next section of the paper, the evolution of US nuclear forces and strategy presented interesting challenges for the arms control community. Secretary McNamara's combination of assured destruction and damage-limitation doctrines is a case in point. These two together created a major contradiction for stability. Since the damage-limitation or "war-fighting" clause of the doctrine carries an implicit pre-emptive counterforce option, a major conflict between US nuclear theory and practice existed. This disconnect becomes especially critical in times of crisis.

As the numbers of Soviet central ballistic missile forces increased and our US military strategies included more counterforce targeting options, the "stability" of assured destruction, and especially its mutuality, decreased accordingly. And because no President or Secretary of Defense would ever explicitly deny or discount the military value of a counterforce nuclear option, stability suffered further. (73:20) Even though McNamara admitted "assured destruction" was not meant as a "military strategy but as a programming guide for the sizing of forces," (73:25) US and also Soviet forces "were designed so that the side striking first had a substantial advantage over the side under attack." (60:119) Arms
control advocates had an especially knotty problem to work, however, no harder than those of today.

Enhancing "strategic stability" by minimizing the difference in effect between first-strike and second strike capability" (60:119) became McNamara's approach to arms control. He "used arguments drawn from his doctrine of mutual assured destruction to limit US forces and define a goal of arms control that would entice the Soviets into agreement, since it would amount to a US concession of strategic equality. The goal was "stability" based on "parity" in central strategic systems. Parity would be in terms of mutual assured destruction capabilities." (24:72-73)

Since McNamara's approach considered stability largely out of political context, we shouldn't be surprised to find the Soviets unconvinced when they compared our rhetoric to the forces they saw. As a result, strategic systems proved impossible to limit. Nonetheless, it was the zest for the concept of stability that drove McNamara's enthusiasm for beginning SALT and resisting the "destabilizing" aspects of the ABM system. (76:222) These are the fundamental principles of the next phase of arms control.

The SALT Negotiations

As the decade of the 1960s closed and the 1970s began, we find arms control efforts seeking to accommodate both technical and political imperatives. Emerging Soviet capabilities plus ABM and MIRV technologies seriously threatened strategic stability. As the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity with the US, the need to maintain
parity became a principal US objective in the SALT negotiations. However, the SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement granted the Soviets a numerical superiority, failed to stop the subsequent modernization of weapons, and exacerbated the problems of stability. (See Texts: Item 1)

ABM systems were seen as "destabilizing" because they offered the opportunity to limit the effectiveness of retaliatory forces, promoted the advantages of striking first and increased the likelihood that "burgeoning defenses would require indefinite enlargement of the retaliatory force. Thus, ABM systems deployed in both countries would make pre-emptive war more likely and the arms race more expensive." (76:221-222)

MIRV technology was especially dangerous to the concept of strategic stability. After accepting a Soviet superiority in launcher numbers, the US was not about to limit its own technological advantage in MIRV systems. Unfortunately, we underestimated Soviet technological prowess and as larger numbers of more capable Soviet missiles were MIRVed, the US ICBM force became threatened. It became desirable to "limit the fractionation of ICBM payloads because of their potential to destabilize the strategic balance." (9:85) However, it was not until 1979 and the SALT II Treaty that we attempted to limit MIRV developments. Any hopes for "freezing" Soviet weapons developments with arms control proved to be politically elusive.
The political components of the SALT process are indicative of a shift from the weapons technology and strategic stability problems to a much broader set of goals and objectives for US arms control efforts. While John Kennedy and Khrushchev "quickly moved, in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, to seek accommodation on some mutual issues, President Nixon and his chief adviser Henry Kissinger wanted to go much farther." (14:132)

SALT was "seen by them as one political tool within the context of detente for gaining leverage over some aspects of Soviet behavior and foreign policy." By agreeing in SALT, the Soviets would become "enmeshed in a complex network of international relations and as a result this overall relationship would shape and influence Soviet foreign policy actions to coincide more closely with the desires of the West." (60:121-122)

This concept was called "linkage." Here's how Henry Kissinger described what he was after.

"The SALT agreement does not stand alone isolated and incongruous in the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some sudden crisis. It stands, rather, linked organically to a chain of agreements and to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age." (46:143-144)

Despite this complex strategy and its requisite environment of detente, linkage suffered and eventually collapsed. The Soviets refused to manipulate and the US foreign policy bureaucracy increasingly resented being left out of the picture, mostly because Henry Kissinger saw himself as running the show. The politics of
strategic stability also contributed to the demise of detente. As the ambiguously worded SALT agreements failed to constrain Soviet growth, the "pace of their deployments, pushed the SECDEF and JCS to turn publicly from skepticism of detente to outright criticism." (60:123)

Reflecting back on the points raised by Dr. Hoover on the demise of the Washington Naval Treaty regimes, we can see a similar situation here with the SALT process. A loss of the political consensus for negotiations rapidly leads to strong desires to abandon the agreement. It was difficult to maintain the necessary political and military commitment, especially in the turbulent times after Watergate.

Weary of the complexities of US-Soviet relations in the era of detente, President Carter reverted to a more simple arrangement. In this context, "SALT returned to the classical objectives of arms control and linkage as a way to cope with Soviet military power was jettisoned." (60:124) In retrospect, SALT II was the Carter administration's only consistent policy toward the Soviet Union. (14:143) In a speech to the Southern Legislative Conference in 1977, President Carter stated his arms control policy, "...genuine progress in SALT will not merely stabilize competition in weapons but can also provide a basis for improvement in political relations." (86) These words framed his approach for the completion of SALT II.

He proposed an alternative solution to the basic guidelines hashed out in the 1974 summit at Vladivostok and this new proposal
upset the Russians. His "comprehensive" policy was aimed at providing "both sides with political parity and strategic stability, with emphasis on constraining those aspects of each side's strategic programs that were seen as most threatening to each other." (14:124-125) He was prepared to trade off US cruise missile development for Soviet restraint on heavy ICBMs. President Carter's major goal was to protect or preserve the survivability of the US ICBM force. The Soviets resented this departure from the Vladivostok agreement and criticized Carter's proposal as too asymmetric in favor of the US.

SALT II was finally signed in 1979 but the hopes for Senate ratification faded quickly. The treaty was criticized in the US as incomplete and unverifiable, especially when it permitted a Soviet "advantage" in heavy ICBMs. (93) The questions of political parity and strategic stability were left open as the discovery of the Soviet Brigade in Cuba and the invasion of Afghanistan preempted SALT II and the treaty was withdrawn from the Senate.

As the decade of the 1970s closed, the public became increasingly concerned about the "continued Soviet military buildup and apprehensive that the US was slipping into a position of dangerous military inferiority." (14:144) Arms control as a means to stability was condemned as having failed to prevent the Soviet Union from opening the "window of vulnerability" with its capability to attack and destroy a major portion of the US ICBM force. US retaliatory capability would be seriously degraded and the US President would then
be faced with the final countervalue option, inviting a catastrophic response in return." (24:76) Hardly a stable strategic situation from the US point of view and a condition that was aggravated by a much darker US-Soviet political relationship than existed ten years before.

Our analysis of the pursuit of stability concludes here before the Reagan administration takes office. We'll briefly discuss the implications of what we've just seen in the context of the current INF and START negotiations in the next chapter. But first, let's fold in a quick rundown on how the Soviet arms control attitudes might differ from ours. Then we can try to make some sense of this in the next chapter.

**Soviet Arms Control "Behavior"**

"Two themes dominate Soviet arms control policy over the last thirty-five years. Within the broad strategic goal of avoiding nuclear war with the West, the Soviets have used arms control negotiations to serve basic security needs. Moscow has also seen arms control negotiations as a means for advancing Soviet interests." (24:253)

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

"American perceptions about Soviet motivations have almost certainly resulted in missed opportunities for meaningful arms control agreements. A continued misreading of Soviet interests and aims could lead the United States to adopt policies whose results are the opposite of what it desires." (57:10)

MICHAEL McGwire
One useful way to examine the Soviet Union's objectives for arms control is to attack the problem from the perspective of what we can learn from the current debate about the changing nature of Soviet nuclear doctrine. From that debate we should be able to distill some implications for arms control.

There appears to be a significant shift in how the Soviets view the utility of nuclear war. As a result, the evidence supporting this argument seems to document that the Soviets are coming to accept a diminished role for nuclear war as a useful instrument in achieving political objectives. It follows, as we'll see, then that the Soviet's current interest in arms control is a natural by-product of this change in Soviet doctrine. Here's a closer look at some of the evidence.

Mary C. FitzGerald of the Center for Naval Analysis sees "Gorbachev's call for arms control stemming from a revolutionary change in Soviet doctrine which downgrades nuclear contingencies and prefers conventional warfare." (20:16) (21) Her judgments come from evaluating the roughly three periods of Soviet nuclear doctrine: 1) 1950s and the use of nuclear weapons as means to supplement troop firepower; 2) 1960s or the period of Sokolovskiy's "Military Strategy" which focused on viable nuclear options; and 3) 1970s-1980s the times of major quantitative improvements in nuclear arsenals which gave rise to the questioning of the possibility of waging and limiting war with nuclear weapons. (20:16)
Cutting across these periods are some changing views about the possibilities of nuclear war. These views, in turn, influence the extent to which the Soviets appear committed to arms control and its two "principal objectives: 1) the political objective of avoiding war; and 2) the military objective, should war prove inescapable, of not losing." (57:12)

Up until the late 1960s, the Soviets apparently believed that World War, should it occur, would inevitably be nuclear and involve massive strikes on the Soviet homeland. Since, Soviet nuclear capability seriously lagged that of the US, they saw arms control as not meeting either objective. They saw no evidence that arms control would help avoid war and without sufficient forces to attack and degrade US retaliatory capability, they saw themselves unable to limit the damage of a nuclear war. After 1966, there appears to be a significant shift in Soviet thinking. A change toward a belief that nuclear war and the devastation could be avoided. (57:11-12)

The Soviets may have interpreted the combination of the US strategy shift from massive retaliation to 'flexible response' in Europe and the French withdrawal from NATO as indicators that war could, at least initially, be held at the conventional level. Michael McGwire goes on to argue that the Soviets concluded that war in Europe "may not necessarily include nuclear strikes in the USSR unless the US homeland is directly attacked," (57:11-12) a question about the extendability of deterrence that bothers many of the NATO Allies...
today. This may have encouraged Soviet hopes of reducing the uncertainties of nuclear war in Europe.

On the military capability side, the size and diversity of US nuclear forces made the "hopes for any sufficient damage limiting strike very small. Moreover, if in the early stages of a war in NATO, the Soviets could capture or otherwise neutralize Alliance nuclear assets without going nuclear, the question of escalation might become moot." Thus, arms control could help contribute to the "political goal of avoiding nuclear war through lessened tensions and the military objective of limiting the devastation of the USSR by capping the US' strategic arsenals." (57:11-12)

A look back at Soviet SALT policy seems to support McGwire's analysis. Raymond Garthoff, a Senior State Department official during the SALT negotiations sums up the overall Soviet objectives during that period quite well, "The Soviets wanted an overreaching, general politically meaningful accord; we stressed concrete military meaningful arms control." (24:266) History supports that substantial political and military progress was made.

First of all, SALT codified Soviet superpower status and US recognition of Soviet military status endorsed the mutuality of the nuclear relationship and contributed to reduced international tensions. On the military side, SALT "failed to constrain Soviet weapons programs except for an ineffective ABM and this served force building plans in the quantitative area. The Interim Offensive Agreement established Soviet ICBM and SLBM numerical superiority and
did not interfere with technological modernization programs such as missile accuracy improvements." (60:126)

Transcending the end of the SALT era is the pivotal event in the emerging doctrinal revolution in the Soviet Union. FitzGerald believes that Brezhnev's "Tula Address" of 1977 signaled that Soviet motivations for arms control were beginning to change. Here, FitzGerald argues, "Brezhnev did away with any hopes of obtaining nuclear military superiority and dismissed the possibility of either side being able to effectively defend against nuclear attacks." As such, neither side could gain a "military significant damage limiting capability and the ongoing debate on realistic defenses was squelched." All this "appeared to ratify mutual assured destruction (MAD) in the minds of the Soviet political/military leadership and deny the rationality of the military quest for a first strike capability." (20:16)

As we attempt to validate this shift in Soviet doctrine, Steve Kime reminds us that, "it is important not to forget that which is fundamental: there exists in the Soviet Union a national consensus on the value of military power firmly based in their legacy of history." (45:44-45) We must seek to understand Soviet arms control initiatives only within this broad political and societal context. They are not likely to adopt negotiating positions that jeopardize the security of the state. So, we can see why they may "accept the political utility of MAD for its contribution to security but reject it as a sound military strategy because forces remain vulnerable." (45:48)
Since the possibility of war cannot be "zeroed out," (to use a term that has taken on significance in the INF business) they must consider nuclear war fighting and winning should war occur. (30) (45) In this regard, Soviet arms control initiatives may be challenged by the imperatives of the past and encouraged by the needs of the future but always helpful in shaping "the broad combination of conventional and nuclear forces which constitutes the totality of Soviet global military power." (45:50)

All of this gave rise in the late 1970s to an admission that the next war could contain a long conventional phase and the US might be prepared better technologically for this kind of outcome. A much different view on the inevitability of nuclear war which presents some knotty military problems to work. The most significant problem in this new environment is how to control escalation within the context of evolving doctrine. Our experts feel the Soviets see the US preparing to be able to use nuclear weapons in the next war for intrawar deterrence and winning the day with superior conventional means. It may be that Soviet arms control efforts will be directed at making them more capable in this kind of future.

Summing up Soviet arms control "behavior," we can see disarmament initiatives as the output of a "methodical arms control policy." (68:67) The goal of which is to preserve Soviet military status and the security of the state by slowing the ever widening technological gap with the West. (68:67) (18:564-565) A gap which has the potential to expand more quickly as a result of the
"revolution in military affairs" brought about as Marshal Ogarkov articulates, "by the rapid quantitative growth in nuclear weapons plus the new combat characteristics of conventional means." (21)

The corresponding "surplus of nuclear capability" makes it more important to constrain US technology through arms control (18:587) as a means to help work the ultimate military problem: "achieving political objectives while avoiding escalation from regional to global nuclear war." (58) Consequently, current and future Soviet arms control initiatives are likely to be framed under the general rubric "less is better." (57:12) An initiative likely to generate overwhelming worldwide support. We better be ready.

How Do Both Sides Measure Up?

Based on what we've just seen, some interesting and markedly different styles, trends and themes in arms control "behavior" seem to emerge. Reflecting, for a moment, back to the importance of objectives and the traditional goals of arms control plus the framework for evaluation outlined in the previous chapter, let's see how each side measures up.

A determined pursuit of strategic stability--both crisis and political--characterize US arms control efforts. Any Soviet weapons development which threatens the credibility of US assured retaliatory capability creates crisis instability and increases the likelihood or probability of nuclear war. Although less than fully integrated, US nuclear forces and arms control initiatives have been aimed at the same objective: deny the Soviets a force structure that would make
preemption or a disarming first-strike attack a viable military option. US attempts to use the SALT process as a means to protect and preserve the survivability of the silo based ICBM force seems to validate this quest for strategic stability. The overall concern for stability, especially in times of crisis, has also stimulated some political objectives for arms control.

As was mentioned in the brief review of the Nixon-Kissinger concept of linkage, the US saw the "process" of arms control as an important contribution to stability. The cooperative relationship of detente and arms control sought to supplant the more adversarial political/military competition with a broader political relationship. While the US legitimized Soviet superpower status with bilateral negotiations, the Soviets were to contribute to political stability by moderating their international conduct. Even though detente and linkage were discarded when the Soviets "misbehaved," in the late 1970s, a strong tendency remains in the US toward using arms control as a means to work the political aspects to stability.

In contrast to the fundamental US arms control view that the likelihood or probability of nuclear war increase as abstract numerical calculations of strategic stability decrease, the Soviets are motivated to think differently. Where we seem to be preoccupied with numerical measurements of equality as insurance against nuclear war, the Soviets' views are detached from these deterministic comparisons. They recognize nuclear war will most likely occur, if it ever does, within the context of the political/military competition.
with the US and consider what to do to limit the damage of nuclear war should it occur. Thus, Soviet arms control initiatives emerge as military means to the political end of making sure the Soviet state survives a nuclear war.

As their views on the inevitability of nuclear war changed, so did their arms control ideas. Soviet arms control attitudes and motivations probably reflect the skillful manipulation of an integral component of a complex political/military strategy aimed at two objectives: avoidance of nuclear war and not losing it if war occurs.

Soviet arms control behavior has evolved carefully. When the Soviets had little nuclear capability, relative to the US, there was no compelling reason for arms control. As they reinterpreted the inevitability of nuclear war in light of NATO's "flexible response" strategy, the SALT process offered some excellent opportunities. The negotiations served to lessen international tensions and provide an environment more conducive to avoiding nuclear war. At the same time, SALT permitted them the opportunity to fully develop a robust ICBM force they saw as necessary to limit damage in times of conflict. There were some more subtle aspects of their arms control strategy as well. Using the environment of detente as a means to reduce US interests toward pursuing arms improvements and to retard US technological improvements proved to be fairly effective strategies.

Now that their views on the inevitability of nuclear war are apparently changing, we see evidence that Soviet arms control strategies are closely coordinated. As a result, it is unlikely that
the future will provide a rationale for any change in arms control behavior that ignores the political/military imperatives of preserving the state.

Putting all this together, we see the US and Soviets pursuing two quite different and asymmetrical sets of objectives. The US primarily concerned with maintaining strategic stability as the guarantor of reducing the likelihood or probability of nuclear war. The Soviets, in contrast, accepting that nuclear war could occur and seeking ways to avoid the conflict but to limit the damage should war occur. What does all this mean? Is it dangerous that we don't share the same set of objectives? Are we more or less secure because of these asymmetrical differences? What does this portend for the future? We'll examine these questions in the next chapter.
"What can we learn from our arms control experience with the Soviet Union? The step-by-step approach to arms control pursued in the 1960s and 1970s did not aim to alter drastically the defense plans of the two sides but attempted instead to identify areas where mutual compromise might codify a rough balance, reduce tensions, and equally important pave the way for more extensive limitations....But did this process and the measures it produced further the traditional arms control objectives of lessening the likelihood and destructiveness of war?"

(13:1)

ALBERT CARNESALE
RICHARD HAASS

Given the substantial differences just described, it seems appropriate, if we are to be successful in moving beyond the illusion of symmetry, to ask some tough questions at this point in the argument. Measuring the results of arms control against its expectations, as indicated is necessary to answer the question raised by Albert Carnesale in the quote above, could provide some useful insights as we ponder what we have just read.

Then the first question we ought to ask in making sense of these asymmetries can be stated quite simply: Has arms control failed? Some various perspectives on the success or failure of arms control can help us decide if asymmetries in arms control behavior and objectives really matter.
Has Arms Control Failed?

According to the Reagan Administration as articulated in the SECDEF's Fiscal Year 1988, Annual Report to Congress, the answer to this important question would have to be "yes." (99:62) Since the SALT process began, "the US attempted to constrain the growth of Soviet systems through negotiations, but flawed and ambiguous agreements permitted huge Soviet increases." (99:62) The treaties of the 1970s were "arms control in name only" which "legalized and offered our agreement to a quadrupling of Soviet strategic weapons [warheads and bombs] and doubling of Soviet ballistic missile warheads." (99:62)

The SECDEF's report goes on to argue that the major lesson learned from the 1970s experience is that "unilateral restraint" offers no leverage when negotiating with the Soviets. (99:63) Consequently, the US strategic modernization programs of 1981 provided the requisite leverage for future negotiations and raised the status of arms control to an "integral component of US national security strategy." (61:19) [Note: for an excellent rundown on the scope of these programs see: Secretary Weinberger's first full budget report, Fiscal Year 1983, Annual Report to Congress, pages III-57 through III-70. (98) For more detail on the Reagan Defense Program, see Fred Charles Ikle', "The Reagan Defense Program: A Focus on the Strategic Imperatives," STRATEGIC REVIEW, Spring 1982, pages 11-34. (39)] Secretary Carlucci carries on a similar theme "toward true reductions in nuclear and conventional forces and because we have bargained from
a position of strength our arms control policies supplement defense policy, not supplant it." (12:107)

While reading these criticisms of past arms control practices and statements of current policies, the reader is driven subtly toward one major conclusion about the results of arms control. The Soviets apparently achieved their arms control objectives, while US results were substantially below expectations. Even though "no weapons system sought by the US was stopped by the SALT process," (60:134) arms control is implicitly forced to "take the rap" for the Soviet buildup. It's not surprising to discover that the asymmetrical nature of US/Soviet arms control goals and objectives is missing from this kind of analysis and the criticisms that normally follow. Perhaps we have asked too much of nuclear arms control too early. There are a couple more views worth exploring in this regard.

Thomas C. Schelling offers an interesting perspective in his Winter 1985/86, Foreign Affairs article on "What Went Wrong with Arms Control?" His insights that the major difference in the 1957-1972, or "high" period of arms control, and the post-1972 period of problems "has been the shift of [arms control's objectives] and interests from the character of weapons to their numbers in specific fixed categories." (76) Schelling's thoughts imply there has been a recent tendency (since 1972) to see the goals of arms control more in terms of countable stacks of weapons.

These kinds of calculations of weapons unfortunately often lead to some faulty and perhaps dangerous conclusions. Some think
that if we can somehow "balance" the asymmetrical nature of the competitors with equal numbers of weapons, then equal security would result. This kind of symmetrical analysis, Schelling would most likely add, leads to misguided numerically driven arms control attempts to "equate the balance of deterrence with the balance of terror. Even though the roots of deterrence and terror are the same," (76:233) attempts to "calculate a goal for arms control" miss the point of what arms control can accomplish. Schelling's observations seem to indicate once again that a realization or understanding of the asymmetrical nature of the two major competitors is somehow lacking from most analysis.

Recognizing this analytical shortcoming, other experts argue that the "most compelling rationale for reductions" (63:6) comes from the political benefits of arms control. The "hostility of weapons are not a problem," according to Joseph S. Nye Jr., but "the hostility with which they are embedded is important." (63:15) Consequently, as Hedley Bull argues, "arms control fits nicely into the international state of affairs as a way to help maintain the balance of power." (64:54) Using Hedley Bull's perspective then, it's not stretching the point too far to see the benefits of arms control coming from its ability to bridge the asymmetrical gap in competing objectives to a symmetrical view of the dangers of nuclear war. In this sense, arms control is not "an end in itself but a means to a desirable political end." (64:119-127) But, we have to be careful and not go too far with high political ambitions for arms control; we are likely to be frustrated there also.
According to Lawrence Freedman, for arms control to truly succeed, the process must be an "integral part of our foreign policy, not a substitute for it." (23:191) However, intuitively pleasing this statement appears to be as we ponder an appropriate role for arms control, there are some practical limits to what we can realistically expect. At best, we are challenged by Freedman to "protect arms control from unrealistic political demands." (23:212)

In this regard, Freedman posits what we can and can't do in political terms with arms control. He states, "we can't use arms control to regulate and redefine the military aspects of East-West relations [probably the highest ambitions we could hold for arms control] but we can use arms control as a means to cope with the antagonism [or the nature of the political/military competition] that exists between the US and the Soviet Union." (23:212) A more modest and realistic objective, explained in more detail in the following analysis of his critique of the "four phases" of arms control.

Recognizing the disparate objectives inherent in the asymmetrical US and Soviet approaches to arms control, Freedman seems to see merit in not reading too much into what is politically possible in the art of arms control. As we've seen so far in this paper, the political context of arms control is quite complex and asking for a coherent foreign policy complete with coordinated and integrated arms control levers is indeed a large request. Perhaps Freedman's historical perspective on what has happened in past attempts to meld the "complex interactions between weapons, doctrines, foreign policy
and arms control" (23:193) will yield some insights into the "failures" of arms control cited earlier in this chapter.

The "state" of arms control in the late 1950s and early 1960s "explicitly excluded foreign policy considerations" and "sought cooperative forms of behavior despite the deeply antagonistic relationship." (23:194) This "essentially managerial concept took the political context of the time largely for granted and provided simple rules for arms control: all that contributed to a second strike was good; anything that made possible a first strike, bad." (23:194-195) The realization that these rather crude assumptions and rules would not work "without either a reappraisal of NATO commitments or a risk of an inadvertent slide into all-out nuclear war," (23:197) brought on the second stage of arms control.

In the era of "flexible response" and the "virtues" of uncertainties about when NATO would employ nuclear weapons, arms control "made things more predictable and certain--which went against the grain of flexible response." (23:198) On the other hand, "arms control activity in terms of the seabed, outerspace and nonproliferation treaties reflected a desire to define the limits of East-West antagonism." (23:199-200) Unfortunately, as the early 1970s came and went the "new symbolism" of national power conferred by arms control's simplistic measures-of-merit and counting conventions of the nuclear balance presented "opportunities for political manipulation and mischief-making." (23:201) "Thus, an arms control process set in motion to encourage and consolidate a positive movement
in East-West affairs eventually came to magnify [and make explicit in numbers] an opposing tendency." (23:202)

Freedman's recap of the "third stage" is especially illuminating as we look back at the failures mentioned earlier. It is from his analysis of the early 1970s and on that "demonstrates the extent to which the simplest notions of the potential and function of arms control has taken root." (23:205) Here his criticism of the "illusion of symmetry" is hard to miss. "Arms control is the only place at which the forces of the two sides can be brought together in such a way as to facilitate close comparisons, and it is the fact that these comparisons bear no relation to the actual process of force development that makes the exercise so fraught." (23:205)

In other words, the "illusion of symmetry" leads to "force matching but no controls--imitation rather than limitation." (23:205) Attempts then to collapse the dynamic political nature of East-West relations into a single set of "arms control indicators" incorrectly force symmetries where they don't necessarily exist. In the "fourth stage" of arms control Freedman hopes to "clear up the mess" with a "consensus on a new role for arms control." (23:207-208) He suggests an arms control strategy that recognizes the complexities of the political/military competition and "is a means not of regulating East-West relations but of creating a system that can cope with antagonism. [Arms control] is a state to be attained rather than a process to be indulged." (23:212)
Lest we be too pessimistic about the prospects of arms control, a couple of contrasting insights into the "successes" of arms control can round out our argument. By analyzing past limitation achievements from the perspectives of those who favor arms control measures, we can gather some additional evidence supporting our thrust away from the "illusion of symmetry." For these views, we'll turn to Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky and Michael May, both noted nuclear experts.

In the first case, Panofsky offers a compelling bit of information for us to use in tempering our criticisms of past arms control efforts. At the very beginning he reminds us that "arms control, only draws a line between what is allowed and what is forbidden. One should not fault an agreement for not having constrained what is allowed." (65:35-36) He deals with what were argued to be "failures of arms control" in the previous section with a series of thought-provoking answers to the criticisms of both "hawks" and "doves" alike. These views are salient as we continue to think about a strategy for the future.

He admits categorically that "past arms control measures have not stopped the arms race, nor has anything else." (65:36) A point well worth remembering as it relates to the determinants of nuclear force structure, the critical elements arms control seeks to shape and influence. "Arms control has not solved the ICBM in-silo vulnerability problem, nor has anything else including the host of technical fixes proposed." (65:36) To the criticism--one this paper wholeheartedly endorses--that "arms control has overemphasized raw
numbers," he attributes some merit. (65:36) Here's more grist for our argument about the dangers or limits of unfounded symmetrical judgments.

He also admits that "arms control has legitimized the arms race by explicitly permitting certain activities but the alternative is to prohibit all or permit all--clearly a prescription preventing any progress." (65:36) Lastly, he answers the criticism that agreements "inspire false confidence" by laying bare the ultimate conclusion of this chain of logic to the light of reason, "arms competition among nations can never be managed in any manner other than unbridled competition." (65:37) As we should be able to summarize by now, adopting this pessimistic view encourages force matching strategies, perpetuates the "illusion of symmetry" and ignores any prospects for efforts to mute the arms competition in ways that contribute to improved security.

Panofsky closes his rebuttal of these criticisms with a hint that bounds the problem of where the "arms control realists" ought to be headed. He sees them carefully crafting their way between the "extremes of the competing visions of the unilateral disarmers and military hardware enthusiasts." In the final analysis Panofsky argues, "we must have arms control before either vision can conceivably lead to reality." (65:38) So despite the major asymmetries between the US and Soviet Union, Panofsky seems to be arguing for continuing to work the hard problems. Our second expert agrees.
Michael May also sees some positive benefits coming from arms control. As both the US and Soviet Union have learned to cope with the existence of nuclear weapons, some major successes have emerged. Most notably, despite the deep political/military asymmetries, each side has come to accept the "unavoidable situation of nuclear deterrence." (54:140) Consequently, "arms control has helped the US and Soviet Union to avoid some serious mistakes, such as weapons in space, on the seabed and the development of extensive ABM system." According to May, "avoiding such mistakes is one of the most valuable and durable advantages of arms control." (54:141) The implicit message here for us is that there are probably some other mistakes we ought to try to avoid through an innovative and creative arms control strategy.

Out of arms control, May would likely agree that the US and Soviets have fashioned a means that has bridged the "asymmetrical gap" to work the mutual problems. Yet, the answers to mutual problems don't necessarily have to be the same for each side. The test of the durability of this relationship May cites will be its ability to address the "central US/Soviet dilemma: very destructive nuclear weapons, inexpensive to other means of exerting military power and deliverable in a number of ways, will forever be at least a potential part of the arsenals." (54:142)

As we close this interpretation of the "failures" and "successes" of arms control in light of the major differences in US and Soviet arms control "behavior," some preliminary judgments begin
to come into focus. For the sake of the remainder of the analysis we'll limit our initial findings to two major statements: 1) arms control cannot be taken out of its political context and 2) the "illusion of symmetry" limits the effectiveness of arms control. If these interim assessments of what we've seen so far in this paper are valid, then we ought to be able to test them as we look briefly at what's going on in INF and START. That's the next section of this chapter.

What About INF and START?

Current INF and START activities tell us some important things about how both sides continue to approach arms control in asymmetrical ways. Whether or not you believe the basic problems stem from the Soviet preference to "chess as opposed to the US partiality for poker," (41:23) (94:23) it's hard to ignore the important differences hiding behind the "illusion of symmetry" created by these negotiations. As we recall the interim solutions of the previous section, we'll take a brief look at both areas. Let's begin with the INF situation.

As announced in the "Joint US-Soviet Summit Statement" of December 10, 1987, following the meetings of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Washington, "the INF agreement is an historic mutual accomplishment [which] makes a vital contribution to greater stability." (2:2) In the words of Gerard C. Smith, a noted arms control expert, "INF is militarily modest but politically important and a positive thrust to arms control." (85:1) Implicit in
the Joint Statement and within the words of Smith is the connection to
the politics of arms control.

As we saw earlier in this paper, it is virtually impossible to
separate the two and there are obviously powerful political incentives
on both sides to follow through with the process. While it is
impossible to ascertain the true political motives for agreeing to
reduce arms, each carries an attendant military risk or tradeoff. So
within the political asymmetries that both sides agree characterizes
the INF agreement, we see the results of the tradeoffs in terms of
plenty of room for both sides to work their separate agenda.

In the US case, INF lives up to our traditional arms control
objective. The agreement is advertised as contributing to increased
crisis stability by removing a significant portion of the Soviet
threat to Europe. (85:4) To claims that the US is "denuclearizing"
Europe by removing its nuclear guarantees, the response has normally
been something like, "100% of the troops and 90% of the nuclear
weapons will still remain in theater." (11:8)

According to Richard Nixon, this kind of dialogue misses the
point entirely. He sees the political "consternation in Europe
generated as a result of the treaty as the real Soviet objective."
(41:23) George Shultz counters that "forces are still robust and we
are not decoupling from NATO." (80) (81:43) While both sides of this
argument over the benefits of the INF treaty are likely to be debated
hotly as the ratification process grinds on, it is likely that neither
side will become a clear winner. What is disturbing is that the benefits of a treaty may be clearer to the Soviets.

An INF treaty seems to fit the traditional Soviet goal of improving their ability to limit damage should war occur. Once we remove our INF forces, especially the Pershing II, the threat they represent to Soviet command and control is reduced significantly. This seems to fit with their apparent goal (for a quick refresher, please refer back to the Soviet section of Chapter III) to reduce their planning uncertainty and move toward a strategy that permits them to fight conventionally in NATO until they achieve their objectives. Unfortunately for us, the INF treaty language denies some interesting conventional cruise missile options which could complicate Soviet defense problems. Apparently, the Soviet desire to control the escalation in theater was worth the price of an asymmetrical reduction of more than two times the US missile total and granting the British and French systems immunity from the INF argument.

All this seems to demonstrate the broad political/military nature of the Soviet approach to arms control. (41:23) According to Strobe Talbott, the Soviets achieved in INF just what they were after, "keeping US missiles as far away from their territory as possible." (94:20) Thereby removing some of the important uncertainties from the escalation questions which would surely result if "push came to shove" in Europe. If what we've just read is plausible, then the jury must remain out on the question of whether or not an INF treaty reduces the likelihood of nuclear war. Perhaps we haven't gone far enough.
Let's take a fast look at the START business and see where that leaves us.

With respect to START, James L. George, a former Assistant and Acting Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1982-1984 offers some excellent insights into the potential dangers of the "illusion of symmetry." His "in brief" prelude to "The Two-Track" Dilemma in the START Negotiations," STRATEGIC REVIEW, Winter 1988 are worth repeating:

"The "two-track" dilemma in the current START negotiations concerns the relationship between the existing inventory--and ongoing programs--in US strategic weapons and the deep cuts that have been accepted, and in light of the limits and sublimits that have been set, the United States faces excruciating choices in adapting viable strategic forces to a START regime. The Soviet Union, by dint of its much more diversified force inventory, does not confront this problem in nearly the same measure. The prospects point not only to dangerous instabilities but, ironically, to a return to the very strategic environment of "massive retaliation" that the United States has sought to escape." (27:35)

Given the compelling allure and appeal of reducing toward significantly lesser numbers of strategic nuclear weapons within the framework of START, the pressures to agree will most likely be the greatest in the history of arms control. However, as George points out there are some real pitfalls hidden along the way. George's analysis is an excellent rundown on the dangers we face.

While we won't deal with the "bean counts" of START beyond mentioning the broad guidelines [50% reduction in strategic forces,
launcher limit, overall warhead limit of 6000, a ballistic missile warhead sublimit of 4900 (ICBM & SLBM) and an implicit bomber and air launched cruise missile (ALCM) limit of 1100 (27:35-36) (2:2)), what's upsetting is that there "has been virtually no critical analysis of these limits." (27)

As a result, the limits of START collide with the character of US strategic force modernization programs "planned back in the early 1970s when only launchers, not warheads counted. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is developing "generations" of different types of systems, giving them flexibility in several different START worlds. To further confound matters, discussions of US nuclear strategy and deterrence have been virtually ignored in the rush of START." (27:5)

Consequently, it's obvious that at least in the US, the arms controllers are not "tracking" (to use George's term) with the force and strategy planners.

"Deep cuts are important," as Gerard Smith argues (85:5) but so is the US goal of stability relative to the Soviet objective. Smith suggests we drop back to "Scowcroft's recommendation to lessen the risk that either country might gain an advantage by striking first." (85:5) (71) This kind of thoughtful analysis of where we ought to be headed seems to be missing from the debate over START. Which as George indicates requires a reduction of central strategic systems, not merely a capping or freezing of numbers. This is an endeavor we haven't tried yet. So despite all the powerful political
pressures for agreement, the military case against the "illusion of symmetry" clouding the START process seems proven.

Now that we've discussed the INF and START business and thought about the "failures" and "successes" of arms control, it's time to start pulling all the major threads of the overall argument together. For if this paper is to have any merit, it ought to state, or at least offer for further consideration, some judgments about the implications of the asymmetrical approaches to arms control discussed over the last four chapters. We'll do that by attempting to answer one summarizing question: Do asymmetries really matter? Here are some thoughts in that regard.

Do Asymmetries Really Matter?

In traditional political science fashion, the answer is it "depends." There is evidence supporting both sides of the issue, but let me try to be a little more helpful by dealing first with the instances where we've seen that the asymmetries didn't hinder arms control progress. The agreements to limit nuclear proliferation, exclude weapons deployments from outer space and the seabeds, plus warning measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental war, etc., all provide mutually positive benefits despite the asymmetries of the two negotiators. Although there are probably some individual reasons why each one of these initiatives were attractive, their mutual benefits stand out. The same cannot be said for all of the larger agreements.
For SALT I, the Interim Offensive Agreement, the ABM Treaty, SALT II, INF and START, the major asymmetries between the US and Soviet Union certainly do matter and profoundly influence the process. When the political benefits are judged to outweigh the military "compromises" necessary to live within the constraints of the agreement, the tendency to use arms control for a broader set of purposes is hard to pass up. The "price" of an agreement often becomes a loosely defined or ambiguous arrangement and the objectives of "arms control" are interpreted widely. The Soviets used SALT to help codify their "superpower" status, while we accepted agreements because they wouldn't stop us from doing anything we wanted to do to modernize our strategic nuclear forces. In fact, the SALT I treaty was defended before Congress with this very logic. This paper argues that subsequent arms reduction efforts don't tackle the real problems head on. They all seem to miss the basics we discussed early in this paper.

The reason we miss the fundamental objectives of arms control and fail to contribute to reducing the likelihood of conflict is because the "illusion of symmetry" prevents us from dealing with the extremely difficult questions of the major asymmetries between the US and Soviet Union. Until we seriously deal with trying to understand the implications of what these substantial differences mean, we are likely to agree to arms reduction initiatives that are not in our best long term interests.
Because we haven't come to grips with these asymmetries, we may have entered into agreements for all the wrong reasons. INF and START could be prime examples. By not recognizing that our approach to arms control is unnecessarily constrained by our programmed pursuit of symmetry and all the intellectual baggage that goes with it, perhaps we've missed some opportunities and left some potentially beneficial areas unexplored. Since as in the case of START there is no compelling military reason for lesser numbers of weapons especially in a dynamic strategic modernization environment, it takes instead a political judgment to get the arms control ball rolling. Since this political decision must ultimately be supported by a military assessment, there are tremendous pressures to accept the absolute minimum allowable military risk consistent with the political guidelines. Perhaps it would have been better to let the military decide first, what's the best combination of military acquisition and arms control to reach a 50% reduction. Without this process taking place first, a symmetry is forced where one does not exist. It's time to move beyond the "illusion of symmetry" and develop an integrated arms control strategy, founded in achievable objectives and aimed squarely at the roots of the basic strategic tensions between the US and Soviet Union.

On balance, asymmetries really do matter, they are the reason for conflict as well as the keys to peace. So far, arms control has only scratched the surface of what can be done. We'll wind all this
up in the next chapter with some thoughts on the future of arms control and some final conclusions.
"We live in an age of vulnerability, a historical period marked by an intense and dangerous competition between two military giants, the United States and the Soviet Union, each possessing significant political, economic and military weaknesses that the other is seeking to exploit....Central to what determines the competition between the two powers is their nuclear forces. After the US and the Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War as the dominant countries in international politics, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles became the most visible symbols of superpower status. Ever since, they have been the principal litmus test for judging where advantage resides in Soviet-American relations." (60:1)

MICHAEL NACHT

"Such non-incremental goals, which will require you to "zero-base" the business and seek completely new ways of organizing everything--from accounting systems to organizational structure to training to equipment layout and distribution network relations--are a commonplace necessity today." (66:41)

TOM PETERS

"Thoughtful people disagree whether arms control is part of the solution or sometimes part of the problem." (100:819)

R. JAMES WOOLSEY

"US weaknesses as it faces the 21st century [are] due to its lack of strategic vision....[We] lack the systems and institutions to think through a long-range agenda." (87:xvii)

NEWTON GINGRICH
By now the conclusions of this paper are beginning to emerge, however, the four quotes cited above help to summarize what we've seen so far. We'll use these quotes as a simple framework for quickly thinking through the major points of this paper's argument.

Conclusions

Michael Nacht eloquently describes the nature of the international political/military competition between the US and the Soviet Union. He highlights the fundamental origins of the tremendous political pressures we've seen placed on arms control in the past. These kinds of pressures are likely to continue, not abate and, we must always consider arms control within its political context, not separately.

From our discussions we've learned that intense political commitment is necessary to carry off an arms control strategy but there is also a practical limit to what can be accomplished through arms control. Whether you believe the Soviets are motivated to pursue arms control because they feel "threatened by the possibilities of nuclear war," (27) or that the ideological contest has "been won by the US" (97:75) and it's time to reduce the military's pressures on the economy (34), the future of arms control looks to be challenging.

Our second author talks about coping in that kind of dynamic environment.

Tom Peters in *Thriving on Chaos* shows the extent to which the "rules of the game" have changed as a result of learning how to adapt.
to the velocity of change in today's business. His point about using "non-incremental goals in a zero-based" analysis is something we ought to think seriously about. He calls for "introducing tension" into fixed ways of doing business with "bold goals." (66:41)

Perhaps we need to "zero-base" the arms control business as well. You'll recall the basic importance of clearly stated goals to the pursuit of any arms control strategy. It may be that in the midst of the chaos of the defense business, some bold goals for arms control, especially ones that challenge past ways of thinking and doing business, would help us move past the "illusion of symmetry." Peters seems to be arguing, business as usual won't cut it anymore. The same can probably be said of arms control.

However, R. James Woolsey has fairly characterized the skepticism that exists about arms control. Nonetheless, arms control carries with it an intuitive appeal that offers hope for achieving some certainty and predictability in these turbulent times. Like it or not, we've grown comfortable with both the "products" and "processes" of arms control. Imagine how comfortable we could get if we really knew where we were headed.

Maybe we could chart a clearer course beforehand if we first recognized the fundamental differences in US and Soviet arms control behavior and then based on that knowledge set out to draw up a negotiating strategy. Perhaps we would have constructed a different START proposal. It looks as though Woolsey is right with respect to START--arms control is part of the problem and it could be a bigger part of the solution.
As we discussed in the last chapter, a 50% reduction "won't change the basic nature of the US/Soviet political/military competition." (5:345), but arms control could help us deal with the difficult problems of taking down large numbers of strategic weapons and crafting a new nuclear strategy in the aftermath. A task we should be thinking through very carefully right now. However, it's not clear that this is being done. A "strategic vision" for integrating acquisition and arms control might help.

Congressman Gingrich's criticism of the generally poor state of long-range strategic thinking ought to raise our sensitivities about the future of arms control. Based on what we've discussed so far, we should step out of the "illusion of symmetry" and do as Perry Smith advocates and create some "alternative futures as a means to get out of planning for the most likely future." (87:4) An attempt at describing some alternatives might yield some insights into ways to shape and influence the future, not merely react to it! The following recommendation is this paper's attempt at constructing the broad parameters of a new "vision" for arms control.

**Recommendations**

"We believe that arms control is a promising, but still only dimly perceived, enlargement of the scope of military strategy...the aims of arms control and the aims of national military strategy should be substantially the same." (75:1&142)

THOMAS C. SCHELLING
MORTON H. HALPERIN

76
Even if we "zero-base" our arms control program, we've got to start somewhere and it's probably best to return to basics. Some original words would be useful as a foundation for an integrated strategy. Our overall "vision" of arms control is rooted in the thoughts of Schelling and Halperin that were recorded back in 1961. Although it's important to break with past thinking where necessary, it's equally important to hang on to what's valid. In that regard, Schelling and Halperin's thoughts are echoed as integral policy guidelines in both Ikle' and Wohlstetter's "Discriminate Deterrence" strategy as well as the President's National Security Strategy. (40) (61) We'll use them too.

First off, we begin with an arms control strategy that is fully integrated into our national security policy and recognize what it can and can't do in terms of US/Soviet relations. Additionally though, we'll insist that our arms control initiatives are directly linked in some manner to the arms acquisition business, perhaps as part of the requirements process. As Sam Nunn points out, the greatest danger to our START program is that "our arms control posture and our ICBM modernization policies are not in sync." (62:4) Somewhere acquisition and arms control must be linked together.

Beyond those parameters there are a couple of additional necessities. First, we must be prepared to conduct asymmetrical reductions and tradeoffs. "Because arms control is likely to generate sizable impact on nuclear and conventional weapons over the next 20 years," (40:1-3) we must be comfortable with negotiating, planning and
and working across the spectrum of weapons. Some interesting episodes and tradeoffs are already being examined to test the Soviet's arms control veracity (89:48) with respect to the conventional force imbalance in Europe.

Second, we should work the problem of stability throughout the arms control process, not arms race stability but crisis stability. (71) (84:73) That's the best place to attack the "illusion of symmetry" and work toward decreasing the likelihood that nuclear war will ever occur. The nuclear crisis reduction centers appear to be a step in the right direction. There's got to be more we can do both formally and informally to understand how each side goes to war. We should also engage the Soviets in interesting ways that take advantage of the lessons learned from the Cuban missile crisis and don't "underestimate the chance of military accident" (53) and contribute instead to increased assurances during times of crisis. In the end, arms control should not create instability (62:4) as it might in the START process as we discussed earlier. It's time to open the debate on the profound nuclear forces and strategy implications of the proposal.

If all this proves useful and we are able to move beyond the "illusion of symmetry," then we just might be able to do a better job of reducing the likelihood of nuclear conflict. Whether we are ready or not, the Soviets are working arms control very hard and we are likely to see innovative Soviet initiatives that may be difficult for
us to be creative in responding to. As we prepare to respond, perhaps the best place to start is "beyond the illusion of symmetry!"
APPENDIX

US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE STATUS

Soviet-American Nuclear Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICBM</strong></td>
<td><strong>ICBM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman II</td>
<td>SS-X-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>SS-X-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>527</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX</td>
<td>SS-X-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-X-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-X-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-X-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SLBM</strong></td>
<td><strong>SLBM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poseidon C-3</td>
<td>SS-N-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident C-40</td>
<td>SS-N-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>384</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bombers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bombers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52G/H (non-ALCM)</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52G/H (ALCM)</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (ICBM &amp; SLBM)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total (ICBM &amp; SLBM)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>640</td>
<td>9,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bombers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bombers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear II (ALCM)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (bombers)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total (bombers)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>1,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>13,873</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The Trident C-4 had been tested with only 7 re-entry vehicles at the time of the signing of SALT II in 1979, but it had gone into service in a test under the Second Agreed Statement in paragraph 10 of Article IV, the missile is counted as having 8 warheads.
- The USSR is deploying the SS-X-24, with 10 warheads. These will need to replace other missiles to assure the Soviet Union's force remains under the SALT II limits.
- The USSR has launched a fifth Typhoon missile and a fourth Delta IV missile. Under SALT II rules, they are counted as cruisers. Each time one of these missiles is fired, it will be necessary to remove a Delta III missile to remain within the SALT II limits.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


29. Hansen, Roger D. "The Reagan Doctrine: Containment's Last 


National Review, August 9, 1985, pp. 26-29, 32.

32. Holloway, David. "War, Militarism and the Soviet State" in Erik 
P. Hoffman and Robin F. Laird, eds., The Soviet Polity in the Modern 

33. Hoover, Robert A. Arms Control: The Interwar Naval Limitation 

34. Hough, Jerry F. "Soviet Arms Control Policy in Perspective." 

Thibault, ed. The Art and Practice of Military Strategy. Washington 


37. Huntington, Samuel P. "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results" 
in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force. New 

38. Hyland, William G. "Reagan-Gorbachev III." Foreign Affairs, 
Fall 1987, pp. 7-21.

Strategic Imperatives." STRATEGIC REVIEW, Spring 1982, pp. 11-34.

40. Ikle, Fred Charles and Wohlstetter, Albert. Discriminate 

41. "---------. "An Interview with Richard Nixon." Time Magazine, 

42. Jervis, Robert; Lebow, Richard N.; and Stein, Janice G. 
Psychology and Deterrence. Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 
1985.


45. Kime, Steve F. "War and Politics in the USSR." STRATEGIC REVIEW, FALL 1987, pp. 44-54.


97. Tucker, Robert W. "Exemplers or Crusader?" The National Interest, Fall 1986, pp. 64-75.

