The Logistics Planning Process of the Far East Air Material Command During the Korean War

Thesis

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COMMAND DURING THE KOREAN WAR

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THE LOGISTICS PLANNING PROCESS OF THE FAR EAST AIR MATERIAL COMMAND DURING THE KOREAN WAR

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Logistics of the Air Force Institute of Technology Air University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Logistics Management

Calvin J. Romrell, B.S.
Captain, USAF
September 1988

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Preface

The purpose of this research was to examine the planning that was done after World War II and how it affected the planning of the FEAMCOM during the Korean War. This research relates much of the planning policy in the Air Force during that war and should prove valuable to all planners interested in avoiding the errors of the past.

A large amount of Korean War data in the Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell AFB, has not been declassified for various reasons. Some of those documents were very interesting but could not be used in this unclassified report. However, the absence of those documents did prevent an accurate description of the process studied.

The difference between the words materiel and material needs some clarification. Materiel refers to the material required for the support of armed forces and is used in several command titles. I have tried to use the two terms in the same manner as the reference document.

I am thankful for the help I have received from many people in writing this thesis. I am deeply thankful to my thesis advisor, Emeritus Professor Jerome G. Peppers Jr., for his toleration and assistance during the writing of this thesis. I would like to give special thanks to my wife and children for their patience during this course of study.

Calvin J. Romrell
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Abstract

This study examined the standard operating procedures (SOP), programs, and repertoires used by the Far East Air Materiel Command (FEAMCOM) for planning logistical support during the Korean War, 1950 - 1953. The impact which the National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949 had on the national military planning structures was reviewed.

The National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949 mandated changes that all U.S. military organizations were striving to implement. These structures were untried and military commanders were unsure how they should operate. The extent of existing plans and policy guidance just prior to the start of the Korean War is examined. The response of the FEAMCOM planners to various tasking problems is discussed. The untried planning process and new supply arrangements with the Army created a very challenging planning problem for the FEAMCOM.

The study concludes that the FEAMCOM was very lucky in being able to provide the overall excellent level of materiel support they did. There was a large amount of surplus materiel which remained in the theatre from World War II. This materiel filled the immediate shortfalls of the war. The FEAMCOM benefited from a lack of any attacks on its facilities in Japan. Its concentrated targets should have
been a tempting target for the North Koreans. The loss of several Japanese depots would have crippled the FEAMCOM.

The appendices to the study contain excerpts from major plans and policy regulations; definitions; a description of the development of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) command structure and guidance for the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, General Headquarters, Far East Command; a summary of FEAF command responsibilities; and a cartoon depiction of the FEAMCOM accomplishments of the first year of the Korean War.
THE LOGISTICS PLANNING PROCESS OF THE FAR EAST AIR MATERIAL COMMAND DURING THE KOREAN WAR

I. Introduction to the Research

Overview

This study examined the standard operating procedures (SOP), programs, and repertoires used by Far East Air Materiel Command (FEAMCOM) for planning logistical support during the Korean War, 1950 - 1953. The Air Force at the time of the Korean War was endeavoring to implement the new planning process mandated by the National Security Act of 1947. The untried planning process and new supply arrangements with the Army created a very challenging planning problem for FEAMCOM. The first chapter covers the background, definitions, justification for the research, a problem statement, methodology, and the scope and limitations of this research.

Chapter II describes the planning structure implemented by the National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949. The chapter includes the nature of existing plans and policy guidance just prior to the start of the Korean War. Chapter III outlines a brief history of the structures in FEAMCOM for logistics plans and for policy-making. The response of FEAMCOM planners various tasking problems is discussed.
Chapter IV contains the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the research.


Background

Korea's strong sense of nationalism has limited the effect of outside influence. The United States security relationship with Korea reflects this aspect of Korean national character. Most of Korea's history is that of an occupied nation. Her vital location has always played an important part in the strategic interests of China, Japan, and the Soviet Union (102:1044). Korea's dominating neighbors have prevented national self-determination for most of her history. However, Korea has managed to retain a strong ethnic homogeneity and has chosen those areas of outside culture it wanted for its own use.

Early History. Korean recorded history begins in the second century B.C. when the Chinese Han dynasty established
Figure 1. Map of Korea
colonies on what we now know as the Korean peninsula. Some of the native Korean tribes retained their independence. In the first century B.C. these tribes divided the peninsula into three kingdoms: Koguryo formed in the north, Paekche in the south, and Silla in the east. Major contributions of Chinese culture during this period include: the Buddhist religion, the Confucian ethical system, the Chinese written language, and the Chinese administrative system.

The three kingdoms fought sporadically until 668 A.D. when Silla, the largest of the three, conquered the other two with aid from the Chinese. In 676 A.D. Silla finally succeeded in driving out the Chinese and gaining complete control over the peninsula. An absolute monarchy established a strong centralized government. An aristocracy with limited power was established for ruling the country. It controlled administrative units of state, county, and ward. The strong heritage of nationalism can be traced from this period.

In 935 A.D. a rival clan succeeded in conquering Silla. The conquerors went to great lengths to unify the people of the overthrown states. They proclaimed themselves the successor of Koguryo and established the kingdom of Koryo. The ruling aristocracy consisted of castle lords and former Silla royalty. Marriage became an important means of strengthening political ties. The aristocrats used Buddhism for spiritual and personal happiness. Confucianism was used for its practical and ethical guidance. Buddhism was
eventually suppressed and pushed into the mountains where it
developed into the main current of Korean Buddhism. Seoul
and Pyongyang became the two principal cities of Koryo and
today these historic sites form the capitals of today's North
and South Korea.

In the thirteenth century the Mongols invaded Koryo. They
made two unsuccessful attempts to use the peninsula as a base
for invading Japan. This marked the beginning of frequent
attempted use of the peninsula by Japan or China as an
invasion route to either Japan or the Asian mainland.
Therefore, the strategic location of the peninsula has
contributed to its inability to control its own destiny
(137:13).

In 1392, Yi Songgye, a Koryoan general, defeated the
Mongols and established the Yi dynasty. With the permission
of the Chinese emperor he changed the name of the region
under his control to Choson. He adopted Confucianism as the
state doctrine and began persecution of the Buddhists. The
Yi dynasty consisted of 26 monarchs. It lasted until the
Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.

The Japanese attempted several times in the 16th century
to again conquer the peninsula for use as an invasion route.
The Japanese were repulsed by the Korean and Chinese armies.

In the early 17th century China became concerned about
Japanese interests in Korea. It conquered Seoul and
extracted the payment of tribute. The Chinese began an
isolationist policy in Korea in an effort to limit Japanese influence there. Because of this isolationism Korea became known as the "Hermit Kingdom." The Chinese continued to dominate Korean internal affairs well into the 19th century.

In the 19th century Japan made repeated efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Korea. The Japanese military used the rebuffs as an excuse to launch an attack on Korea. In response to Japanese pressure the ports of Pusan, Wonsan, and Inchon were opened to the Japanese in 1876. The Chinese found the Japanese involvement very disturbing. They forced Korea to sign a trade agreement that heavily favored Chinese merchants. A desire to limit Japanese influence forced Korea to open her ports to foreign trade. Western nations used this opportunity to influence Korean society with trade and Christian missions (114:2-3).

Japanese Control. Japan felt threatened as European powers began increasing trade into Asia and in particular into China in the late 1800s. The Japanese increased their involvement in Korea to offset European competition and take advantage of China's weakening condition.

The Japanese business owners exploited the Korean populace. Usurious loans by Japanese rice dealers reduced the peasantry to abject poverty. In 1894, the peasantry began to revolt and defeated government resistance. The Korean government had no choice but to turn to the Chinese
government to help deal with the populist revolt. The Japanese used the unrest to dispatch large numbers of troops. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) resulted. The Japanese were victorious. The treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) gave Japan possession of Formosa and declared Korea's independence from China. The Chinese were forced to recognize Japanese hegemony over Korea (137:14-15).

Czarist Russia began exerting its influence in northern Korea in the late nineteenth century. Land concessions from China gave Russia a common border along a short stretch of the northern boarder of Korea. Russia wanted access to the warm-water ports and natural resources of Korea. In mid 1900, the Boxer Rebellion in China presented Russia an opportunity to invade Manchuria.

In 1903, the Russian Minister in Tokyo proposed the division of Korea at the 39th parallel. The portion north of the 39th parallel was to serve as a neutral zone to secure Russian interests in Manchuria (133:4). Japan wanted to control the entire peninsula and turned down the offer (161:17).

The Russians tried to influence anti-Japanese feelings in Korea. The Japanese felt the Korean Queen Min was responsible for the anti-Japanese agitation and responded by having her assassinated in October 1895. The Korean King, fearing for his life, took refuge in the Russian Legation. In return for protection the King granted Russian mining and
lumbering rights in Korea. The conflicting interests of Russia and Japan in Korea resulted in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).

At first Korea tried to remain neutral in the war but under pressure agreed to allow the Japanese to use the country in its war against Russia. Japan easily defeated the Russians. In 1905 U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt offered to mediate the dispute and both sides agreed. The Treaty of Portsmouth resulted in the withdrawal of Russia from Manchuria and the ceding of Sakhalin Island to Japan. Russia also agreed to recognize the dominance of Japan in Korea. In the Katsura-Taft secret agreement on July 29, 1905, "the United States approved Japan's paramountcy of interest in Korea in return for her disavowal of any aggressive intentions toward the Philippines [174:11]." Roosevelt won the Nobel Prize in 1906 for his peace efforts. This was the first time an American was honored with the Nobel Prize.

The United States saw the agreement with Japan in the greater context of getting the Japanese to recognize its Open Door Policy in China. Kyung Cho Chung in his Korea Tomorrow states:

...The United States raised no objection to Japan's interest in Korea, in return for Japan's promise to stay out of the Philippines. All of the Western powers in the Pacific were hopeful that Japan would provide a permanent block against Russian expansion toward the Pacific; in addition, they expected Japan to be so occupied with her northward expansion that a southward advance would be impossible (174:11-12).
The Japanese forced the Korean King to sign a treaty making Korea a Japanese protectorate in December 1905. Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and remained in control until the end of World War II in 1945. The Japanese exerted authoritarian control during this period and crushed all resistance efforts (137:15). The Japanese refused to allow the Koreans to use the old name Han'guk (Korea), but finally settled on the compromise name Chosen (Land of Morning Calm) (174:15).

The Japanese established an efficient, centralized, and brutal government in Korea. The oppressive government was seen as an instrument of totally assimilating Korea and doing away with the Koreans as a separate people. The people were deprived of their rights of assembly, association, the press, and speech. The old Korean schools were closed. The children were forced to study Japanese. All government functions were in Japanese as was the currency.

The government confiscated large sections of land and sold it cheaply to Japanese. Many of the dislocated took to the woods and formed resistance movements. Japanese domination motivated the founding of the Korean Communist Party, in 1925. The Korean Communists consisted of several factions, one of which was lead by Kim Il Sung. The future leader of North Korea spent the early 1930s being schooled in Russia and trained as a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese.

The Depression of 1929 ruined the Japanese silk trade. The military influence in Japan maintained that the economy
could only be revived by expanding into China. In September 1931, Japanese soldiers seized Mukden, Manchuria, claiming they were doing so to stabilize that country. Japanese expansion into China continued and in 1933 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations because of the League's protest of Japanese actions.

In 1938 the Japanese used the peninsula as a logistical point for their invasion of China. The Japanese drafted Koreans into their war effort against China. Much of the Korean populace was relocated to be used as workers on various Japanese capital projects. They built an extensive road and railway system to support the logistics of invasion. Heavy industry was developed in North Korea and agriculture in the South.

After World War II. The Cairo Declaration, issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China, on December 1, 1943, pledged independence for Korea "in due course [37:3]." Roosevelt felt the U.S. experience in the Philippines provided a pattern for a trusteeship in Korea. This "... reflected only the paternalistic, gradualist element of the trusteeship idea that deemed no colonial people fit to run their own affairs without a period of tutelage [43:106]."

The United States and the Soviet Union had agreed only in general terms on the policies for occupying Korea. At the Yalta Conference held in February 1945, the United States
urged the Soviet Union to enter the war against the Japanese. President Roosevelt suggested to Stalin, a four-power occupation force for Korea consisting of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China. Stalin agreed in general but no agreement on the occupation of Korea was signed.

The State Department drew up position papers concerning Korea prior to the Yalta Conference. In the papers the State Department indicated that occupation of Korea by any single state could have far reaching political consequences. The State Department was aware of the historical interest of China and Russia in Korea and felt they should be included in any group occupying Korea.

Foreseeing the serious consequences of territorial division by interested powers, the State Department added that such military government should be organized on the principle of centralized administration with all of Korea administered as a single unit and not as separate zones. The State Department strongly felt that following a period of occupation and prior to Korean Independence, an interim international administration or trusteeship should be established for Korea under the authority of the projected international organization or independent of it. The State Department also felt that it would seem advisable to have Soviet representation on an interim intentional administration regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union enter the war in the Pacific (174:15).

The Potsdam Conference of July 1945 issue a declaration that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. The Soviet Union asked the United States to consider the invasion of Korea. The United States declined because it felt the invasion of mainland Japan should occur first.
The United States encouraged the Soviet Union to enter the war against the Japanese (139:31). The Soviet Union declared war against Japan on 8 August, 1945, which was two days following the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, by the United States. The Soviet Union entered Korea on 10 August (137:6).

In Korea, where from at least 1943 on most United States planners thought American and Soviet power would meet, Roosevelt assumed that a multilateral trusteeship would involve the Soviets and recognize their interests in this country contiguous to their border, but also limit their power. He believed that by committing the Soviets to a new international system, he could render them ineffectual, or at least "responsible," checked by the United States and its allies among the other trust parties. For FDR this was a containment policy toward the Soviets; but instead of drawing lines in the dirt, this sort of containment policy embraced and enrolled the adversary in mutually beneficial relationships (43:130).

Roosevelt and Stalin never actually signed an agreement on how Korea was to be governed after the war. The surrender of Japan on 10 August 1945, required that planning switch from an invasion strategy to that of an occupation force. Russia's late entry required swift action to prevent it from occupying the whole of Korea. The military planners in the Pentagon drafted General Order No. 1 which included the provision for the division of Korea at the 38th parallel. This order was approved by President Truman on 13 August 1945 (174:18).

The Soviet military government took control in the north and the American military government took control in the
south. Each side sought to establish civilian political and governmental institutions which could claim legitimacy for ruling all of the peninsula. Each side underestimated the independent nature of the Korean people. The Koreans had dozens of different groups independently preparing for the independence of Korea.

The Koreans had formed local ruling committees which were mostly leftist in thinking. The Soviets chose to use the committees in their occupational government but made sure that the majority of the committee memberships consisted of communist or leftist sympathizers. The regional nature of the committees prevented any national leader from emerging. The North Korean Communists consisted of several fractious groups with no clear overall leader. The Chinese Communists lead certain separate parties. The Soviets backed Kim Il Sung, considering him an ideal candidate to lead the formation of a communist government. Kim did not solidify his position until December 1945 (37:7).

General Hodge (USA) commanded the American Military Government in Korea. MacArthur, as Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE), gave him the responsibility to administer the south in an orderly manner and to encourage stable political development. The U.S. wanted to nurture a political environment in Korea which would protect U.S. economic and strategic interests.
On December 7, 1945, at the Moscow Conference, the Allied foreign ministers decided to impose a five-year, four power trusteeship over Korea (19:20, 4:10). They also created a Joint United States - Soviet Union Commission which was composed of representatives of the rival military governments in Korea. Opposition to this plan erupted all over Korea. The Soviets ordered the Korean Communists to endorse the plan and to cancel plans to rally against it (133:12). The communist groups felt that trusteeship would eventually mean the communization of all Korea (174:22). The acceptance of trusteeship by the communists added to its opposition from the Korean right. They felt insulted by the plan and believed they were ready for immediate self-government. Disruptive strikes, and protests continually postponed the implementation of the trusteeship such that it was never implemented.

The American Military Government publicly stated its goal of establishing a democratic system. This soon lead to the formation of hundreds of opposing political parties (210:22, 133:11). Hodge thought the political climate to be such that any attempt at imposing a trusteeship would result in revolt (37:10). Several groups named Syngman Rhee as a leader in exile. Rhee had been part of a provisional Korean government in Shanghai. He was extremely anti-Soviet. MacArthur flew Syngman Rhee to Seoul to help Hodge stabilize the political environment (210:21). Hodge found him to be troublesome and
outspoken (37:8). The Koreans wanted to form their own government and resented the paternalism implied in a trusteeship.

The American Military Government chose to use the existing bureaucracy left by the Japanese. They chose to elevate Koreans who had worked in the Japanese bureaucracy to positions of leadership. They did this to preserve the existing bureaucratic efficiency. The policy was very unpopular. Many Koreans believed those Koreans who had worked for the Japanese were traitorous and unfit for the transition government (37:8-10).

The North and South were unsuccessful in working out economic transactions. The U.S. wanted free trade between the two sides in order to expedite economic development in all of Korea. The Soviets wanted only agreements on the trade of specific products. They wanted to trade electricity, raw materials, and chemicals for rice. The disruption of war had caused a short supply of rice in the south so efforts at an agreement failed (37:11).

The economic consequences of the division of Korea were serious and immediate, for the two areas had been heavily interdependent. Most of the best mines were in the North. Eighty-six percent of heavy industry was in the North, whereas 75 percent of light industry, including 88 percent of textile production, was in the South. The South produced two-thirds of Korea's grain, but obtained the needed fertilizer from the North. Eighty-five percent of Korea's electricity and gas was produced in the North, where only one-third of the population lived [37:5].
The Joint United States - Soviet Union Commission on the Independence of Korea, failed to reach an agreement at their final meeting in August 1947. The U.S. suggested the issue be considered by the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement. The Soviet Union refused because they felt the Joint United States - Soviet Union Commission had not done all it could. Secretary of State George C. Marshall thought further negotiation would be fruitless. The U.S. decided to ask the United Nations to settle the problem.

On October 17, 1947, Washington made its proposals to the General Assembly. They included: creation of a Korean national government through election of a legislature in which each geographical subdivision of the nation would have representation proportional to its population, supervision of this election by the occupying powers together with the U.N. Commission observation team, and withdrawal of foreign military forces. After long bargaining and negotiation, the General Assembly accepted the U.S. proposal in November. It agreed to send a United Nations Temporary Commission to Korea (UNTCK) to supervise the national election to be held before the end of March, 1948. Gromyko, as expected, opposed Washington's proposal, declaring that Moscow was unwilling to participate in the work of such a commission. The U.S. proposal was passed in the General Assembly by 43 affirmative votes with the Soviet bloc abstaining (133:13).

In January of 1948, the Soviets refused to allow UNTCK access to North Korea for the elections. On May 14, 1948, UNTCK supervised elections in the south which formed the UN recognized Republic of Korea. The communists responded to the unilateral UNTCK elections by the formation of a communist regime in the north.

From the U.S. viewpoint, the birth of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August 1948 was a testimony of the fulfillment of the U.S. commitment to Korea because of implementation of the UN resolution written by the
United States and supported by the majority of UN member nations (174:29).

The north refused to accept the authority or outcome of the UNTCK supervised elections and took several counter actions. First, four days after the election the north shut off electrical power to the south. Second, on July 10, 1948, the north adopted a constitution based on communist philosophies and concepts. Third, the north announced the formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), on September 9, 1948.

The DPRK, believed, despite the UN acceptance of the ROK, it had a legitimate claim as the only legal government for all of Korea. It claimed elections it held in August 1948 covered the entire peninsula and the people in the south were also given the opportunity to vote. Extension of power over the south was the primary goal of the DPRK from the time of its founding.

The Soviet security assistance in the DPRK emphasized the development of heavy industry and the elimination of illiteracy. The Soviets armed the DPRK with World War II surplus. The DPRK progressed rapidly and built a relatively large army. The industrial capacity already existing in North Korea aided in the DPRK development. This allowed the Soviets to withdraw their forces in December 1948 and demand that the Americans in the ROK do the same (117:14-16).
The Truman Doctrine. Isolationism dates back to President George Washington's farewell address. He warned the country to avoid entangling foreign alliances. At that time there was little reason to be concerned with the affairs in Europe or the Far East. The United States was insulated by a large ocean on both sides of its continent. Foreign trade amounted to less than four percent of the gross national product. The United States was practically self-sufficient and not in need of foreign assistance in large degree.

By World War I the banking ties between the United States and European countries had increased dramatically. The outcome of that war convinced President Wilson some type of international cooperation was required to maintain world peace. In his Fourteen Points, President Wilson proposed a general association of nations. The League of Nations was President Wilson's solution for avoiding future world war. The document called the Covenant of the League of Nations formed the first portion of the treaty of Versailles ending World War I (139:20).

Isolationist feelings in the U.S. Senate defeated the adoption of the League of Nations treaty. The general rationale of the isolationists was that the entangling alliances President Washington had warned about could later pull the United States into another European war. The isolationists still felt the oceans were enough of a buffer to provide the United States with a prolonged peace.
American involvement in foreign wars was justified by alleged moral infractions by enemy powers. Public support in waging war is necessary to support the sacrifices necessary for industrial mobilization. President Roosevelt had to use a moralist outcry to begin aid to our allies prior to our involvement in World War II. Not until "the day that shall live infamy" did Roosevelt have sufficient support to wholly involve the United States in World War II (139:18-19).

When World War II ended the public and Congressional pressure to bring home the troops was enormous. This public pressure has been described as "momism [154:126]." The Army and Navy had established a point system to determine who would be released first. The system gave the greatest number of points to the most experienced troops and they were the first to go home. This loss of experience was far greater than just the number of troops involved would indicate although it quickly led to a loss of almost 80 percent of United States wartime military strength. Many units of the Army and Navy quickly became unable to carry out their combat mission. "President Truman was mindful of the situation, commenting in late 1945 that the present policy was not bringing demobilization but "disintegration" of American armed forces [37:1]."

Truman believed, as did Roosevelt, the U.S. had an important role to play in international affairs. Roosevelt had believed cooperation with the Soviets was possible after
World War II (139:8). However, the Soviet actions in the Mediterranean and Near East forced the U.S. to reevaluate its position in the world (103:3). The Soviet Union tried to acquire warm water ports in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean by attempting to control Iran, Greece, and Turkey shortly following the end of European hostilities.

The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union signed the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance in January, 1942, which provided for all three to withdraw troops from Iran within six months of the end of the war. The Soviet Union remained beyond the mandated time and sent reinforcements into Iran. President Truman brought the situation to the attention of the U.N and the UN, with United States support forced the Soviets to withdraw in May, 1946 (137:35).

The Soviet Union was sponsoring communist liberation movements in both Greece and Turkey. In February, 1947, Great Britain indicated to the United States it would no longer be able to aid Greek and Turkish resistance. This forced a change in United States policy of accommodation toward the Soviet Union to one of confrontation (137:36).

The budding Truman Doctrine received significant impetus from a policy paper by George Kennan, an American counselor in Moscow (139:34). He discussed the deep ideological division between communism and capitalism and the Soviet Union's belligerent behavior. In the conclusion of his telegram he stated:
...we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure...Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective facts about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly tested and reformed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to bolster an outlook already preconceived (139:34).

Truman substantially agreed and authorized the development of a policy designed to challenge Soviet expansionism. The National Security Council produced a policy planning document that detailed the strategic priority of the containment of communism. This policy document was NSC-68 (156:8). This was the base of the Truman Doctrine which had the goal of helping free world governments defend themselves against communism (117:15). Truman outlined his policy in a request to Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey. It has become guidance for much of American security assistance since that time:

I believe that it must be the foreign policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedom. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation (117:5).

U.S. security assistance efforts in the post-World War II period required large sums of money. Europe had been devastated by the war. President Truman told Congress the
programs would help Europe avoid vulnerability to communist subversion. There were three main programs: the Marshall Plan, the Point Four program, and the Mutual Security Concept.

The Marshall Plan was proposed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in June 1947. Marshall suggested the Europeans draw up an economic recovery plan which the United States would help support. President Truman asked Congress for 17 billion dollars, an amount that represented over 1.2 percent of Gross National Product (13:42). President Truman believed the plan was justified because economic health of Europe was vital to that of the United States.

The Point Four program was announced in Truman's inaugural address of January 20, 1949. The name was derived from the fact that this was the fourth major point in his suggested courses of action for American policy (137:42). This program was intended to do on a global scale what the Marshall Plan was already doing in Europe but it received insufficient funding from Congress to succeed.

The Mutual Security Concept was intended for providing military assistance to countries requesting aid in combating the spread of communism. The program was justified as being an economical way of securing United States interests abroad without having to maintain a direct military presence.

Budget constraints forced Congress to make reductions wherever possible. The cuts reduced U.S. forces in the
Pacific to a point where by 1947, they were providing minimum
security (74:2). The security of Europe had priority. Four
other factors influenced this decision. First, the Truman
administration felt the United States could not afford large
military budgets. Truman proposed to hold the total military
budgets below 15 billion dollars per year. Also, the U.S.
was the only nuclear power in the world and that status
provided a general feeling of security. However, in mid-
1949, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon and
severely shook those feelings of security. Second, the
Truman administration believed in the ability of the United
Nations to maintain the peace (74:2). Third, rebuilding the
economies of Europe held the number one priority (103:8).
Fourth, there was a drive to implement Universal Military
Training which would require that all men of legal age
receive one year of military training. It was thought
Universal Military Training would minimize a massive
mobilization effort in the event of war and make a small
permanent military possible. Universal Military Training
never received enough political support to become law.

In September, 1950, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, in
his Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, explained
the necessity of working under a reduced defense budget:

We have not maintained and never will maintain at
all times armed forces large enough to win a major war.
Such a policy would be economically suicidal and
inconsistent with our democratic form of government.
The size of our armed forces must be determined by our
national objectives and commitments related to a
careful analysis of the ever changing world conditions.

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There is no minimum or maximum size for our military establishment automatically insuring our national security. Our military strength, based on a sound mobilization base, must be flexible and adaptable to new situations (47:2).

The U.S. pursued a security assistance policy in Korea directed to prepare the South Korean military forces to stand on their own. The United States agreed the ROK was ready to stand on its own by early 1949 and withdrew its occupation forces by June 1949.

The United States continued to keep a military mission in Korea even after regular American forces were withdrawn. This group continued the training of Korean forces which had been handled previously by the American occupation forces. Korean forces were left with various United States-owned equipment, including 60,000 Japanese rifles and ammunition, various supplies with an acquisition cost of $56 million said to be sufficient to equip 50,000 troops, and some small naval craft [117:7].

The Korean War. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in remarks before the National Press Club, on 12 January 1950, explained the United States policy in the Pacific and the Far East:

This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines, are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is
hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the
Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the
United States. But I hasten to add that no one
perceives the imminence of such attack.

So far as the military security of other areas in
the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no
person can guarantee these areas against military
attack. But it must also be clear that such a
guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the
realm of practical relationship.

Should such an attack occur -- one hesitates to
say where such an armed attack could come from -- the
initial reliance must be on the people attacked to
resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire
civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations
which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by
any people who are determined to protect their
independence against outside aggression. But it is a
mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far
Eastern problems to become obsessed with military
considerations. Important as they are, there are other
problems that press, and these other problems are not
capable of solution through military means. These
other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many
areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to
subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped by
military means (74:3-4).

The effect of this policy statement was that Korea was
outside the sphere of influence of the United States. It
minimized the effect of developments in the Pacific and Far
East on United States policy. It also stated an intent to
rely on the United Nations for resolution of such problems.
The policy seemed to state that the United States could only
protect small portions of the world which were deemed
essential. A Europe first policy was implied by the
statement.

On June 25, 1950, the DPRK army crossed the 38th parallel
invading South Korea in an attempt to unify the country. The
Korean invasion forced the Truman administration to change
its budget priorities. The capability of United States military forces was in sharp contrast to that of 1945:

The Army was down from 8,267,958 to a mere 593,167. The Air Force, included with the Army in 1945, was only 411,277. The Navy had dropped from 3,380,817 in 1945 to 381,538, and the Marine Corps had fallen from 474,680 to 74,279 (144:141).

Truman faced a difficult situation. The defense of Europe remained a top priority. Resource availability limited U.S. options (74:3). Some of Truman's advisors felt the invasion was a diversionary attack to draw the United States away from Europe. A careful evaluation showed Korea was an important part of the maintenance of U.S. interests in the Pacific. If the ROK fell to the Communists, the Soviets could use it to control most of the Pacific (74:3, 103:8). Further inaction on the part of the U.S. would seriously erode the confidence of our European allies and our Pacific friends.

On 26 June, the United Nations Security Council ordered the DPRK to cease-fire and withdraw from the ROK. On 27 June, the Security Council, with the Soviet Union not present, recommended that United Nations members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area [74:5]." Two more days elapsed before the United Nations voted on any aid for Korea.

On 27 June, President Truman ordered U.S. air and naval forces to aid the ROK. MacArthur tasked the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) to air evacuate all civilian American
nationals. MacArthur reported that the ROK could not defend itself against the invading DPRK. On 30 June, President Truman authorized MacArthur to use all available United States forces in the defense of Korea. The United State Army had four divisions of the 8th Army in Japan. All of its units, however, were under strength. The result was that the United States was only able to provide delaying tactics in the first weeks of the war.

On 7 July, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution which established a United Nations Command, and requested President Truman name a commander. President Truman named General Douglas MacArthur (133:18). President Truman requested that MacArthur should identify himself as Commander in Chief of United Nations Forces (CINCUNC) (98:39). The Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time of the vote in the UN. The new United Nations Command called on its member nations to come to the aid of the ROK. Fifteen United Nations members eventually aided the UN effort in Korea (137:22).

The DPRK routed and demoralized the ROK army and United Nations forces during the opening weeks of the Korean War. The North Korean forces took only three and a half days to seize Seoul, the ROK capital. The early success of the North Koreans convinced them that they could drive the United Nations forces off the peninsula and they almost succeeded (96:1).
Establishing a defensive perimeter at Pusan allowed ROK and UN forces to resupply and retake the offensive. MacArthur's surprising counter offensive with a landing at Inchon on 15 September succeeded to the point he proclaimed his view the United States troops would be home for Christmas. The North Korean forces had to make a hasty withdrawal to prevent being encircled by the United Nations forces. By 8 October, the North Korean forces had withdrawn above the 38th parallel and were pursued by the UN forces which soon captured the DPRK capital, Pyongyang, and continued northward soon controlling the country clear to the Yalu River on the Chinese border. There was talk of holding elections in the North and South of Korea thus finally achieving its unification but such did not occur.

China found the situation dissatisfying and soon entered the war. By late October the United Nations forces began to encounter Chinese troops in combat. In November 1950, four Chinese armies, totaling over 200,000 men struck. This attack caused the United Nations forces to begin a retreat which finally ended below the 38th parallel. The retreat was not a rout but it was rapid. American air support killed thousands of Chinese and assisted as it could in the retreat. The Navy evacuated many troops from the East Shores of Korea.

On 1 January, 1951, the Chinese and North Koreans again launched a major offensive and recaptured Seoul on 4 January 1951. The United Nations forces mounted a new offensive and
retook Seoul on 14 March 1951. After retaking Seoul the situation soon became a stalemate with no major actions by either side.

The war was very costly and both sides experienced massive casualties:

"The Pentagon estimated that military casualties on both sides came close to 2.4 million. The Pentagon breakdown: Total UN killed, wounded, or missing: 996,937, of whom 850,000 were ROKs and 17,000 were other non-Americans. Total Communists killed, wounded, or missing: 1,420,000, of whom 520,000 were NKPA (28:975).

The United Nations Command, the DPRK, and the People's Republic of China signed an armistice on 27 July 1953 (117:33). The final division did not differ significantly from the pre-war border (107:13-14). Both sides were not to upgrade their military capabilities after signing but this was soon ignored on both sides of the 38th parallel.

Problem Statement

The national planning structure was in the process of being restructured following World War II. The lessons of that war were carefully reviewed by special investigative teams and by congressional committees investigating proposals for unification. The National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949 were largely justified by a desire of those aware of the lessons of World War II to help the nation avoid past mistakes. The history indicates this objective was not realized by the time of the Korean War.
Mr. Robert F. Futrell, the author of the official Air Force history of the Korean War, stated the logistics history of the Korean War was poorly recorded. He said it was his intent to write concerning logistics but his budget prevented his doing so (99:1).

The impact the planning structure of the new Department of the Air Force and the Department of Defense had on the FEAMCOM logistics planning process was the focus of this study.

**Statement of Purpose/Objective**

The objective of this study was to examine the ways FEAMCOM's logistics planners responded to the Korean War in 1950 -1953. The investigative questions of this study were:

1. How did the FEAMCOM solve its supply problems with the U.S. Army?
2. What logistics guidance (SOPs, programs, and repertoires) did the FEAMCOM planners have for material requirements?
3. How helpful were existing logistics planning regulations (SOPs, programs, and repertoires)?
4. What changes were made to SOPs, programs, and repertoires to correct logistics planning problems?
5. What applicable war plans existed prior to the Korean War and how useful were they?
6. How did the unification process impact the conduct of the Korean War?
7. To what degree were logistics planners included in strategic or tactical planning sessions during the Korean War?

Scope and Limitations

This research was limited to the FEAMCOM's logistics planning response to Korean War tasking from 1950 to 1953. The National planning structure as it developed following the National Security Act of 1947 was also reviewed.

The limitations on this study came from a lack of primary source material concerning logistics planning policy. Some of the data no longer exists. Process and method often require diaries to reconstruct. The few diaries available are those of major command commanders. Unit histories were found deficient in covering the logistics planning process. The Air Force Oral History Program and the Baccus Report conducted some interviews which were reviewed. A large amount of Korean War data in the Air Force Historical Research Center at Maxwell AFB, has not been declassified for various reasons. Some of those documents were very interesting but could not be used in this unclassified report. However, the absence of those documents did prevent an accurate description of the process studied.

Methodology

The research involved extensive readings of historical documents. The literature search included these sources:
Particular Method. The analysis of the issues was facilitated by the use of three policy analysis models suggested by Graham T. Allison in his book *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (22). Model I is called the Rational Actor model. Model II is called the Organizational Process model. Model III is called the Governmental Politics model. Allison describes the models as follows:

Among the questions posed by Model I are:

1. What is the problem?
2. What are the alternatives?
3. What are the strategic costs and benefits associated with each alternative?
4. What is the observed pattern of national (governmental) values and shared axioms?
5. What are the pressures in the "international strategic marketplace"?

Model II leads one to ask:

1. Of what organizations (and organizational components) does the government consist?
2. Which organizations traditionally act on a problem of this sort and with what relative influence?
3. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs do these organizations have for making information about the
problem available at various decision points in the government?
4. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs do these organizations have for generating alternatives about a problem of this sort?
5. What repertoires, Programs, and SOPs do these organizations have for implementing alternative courses of action?
The central questions posed by Model III include:

1. What are the existing action channels for producing actions on this kind of problem?
2. Which players in what positions are centrally involved?
3. How do pressures of job, past stances, and personality affect the central players on this issue?
4. What deadlines will force the issue to resolution?
5. Where are foul-ups likely (22:257)?

The particular model used for answering each investigative question depends on the situation. The organizational model was the one which applied most frequently.

This study is potentially very useful because current strategies are moving away from "Mutually Assured Destruction" and toward the necessity for being able to respond to sudden low level conflicts. Unexpected contingencies (like the Korean War) and large sustained war, as well, are what Air Force planners need to be ready for.

The history of Air Force logistics support in the Korean War has not been adequately reported. That history which does exist is piece-meal and seems to have been rarely studied. This research relates much of the planning policy in the Air Force during that war and should prove valuable to all planners interested in avoiding the errors of the past.
II. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PLANNING STRUCTURE

Overview

Chapter II describes the National Defense Planning Structure as it existed between World War II and the start of the Korean War. The discussion will include some of the lessons learned from World War II; the implementation of the National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949; how logistics planning was influenced by the legislation; and the nature of existing plans and policy guidance just prior to the start of the Korean War.

Logistics Lessons from World War II. World War II pointed out many structural weaknesses in the national war making establishment. Many of the logistics problems were caused by duplication and lack of coordination between the War Department and the Navy Department. The logistics structural weaknesses included the lack of a super-agency to supervise the implementation of existing detailed industrial mobilization plans which were vital to the country because logistics is the link between the nation's economic and military affairs. Duncan Ballantine expressed this when he wrote: "As the link between the war front and the home front, the logistic process is at once the military element in the nation's economy and the economic element in its military operations [56:5]." Recognition of this relationship is vital for responding to national emergency. The father of
industrial mobilization and mobilization planning in the United States, Mr. Barnard M. Baruch testified before the Senate Committee investigating the National Defense Program on 24 October 1947. The committee was investigating the failure of the government to make use of the extensive mobilization planning done prior to World War II. His comments in part:

In November 1918 we drew up an outline at the War Industries Board covering America's participation in the First World War. I sent it to President Wilson, and he accepted it as the Mandate for existence. It is as true today as it was on November 10, 1918. It will be equally true of the next war, which the fates forbid.

If I am to be pinned down as to its economic and industrial aspects, then I say to you that because of our foot-dragging and fumbling, because of our inability to apply corrective methods when they were clearly indicated, the war cost us, unnecessarily, thousands of lives, extra billions of dollars, and months of time. This is my firm conviction based upon an intimate association which is demonstrable.

When the War broke out they started de nœve: They started with the Council of National Defense, and then the Office of Production Management, and then the Supplies Priorities and Allocations Board, and the Production Board were successively organized, each with a little more authority than its predecessor, and the War Production Board [which] had no authority over the War Manpower Commission (59:3-4).

The World War II experience made clear the importance of a unified national strategy for logistics planning. The planning prior to World War II was of little use for several reasons. First was the absence of a unified national will. The United States had returned to isolationism in its foreign policy following World War I. Congress feared trade with belligerent countries would again ensnarl the country in a
European war. The neutrality acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937 limited or prohibited the munitions trade with, or assistance to, foreign nations involved in hostilities.

President Roosevelt proposed the lend-lease program to come to the aid of Great Britain. Special legislation was required to enact the programs. The legislation placed specific restrictions on military aid. The President was allowed to transfer defense items to countries whose defense was vital to the United States (154:22).

Second, the pre-World War II mobilization plans assumed an emergency situation would be clearly recognized. This assumption was unfounded. President Roosevelt had to convince the nation of the gravity of the situation. As a result, aircraft production, for example, started long after the beginning of the emergency (59:8).

Third, the plans were outdated and unrealistic. They lacked input from a national resources planning agency. The buzz word in American industry was mass production. The mass production idea was applied to the planning of and mobilizing for automobile production. Mass production had not previously been required or achieved in aircraft production. Aircraft frame and engine producers such as Curtiss, Bell, Boeing, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, Vultee, Consolidated, Wright Aeronautical, Pratt and Whitney, and Packard lacked the facilities for mass production of engines and aircraft (59:11).
The lend-lease program brought an infusion of capital which financed expansion of manufacturing facilities and primed the production pump. The capability to mass produce aircraft was achieved during the implementation of the lend-lease program. "A great deal of our aircraft production program was under way at the time of Pearl Harbor [59:16]."

Major General Oliver P. Echols (USAF, Ret.), commented on lessons from World War II in a speech to the Air War College on 21 January 1948:

It seems to me that our past experience, together with a realization of the conditions which exist in the world today, lead us to the following conclusions:

1. In World War II, without adequate planning, it required us four and one half years to mobilize industry to the point where it was able to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces, and this without interference by the enemy. Due to the ever increasing complexity of the problem, it is doubtful that we will be able to do it again, even in this period of time.

2. Planning from the bottom up is not effective, except to a very limited extent. To be effective, the plan must provide for immediate action and control at the national level in regard to requirements, schedules and priorities and allocations of materials, facilities, tools and manpower. On a peacetime basis, it will probably require from two to three years to prepare such a plan, and even under favorable circumstances, at least two years is required to apply the necessary controls and to implement the plan after the emergency begins. However, such a plan is necessary if we are again to become involved in a total all out war.

3. Due to the increasing effectiveness of Air Power, an all out mobilization plan is not enough. It is possible that we shall never again have an opportunity to mobilize for war, unless we have a plan to protect the nation during the period of mobilization [59:21-22].
The Case for Unification

Unification is an issue dating back to the War for Independence. General George Washington recognized the advantage of combined land and sea campaigns. This was the subject of a letter written to the Marquis de Lafayette in November 1781 concerning the British control of the sea off the Atlantic coast:

...No land force can act decisively unless it is accompanied by a Maritime superiority. ...for proof of this, we have only to recur to the instances of the ease and facility with which the British shifted their ground as advantages were to be obtained at either extremity of the Continent... (115:11).

Unification as an issue has resurfaced several times since Washington's time. Just after the Spanish-American War the lack of coordination between the Army and the Navy, and general mismanagement of the war effort, focused attention on the need for change in the U.S. military establishment. Little came of these unification efforts except the creation of the forerunner to the Joint Chiefs of Staff - The Joint Board. The Joint Board consisted of four officers from each service who were charged with "discussing and reaching common conclusions regarding all matters calling for cooperation of the two services [115:12]." The Joint Board spent most of its energy on matters of protocol such as rank, honors, and salutes, and accomplished little concerning coordination of plans for joint operations.

After World War I, interest was again focused on the unification issue. The high cost of the war and the
development of air power were the principle causes of the renewed interest. The proposals in the 1920s and 1930s for a separate air service by aviation pioneers such as General Billy Mitchell were not well received by either the Army or the Navy. The opposition succeeded in delaying serious consideration of a separate air force until the end of World War II.

The events surrounding World War II showed that unification was an issue which required serious attention. Unification in practice began with the necessity of having centralized operations during World War II. The requirements for combined land, air, and sea operations cracked opposition to joint planning and operations (115:14). The structures developed during World War II were considered worthy of preservation by many of America's military leaders.

The War Department, under Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and the Navy Department, under Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, were two separate, cabinet-level, executive departments. The expanded requirements for running the war time apparatus required more office space than was presently available. General George C. Marshall and Henry L. Stimson moved into a not yet completed Pentagon on April 29, 1942.

"Although the Navy did not move major activities into the Pentagon until the end of World War II, it was in fact the center of all unified military direction that was improvised in that hectic period [134:25]."

President Truman was convinced that many of the problems the United States faced during World War II were structural
in nature. He felt this structural deficiency could be blamed for the fiasco at Pearl Harbor and our slowness in mobilizing manpower, materiel, and production.

"One of the strongest convictions which I brought to the Presidency, was that the antiquated defense setup...had to be reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our future safety and preserving world peace [209:98]."

In December, 1945, President Truman proposed a single Department of National Defense be created. The Department would be headed by Secretary of Cabinet rank and would be supported by an Under Secretary and several Assistant Secretaries. The Department would be comprised of three separate branches - Army, Navy, and Air Force. Each military branch would be headed by an Assistant Secretary. Each military branch was to have a military commander who would serve with a Chief of Staff of the Department of National Defense on a board which would advise the Secretary of National Defense and the President.

The goal of President Truman was that "we should have integrated strategic plans and a unified military program and budget [115:14]." The President was sensitive to the effects of not having a unified command structure at the time of Pearl Harbor. The War and Navy Departments had lacked a system of collaboration. The formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was meant to correct the lack of coordination of strategic planning and operations. This oversight resulted in logistical shortages hampering the execution of the plans (209:99).
Unified Commands were set up in the various theaters early in the war. Later, Truman indicated he understood the importance of the lessons learned from unified commands, concerning which he said:

We came to the conclusion, soon confirmed by experience, that any extended military effort required over-all coordinated control in order to get the most out of the three armed forces. Had we not early in the war adopted this principle of a unified command for operations, our efforts, no matter how heroic, might have failed (209:100).

During the war unified commands had not been achieved in the Pacific. General MacArthur was designated as Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific. Admiral Nimitz was designated Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The Navy retained control over its resources in this manner.

Following the war the organization of unified commands became an urgent matter. The responsibilities of the occupation forces in the Pacific required that a solution be achieved.

The Joint Chiefs approved the command plan drafted by Norstad and Sherman, forwarding it to the President on December 12 [1946]. The plan envisioned a system of unified command in which a single commander would control land, naval, and air operations within a given area. This so-called "Outline Command Plan," actually the first of its kind, was based on the war experience in which unified command had evolved by necessity. Both Army and Navy leaders agreed that unified command was central to successful combined operations. General Norstad described unified command organization as "an idea whose time had Come." He recalled that he and Sherman sought a solution which seemed reasonable to themselves and therefore to the services they represented. For the most part, they concurred in a system of unified command for all theaters. They defined it as a theater commander responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a joint staff and three service commanders under him. The fact was that prior to the end of the war the Joint Chiefs had decided to have a peace time unified command structure. Also
taking note of occupation requirements, the JCS resolved to establish these unified commands: Far East Command; Pacific Command; Alaskan Command; Northeast Command; Atlantic Fleet; Caribbean Command; and European Command. The Joint Chiefs further observed that a Strategic Air Command had been created composed of strategic air forces not otherwise assigned (209:158).

President Truman approved the "Outline Command Plan," on 14 December, 1946. The "Outline Command Plan," made the Strategic Air Command a specified command, which reported directly to the JCS. A specified command was defined in Joint Action Armed Forces, September 19, 1951:

"A JCS Specified Command is a uni-Service command which has a broad continuing mission and which is specified as a specified command [209-161]."

Formal designation of SAC as a specified did not occur until March 9, 1955 (209:160-161).

A unified command would consist of two or more services. Each service would be commanded by an officer from that service. The unified commander would draw his joint staff from each of the services in the unified command. The JCS would task the unified command according to current requirements. Each service would be responsible for the logistical support of its component in the unified command. The implementation of the proposed "Outline Command Plan," occurred over a four year period. Far East Command was formed by March 1947.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had cooperated well during the war. However, Truman knew that during peacetime the services tended to go their own separate ways. He felt a new way of
doing things was required: "It will require new viewpoints, new doctrine, and new habits of thinking throughout the departmental structure [209:100]." There was general agreement in the Congress that our postwar military organization should be built around a tightly knit core of land, sea, and air power. The difficulty lay, not in determining whether, but how closely, these three major branches of our military strength should be integrated (200:2).

The Position of the Army and Army Air Force. Leaders of the Army Air Force wished to preserve the independence they had gained during the war. They began planning for a separate Air Force before the end of the war. General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, agreed and added his influence to the planning effort. General Eisenhower continued Marshall's efforts after succeeding him as Army Chief of Staff. Eisenhower appointed a planning organization and he and General Carl Spaatz, who had succeeded General H. H. (Hap) Arnold as Army Air Force Commander, agreed on the basic structure for the new service (50:9).

In the "Report to Chief of Staff United States Army on Army and Air Force Organizational Matters Under Unification, March 14, 1947," the lessons of World War II attributable to the organizational structure of United States armed forces were listed:

Our foreign policy and military policy were not always closely integrated.
There was no adequate machinery for the adjustment of our civilian economic life to meet the military requirements of total war. When the war started, there was no adequate machinery for the mobilization of our material resources, productive capacity and manpower. There were weaknesses in planning of material requirements and duplication in procurement both within and between the military departments. The coordination and integration of military and other war budgets were not as thorough and detailed as desirable. Coordination between the Army and Navy was inadequate. The first test of any plan for national security is the extent to which it applies the lessons of the past in the development and execution of corrective measures for the future. A plan which neglects this requirement must be judged inadequate (209:268).

The Army felt the solution was an organization of three departments consisting of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, with each headed by a civilian secretary, who would in turn be responsible to a single civilian secretary of cabinet rank. The three departments were to be tied together by strong organizational links controlled by the secretary of cabinet rank.

The Position of the Navy. The Navy and its supporters strongly opposed the proposals for unification. Their case against unification was hampered somewhat by an Executive gag order intended to keep them from publicly expressing their feelings on the issue (198:7). They still managed to mount significant opposition. There were many concerns raised in a lengthy congressional debate in the period between war's end and 1947.
There was concern unification would not conform to the outline given in the Constitution.

The proposed legislation, instead of leaving to the Congress the duty and responsibility of providing for the national defense, of making appropriations to the Army to be expended within 2 years, of providing, as directed by the Constitution, for a Navy, places that duty and that responsibility upon a National Military Establishment - a new and an additional organization superimposed upon the Army, the Navy, The Air Forces, and the Congress (198:7).

There was great concern that restructuring the military could result in weakened civilian control over appropriations and the formation of foreign policy. The position of the Secretary of National Defense as proposed by President seemed to contain too much power and influence over the various services. Many in Congress and the military thought the services should maintain their independence.

The arguments for unification based on improved economy were disputed. It was felt that instead of sharing mutually usable facilities, a new service would generate many additional requirements. General George C. Kenney addressed this concern while testifying to the Military Affairs Committee, in November, 1945:

I do not hold with those who maintain that inter-service rivalry....is a necessary prerequisite for excellence in equipment and training....It would be as logical as trying to build a winning football team by fostering rivalry between the backs and the line. I feel that tremendous economies can be accomplished by eliminating parallel agencies with a gain rather than a loss in operational efficiency in war and peace (209:94).
The Navy feared that the proposed structure would result in a reduction of its share of the defense budget. This was a threat because it believed the proposed functional grouping of the services could deprive it of its aviation capability. The Navy wanted to develop naval aviation to include a strategic mission. Also, the Navy wanted to develop a new super class carrier which could handle specially designed, nuclear capable, bombers operated by the Navy.

The Navy argued that the interests of the land, sea, and air arms of the military were so different any unification into one department would obscure the independent development of each capability.

The Navy also thought there was a chance of losing the Marine Corps to the Army. Lt General Lawton Collins expressed his views in a report to the Army Staff:

There is no question but that the Navy has set up a little army within the Navy. The Marines now consist of six divisions, which is a sizable force, and the Navy right now is advocating a Marine Corps almost as big as the pre-war Army and Air Force combined....we feel that any needless duplication would be resolved as soon as we got this single Secretary of the Armed Forces. The Marine Corps has done a magnificent job, it has a hold on the public, and it would be silly if we tried to take it away from the Navy (209:95).

The National Security Act of 1947. The act which finally passed the Congress (also known as the Unification Act) was much less than reformers had hoped for but it was a start. The framers of the act felt it was desirable to go slowly in an area of such importance and see how the legislation worked

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in practice (200:2-3). The Congress demonstrated that it was its intent to create a structure which would allow the application of diplomacy, military policy, scientific knowledge, and industrial capacity as one unit. The Declaration of Policy read as follows:

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces (197:2).

The National Security Act of 1947 created the following departments, offices and agencies:

National Security Council
Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Resources Board
National Military Establishment
Secretary of Defense
Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries
Military Assistants to the Secretary
Civilian personnel
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
War Council
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Staff
Munitions Board
Research and Development Board
National Security Council. The function of the National Security Council (NSC) was to advise the President concerning:

...the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security (196:101).

The President was to preside over meetings of the National Security Council which was to contain the following membership:

The President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board

The President also had the option to include any of the following:

The Secretaries of the executive departments
The Chairman of the Munitions Board
The Chairman of the Research and Development Board

Any additional appointments required the advice and consent of the Senate.

Central Intelligence Agency. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established to function under the direction of the NSC. The CIA was to coordinate and supervise activities of all American agencies which gather intelligence information. This information was to be used to advise the NSC concerning national security. It was also to be responsible for the correlation, evaluation, and
dissemination of intelligence information among the applicable agencies. The NSC would direct any additional activities, as necessary. The Director of the CIA was to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

National Security Resources Board. The National Security Resources Board (NSRB), while a part of the national defense set-up, was not a part of the military establishment and was not under the control of the Secretary of Defense. The duties stipulated required the NSRB to perform research and exhaustive studies of required programs and policies.

(c) It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including—

(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war;

(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and conditions;

(3) policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products;

(4) the relationship between potential supplies of, and potential requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war;

(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical material, and for the conservation of these reserves;

(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security.
(d) In performing its functions, the Board shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government (196:103).

The NSRB had as its point of contact within the National Military Establishment, the Munitions Board. The two boards were required to closely coordinate their activities in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Paragraph (2) above, requires that the National Security Resources Board plan for both civilian and military requirements (41:6). The NSRB took over the job of planning for industrial mobilization from the Munitions Board after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

National Military Establishment. The National Military Establishment (NME) was established to contain the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and all other agencies created under title II of the act. The Secretary of Defense was to be the head of the NME (196:201). The agencies and offices in the NME were:

National Military Establishment
Secretary of Defense
Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries
Military Assistants to the Secretary
Civilian personnel
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
War Council
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Staff
Munitions Board
Research and Development Board
Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense was to be selected from civilian life and could not be a retired military person unless he/she had been off active duty in the military for a period of at least ten years. The Office of the Secretary of Defense was to be an executive department, with the Secretary of Defense a member of the President's Cabinet with rank equal to that of the service secretaries. The Secretary was to be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to national security. His duties were prescribed as:

1. Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all of the departments and agencies therein;
2. Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies;
3. Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research;
4. Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies under the applicable appropriation Act;

Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force from presenting to the President or to the Director of the Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary: And provided further, That the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force shall be administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all powers and duties relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries (196:202).
Munitions Board. The Munitions Board took the place of and continued the functions of the Army and Navy Munitions Boards. It served under the direction of the Secretary of Defense with these duties:

It shall be the duty of the Board under the direction of the Secretary of Defense and in support of strategic and logistic plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) to coordinate the appropriate activities within the National Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters, including the procurement, production, and distribution plans of the departments and agencies comprising the Establishment;

(2) to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization;

(3) to recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among the several military services and to plan for standardization of specifications and for the greatest practicable allocation of purchase authority of technical equipment and common use items on the basis of single procurement;

(4) to prepare estimates of potential production, procurement, and personnel for use in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations;

(5) to determine relative priorities of the various segments of the military procurement programs;

(6) to supervise such subordinate agencies as are or may be created to consider the subjects falling within the scope of the Board's responsibilities;

(7) to make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement production, and distribution in such manner as to promote efficiency and economy;

(8) to maintain liaison with other departments and agencies for the proper correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy, particularly in regard to the procurement or disposition of strategic and critical material and the maintenance of adequate reserves of such material, and to make recommendations as to policies in connection therewith;

(9) to assemble and review material and personnel requirements presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the presented by the production, procurement, and distribution agencies assigned to meet military needs, and to make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Defense; and
(10) to perform such duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct (196:213).

The Munitions Board's most important function was described by paragraph (10) for several reasons. The limitations placed on the Secretary of Defense by the Congress included:

A limitation on the size of his staff.
A proscription from establishing a military staff.
A proscription from action not specifically conferred by statute to his office.
A strict limitation of power over the military departments.

Four agencies were established under the Secretary of Defense. They were, the War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Research and Development Board, and the Munitions Board. The War Council was too small for extra tasking. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Research & Development Board were too specialized for random tasking. The Munitions Board was the only tool the Secretary of Defense had to help him perform his job. The tasking covered many areas including:

...the delegation of authority to the chairman of the Munitions Board to assign areas for single service purchasing, joint purchasing and collaborated purchasing. In making these assignments, the services of the procurement policy council are utilized to explore, develop and recommend appropriate fields; this is an inter-service committee set up by the Munitions Board, with a membership of the top supply officers of the three services. Examples of single service purchase are lumber (Army), solid fuels (Navy), and photographic supplies and equipment (Air Force). It is estimated that single and joint service procurement now cover about 85 percent of the dollar value of armed forces purchases. An example of joint purchase in the Reconstituted Petroleum Board, responsible to the three services, but appropriately responsive to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Research & Development Board, and the Munitions Board (41:10-11).

The Munitions Board supervises the development of military requirements for procurement, facilities, manpower and utilities, military requirements, materials, foreign trade, and statistics. The Munitions Board coordinates military requirements with the National Security Resources Board which is responsible for the overall requirements of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization.

The logistics groups involved in industrial planning and coordination are: the JCS, the Munitions Board, the logistics groups of the three Departments, the National Security Resources Board, and the Research and Development Board. A specific example of their interrelation would be:

The National Security Resources Board makes broad allocations of materials and manpower to the National Military Establishment and to other claimant agencies, such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Maritime Commission. The Munitions Board makes allocations of facilities and materials among the Army, Navy, and Air Force and establishes priorities and schedules governing their procurement programs. Matters pertaining to price control, rationing, wage stabilization, monetary policy, and the utilization of small business fall within the purview of the National Security Resources Board or some other agency, such as an office of War Mobilization. The Munitions Board is interested in the petroleum products, the iron ore, tin and other materials available for military programs and makes allocations of these materials among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The National Security Resources Board necessarily makes plans involving the same materials but it concerns itself with the allocation of the Nation's total supply among several claimant agencies, of which one claimant is the National Military Establishment (45:4-5).
The Secretary of Defense was given the responsibility to establish plans for and dates of transferring responsibilities between the services. This mostly concerned separating the Army and its old Army Air Forces to form the new Air Force. However, the goal of unification was to streamline the services in a manner which divided among the services the logistical responsibility for joint operations.

In January, 1948, the Secretary of Defense created under the Munitions Board a Committee on Facilities and Services responsible to supervise studies the three services were conducting concerning common use of certain facilities and services. The whole field of logistics was impacted by this committee. Its general mandate follows:

In order (a) to facilitate, expand upon and accelerate these studies, (b) to provide for unified direction and complete coordination thereof, (c) to place this work on a regular continuing basis with proper staff assistance, and (d) to expedite decisions and assist in their implementation, I am hereby establishing, under the Munitions Board, a committee to (1) study the consolidation and common use of facilities and services by the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the elimination of any unnecessary duplication and overlapping in facilities and services, and (2) monitor the activities of the three departments in the field. This committee will be known as the "Committee on Facilities and Services" and will be composed of the Chairman of the Munitions Board, who will serve as chairman of the committee, the Director of Service, Supply and Procurement for the Department of the Army, the Deputy chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) for the Department of the Navy, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, for the Department of the Air Force. Each member of the committee is authorized to designate an alternate who may serve for him in his absence (41:13).

The Committee was also assigned the responsibility for a continuing study of all installations and activities under
the control of the service departments to maximize common use of facilities in cases where it would provide:

...(1) increased economy without detriment to essential operating efficiency, or (2) better operating efficiency without an appreciable increase in costs (41:13).

At any time the possible economies and efficiencies discussed by the Committee seemed inconsistent with joint logistics plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or assigned by them to other agencies, it became the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reexamine the operations in question. The studies were guided by the importance of maintaining facilities which would enable the NME to conduct rapid and orderly expansion of operations when necessary.

Examples of the projects considered were:

(a) Combination of public information schools of the Army and Air Force.
(b) Reconciliation of the various aircraft programs.
(c) Inventory control procedures (stock levels, etc.).
(d) Standard terminology for logistic purposes.
(e) Uniform housing policy for the three services.
(f) Cross-service storage.
(g) Consolidation of San Francisco Bay Area facilities (41:16).

Research and Development Board. This Board had the responsibility of coordinating scientific developments with the industrial mobilization process. The advisory responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense include:

(1) to prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes;
(2) to advise with regard to trends in scientific research relating to national security and the measures necessary to assure continued and increasing progress;
(3) to recommend measures of coordination of research and development among the military departments, and
allocation among them of responsibilities for specific programs of joint interest;
(4) to formulate policy for the National Military Establishment in connection with research and development matters involving agencies outside the National Military Establishment;
(5) to consider the interaction of research and development and strategy, and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith; and
(6) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct (197:13).

Military Chiefs of Staff. Each service secretary was to have, serving under him, a military chief of staff. The subordinate status of the military chief reinforces the supremacy of civilian control over the military in the United States. In 1821, a Commanding General of the Army was appointed in the War Department. This created a troublesome dual control system.

"The military establishment is under orders of the Commanding General of the Army in that which pertains to its discipline and military control. The fiscal affairs of the Army are conducted by the Secretary of War, through the several staff departments [115:9]."

This situation created a great deal of friction and misunderstanding. The regulation was interpreted to mean that the Secretary of War had no control over the Army while in the field and the Commanding General had no control over resources required for support of his troops (115:9). Secretary of War Root presented arguments acted upon by Congress in 1903, which abolished the position of Commanding General of the Army. The office of the Chief of Staff, subordinate to the Secretary of War, was created in its place and the Chief of Staff was placed in charge of the General
Staff which was subordinate to the Secretary of War. The same arrangement applied in the Department of the Navy, where the Chief of Naval Operations was made subordinate to the Secretary of the Navy.

**Department of the Army.** The Department of War was changed to the Department of the Army with the Secretary of War becoming the Secretary of the Army. The mission of the Army:

In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It shall be responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war (196:205).

The flow of logistic responsibility in the Army ran from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. The Army had several organizations with logistics planning responsibilities. Among them were: the Quartermaster Corps, Corps of Engineers, and Transportation Corps (123:630). Each Army organization had the responsibility to develop logistics plans for war plans in which it was tasked.

**Department of the Navy.**

In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall include naval combat and
services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It shall be responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (196:206).

The flow of logistic responsibility in the Navy ran from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and to the Chief of Naval Materiel. This level of organization was responsible for the development of broad naval logistics policy, requirements, strategic and logistic plans, and guidance for lower level naval planning. The Naval Supply System using the policy guidance was responsible to the operational organizations of the Navy (97:5).

The United States Marine Corps.

The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which
pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: Provided, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war (196:206).

The Marine Corps was subject to the same upper echelon logistics policy making structure as the Navy except responsibility flowed from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and then to the Quartermaster General, USMC. The Marine Corps was responsible for logistics plans unique to its own operations.

The Marine Corps divided their logistics budget into blue and green funds. The blue funds represented items funded in common with the Navy. For example, aircraft were procured for the Marine Corps by the Navy. Green funds were for items peculiar to the Marine Corps. These items were procured in cooperation with program managers of the other services. This was in keeping with section 206 of the National Security Act which included the following:

It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces (196:206).
The Department of the Air Force.

In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war (196:208).

The flow of logistic responsibility in the Air Force ran from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force Chief of Staff, to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel. This level of organization was responsible for the development of broad Air Force logistics policy, requirements, strategic and logistic plans, and guidance for lower level Air Force planning.

Five of the fourteen Air Force establishments having major command status in September 1947, have remained major commands with the same name. Those five are: Air Training Command (ATC), Alaskan Air Command (AAC), Strategic Air Command (SAC), Tactical Air Command (TAC), and United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) (158:11).

Three of the original commands have continued as major commands but with name changes. Those are: Air Materiel Command (AMC), Air Transport Command (ATC), and Far East Air Forces (FEAF). They became, respectively, Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), Military Air Transport Service...
(MATS) (later, Military Airlift Command [MAC]), and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) (158:11).

Air Proving Ground Command (APGC), and Seventh Air Force (7AF) (later, Pacific Air Command) lost major command status. Bolling Field Command (later, Headquarters Command USAF), Caribbean Air Command (later, United States Air Forces Southern Command), and Air (later, Aerospace) Defense Command (ADC) have been inactivated. Air University (AU) lost major command status in 1978, but regained it in July 1983 (158:12).

Eight new commands appeared since September 1947: Continental Air Command, Northeast Air Command, Special Weapons Command, 3rd Air Division (in major command status), Air Force Systems Command, Air Force Communications Command, United States Air Force Security Service (later, Electronic Security Command), and Space Command. They did not all survive over time and only the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), Air Force Communications Command (AFCC), Electronic Security Command (ESC), and Space Command (SPACECOM) remain as active commands. The 3rd Air Division exists but is no longer a major command (158:12). The Air Force command organization as of October, 1947 is reflected in figure 1.

War Council. The Secretary of Defense had the power of decision over the War Council. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force, and the Chief of Navy Operations, were to
Figure 2. Air Force organization of October 1947 (50:13)
serve on the Council. They advised the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy (196:210). The membership on the War Council was balanced to prevent any one service from exercising undue influence in policy decisions. The Council was analogous to the President's Cabinet for the Secretary of Defense. The policy matters discussed included the logistical initiatives of the Secretary.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was continued essentially in its World War II form. It was to consist of the military chiefs of the three military departments plus the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense and the President. They were responsible to act as the principle military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense. Their duties were:

Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—
(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;
(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;
(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;
(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;
(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;
(6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and
(7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations (209:211).
The Joint Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was authorized a Joint Staff of not more than 100 officers. The limitation was imposed to prevent the Joint Chiefs of Staff from intruding extensively in the affairs of the individual military departments and from becoming an elitist general staff reminiscent of Nazi Germany.

The Joint Staff contained three primary committees for the purpose of accomplishing its statutory responsibilities (see figure 3). The three committees were: The Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), the Joint Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC), and the Joint Intelligence Committee; each of which have full time working groups (see figure 4). Two other committees also had logistics responsibilities. They were: the Joint Military Transportation Committee (JMTC), and the Joint Munitions Allocation Committee (JMAC) (166:2). The responsibilities and the resources provided the Joint Staff to fulfil its statutory responsibilities were expanded and modified in the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act and will be discussed in that section.

The Development of Federal Budgeting

The United States was the last of the great nations to develop a systematic budgeting procedure. The function of a budget system was to provide financial factors for planning, information, and control and to establish an integrated financial program in harmony with long-range and general economic policies.
There were four main purposes of a budget. First, it served as a political instrument, which detailed the priorities of the nation. Second, it was an administrative instrument which reviewed programs on a periodic basis and ensured they received the assets required for approved operation. Third, it was an economic tool for implementing fiscal policy. Fourth, it was an accounting instrument which identified responsibility centers for the accountability for those persons managing funds or programs (125:1).

The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the framework for an executive budget (32:86). The Act gave the President the full responsibility for: (1) recommending appropriations and estimating expenditures for all government agencies, and (2) for recommending the method of financing these expenditures. It established the Bureau of the Budget within the Executive Branch to assist the President in this task.

The Bureau of the Budget was to receive the proposals of the various government agencies, review them, and submit them with recommendations to the President for final action. By providing for the coordination and screening of the requests of individual agencies, the Act took a big step toward introducing budgetary and fiscal discipline within the Executive Department. The Bureau soon became a central figure in policy formulation. For example, Frank Pace, then Director of the Bureau of the Budget, in testifying before a
congressional committee in 1949, described the preparation of the defense budget as follows:

We [the Bureau of the Budget] would provide him [the President] with certain factual information as to where certain policies would lead. From that the President sets a ceiling on the armed services, which was last year, I think, generally known as $15 billion. However, I think it should be explained that under the ceiling process—and this is not solely for the armed forces but exists for every department of the Government—....

There is also the proviso that if within that limitation it is impossible to include certain programs which the Secretary of Defense considers of imperative importance to the national defense, they shall be included in...what is termed the "B" list...The "B" list is what cannot be included under the ceiling (115:24).

The Act was silent on how expenditures should be presented in the budget and whether they should be presented on an accrual or a cash basis. The Act established the structure for budget preparation but didn't address budget policy. In 1949 the Hoover Commission recommended the adoption of a performance budget on functions, activities, and projects which would focus attention on the service to be performed rather than the item(s) to be acquired. A performance budget focuses on the ends to be served rather than the amount of money spent (165:8). At a minimum a performance budget involves:

1. the formulation and adoption of a plan of activities and programs for a stated time period;
2. the relating of program costs to resources; and
3. the achievement of the authorized plan, according to a time schedule and at a cost within available resources.

This work plan to be meaningful must lie within the framework of a central public policy. It should include such substance as will provide reasonably accurate answers to the following questions concerning each program in the budget:

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WHAT are we proposing to do and WHY?
HOW MUCH do we propose to do and WHEN?
WHAT resources will be needed and at what cost?
WHEN will we be through (165:81)?

The National Security Act of 1949. The National Security Act of 1947 represented a starting point in the unification process. After 18 months of operation the Congress decided it was time to reexamine what had been accomplished in the light of experience.

...there was general agreement among all types of observers that although it provide a practical and workable basis for a beginning in coping with the twin problems of unification of the military services and coordinating the military policy with foreign and economic policies, its operation revealed certain weaknesses in the statute that required correction. At the same time, however, the declaration of policy upon which the act was built had shown itself to be basically sound and worthy of continued acceptance [200:3].

On March 5, 1949, President Truman recommended the National Security Act of 1947 be amended to accomplish two basic purposes:

First, to convert the National Military Establishment into an executive department of the Government, to be known as the Department of Defense; and, second, to provide the Secretary of Defense with appropriate responsibility and authority, and with civilian and military assistance adequate to fulfill his enlarged responsibility. (200:3)."

The proposed amendments were criticized by many as being too conservative. The Senate Armed Services Committee preferred to follow an evolutionary path toward unification rather than an outright merger. The Committee felt the
amendments should only correct those weakness shown to exist by 18 months of experience. This view revealed great concern about moving too swiftly in an area where any mistakes might have grave consequences (200:4).

The goal of unification was to achieve increased security while improving economy and efficiency. In January 1949, the Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government proposed several ways of increasing economy and efficiency in the Executive Department. The Congress, believing the armed services to be the nation's largest spenders, suggested the proposed measures for fiscal and budget reform should be first applied there without waiting for adoption on a government-wide basis (200:4). Several of these recommendations were included in the proposed legislation and the introduction to the title of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, expresses this emphasis:

An Act
To reorganize fiscal management in the National Military Establishment to promote economy and efficiency, and for other purposes [199:1].

The new Department of Defense would contain the Army, Navy, and Air Force as military departments. The role and responsibility of the Secretary of Defense was expanded and clarified. The restrictions over the Secretary's exercise of direction and control over the military departments were removed. The service secretaries were made subordinate to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

The Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board were reorganized as staff units under the control of the Secretary of Defense. This was intended to enhance and strengthen his office. An Under Secretary of Defense and three Assistant Secretaries of Defense were added to assist the Secretary in the performance of his duties. Provision was made for budgetary and fiscal reform within the military departments.

The position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was added with the incumbent to be the chief adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense and to be the top ranking military official.

**Summary of Significant Sections of the Act.** The composition of the National Security Council was changed by adding the Vice President and deleting the Service Secretaries.

The NME was converted into an executive department called the Department of Defense (DOD). The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were converted from executive departments to military departments within the Department of Defense. The three department concept of administration was retained, vice single department administration (200:5).
The powers of the Secretary of Defense were changed from being general in nature to direct authority, direction, and control. The Act also specified what steps should be taken in the streamlining process of the services. Transfer of statutory missions outlined in the '47 Act were prohibited. The Department of Defense under the Secretary of Defense was made responsible for budget preparation for the entire department, with control of appropriations. The three service secretaries were clearly subordinated to the Secretary of Defense (200:6-7).

The position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was added. The position was by Presidential appointment for two years with possibility for reappointment. The position was given precedence over all other military officers. However, the chairman does not have command authority over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman was to serve as the principle military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense and was given a seat on the War Council. The Joint Staff was enlarged from 100 officers to 210 officers (200:9).

The Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board were made agencies of the Secretary of Defense. The statutory duties of each were changed to assist the Secretary of Defense in the fulfillment of his duties. The Munitions Board retained its association with strategic and logistics plans developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (200:10).
Title IV was added to the Act: "Promotion of Economy and Efficiency Through Establishment of Uniform Budgetary and Fiscal procedures and Organizations [199:8]."

Title IV establishes the authority of the Secretary of Defense over all military budgets. To provide expertise in the budget process, the Act authorized a Comptroller in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a Comptroller in each service department. Uniform accounting, and performance budgeting, procedures in the services was mandated. The Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, was authorized to transfer up to five percent of funds between programs to promote flexibility in response to various contingencies. All such transfers were required to be reported to the President and the Congress.

The Secretary of Defense was given sole authority in the Department of Defense to submit requests for appropriations to Congress. This was designed to improve the control of the Secretary over the economy and efficiency of the operations of the DOD and to remove the submissions of budget requests directly from the military departments (200:15).

Among its other provisions are authority for the organization of inventories of the military departments into stock funds, for the operation of industrial- and commercial-type activities as integral working units--in a manner similar to commercial business enterprises--on the basis of an adequate capital structure, for departmental management funds to facilitate the carrying out of joint and special operations, for uniform terminologies, classifications, reporting systems, and accounting procedures, for the common use of disbursing facilities, and for reports of property (200:11).
The Joint Staff Planning Process. The expansion of the Joint Staff to 210 officers allowed improvements to be made in the planning process. The Joint Strategic Plans Group (JSPG), grew to 47; the Joint Logistics Plans Group (JLPG), grew to 35; the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) increased to 27, the Joint Military Transportation Committee (JMTC) had nine officers; and the Joint Munitions Allocation Committee (JMAC) had five. The development of plans in the Joint Staff was an iterative process which required continuing coordination among the various working groups. This was necessary to insure that the expertise of each group was expressed in the plan.

The JMTC was charged with formulating policy and recommendations for the JCS on transportation issues concerning all services. The JMTC consisted of general and flag officers who coordinated with the other JCS planning committees concerning transportation planning factors and feasibility issues. They had the authority to pass planning guidance directly to the services (166:2-4).

The JMAC consisted of the chief logistics officer of each service. It conducted feasibility studies during the planning development process and coordinated policy for the allocation of munitions to:

1. United States forces in accordance with approved over-all strategic and logistic plans.
2. Participating nations under approved military assistance programs (166:4).
Each of the principle JCS committees consisted of a deputy director and three members, one from each service (see figure 3). Under each committee was a working group with the same name as the committee it was assigned to (see figure 4). Each working group had a team of three assistant directors, one from each service. There was a free-flow of information between the various committee and group members during the planning process (166:4).

The JLPC is responsible for four general areas of work:

1. Preparation of logistic reports including recommendations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff action.
2. Development of the logistic implications of war plans during their preparation.
3. Preparation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff logistic plans to support joint strategic plans.
4. Preparation of the Joint Mobilization Plan (166:2).

The Joint Logistics Plans Group (JLPG) has six technical teams which were: "Logistics Plans, Transportation, Construction, Personnel and Units, Petroleum, and Aircraft (166:5)."

The JSPC was responsible for preparation of outline strategic plans which were submitted to the JCS for approval. When the JSPC was tasked to develop a war plan, they assigned the work to a Joint Strategic Plans Group (JSPG). The JSPG consisted of three planners, one from each service. The JSPG began the development of the strategic plan by gathering a statement of national objectives, assumptions to be made, and tasks to be considered. It also created force tabs which

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Figure 3. Joint Staff Committees with Logistics Responsibilities
Figure 4. Joint Logistics Plans Group

Deputy Director for Logistics (1)

Assistant Director for Logistics (3)

Senior Team (3)

Mobilization Plans Team (3)

Logistics Plans Team (3)

Requirements Team (3)

Transportation Team (3)

Construction Team (3)

Personnel Team (3)

Petroleum Team (3)

Aircraft Team (3)

Military Aid Team (3)
described an estimated time-phase build-up of the forces which would deploy after D-day (166:7). The JLPG and the JIG contributed feasibility input during the early development of the plan.

The JSPG would submit its war plan to the JSPC and the JLPC simultaneously. The two committees submitted the plan to each service member on the committee who would then use their staff to review the plan. The JLPC had six logistics areas to be analyzed for supportability. They were: personnel, tonnages of supply, transportation, petroleum, aircraft, and construction (166:9). These areas corresponded to the six working groups in the JSPG. These areas were considered the major logistics limiting factors for any war plan.

The various logistics working groups had to make assumptions to fill in for a lack of detail in the war plans. Those assumptions related to the following questions:

1. Which sea routes will be open or closed?
2. How many and what type airplanes will be available from civilian air lines?
3. What damage will occur to continental and overseas ports and how will this damage affect delivery of supplies (166:9)?

The generation of logistics implications was very mechanical and involved matching the requirements called for in the war plan against current capabilities. The availability of the requirements for each of the six areas was determined and the results were used to draw conclusions
and make recommendations to be submitted to the JSPC. The strategic plan would then be modified if necessary. The strategic planners would then submit the outline strategic plan to the JCS along with recommendations for improving readiness. The JCS would review it and determine what type plan was required and would assign the effort to appropriate planning committees.

There were three types of strategic war plans:
(1) The Emergency War Plan; (2) The Mid-range War Plan; and (3) The Long-range War Plan (166:14). Other types of plans might also require logistic input. They might be Mobilization Plans, NATO Plans, Mutual Security Program Plans, and budget plans (166:14).

A Joint Logistics Plan was used to provide guidance concerning the expenditures and use of resources required to support military operations. It provided broad guidelines for those commanders under the JCS to use in their own logistics plans and annexes. The main features of a Joint Logistic Plan were:

1. Purpose.
   a. Assures adequate logistic support.
   b. Provides for coordinated effort of the services in logistic support of commands directly under Joint Chiefs of Staff.
   c. Prescribes logistic responsibilities of these commands and their relations to other commands and forces of other countries.
   d. Prescribes policies to assure world-wide development of logistics in pattern required to support Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic concept.

2. Contents.
   a. Introduction (summaries of strategy,
situation, forces, definitions, operating responsibilities).
b. Part I—supply.
c. Part II—materiel maintenance and modification.
d. Part III—medical services.
e. Part IV—transportation.
f. Part V—construction and base development.
g. Part VI—personnel
h. Part VII—administrative management.

3. Planning and implementing procedures.
a. General planning responsibilities.
   (1) Joint Chiefs of Staff.
   (2) Services.
   (3) Commands.
b. Implementation instructions.
   (1) Action prior to operations or prior to D-Day.
   (2) Special instructions and information (166:16).

A JCS plan could not be completed at the same time as a war plan because the Joint Staff planners lacked information that had to be provided by service planners. The plan was issued in sections with precedence given to sections essential to planning for the services and unified commands (166:17).

Logistics Planning in the Air Materiel Command. The Air Materiel Command (AMC) consisted of headquarters at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH; 8 Air Materiel Areas in the Zone of the Interior (ZI), which contained 15 depots, 6 air procurement district offices, and regional and subregional offices. The overseas areas were served by AMC organizations which were under the operational control of the theater commanders. For the Korean War, the most important of these overseas
organizations was the Far East Air Materiel Command (FEAMCOM) with headquarters at Tachikawa, Japan, under operational control of the Far East Air Force (FEAF). Other overseas organizations included depots at Burtonwood, Brize Norton, and Sealand in the United Kingdom; Chateauroux, France; and Nouasseur, North Africa, all under United States Air Forces - Europe.

The AMC exercised only technical influence on these overseas logistics organizations in the form of technical orders, manuals, and Air Force Regulations. However, the AMC would also buy certain items such as tip tanks for fighter aircraft (159:13-15).

The AMC also had the responsibility to design logistical systems for the Air Force and was responsible for logistical aid in the administration of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (159:11).

The Newark and Sacramento depots served as overseas transportation control points for overseas support. The supplies from the ZI were funneled into the depots for shipment to their overseas location. Sacramento served the Pacific Theatre and Newark served the European Theatre.

The AMC was the center of Air Force logistics. Its mission included procurement of weapon systems and materiel, storage, distribution, maintenance, determination of requirements, and presentation of budgets for support of Air Force programs. The budget process projected three years
into the future. It included program areas for organization and personnel, installations, flying hours, aircraft inventory, and modernization of Air Force organizations.

Headquarters AMC received guidance from Headquarters Air Force concerning general program needs. It, in turn, analyzed and elaborated on those requirements and sent the requirements to the depot which specialized in the particular item. The requirements were defined by the depot and translated into the end items required to support the program(s) (159:1-5). The requirements developed at the depot were returned to HQ AMC where they were included in a budget plan sent up the chain of command for further review. The detail to which each item was justified would influence the likelihood it would survive the budget process.

Requirements were determined by balancing tables of organization and equipment (TO&E), tables of allowances (TA), and technical orders (TOs) describing kits, against the mission of the organization in question (for definitions of various types of tables see Appendix B) (159:18).

Summary

Senior civilian and military leaders in United States began planning new civilian and military organizations that would be more responsive to National emergencies, even before the end of World War II. The high cost of that war and the requirements to rebuild the world economies caused fiscal
constraints on the military budgets. The military unification effort in the post-war era was driven in large degree by the need to be more efficient in the logistical support of the military services. Organizational and procedural deficiencies were blamed for the lag in industrial mobilization that certainly prolonged World War II. The National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949 were intended to create an efficient military organization capable of effectively responding to another world war. The vagueness of the legislation left to the organizations it created (OSD, JCS, Munitions Board, etc) the job of developing structures and guidance for planning the next war. The Truman Administration recognized the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to world peace and hoped its preparations would be sufficient and in time.

The next chapter of this study examines how the post-war organization of the Air Force in the Far East responded to the invasion of Korea. The planning efforts of the Far East Air Materiel Command (FEAMCOM) will be emphasized.
III. The Far East Air Materiel Command's Logistics Plans and Policy Making Response to Korean Tasking

Overview

Chapter III outlines a brief organizational history of the structures in the FEAMCOM for logistics plans and for policy-making. The response of the FEAMCOM planners to various tasking problems is discussed. Supply problems between the Army and the Air Force and the solutions to those problems will be discussed. The logistics guidance from higher headquarters and the usefulness of existing plans and procedures is examined. Adjustments to various planning operating procedures is reviewed.

Brief History of the Far East Air Materiel Command

The Far East Air Materiel Command (FEAMCOM) was first activated as the Far East Air Service at Nelsen Field in the Philippines in November 1941. It was forced to cease operations on 8 December 1941 following the Japanese bombing and joined the ground forces resisting the Japanese invasion. It was again activated at Brisbane, Australia, in June 1944. During the campaign to regain the Philippines the command moved from Brisbane to Hollandia, New Guinea, then to Manila, and finally to Fachu, Japan, in January 1947. At Fachu the command became the FEAMCOM (79:532).

In July of 1949, the FEAMCOM was moved again to Tachikawa Air Base which contained the facilities of the old Imperial
Japanese Army Air Field. The base was the site of the Imperial Japanese Army Air Materiel Area. The facilities at Tachikawa included an aircraft factory, a military school, an experimental laboratory, a supply area, and a landing strip. The headquarters were moved into the military school and the aircraft factory became the location of the maintenance and supply area (78:532).

The FEAMCOM was one of five Far East Air Force (FEAF) organizations. The FEAF was the Air Force component in the United States Far East Command (FEC). (See Appendix D). The other four were the Fifth Air Force, located at Nagoya, Japan; the Thirteenth Air Force, located at Clark Air Base; the Twentieth Air Force, located at Kadena; and the Far East Air Force Base at Tokyo. The FEAMCOM operated six separate installations located at Tama, Yanada, Iwahara, Kisarazu, and FEAMCOM Air Base, in Japan, and one on the island of Iwo Jima.

The FEAMCOM was responsible for all supply and maintenance actions in the FEAF with the exception of those for the Thirteenth Air Force. The Thirteenth Air Force was supplied by the 6208th Air Depot Wing at Clark Air Force Base, PI (78:233). Soon after the start of the Korean War it was determined the 6208th had to be moved closer to the battle zone. The assets of the FEAMCOM were concentrated in the Depot at Tachikawa and could be vulnerable to attack. The 6208th needed to be located in an area out of the range of
bombers from the Asian mainland. Okinawa was decided upon as an ideal solution and the 6208th was moved to Kadena Air Base in September 1950, and placed under the command of the FEAMCOM (74:113). This gave the FEAF commander, General Stratemeyer complete centralized control of his logistics assets (see figure 5 and Appendix E) (87:1).

A reorganization of the command became effective 1 February 1952 (See figure 6). This action deactivated the 13th Group at FEAMCOM Air Base and activated the 6400th Depot Wing. This reorganization left the FEAMCOM with a command headquarters, two depot wings in Japan, and one in the Philippines. Previous to this change Headquarters FEAMCOM had been responsible for both command and depot functions. The 6400th Depot Wing relieved the command headquarters of the dual function. The second depot wing in Japan, the 6418, located at Iwakuni, didn't attain full wing because of a lack of funding. In July 1952, the command name was changed to Far East Air Logistic Force (FEALOGFOR) with all functions remaining the same (74:113, 179:5).

The FEAMCOM's Mission

The FEAMCOM provided logistical support to all the FEAF activities except for the 13th Air Force which was later added to its responsibility in September 1950. Its mission could be expressed in three categories:

1. Exercise command jurisdiction over all units assigned and/or attached to Headquarters FEAMCOM.
2. Provide adequate logistic support to all Air Force
Figure 5. Map of the FEAF Area of Responsibility
activities in the FEAF and to title III countries through the MDAP.


The types of organizations supported included:

5 Fighter Wings
1 Light Bomb Wing
1 Medium Bomb Wing
1 Heavy Bomb Wing
1 Heavy Troop Carrier Wing
1 Weather Wing
1 Airways and Air Communications Service (AACS) Wing
2 Air-Sea Rescue Squadrons
1 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
1 Weather Reconnaissance Squadron
3 Aircraft Control and Warning Groups
The Military Air Transport Service
The Army (79:531)

The logistical responsibilities of FEAMCOM included:

1. Exercise Technical supervision and control of procurement for all FEAF activities.
2. Maintain, overhaul, repair, and modification of all materiel for which the FEAF has depot maintenance responsibility.
3. Perform the functions of a central procurement agency for the FEAF.
4. Maintain central records of reparations equipment utilized by FEAF.
5. Accomplish engineering and installation of all communication and electronic facilities, except AACS, throughout the theatre.
6. Exercise control and technical supervision of the receipt, storage, issue, and modification of Air Force ammunition.
7. Provide technical assistance to, and surveillance over all FEAF POL, laundry, and clothing sales store operations.
8. Determine and prescribe logistical policies and central procedures for the theatre through the media of FEAF materiel directives.
10. Administer civilian personnel and technical representatives assigned to Headquarters, FEAF,
Figure 6. The FEAMCOM Organization as of 25 June 1950

- Commanding General
  - Vice Commander
    - Adulant General
      - Surgeon
      - Inspector General
      - Deputy for General Staff
        - Deputy for Military
          - Deputy for Intelligence
          - Deputy for Operations
            - 13TH Medical Group
            - 13TH Supply Group
            - 13TH Maintenance Group
            - 13TH Air Base Group
            - HQ & HQ SQ
            - 440TH Signal Aviation
              - Heavy Construction Btn
Figure 7. The FEALOGFOR organization as of July 1952.
FEAF Base, Military Air Transport Service and airways and communications service.
11. Maintain an air base on Iwo Jima with facilities for weather service, communications, air-sea rescue and refueling service.
12. Coordinate action for defense of Volcano and Bonin Islands with appropriate Army and Navy Commanders.
13. Provide area medical services through a USAF Hospital.
14. Perform such other functions as may be directed by Higher Headquarters (79:531, 85:4)

Impact of North Korean Invasion on the FEAMCOM

General Stratemeyer, Commanding General, FEAF, notified Brigadier General Doyle, Commanding General, FEAMCOM, about the situation in Korea within a few hours of the attack. General Doyle called his staff together and briefed them on the situation. He issued the following major directives:

The Supply Group and Deputy for Materiel to get up-to-date status of F-51 parts; the Maintenance Group to get the status of reparable items from the Supply Group; the Deputy for Intelligence to establish liaison with Headquarters, FEAF and report significant changes in the situation, and also to inquire into the necessity for increased guard at Tama and Yamada Reserve Ammunition Depots; The Maintenance Group to alert Kisarasu Air Base to the situation; the Supply and Maintenance Group Commanders, together with the Provost Marshal, to take specific steps to guard against sabotage; the Provost Marshal to tighten up procedures at FEAMCOM gates; the group commanders to brief troops on the situation with special emphasis on their keeping calm; the Deputy for Personnel to be prepared to discuss with the Commanding General a cadre for an additional depot wing headquarters, should one be needed, personnel to be drawn from the resources of FEAMCOM (77:232-233).

This meeting started planning for the move of the 6208th Air Base Depot Wing from Clark Air Base, Philippine Islands to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. The Deputy for Materiel
prepared a study titled *Factors Involved in Relocation of an Air Depot Wing*. Other factors considered in the move were the impact on theatre logistic requirements if the war spread to other Asiatic countries which might involve supply operations throughout the entire Pacific Area. These considerations indicated that a central depot and three or four area depots would be required (77-234).

FEAMCOM Operations Plan Number 1 was published on 26 July (77:239). It had been under development since the beginning of the year. It was begun because the political situation in the FEAF area might have resulted in the FEAMCOM assets at Tachikawa and FEAMCOM Air Bases coming under attack.

Basically, it provided for placing the command on a war footing and defining emergency operations and leadership of all defense activity at the two bases. It established an Area Defense Force consisting of a Commander, Vice Commander, Chief of Staff, Operations, Intelligence, Communications, Materiel and Damage Control Officers, together with the following units: 13th and 374th Maintenance, Supply, Air Base, and Troop Carrier Groups; 440th Signal Aviation Heavy Construction Battalion; Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, FEAMCOM; and the 374th Troop Carrier Squadron (77:239).

The normal activities of a non-essential nature were suspended and leave and unnecessary TDYs were cancelled. All efforts were directed at establishing the command on a wartime footing. Other actions will be discussed in the appropriate sections of this chapter (see Appendix E).

**Organization**

Brigadier General John P. Doyle was commander of the FEAMCOM during the first two years of the Korean War. Major
General Paul E. Ruestow assumed command on 10 June 1952. The FEAMCOM experienced little change or growth (other than an increase in Japanese civilian employees and Japanese industrial contracts) over the first two years of the war (see figure 4) while supporting over four times as many organizations. The FEAMCOM was generally credited with doing an outstanding job (98:495).

The FEAMCOM units were organized under T/O&E 1-511 (Table of Organization and Equipment) which described air depot wings (See Appendix B). This organizational authorization was very troublesome for the FEAMCOM because the T/O&Es described only a generic organization and was not tailored to local conditions. The T/O&E concept was explained:

**Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E)** - A table which prescribes the normal mission, organization structure and personnel and equipment authorized for a military unit (185:2).

The 13th Air Depot Wing and the FEAMCOM were consolidated into one organization on 1 November 1949. Under the T/O&E authorization the combination would result in a loss of personnel authorizations because the T/O&E did not provide for this structure or its responsibilities (82:12). The personnel authorization short-fall was corrected by a non-T/O&E (see Appendix B) authorization of 80 officers and 172 airmen (79:530). The problems presented by the T/O&E concept of an air depot wing can be understood when it is recognized that prior to the Korean war the air depot at the FEAMCOM Headquarters had a peacetime operational workload of three
times that supported by the generic T/O&E concept. After the war began that workload level again increased by 300 percent (87:2). Manning authorizations were ultimately arranged by special calculations over and above the T0&E.

Organizational Flexibility. The air base wing concept had several organizational problems which resulted from trying to move operational squadrons of a wing without them being accompanied by support units. When the operational units were moved without the supply or air base group portions of the T/O&E they could not operate. The FEAMCOM responded to this problem by organizing logistic support units as temporary stand-ins until a complete organization was assembled (87:5).

The FEAMCOM solved its air depot problem and air base problem by reorganizing on the basis of a Table of Distribution (T/D). (See Appendix B). This was not an ideal solution for the air depot because the T/D organization emphasized the ability to move with operational ability intact but that was not an important factor for the air depots (74:118). The T/D was described as follows:

Table of Distribution (T/D) - A document issued by a major air command which indicates the sectional distribution of military and civilian personnel authorizations for a T/D Unit (AFR 20-52, Table of Distribution Units, 19 October 1949) (185:2).

In addition, the normal base supplemental equipment was provided from Tables of Allowance (TA) 1-1, for Air Force equipment, TA 1-75 for motor vehicle equipment, and TA 1-1C
for repairs and utility equipment (79:530). The TA was
defined as follows:

**Table of Allowance (T/A)** - A table or list that
establishes the maximum amount of organic equipment for
an AF base, organization, or activity (185:2).

**Air Installations.** The early communist blitzkrieg
into South Korea resulted in the Republic of Korea (ROK)
Army's loss of most of its assets including most of its
airfields. The airfields were built during World War II
using sod for take-off and landing areas. Only Kimpo
airfield, which had been built by the United States Air Force
in 1945, was capable of accommodating modern, heavy aircraft
such as transports, bombers, and fighter aircraft. This
meant there was a large requirement for airfield
construction.

This was a problem because the FEAF lacked trained
personnel and the proper equipment to do the job. In the FEC
the manning of Aviation Engineering units (SCARWAF: Special
Category Army Personnel with the Air Force) was an Army
responsibility. Neither the Army nor the Air Force had
vigorously considered this lack of capability with any sense
of urgency (87:19).

By the end of June 1950, the FEAF was frantically making
plans for air field construction in Korea. The bombers that
were trying to fly interdiction sortie had to fly 200 to 300
miles from remote bases to the target. Air fields in Korea
were essential to the proper use of air power.
In an effort to surmount the SCARWAF shortage, Japanese and Korean construction contractors were sought. A provisional 1st Construction Command was established on 11 July 1950. The FEAF had an aviation engineer strength consisting of two battalions, a group headquarters, and a maintenance company. The FEAF lacked sufficient personnel to staff the command. The lack of staff ultimately prevented the 1st Construction Command from accomplishing its mission. The aviation engineer unit would often arrive at an airfield armed only with orders. No equipment or materiel had been provided. They found the situation discouraging (75:119).

In September 1950 the UNC counter-offensive freed many ready made sites. Detachments of engineer went to work on improving them as fast as possible. Renovated airfields were prepared at Pohang, Pyongtaek, Kunsan, Suwon, Kimpo, Seoul, and Kangnung. This was the start of a continuing two year airfield construction program.

The Army never completely filled Air Force requests for increased SCARWAF personnel. It stated it did not have the personnel to send and the only way it could send more was by robbing the cadre of existing units. It wasn't until December 1952 that the Air Force filled the shortfall with Air Force personnel.

The planning assumptions for airfield construction caused a great deal of waste. The planners assumed the airfields being constructed would only be needed for a six month
period. This assumption caused the aviation engineers to ignore the quality of fill, drainage, and compactness at an airfield. When it became obvious a two year minimum life span was more realistic, a great deal of work had to be reaccomplished (75:121).

Analysis by the Comptroller showed that pierced-steel-planking (PSP) was no bargain. PSP was used to provide a quick runway construction capability. However, every major runway where it was used required constant major repairs. In 1952 and 1953, every PSP runway was replaced with concrete or a combination of concrete and asphalt surfaces (See figure 8).

The comparison of PSP to concrete is based on analysis of the costs involved:

The 9000 by 150 foot runway required 184,000 bags of cement; 15,000 yards of sand in the mix, and 7,000 yards for curing; 24,000 yards of crushed rock; and 1,000,000 gallons of water. The sand, rock and water were free, except for the quarrying and hauling cost. The cement was procured through Japanese sources and cost $.84 a bag for a total cost of $154,560.00. To build a comparable runway of steel plank would require 108,456 pieces of PSP, costing $7.00 per piece (total: $759,192.00) (75:121-122).

The maintenance costs contrasted sharply. In a two year period the concrete runway required only ten barrels of asphalt for the fill of a few cracks. The PSP required constant maintenance. Many PSP sections had to be replaced each 24 hour period. This amounted to $1750 to $2100 each day for PSP, alone. The maintenance team required 60 Koreans and five U.S. military supervisors during the day, and 40
Figure 8. Air Bases in South Korea as of 27 July 1953 (75:120)
Figure 8, continued.
Koreans and four U.S. military supervisors at night, for an expenditure of 25,000 man hours per month, adding significantly to the cost of a PSP runway.

The PSP required constant policing to prevent foreign object damage. The corners of the PSP would curl up around the edges and cause constant tire damage. Tires of aircraft using PSP runways had to replaced every five sorties. The tires would last 29 sorties on a concrete runway. Structural damage was also greater on PSP. The PSP would cause a great deal of take-off drag. Sometimes this resulted in the requirement for JATO (jet assisted take-off) assistance. The PSP provided much less braking ability. Aircraft operation on PSP was noisy and masked possible engine problems from the pilots. A runway constructed of PSP was about two weeks faster to construct and could be repaired faster in the event of battle damage but it was more expensive overall (75:121). There were over 50 airfields built during the Korean war. The supply of materiel for airfield construction, alone was a major transportation challenge for the FEAMCOM.

Supply

Within hours of the onset of combat, the workload of the 10th Supply Group, Depot was greatly increased. It doubled the normal rate in the first four days. By the end of June combat-scale operations requiring much greater supply support had been established which would last to the end of the war.
Prior to the war there were only sufficient supply levels to maintain a reduced training sortie rate in the FEAF. After the war began the accelerated sortie rates quickly exhausted the supply levels. This situation was exacerbated by the rapid changes in the numbers of assigned aircraft, the lack of maintenance experience, and greatly increased combat consumption. These combined to diminish the supply support available in the theatre. The supply planning covered five major areas:

First, the fullest use had to be made of the resources on hand. New disposition procedures were initiated, and the area of support drained of excess stocks in F-51 and other critical categories. Stocks in repairable storage and stocks requiring technical order compliance were immediately processed to maintenance, and work order control procedures streamlined to accelerate this function. Salvage yards were screened for any items that had formerly been excess to requirements. The possibilities of local purchase were exploited with a heavy increase in purchasing and contracting responsibilities (77:250).

Second, to relieve the burden on combat units and to cushion the shock of war demands, thousands of line items had to be speeded on the way to the bases on automatic shipment. Plans were put into effect for assembly and automatic shipment from the Group of airframe, engine and accessories spares, and supply on 17 table II projects.

Third, to meet the demands of aircraft already enroute, it was necessary that Table II and III supplies and spares be requisitioned for automatic shipment from AMC, so that minimum requirements would be on hand while the pipeline was filled. This was accomplished immediately. Arrangements were completed for diversion to the bases and segregated for depot storage of advance stocks for the new aircraft.

Fourth, stocks had to be built up in the quickest possible time to meet skyrocketing demand. Over 155,000 line items had to be screened immediately against unknown and unpredictable requirements. Levels had to be tripled or quadrupled and , to anticipate demand, thousands of line items had to be requisitioned immediately on the highest, over riding priority.
Fifth, the pipeline was too long. It had to be shortened. Formerly, the cycle from requisitioning to receipt of supplies, at a distance of 6,000 miles, extended from four to five months. If stocks were to be built up in advance of the new aircraft and new organizations, already enroute, accelerated requisitioning procedures were essential. To this end, mechanized requisitioning procedures were developed, to be effective on 1 July. Together with this, increasing emphasis, was focused on air transportation from the States. At the other end of the pipeline, from the depot to combat activities, flow times were abbreviated by the use of FEAMCOM aircraft and maximum air transport (77:250-252).

Requisitions to the ZI were often challenged and delayed because they didn't match previous consumption data. The ZI depots had not yet recognized that experience gained from combat made it necessary to constantly refine consumption data to higher levels. The long lead times, and unrealistic provisioning of spare parts, lead to a serious lag in the deliveries of spares to the theatre (74:112-113).

The FEAF received generally excellent support from the AMC. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, USAF, pointed out the importance of an all-out effort to support the war effort:

This business of going along the way we have been - business as usual - stops right now. Everybody is to bend every effort to make sure that no stone is left unturned so that General MacArthur's Far East Air Force gets everything it needs. We have to uphold the reputation of the USAF in the eyes of the public. That in itself is very important besides the importance of this war (7:2).

The code word "HOLDOFF," carrying an S-1 overriding priority, was immediately established on 28 June 1950 to identify readily all requests for items in support of the
FEAF. On 3 July 1950, a teleconversation system was set up between Headquarters FEAF and the AMC headquarters, in an effort to expedite supply action to Korea (7:3).

A backup procedure was used which would copy that used for the Berlin Airlift ("Project Vittles") by ZI personnel. The procedure involved the transcription of the requisition information onto IBM tapes at the FEAMCOM Air Base for transmission by teletype to a companion machine at Tama. The equipment at Tama would encode the requisitions for transcription at the other end of the communications line for immediate supply action. This procedure was estimated to cut the transmission, receipt, and filling of "HOLDOFF" requisitions to eight hours before the beginning of packing and shipment (77:236).

In January 1951, Air Force Regulation 70-16 was published. This regulation required the FEAMCOM to procure many supplies from the local economy. The Sacramento Air Materiel Area was the agent for purchase of any spares or parts the FEAMCOM could not procure locally. The FEAMCOM reimbursed the Sacramento Air Materiel Area for spares purchased by it in the ZI (80-152).

**Interservice Support.** Interservice support was filled with problems. This was caused by procedural differences between and differences of interpretation by, the services. Fortunately, these problems could usually be eliminated by informal discussion and cooperation at the
Generally, everyone was cooperative and eager to win the war.

The Army and the Air Force each drew supplies from the other. The Air Force obtained many expendable items from the Army but often the Army would initially refuse the issue because there was no TA cited as authorization for the items. The problem was overcome when the Army learned the Air Force didn't use TAs as authorization for expendable items. The problem was one of mis-understanding which was cleared by explanation.

The Army began to increase its organic air capability. By the end of the war the Army had 800 aircraft in Japan and Korea. The support for these aircraft was obtained from the FEAMCOM. There was no initial effort to establish separate supply stocks for these Army spares. However, separate stocking soon became necessary to establish appropriate funding accounting for these parts. The separation process of supply funding was not achieved prior to the end of the war (74:114).

South Asiatic Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The Truman Administration had begun Mutual Defense Assistance Programs (MDAP) in the NATO area in the late 1940s. They were working well there and appropriations for fiscal 1950 were set aside for similar efforts in the Asian region. Part of the legislation permitted the transfer of surplus stocks to the participating countries without the surplus goods...
being charged to the program (see Appendix A). The costs of handling the surplus were funded by the program (46:6-7, 25-28).

The FEAMCOM began planning for the South Asiatic MDAPs in the first half of 1950. The FEAMCOM had been tasked to develop support plans and doctrine for several Asian nations including Korea, the Philippine Republic, The United States of Indonesia, the Chinese Nationalist Republic, Thailand, the British in Malaya, and the French in Vietnam. The tasking included:

(1) to receive requisitions on approved programs;
(2) to fill any portion of the requirements from excess property available to FEAMCOM;
(3) to honor AOCP (aircraft out of commission, awaiting parts) requests on a replacement cost basis if the property is not available in excess (78:234).

The FEAMCOM responded to the tasking by estimating costs for the personnel, packing, crating, and transportation required. The FEAMCOM submitted a request for an initial authorization of $25,000 for the program to FEAF on 19 June 1950. The program was implemented at the start of the war. It was greatly expanded to aid the supporting member nations with their war efforts. The planning was useful in the resupply of the ROK forces because it identified and located surplus materials just before the time they were needed the most (78:234-235, 123:19). To illustrate this point:

An early example of the type of support which this command would be called upon to furnish member nations came on the evening of 29 June when Australian Squadron Leader Barrow of the 77th Squadron, RAAF, phoned this headquarters and requested between 100 and 200 seventy-five or 110 gallon droppable fuel tanks for use on
Mustang fighter aircraft for increasing the range of flight operations over Korea. Headquarters, FEAF authorized this command to assist the Australian Government to the limit of its capabilities. The Supply Group immediately secured 140 fuel tanks from Johnson Air Base and shipped them to Iwakuni Air Base, Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan (78:234).

Maintenance

The maintenance of many different types of aircraft, both conventional and jet, greatly complicated the logistics effort. Technical assistance was given to the combat units in Korea and the REMCOs (Rear-Echelon Maintenance Combined Operations) in Japan. There were 116 civilian technical representatives, representing 25 manufacturers, who were constantly available to the various maintenance organizations. Specialized teams coordinated all maintenance matters and kept all technical data as up to date as possible (74:114).

Battle damage repair ability was very limited. The lack of competent structural engineering ability prevented maintenance on stressed and tapered skin areas. Small arms fire damage was patched using methods developed in the theater. Structural engineering, and specialized equipment such as jigs and optical alignment equipment, would have reduced the number of which aircraft that had to be returned to the ZI for depot maintenance. The return rate was increased by the lack of depot repair capacity in the theatre. The return rate of reparable components and equipment reached 85 percent of those items awaiting depot
repair. The pipeline for this materiel was very long and time consuming which often required critical items, such as aircraft engines, to be air transported (75:114).

Jet Engine Repair. The time between engine overhaul was almost doubled by the establishment of a Jet Engine Minor Repair Program in the theatre. The program was started with the aid of the FEAMCOM contractor technical representatives. It consisted of the removal and repair or replacement of the components in that part of the engine where the fuel was either ignited, burned, or exhausted. These parts included fuel nozzles, combustion chambers, turbine blades, turbine wheels, aft bearing and tail cones. The methods used for engine repair often required innovation at the local level to make-up for a lack of equipment stands and other types of specialized equipment (75:115).

Jet engine repair was so critical to the support of combat operations that the FEAMCOM planners recommended that provision for the facilities, materiel, and equipment for jet engine minor repair be included in all appropriate T/O&Es. They further recommended that training schools or other education programs be established in theatre to provide more personnel skilled in jet engine repair (175:115).

Transportation

"Probably the most general limiting factor in Korea was transportation [123:22]." Most of the materiel arriving in
Japan or directly in Korea, was transported by ship. Materiel shipped from the ZI would arrive at the port at Yokohama. From there it would be hauled by truck to the main depot at Tachikawa. If the materiel was destined for Korea, it was trucked back to the Yokohama Port and reloaded onto ships. This process was very wasteful.

The problem was solved by an in transit depot at the Yokohama Port. The depot would identify the final destination of the materiel and would then route it to its final destination.

The question of how to use air transportation was whether to maximize the amount of materiel transported by air, or establish a prioritized list of spares. The amount of materiel that could be transported by air was a small fraction of the materiel which required shipment. The FEAMCOM left the selection of the type of transportation to the AMC:

The Far East Air Materiel Command indicated the precedence of priority of its requisitions, leaving it to the AMC to assign Priority and method of transportation in consonance with theater quotas for airlift, Marinex [see Appendix B], or routine-water shipment. ...Procedures to control, expedite, and follow up all shipments had to be established and put into operation. The experience gained in the Berlin airlift was utilized in formulating these procedures. On the whole the problem of transportation and control of shipment was the largest problem encountered by the command [AMC] in its support of Project HOLDOFF (7:49).

The FEAMCOM procured transportation service direct from the Japanese National Railway. This was a satisfactory system for transportation of materiel in Japan. In Korea the
Army operated the rail system. There was no system or agency to allocate rail space among the various claimants. The Air Force had problems moving its materiel away from the port areas:

Perhaps the most serious continuing bottleneck in the transportation system was in moving goods out of the port areas, and this situation was aggravated by the concentration of depots in the Pusan area, near the port facilities (123:20).

The push supply system implemented at the beginning of the war was hard to anticipate (7:5-6). The supply and transportation people at the ports and depots in the Pusan area had no idea of what, when or how much materiel to expect and plan for.

Critical materiel such as aviation ammunition was often stranded at port. The FEAMCOM was forced to resort to organic motor transport to move urgently needed items (75:117).

The transportation difficulty experienced in theatre was the result of a lack of transportation planning. No consideration was given to transportation requirements prior to implementation of the movement of units or materiel. The requirement for transportation consideration eventually had to be considered. Any operation which ignored it in its planning could count on a delay, once operations began, until the transportation had be arranged (179:92).

**Shipment of Aircraft.** The shipment of fighter aircraft was by ship. This subjected the aircraft to a high
level of corrosion during shipment. The aircraft were strapped down to an open deck for shipment on a freighter or tanker. The aircraft were completely cocooned but the cocoons often developed cracks which allowed salt water spray corrosion.

Some of the aircraft were so badly damaged upon arrival they had to be shipped back to the ZI for major repairs. They were shipped back in the hangar decks of aircraft carriers. Officials found that shipment in the covered area of the carrier hangar decks prevented salt water corrosion damage. The aircraft carriers were thereafter used for shipment of USAF aircraft when they were available. This solved most of the transportation corrosion problem (179:91).

**Personnel**

In the six month period preceding the Korean War, the FEAF was undergoing a reduction in force which would cause great difficulties once hostilities began. In January 1950, the command had 3807 officers and 25,297 airmen against authorizations of 4027 and 34,436, respectively. By June the number of officers had been reduced to 3611 and there had been an increase to 30,350 airmen, against authorizations of 3755 and 34,728 respectively. The civilian structure remained more constant with an increase in United States National employees from 10,297 to 12,424. The employment of indigenous civilians decreased from 40,026 to 38,072 (75:148).
Headquarters USAF had tried to maintain a supply of qualified replacements but by June 1950 the FEAF had severe shortages in personnel qualified in Communications, electronics, and aircraft maintenance. The rotation of personnel from the FEAF to the ZI was often accomplished in a manner which gave little consideration to skill levels or experience levels or unit capabilities (80:8). The shortage of technically qualified officers demonstrated a lack of any detailed personnel replacement planning.

Most of the replacements were recent graduates of technical schools. The replacements had not been trained to maintain the obsolete equipment in use in the FEAF. There had also been an effort to replace the FEAF technical schools with on-the-job training (OJT). This adversely affected the ability of the FEAF to immediately utilize the new personnel in their assigned tasks (75:148).

The theatre organization problems adversely affected the personnel situation in several ways. There was not enough time for detailed personnel planning. Requisitions were filled on an as needed basis. New personnel from the U.S. were placed on temporary duty with their gaining unit because of the belief the war would be of short duration. Personnel were often sent on temporary duty from location to location without their parent unit being aware of where they were. This resulted in the inability of commanders to know how many people they actually had assigned. Therefore, they had
difficulty knowing if they had the resources to comply with unit tasking. This haphazard personnel assignment system was quickly recognized as being potentially disastrous.

The need for order and discipline resulted in personnel planning actions with the goals of assigning new personnel to permanent stations and creating a manning priority system. The priority system judged the number of individuals assigned to a unit against the number authorized. Problems developed from the lag in the establishment of unit authorizations and the arrival of personnel to fill those authorizations. The planning failed to time the arrival of personnel with operational needs (75:149)

The FEAMCOM reacted to the emergency by streamlining scheduled activities. This involved cancelling all non-essential activities and shifting the personnel involved to critical areas. Individuals with system knowledge who were in the theatre were sent on temporary duty assignment to the FEAMCOM. This still left large shortages. Recruitment of civilian personnel began immediately. Phone calls were made to individuals who were known to have expertise in critical areas. Those available were used as civilian contractors.

The extensive use of skilled Japanese was a major factor in the success of the FEAMCOM meeting its logistical taskings. On 25 June, 1950 a request was sent to the Central Civilian Personnel Office for 800 additional Japanese workers. The jobs paid a very competitive rate. This
attracted high quality workers. The request for additional workers was filled by 3 July 1950 (77:244).

The use of the Japanese had mixed results at first. They were productive but special training programs had to be designed to increase productivity:

Training of indigenous personnel in business management, English and typing, as well as on-the-job training in numerous supply and maintenance skills, has proven mandatory if satisfactory results are to be obtained (80:10).

The Japanese workers caused very few problems for the FEAMCOM. They were very satisfied by the way they were treated and generally believed the command had their best interests at heart. Absenteeism among the Japanese employees was almost non-existent.

The Korean civilians were a different story. The FEAMCOM had continuing problems with the high absentee rate of the Koreans. A study conducted by the FEAMCOM Personnel Division concluded the situation was similar to one which existed during World War II in Sardinia.

It is believed that provisions should be made on a worldwide scale for indigenous laborers to receive food, either prepared or raw, as a part of this compensation whenever operations are being carried on in an area such as Korea where a food blackmarket exists (82:10).

The solution used in Sardinia was one hot meal per day. In Korea the solution was partial payment in kind - one pound of raw rice per day (82:10). That action helped but did not resolve the problem.
The Comptroller system of the Air Force began in early 1950, as mandated by the National Security Act of 1949. The Comptroller in the FEAF and the FEAMCOM had the responsibility to insure that the Commands' efforts were conducted in the most economical manner possible. Sometimes the effort to save money was costly in the long run. There was an effort to assume the shortest possible occupancy. The airfields were an example of this.

In 1951 after the ground war had stabilized, there was an effort to increase the efficiency with which the FEAF operated. Regular analysis of programs and planning factors lead to many economies. The discontinuation of the use of PSP is an example of this analysis.

Management analysis was fairly new when the Korean war began. It had been used during "Project Vittles" and lessons from that experience were being applied in Korea. This area of effort showed itself to be an essential aspect of establishing and maintaining logistical efficiency (75:160).

Accounting. When the war began there was consideration given to discontinuing all accounting systems. It was felt there would be no room for such systems in the heat of battle. The systems were never discontinued but they were permitted to become very lax early in the war.
The extension of waivers to tight accounting practices was reserved for combat units on a strictly controlled basis. Expenditure accounting was used in the combat units. Expenditure accounting does not provide control over specific, allotted, appropriated funds. A system of obligation authorities and funding officers were employed in forward combat units. The major accounting records would be maintained by the parent organization.

The data was found to be necessary in the calculations for analysis and for budget submissions. The Commanding General, FEAMCOM, Brigadier General John P. Doyle, in his introduction to the FEAMCOM history for the first half of 1951, stated:

This history and that of the previous six-month period, might aptly be titled, "Lessons on How to Fight a Budgeted War" - since this is the first time that a United States air force has been required to compute and defend a budget in a combat theatre as has the Far East Air Forces during this conflict. FEAMCOM, in turn has had to substantiate their budget in the same detail as a Zone of the Interior command during peacetime (80:8).

The accounting for supplies which were dispersed among the various services and our allies was very difficult. Written agreements were necessary for services and countries having units in the combat zone. The AMC handled all reimbursement approvals but there were transfers between units in the FEC. This required a great deal of correspondence and authentication. A better system was needed.
Summary

The FEAMCOM responded in a very credible manner to a difficult situation it was poorly prepared for. It was very lucky. It could not have responded as well had there not been a large quantity of surplus materiel in theatre and the ZI. The Japanese economy was beginning to rebuild following World War II and it was able to provide a great deal of help. The depots at the Tachikawa and FEAMCOM Air Bases could have been targets for a more aggressive enemy and their destruction would have crippled the UN aviation efforts in Korea.

The lack of logistics planning wasn't critical in the Korean War because of the amount of materiel support offered. Had there been complications, such as a concurrent conflict in the NATO area, the Korean story could have been very different.

The most significant logistical lesson from Korea is that emergency responses to combat situations must be well thought out. Recent history offers many examples of the calamities that result when operations lack proper planning. The old alliterative saying "prior proper planning prevents poor performance" accurately expresses the lessons of Korea.

Chapter IV will consider the answers to the investigative questions asked in Chapter I.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

FEAF was the first United States Air Force unit required to substantiate budget requirements during a war. The FEAMCOM, likewise, was required to defend its budget submissions. These requirements forced the development of new efficiencies and means of determining requirements. This study has considered many of those areas, and the seven investigative questions which concern them will be answered in this chapter.

1. How did the FEAMCOM solve its supply problems with the U.S. Army?

General Headquarters Far East Command Circular No. 44 dated 20 August 1949, (see Appendix D) is generally cited as proof that the FEC had a joint staff. However, this small staff consisted of just three officers from each service and did not meet the intent of the joint staff contemplated by the JCS unified command plan. The Army dominated the FEC staff and this resulted in many problems (195:10).

For example, Gen. MacArthur had not yet agreed on the division of common supply stocks between the Army and the Air Force. The common, non-allocated stocks in question were mainly for wheeled vehicles. The Army controlled these common stocks and gave priority to Army priority requisitions. This left the FEAF without a reliable theater source for these parts. The FEAF solved the problem by
having the FEAMCOM submit priority 1 requisitions directly to the AMC. The AMC was able to meet FEAF requirements (87:6-7).

2. What logistics guidance (SOPs, programs, and repertoires) did the FEAMCOM planners have for material requirements?

The logistical guidance for the FEAMCOM planners went through many organizations before it reached the FEAMCOM. Chapter two discusses the various national organizations that participated in this process. The JLPG at Headquarters USAF and Headquarters FEC, were responsible for the development of overall guidance that the AMC and the FEAMCOM respectively used to develop planning factors. Problems arose when the various organizations planning support for the FEAF used different planning assumptions. As an example:

Basic planning factors were used to determine the men, planes, supplies and other resources needed for extensive air actions. As in a production line, an item in short supply could determine the rate of operation in an air force. If the agency responsible for procuring aviation ammunition estimated needs on the basis of 1500 sorties, and the agency responsible for procurement of petroleum products estimated requirements on the basis of only 1000 sorties, waste, imbalance and reduced effectiveness would result (75:161).

This problem was alleviated somewhat by the preparation of a "FEAF War Time Planning Factors Manual." Combat experience required that this manual be updated on a recurring basis (See Chapter 3, Comptroller).
That planning factors were influenced by the national level is evident by intelligence estimates that the war would be over by 1 Jan 1952 (98:419). This affected programing decisions that, for example, reduced the number of droppable wing tanks for fighter aircraft. This item became a severe limiting factor by 1 January 1952 (98:419).

The projection of an end of war date is the type decision that is decided on in the NSC based on intelligence summaries produced by the Director of Central Intelligence. The unification process produced an organization which required the best from each element. Decisions reached in each organization eventual effect the nations logistical ability to prosecute the war effort.

3. How helpful were existing logistics planning regulations (SOPs, programs, and repertoires)?

Planning for the South Asiatic Mutual Defense Assistance Program was begun in early 1950. This planning identified the location of in-theatre surplus materiel and began the budgeting process for transferring it to our Asian allies. This effort gave the FEAF a head start in its efforts to support the UN effort in Korea.

Other existing plans were a starting point but they didn't fit the conditions of the Korean war. The standard TO&Es of the FEAF units did not meet the requirements of units in Korea. They had to be modified to be theatre specific. This refinement made the T/O&E more useful as an indicator of
budget requirements.

The Air Force planning regulation 400-5, which had been updated in March, 1950 were not adequate for the FEAF. It was based on World War II consumption data and used generic T/O&Es, T/Ds, and T/As. This information was useful as a starting point. The FEAMCOM developed its own planning factor guidance through analysis provided by the Comptroller. The FEAF comptroller developed a "FEAF Wartime Planning Factors Manual" that standardized planning between various organizations in the FEAF (75:161).

The situation in Korea was always changing and that required that historical data be weighted against other intelligence analysis of the situation. This demonstrated how hard it was to build a manual with all of the answers. The comptroller's identification of waste and suggested solutions proved its value.

4. What changes were made to SOPs, programs, and repertoires to correct logistics planning problems?

The adjustment of the way that T/O&Es, T/Ds, and TAs were used in theatre solved many problems.

This headquarters is utilizing to the maximum the "planning guidance for the United States Air Force logistic structure in overseas areas" in its planning for future operations. The planning guidance referred to has not yet become Air Force approved doctrine, however, it has been approved for planning purposes. As a result of the Korean conflict, it has become very obvious to this command that the logistical commander is responsible for all Air Force logistic functions within a theater. In the course of the Korean War, it has become only too obvious that the tools required by the Air Force are in many instances controlled by other
services (see Appendix A) (82:12).

The problems of having logistical responsibilities spread across service lines touched many areas of support. These included transportation, supply spares for vehicle support, SCARWAF troops for airfield construction, and support of Army aircraft.

The consolidation of the logistics assets in the FEAF early in the Korean War placed the depot level logistics support under one commander. This made it easier to standardize the planning effort at the various levels of the FEAF.

5. What applicable war plans existed prior to the Korean War and how useful were they?

There was no plan for the defense of Korea. However, there had been extensive general planning for logistical support for defense of any area in the FEAF sphere of influence. The FEAMCOM had been working on an area defense plan that was designed to protect Tachikawa Air Base from sabotage or attack. This plan, FEAMCOM Operations Plan No. 1 was put into effect on 26 June 1950.

Planning for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program began in the first half of 1950. The FEAMCOM had been tasked to develop support plans and doctrine for several Asian nations including Korea, the Philippine Republic, The United States of Indonesia, the Chinese Nationalist Republic, Thailand, the British in Malaya, and the French in Vietnam. This planning
was useful in the resupply of the ROK forces (78:234).

6. How did the unification process impact the conduct of the Korean War?

The unification process pervaded the entire conduct of the Korean War. An example is the transfer of logistical responsibility from the Army to the Air Force. The National Security Act of 1947 stipulated that all transfers would occur within a two year time-frame. It was accomplished in that time period in the ZI; however, in the FEC area the transfer had not yet been accomplished when the war began (184).

The organizational interaction during the Korean war was based on the structures formed by the unification process. Planning assumptions were derived in the top organizations created by the National Security Acts (NSRB, MB, NSC, CIA, War Council, JCS, Joint Staff, etc.). The political policies of the Truman Administration required that the Korean War be strictly budgeted. This was a unique situation in American history. The National Security Acts had created a structure that made the conduct of a budgeted war possible.

7. To what degree were logistics planners included in strategic or tactical planning sessions during the Korean War?

There were examples of fully coordinated operations plans complete with logistics annexes during the Korean war (68, 69, 70, 71). These plans had been adapted from planning that
had previously been accomplished in the 13th Air Force.

These plans were the exception:

Pre-combat logistic planning was not carried out in the Korean war as it was in World War II, even though it was recognized that effective combat operations are tied closely to logistic support abilities. Aircraft have been received in this theater without sufficient logistical planning to support their combat operability, e.g. the F-86 Sabre-jet aircraft. Wartime requirements obviously differ entirely from peacetime needs and require a wholly different provisioning program -- greater numbers and varieties of parts than were ever the requirements of the ZI in peacetime. The F-86 aircraft wing tanks used in the ZI are designed to be almost a permanent part of the aircraft. They are designed to withstand the high speeds which are attained in tests, training maneuvers, etc. Consequently, they are expensive -- costing approximately $1,200.00 per pair. They are never dropped in flight but are used time and time again. In combat, on the other hand, when the enemy is sighted, these tip tanks are dropped before high speeds are reached, and therefore, a cheaper product suffices for combat theater requirements.

A combat aircraft and a pilot trained for combat operations are not sufficient; both must be backed up by an adequate support organization and a provisioning program based on combat operations (82:13) (See Appendix 7).

The Headquarters FEC had the structure and guidelines for incorporating logistical evaluation in operations planning. There was the perception that because the events in Korea required emergency action there was not time to evaluate operations plans for logistical feasibility. The emergency situation required that everyone make do with what they had. A planning structure had been implemented in the FEC during the second half of 1949. This done to comply with standardization instruction from the JCS (195:10):

The Commander-in-Chief published GHQ, FEC Circular No. 44, 20 August 1949, to establish Joint Strategic

The old saying "the hurrieder I go, the behinder I get" applies to what happened repeatedly in Korea. The lack of personnel augmentation planning resulted in the requirement to spend many hundreds of hours auditing personnel records so that commanders would know how many people had actually been assigned to their units.

Recommendations

The Comptroller in the various levels of command in the FEAF contributed a great deal to the success of the logistical effort in the Korean War. They were responsible for analysis that was used in the determination of new planning factors for logistics planning. The study of this area would contribute a great deal to the understanding of logistics of the Korean War.
SECTION IV - LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF USAF PROGRAMS

Part I - Logistic Policies, Principles and Objective.

1. General Policies and Objective. The logistic policies of the Department of the Air Force are predicated on the basic principles developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guidance of commanders and committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their assignment of logistic responsibilities. The objective of the Department of the Air Force logistic policies is to meet the requirements for supplies, equipment and services for approved programs, including common and cross services as stipulated by joint agreements, consistent with availability of resources and budgetary programs.

   a. The Department of the Air Force is responsible for the logistic support of all the component elements of the USAF except when logistical support is otherwise provided for by agreements or assignments.
   b. It is the policy of the Department of the Air Force to assign logistic responsibilities within the USAF so that the efficiency of the combat elements as a whole is the most effective that can be obtained within the limits of available personnel, funds, and materiel. The objective of this policy has in view the prevention of unnecessary duplication or overlapping among Air Force commands, agencies, or services, and among the three services in the Department of Defense, by utilization of the personnel, intelligence, facilities, equipment, materiel and services of any or all services in cases where military effectiveness and economy of resources will be increased thereby.
   c. The assignment of specific responsibilities within the Air Force is based on the consideration of the desirability of establishing a logistic system which will be suitable for expansion in an emergency to meet anticipated peak loads. In determining the means for meeting these loads, it will be the policy of the USAF to utilize existing facilities available in the Department of Defense, other Federal agencies or private industry and commerce.
   d. To the maximum extent practicable, the assignment of logistic responsibilities within the USAF in peace time will be identical to those to be assigned.
training and an orderly transition in such an emergency.

e. The assignment of logistic functions and responsibilities within the Department of the Air Force will be accomplished in a manner which will assure responsiveness to the operational and technical requirements of the commanders concerned.

f. Consolidation of facilities and/or services will not extend to the point where operational units are deprived of the support essential to their operational mobility and effectiveness.

g. In assigning Air Force logistic responsibilities, the Department of the Air Force, in addition to the above, will be governed by the policies and basic principles established for the Department of Defense, as follows:

1. Any logistic system which is established for the Department of the Air Force will make adequate provision either through liaison or by other appropriate means, that the needs of the requiring services are satisfactorily met.

2. Where joint use of facilities is directed, one service - normally the providing service - should exercise administrative control.

3. Where on service temporarily uses the personnel of another, such personnel should function under the operational control of the service employing them.

4. Subject to the above, the mission, the operational responsibility, the predominance of military interest, the composition of forces, the logistic capabilities and other local considerations, should be the guiding factors used in assignment of logistic responsibilities.

h. The Department of the Air Force will cooperate with other services of the Department of Defense to enhance the effectiveness of the logistic support provided by the USAF by the continued development of:

1. Uniform policies consistent with the specialized needs essential to the effective functioning of each service.

2. Coordination and standardization of procedures and forms for the procurement, requisition, storage, transportation, distribution, issuance, and maintenance of supplies and equipment.

3. Uniform standards, where practicable and advisable, especially in those fields which affect the individual, such as food, shelter, transportation, recreation and hospitalization.

4. Common terminology and criteria.

5. Free exchange and flow of information, not only at top service levels but on all
working levels within the command and logistic structure.

Part II - USAF Logistic Support of Specific Programs.

1. Active Air Force and USAF Reserve Forces.
   a. Policies and procedures for determining authorizations and quantitative requirements for supply and equipment for the active Air Force, National Guard, USAF Reserve and Air Force ROTC as follows:
      (1) By issues from Air Force stocks on a non-reimbursable basis of those items that are excess to the computed requirements of the active Air Force.
      (2) By issues from Air Force stocks, on a reimbursable basis, when replacement of like items can be effected in sufficient time to meet issue requirements of the active Air Force in a higher priority.
      (3) Through new procurement within availability of recipient component funds of materiel and equipment not otherwise available.
      (4) By issues from Air Force stocks, on a loan basis, of those items of training equipment required for the conduct of summer camp training, provided rehabilitation and transportation costs incurred are borne by the appropriate Reserve component involved.

2. Civil Air Patrol.
   a. Policy guidance relative to the logistic support of CAP will be governed by the following limitations:
      (1) Specific funds for the support of CAP activities for F.Y. 1951 have not been included in budget estimates submitted to Congress, nor is consideration being accorded the submission of this item in future budgets.
      (2) Routine office and administrative supplies required by the National Headquarters, CAP and by the AF-CAP liaison offices will be supplied by the nearest Air Force installation. The level of supply will be determined and controlled by National Headquarters, CAP, and by Headquarters, USAF.

3. Explorers (Air Scouts) B.S.A. The Explorers (Air Scouts) Boy Scouts of America are authorized recipients of donable property which is obsolete of surplus to the requirements of the Department of Defense and other property which is considered usable for educational purposes in accordance with the meaning of Public Law 152, 81st Congress. This is the only source of supply
from which the Air Force is authorized to render support to the Air Explorers (Air Scouts) B.S.A.

4. Services for Military Personnel.
   a. The Air Force will administer a program of military justice, including pre-trial and trial proceedings, and appellate review of court-martial cases; claims and litigation; tax matters; review of contracts; patent matters; all legal matters pertaining to Air Force reservations including both real and personal property; drafting of proposed legislation and research; review and codification of existing law; legal advice on military affairs, international and admiralty law.
   b. Chaplain services will be provided to meet the requirements of the Air Force.
   c. Records for USAF Reserve Forces not on extended active duty, other than Air National Guard, will be maintained under the jurisdiction of the Continental Air Command.
   d. A Special Services program to include voluntary competitive and informal sports, library service, both recreational and technical; service clubs, manual arts, soldier shows and musical activities will be pursued. Inter-service facilities and services will be utilized wherever practicable. Initial funding of these activities will be by appropriated funds for basic requirements to insure success of the overall program. Non-appropriated funds to the extent available and as required will be used to supplement appropriated funds at all echelons of command.
   e. The awarding of certificates and decorations for achievement and service of military and civilian personnel of the Air Force will continue.
   f. Medical Service. The Air Force will:
      (1) Provide hospitalization, outpatient medical care and treatment for Air Force personnel entitled thereto, as prescribed in existing laws, regulations or contracts, including care, treatment, and subsistence in non-military medical facilities, whether on duty, leave or furlough status, except for selective diagnostic or therapeutic procedures obtained by such personnel in civilian medical facilities or from civilian physicians or dentists.
      (2) Provide facilities for aeromedical professional services at all echelons where applicable, which include all aspects peculiar to Aviation Medicine, Preventive Medicine, Physical Standards and Clinical Medicine.
      (3) Participate in the joint interdepartmental operation of the Armed Services Medical Procurement Agency which includes the Medical
Industrial Mobilization Program and the Medical Engineering Development Program.

(4) Engage in the joint staffing of related medical facilities as operated by the Department of the Army, which provide a common service to the Department of the Air Force, as set forth in JAAFAR 1-11-62 dated 16 May 1949.

5. Services for Dependents and Civilian Personnel. The Air Force will:
   a. Pursue and administer a progressive, constructive, and economical civilian personnel program. This program will include recruitment, placement, classification and wage administration, employee relations and services, training, employee suggestions, payroll, leave and retirement and other program activities which contribute to the general competence, morale and productivity of civilian employees.
   b. Make provision for elementary and secondary education for dependent children for military and civilian personnel at Air Force installations world-wide where facilities are not otherwise available.
   c. Provide medical service including hospitalization for:
      (1) Dependents of military personnel in the continental United States and overseas, when facilities and accommodations are available.
      (2) Civilian employees of the Department of the Air Force and their dependents in overseas areas, when no other adequate facilities are available.
   d. Conduct a Medical Health Service program for civilian employees of the Air Force in accordance with Public Law 658, 79th Congress.

6. Overseas Civilian Aid. The Department of the Air Force recognizes a responsibility for providing logistic support from United States military supply sources on a reimbursable for occupation cost charge basis, to:
   a. The population, government, or economy of the occupied area through the military government or other appropriate United States agencies, when the justification is such that the withdrawal or lack of support would create disease and unrest among the civilian populace prejudicial to the accomplishment of the occupation mission.
   b. Certain non-military United States and non-United States groups and individuals directly assisting the mission of overseas commanders when the justification is such that withdrawal or lack of support jeopardizes their mission. The logistic support contemplated within this policy will be
interpreted to mean materiel and services essential for
day-to-day operating and maintenance requirements.

(1) The initial determination of eligibility
of and priority for logistic support for groups and
individuals outside of the Department of Defense will
rest with the overseas commander. The Department of
the Air Force and Army as applicable, will make the
final determination of eligibility on the basis of
justification presented by the overseas commander and
the ability to supply.

(2) Among the factors the overseas
commanders will consider in establishing the
eligibility of non-military United States and non-
United States Groups and individuals (other than
civilian populace) for materiel and services will be
the following:

(a) That materiel and services required
cannot be obtained locally or be feasibly imported from
other sources.

(b) That no non-recoverable expense
will be incurred by either the Department of the Air
Force or the overseas command.

(c) That military personnel are not
increased in order to provide materiel and services,
and are not retained for a period longer than would be
required were such services not being furnished.

7. Non-United States Civilian Aid.

a. Government Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA).
This program furnishes supplies to combat disease and
unrest, and provides relief and rehabilitation in the
occupied areas of Germany, Japan, and Korea.
Notwithstanding the overseas priority accorded such
supply, transfers from Air Force or Army stock on a
reimbursable basis will be accomplished only upon
specific direction from Deputy Chief of Staff,
Materiel, Headquarters, USAF, or Director of Logistics,
GSUSA, as applicable.

b. Overseas Excesses. Overseas Air Force and
Army stocks excess to theater troop requirements are
utilized to the maximum extent possible in implementing
civilian supply programs. If needed to prevent disease
and unrest among the civilian populace, such stocks
when transferred are considered as being made available
for an overseas theater requirement and are not
considered surplus. If usable in the economy, but not
required as a matter of emergency, stocks excess to
theater troop requirements must first be screened for
possible return to the zone of interior under current
policies.

c. Zone of Interior Excesses. Air Force excesses
generated in the zone of interior are used to the
maximum extent possible in implementing civilian supply programs in overseas areas.

8. **Foreign Military Assistance.**
   
a. Logistic support for Foreign Military Assistance will generally consist of providing certain training for foreign students and furnishing materiel as follows:
   
   (1) Utilization of excess properties of the Department of Defense as defined and prescribed in Public Law 329, 81 Congress and AF Regulation 67-41, Logistical Support for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
   
   (2) Issues from Air Force stocks on a reimbursable basis subject to availability or replacement in time requirements.
   
   (3) Direct purchase of supplies and equipment from qualified commercial surplus dealers and U.S. production facilities in accordance with Armed Services Procurement regulations and AF Regulation 67-41.

b. In general, annual assistance programs will be forwarded to the Department of State for approval through appropriate overseas channels, the Department of the Air Force, and the Department of Defense. These programs when properly priced and approved will be returned to the respective countries as a basis for preparation of required requisitions. Major additions and/or changes to an annual program previously submitted must also be routed through the same channels for Department of State approval.

c. Each foreign aid program will be subdivided into sections or sub-programs consistent with the supply or training objectives of the Air Force Section of the appropriate Joint Military Agency Group. Supplies and equipment to support each sub-program will be grouped separately by source of procurement authority; i.e., by Service Department and as applicable by Branch or Bureau. Major items and categories of supplies and equipment will be listed showing U.S. military nomenclature and stock numbers. The amount of funds allotted for each item or category of items will also be shown. Each program will also list the total number of applicable publications necessary to support each aircraft and major item of equipment or other program requirements. AF Regulation 65-11, Logistical Support for the Air Force sections of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (in process of publication) prescribes policies and fundamental procedures for the logistical support of the Air Force sections, Military Assistance Advisory Groups which are to administer the foreign aid programs in the various countries under MDAP.
d. The Department of the Army will be responsible for the determination and funding of ground program requirements of Army procured Air Force purchased items.

9. **Commercial Transportation and Communications Systems.**
   a. The policy of the USAF is to select that media of transportation to accomplish a mission which will provide the service required at the lowest cost. Full advantage of favorable freight rates and tariffs will be taken.
   b. Commercial transportation as used herein covers all forms of commercial transportation including accessorl services incident thereto, (including but not limited to diversion charges, switching, drayage, demurrage, contract stevedoring, and commercial and port handling charges at Air Force bases only) and parcel post in excess of four pounds.
   c. The Alcan Highway will be used for the movement of supplies when no other means of transportation will meet the requirement.
   d. **Commercial Communications Systems F.Y. 1951.** The continuation of commercial communications services for F.Y. 1951 will be limited to those networks required to provide for:
      (1) The safe movement and control of all military aircraft along military air route and at flight destinations, and Civil Air Patrol aircraft on search and rescue missions when directed by Search and Rescue Service, Military Air Transport Service.
      (2) The command communications which link the commanders of the various USAF subordinate commands with the Chief of Staff for command control of our combat-ready field forces.
      (3) The Aircraft Control and Warning System network which is essential to the defense of the United States and Alaska.
      (4) The continuation of communications services obtained from the Civil Aeronautics Administration on a reimbursable basis at a savings to the Government.
      (5) The special circuit requirements of the USAF Security Service Intercept Stations.

10. **Stockpiling of Strategic Materials.**
    a. Responsibility for administering the stockpile program has been delegated to the Munitions Board by law and supplemented by National Security Resources Board Document #99, January 5, 1949. Through Air Force representation on the Board and the logistical functions required in the Department to support mobilization planning, the Air Force has a primary
interest and responsibility in the determination of materials to be stockpiled as well as the quality and quantity of the material stockpiled. The role of the Air Force begins with the development of Air Force programs and mobilization plans based on JCS plans and the related determination of materials requirements which provide the basis for all stockpile considerations.

b. Storage. The three military Services of the Department of Defense are to provide adequate storage space for strategic materials to the extent practicable, pursuant to Public Law 520, 79th Congress, and in compliance with Memorandum on this subject from the Secretary of Defense to the three Departments, dated 28 June 1948.

(1) The Department of the Air Force has a definite responsibility to provide storage space for strategic and critical materials, and will discharge it as a function just as important as the basic military function for which any base or depot is established. This responsibility will be carried out by the Commanding General, Air Materiel Command under the staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, Headquarters, USAF.

(2) Basic policies and procedures governing the storage of strategic and critical materials are contained in the Munitions Board Strategic and Critical Materials Storage Manual, May 1948.

(3) The Joint Financing Agreement between the Departments of Army, Navy, Air Force and Treasury provide for the utilization of appropriated stockpile funds to defray expenses incident to the receipt, handling, and storage of strategic materials at Armed Forces installations. Implementation of this agreement by this Headquarters is contained in AF Regulation 67-39, 25 January 1950, and further implemented by Headquarters, Air Materiel Command in AMC Regulation 67-23.

11. Equipment of Army Civilian Components from USAF Stocks.

Quantities of Air Force procured items determined to be available to the Army Civilian Components, computed in accordance with requirements, priorities and policies governing application of available assets, will be maintained in appropriate accounts either at depot or national level. These accounts will not be subject to change upon recomputation unless approved by the Director of Logistics, GSUSA (FEAF:).
SECTION V - AUTHORIZATION, QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS, AND PROGRAM FACTORS

1. The objectives of this Section are:

a. To provide policies and procedures regarding total quantitative authorizations of materiel and services required by the USAF to meet all Air Force requirements and logistic responsibilities, and the quantitative authorizations for each of the program elements for which the USAF is responsible for logistic support.

b. To present an outline of the program elements, program documents and related publications which will be utilized as bases for the establishment of quantitative materiel authorizations and requirements referred to above.

2. For the purpose of clarity, convenience and effective presentation, the textual material in Section V is arranged in three parts, as follows:

   (1) Part I - Program Documents and Related Information.
   (2) Part II - Authorizations, Quantitative Requirements and Budget Estimates.
   (3) Part III - Authorizations by Specific USAF Activities.

Part I - Program Documents and Related Information

1. The program documents which are furnished to USAF activities requiring their use for logistic and operational planning are outlined below. These documents are also furnished to pertinent activities requiring such information for this latter purpose, it is the responsibility of all USAF activities contributing to their compilation to supply such information as is required in sufficient time to complete the respective portions of the budget cycle within the time limitations specified by the budget directive. For the purpose of the USAF Logistic Operating Policies their use is limited to planning only and the information contained therein does not necessarily serve as a basis for authorizations, nor are they directive in nature except as specifically stated therein.

2. Unless otherwise directed by Headquarters, USAF, the latest edition of program documents, planning factors, basic assumptions and/or program data will be
used in the current calculation of quantitative requirements of materiel and services.

3. Program documents will be phased for the current and two subsequent fiscal years. If phasing or projection of a program is not possible for other than the current fiscal year the preparing agency will provide assumptions relative to the application of the program for the current fiscal year to the period for which total materiel authorizations and quantitative requirements are computed. This procedure will permit efficient scheduling of procurement, building of inventories and effecting distribution by taking into account necessary lead time and unavoidable delays between contracting negotiations and actual delivery of material to depots and using organizations.

4. **Program Documents to be Established by Proposed AF letter 150.**

   a. Air Force Letter 150 - Program and Manpower, USAF Program - Procedure for the Establishment and Maintenance of U.S. Air Force Program Covering Organizations, Personnel, Aircraft, Flying Hours and Installations is in process of publication. This letter prescribes procedures for the establishment and maintenance, on a current basis, of the USAF Program dealing with the areas specified above.

   b. The basic program data to be used in the initial establishment of the USAF Program as prescribed in AF Letter No. 150 - are outlined below. Future publications of these documents in their existing format and method of preparation will be discontinued upon publication of AF Letter No. 150 -.

      (1) The Department of the Air Force Troop Program, dated 1 January 1950.

      (2) The USAF Aircraft Program of Projected Authorizations, dated 1 January 1950.

      (3) USAF Projected Flying Hours, World-Wide Activities, (SC-U-19), dated 1 January 1950.

5. **Program Documents Provided by Headquarters, USAF.**

   The program documents, planning factors and other data provided by Headquarters, USAF for the calculation of budget estimates and quantitative requirements of equipment include:

   a. USAF Budget Directive.

   b. Unit Conversion and Equipping Program.


   d. USAF Troop List.

   e. Aircraft Procurement Schedules.

   f. AF Letter No. 150-10
g. Electronics and Communications Equipment Programs.
h. Guided Missiles Program.
i. Airfield Lighting Equipment Program.
j. Special Projects and Materiel Program.
k. USAF Personnel Requirements by SSN and by Grade.
l. Research and Development Program.
m. Consolidated Training Directive (Flying and Technical Training.)
n. Winterization Program.
o. Air Combat Maneuvers, Field Training Program for Air National Guard, USAF Reserve, Air Force ROTC, CAP and Air Explorers, (Air Scouts) B.S.A.
q. Construction Program.

6. Programming Data for Equipment Tables. The Commanding General, Air Materiel Command is responsible for the collection and compilation of programming data for equipment authorization tables and special projects. These data are included in AMC-AE-U34 Report, Data Required for Computing Quantitative Requirements of Materiel, prepared in accordance with AF Regulation 67-11, 26 March 1949, and AF M&S Directive No. 67-75, dated 11 April 1949.

7. Basis for Determining Supply Authorization. The documents outlined below constitute an appropriate basis for determining supply authorization and effecting distribution of assets to units of the active Air Force and pertinent units of the USAF Reserve.
   c. Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&Es).
   d. Tables of Allowances (T/As).
   e. Equipment Modification Lists (EMLs).
   g. Tables Distribution (T/Ds).
   j. Air Force Manual 160-6 (Outlines replacement factors and consumption rates for Medical Department items).
   k. Authorizations for Class V equipment as approved under existing regulations.
m. AR 775-10, Qualification in Arms and Ammunition Training Allowances, 17 September 1947.


Part II - Authorizations. Quantitative Requirements and Budget Estimates.

1. Equipping T/O&E Organizations.
   a. The total quantitative requirements of materiel and services required to fulfill USAF logistic responsibilities will be determined for the current fiscal year and two (2) succeeding fiscal years, except where otherwise specified or directed by headquarters, USAF.
   b. Organization, base and maintenance supplies and equipment requirements will be based upon basic authorizations applied to and consistent with appropriate Air Force programs and past issue experience. Maximum consideration will be given to using substitute or commercial items in meeting above authorizations if by so doing economy will be effected.
   c. For the purpose of budgetary calculations, quantitative requirements will be determined for the specific fiscal year in accordance with the USAF Budget Directive.
   d. Individual clothing and equipment available within supply priority is authorized and will be furnished and distributed to the Active Air Force, Air National Guard and USAF Reserve on the basis of 100% of applicable allowances for all assigned personnel.
   e. T/O&E organizations will be equipped in accordance with the following authorizations:
      (1) Overseas units, (except certain USAF units assigned to the Alaskan Air Command, which will be authorized reduced T/O&E allowances) will be equipped with 100% allowances in applicable T/O&Es.
      (2) Units of the Strategic STriking Force and units scheduled in the current war plan for deployment overseas between D-day and D+8 months will be equipped with 100% allowances in accordance with applicable T/O&Es. In those cases where a readiness reserve for the unit is maintained in storage by another activity, subject unit will be equipped with Unit Essential Equipment (UEE) only.
      (3) Units which are not scheduled in the current war plan for deployment prior to D+8 months will utilize base T/A equipment and necessary individual items of equipment from the appropriate T/O&Es. Remainder of T/O&Es equipment for such units will be maintained in AMC stocks subject to procurement leadtime.
(4) The remainder of T/O&E equipment for units covered by paragraph (1), (2) and (3) above will be maintained in AMC stocks subject to procurement leadtime.

f. Pending issuance of implementation instructions by Headquarters, USAF, as to the quantity and type units that will fall in the categories outlined above, so that the new policy on T/O&E can be applied, requirements will be calculated on the basis of equipping all T/O&E units with full allowances in accordance with the appropriate column of applicable T/O&Es.

2. The policies and procedures in AF Regulation 65-21, Computation of Quantitative Requirements, 1 November 1948, will be complied with by Headquarters, Air Materiel Command and other agencies responsible for the computation of USAF quantitative requirements.

3. Authorizations and total quantitative requirements of materiel and services will be determined, insofar as possible, by the application of current Air Force T/O&Es and Tables of Allowances to the program elements of the USAF Program and commitments.

4. The Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, is responsible for obtaining inventory data on all T/O&E and T.A equipment on hand of the active Air Force, USAF Reserve Force and other elements for which the USAF is responsible for computing quantitative materiel requirements, including the Air National Guard, USAF Reserve, Air Force RoTC, and National Headquarters CAP and AF CAP liaison officer accounts. The total quantitative requirement will include all elements of the USAF Program and other commitments assigned to the Air Force for logistic support.

5. Authorizations of Class IV equipment and materiel for the zone of interior will be determined on the basis of past usage experience and estimated future needs.

6. Quantitative requirements for aircraft spare parts, Tables II and flyaway kits will be determined in accordance with AF Regulation 65-80 and revisions thereto.

7. **Weapons and Ammunition.**
   a. **Individual Weapons.** With the exception of medical, dental and chaplains, all USAF personnel will be armed during time of war; when assigned to strategic striking force units and organizations scheduled for deployment between D and D + 8 months and while
stationed overseas during time of peace. During peacetime, in the United States, individual weapons will be assigned to organizations other than those listed above in sufficient number for training and internal security of installations only.

b. Service Test Weapons. Service test quantities of such weapons as are reported and recommended for test by Research and Development are authorized.

c. Materiel and supplies are authorized in sufficient quantities to support the training of individuals and units prescribed, and to provide a minimum level for current operational requirements. The term "Minimum Operational Level," with reference to combat ammunition, is defined as the smallest quantity with which it will be possible to meet current peacetime, and in the event of hostilities, six months operational stock level of combat type ammunition.

d. Ammunition training authorizations for the zone of interior will be determined in accordance with AR 775-10, dated 17 September 1947. Ammunition requirements for overseas areas will be based on:

(1) Overseas Command Forecast of Requirements, Reports Control Symbol CSGSP-105 (R-1) and/or

(2) Report of Data Required to Compute Quantitative Requirements of materiel, Reports Control AMC-AE-U34.

8. Individual Clothing and Equipage.

a. All USAF male airmen personnel are authorized and will be furnished the new blue Air Force uniform, shade 84, by 1 September 1950. OD uniforms will be issued and maintained through F.Y. 1950. Serviceable OD uniforms in possession of airmen will be use as work clothing through F.Y. 1952.

b. The clothing monetary allowance system became effective 1 October 1949. (AFR 67-18, Clothing and Equipage, Clothing Monetary Allowance System, 27 April 1949).

c. There will be a reduction in initial individual allowances and a change in organizational allowances in conjunction with the clothing monetary allowance system. Estimated monetary savings to be paid airmen through reduced maintenance requirements will be furnished to Headquarters, USAF, by Headquarters, Air Materiel Command.

d. Airmen will continue to wear the presently authorized summer khaki uniform, with blue garrison cap, blue tie, blue belt and silver buckle and black shoes and socks.

9. General Purpose Vehicles.

a. Replacement will be averaged over period of
seven and one-half (7 1/2) years.

b. Commercial type vehicles will be procured for all zone of interior organizations to the extent allowable in T/A 1-75. T/O&E units scheduled for deployment through D to D+ 8 will have authorized quantities of tactical type vehicles in storage. Tactical type vehicles will be utilized in occupied area. In other overseas area, commercial vehicles may be utilized if approved by Headquarters, USAF.

c. For the purpose of accomplishing b above, F.Y.s 1950 and 1951 funds will be expended primarily to purchase commercial type vehicles. In the event that expenditure of these funds will not accomplish completely the objective in paragraph b above, the remaining commercial vehicles will be budgeted for in F.Y. 1952.

d. Combat equipment will not procured for installations on commercial vehicles. Winterization of commercial vehicles will be accomplished only to the extent absolutely necessary.

e. For the purpose of obtaining maximum utilization from a minimum inventory of USAF vehicles, the provision of letter, subject: Reduction in Utilization of Vehicles, 30 August 1949, will be observed.

10. Special Purpose Vehicles.

a. A 10-year replacement program for special purpose vehicles will be initiated to replace authorized special purpose vehicles lost through attrition.

b. The provisions of paragraph 9 e above are applicable also to special purpose vehicles.

11. Training Authorizations

a. Air Combat Maneuvers. Estimates for air combat maneuvers will be based upon programs furnished by Headquarters, USAF.

b. Training Aids.

(1) Technical literature, training devices and films are authorized only on an absolute minimum basis consistent with approved training programs. The provision of large cost items will be phased over a five year period and will be directed toward the conservation of resources and safety of operations. In the case of complicated items of equipment, such as the C-1 Flight Simulator, requests shall be limited to those quantities that are within the capability of production facilities.

(2) Air Training Command and Air Materiel Command will collaborate and coordinate in determining the quantitative requirements for training devices and films.
12. **Military Personnel Program and Requirements.**
   a. **Program Standard for Pipeline and/or Non-Effectives.**
      (1) Basic trainee loads will be based on estimated losses as reconciled with anticipated gains by month. A reenlistment rate of 55% and a 21% prior service factor will be assumed. To insure that command strength reconciles with budgeted strength, recruiting intake will be maintained at such levels as may be necessary to meet an enlisted manyear average of 357,905 during F.Y. 1951. Such planned intake will be reflected in personnel gain and loss documents.
      (2) Other student loads will be based on projected attrition losses by Specification Serial Number. It will be assumed that during F.Y. 1951 currently existing overall shortages in specific SSNs will have been largely eliminated and the training program will be stabilized at normal attrition rate.
   b. **Peacetime Manning of Combat Units.** Except for the Strategic Air Command "readiness unit," combat units will be programmed at peace strength.

13. **Special Materiel Authorization for Overseas Commands.**
   a. **Theater Ration Authorization.** Authorization for requirements, procurement and distribution of subsistence and post exchange items for overseas commands will be based upon information contained in the Strength Reports for rations in the theater extracts to the Departments of the Army and Air Force Troop List. References are WD Memorandum 345-50-1, 24 January 1947, as amended, and Department of the Army Memorandum 700-5-11, 11 October 1947.
   b. **Expendable Incident to Feeding, Housing and Medical Care.** Authorizations for requirements for expendable supplies incident to the feeding, housing, and provision of medical care to individuals (civilian and military) within overseas commands will be based on the number of such personnel for which the Department of the Air Force authorized the overseas commander to provide food, housing, and medical care. Authorization for requirements for expendable medical supplies will be based on pertinent consumption rates and replacement factors. (The above does not include expendable supplies required for maintenance of housing facilities).

14. **Printing and Binding.**
   a. Printing material required for Air Force-wide use must be procured only from the Government Printing Office, unless that office authorizes printing elsewhere because of urgency of economy. Items
considered field printing require the prior approval of the Congressional Joint Committee on Printing as prescribed by Regulation No. 1, dated 1 July 1948 of the Committee.

b. Requirements for printing to be furnished by the Government Printing Office will be submitted as programs and listed by priorities.

c. Maximum use will be made of available stocks of forms and publications prior to the issue and utilization of revisions and substitutes.

d. Frequent revisions of existing material will be avoided wherever possible. Changes and revisions to approved items will be controlled and issued periodically. The need for implementing directives will be avoided wherever possible through the consolidation of matter in single documents.

e. Additional Air Force printing plants will not be established unless a demonstrable continuing need exists. Requirements of field commands will be programmed within the production capacity of existing facilities.

f. Field Printing for F.Y. 1951 will be based on three primary factors:

(1) Careful screening of requirements for essentiality.

(2) Economies in reproduction.

(3) Conservative distribution.

g. Field plants will produce within their spheres of authority only essential program publications to the limit of current facilities and press capacity.

h. Overloads will be accomplished by contract under programs established by major commands.

i. A long range rehabilitation program is projected for the purpose of replacing approximately 60% of all major items of printing binding equipment within the next six (6) years. Expenditures over this period will be on decreasing annual scale; major expenditures to be made in F.Y.'s 1951 and 1952. This rehabilitation will insure continuation of field printing plants in active operation and will result in increased efficiency and decreased costs.

15. Medical Materiel.

a. Medical T/O&E unit equipment authorizations will be as outlined above, and will be assembled and stored in accordance with AFL-160-14 and AFR 160-6. For peacetime operation, both Z/I and overseas, equipment allowances base on Z/I standards will be in accordance with T/A 1-1.

b. Medical support for Air Force tactical units will be based on the following:

(1) Heavy Bomber and Strategic Reconnaissance Wings; Medical Group, 150-bed.
(2) Medium Bomb Wing; Medical Group, 125-bed.

(3) Light Bomber, Light Bomber (Jet) Troop Carrier and Depot Wings; Medical Group, 100-bed.

(4) Fighter, Two Engine and Tactical Reconnaissance Wings; Medical Group, 75-bed.

(5) Fighter, Single Engine, Jet, and All Weather Wings; Medical Group, 50-bed.

Part III - Authorizations and Quantitative Requirements by Specific USAF Activities

1. Active United States Air Force.
   a. Quantitative requirements (initial issue and replacement) for United States Air Force organizations will be based on the same factors as contained in Section V, Part II.
   b. Equipment and supplies prestocked under Project AF-EN-1-50-OPR does not represent an additional requirement over and above T/O&E authorization for Air Force units, except for those requirement assemblies that are not designated. Where equipment assemblies are not designated, it represents an additional requirement, (Reference letter, Dept. of the Air Force, date 2 February 1950,, subject: Prestocking of Equipment and Supplies, Project AF-GEN-1-50-OPR).
   c. Authorization for requirements for individual clothing and equipment will follow T/A s 21 and 20-51 where applicable.

2. Air National Guard.
   a. The Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, is responsible for computing quantitative and fund requirements for all supplies and equipment authorized for the Air National Guard.
   b. Quantitative requirements of equipment and materiel for the Air National Guard for the current fiscal year and two subsequent fiscal years will be determined on the basis of policies established for the Regular Air Force, with the following exceptions:
      (1) Requirements for administrative and maintenance equipment will be in accordance with T? 1-95, Air National Guard Administration and Maintenance, 31 October 1949.
      (2) Requirements for training equipment will be in accordance with T/A 1-96.
      (3) Requirements for individual clothing and equipment will be in accordance with T/a 21-1. Estimates for blue uniforms will be calculated on a consumption basis only, and will be computed on a three-year phased program beginning with F.Y. 1952.
c. The Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, is responsible for obtaining stock balance and consumption data relative to Air National Guard supplies and equipment at depot, base and organization level.

3. USAF Reserve.
   a. The Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, is responsible for computing quantitative and fund requirements for all supplies and equipment, including Army purchased items, authorized for the Air Force Reserve Training Center program and clothing and individual equipment authorized for the Corollary Unit program.
   
   b. Quantitative requirements of equipment and materiel for the USAF Reserve for the current fiscal year and two subsequent fiscal years will be determined on the basis of policies established for the Regular Air Force, with the following exceptions:
      1. Requirements for administrative and maintenance equipment will be in accordance with allowances authorized in T/A 1-85.
      2. Requirements for training equipment will be in accordance T/A 1-86.
      3. Requirements for individual clothing and equipment will be in accordance with T/A 21-3. Estimates for blue uniforms will be calculated on a consumption basis only, and will be computed on a three year phased program beginning with F.Y. 1952.
      4. Provision for C-46 spares and spare parts is authorized.
      5. Requirements for individuals on short tours of active duty will be provided as prescribed in Section XXVIII, AF Supply Manual 67-1, as amended.
      6. Requirements for individuals participating in the USAF Reserve Corollary Program will be provided as prescribed in AFL 45-1, 9 May 1949.

   c. The Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, is responsible for obtaining stock balance and consumption data relative to USAF Reserve supplies and equipment at depot, base and organization level.

4. Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corp.
   a. The Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, is responsible for computing quantitative and fund requirements for all supplies and equipment, including Army purchase items, required for the conduct of the Air Force ROTC program.
   
   b. Quantitative requirements for the Air Force ROTC will be determined for the current fiscal year and two succeeding years, as follows:
(1) Requirements for equipment allowances for the Air Force ROTC at educational institutions will be determined in accordance with T/A 1-90.

(2) Requirements for equipment for use in conduct of Air Force ROTC summer training camps will be determined in accordance with T/A 1-91. (Items authorized in reference table of allowance will be made available by the USAF on a loan basis).

(3) Requirements for clothing and individual equipment will be based on T/A 21-2, as amended. Estimates for blue uniforms will be calculated on a consumption basis only and will be computed on three-year phased program beginning with F.Y. 1951.

(4) Replacement requirements will be based on pertinent zone of interior replacement factors published in the latest Department of the Army - Air Force Supply Bulletin "Replacement Factor" of the 38-4 series, and AFM 67-3.

c. The Commanding General, Air Materiel Command is responsible for obtaining stock balance and consumption data relative to Air Force ROTC supplies and equipment at depot, base (where applicable) and institution level.

5. Civil Air Patrol.

a. The Commanding General, Air Materiel Command is responsible for computing quantitative requirements for all supplies and equipment authorized for the National Headquarters, Civil Air Patrol and AF Civil Air Patrol liaison officers, based on authorized allowances contained in applicable T/As.

b. Issues to CAP organizations will be limited to items that may be made available by gift or loan, sale or otherwise, with or without charge, such as obsolete or surplus aircraft, aircraft parts, materiel, supplies and equipment of the U.S. Air Force, and property obtained by withdrawal from disposal agencies and transfer from constituent units of the Department of Defense.

c. Fuels and lubricants are authorized by the Air Force to CAP pilots for approved flights in connection with search and rescue missions when directed by Air Rescue Service, Military Air Transport Service; and for such other missions authorized by headquarters, USAF and ordered by the National Commander, CAP. Arrangements for the furnishing of fuel and lubricants to CAP will be made through the AF-CAP wing liaison officer concerned, and procedures for furnishing such fuel and lubricants will be as prescribed in AFR 55-10.

for the use of MARS will be as directed by Headquarters, USAF. Material surplus or excess to the Regular Air Force, USAF Reserve, Air National Guard and Air Force ROTC Programs will be made available to the MARS Program without charge.

7. National Security Training. Authorizations for computation of quantitative requirements of equipment, supplies and services for National Security Training, Air Force, will be based, if a computation is directed on the following documents:
   a. War Department Plan for Universal Military Training.
   b. Air Force Supplement to War Department Plan for UMT, dated 1 January 1948.
   c. Tentative 00-30 series T.O. included in Tab K of the Air Force Supplement to War Department Plan for UMT.
   d. Technical Order 00-30-558 may be used for the computation of quantitative requirements of equipment for basic training.
   e. T/A 1-2, Air Force Individual Training Schools, 20 September 1945, and changes thereto may be used for computing equipment requirements for individual training.
   f. T/A 1-1, Administration and Maintenance, 4 October 1948, may be used for computing quantitative requirements of administrative and housekeeping equipment.
   g. T/A 21-4 may be used for computing individual clothing requirements.
Active Installation - An Air Force installation which has been designated in Air Force orders as active; usually an installation accommodating an Air Force activity or one being prepared for an Air Force activity.

Adopted Type Items - Items of materiel or equipment which are adopted for use by the Air Force and are classified as STANDARD STATUS, SUBSTITUTE STANDARD STATUS or LIMITED STANDARD STATUS.

Air Defense Units - Those USAF and Air National Guard units assigned to the air defense of the United States as a primary mission in the event of emergency.

Air Force Medical Materiel - Supplies jointly procured by Armed Services Medical Procurement Agency, stored in Army medical supply depots, requisitioned by Air Force activities and issued against the current USAF dollar equity.

Air Force Purchased Supplies - Items or categories of items normally procured through Department of the Air Force supply agencies, except those items which the Department of the Air Force purchases and delivers to the Department of the Army in bulk for storage and issue through Army supply channels.

Air Force Supplies - Items or categories of items which are:
   a. Provided through Air Force supply agencies for use by Air Force activities.
   b. Provided through Army supply agencies for use by the Air Force and in possession of Air Force activities, exclusive of items on a temporary loan basis from the Department of the Army.
   c. Army purchased supplies stored as Air Force credits under custody of the Army.

Army Purchased Supplies - Items or categories or items normally procured through Department of the Army supply agencies, except those items to which the Department of the Army purchases and delivers to the Department of the Air Force in bulk for storage and issue through Air Force supply channels.

Army Supplies - Items or categories of items which are:
   a. Provided through Army supply agencies for use by Army activities.
b. Provided through Air Force supply agencies for use by the Army and in possession of Army activities, exclusive of items on a temporary loan basis from the Department of the Air Force.

c. Air Force purchased supplies stored as Army credits under custody of the Air Force.

**ASPPA Purchased Supplies for USAF** - Includes all petroleum fuels and lubricants, hydraulic oils, corrosion preventatives and solvents purchased for the USAF by the Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency; and the storage and servicing of these supplies contracted for by the ASPPA.

**Corollary Unit** - A unit of the Air Force Reserve organized on the same T/O&E or T/D as its parent regular Air Force unit. Each Corollary Unit will be at the same location as its parent unit and will be trained with the facilities and equipment available to the parent unit. A Corollary Unit will be activated at each location where personnel of a regular Air Force unit can be duplicated with similar reservists.

**Current USAF Operational Program** - The USAF Program for optimum build-up during a fiscal year from a current status position to the D-day status specified in the Intermediate Range War Plan within the current fiscal year limitations on availability of funds, manpower and facilities.

**Equipment Modification List (EML)** - A table of equipment prepared for a specifically designated unit which modifies allowances of equipment in the T/O&E and the necessary additions, deletions or substitutions of equipment to bring the equipment for Section III of the T/O&E in consonance with personnel contained in Section II of the T/O&E (Proposed AFR 20-38).

**Excess Installation** - An Air Force installation which has been declared by Headquarters USAF as excess to the requirements of the Department of the Air Force.

**Excess Property** - Any property under the control of the Air Force which is not required for its needs and the discharge of its responsibilities.

**Foreign Excess Property** - Any excess property located outside the continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

**Inactive Installation** - An Air Force installation which has been designated in Air Force orders as
inactive; usually an installation closed to operations, with no Air Force activity except caretaking.

**Industrial Reserve Installation** - An Air Force installation primarily useful for research, development and production of materiel for the Air Force, but which currently may be idle, or may be used for one or more of the following purposes: outlease to commercial interests, occupation by other government agencies, storage of reserve tools, depot operations, training of Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, etc.

**Logistics** - That part of the entire military activity including planning and implementation, which deals with research, design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition, evacuation, and welfare of personnel: acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities and real property; and acquisition or furnishing of services.

**Logistic Responsibilities** - Those responsibilities of the military departments, armed services, or an element thereof for planning for and/or performing logistic functions for one or more services or components thereof in the support of strategic, tactical or other plans or operations.

**Marinex** - The code name used to describe express water shipment. The average time for Marinex was 14 days, for days less time than was required for routine shipment (7:49).

**Medical Air Evacuation** - The method by which military personnel, civilian dependents, and civilian employees will, insofar as possible, be transported from overseas commands to the zone of interior and, where required, within the continental United States, except where medically contra-indicated.

**Mobilization Assignment** - The duty for which an individual reservist volunteers and is assigned on inactive duty status in anticipation of war or other national emergency. The purpose of mobilization assignments is to provide augmentation for units of the regular Air Force from peace-time strength required on M-Day. Mobilization assignees are trained and administered by the major command to which assigned.

**Mobilization Reserve (War Reserve and Mobilization Reserve)** - That quantity of supplies, materiel and
equipment presented on a departmental level, as required over and above normal operating levels, which is retained for use in the event of mobilization.

**Non T/O&E Authorizations** - Military and civilian personnel authorizations (also to be known as troop spaces and civilian positions respectively) allotted by means of Personnel Allotment Vouchers to major air command by Headquarters, USAF (AFR 20-52, Table of Distribution Units, 19 October 1949).

**Note Reference Number** - A cross reference between the Troop Program and the Troop Lost used to determine the composition of T/O&E units as prescribed by the Air Force A.G. Letters pertaining to organization.

**Personnel and Equipment Modification List (P&EML)** - A list of changes by addition, or deletion of items or changing basis of distribution specified in the T/O&E to meet specific operating conditions.

**Planned Procurement** - That quantity of an item which is authorized to be used as the basis for determining fiscal year fund estimates and does not necessarily represent the total procurement necessary to completely equip and maintain the Active Air Force and/or other programs.

**Program** - A phased projection of planned authorizations to accomplish a specific objective.

**Program Document** - An official publication which contains a portion of or all of one or more programs.

**Programmed Procurement** - That quantity of an item which is scheduled for procurement with available year funds and does not necessarily represent the total procurement necessary to completely equip and maintain the Air Force and/or other programs.

**Property** - Any interest in property of any kind except the public domain and lands received or dedicated for national forest of national park purposes.

**Readiness Reserve** - T/O&E equipment and supplies that are prestocked for certain type Air Force units in various locations, both overseas and in the zone of interior, in accordance with an objective recently approved by the Chief of Staff. Letter, Department of the Air Force, dated 3 February 1950, subject, "Prestocking of Equipment and Supplies, Project AF-GEN-
1-50-OPR" establishes requirements for such prestocking of "readiness reserves".

**Repairable Items** - Any item, except aircraft (end item), which is in an unserviceable condition, and can be restored to a serviceable condition within the mandatory limitation established for uneconomically repairable items (See definition of Uneconomically repairable Items).

**Resources** - Personnel, materiel, real property, and funds to be utilized to meet a programmed Air Force mission, function, or activity.

**SCARWAF Personnel (Military)** - Those Army personnel assigned as permanent party to an Air Force (USAF or SCARWAF) unit or assigned as pipeline to any Air Force or Army unit, provided their ultimate permanent party assignment is to be an Air Force Unit. (In the case of students, patients and separates the determinant is the last permanent party assignment rather than the ultimate permanent party assignment. These personnel are chargeable to the U.S. Air Force troop ceiling).

**Strategic Force Units** - Those units (including Air National Guard units designated as M-Day units) designated to participate in strategic air operations other than those included in the "Strategic Striking Force Units".

**Strategic Striking Force** - This force is composed of those operational and necessary supporting units which are designated for participation in primary strategic air operations.

**Supplies** - Items necessary for the equipping, maintenance and operation of a military command -- including food, clothing, equipment, arms, ammunition, fuel, forage, materials, and machinery of all kinds.

**Surplus Installation** - An excess Air Force installation which has been determined by the Administrator, General Services Administration, to be surplus to the requirements of all Federal agencies, and for which the Department of the Air Force has been designated to perform care and handling pending disposition.

**Surplus Property** - Any excess property not required for the needs and the discharge of the responsibilities of all Federal agencies as determined by the General Services Administration.
Table of Allowance (T/A) - A table or list that establishes the maximum amount of organic equipment for an AF base, organization, or activity.

Table of Distribution (T/D) - A document issued by a major air command which indicates the sectional distribution of military and civilian personnel authorizations for a T/D Unit (AFR 20-52, Table of Distribution Units, 19 October 1949).

Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) - A table which prescribes the normal mission, organization structure and personnel and equipment authorized for a military unit.

Tactical Cooperation Units - Those units whose primary mission is that of cooperation with the U.S. Army.

Uneconomically Repairable Items - Any repairable items for which the manhour cost of overhaul or placing the repairable item in a serviceable condition, plus the catalog price of required spare parts (or in lieu thereof an estimated cost of required labor and spare parts) is in excess of thirty percent (30%) of the catalog of estimated cost of replacement. The Commanding General, Air Materiel Command will prescribe the cost factor to determine the economical reparability of certain types of equipment to which, due to their initial cost, scarcity, surplus, critical component or material content, the arbitrary factor will not be applicable.

USAF Logistic Program - A collective term which includes all programs formulated to enable the Department of the Air Force to execute its responsibilities for furnishing required logistic support in full, or jointly with other agencies of the U. S. Government.

USAF Precedence List of Functional Activities - A document published periodically to provide a basis for overall priorities control in manning, equipping, and supplying USAF units. This document shows USAF functional activities by general categories and a detailed listing of units or activities within each category.

USAF Program - A chronologically arranged statement of action which is necessary to achieve an operational objective according to plan. It is used in the all inclusive or collective sense, as "The USAF
Program" and in the partial sense, as "The USAF Construction Program", "The USAF Aircraft Modification Program", etc.
Appendix C: Development of the FEAf Command Structure
(74:22-23)

1. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Chief of Naval Operations in a message to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 17 December 1941, placed all Army forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under the command of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, under the principle of unity of command.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in CCS 57/2, 24 March 1942, designated the Pacific Theater as an area of United States strategic responsibility.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff by directive of 30 March 1942, divided the Pacific Theater into two areas of responsibility, the Southwest Pacific Area and the Pacific Ocean Area. This directive defined the responsibilities and delineated the areas. It designated the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area as commander of all armed forces which the governments concerned had assigned or would assign to that area, and designated Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area as commander of all armed forces which the governments concerned had assigned or would assign to that area.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 1259/4, 3 April 1945, designated the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC), and all U.S. Army resources in the Pacific Theater (less Southeast Pacific Area and resources under the command of Commanding General, Alaskan Department) were placed under his command. All U.S. Naval resources in the Pacific (less Southeast Pacific Area) were placed under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPAO). The Twentieth Air Force was continued under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. (SCAP) The Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 1467, 13 August 1945, approved by the President, designated CINCAFPAC as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and directed him to exercise supreme command over all land, sea and air forces which may be allocated for enforcement in Japan of the surrender terms by the Allied Powers concerned.

6. (FEC) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved JCS 1259/27, dated 11 December 1946. On 14 December 1946,
the President approved the Unified Command Plan and commanders concerned were notified of their appointments as Commanders-in-Chief. It was stated that: (1) CINCFE will exercise unified command in accordance JCS 1259/27 over all U.S. Army and Army Air Forces in Japan, Korea, Ryukyus, Philippines, Marianas, and Bonins, currently under command of CINCAFPAC, and over certain naval forces reporting to him, and (2) General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE).

a. The Commander-in-Chief published GHQ, FEC Circulars to indicate the organization of General Headquarters, Far East Command, and the major commands.
b. The Commander-in-Chief published GHQ, FEC Circular No. 44, 20 August 1949, to establish Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, General Headquarters, Far East Command. This group was established in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5, JCS 1259/27.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

CIRCULAR ) 20 August 1949
No....44 )

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS AND OPERATIONS GROUP,
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND

1. General. The Joint Strategic Plans and Operations and Operations Group (JSPOG) (Chief of Group) is established by General Orders 2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, 1 January 1947, under authority contained in paragraph 5, Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive No. 1259/27, 11 December 1946, to assist and advise the Commander-in Chief, Far East, on matters pertaining to his exercise of unified command over Army, Navy, and Air Force forces allocated to the Far East Command by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the intent of this circular to further clarify and emphasize the responsibilities, authority, and organization of the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group.

2. Responsibilities and Authority. The Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group has the following basic responsibilities and authority to:
   a. Prepare and review, in coordination with the
General and Special Staff and other agencies of General Headquarters, strategic operations plans and estimates for the joint employment of military forces required for the fulfillment of missions and responsibilities assigned or assumed by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East.

b. Prepare, in coordination with the General and Special Staff and other agencies of General headquarters, logistic plans and estimates for the support of joint action.

c. Supervise and insure the coordination of plans and operating procedures involving the joint employment of military forces of the Far East Command.

d. Issue directives, when approved by the Chief of Staff, to staff sections of General Headquarters for the preparation of annexes or other detailed portions of strategic plans and estimates.

3. Organization.

a. The Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group is composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force Divisions consisting of senior officers of each Service of the National Military Establishment assigned to the Group by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East.

b. The Group is supported by the necessary service and civilian personnel required for essential clerical, drafting, and other administrative functions.

c. Whenever matters of particular concern to a General Staff Section are under consideration by the JSPOG, and upon approval by the Chief of Staff of a request by the Chief, JSPOG, that assistance is required of a general staff section, the Group will be further supported by the attachment, on an "ad hoc" basis, of designated key officers from pertinent general staff sections. Such attached personnel will aid in the preparation of annexes, provide liaison and coordination of annexes, provide liaison and coordination with the sections preparing annexes, and assist in coordinating the annexes with the over-all plan.

AG 300.5 (29 Jul 49) JSPOG

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

EDWARD M. ALMOND,
Major General, General Staff Corps

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7. The U.N. Security Council resolution of 7 July 50:
   a. Established the Unified Command under the
      President of the United States.
   b. Designated the U.S. Government as its
      Executive Agent for matters dealing with the
      Korean Conflict.
   c. Requested the President of the United States
      to designate a commander for United Nations
      forces.

8. The Commander of the Unified Command (President
   Truman) acting through the JCS, directed the
   establishment of the UNC, with CINCFE (General
   MacArthur) designated as CINCUNC (Commander-in-Chief of
   the military forces which the members of the United
   Nations placed under the unified command of the United
   States).

9. The UNC was established by General Order #1, GHQ,
   UNC, 24 July 1950.

   Schematically, our chain of command for the Korean
   War became:

   ![Diagram]

   It is to be noted that although the Security
   Council established a unified command under the
   President of the United States, and that the President
   designated General MacArthur CINCUNC, the Security
   Council exercised no command. General MacArthur was
   responsible to the United States government, form which
he received his instructions. The United Nations did not offer to the United States any specific directives for the conduct of military operations in Korea, but it did set forth general policies and objectives, notably in its resolutions of 27 June and 7 July 1950.

The words "to restore international peace and security in the area" contained in the 27 June 1950 resolution are highly significant. They provide the basis for military action north of the thirty-eighth parallel.
1. PRIOR TO THE KOREAN CRISIS COMFEAF HAD NO COMBAT RESPONSIBILITIES IN KOREA...

FAR EAST AIR FORCES

Maintain air control (police of the air for the purpose of preventing unauthorized air traffic, to include surveillance and control of the air spaces with the object of preventing the use of such space by an aircraft, clandestinely or otherwise for unlawful or unauthorized enterprise) over Japan and the Ryukyus, Marianas, Volcano and Bonin Islands.

Conduct air transport operations and maintain services and facilities in Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude as directed by the Commander in Chief Far East.

Maintain a mobile air striking force of such size and composition as may be prescribed from time to time.

Maintain air bases and related installations, including staging bases and facilities for mounting an air striking force. Participate in development of such bases and related installations as directed.

Provide air defense, including air warning service, to operate on a training status capable of shifting to a full alert status on short notice for Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, and air defense, within existing capabilities, for the Marianas, Volcano and Bonin Islands. Such air defense will include defense of permanent naval bases.

Provide air defense, including air warning service, as may be required, for United States bases and installations in the Philippine Islands, subject to the limitations imposed by current agreements between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines.

Conduct air operations to maintain the security of the FEC including the protection of sea and air communications.

Exercise operational control over antiaircraft artillery units, other than Army Divisional units when engaged in air defense, including control of anti-aircraft fire from ships within gun fire range of shore when within organized air defense areas designated by Commanding General, FEAF.

Coordinate, as required, Air Force planning, scheduled training, and authorized movement of forces with Army and Navy commands of FEC and with the senior commanders of Military Air Transport Service, Air Weather service, and Airways and Air Communications Service within the area of responsibility of FEC.

Perform aerial photography and reconnaissance as required or as arranged with local commanders.
Provide air support of operations as arranged with appropriate Army and Navy commanders.

Provide air facilities for the training of anti-aircraft artillery units as arranged with local Army commanders.

Provide on call, long range over-water search and reconnaissance as may be directed by CINCFE.

Conduct required troop carrier operations.

Conduct search and rescue operations in coordination with the Commander, United States Naval Forces Far East.

Perform occupation duties in Japan as directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Assist the Joint United States Military advisory Group in air matters and in organizing, training, development and equipping of the Philippine Armed Forces, as directed.

Establish and control military air routes, air traffic procedures and the facilities therefor in FEC areas in conjunction with MATS, AWS, AACS and appropriate naval commands.

Control international air traffic entering or departing Japan, as directed by CINCFE.

Control entry and exit of passengers and cargo by commercial air transportation to and from Ryukyu Islands in accordance with policies established by the Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands.

Advise CINCFE on civil air matters in FEC areas, to include advice on establishment of policy, the entry of commercial airlines, the coordination of air policy with State Department agencies and liaison with the Civil Aeronautics Authority of mutual plans, problems and policies, and represent CINCFE in such matters as directed.

Keep CINCFE informed as to the adequacy of the service rendered by the Joint Airways Communications Service and make appropriate recommendations for improvements or modifications when necessary.

Close out wartime installations as directed.

Keep CINCFE informed as to the status of proposed changes in those Air Force programs which may result in future demands of Army logistic agencies and coordinate with CINCFE prior to effecting any changes in the deployment of AIR Force units or any augmentation of the list of manned Air Force units which might affect the logistic missions of the Commanding Generals, Eighth Army, Marianas-Bonins Command (MARBO), or Ryukyus Command (RYCOM).

Coordinate action for defense in the volcano and Bonin Islands with appropriate Army and Navy Commanders.

FIFTH AIR FORCE

Maintain in maximum state of combat readiness such Air Forces as Commanding General, FEAF may assign.
Maintain air control over Japan proper and water areas adjacent thereto.
Maintain air bases and related installations, including staging bases and facilities for mounting such additional air striking forces as may be directed.
Provide air defense, to include air warning service for Japan proper.
Conduct air operations in coordination with Army and Navy operations to maintain the security of U.S. Forces in Japan.
Coordinate with Commanding General, Eighth Army and Commander, Naval Forces, Far East on matters of coordinate interest affecting training and operations and on plans for operation in event of emergency.
Assist Commanding General, Eighth Army and Commander, Naval Forces Far East in the enforcement of surrender terms and in carrying out the occupational mission in Japan.
Perform aerial surveillance, reconnaissance, and photograph missions as prescribed.
Conduct search and rescue operations in coordination with Commander, Naval Forces Far East.
Provide air facilities for the training of anti-aircraft artillery units.
Exercise operational control over anti-aircraft artillery units engaged in Air Defense.
Take necessary action and assist Commanding General, Eighth Army as practicable in the event of disaster in Japan. Maintain typhoon evacuation plans.
Insure internal security of Fifth Air Force Bases.
Exercise operational control over air elements, BCOF, in Japan.

THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE

Maintain in a maximum state of combat readiness such Air Force units as the Commanding General, FEAF may assign or attach for operational control.
Maintain and continue the development of Air Bases and related installations, including staging bases and facilities, for mounting such air striking forces as may be directed.
Develop and maintain postwar bases in the Philippines including staging facilities for maintaining striking forces, as directed and as provided by current treaties and agreements between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines.
Coordinate action with COMNAVFE or his designated representative in the Philippines for the defense of United States bases and installations in the Philippines, subject to limitations imposed by current agreement between the United States and the Republic of Philippines.
Provide air facilities for the training of anti-aircraft artillery units as may be deployed in the Philippines.

Provide air defense, with air warning service, for United States bases and installations in the Philippines subject to limitations imposed by current agreements between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines.

Conduct search and rescue operations in coordination with Commander, Naval Forces Philippines and the Republic of the Philippines.

Conduct necessary troop carrier operations.

Exercise command or operational control over and provide logistic support for, United States Army and Air Force assigned or attached to Philippines Command (Air Force) and Thirteenth Air Force.

In event of a major disaster or civil disorder in the Philippines: Assume operational control of all Far East Command Forces in the area concerned. Coordinate action with the United States Ambassador and his staff to protect United States Government personnel, property, and installations; provide sanctuary and render assistance to the extent of capabilities to endangered United States Nationals; render humanitarian assistance to the extent of capabilities to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or the Agencies thereof, consistent with the general principles of military aid to the civil power as set forth in Army Regulations 500-50 and Army Regulations 500-60.

In the event of unexpected attack (prior to declaration of a general emergency) in the Philippines, assume temporary operational control of all United States armed forces in the Philippines, except those forces designated by JCS for atomic operations.

Exercise operational control over antiaircraft artillery units when engaged in Air Defense.

Exercise such measures as necessary, to insure the internal security of all United States military installations in the Philippines except those installations under the control of COMNAVFE.

Maintain liaison with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through the United States Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines.

Assist the Joint United States Military advisory Group in air matters and in the organizing, training, development and equipping of the Philippine Armed Forces as directed.

Provide logistical support for United States Air Force and Army units in the Philippines assigned or attached to Philippines Command (Air Force) and Thirteenth Air Force.

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

To maintain in maximum state of combat readiness such air forces as the Commanding General, FEAF may assign.

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To maintain air control over the Ryukyu Islands.
To maintain air bases and related installations, including staging bases, and facilities for mounting such additional air striking forces as might be directed.
To provide air defense, including air warning services, for the Ryukyu Islands as prescribed by FEC and FEAF directives.
To coordinate with the following commands (as appropriate) matters of coordinate interest affecting current training and operations, and plans for operations of the Twentieth Air Force in the event of local or general emergencies as prescribed in current Headquarters, FEAF Operational Plans and Directives: Commanding General, Ryukyus Command; Commanding General, Far East Air Materiel Command; Commanders, FEAF major commands; Commanders of local Airways and Air Communications Service; Military Air Transport Service and Air Weather Service; and to submit copies of defense plans as directed in separate instructions.
To conduct air operations in coordination with Army Navy operations to maintain the security of the United States Forces in the Ryukyu Islands.
To perform aerial surveillance, reconnaissance, and photography, and special reconnaissance missions as prescribed.
To provide air facilities for the training of anti-aircraft artillery units as arranged with the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, and to exercise operational control of anti-aircraft artillery units when engaged in air defense in consonance with operational directives.
To conduct required troop carrier operations.
To conduct search and rescue operations in coordination with the Commander, United States Naval Forces Far East, and to provide on call long-range over-water search and reconnaissance as directed.
For purposes of local defense only, and in the event of attack by an armed enemy in the Ryukyu Islands, to conduct such operations as necessary under the temporary direction of the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command who will exercise operational control in consonance with strategic plans approved by the Commander-in-chief, Far East.
To control international air traffic entering or departing the Ryukyu Islands as prescribed in current directives, and to control entry and exit of passengers and cargo by commercial air transportation to and from the Ryukyu Islands in accordance with policies established by the Military Governor of the Ryukyus.
In the event of major disaster in the Ryukyu Islands, to take necessary action and assist local Army and Navy commanders as practicable, taking cognizance of area disaster plans of the Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands.
To prepare typhoon evacuation plans as prescribed.
To exercise such measures as necessary to insure the internal security of twentieth Air Force installations.

To coordinate with the Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands all activities which have an impact on the civil economy of, or affect the civil activities which have an impact on the civil economy of, or affect the civil activities in, the Ryukyu Islands.

To assist the 2143rd Air Weather Wing in all types of weather reconnaissance when capabilities of weather reconnaissance units preclude performance of required missions and whenever requested by the Commanding Officer of the 2143rd Air Weather Wing.

FAR EAST AIR MATERIEL COMMAND

To provide logistic support of the Far East Air Forces.

FEAF BASE

To provide administrative and housekeeping services in support of FEAF Headquarters.
Appendix E: The FEAMCOM Accomplishments of the First Year of the Korean War (82)

**FEAMCOM SEES RED**

25 JUNE 1950 — 30 JUNE 1951
FAR EAST AIR MATERIEL COMMAND

Published
For the Benefit of
The Air Force Aid Society
Periodically, every commander has to take time to size up the accomplishments of his organization. Just as the president of any large business concern studies the annual financial reports—or statement of profit and loss—I've been reviewing our accomplishments of the past year.

I'm proud of our record. I'm proud of you who made this record. Let's look it over together. You'll be just as proud of it and the part you played in it as I am!!
As the FEAF "Logistics Command," FEAMCOM's primary responsibilities are to provide supplies and equipment to the Far East Air Forces, and to provide depot maintenance for all aircraft and AF equipment used by FEAF activities.

Prior to 25 June 1950, we carried out these responsibilities with our one depot in Japan and a few sub-bases, operating on a limited scale. Supporting an occupation Air Force, whose mission was primarily training, wasn't too tough —

We had our problems and minor "Blitz's." Most of us put in our 8-hour day, but no one was tired! We used to play golf once in a while and occasionally go to a rest hotel for a weekend. It was a pretty good job, and a peaceful existence —
UNTIL JUNE 25, 1950, WHEN —

THE RED
MOVED INTO SOUTH KOREA AND — OVERNITE —
That routine life was gone!! Uncle Sam went to war—and his Air Force moved right into high blower. FEAMCOM had the job of keeping it in high blower, and we weren't about to let Uncle Sam and our Air Force down—not to mention all the little people the whole world over who felt they had a right to live the way they wanted—

There was no gradual buildup in our workload. It started climbing immediately and hasn't settled down yet!! We did some pretty fast shuffling, too, to stay with it.

The first thing you probably all remember was that 70-hour minimum work week that was necessary until we could get really geared up, and until—
WE COULD GET OUR NETWORK OF CLOSE SUPPORT UNITS (KOREA AIR MATERIEL UNITS) AND BASES ESTABLISHED AND FUNCTIONING. YOU KNOW, OF COURSE, THAT FEAMCOM HAS UNITS ON EVERY LAND MASS IN THE FAR EAST FROM WHICH FEAF OPERATES!!

YOU KNOW THE STORY AS WELL AS I DO. LET'S TAKE A LOOK AT OUR RECORD — THE FEAMCOM RECORD — AND LET IT SPEAK FOR ITSELF.

— THE SUPPLY ACTIVITY FELT THE FIRST BLOW. IN ORDER TO "ROLL WITH IT," WE HAD TO CUT THE PIPELINE TIME IT TOOK TO GET CRITICAL SUPPLIES FROM THE STATES FROM WEEKS TO HOURS!!

SO —
In an all-night teleconference with Headquarters, AMC, on 29 June 1950, we presented a proposed system for mechanically preparing and electrically transmitting requisitions to the Zone of Interior, which they approved. We started operating under this procedure on the 3rd of July, and since then it has been adopted by the Air Force as a world-wide SOP!!

That supplies started coming in a hurry is pretty well evident from the fact that our tonnage received has quintupled the pre-Korea average!!

But as fast as the supplies came in they were on their way out again to our combat units —
There seemed to be no limit to the number of combat units which we supported. We are now supporting the equivalent of 4 times as many organizations as we did prior to Korea — and the number's still growing!!

Requisitions received from these units more than tripled the pre-Korea average,

and in filling these requests we processed almost as many line items in one month as we did in four months before war in Korea!!
The effectiveness of our support is evident in the low theater AOCP* rate—one of the lowest in the entire USAF, and below the average Zone of Interior rate every month since Korea!!

We even set up our own "Airlift", using "desk-jockey" pilots to deliver vital AOCP and ANFE** items so that combat planes could be kept in the air as much as possible. Over 2,000,000 ton miles were flown to Korea since July 1950!!

* Aircraft Out of Commission for Parts  ** Aircraft Not Fully Equipped

But only a comparatively small part of supplies were handled by air. The vast majority was shipped by rail. From January through June of this year we received 10 times the number of railcars per month as we did prior to the Korean war!!
We burned the rails up the other way, too—

Shipping out nine times the number of railcars per month that we shipped before!!

Ammunition was a real problem. We handled the limited amount of aviation ammunition (AVAMMO) needed for training missions, plus a small reserve from two AVAMMO depots in Japan.

When the combat units started to grow—and tactical commanders started to pour it on—our depots had to expand in size and number. Remember "Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition"?

Well, we did!!
We handled an average of 175 times the ammunition monthly as we did in our average pre—Korea month!!

When the newscaster says 500 or 800 tons of bombs were dropped on RED installations today—it doesn’t stop those aching backs—but it helps a lot to know that it’s worth it!!

Of course, supply was not the only outfit that caught a large workload increase. In maintenance our workload didn’t build up gradually either—it zoomed up right away—
Since the war, we've processed nearly 4 times the average number of aircraft through our depot a month than we did during normal pre-Korea months!

Aircraft battle damage repair was something we hadn't had to get into prior to July '50—but we realized that we'd soon be 'on the spot' unless we had well-trained crews on the line and in the shops.
WE STARTED A SCHOOL TO TRAIN THESE CREWS. WHEN THE BATTLE—
DAMAGED AIRCRAFT HIT THE DEPOT WE HAD WELL—QUALIFIED TEAMS OF
AIRMEN, CIVILIANS, AND JAPANESE WHO PATCHED THEM UP AND SENT
THEM BACK IN A HURRY!!

IN ADDITION TO OUR AIRCRAFT WORKLOAD, AIR FORCE
SPECIAL-PURPOSE VEHICLES AND MOTORIZED EQUIPMENT
WERE GETTING SOME PRETTY THOROUGH WORK, TOO.
LIKE EVERYTHING ELSE,
THEY HAD TO BE REBUILT—
YESTERDAY.
THESE AND MANY VITAL
PARTS IN CRITICAL SHORT
SUPPLY ARE REPAIRED AT
ONE OF OUR FEAMCOM SUB-BASES, AREA "A"!!
Here again, the work was piled on. Since the war, our production has increased nearly three times!!

We made our own spare parts, in many cases!!

Actually, critical parts for all kinds of AF equipment which weren't available through normal supply were manufactured in our Maintenance Industrial Shops!! Sometimes the smallest part would have held up production lines if our Japanese and U.S. metal workers hadn't been "on the ball"!

Our production has more than doubled!!
Yes—we were in the repair business on a large scale. Besides airplanes and vehicles, our shops repaired or reconditioned all sorts of aircraft accessories and communications—electronics equipment. We fixed everything from generators to flight instruments and from armament devices to long range radar sets!! In fact—our accessory repair workload—once normal and medium—sized—grew nearly three times as big after June '50 as it was before!! Some of the war materials which we made in quantity were igniters for

NAPALM FIRE BOMBS — pylons used to attach bombs or fuel tanks to F-80 wings — and oversized 255-gallon fuel tanks that made it possible for the "Shooting Star" to stay over the target longer!!

Also, FEAMCOM Maintenance Group shops put out a wicked little device by the thousands: small tire puncturing barbs that could be dropped on main RED supply routes!! Ordinary jeeps were modified into ground—to—air tactical Controller vehicles, too, and sent to Korea. You've heard how they work!!
Those T-6 spotter planes (they call 'em 'mosquitoes' in Korea) were modified at FEAMCOM. What were once considered practically obsolete training planes came out of our depot to take their places as the eyes of the AF ground support units in Korea!!

We've seen what our two operating groups have done, but let's not forget that our service activity caught it in the neck, too —

Our housekeeper - Air Base Group - had to gear up. Some took base facilities for granted, not realizing that big problems were being solved constantly. People who worked around the clock had to be fed around the clock — and they were!!

We had to keep a communications net operating any time people are working — and our Base Communications Center kept the wires hot and the air vibrating!!
The Base Motor Pool, and Motor Shop, had to keep the few vehicles we had in tip-top shape so that the unlimited demands of Supply, Maintenance, and Air Base Groups could be satisfied.

The Air Police activity had to keep FEAMCOM's doors secure after the "Blitz", and when the Army units in the vicinity left for other parts, our "AP's" assumed area patrol responsibilities for nearly 50 times as large an area as before.

It soon was apparent that we would have to move our Air Force personnel reception center activity to FEAMCOM's area 'B', since space at Army facilities in Yokohama was badly needed to handle new soldier arrivals. In late October, we set up our 6403rd Personnel Processing Squadron—and processed in one month since the war started 40 times the pre-war average number of officers and 26 times the number of airmen!!
We're talking of processing personnel, our own Medical Group processed 4 times as many patients as before — with no additional doctors and nurses!!

In addition to preventive inoculations of replacements for Korea, hundreds of battle casualties were flown back to FEAMCOM — and the tireless work of our professionals and Japanese attendants was performed with the same top-quality skill as always. Saved lives of seriously wounded soldiers have shown this.

We could go on and on showing where we've provided the stuff — but you're probably wondering how and with what additional facilities and money we were able to "make the grade". Let's see about that right now!! First,
LET'S KEEP IN MIND THAT OUR SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES HAVE INCREASED 400% SINCE THE START OF THE WAR. WE'VE BEEN ABLE TO MEET THIS RISE IN WORKLOAD WITH ONLY

----- 53% MORE MILITARY PERSONNEL !!

----- 5% MORE CIVILIANS !!

----- 45% MORE JAPANESE !!

YES, WITH ONLY HALF AGAIN AS MANY PEOPLE, WE SUCCESSFULLY SHOULDER RESPONSIBILITIES FOUR TIMES HEAVIER THAN PRE-KOREA !!

More than 77% of this monthly cost after the war broke out, however, can be identified as sales over the counter. That's the increase in the value of the supplies we furnished the Far East Air Forces!

In addition - the equivalent dollar value of the supplies and equipment which we furnished.

The Army, Navy (including Marines) and participating United Nations forces would pay for approximately four months of FEAMCOM's pre-Korean cost of operations! In order to furnish our fighting forces additional support as quickly as possible, we had to get additional support ourselves. Before the war, we bought only the supplies we had to have in our normal occupation duties.
FROM JAPANESE SUPPLIERS. AFTER THE ATTACK CAME, WE HAD TO BUY MUCH MORE WHEN AND WHERE WE COULD. THE DOLLAR VALUE OF FEAMCOM'S LOCAL PROCUREMENT WITH JAPANESE CONCERNS LEAPED FROM TWO MILLION A YEAR BEFORE KOREA TO MORE THAN TWENTY-FIVE MILLION LAST YEAR!! WE BOUGHT AT FAR LESS THAN STATESIDE PRICES, SAVED CRITICAL SHIPPING SPACE—AND EVEN MORE CRITICAL TIME!!

WHEN WE SAID WE WORKED AROUND THE CLOCK—WE WEREN'T KIDDING. YOU DIDN'T GET MUCH TIME OFF; SOME DIDN'T GET ANY—BUT MOST OF YOU DIDN'T WANT IT —
As long as our planes and people were going "all out" in Korea, those people were working night and day—and none of us was going to quit, either—

We constantly had to review our personnel needs, and make sure that people working where the need wasn't so great were shifted to where it was!!
We pared down our forces wherever we could—and worked at it continually—keeping in mind our objective: to maintain FEAF in ready-to-fight status. Our efforts paid off—and we're pretty confident now that we'll be able to handle any other emergency—if and when.

For the next 12 to 18 months, our workload will be heavier—even though we have a cease-fire, a temporary truce, or an armistice.

Remember, there'll be aircraft, vehicles and all types of battle-worn AF equipment that will have to be taken care of, in addition.
to our normal work. All of us at FEAMCOM—like the woman whose "work is never done"—will be in the logistics business as long as we have outfits to support.

We're proud of our record and we're proud of our work. We intend to finish our job in the same spirit—no matter how much longer we see red.

John P. Doyle
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**Title:** THE LOGISTICS PLANNING PROCESS OF THE FAR EAST AIR MATERIEL COMMAND DURING THE KOREAN WAR

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**ABSTRACT**

TITLE: THE LOGISTICS PLANNING PROCESS OF THE FAR EAST AIR MATERIEL COMMAND DURING THE KOREAN WAR
This study examined the standard operating procedures (SOP), programs, and repertoires used by the Far East Air Materiel Command (FEAMCOM) for planning logistical support during the Korean War, 1950 - 1953. The impact which the National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949 had on the national military planning structures was reviewed.

The National Security Acts of 1947 and 1949 mandated changes that all U.S. military organizations were striving to implement. These structures were untried and military commanders were unsure how they should operate. The extent of existing plans and policy guidance just prior to the start of the Korean War is examined. The response of the FEAMCOM planners to various tasking problems is discussed. The untried planning process and new supply arrangements with the Army created a very challenging planning problem for the FEAMCOM.

The study concludes that the FEAMCOM was very lucky in being able to provide the overall excellent level of materiel support they did. There was a large amount of surplus materiel which remained in the theatre from World War II. This materiel filled the immediate shortfalls of the war. The FEAMCOM benefited from a lack of any attacks on its facilities in Japan. Its concentrated targets should have been a tempting target for the North Koreans. The loss of several Japanese depots would have crippled the FEAMCOM.

The appendices to the study contain excerpts from major plans and policy regulations; definitions; a description of the development of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) command structure and guidance for the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, General Headquarters, Far East Command; a summary of FEAF command responsibilities; and a cartoon depiction of the FEAMCOM accomplishments of the first year of the Korean War.