THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE OF WAR TERMINATION: LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS

by

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This abstract discusses the objectives of war termination from the perspective of the Soviet Union. Specifically, considerations relating to the possibility of limited Soviet objectives for terminating a war are analyzed. A possible future war in Europe is the primary example; it is argued that the political and military dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of U.S. military power from the continent might be sufficient Soviet conditions for seeking war termination. The hypothesis that the USSR would prefer to fight a conventional war (and avoid using nuclear weapons) is examined as is the Soviet need to maintain cohesion within the Warsaw Pact. It is concluded that the limits of conventional warfare and the constraints of alliance dynamics could interact in Soviet strategy to limit objectives for terminating a future war in Europe. An appendix supplements and contrasts the thesis text by reviewing Western views on warfare termination.
The Soviet Objective of War Termination:
Limits and Constraints

by

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ABSTRACT

This abstract discusses the objectives of war termination from the perspective of the Soviet Union. Specifically, considerations relating to the possibility of limited Soviet objectives for terminating a war are analyzed. A possible future war in Europe is the primary example; it is argued that the political and military dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of U.S. military power from the continent might be sufficient Soviet conditions for seeking war termination. The hypothesis that the USSR would prefer to fight a conventional war (and avoid using nuclear weapons) is examined as is the Soviet need to maintain cohesion within the Warsaw Pact. It is concluded that the limits of conventional warfare and the constraints of alliance dynamics could interact in Soviet strategy to limit objectives for terminating a future war in Europe. An appendix supplements and contrasts the thesis text by reviewing Western views on war termination.
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I. INTRODUCTION

War termination is commonly described as a process that ends a war (Abt 1985, 30; Handel 1978, 52). However, the output of that process may be more than just the end of the war; it may be the fulfillment of a prerequisite objective that makes termination possible. In other words, war termination may correspond to the attainment of an objective; from the perspective of a belligerent, the attainment of an objective and the conditions for war termination may be synonymous. This thesis examines the relationship between Soviet objectives and war termination, focusing on the hypothesis that, in the event of war, the Soviet Union may pursue limited objectives, thus limited war termination conditions.

It is commonly believed in the West that the Soviets would accept no less than total, unconditional victory. Moreover, such a Soviet victory is often presumed to be the result of a strategic nuclear war. However, Soviet objectives in a war may be contingent on political aims, military capabilities, and alliance constraints and, therefore, may be subject to limitation.

Furthermore, nuclear war scenarios may neglect the emerging trends in arms control to reduce nuclear arsenals as well as the increased awareness of potential ecological
difficulties that could diminish the utility of nuclear operations for the belligerents. The destructive potential of war could encourage the Soviets to terminate the conflict short of decisive, total victory, especially if the war were fought with conventional weapons.

A content analysis of Soviet writings is conducted in the second chapter, presenting evidence that the Soviets recognize the practical reality of limited objectives and may seek a conditional, rather than a total, victory in a future war.

The two subsequent chapters focus on a future war in Europe. First, it is argued that the Soviets may seek the political and military dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of U.S. military power from Europe as conditions for terminating the war. Defeating NATO may entail only its neutralization and not necessarily its complete obliteration. Rather than absolute hegemony over Western Europe, the Soviets may settle for a more realistic functional hegemony.

Second, constraints imposed on Soviet war objectives by the Warsaw Pact are discussed. It is proposed that the limits of Soviet control, the faults in alliance cohesion, and the importance of the NSWP militaries to Soviet strategy could interact to constrain Moscow's objectives for terminating a war against NATO.
An appendix reviews Western theories regarding the relationship between political objectives and war termination. The Appendix supplies cross references to the text of the thesis and serves to contrast Western and Soviet perspectives on the objective of war termination.
II. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE OF WAR TERMINATION

A. INTRODUCTION

Soviet writings emphasize the imperative of terminating a war only upon the attainment of victory. Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU) Ogarkov wrote in 1979 that a future world war would be "a decisive clash between two opposing world socio-economic systems-socialism and capitalism." (Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 93) In this future world war, Ogarkov continues, the "armed forces will also pursue the most decisive political and strategic goals without any compromise"; the aim of the war would be "victory." (Soviet Military Encyclopedia 1979, 93-94) However, the Soviets have recognized that achieving victory in war is problematic. An article in the restricted journal of the Soviet General Staff Voyennaya mysl' (Military Thought) noted that

military strategy is faced, as previously, with a most difficult problem--development of a theory of a war's possible outcome, or a theory of victory in war. Military strategy has always been confronted with this problem. (Sokolovskiy and Cheredichenko 1968, 391)

Thus, although the Soviets claim their aim in a war is victory, they apparently understand the difficulty of victoriously terminating a war. It is uncertain, in a future war, whether the Soviets would actually seek the decisive end that is typically declared or whether the
Soviets plan for limited objectives and thus limited termination conditions. As observed by Robert Arnett, "it is important to remember that a Soviet statement on victory, by itself, does not tell us what kind of victory they might perceive as being possible." (1979, 176) Thus, it must be asked, how might the Soviets define victory in a future war?

The ultimate goal for the Soviet Union appears to be the victory of communism throughout the world. As recently as 1987, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev declared: "We are moving towards a new world, the world of communism. We shall never turn off that road." (1987a, 30) Gorbachev had, previous to this declaration, identified capitalism as "the society which history has doomed" (1986c, 13); the demise of capitalism is the prerequisite for the ultimate Soviet political goal.

The Soviets would likely prefer to achieve the victory of communism without resorting to war. In fact, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) concluded in the 1950s that, although the victory of communism was a foregone conclusion, war was no longer inevitable; neither conclusion has since been rescinded (Tyushkevich 1986, 9).

Recent statements by General Secretary Gorbachev similarly reject the inevitability of war. For example, Gorbachev has told the American public, in an interview for Time magazine, that the Soviet Union "will never start
Moreover, Gorbachev has claimed "that the old notions of war as a means of attaining political objectives have become outdated." (1986d, 3)

However, Gorbachev's statements were most likely propaganda for popular consumption rather than declarations of doctrinal tenets. Gorbachev does not state that, should a war occur, political objectives would be absent.

Although war is no longer inevitable, according to the Soviets, its outbreak is still possible. As expressed by MSU Ogarkov, "[t]he absence of a fatal inevitability of war...by no means signifies elimination of the possibility of a war occurring in the contemporary era." (1982)

Therefore, the ability to "deliver crushing counter-attacks at the enemy so as to overwhelm it under whatever circumstances" (Ogarkov 1986, 1) is a salient feature of Soviet military doctrine.

Soviet political objectives would probably remain primary should a war occur. The Soviets have long believed that war cannot be understood without first understanding its connection with the policies preceding it, without a study of the policies pursued by two warring sides long before the war....The political interests of the classes at war and of their states determine the war aims.... (Byely and others 1972, 9-10)
Presuming that Soviet peacetime policies seek the global victory of communism, the statement above would imply a similar aim during war.

Current Soviet leadership roots are in a Bolshevik past that defined victory as the complete destruction of the adversary's social, economic, and governmental system; for the Bolsheviks, their Marxist-Leninist ideology aimed at "polnaya pobieda" or total victory (Vigor 1983, 42). Although roots form an ideological foundation, time involves a branching out in diverse directions; adjustment and growth affect the form but not the content. Thus, while total victory may be an ultimate objective, war may only be a means to this objective, limited to preparing the conditions for a final communist victory.

Lenin adopted the Clausewitzian dictate that "war is simply the continuation of politics by other [specifically forceful] means." (Ivanov 1969, 409). Expanding on that, Marshal Sokolovskiy, editor of the book Military Strategy, described the Marxist-Leninist position "that war is not an aim in itself, but only a tool of politics." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 14) Therefore, it may be presumed that the USSR's long-term political objectives involve total victory; however, a specific war may be terminated short of the realization of the Soviet Union's ultimate intentions after having satisfactorily advanced the political aim.
One Soviet source quotes Lenin's statement that war "does not alter that direction in which policy was developing before the war but rather accelerates that development." (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 74) By accelerating policy, it does not necessarily mean that war will attain the ultimate objectives of policy. Although the ultimate Soviet objective is declared as the global victory of socialism, Soviet writings recognize that "[w]ar can accelerate maturation of objective and subjective preconditions" for such an event (Volkogonov, ed. 1984).

This chapter reviews the content of Soviet writings relevant to objectives for terminating a war. The vast majority of Soviet writings indicate a requirement for a decisive, total victory in war. However, this chapter presents evidence that the Soviets recognize the practical necessity of pursuing limited objectives and therefore may seek a more conditional victory in a future war.

In presenting the argument for limited Soviet war termination objectives, this chapter concentrates on the socio-political aspect of Soviet military doctrine as it relates to "the nature of the political goals and strategic missions of a state in war...." (Gareyev 1985) The other aspect of Soviet military doctrine, the military-technical, which is concerned with "the forms and modes of conduct of operations and a war as a whole" (Ogarkov, ed. 1983c), will be discussed in the next chapter.
B. TOTAL VICTORY

Soviet writings on future war characteristically predict a decisive victory for socialism. For example, MSU Grechko confidently exclaimed "that victory in this war would go to us--to the socialist social system." (1973, 16)

To ensure this victory, the Soviets claim the need to destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons, economy, government and military control centers, and groupings of military forces (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 282). Moreover, the Soviets require "a rapid and decisive defeat of the aggressor" to eliminate "any possibilities of his further conducting war...." (Povaliy 1968, 71) Finally, to achieve total victory "it is necessary to complete the rout of remaining and resisting formations of enemy armed forces and to occupy important strategic areas on enemy territory." (Iovlev 1963, 9)

Hence, common to Soviet literary discussion on victory is an uncompromising aim of complete military, political, and economic defeat of the enemy. Even in discussing topics seemingly less conducive to bellicose declarations, the Soviet conceptual framework offers insight into the unconditional nature of Soviet objectives for terminating a war.

*See Appendix, section B. for a discussion, from a Western perspective, of the concept of total victory and its potential problems.
1. **Peace and Defense**

In the West, peace is a concept eagerly and often naively pursued; in the Kremlin, peace is synonymous with communist victory. In addition to the paraphrase noted earlier, the famous Clausewitzian statement on politics and war was also twisted by Lenin into: "politics is the continuation of war by other means." (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 43) In other words, war is a continuing process that is conducted using political means during periods described in the West as peace.

The Soviet view of peace equates to the extinction of capitalism and the global domination of communism. As expressed in an article by two professors at the Lenin Military-Political Academy, "100 per cent durability of peace stems from the elimination of the source of war as a result of the transition from capitalism to socialism." (Milovidov and Zhdanov 1980, 99) More directly, another Soviet source notes "[t]he liquidation of the exploitation system and transition of all mankind to socialism and Communism will eliminate the causes of wars, with the disappearance of military conflicts themselves." (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 14)

Similarly, the Soviet concept of military defense, although inclusive of the typical Western notions of holding ground and repelling attack, is distinctly offensive in nature. In broad terms, the Soviets describe
their military doctrine as defensive, but they are poised to decisively respond "should the imperialists succeed in unleashing" a war (Soviet Military Encyclopedia 1979, 93).

However, the noted Soviet military writer Y. Rybkin defined the term "unleashing war" as only applicable to "the aggressive forces, since it is they who are guilty of all wars without exception, and since any just war (regardless of who attacked first) is caused by the creation of unbearable conditions and oppression [emphasis added]." (1973a, 42) Thus, the Soviets may actually initiate attack yet perceptually categorize their actions as defensive.

Although Soviet military strategy differentiates between offensive and defensive operations, it is admitted that "the methods of waging a defensive battle approach those of an offensive." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 296) Similarly, Colonel General Gareyev, in his book on the Soviet military theorist M.V. Frunze, emphasized that "the main thing on the defensive...[was] the launching of an attack against the enemy and the winning of initiative in order to fundamentally alter the situation." (1985)

Furthermore, the Soviet concept of defense seems nearly identical to Western notions of pre-emption. For example, in a description of nuclear war, one Soviet source noted that
[e]mployment of nuclear weapons in the defensive operation and engagement increases the stability of defense and enables the defending forces to mount heavy strikes against the opposing enemy force even before the attack begins [emphasis added]. (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 106-107)

In addition, the Soviet Military Encyclopedia Dictionary contains the term "Aggressiveness of Defense," which includes in its definition the need to strike "during the time when the adversary is preparing for an attack...." (Ogarkov, ed. 1983a)

Peace and defense in the Soviet lexicon contain no trace of the passivity or restraint that is characteristic of Western interpretations of these terms. It seems evident that the Soviet concepts of peace and defense entail the decisive defeat of the adversary.

2. Decisive Intent

Soviet writings emphasize the inevitable decisive aims of a future war. Although a paraphrase of Frunze's remarks on future war, Gareyev's statement that "there will not be any limited goals in a war" (1985) may be currently relevant. In a description of the socio-political aspect of Soviet military doctrine on future war, the authors of Marxism-Leninism on War and Army suggest that "every side will pursue the most decisive aims." (Byely and others 1972, 304)

Furthermore, the Soviets indicate that the sides in a future war will be coalitions fighting for "resolute
political and military objectives." (Milovidov and Kozlov 1972, 100) Therefore, a coalition war "will be waged without compromise." (Kurkotkin 1985b, 20)

The coalition character of a future war will not geographically limit the war, according to Soviet sources. Marshal Ogarkov has predicted that a future war "will acquire unprecedented spatial scope, encompass entire continents and ocean expanses and unavoidably drag into its orbit the majority of the countries of the world." (1985) Ogarkov claims that such a world war "will continue until total victory over the enemy is achieved." (1985) Thus, the USSR must maintain "the ability to inflict upon [the aggressor] crushing retaliatory strikes and to destroy him in any situation." (Ogarkov 1985)

Nuclear war is distinguished in Soviet writings as the most decisive means of fighting a world war. One source recognized the task of a nuclear war to be the "destruction of the entire system of capitalism...." (Byely and others 1972, 106-107) An article from Voyennaya mysl' states that the military-political goals of a nuclear war would be decisive and the nature of military operations in such a war would be "extremely intense, decisive, and non-compromising." (Zemskov 1969, 438)

"See Chapter IV for discussion of why a future coalition war might be more limited than these Soviet declarations imply."
In a world war, nuclear or otherwise, Soviet writings describe the requisite total utilization of a nation's resources to ensure victory (Milovidov and Kozlov 1972, 59). History, according to Soviet sources, has proven that the failure to fully utilize a country's capabilities results in defeat (Ogarkov, ed. 1983b).

The full application of Soviet resources to a war effort includes economic, ideological, and diplomatic activity in addition to military operations to achieve the political aims of the war; these, the Soviets maintain, "are all means of waging war, its component parts." (Byely and others 1972, 11-12) By delineating the requirement to dedicate all resources to the war effort, the Soviets may be implying the decisive nature of their objectives.

Accentuating the apparent decisive intent of Soviet military doctrine is its absolute and offensive nature (Kozlov, ed. 1971, 65). As proclaimed by General Kozlov, Chief of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, "[o]nly with a decisive offensive can one achieve total defeat of the enemy, seize his territory and undermine his capability to continue prosecution of the war." (1981, 37) Gareyev plainly stated that "if a war is imposed on us, our military strategy will be decisive and offensive." (1985)

An offensive strategy maintains the initiative and, thus, the capability to impose "the will of the attacker on the defending side." (Gareyev 1985) By supplementing the
offensive with surprise, the Soviets apparently expect to paralyze enemy response capability (Gareyev 1985). Possibly as a result of surprise, Soviet writings emphasize the importance of the initial period of a war and the potential to achieve "the basic strategic goals" during this period (Lomov, ed. 1973, 138).

A primary target in the Soviet offensive would likely be the morale of the enemy forces. As one Soviet source notes

[only powerful blows against the aggressor and his troops are able to erode and then to destroy their fighting spirit. Therefore, in preparing to rebuff possible imperialist aggression, the Soviet state and its Armed Forces are firmly resolved to rout the aggressor by the strength of their weapons and morale. (Byely and others 1972, 241)

Attacking the morale of the enemy while preserving Soviet morale is essential to the military strategy of the USSR. In the book The People, the Army, the Commander, it is stressed that "the morale of the people and the troops is one of the most important factors determining the course and outcome of a war." (Skirdo 1970, 49)

3. Class War

The Soviets' claim that their troop morale is superior because it is underpinned by the just nature of their ideological cause and the righteousness of the proletariat class. A future war would test the strength of morale, according to Soviet writings, because such a war would not merely be a military confrontation but rather "a
revolutionary class war." (Gareyev 1985) Moreover, it is
the "bitter class nature" of this war that "predetermines
the extremely decisive nature of the political and military
aims of the belligerents." (Povaliy 1967, 70)

Thus, a future world war would "sharply intensify
the class struggle and accelerate the victory of the
working class." (Byely and others 1972, 21) Although war is
not deemed essential for the victory of the working class,
the effects of war are expected to aggravate "the internal
and external contradictions of capitalism," erode state
control, and foster "a deep political crisis of the whole
system of imperialism," thereby creating conditions
conducive to successful revolution (Byely and others 1972,
75).

For the international working class, a future war
"will be a holy war for freedom and independence, a just
liberation war." (Byely and others 1972, 73) The Soviets
write that the power of the working masses is great enough
to either "demand the resignation of the government"
pursuing aggressive aims or to physically turn upon the
government and conduct a just socialist revolution (Byely
and others 1972, 105).

Other activities such as sabotage and guerrilla
warfare are suggested as potential roles for the
"international proletariat" in support of the socialist
victory (Byely and others 1972, 121). In other words, the
global working class is expected to be an ally of the Soviet cause in a future war and to contribute to the defeat of the capitalist states; the commonality of class interests creates an obligation to support Soviet objectives.

Whether the Soviets actually expect to establish "dictatorships of the proletariat throughout the world" is uncertain (Cimbala and Douglass, eds. [1988], 330). However, although highly rhetorical and propagandistic, Soviet writings on the revolutionary, class aspect of future war illustrate the uncompromising goals conveyed to the Soviet population and to people sympathetic to the Soviet cause.

Certainly, the Soviets have not abandoned the appeal to the working class as illustrated by a recent statement by Gorbachev, claiming that the working class "has the potential to play a decisive role, especially at abrupt turning points in history." (Gorbachev 1987a, 26) Gorbachev would perhaps categorize war as a sufficiently abrupt event to qualify as a "turning point."

4. Preparation

The Soviets stress the need to prepare for war in advance. As the authors of Military Strategy note: "victory in a future war will not come by itself. It must be thoroughly prepared for and assured." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 209) Similarly, an article in Voyennaya mysľ stated
that "[v]ictory in war is forged in peacetime." (Kruchinin 1963, 25)

Modern war has complicated the problem of peacetime preparations. The Soviets note that because major strategic objectives can be realized in the initial period of the war, "not only the course but the outcome of the war" may be quickly decided (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 126). Thus, prewar preparation has acquired greater urgency for the Soviets, specifically in the areas of ideological indoctrination and economic defense (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 126).

a. Political-Ideological Indoctrination

The political-ideological indoctrination of the population, especially the military, is integral to Soviet peacetime preparations for war. The importance of such indoctrination is reflected in the Soviet observation that "it is impossible to begin a war or conduct it, let alone conclude it victoriously, without careful ideological preparation of the people and the army." (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 216)

Political indoctrination, especially in the Soviet and NSWP (non-Soviet Warsaw Pact) militaries, is a persistent, pervasive, repetitive program designed to develop personnel "in a spirit of devotion to the ideas and cause of communism and of hatred for its enemies."
(Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 220) More recently, Soviet Army General Gribkov, the Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, described the need to instill "a burning hate for imperialists...." (1987, 8)

Successful communication and absorption of the ideological precepts, particularly for military personnel, has been described as "[t]he most important condition for strengthening the military might of the Soviet state." (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 220) In war, states Marshal Kutakhov, CINC (Commander-in-Chief) of the Soviet Air Forces, a successful indoctrination program would provide "a strong offensive impulse to the troops at the time of the transition of the Soviet Army to the decisive offensive." (1983, 21) In addition, by ingraining a hatred of the enemy into the military personnel, the Soviets expect to create zealous forces eager "to achieve complete victory...." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 330)

Primary among the requirements for the indoctrinated troops, as well as civilians, is a fervent sense of heroism. The Soviets are told that it would be an honor and privilege to give one's life for the cause of victory. An indoctrination lesson on the Soviet military oath emphasizes

[t]he highest form of bravery and courage, the highest understanding of one's duty and of the oath are the deliberate sacrifice of oneself for the overall success,
self-sacrifice for the sake of the common victory. (Babenko 1982, 42)

A recent article on Soviet military doctrine reiterates the need to indoctrinate the individual serviceman "with the ability to fight to his last drop of blood and with the willingness to sacrifice himself to achieve success in battle and in a fight." (Kostev 1987, 4)

b. Economic Preparation

Economic preparation relates to the ability of the USSR to support the military effort throughout a future war. The Soviet economy is expected to survive and supply military and domestic needs, even in a nuclear war (Akimov and Illin 1984, 80). The wartime economy is expected to absorb damage yet "provide new units." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 321) As one Soviet source emphasizes, it is "impossible to support combat operation without current production"; thus, the wartime economy is integral to military success (Volkogonov, ed. 1984).

Soviet civil defense is apparently not a humanitarian gesture on the part of the Politburo but rather a system designed "to ensure the required conditions for normal activity of all governmental control agencies during the course of the war and the effective functioning of the national economy." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 332)

Soviet writings proclaim the economy important enough not only to affect but to determine the outcome of a
war (Byely and others 1972, 218). The performance of the Soviet economy in World War II has been called "a decisive factor in the victory over nazi Germany." (Byely and others 1972, 226) Furthermore, it is the experience of continuously economically supporting a war effort during WWII that the Soviets claim to be currently valuable and relevant (Kurkotkin 1985a, 29).

Given the apparent importance of the economy to Soviet military strategy, underlying motivations to Gorbachev's "perestroika" or economic restructuring may be revealed. According to the new CPSU program of 1986, the purpose of perestroika is to hasten the "all-around progress and advance toward communism" through the "acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development." ("The CPSU Program," 131) Success in perestroika would see a "qualitative transformation" of the Soviet economy and, thus, Soviet society to an advanced level ("The CPSU Program" 1986, 131).

From a warfighting perspective, a stronger, more capable economy would likely be reflected in a more lethal military. Moreover, in a conventional war, a vital economy may be more secure (compared to potential conditions in a nuclear war) and may have a greater effect on the outcome of a prolonged war.

Political-ideological indoctrination and economic preparation reinforce foundations necessary to
support a decisive war effort. Many Soviet sources recall the World War II motto "Everything for the front, everything for victory" (Grechko 1975, 49), probably indicating the future relevance of this rallying cry. However, while comprehensive Soviet activities will likely be consumed in the quest for victory, the extent of that victory may not necessarily reflect the totality of the overall Soviet effort.

C. LIMITED VICTORY

Although Soviet writings predominantly emphasize the absolute war termination objective of total victory, there are indications that the Soviets accept the utility of limited objectives.

Although Gareyev writes of the "principle of a partial victory" (1985), it would be a misinterpretation to assume he was referring to anything more than tactical or operational military activities. Rather, Gareyev appears to be contradicting the thesis presented in Military Strategy that victory in a future war will result from a "one-time application of the entire might of a state" and not from the additive effects of "partial successes." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 12). According to Gareyev, operational and tactical scale victories are still prerequisites of success in war (1985). Thus, Gareyev's comment on the importance of partial victory is directed at operational and tactical
victories and is not applicable to discussion of Soviet limited strategic objectives for terminating a war.

However, of greater relevance is the potential for limited objectives inherent in the interdependence of politics and war in Soviet strategic thought. According to Soviet writings, politics, or political goals, is attributed "the decisive role not only in the preparations for war but also in its conduct." (Byely and others 1972, 16)

Although Soviet military doctrine is tacitly respected by many Western military analysts for its warfighting orientation (in contrast to the declaratory confusion of Western military strategy), the Soviets have acknowledged that

[i]n a number of cases it is possible that attacks will even be made against objectives which are not of great military and economic importance, but which are advantageous from a political viewpoint. (Shirokov 1968, 322-323)

Political goals guide Soviet military decisions; thus, political goals determine and direct the entire "strategic plan of the war," aimed at the defeat of the enemy (Byely and others 1972, 17).

However, the Soviets note that "politics takes into account not only the aims of the war but also those of the post-war settlement and subordinates the conduct of the war to the attainment of these aims." (Byely and others 1972, 17) Implicit in this statement is the recognition that the
post-war political alignment is contingent on the course of the war; therefore, Soviet objectives may be more fluid than is commonly accepted.

Although the Soviets stress the aim of completely destroying the enemy, this is dependent upon the political and strategic goals of the war (Dzhelaukhov 1966, 160). Thus, the extent of these goals will define the limits of the war. As noted in an article in *Voyennaya mysl*, "political motives can force the abandonment of strikes against extremely important economic and military targets or their implementation with smaller forces and on a selective basis." (Shirokov 1968, 322)

Furthermore, while the Soviets describe the process of simultaneous and comprehensive destruction of the enemy's deep strategic rear in the event of a war, they seemingly modify this by stating that "the belligerents will strive to select from the objectives those which have the greatest influence on the course and outcome of the armed struggle." (Shirokov 1968, 313) Again, this would seem to place limits on Soviet military actions, dictated by political considerations.

Recent Soviet writings strongly suggest limited military objectives, determined by political considerations. It must be noted that attainment of a Soviet strategic objective entails a basic change in the "strategic and the military-political situation, and will
have an effect on the entire subsequent course of the armed conflict." (Kruchinin 1963, 12) Given this, a 1984 article in Voyennaya mysl', cited by military analysts Phillip Petersen and Notra Trulock, explains:

Limited strategic objectives could be to annihilate an armed forces group of the enemy in a theater or a certain sector of a theater, to destroy the economic and military potential of one or several enemy nations, to disrupt the state administration and war directing systems of the enemy, to remove from the war one or several nations of an enemy alliance, etc. (Kuznetsov 1984 quoted in Petersen and Trulock 1987, 12)

Thus, strategic objectives can be limited in the military sense; additionally, restraint in political aims is implied.

Explicit in the same article is the indication that,

the specific contents of strategic objectives depend on the political objectives of the nations in a war; on the economic, political, and morale capabilities, and on the composition and fighting strength of the armed forces of the opposing sides; on the weapons being used; and on the geographical conditions. (Kuznetsov 1984 quoted in Petersen and Trulock 1987, 12)

Therefore, political objectives may vary depending on the correlation of opposing forces and the type of war being fought. Given the Soviet emphasis on calculating the correlation of forces, practical factors that are inherently more restrictive than ideological considerations would seem to be taken into account in Soviet military thought.
1. Correlation of Forces

The correlation of forces is a concept that inherently imposes limits on Soviet objectives. It is a comparison of the "economic, military, and moral-political potentials" of probable adversaries that can determine the inevitable victor in a war (Anureyev 1967, 241). The fact that the correlation is variable over time would seem to imply that objectives conform to the correlation; otherwise capabilities would not correspond to political objectives.

Capabilities, the Soviets recognize, determine whether "war aims, plans and concepts of military operations are realistic...." (Skirdo 1970, 86) Thus, the Soviets emphasize the need for a "sober calculation of the correlation of forces between us and our adversary." (Skirdo 1970, 89) Moreover, it is observed that

[e]xaggeration of one's own and underestimation of the enemy's forces as well as ignoring the adversary's economic, moral, and military potential lead to adventurism, to unrealistic war plans, and, in the final analysis, to total failure. (Skirdo 1970, 89)

It seems that failure to constrain objectives within the limits of capability leads to defeat; it is unlikely that the cautious Soviets would consciously commit themselves to such an outcome.

Military power is the most critical element within the correlation of forces. According to the Soviets, "victory and defeat of the warring states (coalitions), the course and the outcome of wars, depends on the whole
directly on the correlation of their military power." (Byely and others 1972, 211) However, "supremacy in military power only makes victory possible"; even "great supremacy" does not "guarantee victory." (Byely and others 1972, 212)

Although the Soviets claim that after World War II "the correlation of forces in the world had changed radically in favor of socialism" (Ogarkov 1982), it is unlikely they assume victory has been guaranteed. Militarily, the Soviets recognize that "in order to achieve victory it is essential to have a mastery of all forms of combat, to learn to supplement one form of combat with another with maximum swiftness." (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 105) The types of weapons employed by the Soviets to achieve military-political objectives may, in turn, reflect the scope of the objectives pursued.

2. Nuclear or Conventional War

The nature of nuclear war is largely unknown. The awesome destructive power of the weapons in question commonly leads to assumptions concerning the totality and, possibly, the finality of a nuclear war. Early Soviet writings on nuclear war reflected the perception that such a war would be the ultimate conflict, terminating with a decisive Soviet victory.

For example, a 1968 article in Voyennaya mysl' proclaimed that "if imperialism commits a crime and plunges
mankind into the abyss of nuclear war, it will perish, and not 'both sides', not socialism...." (Bochkarev, 15) Similarly, in 1972, a Soviet book on Lenin and contemporary war indicated that "[t]here is profound error and harm in the disorientating claims of bourgeois ideologues that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war" (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 17); clearly, the USSR is the expected victor.

Expectations of victory in a nuclear war entail belief in the political utility of such a war. A Soviet military writer noted in 1973 that "neither the nature of the modern era nor nuclear weapons have changed the position that nuclear war...would be an extension of policy." (Rybkin 1973b, 103) Moreover, nuclear war was considered "even more 'political" due to its ability to finally resolve the conflict between capitalism and socialism (Byely and others 1972, 29).

Thus, in the 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet writings heralded nuclear war, should it occur, as the final and total political solution to the conflict between socialism and capitalism. Political objectives would necessarily be unconditional and limits would be nonexistent.

However, some Western analysts detected a shift in Soviet nuclear declaratory posture beginning in the second half of the 1970s. Specifically, Brezhnev's speech at Tula
in January 1977 is identified as a watershed in Soviet nuclear policy.*

At Tula, Brezhnev publicly denounced goals of superiority and first strike capability. Specifically, he stated, "the allegations that the Soviet Union is going beyond what is sufficient for defense, that it is striving for superiority in armaments with the aim of delivering a 'first strike,' are absurd and utterly unfounded." (Brezhnev 1977, 3) Furthermore, Brezhnev declared a willingness to reduce nuclear arsenals (1977, 3).

Certain analysts seized Brezhnev's remarks as an unequivocal Soviet acceptance of the "inutility of nuclear war as a rational instrument of policy." (FitzGerald 1986, 25) Authoritative Soviet sources have, in fact, followed Brezhnev in denying the relevance of nuclear war. For example, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet air forces and deputy minister of defense Marshal Kutakhov declared:

any aggressors' plan to unleash nuclear war and in doing so to gain victory are senseless. If such a war breaks out it will inevitably lead to the death of entire peoples, to colossal destruction and to catastrophic consequences for civilization and life on earth itself. (1983, 22)

A noted Soviet military professor concluded that "counting on victory in a nuclear war is dangerous madness"; furthermore, such a war is no longer "a question of victory

*For further discussion see Fitzgerald 1986
or defeat, but rather of destruction or existence." (Volkogonov 1985, 5)

More recently, Gorbachev has identified the USSR as "a staunch adversary of nuclear war in any variant." (1986a, 4) Gorbachev's comment may be particularly significant within the overall context of his arms control initiatives and Soviet military doctrine. In 1986, Gorbachev expressed the desire to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 (1986b, A13).

Furthermore, Gorbachev told the 27th Party Congress of the intent to restrict "military potential within the grounds of reasonable sufficiency." (1986c, 63) Such "sufficiency" would be capable of "repulsing any possible aggression but inadequate for conducting offensive actions." (Gorbachev 1987b, 6)

However, as previously discussed, the Soviet conceptual framework is largely alien to Western interpretation. Although presumably restrained in nature, Soviet military sufficiency may entail few restrictions. Soviet Minister of Defense Yazov included in his discussion of sufficiency the need, if attacked, to "give a crushing rebuff to the aggressor" (1987, 5), a requirement no different from prior Soviet military postures.

Moreover, an article on military doctrine indicated the broad prerequisites governing Soviet guidelines: "The limits for reasonable defensive sufficiency are determined
by the need to prevent an unpunished attack under any circumstances, even the most unfavorable...." (Kostev 1987, 3) It seems, as Gerhard Wettig points out, that Soviet sufficiency is limited "only to the extent that [military capabilities] provide for the destruction of the adversary in the event of war." (1987, 4)

Thus, Gorbachev's sufficiency may only be political rhetoric, perhaps aimed at palliating Western perceptions of a Soviet threat and Warsaw Pact doubts over Soviet intentions. Soviet calculations of sufficient defense may still correlate to Grechko's instruction that

there can be no end to work to strengthen combat readiness. Any results, even the best, must be regarded as a base, as a trampoline, for achieving still higher indicators. What is considered a success today may no longer satisfy us tomorrow. (1973, 17)

The statement in 1987 by first deputy minister of defense Lushev, guaranteeing the "victory of communism" resulting from "the growing economic and defensive might of the USSR" (13), would seem to discount Western interpretations of Soviet sufficiency.

Brezhnev's Tula remarks and Gorbachev's notion of sufficiency may have the aim, not of introducing doctrinal shifts, but of developing perceptions favorable to Soviet arms control positions. The institutional limits imposed by SALT II and the reductions attained in the INF Treaty and the pending START treaty may achieve, in peacetime, the
wartime objective of "eliminating or neutralizing" nuclear weapons (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 291).

The assumption that the Soviets deny the possibility of winning a nuclear war may be fatally flawed. An article in Voyennaya mys' attributes to "bourgeois theoreticians" (Bochkarev 1968, 2) what may be applicable to Soviet rhetoric. According to the article, "[o]ne cannot fail to see that the 'idea of the death civilization' and nuclear war, in a certain regard is advantageous for the same monopolistic bourgeoisie since it permits them to camouflage their reactionary and aggressive aspirations." (Bochkarev 1968, 2)

It may be more reasonable to assume that the Soviets would rather accomplish their objectives through peaceful means; should war occur, nuclear conflict would be the least preferred method of combat but not excluded.

Recent Soviet sources have stated that "[t]he assertion that nuclear war will not be a continuation of politics is completely fallacious." (Gareyev 1985) A 1986 book review hinted at the possible debate within the Soviet Union on how to "correlate the thesis that victory in a nuclear missile war is impossible with the necessity of increasing combat readiness of the army and navy so as to be able to crush any aggressor." (Kaneyevskiy 1987, 31) It is unclear whether Defense Minister Yazov ended the debate
by declaring that "nuclear war cannot be a means for
attaining political goals." (1987, 4)

Yazov's declaration possibly meant that nuclear war
is a least favored alternative; for the Soviets to totally
discount the political utility of nuclear weapons seems
implausible. In the event of a war, the Soviets could be
expected, as described by Rand Soviet specialist Benjamin
Lambeth, to use "every resource available" to secure
victory (1985, 8).

Soviet writings have expressed doubts about the
controllability of nuclear war. Western assumptions as to
the feasibility of limited nuclear war are regularly
denounced by the Soviets. For example, Marshal Ogarkov has
commented on the impossibility "to hold nuclear war within
Minister Ustinov stated that "all sober-minded people
realize fully well that a so-called local nuclear conflict
can always escalate into a world nuclear war." (1981, 21)

However, Ustinov may have qualified his statement
by using the word "can" instead of "will", possibly
indicating that escalation is not always inevitable. In
fact, according to former U.S. Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger, quoted from congressional testimony in 1974 in
an article by Graham Vernon, previous Soviet exercises have
indicated "notions of controlled nuclear war and
non-nuclear war...." (1979, 59)
Furthermore, Notra Trulock cites Voroshilov General Staff Academy lecture materials from the mid-1970s that discuss limited Soviet nuclear use in a war with NATO (1987, 61-62). Trulock goes on to suggest that NATO's flexible response strategy provides the Soviets the opportunity to limit nuclear war below the intercontinental level (1987, 78).

However, the Soviets may prefer to avoid the uncertainty and questionable controllability of nuclear war. It is important to the Soviets that war remain in their control; a nuclear war may not provide the conditions for maintaining such control, given the potential for extensive damage and chaos.

As recognized by Gareyev, "the improvement and stockpiling of nuclear missile weapons have reached such limits where the massed employment of these weapons in a war can entail catastrophic consequences for both sides." (1985) As early as 1959, an article in Voyennaya mysl' observed "[i]f we destroy the enemy's troops, but in the same step render our own armed forces lifeless, then we shall hardly be able to impose our will on the enemy." (Trifonenkov and Seleznov, 7)

According to another Soviet source

even if a modern aggressor estimates that he will be able to save a certain portion of the population and national wealth, the price of aggression comes too great and does not justify those goals for which it is undertaken. (Lomov, ed. 1973. 269)
Moreover, a nuclear war would complicate and possibly negate the maintenance of "firm and continuous strategic leadership over the armed forces...." (Lomov, ed. 1973, 138)

Thus, with the attainment of parity, the Soviets may have concluded that nuclear war, although still most decisive, is potentially less practical for military and political objectives. As revealed in a 1969 Voyennaya mysl' article,

the fatal consequences of the nuclear war is too heavy for an aggressor to make an easy decision on the immediate employment of nuclear weapons from the very beginning of a war without having used all other means for the attainment of its objectives. (Ivanov, 412)

Although never previously denying the possibility of conventional operations, Soviet doctrine may have strongly shifted in its preference for and confidence in a conventional warfighting strategy. Gorbachev stresses the need to "terminate the material preparations for a nuclear war" (1986a, 4); his emphasis on alleviating preparations for other types of wars is less defined.

Moreover, a 1987 article in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil claimed "there have been changes in the context of Soviet military doctrine." The article proclaimed nuclear war as "not appropriate to the real situation." Ostensibly basing his judgments on the West's preparations to conduct "extended conventional war," the article's author concluded that the USSR "has to prepare an armed defense using not
only nuclear weapons, but also highly effective conventional means of destruction." (Kostev 1987,3)

A possible shift in Soviet military emphasis to conventional war could affect Soviet objectives for terminating a war. Specifically, a conventional warfighting strategy may be inherently limited in its political and geographic potential. Although conventional operations could enhance Soviet capabilities to maintain control over both the course of the war and the Warsaw Pact alliance, a conventional war would likely be restricted to certain theaters involving definite but limited objectives. A truly global conventional war would probably not only extend the duration of a war but also complicate the attainment of broader geographical and political objectives. Chapter III further discusses the question of nuclear and conventional warfare, focusing primarily on the military-technical merits as they relate to possible Soviet war termination decisions.

3. Negotiation

The Soviets recognize, especially in a conventional war, the possibility of protracted combat (Povaliy 1967, 70). As noted by Gareyev, "it is difficult to figure on a rapid war between major coalitions with their enormous potentials....it is essential to be ready for a protracted, stubborn and fierce armed struggle." (1985) The book Military Strategy indicated that the Soviets may plan for a
war of at least one year, based on material requirements (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 28).

Should a protracted war occur, the likelihood of negotiating a settlement may increase as military operations stalemate. However, evidence of the possibility of negotiating war termination in Soviet writings is scarce.

Some Western analysts surmise that the Soviets cannot even accept the concept of bargaining for war termination because to do so would suggest, first, that they would be willing to share responsibility for the determination of their future and, second, that once in a war they would be willing to settle for less than fulfillment of their objectives. (Cimbala and Douglass, eds. [1988], 333)

However, to deny the possibility of Soviet bargaining is to assume unconditional and absolute Soviet objectives.

Though scarce, there is evidence the Soviets acknowledge the role of negotiation in war termination. Lenin is identified as describing, among the phenomena of war, "peace terms dictated by the victors, which achieve the stated aims." (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 35) While "dictated" is hardly synonymous with "negotiated", the imposition of peace terms implies the existence of a political entity that is the object of the dictation.

The authors of Military Strategy discuss negotiation, albeit from the alleged perspective of Western theorists. Specifically discussed are tacit agreements on the limits of military operations and the possibility of
communicating and coordinating political aims with an adversary prior to and at the outbreak of a war (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 65-66). On nuclear war, the Western notion of conducting "negotiations for a peaceful settlement" after a nuclear exchange is described (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 279). Whether the Soviets actually accept what is ostensibly discussed as Western theory is uncertain; however, the detailed account of limited war and negotiation in Military Strategy could involve some mirror-imaging of Soviet thinking on these subjects.

At best, Soviet writings offer only veiled evidence of acceptance of intra-war negotiations. For example, Ogarkov wrote in the Military Encyclopedia Dictionary that "[d]iplomacy is inseparably linked with resolution of the problems of war and peace." (1983c) Although vague, Ogarkov's statement does seem to indicate possible Soviet recognition of the likelihood of negotiating settlements to end specific wars.

Another Soviet source recognized that, in war, the participants aim for victory; however, the war could end "as a mutual compromise." (Lomov, ed. 1973, 226) Thus, negotiation to end a war is strongly implied.

One must examine historical examples, such as the 1939-1940 Russo-Finnish war, to find clearer indications of Soviet intra-war bargaining behavior. In this war, the USSR sought mainly to establish a more secure buffer for the
defense of Leningrad; this resulted in the acquisition of approximately eleven percent of Finnish territory (Vigor 1983, 32).

Although the Soviets may have initially intended to install a favorable government and were militarily poised to do so, hints of a growing German threat seem to have encouraged the limiting of objectives. Thus, the Soviets negotiated a favorable but limited war settlement with the existing Finnish government (Ulam 1974, 294).

It must be noted that while providing a historical reference, this example is not necessarily indicative of common Soviet practice; however, it is a relevant response to an argument claiming that the Soviets are totally unwilling to negotiate limited war termination conditions.

Afghanistan provides the most recent historical example of Soviet wartime negotiating behavior. Since 1986, the Soviets have modified their requirement for troop withdrawal from a four year timetable to less than a year (U.S. Department of State 1987, 11).

An apparent breakthrough was achieved on 8 February 1988 when Gorbachev agreed to a ten month schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops beginning on 15 May but contingent on a U.N.-sponsored settlement being reached by the middle of March (Lee 1988, A1, A19). Furthermore, Gorbachev's offer was reportedly made regardless of the type of government eventually created in Afghanistan.
thereby removing a previously complicating linkage (Lee 1988, A19).

It is unclear whether the Soviets are negotiating in good faith to end the Afghan war. On 14 April 1988, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union did sign accords providing for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the restoration of Afghanistan to nonaligned status (Lewis 1988, A1). Assuming Soviet sincerity, the agreement would be evidence of Soviet flexibility to adjust and limit war objectives within emerging constraints.

However, too many possibilities exist for duplicitous Soviet motivations. For example, the Soviet invasion served to unite seven Islamic factions in a holy war against the intruders; but as peace has drawn near, division within the rebel ranks has increased, threatening to erupt in violence once the common enemy is removed (Weintraub 1988, A18).

Although the Soviets agreed to non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan (Lewis 1988, A1), it is conceivable that an Afghan government, covertly supported by the Soviet Union, could oversee the emasculation of the resistance that Soviet troops were unable to achieve in over eight years. Certainly, the presence of 10,000 Soviet advisors currently within Afghanistan but not required by the 14 April accord to be removed (Lewis 1988, A13) does
not seem consistent with a promise of non-interference. Moreover, the Soviets could exploit the tacit provision that permits the U.S. and the USSR to aid their respective allies should the other superpower engage in such activity (Lewis 1988, A1).

Finally, the Soviet agreement to begin their troop pullout by 15 May (Lewis 1988, A1) could be a ploy to derive propaganda points, in light of the May summit meeting between President Reagan and Gorbachev and probable Soviet hopes for a favorable START treaty.

Thus, it would be premature to make a case study of Afghanistan to support judgments about Soviet intra-war negotiating proclivities. The possibility may be considerable, however, that the Soviets may be compelled to engage in intra-war bargaining in a future conflict, depending on the limitations and adjustments imposed on their war objectives.

D. CONCLUSION

In reality, the most decisive aspect of Soviet military strategy may be rhetoric. According to analysts Petersen and Trulock, rhetoric ascribing decisive war objectives to the USSR is intended to convince the West that notions of limited war or limited objectives are unrealistic (1987, 17).
Therefore, it is advantageous, in Soviet strategy, for the West to believe that any nuclear use would quickly escalate into a massive exchange; that any war, once begun, must end in total, unconditional surrender; and that the Soviets will employ nuclear weapons as warfighting assets, especially if conventional weapons cannot secure the objectives (Petersen and Trulock 1987, 17). Any admission of limited objectives would deny the Soviets of the political utility derived from the perceptions imposed on the West.

However, rhetoric aside, Soviet objectives may be contextually flexible and pragmatic. Although ultimate political aims may entail the decisive, final defeat of all opposition—capitalist or otherwise—the circumstances and situation will affect the definition and achievement of Soviet political aims in a given war.

In his discussion on war, Colonel Rybkin noted that, having begun a war with specific goals, the opposing sides often unexpectedly encounter a situation where they set in motion previously disregarded forces, which may have an effect on social processes even long before victory or defeat. (1973a, 45)

Such social processes could involve, for example, changes in the correlation of forces, a change of government within members of opposing coalitions, or domestic upheavals of varying degrees, including revolution. The Soviets could be just as adversely affected by such processes as could the West; therefore, the Soviets
may be forced, depending on the circumstances, to alter their objectives.

As an example, the moral-political foundation of the Soviets could be their fatal flaw. As explained by the authors of *Military Strategy*, the "[s]trategic leadership cannot but consider the moral and political state of the entire population of the country and of the armed forces, when selecting one or another method of strategic action" (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 35); should this moral and political state in the USSR or the Warsaw Pact be unstable, Soviet actions may be constrained.

Petersen and Trulock believe there is a "flexibility that allows the Soviets the ability to draw up short of initial overall political objectives." (1987, 17) For strategic, operational, and tactical scale military actions, the Soviets define flexibility as "the ability to assess a situation quickly and soberly, to catch the essential and, in conformity with this, to follow through with these decisions.... (emphasis added)" (Milovidov and Kozlov, eds. 1972, 275) Presumably, the amount that military strategy must flex would correspondingly affect political aims.

Furthermore, the Soviets recognize the need for "reasonableness and scientific substantiation" in determining objectives and plans (Skirdo 1970, 86). Lack of such reason results in a failure "to consider the true
state of affairs, a tendency to ignore the correlation of forces and one's own weakness, as well as underestimation of difficulties." (Skirdo 1970, 86) It is unlikely that the Soviets would neglect such considerations.

The assumption that the Soviets would apply reason to their pre-war calculations implies similar application and modification during the war. As noted in one Soviet source, "[s]tates drawn into a war are often compelled to reappraise some aspects of their policies, to adapt them to the new tasks emerging in the course of the armed struggle." (Byely and others 1972, 20) Similarly, a more recent Soviet book recognized the need for policy "to make adjustments, to change the goals and to pose new tasks" should "the course of military operations [develop] in a way not consistent with the plan." (Volkogonov, ed. 1984)

Military capabilities could figure greatly in Soviet objectives; as discussed earlier, military power entails inherent restrictions on the feasibility of attaining political objectives. According to Ogarkov,

[t]he political objectives of the war must fully correspond to the military potential of the state, the military capabilities of the armed forces and the methods of conducting military operations which they are using. The latter must reliably ensure the achievement of the established objectives. (1985)

Failure of the military to obtain objectives, possibly because the objectives are too ambitious or inflexible, could be detrimental to the overall war effort. As the
Soviets have noted, "strategic failures can tell very substantially on the course and even the outcome of the war." (Lomov, ed. 1973, 238) Moreover, military success or failure will affect morale which, according to the Soviets, "determines the nature of strategic plans in general...." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 36)

Thus, contrary to common declaratory posture, the Soviets may accept the requirement of flexible and limited objectives, imposed by the uncertainty of war. The course of war is subject to change as are the politics that determine the war's objectives. Victory, as defined by the Soviets, may be a hybrid of the political aims developed prior to the war and the adjustments in those aims occurring as a result of war.

The ultimate Soviet political objective of the global victory of communism is probably immutable as long as the USSR and the ruling Politburo exist. A peaceful resolution to the communist-capitalist competition, despite the inherently lengthy duration of such a conflict, is probably preferable to the Soviets. War would be more difficult to direct and control; the potential for error would be great and the consequences could be fatal.

Even if the Soviets accept that a future war cannot and will not necessarily achieve the victory of communism, this ultimate objective is not denied. Although it is
acknowledged that temporary setbacks are possible, victory is still held to be inevitable (Kozlov, ed. 1971, 40).

In conclusion, war is not required to achieve the final Soviet victory; should a war occur, however, the Soviets likely expect the outcome will advance their progress toward final victory. However, to pursue unconditional objectives could perpetrate the fatal mistake of extending politics beyond capabilities. Hence, Soviet war termination objectives in a future war are likely to be limited; victory may be defined as an outcome that contributes to the ultimate political objective.

In the following chapter, limited Soviet objectives for terminating a war in Europe and the potential contribution of these objectives toward the ultimate victory of communism are discussed.
III. SOVIET LIMITED OBJECTIVES FOR WAR TERMINATION IN EUROPE

A. INTRODUCTION

Although the Soviets no longer claim that war is inevitable, they state that, should a war occur, it will be a "decisive armed conflict between two diametrically opposed social systems--capitalism and socialism." (Ogarkov 1982) Europe is a likely major battlefield for such a clash and it is probable that the Soviet Union has given consideration, not only to how such a war might be fought, but to the conditions required for concluding military conflict.

Strategic analyst Colin Gray asserts that the USSR may deem a rapid defeat of NATO as decisive in altering the correlation of forces and inducing the United States to seek a termination of hostilities. Gray states:

the Soviet Union has every reason to attempt to take the resources base and strategic geography of Western Europe out of the American 'column' as early as possible and in the process inflict, hopefully, crippling losses on American general-purpose forces. (Gray 1986, 88)

However, the defeat and removal of NATO from the U.S. force ledger may not require victory in the sense of complete destruction of the adversaries' political, economic, and military foundations. The Soviet Union may want to terminate a war in Europe with complete hegemony.
realized; it may settle, though, for the political and military dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of U.S. military power from the continent as sufficient for ending a European war. In short, to defeat NATO may entail only its neutralization, thereby leaving Western Europe vulnerable to Soviet coercion and blackmail.

Although seemingly contrary to the decisive conflict predicted by Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology, the premise of limited Soviet objectives for terminating a war in Europe does not preclude the eventual fulfillment of the Communist requirement, as explained in the previous chapter.

Termination need not require total occupation or replacement of all Western European governments with Soviet-sponsored regimes; hegemonic Soviet control and revolutionary change could, however, be a process accelerated by the post-war conditions. As noted by the Soviets, "[p]olicy utilizes the results of a war that has been concluded." (Volkogonov, ed. 1984)

Therefore, Soviet objectives in a war with NATO are assumed to be the defeat of the alliance and the removal of American power from Europe. This may be a prerequisite in a larger struggle between free societies and the USSR; conservation of resources in the preliminary battle may enhance Soviet readiness in the greater conflict.
This chapter presents a case for limited Soviet objectives for terminating a war with NATO. Soviet war-fighting and war-related strategies and tactics pertaining to the dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of U.S. influence from Europe are discussed; thoughts on how a war may end should not be isolated from reflections on how a war may be fought.

B. LIMITED VICTORY IN EUROPE

The idea that Soviet objectives may stop short of total victory requires further explanation. Christopher Donnelly claims that the Soviets require, in a short time, "the total political collapse of the key NATO governments, or the physical destruction or neutralization of the machinery of national and international politics...." (1980, 35) Based on his belief that "total victories are the product of total ideologies" (1983, 30-31), Peter Vigor states that "Soviet victory in a total war...would inevitably mean the total destruction of Western liberal democracies" because "a war can only really be ended by completely resolving the policy clash that engendered it" and by precluding the defeated country or countries from seeking revenge. (1983, 44-46)

The above assertions are not disputed; rather, they are believed essential in the overall ideological struggle but, as previously mentioned, not all are necessarily within
immediate military objectives. For example, it is possible that, in a war, an organization sympathetic to the Soviet Union may ascend to power in a NATO member with enough popular support to facilitate that country's withdrawal from the Western Alliance; with enough such defections, NATO could be effectively neutralized. Furthermore, the Soviets could facilitate the replacement of existing governments through violent subversion or overt military takeover.

The distinction of limitation is that coups in all Western European governments would not necessarily be required to terminate the war. Hence, in a war against NATO, Soviet war-fighting strategy may be designed to defeat the alliance short of complete political and military destruction.

Analysts Phillip Petersen and Notra Trulock suggest that Soviet declaratory policies coupled with operational pragmatism result in military strategy being "focused on the perceived political vulnerabilities of NATO as much as it is focused on perceived military vulnerabilities." (1987, 17) Thus, military efforts could be concentrated on political weaknesses within the Western alliance.

Evidence is available in Soviet writings that suggests thoughts of defeating NATO by exploiting political vulnerabilities. For example, according to Military Strategy, a strategy for victory "can arise only from
politics strengthened by a unity of purpose on the part of the coalition members, which is very difficult to achieve in coalitions of predatory imperialist countries." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 22) Implied is a Soviet realization of the utility in disrupting NATO's unity of purpose.

Furthermore, Gareyev, in his book *M. V. Frunze—Military Theorist*, writes of the need to "determine what enemies must be defeated in what sequence." (1985) In a war with NATO, this could translate into a Soviet effort against weak or vulnerable members, the removal of which would destroy--or at least degrade--the alliance's military efficacy.

In sum, it is possible that Soviet war plans include limited contingencies to defeat NATO short of political and military obliteration. War termination may depend on the imposition of political disintegration and military impotence upon NATO.

1. Wartime Strategy

According to Rand analyst John Van Oudenaren, Soviet peacetime strategies are designed to facilitate the dissolution of the NATO alliance to as great a degree as possible (1986, 4); wartime strategies are a violent extension of this objective.

Depending on the evaluation of the pre-war political-military situation, the Soviets are likely to pursue "the withdrawal from the war of one or several
countries of the unfriendly aggressor bloc"; "the
disorganization of the enemy's deep rear area"; and "the
destruction of [the enemy's] strategic groups of armed
forces...." (Kruchinin 1963, 12)

It may be hypothesized that such goals would be
directed toward the dissolution of NATO and the decoupling
of U.S. military power from Europe; in other words, the
neutralization of NATO rather than its unconditional
defeat. Efforts toward the attainment of limited Soviet
objectives for terminating a war in Europe will likely be
pursued concurrently and thus overlap. Furthermore, the
Soviets expound the "need to decisively defeat the
aggressor in the shortest possible time" (Sokolovskiy, ed.
1968, 202); therefore, the Soviets may aim for a rapid
victory in Europe. The following sections will discuss
aspects of Soviet wartime strategy and related implications
for terminating a war upon the attainment of limited
objectives.

C. WARTIME DIPLOMACY

Just as Soviet peacetime diplomacy seeks to weaken NATO
cohesion (Van Oudenaren 1986, 4), wartime diplomacy is a
low risk, high yield venture likely to be conducted
throughout the duration of a conflict with the intention of
destroying NATO cohesion. Upon forcing the dissolution of
NATO, the USSR might have secured one of its most critical
limited war termination objectives. As stated in *Military Strategy*, the "diplomatic and economic struggle does not stop in wartime." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 20) Moreover, wartime diplomacy is recognized as being capable of influencing "the course and even the character of military operations." (Dmitriyev 1971, 58)

Gareyev further elaborates that the Soviets must "carefully follow and correctly assess the military-political forces" and "skillfully play upon the contradictions between the bourgeois countries and their internal contradictions." (1985) Diplomacy will be essential for such assessment and necessary for the manipulation of vulnerable members of NATO.

According to the Soviets, effective diplomatic efforts can contribute to "strategic success" by securing the "withdrawal of individual states of the enemy coalition from the war." (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary 1986, 80-81) For example, according to Soviet sources, included in the Soviet diplomatic activities during World War II were the establishing of an anti-fascist popular front, the sabotaging of enemy diplomatic efforts, the acquiring of new allies or the neutralizing of potential enemies, and, perhaps most crucial, the splitting of the enemy coalition via the signing of separate peace treaties (Dmitriyev 1971, 57-58).
Coercion in wartime assumes an overt and violent nature. In developing war termination objectives, it is essential to complement coercion with what Fred Ikle terms "political inducements" (1971, 46); wartime diplomacy may provide the vehicle for communicating these inducements. *

Throughout the course of a war, opportunities will arise for the timely proposal of political inducements. As noted in the Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, "[t]he internal political affairs of belligerent nations and international relations undergo significant changes, depending on the course taken by a war." (Ogarkov, ed. 1983b) Furthermore, the Soviets recognize that:

the composition of the opposing coalition will depend largely upon our successes and how the strategic situation will develop. In the event of our decisive successes, certain countries can pull out of this coalition.... (Gareyev 1985)

The fortunes of war need not portend imminent doom for a country to reconsider its alliance obligations. As stated by Fred Ikle, "giving up after the army has been beaten is almost invariably worse for the nation." (1971, 52) Yet, for the Soviets to convince a NATO ally to forsake its commitments prior to the outcome of the war may be commensurate to a military defeat as far as the overall

*See Appendix, section C., 4., d. for discussion on the difficulties of communicating and conducting diplomacy during war.
efficacy of the alliance or, for that matter, the withdrawing government is concerned (Ikle 1971, 102). Therefore, Soviet wartime diplomacy can potentially reduce the costs of a war being fought for limited objectives.

The Soviets may attempt to impose conditions on Europe that supplement wartime diplomatic efforts. This may be accomplished in several ways, the conduct of which may, again, be overlapping and complementary.

1. Political Contacts

The Soviets may attempt to exploit the inroads laid by a peacetime campaign to secure Western political contacts and, thus, create a political infrastructure with the potential to ascend to power, replacing an existing NATO government with a regime controlled by or sympathetic to the USSR. Many peacetime political contacts are secured and supported via an extensive Soviet network of diplomatic and intelligence agents (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1986, 5-6).

Specific targets of peacetime recruitment and wartime utilization are likely to include political parties, key government personnel, peace organizations, unions, and, possibly, terrorist organizations. According to Boris Ponomarev, former head of the Soviet's International Department, such contacts would establish "broad alliances covering the majority of the people and
capable of achieving major social changes," whose "final objective would be socialism." (1977, 40)

Political and governmental contacts may provide the Soviets their most beneficial avenue for undermining Western governments during a war. According to Robert Gates, an official in the CIA, "Moscow's ultimate objective is to develop agents of influence at the highest levels of foreign governments." (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1986, 23)

Cases such as Norway's "Treholt affair"* highlight a Soviet ability to secure positions in Western governments, the true extent of which may be unknown. This ability suggests the USSR's potential to undermine these governments from within during war. With favorable forces in power, separate peace treaties that could undermine the political and military viability of NATO would be more easily attainable, thereby promoting Soviet objectives for war termination.

It is possible that the course of the war may itself generate a change in an opposing government. As Fred Ikle notes, "the impact of the new appreciation of how the war is going and what it costs may strike the spark for a change in leadership." (1971, 37)

*See Van Oudenaren 1986, 105.
2. Political Coups

Should the war effort fall short of inducing desired change, the Soviet Union may assume the initiative. Historically, the Soviets have shown no remorse in the removal and replacement of governments unsupportive of Moscow's interests. For example, in 1956, while the Soviet ambassador to Hungary, Yuri Andropov, was assuring the Hungarian leader Imre Nagy of the security of his regime, Red Army tanks were approaching the Hungarian Parliament to force an end to Nagy's government (Charlton 1984, 126).

The preferred Soviet method of negotiation, some Western analysts have observed, is to "destroy the existing leadership, insert a new pro-Soviet leadership, recognize the new leadership, and negotiate with that new leadership." (Cimbala and Douglass, eds. [1988], 332) For example, although the circumstances characterizing Soviet objectives and operations in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan are not wholly analogous to a similar scenario applied to a NATO country, the model is operationally informative and historically relevant.

Both in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the Soviets fostered ties with rival factions that the Soviets would assist in gaining political control. Once in power, these factions would formally align themselves with the Soviet Union. Thus, in both cases, the Soviet strategy was to complement a military invasion with a political coup in a
minimal amount of time to preclude an organized response. (Valenta 1984, 230-232)

In Czechoslovakia, for example, the government of Alexander Dubcek and other potential leaders of a Czech resistance were arrested within one to two hours of the start of the 1968 invasion (Vigor 1983, 136). However, in this example, the pro-Soviet factions failed to take power and Dubcek, under tighter control, was reinstated until Moscow gradually effected permanent political change (Valenta 1984, 232). The objectives of strict Soviet political control were ultimately met; the military invasion merely created the conditions necessary to secure the objectives.

On the other hand, rapid and violent political change supplemented the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion began in large scale on December 24, 1979; on December 27, KGB and Spetsnaz forces attacked and killed President Amin (Kohler 1987, 47). It was then announced that Babrak Karmal, the Soviets' puppet of choice, had led the overthrow and was now asking for Soviet assistance, after the invasion had been initiated (Ulam 1983, 255).

One might surmise the possibility of similar coup attempts against NATO governments in order to secure war termination objectives through a separate peace with a pro-Soviet regime. According to Victor Suvorov, the role of KGB and Spetsnaz forces in the Afghanistan coup was not an
anomaly; in war, both organizations are tasked with "[h]unting down and assassinating the enemy's political and military leaders." (1983, 1210) Former Czechoslovakian government official Jan Sejna describes how, in 1964, the KGB developed a list of hundreds of names of British political, industrial, military, and security personnel designated for imprisonment and execution to prevent their opposition to a "progressive [read pro-Soviet] government." (1982, 144)

3. The Public Battle

Complementing Soviet diplomatic and military strategy to secure withdrawals from NATO may be a wartime campaign to enlist the assistance of Western publics in the diplomatic struggle. As recognized by Michael Handel: "In peace negotiations, public opinion can play a significant role." (1978, 63)

Soviet literature places significant emphasis on the role of the public in time of war. The book Military Strategy notes that in modern war, "the attitude of the mass populace toward the war will unavoidably have a decisive effect on its final outcome." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 210) Further, Gareyev writes, "the rear supplies the front not only with material but also ideas and moods." (1985) This may indicate that the Soviets perceive the battle to control public opinion crucial to the war effort; a Western public lacking the conviction and fortitude to
suffer through a war could force the withdrawal of one or more NATO countries.

In the opinion of analyst C.J. Dick, the Soviets do question the fiber of the Western publics:

The Soviets would doubt whether Western Europeans would have the unity and determination, the hardihood and lack of concern for their own lives (and that of their families) that characterize the Afghans, and which are necessary for a protracted and apparently hopeless struggle. (1986, 19)

Similarly, the Soviets remark on alleged citations by U.S. authors that conclude "that the Western countries would be unable to endure the horrors of the atomic chaos." (Byely and others 1972, 246)

The Soviet Union would probably expect an inverse relationship between its anticipated rising fortunes in a war and the lowering of Western morale. As written in Military Strategy, "military successes or defeats decisively affect the morale of the army and the people." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 36)

Hence, it is likely that Soviet diplomatic and political efforts will attempt to enlist NATO public support to encourage their respective governments to withdraw from the war. However, part of such a Soviet strategy may aim toward destroying public morale, thus laying it prone to capitulation.

In terms of the salience of the public battle in Soviet strategy, it may be more than just an historical
anecdote that Gareyev communicated when he wrote: "In World War I, Germany surrendered because of the economic and moral-political collapse of the nation's rear without still having suffered a complete defeat on the battlefield." (1985)

Although wartime diplomacy would likely play a significant role in the overall Soviet war-fighting strategy, diplomacy is primarily deemed capable of "dealing 'auxiliary blows'". (Dmitriyev 1971, 57) According to the Soviets, the ultimate realization of objectives requires military successes (Dmitriyev 1971, 57-58).

D. WAR-FIGHTING

Another method of imposing conditions that supplement wartime diplomacy is, of course, war-fighting. In order to secure the withdrawal of nations from NATO, the Soviets may aim to convince target countries that victory is unattainable, thereby facilitating the imposition of termination conditions upon them.

Most of what has previously been discussed in this thesis has described the socio-political aspect of Soviet military doctrine. Much of the subsequent discussion in this chapter will focus on the military-technical aspect, concerned with the specifics of the war and how it might be conducted to attain Soviet objectives for terminating a war in Europe (Byely and others 1972, 6).
1. The Nuclear Question

When discussing Soviet war-fighting strategy, it is necessary to consider the role assumed for nuclear weapons. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is significant debate over whether the Soviets would use nuclear weapons in a hypothetical large-scale East-West war in Europe. Books such as *Military Strategy* (1968) and *The Offensive* (1970) are heavily slanted toward nuclear strategy. However, analysts point to more recent authoritative writings, such as Gareyev's book, that can be interpreted as questioning previous concepts of military art:

A profound and generally correct analysis of the development prospects of the theory of military strategy considering the appearance of nuclear missile weapons has been provided in the book *Voyennaya strategiya* [*Military Strategy*] edited by MSU V. D. Sokolovskiy. However, over the more than 20 years not all the provisions of this book have been confirmed. (1985)

Whether nuclear weapons remain the primary Soviet war-fighting instrument, a limited use weapon, or a dormant deterrent that encourages the limitation of war to conventional operations is uncertain. The Soviets have stated that "a world war can begin, and be waged for a certain time, with the use of only conventional weapons" but that "the expansion of military operations can lead to its escalation into a general use nuclear war...." (*Soviet Military Encyclopedia* 1979, 93)
Though the Soviets have noted that "for one of the sides, which has achieved the necessary results and is successfully developing the offensive, it will be advantageous to delay the beginning of the use of nuclear weapons as long as possible," they recognize that possible nuclear use by the opponent could result in mutual nuclear exchanges (Samorukov 1967, 261-262). Soviet analyses of NATO exercises may have concluded that the West would resort to nuclear use as early as four to five days into a war (Samorukov 1967, 263); the Soviets would presumably attempt to anticipate and preempt such use.

The Soviets could, as argued by Notra Trulock, elect to conduct only limited nuclear strikes, "tightly controlled by the political leadership and based firmly on considerations of military effectiveness...." (1987, 55) Similarly, Albert Wohlstetter, based on his analysis of Soviet military writings and lecture materials from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, envisions possible Soviet nuclear use on the NATO flanks, perhaps "to divide allies and to give some the incentive and opportunity to opt out." (1985, 983) William Scott notes that Soviet military writings since the early 1980s stress tactical nuclear use (1984, 70).

However, as discussed in the previous chapter, should war occur, nuclear conflict may be the least preferred war-fighting option. The Soviet need to maintain
political and military control and the intention to keep vital European objectives intact would likely be complicated by nuclear war (Wohlstetter 1985, 983-985).

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Soviet emphasis on maintaining control in a conflict may be the most compelling argument against using nuclear weapons even in a most limited manner, given the uncertainties in conducting nuclear war. Arms control initiatives, such as the INF Treaty, and public statements seem to reinforce the argument that maintaining control over both the course of the war and the Warsaw Pact alliance are Soviet imperatives.

For example, in 1981, Leonid Brezhnev described weapons of mass destruction to the 26th Party Congress as "exceptionally difficult, if not impossible" to control (22). Similarly, Gorbachev reported to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1987 that weapons are becoming "uncontrollable." (1987a, 24)

Conventional war may seem inherently more controllable and therefore more practical to the Soviets. The Soviets claim that a single counter-force nuclear strike cannot succeed in destroying the opponent's nuclear weapons (Ogarkov 1984, 90); however, a conventional war, fought with advanced conventional weapons, may succeed in attaining more limited objectives.
Marshal Ogarkov explains that while the socio-political aspect of Soviet military doctrine is stable and largely enduring, the military-technical aspect "is more changeable, for it depends decisively on the means and methods of waging armed conflict, which are constantly changing and improving." (1985) Included in Ogarkov's changing aspect of Soviet military doctrine is "the significant qualitative improvement of conventional means and methods of armed conflict." (1985)

Ogarkov also discusses "the rapid quantitative increase in nuclear weapons" and associated qualitative improvements that have led to a fundamental reexamination of the role of these weapons and to overturning former views on their place and significance in war; on the methods of waging battles and operations; and even on the overall possibility of conducting war with the use of nuclear weapons. (1985)

In contrast to the historically earlier Soviet declaratory emphasis on inevitable nuclear use, this more recent statement by Ogarkov may signal a Soviet de-emphasis of nuclear warfare, possibly in favor of conventional warfare, given the emerging improvements in conventional weapons and nuclear defenses.

Other recent statements may further indicate a growing emphasis on conventional warfare, characterized by advanced technology but nevertheless non-nuclear in nature. For example, in 1987, first deputy minister of defense General Lushev wrote of "the changes in military affairs,
to the carrying out of combat under conditions where the aggressor employs high-precision weapons" (6). Although Lushev was describing an aggressor, it is unlikely the Soviets neglect such possibilities for their own forces.

The meaning and intent of Soviet writings and statements are open to debate; a shift to a conventional war-fighting emphasis is possible. Moreover, one analyst suggests that Soviet joint exercises in Europe since the Dnieper exercise in 1967 have "generally reflected, to an appreciable extent, the desire to prepare for a war in Europe that could be fought extensively, if not exclusively, with conventional arms." (Caravelli 1983, 401)

Most likely, as Petersen and Trulock have surmised from their study of Soviet military doctrine since 1964, the Soviets "prepare to fight with conventional means under the constant threat of the enemy's use of nuclear weapons." (1987, 11) Thus, the Soviets may prefer, for purposes of control (even to the extent of limiting their objectives) to contain fighting to the conventional level but they do not rule out the possibility of engaging in combined arms operations that include nuclear weapons to achieve victory (Byely and others 1972, 253).

A conventional warfighting strategy may be inherently limited in its political and geographic potential. However, a conventional war may be perceived by the Soviets as facilitating greater control over the course
of the war as well as a more effective means of securing and maintaining their objectives, albeit limited, for terminating a war in Europe. Furthermore, the Soviet Union may expect that its potential for escalation dominance, or the capability to dominate any phase of military conflict (conventional, tactical nuclear, strategic nuclear, or chemical/biological) may preclude Western nuclear use in a war with the Warsaw Pact.

2. Escalation Dominance

Arguments claiming a Soviet capability to dominate escalation center on the shift in the nuclear weapons balance, the improved "lethality and force mobility" of Soviet conventional weapons, the lack of NATO "operational depth and large reserves required to counter major Warsaw Pact penetration early in the war", and the decreasing cohesion within the Western alliance (Hines and Petersen 1983a, 702).

Analysts suggest that Soviet conventional forces alone are capable of holding NATO's nuclear weapons at risk (Nerlich 1980, 114). Historical concessions of Warsaw Pact quantitative superiority may have evolved into a compromise of NATO qualitative superiority as well (Schemmer 1984, 80).

As an example, military analyst Phillip Karber asserts that the development and deployment of reactive armor on Soviet tanks "nullifies a decade of NATO
investment in infantry antitank weapons...." (Schemmer 1987, 43)

The former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Rogers, stated that, overall,

Although Allied Command Europe gets stronger conventionally every year, the gap between the force capability of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact gets wider each year, decreasing the credibility of our deterrent. (1984, 2)

Based on the conclusions of a NATO Military Committee report, a 1985 article in the Armed Forces Journal International asserted that within 15 years "a [Warsaw] Pact [conventional] blitzkrieg could overwhelm NATO before it could even resort to the nuclear option...." (Schemmer 1985, 64)

NATO theater nuclear forces are outnumbered, and some may be self-deterring. The ranges of NATO's battlefield and short-range intermediate nuclear forces (SRINF), combined with the expected speed of a Soviet offensive and the probable delay in nuclear release authority, may either preclude use or force use on NATO territory. This choice could result in non-use. Further complicating the situation is the ability of the Soviets to conduct a SRINF exchange in Europe while their homeland remains out of range. (Nerlich 1980, 115)

Medium and long range INF weapons can hold Soviet territory at risk; however, these are also outnumbered and have been negotiated away in the December 1987 INF Treaty,
thus further diminishing the NATO deterrent. It had been suggested that American INF missiles in Europe "serve as links to United States intercontinental systems and demonstrate to the USSR that it could not hope to limit a war to Europe." (Yost 1987, 73)

This continental linkage being removed, and potential Soviet escalation dominance has placed the intercontinental deterrent in question. Many in Europe doubt the existence of an American 'nuclear umbrella' as well as the logic behind any nuclear employment, much less the initiating use. American strategic forces are vulnerable to Soviet attack and, thus, have lost "strategic flexibility." (Nerlich 1980, 116)

Henry Kissinger plainly described what many in NATO feared when he stated:

the European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization. (1979, 266)

Even if NATO maintains its intention to initiate use of nuclear weapons to repel a Warsaw Pact invasion, the Soviets could possibly exploit Western notions of limiting war by engaging in solely conventional operations. In other words, apparent Soviet nuclear superiority, coupled with declared and operational restraint, may be enough to maintain conventional levels of fighting long enough to militarily defeat or politically dissolve NATO.
NATO appears to be in a position where the current military balance on the conventional and nuclear levels negates the efficacy of its flexible response doctrine; some would argue that the alliance can neither credibly threaten to punish Soviet aggression nor effectively deny Soviet objectives on the various escalatory levels (Legge 1983, 41). From this viewpoint, NATO's escalatory options may be foreclosed.

According to Fred Ikle, "in an acute crisis, when nuclear destruction turns from an abstract fear into a concrete vision of terror,...reliance on nuclear arms may make NATO governments afraid of their own military capability." (1980, 20) Petersen and Trulock provide an excerpt from the Voroshilov Staff Academy lectures that suggests that the Soviets long ago recognized this possibility:

> the danger of massive strikes by all nuclear weapons in retaliation for any attempt at the use of nuclear weapons, be it of a limited nature, may force the [NATO] countries to give up the continuation of combat actions. (Petersen and Trulock 1987, 14)

Furthermore, as discussed in the conclusion of the previous chapter, Soviet rhetoric would probably attempt to promote such apocalyptic Western fears.

Realizing their potential for escalation dominance, the Soviets may recognize NATO's disincentives to employ nuclear weapons and, thus, structure war-fighting
strategies accordingly. For example, the Soviets could, through deep penetrations of NATO nations, further complicate nuclear use against the advancing military forces (Hines and Petersen 1983a, 702).

With NATO outflanked on a tactical level and intercontinental forces stalemated on the strategic level, the USSR may be free to exploit its conventional force preponderance. As stated by Hines, Petersen, and Trulock, the neutralization of NATO's nuclear deterrent "should serve to force the conduct of warfare down to the conventional level where victory could be both more attainable and meaningful." (1986, 18)

At this point, wartime diplomacy may reap its greatest harvest. NATO would be reduced to a dysfunctional military alliance ripe for dissolution through separate and conditional peace agreements. A wartime variant of the Soviet diplomatic dual-track employed during the anti-INF campaign might be offered. During the 1979-1983 anti-INF campaign, the Soviets combined nuclear threats with offers to spare those countries not deploying U.S. missiles (Ruehl 1983, 23); during war, those same nuclear threats might accompany offers to spare those countries suing for peace.

The contacts forged during peacetime will likely accelerate their efforts to promote Soviet war termination objectives. Even without such Soviet manipulation, Ikle suggests, "[e]normous pressure would be mobilized and
brought to bear on government leaders--through parliaments, the media and other channels--to avoid at almost any price the risk of large-scale nuclear war." (1980, 20)

Statistical evidence lends credibility to Ikle's statement. In a 1983 Harris poll, significant percentages of Europeans surveyed indicated that the use of nuclear weapons would not be acceptable under any circumstances, even if their respective country was attacked with such weapons. Greece, Norway, Italy, and the Netherlands registered among the highest percentages: 51, 48, 47, and 42, respectively. Lesser portions were registered by West Germany, France, and Great Britain at 31, 27, and 24 percent, respectively. Although only Greece scored above 50 percent, the peacetime numbers may only be percentages of a larger cry for peace at any price to be heard during war. (De Boer 1985, 125)

Discussion of Soviet escalation dominance would be incomplete without mention of biological and chemical warfare capabilities (BW/CW). In-depth discussion of these aspects of military power is beyond the intent of this thesis. However, it must be noted that, in chemical warfare, Soviet offensive preponderance and NATO's defensive neglect leads to the presumption that such weapons could be effectively employed, at least in a limited manner, in a major conflict in Europe (U.S. DIA 1985, 1) Estimates of Soviet chemical stockpiles range from
20-50 times greater than that maintained by the U.S. (Levinson 1986, 732).

In biological warfare, the Defense Intelligence Agency has concluded that, not only are the Soviets developing and producing BW agents, they are "continuing to test and evaluate delivery and dissemination systems for these agents." (U.S. DIA 1986, 1)

Although the Soviets may have been acknowledging their assessment of the potential utility of future CW/BW use in noting that "[t]he experience of past wars teaches us that sudden use of new resources of armed conflict has an intense moral-psychological influence upon the enemy" (Volkogonov, ed. 1984), such use may be delayed in a war.

Rather than instigating a counterproductive Western retaliation to the use of CW/BW weapons, the Soviets may prefer to exploit their preponderant advantage through threats aimed at convincing various NATO nations of the utility of conditional peace settlements. Thus, the Soviets might attempt to exploit various aspects of an ability to dominate escalation to attain their objectives for war termination.

3. **The Initial Period of War**

Soviet conventional, nuclear, and CW/BW capabilities can arguably claim to have achieved escalation dominance over NATO. Skillful military use of the
considerable Soviet force potential would obviously enhance prospects for favorable war termination.

Fred Ikle suggests that the outcome of a single battle could bring about the termination of a war "if the leadership on the losing side does not want to make its forces fight on till they are all destroyed...." (1971, 37) He further points out, "when escalation--or the threat of it--has succeeded in reversing the enemy's determination to fight on, it has consisted of an extraordinarily powerful move." (Ikle 1971, 55)

It is likely that the battle and escalation Ikle refers to would occur in the initial phase of Soviet attack. For example, the Soviets discuss their intent to attain "victory over the aggressor first of all within the shortest possible time...." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 211) Moreover, based on their study of WWII, the Soviets have recognized "the increased importance...of initial operations for the course and even the outcome of a war." (Ivanov 1974, 303)

It is possible, as suggested by Nathan Leites, that initial Soviet operations would strike a main blow that may be both militarily and politically motivated (1982, 303). The Soviets have discussed a concept called "power pressure", defined as a "show of force...aimed at influencing the psychological state of the decision-maker and forming in his mind the primary objective of avoiding
combat." (Ionov 1971, 603) It may be that although the initial attack compels the targeted decision-makers to engage in military defense, they may quickly be convinced to avoid further hostilities.

To this end, the powerful character and direction of the initial attack may be a logical complement to Soviet pre-war political and diplomatic efforts, the decisive impact of which "either helped the enemy's peace faction to dislodge leaders who were committed to fight on, or it caused a sudden change of mind in the enemy leadership." (Ikle 1971, 55-56) According to Soviet sources, assessment of the political situation would result in:

acceptable prognoses on the capability of the state or coalition of states, located in the theater of military operation, to continue the war when certain areas are knocked out of action or captured. (Shirokov 1966, 200)

One conceivable Soviet prognosis of the military and political vulnerability of NATO suggests an attack in the Western TVD* with the primary strategic direction aimed

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*The Soviet concept of the TVD (teatr voyennykh deystviy) organizes regions of war based on military, political, and economic considerations that determine not only the territory involved but the overall importance of the related objective. Strategic directions occur within TVDs. The three European TVD's are the Northwestern, Southwestern, and Western, with the latter including Denmark, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Ireland, northern Morocco, western Algeria, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, the southern part of the Baltic Sea, and the western part of the Mediterranean Sea. (See Hines and Petersen 1986, 282-284).
at Denmark. According to analysts Christopher Donnelly and Phillip Petersen, Denmark "constitutes the principal focus for Soviet hopes to unravel the NATO coalition quickly." (1986, 1047) They surmise that if the Soviets could succeed in quickly neutralizing Denmark, other small countries would voluntarily follow; thus, NATO's geo-political and military situation would be severely damaged, if not decisively so (Donnelly and Petersen 1986, 1047).

Assisting such a Soviet strategy may be NATO's military organization. NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) is tasked with the defense of northern West Germany and is split into national corps sectors, arranged from north to south: Dutch, German, British, and Belgian. Danish and German forces combine in the defense of the Schleswig-Holstein region, which borders on Denmark (Mearsheimer 1982, 10-11).

The opportunity this organization presents to the Soviets stems from the fact that not all corps are created equal. Therefore, the Soviets are likely to concentrate attack on the weaker corps sectors such as the Dutch, British, and Belgian in the NORTHAG region (Donnelly and Petersen 1986, 1050).

Analyst John Yurechko suggests that the Soviets could concentrate on "corps boundaries and command 'seams' of NATO's various national force groupings" to enhance the effectiveness of the attack and facilitate encirclement.
operations (1987, 38). Prior to actually destroying the encircled corps, the Soviets might entertain peace negotiations with the respective governments, using the surrounded troops as "bargaining chips." (Yurechko 1987, 38)

Although the highly regarded West German troops would have to be defeated in Schlewig-Holstein, the Soviets are expected to devote considerable efforts to the defeat and isolation of forces on the Jutland Peninsula, and, thus, Denmark (Donnelly and Petersen 1986, 1047-1048).

By neutralizing the stronger U.S. and West German corps with an economy of force and exploiting NATO's weaker defenses with overwhelming force ratios, the Soviets may expect to inflict a rapid political and military defeat upon NATO (Donnelly and Petersen 1986, 1050). The Soviet Union may expect its sudden military success to result in the political neutralization of Denmark and, subsequently, the Netherlands and Belgium. Defeat of NATO's NORTAG would--the Soviets may reason--leave both the Netherlands and Belgium highly vulnerable and, therefore, possibly amenable to conditional peace with the USSR.

It may be more than coincidence that Soviet writings note the success of initial German operations during WWII against Denmark and Norway and the subsequent success against Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and, ultimately, France (Ivanov 1974, 8). Moreover, the lack of
military preparation by the Belgium and Dutch governments is identified as pre-determining their surrender, which, in turn, "contributed to the rapid defeat of the main Anglo-French forces in Belgium, Holland, and the northern regions of France." (Ivanov 1974, 9) The Soviets observe that the French were left strategically and morally vulnerable, resulting in France's rapid surrender (Ivanov 1974, 9). Thus, as interpreted by the Soviets, the Germans secured victory over the European mainland largely during the initial period of the war.

Withdrawal by Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands from a future conflict would not necessarily defeat the West; it would, however, require substantial reformulation of strategy by the remaining Western belligerents. Certainly, the combined loss of forces, airfields, territory, and key ports for receipt of reinforcements would severely complicate the military response by those Western nations still fighting.

The Soviets might hope that, rather than militarily adjust to the new political-military situation, the Western belligerents would concede the war to the Warsaw Pact and endeavor to minimize losses in a conditional peace.

4. Surprise

Regardless of whether the above scenario is a realistic prediction for the direction of the Soviets' main blow, the actual strategic direction will most likely be
facilitated by the element of surprise. Soviet military writings place great emphasis on surprise. It has been suggested that "[t]he side achieving surprise can obtain a decisive advantage." (Tyushkevich 1969, 468)

Surprise in initiating a war would amount to preemption, an option recognized in Soviet writings. For example, a Soviet training lecture stresses "[o]nly he who acts quickly, decisively, anticipating the enemy, can achieve victory" (Repin 1985, 5), thus strongly implying the merits of preemption. Moreover, Gareyev, in discussing the Soviet military theorist Frunze, states that "the most effective method of countering enemy countersrikes [is] the use of preemptive active operations...." (1985)

One of the greatest advantages of surprise in supplementing the main blow of the initial period of the war may be its psychological impact. Frequently noted are the psychological consequences of surprise upon the opposing forces such as the loss of time caused by sudden confusion, disorientation of individuals' mental functions, disorganization of entire groups, fear, increased mental strain, and an overall weakening of troop morale (Paleski 1971, 505).

In addition, unless SACEUR/CINCEUR requests nuclear use authorization in a period of immediate emergency,
Soviet surprise could disrupt the decision-making process* through rapid military advances and the preemptive destruction of NATO nuclear forces (Kelleher 1987, 461). It is probable that a Soviet surprise attack would attempt to achieve a sudden shift in the military correlation of forces, thereby assisting attempts at diplomatic coercion.

It is conceivable that Soviet military and diplomatic efforts could impose upon certain arrangements, such as "dual key" systems**, to either slow or stop the utilization of a portion of NATO's nuclear arsenal, thereby complementing a Soviet surprise attack. A country facing the prospect or the reality of defeat at the conventional level of operations might agree to a separate peace with the Soviets rather than risk the uncertain results of a nuclear battle. The dual key system presents the potential for an "operational veto" of nuclear use by a host nation under Soviet duress or reconsidering its NATO commitment (Kelleher 1987, 463). Of course, upon fulfillment of the requirements of the INF Treaty, fewer U.S. and NATO nuclear forces will be vulnerable to Soviet surprise attack.

*See Blair 1987, 108-111 for a description of NATO nuclear release procedures.

**Arrangements in which the U.S. controls the nuclear warhead and a European host nation controls the delivery system are called "dual key" systems. See Bracken 1983 138-140 for further discussion.
and there will be fewer nuclear obstacles to Soviet dominance of Europe.

One Soviet writer may have been acknowledging NATO's political and military difficulties when he wrote that the "conflicts and distrust existing among the member nations of today's alliances and blocs make it extremely difficult for them to utilize their forces and resources." (Skirdo 1970, 118)

Questions arise as to whether the Soviets could achieve the degree of surprise necessary to nullify NATO's nuclear arsenal and thereby attain a position of coercive dominance over some or all of the alliance. Some analysts suggest that a successful offensive "from a standing start" is possible and could exploit, not only NATO's nuclear handicaps, but unprepared forward defenses and the lack of defense in depth (Dick 1986, 10). The Soviets have noted the need "to maintain in peacetime those armed forces which would be in a position to reach at least the nearest definite strategic war objectives before successive echelons are mobilized and put into action." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 245)

According to military analyst Phillip Karber, the Soviets have more than adequate standing forces to initiate a surprise attack:

in the absence of a prepared defense, given only a partial modernization of the M-1 fleets, with the maldeployment of US units, if the Soviets have only a
24-hour lead time in movement they can blow through our covering force at 10-to-1 odds: they can get to our defense positions with five times as many tank battalions as fast as we can. (Schemmer 1987, 116)

The reading of strategic warning is likely to be blurred by Soviet cover and deception. For example, the Soviets acknowledge the utility of conducting operational troop movements and deployments under the guise of an exercise (Kiryan 1986). Warsaw Pact exercises along the Czechoslovakian border in 1968 served to prepare for the eventual invasion (Vigor 1983, 135). Furthermore, the exercises had ended causing the Czechs to relax prior to the assault (Vigor 1983, 135).

Part of Soviet deception and surprise may involve the "development of a major attack in a direction least expected by the enemy." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 141) Such a deception is conceivable in the northern Germany/Schleswig-Holstein scenario discussed earlier.

The strongest NATO defenses are located in central West Germany; therefore, the Soviets may choose the weaker northern route to outflank the stronger forces on the central front. In The Offensive, Sidorenko describes the "axis of main attack" as being the "weakest point in the enemy defense", thus an area ensuring "swift breakthrough of the enemy defense and development of offensive at high rates...." (1970, 87)
A prominent example of Soviet surprise concerning the direction of the main attack involves the Manchurian campaign of 1945. The campaign involved three fronts; the primary front was correctly interpreted by the Japanese to be the Trans-Baikal front. However, the main axis of attack was presumed to be through the relatively traversable Hailer Valley; another alternative, over the Great Khinghan Mountains, was deemed impossible for large numbers of motorized and mechanized troops. Contrary to Japanese belief, the main, most powerful Soviet attack occurred over the Greater Khinghan Mountains. For this, and many other reasons, the Soviet Manchurian offensive achieved its objectives in less than ten days. (Vigor 1983, 108-109)

In summary, a strategy enhanced by successful surprise would contribute to objectives related to the defeat of NATO. Successful surprise would likely facilitate a rapid, deep territorial penetration aimed at forcing Western nations to accept Soviet terms or to suffer worse destruction. With enough nations removed from the alliance or key nations neutralized, Soviet objectives for the dissolution of NATO's political and military viability might be met.

5. The Deep Strike Operation

Frequent reference is made in Soviet military writings to the deep strike, involving both conventional
and nuclear weapons, intended to rapidly disorganize the enemy's deep rear area and complicate, if not undermine, the enemy's war-fighting capability. Common characteristics of the deep strike include combined missile, aircraft, and naval attack and "deep penetration into the rear of the enemy by airborne landing troops, naval landing troops, and...land forces." (Dzhelaukhov 1966, 170)

The primary targets throughout the deep strike are the nuclear weapons of the enemy (Shtrik 1968, 280). Thus, if the attack is conventional, the intention is to prepare "in such a way as to be in the most favorable position" should nuclear use be initiated (Samorukov 1967, 259). Recently, "high precision weapons" have been designated as primary targets, in addition to nuclear weapons, probably in recognition of the greater lethality of modern conventional missiles (Gareyev 1985).

The Soviets devote special emphasis to two topics that may be integral to the deep strike operation, critical in disrupting the rear area and, ultimately, essential to war termination objectives: enemy command and control and the adversary's economic structure. For example, historical writings have called attention to the effects that Soviet attacks upon state administration centers and military-industrial production facilities during WWII had
on forcing the withdrawal of Finland and Hungary from the German camp (Reshetnikov 1986, 29-30)

Similarly, the Soviets claim that Japan's failure to attack "the vital centers" of the enemy or to destroy the enemy's "military-economic potential" denied victory to Tokyo in WWII despite great initial success (Ivanov 1974, 10)

Thus, Soviet writings have noted that "the main objective of armed combat is directed not only against enemy armed forces on the battlefields as was the case in the past, but also against everything which determines the viability of the government." (Skovorodkin 1967, 212)

Moreover, Gareyev argues that, based on "the importance of the rear for the course and outcome of a war," it is essential to "disrupt the enemy rear by launching attacks against it and capturing its most important economic and political centers...." (1985)

a. The Attack on C2

The Soviets attach extreme importance to attacking political and military command and control. For example, it may be relevant to future Soviet behavior that a main aim of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to quickly secure control of the capital (U.S. Congress. House. 1987, 52). As one Soviet writer observes: "A disruption of the control over a country and its troops in a theater of military operations can severely effect the
course of events, and in difficult circumstances, can even lead to defeat in a war." (Shirokov 1966, 207)

Accordingly, the need is cited for maintaining knowledge of the location of both stationary and mobile command posts and the associated hardness of such units (Shirokov 1966, 207). Additionally, location of communication centers and the related hardware such as cables and satellites must be ascertained (Shirokov 1966, 207).

Successful att against U.S. and NATO satellites could be a tremendous force multiplier for the Soviets. As noted by the Soviets, the "destruction of hostile reconnaissance means" enhances surprise and, thus, success (Kuleszynski 1971, 495). Critical trans-Atlantic communication links could be severed; crucial reconnaissance assets could be blinded and deafened (Hansen 1984, 1623). In addition to the denial of information concerning the details of the initial attack, subsequent dispersal of tactical and strategic mobile missiles could result in a decisive condition for the imposition of a Soviet-dictated war termination (Hansen 1984, 1624).

Disruption of command and control could occur internally as well as from external attack; possible Soviet infiltration of the government and military should not be overlooked. Jan Sejna claims that the Soviets infiltrated the Dutch General Staff and the Turkish military (1982,
in both cases it was assumed the infiltrations would expedite the removal of the respective countries from a war effort (1982, 139-140).

b. Economic Warfare

A second area of special Soviet emphasis concerns the adversary's economic structure. On one hand, the Soviets stress the destruction of the enemy's economic potential and the subsequent effect upon that country's and the coalition's war effort. As stated by Gareyev, "[e]conomic conflict is carried out in the aim of ensuring economic superiority over the enemy." (1985) Furthermore, by attributing the concept to "Western theoreticians", the Soviets state:

Under the conditions of massive use of nuclear weapons, attacks upon economic objectives can knock small states out of a war, sharply reduce the economic and moral potential of the major countries of the world, and thereby create the most favorable conditions for the attainment of victory. (Shirokov 1968, 317)

On the other hand, the Soviets acknowledge that "it is very important to determine which targets and enemy economic regions should be left intact or rapidly reconstructed and used in the interests of our own country and for supplying the troops." (Shirokov 1966, 203)

Thus, economic targeting by the Soviet Union is, apparently, not intended "to turn the large economic and industrial regions into a heap of ruins...." (Shirokov 1966, 201) Nor do the Soviets necessarily expect that
complete destruction of the enemy economy is initially possible (Korniyenko and Korolev 1967, 30). Rather, such targeting is aimed at specific vulnerabilities in the overall military-economic structure of the adversary; the intent is to cripple the capacity for war-fighting (Shirokov 1966, 201).

c. The OMG

Integral to the concept of the deep strike are troop operations in the enemy rear. For example, Western analysts suggest that Soviet amphibious and airborne assaults may serve to establish second fronts and to force the withdrawal from the war of selected NATO governments (Hines and Petersen 1983a, 710; Donnelly and Petersen 1986, 1050). In addition, amphibious and airborne assaults could supplement the deep ground force penetration characterized by the OMG (Donnelly and Petersen 1986, 1049).

Western analysts describe the OMG as an "advanced raid element", as large as an army, operating ahead of the main forces to both facilitate the main advance and to attack air and nuclear capabilities, command and control, logistics, and reserves (Hines and Petersen 1983a, 716). Advance would be expected to be rapid and continuous to ensure "the constant holding of initiative." (Gareyev 1985)

A primary consideration in the rapid insertion would be to preclude NATO nuclear use by destroying weapons
as well as establishing territorial proximity deep in Western Europe, thereby negating the rationality of nuclear use to combat the OMG (Donnelly 1984, 66). As surmised by Christopher Donnelly, the role of the OMG is to contribute to the "rapid collapse of NATO and the limiting of the war to the battlefield." (1983, 128)

The value of the OMG in Soviet deep operations may be partially attributed to NATO's shallow defenses (Hines and Petersen 1986b, 570). It is suggested that the scale and depth of OMG penetrations and subsequent encirclements would be highly problematic for NATO corps to defend against or escape from (Hines and Petersen 1986b, 570).

In addition to encirclement operations, the OMG, in conjunction with the deep troop landings, may force NATO "to fight in two directions, to their front and rear, from the very outset of the offensive." (Hines and Petersen 1983b, 1392) Moreover, of critical importance may be the use of large OMGs to seize or surround economic or political centers to force NATO countries to sue for peace. (Hines and Petersen 1984, 10)

Presumably, in addition to the military utility of the OMG, the Soviets recognize the crushing effect on morale and the will to fight that a rapid insertion of enemy forces within a country can induce. Despair could quickly be compounded by panic and confusion if, as hinted
by Gareyev, the OMG employs "special weapons" upon "breaking through into the enemy rear...." (1985) CW/BW and nuclear weapons may be those referred to in Soviet terminology as "special."

The OMG, in short, may serve to expand a "tactical breakthrough into an operational one"; the effects of its attack might be decisive in securing Soviet objectives for war termination (Sokolov 1985, 3).

d. Special Forces

Assisting the efforts of the more traditional combat troops in the deep operation may be elements of Soviet Spetsnaz, or special forces. Of special interest is the probable role of Spetsnaz and the KGB in war to assassinate political and military leaders.

A recent Congressional Research Service study describes apparent Soviet preparations to "decapitate" decision-makers in the event of high intensity conflicts (U.S. Congress. House. 1987, 62). The study notes: "Even a scattering of Soviet-controlled assassins and saboteurs...could savage rival nerve centers at the onset of surprise hostilities." (U.S. Congress. House. 1987, 62)

Allegedly, many Spetsnaz, KGB, and GRU (military security) agents are kept in place inside target countries. Victor Suvorov describes the existence of
"sleeping" agent networks, "which would be brought into action only in the event of war." (1983, 1213)

e. Partisan Warfare

Supplementing, and perhaps arranged by, Soviet special forces may be what Soviet writings refer to as "partisan warfare." Partisan warfare is described in Military Strategy as an "important type of military operation" which "disorganized the enemy rear and diverted considerable enemy forces" during World War II (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 273). Earlier in the book, partisan warfare is attributed "strategic significance." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 162)

Most Soviet writings discuss partisan warfare in an historical context. However, there are also implications for its importance in modern warfare. Colonel Skirdo's book The People, the Army, the Commander describes how "Soviet Partisan detachments" operated in France and Italy during WWII (1970, 71). Furthermore, according to Skirdo, Soviet arms and "partisan leadership training" helped the resistance movements within Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia during the war and afterwards to get "democratic regimes established as soon as the invaders were expelled." (1970, 71)

Of significance to the initial period of the war and as a possible connection between Soviet special
forces and partisan coordination, Skirdo, in reference to WWII, notes:

On the eve of the Soviet troops' offensive operations, the partisans intensified their blows against the enemy's rear and communications, and paralyzed his operational reserves. When the operation began, the partisans blocked the enemy's routes of retreat, set ambushes, and rendered the enemy's staffs ineffective. (1970, 67)

He further claims that such activity was "planned and coordinated with the combat operations of Soviet troops at the front." (Skirdo 1970, 67)

A large portion of the Soviet writings concern the activities of Soviet partisans on their own soil. Yet, although it may be far-fetched speculation, Soviet efforts to secure peacetime contacts may find wartime relevance in the assistance, training, and direction of opposition movements within various NATO countries. According to a former East German intelligence officer, one of the reasons that the Soviets expect to win a future war in Europe is their claim that "[m]any West Germans who have been silent until now, will take part in sabotage missions once fighting begins." (Kempe 1984, 30)

Soviet writings do not discount a future partisan movement; Skirdo claims that "if the imperialists do unleash another war, it will evoke a massive partisan movement and other forms of armed resistance in their rear." (1970, 71) Moreover, Skirdo may have been thinking of the U.S. and NATO when he wrote: "A partisan movement
by the general populace is also quite possible in a country used by an aggressor state to accommodate its troops, military bases, and combat equipment." (1970, 73)

The Soviet Union has demonstrated its propensity to support the intent and ideal of a movement, then exploit joint success for its own unilateral benefit. It should be recognized that, of the countries listed above in which the Soviets assisted the creation of "democratic regimes" after contributing to the partisan movements, all quickly succumbed to communist rule; all but one (Yugoslavia) became and remain Soviet satellites.

It is conceivable that preparatory acts of decapitation, sabotage, and terrorism, combined with a massive military deep strike operation, could go far in administering the decisive blow the Soviets claim to be possible in the initial period of war. Hence, it is also conceivable that, given a sudden and staggering initiation of war, countries within NATO would be neutralized, perhaps convinced that their own self-preservation had come to hinge on accepting Soviet terms. Soviet war efforts may seek the negation of any alternative thoughts in NATO deliberations.

f. SLOC Interdiction

Before concluding discussion of the Soviet deep operation and its effect on war termination, the relevance of SLOC (sea lines of communication) interdiction must be
noted. According to the Soviets, "in a conventional war, combat operations in disrupting ocean, sea, and air shipping are acknowledged as necessary." (Zemskov 1969, 446)

Attacks by Soviet surface, sub-surface, and air assets upon re-supply convoys to Europe could finally determine the outcome of the war. However, it should not be assumed that the Soviet Union would delay an anti-SLOC campaign until its attack in Europe had faltered and the U.S. had loaded its cargo for the trans-Atlantic crossing.

It is possible that the Soviets would preempt re-supply, possibly by destroying crucial airports and sea-ports on both sides of the Atlantic or by mining sea-ports, making it difficult or impossible for NATO forces to receive supplies. The deep strike should not be presumed to be limited to Europe; destruction or prevention of re-supply could force the realization upon NATO that the war had been lost and that conditional surrender was the only remaining hope.

g. Total Defeat of the Enemy's Armed Forces

Forcing the withdrawal from the war of alliance members and disorganization of the enemy's rear area might ultimately result in the complete military defeat of NATO. However, Soviet objectives may not require the West's total military defeat; rather, securing alliance dissolution and disengagement of U.S. influence from Europe may be
sufficient Soviet war termination objectives within the context of an overall superpower strategic conflict.

On the other hand, the complete defeat of NATO armed forces would present the USSR with unchallenged hegemony on the European continent. Therefore, total victory as an objective for terminating a war cannot be discounted, especially in the event that the Soviets achieve the stunning success envisioned for the initial period of the war.* Furthermore, should the potential for escalation dominance manifest itself into an operational certainty, the Soviet Union may not be at all inclined to limit its objectives.

Authoritative Soviet sources have indicated "[t]he Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, in order to protect their socialist achievements, will be forced to adopt...aims directed towards total defeat of the armed forces of the enemy...." (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 1983)

However, the Soviets have indicated recognition of the difficulty involved in rapidly achieving complete success, even in a nuclear war. For example, Gareyev, ostensibly referring to WWI, writes of "the impossibility of achieving the aims of a war by a single annihilating

*See Appendix, section D., 4., b. for a discussion of the potential problems of unabated military operations driven by initial success.
attack." (1985) Sidorenko states that "one can hardly count on the fact that the attacker will succeed in destroying all important objectives with one simultaneous nuclear strike." (1970, 114) Further, he writes that nuclear preemption of the enemy "is considered to be the decisive condition for the attainment of superiority over him and the seizure and retention of the initiative." (Sidorenko 1970, 115) But, preemption is not said to guarantee complete victory.

Total victory is likely to require a long and costly war. As noted in the previous chapter, the USSR may plan for a war lasting at least one year (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 28). Certainly, the "possibility of a protracted war" is not denied by the Soviets (Sokolovskiy, ed. 1968, 385). A future war, explains Gareyev, will likely be of an "extended, fierce and protracted nature...." (1985)

Hence, the Soviets recognize the potential for a prolonged conflict, especially if, as previously argued, the war-fighting is contained to the conventional level. However, the imposition of total defeat may be viewed as too immediately difficult and costly a war termination objective. This is not to discount the ultimate goal of the ideological victory of Communism; rather, a war in Europe may present the opportunity for rapid but limited objectives toward the defeat of the greatest threat perceived by the Soviets: the United States.

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E. CONCLUSION

In summary, it is argued that a future war in Europe is likely to be part of a greater conflict between the USSR and the free societies of the West. Thus, a Soviet war-winning strategy would be designed to insure the ultimate defeat of the U.S. and other free countries. To achieve this, NATO, as an effective military and political alliance, may need only to be neutralized to remove it from the balance in the overall East-West correlation of forces. These Soviet objectives for war termination in Europe would be decidedly limited and, as such, might only be temporary relief for the countries of Western Europe while the larger war is concluded with the U.S. and the other remaining free countries.

Much of the Soviets' success in a future war may depend upon the effectiveness of their peacetime efforts both to de-couple NATO politically, economically, and militarily as well as to secure contacts located in the enemy rear area for wartime utilization.

It may be argued that Soviet efforts to isolate or de-couple nations from NATO have failed during nearly forty years of peace. Moreover, war might dramatically and fatalistically erase any political and diplomatic inroads laid in popular support, thereby nullifying the strategy of dissolving NATO. In addition, contacts of political and
military significance in peacetime may not be available for use or amenable to exploitation during war.

Perhaps the only certainty of war is the uncertainty that will characterize its course. It is probable that Soviet peacetime activities endeavor to limit such uncertainty to the fullest extent possible. Moscow's military strength may contribute to Soviet confidence in the controllability of a war. Employment of Soviet military capabilities could drastically affect the choices made by any government in power in Western Europe. As two Western analysts conclude, "[i]f the current balance of forces remains unchanged, war termination for NATO will likely be very close to the old-fashioned notion of defeat." (Sloss and Stoppa-Liebl 1986, 112)

The probable extent of conventional or nuclear use in a future war is certainly unknown. Nuclear warfare may be undesirable in Soviet planning for a war in Europe because of the risk of extensive collateral damage, problems of command and control, and the likely complications in securing a termination settlement. In a nuclear war, communication of intent would be critical to purposeful war termination but extremely problematic.*

Conventional war could limit communication difficulty. Rapid conventional success and the withholding of massive

*See Appendix, section C., 4., d. for discussion of the problems of communication and war termination.
nuclear destruction could more readily result in a Soviet defeat of NATO because of the availability of the means to indicate a desire for peace. The threat of greater destruction might accelerate this process of war termination.

In addition, the Soviet Union may need to win a war quickly and decisively in Europe to prevent damage to the cohesion of its own bloc, a problem discussed in the following chapter.

Although only one scenario, the operation against NORTHAG in the Western TVD, was highlighted in this chapter, the intent was not to neglect possible Soviet actions in the Southwestern or Northwestern TVDs. One example was emphasized in order to illustrate the possible application of Soviet military art.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the Soviets may offer insight into their own thinking by ostensibly describing NATO strategy. For example, one writer notes that "[t]he main objective of a limited war in Europe would be the elimination of the Socialist system in one of several Warsaw Pact nations and a significant weakening of the Soviet Union [emphasis added]." (Semin 1983, 49). Whether the Soviets are mirror-imaging their intentions for NATO and the U.S. is uncertain. However, limited Soviet objectives for terminating a war are arguably more practical and attainable and would advance the ultimate
Soviet objective of the victory of communism without (as discussed in the following chapter) unraveling the coalition that currently underpins Soviet security.
IV. WARSAW PACT CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET OBJECTIVES FOR WAR TERMINATION

A. INTRODUCTION

As the Soviets have noted, war can adversely affect alliance cohesion and, therefore, alliance effectiveness (Gareyev 1985). The extent to which an alliance is shaken, combined with the actual importance of that alliance to the overall war effort, could dictate the war termination requirements of the coalition leader. Thus, alliances can constrain as well as strengthen a coalition leader.

The Soviets have recognized that "during wars that are waged by coalitions, the states at war have to take into account also the politics and military-strategic position of their allies." (Byely and others 1972, 10) In a war in Europe, the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) members could constrain Moscow's objectives, depending on what the Soviets expect of their allies and in what context allied contributions occur. In addition, the amount of control maintained over the allies may affect wartime performance.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance of the Warsaw Pact to Soviet military strategy in Europe. The degree of importance is a likely measure for the amount of constraint that alliance upheaval could impose on Soviet
war termination objectives. In general, objectives for war termination are concerned with the type of victory sought—for example, whether a total or limited victory is acceptable. In other words, war termination objectives seek the conditions deemed necessary to resolve the armed conflict.

In this chapter, the importance of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet military doctrine is identified. The possible character of a future war and its influence on the Warsaw Pact is then discussed. Included are considerations of the war's duration, the impact of success or failure, the possibility of conventional or nuclear combat, and, finally, the effect of offensive or defensive operations and missions. The discussion focuses on the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in general, even though it is recognized that important differences characterize individual NSWP members.

Attempts at predicting the behavior and intention of countries and alliances inherently lack quantitative precision. Moreover, information relative to the Warsaw Pact is limited by the secretive nature of the alliance (Nelson 1984, 3). However, it is proposed that, during a war, the limits of Soviet control, the faults in alliance cohesion, and the importance of the NSWP militaries to Soviet strategy could interact to constrain Moscow's objectives for war termination.

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B. UNIFIED MILITARY DOCTRINE

Soviet control of Eastern Europe is codified in the Warsaw Treaty. In April 1985, the WTO members extended the "Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" for twenty years, with a subsequent extension for ten more (Khvorostyanov 1986, 8). Thus, the Soviets have secured the agreement of the East European participants to continue the alliance; from Moscow's perspective, this likely entails unquestioned Soviet leadership and a unified military doctrine based on Soviet military strategy.

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, "NSWP plans, doctrine, tactics, training, force structure, and readiness are shaped according to Soviet dictates," thus guaranteeing Soviet control over alliance action (1987, 19). MSU Kulikov, current Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, confirmed this in stating that "[t]he combat alliance of the fraternal peoples of the socialist countries and their armies has a united military-strategic foundation" and a "coordinated military doctrine." (Kulikov 1985, 84)

Thus, with a unified military doctrine, the Soviets can shape and organize the alliance to complement Moscow's objectives. Kulikov emphasizes this point in stating that "[a] unity of views on fundamental problems of military organizational development, the nature of modern warfare
and the methods of waging it naturally constitutes an extremely important consolidating factor." (1972, 16)

The characteristic features of the Soviet military experience, according to Kulikov, that apply to the socialist community, include the "defense of the socialist homeland and the conquests of socialism." (1972, 16)

Foremost is defense of the socialist homeland (the Soviet Union) with the remainder of the socialist community occupying secondary status.

The idea of a unified military doctrine is contained within the Soviet concept of coalition warfare. In an article in Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal (Military History Journal), Colonel General Altukhov identified the features and considerations of coalition warfare, based on Soviet experiences in World War II. Included are common war aims within the coalition; the composition of troops within operational and strategic groupings; the specific requirements of organization, weapon, and training interaction; and "the relationships between the governments of the nations participating in the coalition...." (Altukhov 1982, 42)

The key to successful coalition warfare, according to Altukhov, is the maintenance of "direct control over the allied troops" by the coalition command (1982, 42). Such control would require the "unconditional subordination to the coalition command by all the allied troops regardless
of their national affiliation." (Altukhov 1982, 43) Furthermore, essential to control of coalition troops is a compatible command and control system "in technical, organizational and methodological terms." (Altukhov 1982, 44) Altukhov leaves little doubt over the identity of the coalition command capable of providing the requisite control in noting that in World War II "an important role in organizing the joint operations of the Allied armies was played by the Soviet Supreme High Command and the general staff." (1982, 44)

Inherent in a Soviet-imposed unified military doctrine is the comprehensive integration of the alliance system. Kulikov noted the requirement of "monolithic unity... encompassing all activities of societal activity, politics, economics, ideology and culture" and the maintenance of "armed defense" until imperialism "ceases to exist." (1972, 17) It appears that, in the ideal, a unified military doctrine entails a national submission to the Soviet system of control and integral participation, should a war occur in Europe, toward the attainment of Soviet objectives for war termination.

C. CHARACTER OF THE WAR

Maintaining the alliance throughout the war is essential to Soviet objectives. As Kulikov stated in a
an important role...will be played by the viability and strength of the military coalitions not only from an economic and military standpoint but also from a morale and political point of view, that is on the whole the social capability of withstanding the sternest tests of war. (1972, 19)

Thus, coalition unity would be a consideration for the Soviets during the course of a future war as well as a consideration in terminating that war.

Additionally, as discussed in chapter II, Soviet Marxist-Leninist theory claims that "politics plays the decisive role not only in the preparations for war but also in its conduct." (Byely and others 1972, 16) Within this political determinism are "measures taken to strengthen allied relations within the coalition and the general strategic plan of the war" (Byely and others 1972, 17), indicating a definite role within Soviet military strategy for NSWP forces.

The role assigned to NSWP forces is a function of the character of the war. The Soviets recognize the "character of a war" as a contributing element within a state's wartime "moral-political potential" (Ogarkov 1983d). Therefore, it is likely that the Soviets will calculate into the correlation of forces the character of a war being fought and its effect upon the belligerents. Their calculation will determine the employment of NSWP forces.
within Soviet military strategy. The extent to which Soviet forecasting is correct and the amount of emergent wartime adjustment necessary may affect war termination objectives.

1. Duration

It is generally assumed that a "quick, decisive victory" (Nelson 1984, 10) is more favorable for maintaining alliance cohesion than a prolonged war. In terms of the WTO, analysts speculate that "the longer militaries of East Europe are required to perform, the more one should doubt the full application of their available forces" due to increasing strains inherent in a wartime mobilization (Nelson 1984, 10). Based on his analysis, Daniel Nelson estimates that NSWP force reliability would become questionable eleven to thirteen days into an invasion and it is unlikely that reliability could be maintained beyond eight weeks (Nelson 1984, 12).

This analysis should neither be surprising nor one from which NATO should derive undue optimism. Although NATO is not bound by coercion, allied reliability may be brought into question sooner by virtue of inadequate defenses. It is proverbial that military alliances throughout history have been unable to withstand the strains of war.

The relative question for the Warsaw Pact is how long the Soviets will be able to maintain alliance
cohesion. Analyst C.J. Dick speculates that "the Warsaw Pact is a brittle grouping of fair-weather friends which is likely to disintegrate if exposed to great or prolonged strain." (1983, 1715)

However, a Rand interview study of East European emigres revealed "a noticeable trend in the evolution of the attitudes of our respondents toward rank-and-file reliability," possibly due to unit camaraderie and mutual dependence (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 43). Thus, while Western analysts may conclude that the Warsaw Pact is an ailing alliance, it may be totally inaccurate to expect war to facilitate a substantial national backlash against Soviet control. War is a very unpredictable stimulus.

It is reasonable, however, to presume that, without consideration of potential interactive effects from events within the NATO alliance, the longer the war, the more resistance from NSWP forces to Soviet objectives (Van Oudenaren 1984, 18).

Respondents in the Rand emigre study indicated that protracted conflicts or military reversals could facilitate a breakdown in control and lead to significant numbers of desertions (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 98). Furthermore, the precarious socioeconomic conditions within East Europe are likely to worsen as the war progresses (Nelson 1984, 26). The Soviets may have recognized the
disruptive potential posed by East European forces and may limit the offensive role of NSWP forces in a war (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 60).

As discussed in the previous chapter, Soviet strategy in Europe will likely attempt a "rapid rate of advance and rapid deep exploitation" (Ogarkov 1982) of Western Europe to quickly achieve NATO's capitulation. In this short war scenario, particularly if preceded by only limited warning or surprise attack against NATO, the majority of former East European servicemen interviewed by Rand predicted reliable NSWP participation (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 101). To improve the odds of NSWP reliability, the Soviets would probably employ only the NSWP forces believed to be most dependable.

According to a former East German intelligence officer interviewed in The Wall Street Journal, the Soviets exercise GDR forces for an offensive against West Europe. However, although the plan is to reach the Atlantic in seven days, only Soviet troop movements are expected after the fourth day. Thus, the Soviets may recognize limited NSWP troop reliability, even among GDR forces, and plan to employ them only initially until Soviet follow-on echelons arrive. (Kempe 1984, 30)

2. Success versus Failure

The Soviet observation that "[v]ictories or defeats have an enormous effect on belligerent...states" supports
speculation that success or failure is likely to affect NSWP reliability (Byely and others 1972, 20). The USSR may hope that early battlefield success would create a perception among East European regimes of Soviet invincibility and, thus, futility to do other than follow in the Red Army wake (Yurechko 1987, 32).

On the other hand, failure seems certain to disrupt and possibly destroy Warsaw Pact cohesion. As analyst Stephen Cimbala suggests, "the USSR, having crossed the threshold of war with the West..., would be hard pressed to justify this exertion without bringing about some change in the post-conflict military and political balance of power." (Cimbala [1988], 309) The inability to secure even minimal objectives could prompt rapid WTO dissolution.

According to Rand's emigre study, "[m]ost respondents felt there were strong limits on reliability should a Soviet offensive against West Europe falter or be reversed." (Alexiev, Johnson, Kliszewski 1986, 101) Failure would likely be manifested in passive resistance, defections, and possibly active military resistance (Herspring and Volgyes 1979, 284).

Morale is likely to be adversely affected by wartime failure. The difficulty of persuading people to accept ideological justifications for war in an atmosphere largely devoid of ideological acceptance is likely to be exacerbated by unsuccessful operations. Although MSU
Kulikov describes Marxism-Leninism as the "ideological foundation of the unity of the Warsaw pact countries" (1985, 84), evidence suggests that ideological indoctrination of NSWP troops is met with skepticism and may be counterproductive (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 24).

According to the Rand study of East European emigres, "the gulf between propaganda and reality is a major cause of military disenchantment." (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 36) Thus, ideological credibility is waning and accompanying it may be the commitment of large percentages of East European military personnel to defend the regimes that perpetuate the hoax of Marxism-Leninism. Daily exposure to Western sources of information by East European military personnel is a constant stress upon the alliance's ideological fault (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 25).

Although the subject is highly speculative, it can be reasonably assumed that NSWP reliability would remain high and thus supportive of Soviet objectives for war termination in a successful war. However, in the event of failure, defensive or de-escalatory options may be inconsistent with Soviet Warsaw Pact control (Kime 1982, 69). Should the war effort stall or go against the WTO,
the Soviets may be required to restrict their objectives or change the character of the war to a more destructive mode.

3. Nuclear or Conventional War

As discussed in earlier chapters, the Soviet perspective on nuclear and conventional war seems to indicate a preference for limiting hostilities to the conventional level, using their apparent potential for escalation dominance to negate the utility of the Western nuclear arsenals. The Soviets would expect to win the war by virtue of their conventional superiority and through rapid advances that could otherwise be hindered by nuclear use (Hines, Petersen, and Trulock 1986, 8).

A conventional warfighting strategy is likely to be less abhorred by the NSWP countries than a nuclear strategy. Furthermore, a conventional war may be more in keeping with the maintenance of Soviet control, both of the course of the war and the course of their allies, given the probability that mutual nuclear exchanges would disrupt command and control mechanisms (Hines, Petersen, and Trulock 1986, 8). Although a conventional war might not achieve the rapid victory needed by the Soviets to preclude ruptures in WTO cohesion, neither would a nuclear war equate to a rapid victory. Even in a nuclear war that might be geographically and militarily limited, control would be a precarious variable. Hence, a conventional war
would seem to favor the maintenance of Soviet control over the Warsaw Pact.

4. **Offensive or Defensive Operational Employment**

In general, the employment of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces in offensive operations may be expected to qualitatively affect NSWP force reliability compared to employment in defensive or support operations. Should NSWP forces engage in offensive operations, reliability, and therefore termination objectives, could be highly qualified, depending on the war's duration and success.

Conversely, a defensive war fought in East Europe might elicit a higher level of reliability and a stubborn termination strategy—though this hypothesis obviously lacks political credibility, since it assumes offensive NATO operations in Eastern Europe. The implausibility of this assumption and NATO's physical incapacity to undertake such operations make this hypothesis one of mainly theoretical interest. However, utilization of NSWP militaries in a defensive role to repel potential limited counter-attacks by NATO forces or to provide support to Soviet offensive forces may be integral to Soviet military strategy.

In either offensive or defensive operations, the importance of the NSWP forces to Soviet military strategy and the role assigned to these forces will have a
corresponding influence on the course of the war and the attainment of Soviet objectives.

a. Offensive Operations

The Soviets train the Warsaw Pact forces to conduct offensive operations. Warsaw Pact exercises such as "Druzhba-81" and "Shield-82" have stressed deep territorial objectives, high speed offensive operations, and improved command and control over the forces involved (Simon 1985, 194-195, 215). However, employment of NSWP forces in offensive operations is problematic, thus reliability in an offensive role is questionable.

Referring to what they term "external-offensive reliability," Herspring and Volgyes propose that NSWP soldiers will be less effective fighting for an unpopular regime or a regime not representing the national interest. Should the war aims favor Soviet interests to the exclusion of the NSWP country's interests, the East European troops may fight but only to survive, not necessarily to win. Herspring and Volgyes conclude that WTO reliability is contingent on the East European populations' perceiving consistency between their own national interests and that of the USSR*; the analysts note that "as recent events in Eastern Europe have shown, under most circumstances, such a development is unlikely." (Herspring and Volgyes 1979, 284)

*See Appendix, section D., 4., d. for discussion of coalition dynamics from the Western perspective.
However, the duration of the war may qualify the assumptions of Herspring and Volgyes. For example, Rand found general agreement among the former East European servicemen interviewed that East European armies would reliably support Soviet objectives during the initial offensive, implying that such support would diminish with time (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 98).

Given the offensive strategy likely to be employed by the Soviets in a future war and Ogarkov's premise that this war "will assume a coalition character from the very outset and will pursue political and strategic aims," NSWP forces seem integral to Soviet success (1982). Depending upon the degree of strategic or tactical surprise attempted, NSWP participation could be critical to Soviet success (Simon 1985, 1). In recognizing that the "augmentation of strategic efforts in a modern world war...is a coalition problem, since it is impossible to solve this problem on a scale of just the armed forces of single nation," the value of NSWP forces within Soviet strategy is acknowledged (Dzhelauklov 1964, 56).

However, not all NSWP forces will necessarily be employed within a Soviet-led military offensive. Ogarkov appears to refer to role differentiation within WTO military strategy in stating that

national particularities of the corresponding countries, which are related to the level of development which they have achieved, their geographical position and possible
nature of actions of the probable enemy are taken into account (1985).

Warsaw Pact military exercise patterns may indicate which forces are integral to Soviet offensive planning*. Of 24 maneuvers held between 1961-1967, 18 occurred in the Warsaw Pact "Northern Tier" states of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (Caravelli 1983, 396). More recent exercises such as the 1969 Oder-Neisse maneuvers, "Shield-76", and "Opal-87" involved only the Northern Tier states and the Soviet Union (Jones 1980, 18; U.S. DIA 1977, 13; Staar 1987, 359).

Additionally, since the mid-1970's, Hungary has been a frequent participant in exercises held in the Northern Tier (Johnson 1981, 27). Recent examples include "Danube-84" and "Druzhba-86" (Staar 1984, 355; Dean 1987, 30)

Thus, the Soviets train to interact with the Northern Tier states along with Hungary. Rand analyst A. Ross Johnson argues that this reflects a greater strategic dependence on Northern Tier forces born from Soviet concerns over China and the Afghanistan conflict (Johnson 1981, 18-19). However, the prominence of the Western TVD in a European war and the geographic position of the

*It must be noted that Warsaw Pact exercises serve various functions in addition to operational planning, including external political signaling and intra-alliance peacetime control and cohesion. See Caravelli 1983; Jones 1980.
Northern Tier countries is the likely explanation for the utility of the northern WTO members in Soviet military strategy.

The fact that the Northern Tier forces train for offensive operations was confirmed by a former East German intelligence officer, who stated in *The Wall Street Journal* that "[t]he first strike always began from our side" (Kempe 1984, 1)* Furthermore, according to the intelligence officer, Soviet and East German troops always practiced the offensive; the predominant goal was the destruction of the enemy on its own territory (Kempe 1984, 1, 30).

Another former East European officer interviewed by A. Ross Johnson claims that thirty percent of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier first strategic echelon consists of NSWP forces (1981, 4). Apparently, elite national contingents from NSWP forces comprise these first echelon forces and are designated for immediate Soviet use under the guise of the Warsaw Pact (Kulikov 1985, 88)

Primary among the Northern Tier forces in Soviet strategy are the East Germans (Staar 1977, 226). The GDR forces are believed to be completely integrated

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*The reason for always taking the offensive, explained the intelligence officer, was because of alleged ability "to read the enemy's intentions and attack before he can." (Kemp 1984, 1) This is significant in light of recent revelations on the Walker spy ring.*
within the Warsaw Pact first strategic echelon (Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev 1980, 79). The role of the GDR in Soviet military strategy may have been developed early; between 1956-1970, for example, twenty of twenty one Northern Tier exercises included East Germany and fourteen of the twenty were held within the GDR (Hoensch 1982, 44). Nelson suggests the present level of East German integration within the WTO surpasses the other alliance members, possibly indicating the unequal value of the GDR to Soviet strategy (Nelson 1984, 22-23).

Currently, the armed forces of the GDR are among the best equipped in the Warsaw Pact, although Poland and Czechoslovakia are also comparatively well equipped, quantitatively and qualitatively. However, despite ongoing modernization efforts, "there remains a considerable 'generation gap' between the Soviet Union's own equipment in Eastern Europe and that of the forces of its European allies." (The Military Balance 1987-1988 1987, 46-53)

Although it would seem inconsistent with Soviet war objectives to permit Warsaw Pact arsenals to lag behind the state of the art, Moscow may desire capability incongruence as a hedge against alliance instability or, as Viktor Suvorov suggests, may be by strategic design. Soviet control over the procurement of WTO arsenals could provide a means of delineating the role played by each NSWP member. Suvorov describes the forces of the NSWP as
supplementary elements to round out Soviet armies and fronts; thus, the East European militaries are integral to the Soviet armed forces and Soviet strategy (1982, 125-127).

Less integral, however, at least in an offensive capacity, appear to be the Southern Tier states. As mentioned previously, Hungary may be important to Soviet objectives in north and central Europe; Bulgaria and Romania may be almost inconsequential to Soviet war objectives. For example, only Romania participated in fewer Warsaw Pact exercises than Bulgaria between 1961-1979 and even those exercises were support, not offensive, oriented (Holloway 1984, 27). Furthermore, Romania has unilaterally limited itself to defensive operations within its own borders (Volgyes 1982, 45). It appears that the role of the Southern Tier states in Soviet military strategy may be confined to defense of, and maintaining stability in, the Warsaw Pact southern flank.

A strategic consideration for the Soviets in an offensive employment of NSWP troops would be the match up of traditional enemies, not only as foes but as allies. The Poles, for example, have historic bonds with the Americans, the French, and the British but antagonisms against the Germans and the Romanians (Herspring and Volgyes 1979, 289). Moreover, historical antagonisms run deep throughout the WTO (Herspring and Volgyes 1979,
Thus, the employment of NSWP forces in offensive operations could involve divisive consequences although the intensity of historic relationships is likely to be tempered by the effects of war.

Soviet efforts that minimize mobilization procedures and incorporate NSWP forces within much larger Soviet force groupings could improve prospects for effective initial offensive employment of East European troops (Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev 1980, 121). According to John Yurechko, there are NSWP forces that are immediately subordinate to Warsaw Pact commands presided over by Soviets; in the event of war the ability of East European governments to control their own troops would effectively be precluded (1987, 31-32). Moreover, NSWP force integration is apparently practiced during large and small scale WTO exercises, incorporating units (regiments) and subunits (battalions) into Soviet divisions, armies, and fronts (Jones 1984, 244-257).

The rapidity of events and the dominance of surrounding Soviet forces would likely leave no immediate alternative but to participate in the offensive (Rakowska-Harmstone 1984, 339). Mobilization subsequent to the start of a war and the movement of Soviet reserve echelons through East Europe could inhibit any developing inclinations of NSWP resistance (Yurechko 1987, 32). Alternatively, an extended pre-war mobilization would not
only alert NATO, it could stimulate feelings of nationalism and dissent antagonistic to Soviet control (Rakowska-Harmstone 1984, 340).

b. Defensive Operations

A recent Soviet article declared that "[t]he military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states is strictly a defensive one." ("Military Doctrine" 1987, 70) In the highly unlikely (and, indeed, essentially fictitious) hypothesis that East European armies might find themselves fighting a defensive war against NATO, it is naturally assumed that homeland defense would prompt a heroic effort.

If the East European forces perceived that their country's survival was threatened, then a determined defense would be possible (Herspring and Vclgyes 1979, 280). For example, East Europeans interviewed by Rand "foresaw greater reliability in a scenario in which NSWP armies perceived their mission as defending national territory against a Western incursion." (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 101)

However, the fact that the NSWP regimes are an unnatural outgrowth of the Soviet Union might instead result in a welcome for the forces from the West, similar to that initially bestowed upon the Nazi invaders in the Ukraine during World War II. Should this ever occur, some have observed, it would be hoped that Western forces would
be better at recognizing and seizing such an opportunity than were the Nazis. (Rakowska-Harmstone 1984, 344-345)

As noted earlier, a utilization of NSWP militaries in certain defensive operations might vitally support the offensive operations of Soviet and selected non-Soviet forces. Warsaw Pact forces might be more reliable fulfilling a support role, and Soviet war termination objectives could thus remain largely unhindered by alliance constraints.

The Soviet view of wartime operations requires a strong rear and the "defense and holding of important regions of one's territory." (Soviet Military Encyclopedia 1979, 94). Furthermore, the Soviets note (and certainly hope) that the W.T.O. "ensures that reserves and resources may be maneuvered effectively, and facilitates the organization of defense, including air defense, supply of material, and troop movement." (Skirdo 1970, 14) Thus, NSWP forces could be valuable in a defensive mission.

An important NSWP defensive function to the overall Soviet war effort would be protection of logistics. Although the Soviets apparently attempt to minimize logistical dependence on their allies, East Europe's position between the Soviet Union and the West geographically stretches vulnerable supply lines (Van Oudenaren 1984, 19). Thus, in a European war, the Soviets
would require East European assurance of safe passage for resupply and reinforcement (Papp 1978, 62).

Preceding resupply from the Soviet Union would be the use of ammunition, fuel, and oil stocks forward deployed throughout East Europe. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, these stores amount to a sixty to ninety day supply. Distribution of these and other war materials will be assisted by the NSWP transportation infrastructure, supervised by a Soviet command, and probably protected by East European forces. (U.S. DOD 1987, 100-101)

The Soviets seem to have enough doubt over allied reliability that measures have been taken to minimize possible disruptions of even a support role. For example, a ferry system across the Black Sea is available to Bulgaria, thus bypassing Romania (O'Ballance 1982, 58). Similarly, in the event that Poland disrupts the Soviet war effort, a ferry system has been developed to deliver supplies from the USSR directly to East Germany (Brown and Johnson 1984, 15). To preclude such disruption, however, the Soviets have allegedly disguised their own troops in Polish uniforms and deployed them at critical installations such as airfields, arms depots, and communication centers; presumably, the Soviets have taken similar precautions throughout East Europe (Kempe 1984, 30).
Another major function of the East European countries appears to be the supplementing of the Soviet air defense system. The Soviets have long recognized that air defense requires "time and space" as well as "the coordinated actions of large air defense forces not of a single country but of several." (Zabelok 1971, 109) Further, the Soviets conclude that "[c]oalition air defense is a characteristic feature of military and political integration." (Zabelok 1971, 123)

Hence, it follows that the East European air defense systems are directly subordinate to the Soviet air defense command (Voiska PVO) in Moscow (Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev 1980, 17). The PVO command links the Soviet air defense districts with the air early warning and defense networks of each NSWP country (Lewis 1982, 114). The central integration and control indicates the importance of the NSWP defenses to the Soviets; loss of this outer air defense system could severely disrupt Soviet war objectives.

Finally, the USSR may depend on East European forces to tend order in the rear while the Soviets are occupied to the West; however, history does not represent this option as viable. Herspring and Volgyes cite seven post-WWII cases where East European armed forces refused to support their respective governments during a "serious internal disturbance." (1979, 278-279).
Neither does history present the Soviets with favorable examples of joint Warsaw Pact restraint of an errant member. Although East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian forces assisted in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, their involvement was essentially symbolic. While as many as twenty three Soviet divisions comprised the invasion force, the NSWP augmentation consisted of a total of five divisions and a brigade (Lewis 1982, 154). Furthermore, most significant operations and occupations were performed solely by Soviet forces (Lewis 1982, 142).

Any symbolic dividends derived from East European cooperation and participation in the Czechoslovakian invasion quickly became negative. For the NSWP invaders, the experience was demoralizing even though the East European forces were quickly withdrawn. As Robin Remington suggests, the "demoralizing impact on East European participants has substantial implications...for more prolonged occupations by Moscow. " (1984, 51)

Wartime implications for suppression and occupation of an 'ally' are likely to be more problematical for Moscow. Dependence on NSWP forces for intra-alliance domestic control would probably be greater. However, in any situation requiring force against civilians, especially by indigenous troops, reliable execution would be doubtful (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 79, 101). The
respondents in the Rand emigre study concur that violence against fellow countrymen could only be ordered under the threat of similar reprisals for disobedience (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 96).

Hence, the NSWP forces may be more reliable in defensive operations than in offensive operations but even this assumption must be highly qualified. The likely defensive and support duties assigned to NSWP forces are not incidental to Soviet military strategy. A breakdown in logistics, air defense, or domestic control could require a diversion of Soviet forces, thus reducing overall military effectiveness (Simon 1985, 2). Use of Soviet reserve echelons could diminish the scope, pace, and intensity of the offensive, possibly requiring alteration of Soviet strategic objectives.

Moreover, the Soviets would probably be apprehensive about leaving a large percentage of the armed East European troops between the Soviet front forces and the USSR. Even in a 'safe' supporting role, the NSWP countries could disrupt the Soviet warfighting strategy and adversely affect Soviet objectives for war termination.

D. CONCLUSION

The functional importance of the Warsaw Pact to Soviet military strategy creates a constraint upon Soviet war termination objectives. The pervasive system of control
and integration probably reflects the degree of importance the NSWP countries represent in the Soviet correlation of forces.

However, peacetime intra-alliance trends reveal cracks in cohesion that the strains of war could decisively rupture. Potent peacetime controls may become ineffective in a continental war. As Edward Atkeson suggests, "there is a basic 'fault line'--not unlike a seismological fault--running between the Soviets and their allies, which, if subjected to great stress, could rupture, with serious ramifications for Soviet fortunes." (1986, 111-112)

It is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact is merely a peacetime trophy of Soviet power, a transparent icon of communist ideology. The Soviets acknowledge that "the stability of a coalition" has significant bearing on "the question of victory." (Sokolovskiy and Cheredichenko 1968, 392) In the event of a war in Europe, given the offensive essence of Soviet military strategy, the Warsaw Pact is critical to the Soviet defeat of NATO--an objective that is unlikely to be open to compromise. The Soviets convey the impression that they fear that if NATO survives, the USSR may not.

The Soviets have long recognized that to achieve complete victory, "it is necessary to complete the rout of remaining and resisting formations of enemy armed forces and to occupy important strategic areas on enemy
territory." (Iovlev 1963, 9) In addition, it is necessary to hold one's own territory as well as retaining captured territory (Iovlev 1963, 9). The Soviets could not expect to conduct such a war without the NSWP forces.

However, the Soviets are unlikely to limit the NSWP duties to defense of the rear while the Red Army prosecutes the front. In ostensibly describing the wartime tendencies of imperialist coalition leaders, the Soviets have noted the utility of exhausting the strength of alliance members to ensure they "follow in the political wake of the power in question." (Byely and others 1972, 15) The writers may have been mirror-imaging, or perhaps implicitly revealing, a Soviet intent to exploit the Warsaw Pact militaries to defeat the enemy, thus strengthening the preponderance of Soviet power within the alliance.

Although the Warsaw Pact is generally viewed in the West as an integral element of Soviet power, undue optimism over questionable WTO wartime cohesion is too often heralded as the West's unbeatable wildcard. While the Warsaw Pact has severe problems, some observers have declared that the Western alliance may have disunity problems of its own, especially in the event of selective Soviet attacks (Ikle, Wohlstetter, and others 1988, 34). It would be dangerous, at any rate, to place excessive confidence in expectations that NSWP soldiers would double their risks in war by turning on the Soviets while missiles...
and bullets fly in from the West. The Rand study of East European emigres concluded that NSWP reliability is higher than often assumed (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 102).

However, the character of a war could greatly affect reliability. The same Rand study also concluded that Soviet control is precarious and under tremendous strain; an unfavorable shift in the fortunes of war could devastate NSWP reliability (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 102).

Moreover, Stephen Rosen notes that the Soviet Union has a history of mutiny within its empire. For example, Rosen describes a report that, in 1941, 100,000 Lithuanians drove the Red Army from Soviet Lithuania (1986, 77). In addition, Rosen cites reports of non-Russian soldiers fleeing battle in large numbers in 1942 in the Ukraine and Volga regions of the Soviet Union (1986, 77). According to Rosen, as many as two million Soviet citizens may have operated in some support capacity for the Nazi invaders (1986, 78).

In conclusion, the NSWP forces are essential to the realization of Soviet objectives in a war in Europe, although control and reliability are uncertain variables. Though not addressed in this chapter, the possibility that a future war might be fought on more than just the European front could increase the importance of the Warsaw Pact.
(Erickson 1981, 168). In any war with NATO, however, the performance of NSWP forces would enhance or degrade the prospects for Soviet success (Alexiev, Johnson, and Kliszewski 1986, 3). Thus, the coalition developed to enhance Soviet power could act to constrain Soviet war termination objectives.
V. CONCLUSION

This thesis has analyzed a number of key arguments relating to the possibility of limited Soviet objectives for terminating a war. Should a war occur in Europe, for example, it is suggested that the Soviets might enter such a war with definite but limited objectives, the attainment of which could define Moscow's conditions for terminating combat. These conditions may include the political and military dissolution of NATO and the decoupling of U.S. military power from the continent, thereby neutralizing the Western alliance and establishing de facto Soviet hegemony over the European continent.

In other words, the common belief in the West that the Soviets would accept no less than total, unconditional victory, secured in a strategic nuclear war, may be a flawed and unrealistic thesis that accepts too much of the Soviet public diplomacy line. According to the Soviets, political objectives are "of decisive importance for gaining victory in war" (Skirdo 1970, 98). However, a nuclear war fought for total victory might preclude the attainment of political objectives of any utility.

The historically cautious Soviets are not likely to aim for a pyrrhic victory. Rather, the Soviets recognize that
political objectives must be "strictly in accord with the manpower, resources and capabilities of one's own country and the countries of the coalition." (Skirdo 1970, 98) Hence, Soviet political, and therefore war, objectives for terminating a future conflict are likely to be tempered by an awareness of their military capabilities and alliance constraints.

Although the Soviets possess formidable military capabilities, including a robust nuclear arsenal, their desire to maintain control over the course of events may lead them to restrict their use of nuclear weapons to an intra-war deterrent role—for example, to discourage U.S. and/or third-power nuclear escalation. The possibility (and the potential utility) of nuclear employment is not denied. However, in some circumstances, the Soviets might well prefer to conduct a rapid conventional operation, unhindered by the effects of nuclear weapons, in order to quickly defeat NATO and remove U.S. influence from Europe. Termination upon the attainment of such objectives would leave much of Europe intact for future Soviet exploitation.

The Soviets express the need to quickly secure their objectives in a future war, perhaps because they recognize the current geographical limits of effective conventional operations as well as the potential for American reinforcements to prolong the conflict and possibly even
shift the course of the war. Therefore, Soviet objectives may be limited and time urgent.

Moreover, the limits of Soviet control over the NSWP countries due to the faults in alliance cohesion may increase the urgency for quickly attaining objectives and terminating a war. The NSWP forces are likely critical to Soviet military strategy; thus, the integral role of these forces, combined with the dangers of prolonged operations, may interact to limit Moscow's objectives for terminating a war against NATO. Objectives that strain the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact may undermine the empire the Soviets could be seeking to expand in a war and might ultimately result in a devastating defeat for the Kremlin.

Hence, the limits of conventional warfare and the constraints of alliance dynamics could interact in Soviet strategy to limit objectives for terminating a future war in Europe. The attainment of these objectives in Europe would likely establish functional Soviet hegemony over the continent, a threat identified in the 1988 National Security Strategy of the United States as endangering America's "most basic national security interests."

(Reagan, 1)

Although this thesis has concluded that the Soviets might pursue limited objectives for terminating a future war in Europe, it would be unwise for the West to derive any comfort from such an analysis, should it be accurate.
It appears that the Soviets would prefer not to use the vehicle of war to attain the ultimate victory of Communism. The Soviets appear determined, however, to do their best to ensure that the outcome of a future war, should such a conflict take place, would advance their progress toward such a final victory.
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APPENDIX: THE OBJECTIVE OF WAR TERMINATION
THE WESTERN VIEW

The following appendix is a theoretical review of the relationship between political objectives and war termination from the Western perspective. This appendix expands on the concept of limited objectives by discussing both unlimited objectives for war termination as well as the process of limiting objectives as a war evolves. Discussion is confined to what has been termed "external" wars between states, thereby excluding consideration of wars "internal" to a single state (Randle 1973, 1).

Cross references to the text of the thesis are intended to contrast Western and Soviet perspectives on the objective of war termination. An immediate and obvious contrast is the detail and breadth of discussion in the West on the topic of war termination compared to the paucity of information in the Soviet literature.

A. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

Wars are fought for political objectives (Kecskemeti 1970, 107). According to Clausewitz, war is a "continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." (1984, 87) Political objectives guide the conduct of the war, such as its duration and intensity, and determine the acceptable conditions for termination (Coser 1961, 348). Furthermore, political objectives may change
during, and as a result of, the course of the war. Thus, objectives for war termination may also change. *

According to Clausewitz, the primary objective of a war is to defeat the enemy, specifically its military forces (1984, 595-596). However, a more generally applicable objective of war may be some combination of attainment and denial of one's own and the enemy's objectives. **

War's are neither all zero-sum affairs nor are they necessarily total. Herman Kahn and his co-authors of War Termination Issues and Concepts identify eleven outcomes for war ranging from unconditional and total victory to unconditional and total surrender; in between are more ambiguous outcomes that include co-winners or co-losers (1968, 51).

Thus, adversarial objectives may overlap, parallel, or directly conflict. Moreover, objectives will differ in ambition and intensity.

Examples of war objectives, in addition to Clausewitz's imperative of vanquishing the adversary's military, include territorial and resource acquisition, promotion or

*See chapter II, section C. for discussion of the interdependence of politics and war in Soviet strategic thought.

**As discussed in chapter III, for the USSR, this may include the political and military dissolution of NATO and the denial of U.S. military and political influence in Europe.
infliction of punishment, preservation of a status quo relationship, and attainment of influence or control over the policies of another state (Randle 1973, 33-34).*

Although the objectives are varied, each is politically motivated and likely reflects the requisite conditions for terminating the war. More important than the specific objectives may be the intensity and scope of the objectives; in other words, are the objectives unlimited, subject to change, or purposefully limited? How the objectives correspond to these three categories may indicate the potential for realizing the desired conditions for terminating the war.

B. UNLIMITED OBJECTIVES

Unlimited objectives entail decisive and possibly total termination conditions. At the least, a belligerent seeking unlimited objectives will require severe submission of the adversary to end the war; at most, the adversary may cease to exist.

Total victory is the successful outcome of a war fought for unlimited objectives.** The victor would have established the ability to freely impose its will upon the

*See chapter II, section C. for a Soviet listing of "Limited strategic objectives," according to Kuznetsov, that is far more offensive in nature and which offers no alternative other than some degree of victory.

**See chapter II, section B. for the Soviet perspective on total victory.
vanquished, probably by securing an unconditional surrender.

The Allies' objective of unconditional surrender for the Axis powers in World War II is described by Paul Kecskemeti as "designed to make sure that the winners, in accepting surrender, would not unwittingly permit the survival of potential forces of aggression." (1958, 216) Thus, the removal of the adversaries' capability to ever commit aggression was the Allies' requisite termination condition.

Unlimited objectives seek to decisively eliminate threats, to establish permanent domination, to secure a lasting peace (Kecskemeti 1958, 218). Though such objectives may suggest the ideal outcome for a victorious belligerent, actual attainment of this ideal is often unrealistic. A war fought for unlimited objectives could entail disastrous consequences for the belligerent seeking such a total victory.

1. Problems with Unlimited Objectives

The scope of unlimited objectives may preclude attainment. Unlimited objectives may be illusory, may be disconnected from political requirements, and may be ultimately pyrrhic if realized.
a. Illusory Objective

Unlimited objectives may simply be too difficult to realize.* In addition to complicating the war effort, enforcement of harsh termination requirements in the post-war environment would be problematic and could severely strain the victor (Kaplan 1980, 74).

Objectives that cannot be achieved may inevitably accumulate costs that outweigh potential benefits (Kaplan 1980, 73). However, the immutable and total character of the objective may blind the belligerent to emerging reality, as may have happened to Hitler during World War II, and the point of optimal termination of the war is lost (Foster and Brewer 1976, 15). Thus, not only is the objective unattainable but prospects for lesser objectives for terminating the war may be foreclosed.

It is possible that unlimited objectives are unattainable because they leave the adversary no option but to fight. Kecskemeti, in his study Strategic Surrender suggests that the Allies' requirement of unconditional surrender fueled resistance by instilling the fear of national extinction in Germany and Japan; therefore, the war was unnecessarily prolonged and allied costs were increased (1958, 223). However, although Kecskemeti

*See chapter II, section C. for discussion on how the Soviet calculation of the correlation of forces and the constraints of fighting a conventional war may interact to prevent objectives from exceeding reality.
recognizes the potential for an adversary's perceptions to complicate and possibly to deny unlimited objectives, he concludes that it was the Allies' unreasonable resistance to pursue limited conditions for termination that actually prolonged WWII (1958, 226-228).

b. Political Disconnect

As discussed earlier, political objectives determine the objectives of a war. However, a war fought for unlimited objectives may become disconnected from the political objectives that originally motivated the conflict.*

Ideology is a motivating factor in conducting a war. Because of the uncompromising nature of many ideologies, a state may be locked into a war for unlimited objectives that are divorced from political utility and reality. The force of ideology may prevent political leaders from even considering a limited settlement to a war (Randle 1970, 85).**

Democratic cultures may be particularly prone to the ideological trap by perceiving war as a decisive

*See chapter II, sections A. and C. The Soviets claim that war is the continuation of politics by other means, thus war can never be separated from politics; rather, war must advance political objectives.

**See chapter II, section D; chapter III, section A. Certainly, the USSR is ideologically driven but it is argued that the Soviets view war as advancing the victory of communism and not necessarily securing, by itself, the final victory of communism.
crusade of good over evil, thereby neglecting political considerations (Kecskemeti 1958, 26). One study suggests that the clash of ideologies contributed to Franklin Roosevelt's refusal to consider terminating WWII short of the total defeat and unconditional surrender of the Axis forces (Dornan and others 1978, 7).

Wars may be fought between opposing coalitions. A minimal objective in such wars is for a coalition to emerge from battle intact. However, a quest for unlimited objectives may complicate efforts to maintain alliance cohesion for several reasons. First, the difficult demands placed on belligerents aspiring to unlimited objectives may internally strain the belligerents and thus adversely affect the coalition (Kaplan 1980, 74).

Second, reaching a consensus over the importance of unlimited objectives and the strategy for attaining the objectives could divide rather than unite the alliance (Kaplan 1980, 77). Thus, seeking to terminate a war upon achieving decisive objectives may undermine the foundations of security provided by an alliance while failing to secure the desired objectives.*

Future wars may involve the use of nuclear weapons to secure political objectives; however, the use of

*See chapter IV. The fragility of the Warsaw Pact suggests the need for the Soviets to limit their objectives for war termination rather than risk the dissolution of their current security system.
nuclear weapons may actually be counter-productive to certain objectives (Fox 1970, 10). For example, even if objectives are initially limited, the potential damage involved in fighting a nuclear war could result in a loss of political control over military actions, thereby creating a sequence of destruction devoid of political purpose (Gray 1986, 84). Furthermore, as pointed out by Kecskemeti, a large scale nuclear war that could destroy a majority of the belligerents' populations would serve no political purpose (1970, 112-113).*

War-fighting that becomes removed from political objectives fosters a war with no purpose. It may be that as objectives approach the extreme of totality, the potential for political disconnect increases.

c. Pyrrhic Objectives

Unlimited objectives have the potential to achieve total victory; they also may lead to a pyrrhic victory, especially in a nuclear war (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 51). As one source noted, objectives that are too unlimited could see the "spoils of victory turned to ashes." (Kaplan 1980, 74)

Nuclear war plainly has the potential to wreak grave mutual destruction upon the adversaries in the

*See chapter II, section C., 2.; chapter III, section D., 1. for political and military reasons why the Soviets may prefer fighting a conventional war.
conflict. Moreover, unknown ecological damage resulting from nuclear use could pose a broader global threat. Thus, pursuing unlimited objectives through a strategic nuclear war could produce no victor.* Even an intended limited nuclear use could rapidly escalate if severe time constraints obscured decision-making.**

However, the controllability of nuclear war is not at issue here; rather the question is whether nuclear weapons can contribute to the successful attainment of unlimited objectives. One possible outcome of the employment of nuclear weapons toward such objectives is a pyrrhic victory which does not serve a rational political purpose. Rationality is only likely to be evident through objectives that seek more limited conditions for war termination.

C. LIMITING OBJECTIVES

States may enter a war with firm objectives. However, the course of the war is likely to affect the probabilities associated with the realization of those objectives. Frequently, objectives must be tempered to coincide with

*See chapter II, section C., 2. The Soviets have declared that nuclear war could produce no victors yet the Soviets have also claimed to be the inevitable victor in a future war.

**See Wohlstetter, 1985 for further discussion on potential ecological and control problems postulated in nuclear war scenarios.
the reality of the war. Thus, conditions for termination may be reduced as the war progresses.*

There are numerous reasons for limiting objectives during a war such as a deterioration in the military situation, exhaustion of resources, internal social and political unrest, or simply the realization that the original objectives are unattainable (Handel 1978, 70-71). However, recognition of and adjustment to these reasons may hinge on rationality.

1. Rationality

To limit objectives in accordance with the reality of war implies greater rationality than may be involved in the pursuit of unlimited or unyielding objectives. As the war unfolds, a rational belligerent will evaluate the potential political and military benefits and costs of a war and may adjust objectives accordingly (Kecskemeti 1958, 20-21). An assessment of the prospects and desire for achieving objectives must be a continual process for the rational belligerent (Williams 1981, 375).

A state compelled to modify its objectives may be more inclined to pursue a negotiated settlement of the war (Pillar 1983, 47-48). A rational assumption is that "the continuation of a war is riskier than a negotiated

*See chapter II, section C., 3. for two possible historical examples where the USSR might have subsequently limited its objectives as the war progressed.
settlement (the outcome of a war being more uncertain than the results of a particular settlement)." (Wittman 1979, 757) Such rational assumptions would require correct assessment of the adversary’s perceptions of the war in order to develop a potentially mutually acceptable termination strategy (Foster and Brewer 1976, 5).

Circumstances that may induce a rational state to negotiate a settlement, thereby implicitly limiting its objectives, are varied. Although an advantage on the battlefield could reduce the inclination toward negotiation, such an advantage could also increase the incentive to negotiate because of the improved bargaining position (Pillar 1983, 49). For example, although the prospects for further military success were probable once the U.S. pushed communist forces across the 38th parallel for the second time in the Korean War, the Americans instead accelerated efforts toward a negotiated settlement (Pillar 1983, 49).

Should a belligerent find itself losing a war, however, a rational decision might be to negotiate an end to the war while significant bargaining assets, such as military forces, are in possession (Fox 1970, 10). However, it must be noted that rationality implies a reasonable assessment of the war; a correct prediction of the war’s probable development; an accurate anticipation of the adversary’s assessments and intentions; and an
allowance for errors in these formulations (Carroll 1969, 302). Thus, rational behavior and accurate prediction are problematic.

Surrender may be a rational choice if the loser maintains enough bargaining strength to negotiate minimally acceptable terms (Kecskemeti 1958, 19). Although such terms may be severe, surrender may have attractions (Kecskemeti 1958, 13). For example, a state might feel compelled to surrender if, in doing so, its core values could still be maintained (Kecskemeti 1958, 14).

Other incentives for surrender may include exhaustion from the war effort or the need to conserve remaining strength for future action (Kecskemeti 1958, 14). For example, Lenin signed the severe treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans in WWI that amounted to a de-facto Russian surrender but permitted the Bolsheviks to conserve and concentrate resources on the consolidation of power in Russia (Ulam 1974, 73-74). However, the most salient reason and critical incentive for surrender may be the maintenance of national or political existence, especially in a nuclear war (Kecskemeti 1958, 236).

Whether nuclear force employment would be rational or not would be contingent on the specific circumstances. However, terminating a nuclear war before control is lost would obviously be wholly rational (although the problems of distinguishing when a nuclear war may be out of control
are not well understood). Many analysts presume that total victory in a nuclear war is unlikely because of the loss of control that a large-scale nuclear war could induce (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 120). Therefore, a rational government may be more likely to negotiate a compromise in a limited war prior to a loss of control (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 120).

Time may be another rational incentive to negotiate an end to a war. Even if a belligerent maintains a military advantage in a war, foresight may indicate the precarious duration of this advantage and therefore require a termination of the war to retain the objectives currently in hand (Handel 1978, 70-71).* Conversely, if a belligerent is losing a war with little prospect for improvement or further support, time will only worsen its position; thus settlement would seem a rational imperative (Handel 1978, 70-71).

2. Military Capabilities

A deterioration in the military situation that degrades prospects and capabilities for conducting the war may have the greatest influence in limiting objectives and adjusting termination conditions (Handel 1978, 70). If a belligerent finds itself losing the war, ambitious

*See chapter III, section D., 3. and 5. The uncertain variable of time is a likely Soviet motivation toward achieving of rapid victory.
objectives may require modification; if a belligerent is winning a war, it still may not possess the capabilities to achieve its original termination conditions.

Military capabilities to attain objectives change during the course of a war. Battlefield defeats and the attrition of resources throughout the war will inevitably make the achievement of objectives more difficult and possibly prohibitive (Pillar 1983, 46). Conversely, one side's defeat is likely to be the adversary's victory and resource depletion may be relative as one side gains an advantage (Pillar 1983, 46).* It is the loss of advantage that may compel a belligerent to limit its objectives.

As Fred Ikle points out in his classic book Every War Must End, "[t]o bring the fighting to an end, one nation or the other almost always has to revise its war aims." (1971, 96) According to Ikle, military prospects often dictate the need for and the extent of the revision in objectives (1971, 96).

3. Public Pressure

Another salient reason for limiting objectives may be a turn in public attitudes against the war effort, such as occurred to the United States during the Vietnam War (Handel 1978, 63). Such pressure is most likely to be felt and have an effect on the objectives of open, democratic

*See chapter III, section D. Both of Pillar's points are similarly recognized by the Soviets.
societies, given the insulation of the decision-making process characteristic in closed, totalitarian governments (Handel 1978, 63).*

Reasons that public pressure may shift against the war include the length of the war, war-related economic difficulties, battlefield defeats, and the threat of worse defeat or invasion (Randle 1973, 432-433). In addition, a shift in national values that unseats the moral underpinning of the war may force the limiting of objectives (Randle 1970, 78).

Severe casualties, both military and civilian, may also turn public support against the war (Beer and Mayer 1986, 100). In his historically based study on battle casualties and population losses as predictors of war termination, Frank Klingberg suggests that "when population losses approach three of four percent, a critical period may have been reached in the nation's morale." (1966, 148)

Leading or following public pressure may be the influence of legislative bodies, mass media, and intellectual and business groups (Randle 1970, 79-81). Each may have a significant impact on the limits that the public forces upon the termination conditions of the respective belligerent.

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*See chapter III, section C., 3. The vulnerability of democratic societies is surely recognized by the Soviets, given their emphasis on the public battle.
4. Problems with Limiting Objectives

The limiting of objectives during a war does not mean that the adversary will reciprocate to draw the sides closer to termination. Moreover, rational behavior by one belligerent is no assurance of similar action by the enemy. Yet, the adversary may not pose the only problem to adjusting objectives and thus to prospects for ending a war; domestic influences can also intervene to inhibit rational war termination.

a. Political Resistance

As previously noted, resolving a war often requires political "reorientation" of values and attitudes, characterized by a modification of objectives by the loser as well as the winner (possibly in order to convince the loser of the utility of termination) (Kecskemeti 1970, 113). However, reorientation of values is not easy, especially if a rigid ideology underpins the political system (Kecskemeti 1970, 113-114).

It has been suggested that a change in government is one way to "devalue" or "de-ideologize" a war (Randle 1973, 13).* It may be the possibility of such an upheaval that entrenches a regime in the stubborn pursuit of unrealistic objectives (Ikle 1971, 98). Moreover, a

*See chapter III, section. Soviet wartime diplomacy would likely attempt to induce such changes in Western governments.
government that attempts to end a war it is losing may be ending its own regime—a potential result of either the settlement with the adversary or internal upheaval (Ikle 1971, 69). Thus, fear for regime survival may lock the government in a losing cause rather than promoting negotiations toward some minimally favorable settlement.

Ikle refers to the "treason of the hawks" who, by requiring success as the sole condition for termination, may fight for too much, for too long, or even for too little and thereby harm themselves and their country (1971, 61-64). As stated by Ikle,

In so many crises of war termination, 'hawks' have grossly neglected threats to the political future of their nation in stubborn pursuit of some secondary objectives, such as territorial possessions at the periphery of their homeland or ephemeral arrangements regarding the military balance.... Engrossed by real or imaginary opportunities on the military front, they redouble their efforts for short-term gains. (1971, 81-82)

Although peace may be desired, the possibility of accepting defeat is rejected (Coser 1961, 352). Furthermore, a renunciation of objectives, even if a return to the pre-war status quo is possible, may be unacceptable if perceived as a defeat (O'Connor 1969, 380).

Therefore, hollow hopes for a military reversal, increased foreign assistance, better negotiating conditions, or "that some untoward event will adversely affect the enemy's capacity to wage war" (Randle 1970, 84) may prolong a war beyond reasonable costs. What is lost,
observes Ikle, is the everyday notion of "cutting one's losses." (1971, 83) Thus, in prolonging an unsuccessful war, greater losses are incurred than would have been had objectives been limited (Ikle 1971, 83).

It may be especially difficult for political leaders to limit or abandon objectives for which grave sacrifices in lives have been made (Ikle 1971, 98). Although it was noted earlier that the public can influence the limiting of war objectives, the public may also encourage the continuation of the war to justify the costs incurred (Foster and Brewer 1976, 15).

Depending on the intent of the government, public pressure could either support policies that prolong the war or constrain political activities that might otherwise seek an early termination. In the latter case, convincing the public that the national interest lies in terminating the war may be as difficult as originally demonstrating to a public the imperative of fighting a war (Coser 1961, 351).**

*See chapter III, section D., 2. Soviet wartime diplomacy might attempt to remind Western nations of the advantage of cutting losses by implicit and, possibly, explicit reminders of Moscow's potential to dominate escalation.

**Soviet support would likely be readily forthcoming to convince Western publics that their national interest lies in terminating a war with the Soviets, provided Moscow's interests were served. See chapter III, section C., 3.
For instance, much inflammatory rhetoric may be showered upon the public to secure its support for the war; any limitation or compromise in the war may be seen as treason, based on ingrained perceptions of the enemy (O'Connor 1969, 379). Ikle identifies Italy in 1943 as an example where domestic pressures to continue fighting contributed to the government's failure to limit its objectives and negotiate a favorable war termination (1971, 34-35).

Internal political struggles could also complicate the limiting of objectives and the termination of a war. Although certain factions may seek to terminate the war,* other parties may implore the pursuit of the original objectives (Coser 1961, 350). For example, according to Ikle, although members within the German government in WWI predicted the inevitable stalemating of the war, the objective of acquiring territory on the eastern and western fronts was not abandoned and the regime, Germany, and much of Europe suffered the consequences (1971, 8-9).

The study of the Boer War by C.R. Mitchell and Michael Nicholson presented in the Journal of Conflict Resolution illustrates the effects of internal struggle on war termination. In general, they conclude that "different

*These factions would be likely targets for Soviet wartime diplomacy. See chapter III, section C., 1.
preference orderings or utility functions within parties in conflict can have a major impact in determining when a war will end and when a peace settlement will finally be agreed upon." (Mitchell and Nicholson 1983, 515) The study notes that internal struggles are applicable to single governments as well as alliances (Mitchell and Nicholson 1983, 516).

The alliance Mitchell and Nicholson refer to was between the independent governments of Transvaal and the Orange Free State in opposition to Great Britain. Differences in objectives for fighting and terminating the war with the British forged an unproductive cleavage between the two parties and may have contributed to their defeat (Mitchell and Nicholson 1983, 515).

Thus, alliances are not always united in objectives. It is probable that alliance members differ in perspectives, capabilities, and doctrine (Randle 1973, 123). Such differences are likely to impact on objectives and could, similar to disputes within a government, either prolong or shorten a war.*

The internal dispute within a single government, as described by Mitchell and Nicholson, was between the British political and military administrations

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*See chapter IV. It is argued that the Warsaw Pact would serve to constrain Soviet objectives, possibly requiring a shorter war.
in South Africa. The former sought the unconditional surrender of the Boers; the latter supported pursuit of a negotiated settlement (Mitchell and Nicholson 1983, 511-512). As a result of the dispute, the war effort may have been prolonged (Mitchell and Nicholson 1983, 515-516).

b. Military Resistance

As illustrated by Mitchell and Nicholson, the internal dispute is often between military and political leaders. War inevitably enhances the power of the military as diplomacy is subordinated to war-fighting concerns; however, this sudden power may create opportunity for internal conflict (Ikle 1971, 13).

A military is trained to win wars; to seek a termination under unfavorable conditions runs contrary to most military thought (Handel 1978, 61). Just as with much of the Japanese military elite during WWII, military leaders often "refuse to admit that a war has been lost or cannot be decisively won." (Handel 1978, 61) Thus, limiting objectives may be antithetical to military proclivities.*

In addition to rejecting compromise in a losing effort, with battlefield success, military leaders may also become opposed to settlement (Handel 1978, 62). For

*Soviet recognition of such military proclivities might offer of partial explanation of Soviet plans for attacks upon military C2. See chapter III, section D., 5., a.
example, Handel describes the Allied High Command's objection to an armistice with Germany in WWI once the allies had established an advantage (Handel 1978, 62).

More often, as Kecskemeti points out, military leaders who reject limiting objectives have over-estimated their capabilities in a losing effort thereby securing a disastrous outcome (1970, 108). Kecskemeti refers to this as the "Irreversibility Principle" where a military trend is evaluated as not having stabilized and therefore still reversible (1970, 108). Having made this faulty evaluation, the military (as well as the political) leaders fall into the trap of devoting additional reserves and resources to a war effort to secure an outcome beyond reach (Kecskemeti 1970, 108). Hence, instead of limiting objectives and possibly terminating the war while negotiating power is still evident, capabilities are squandered and the consequences of defeat are exacerbated.

c. Escalation

Related to Kecskemeti's "Irreversibility Principle" is the problem of escalation. It may be that both political and military leaders, indoctrinated in the psychology of power, are averse to limiting objectives. Political and military leaders may assume that the adversary will yield first, thus a more total victory rather than a limited compromise may be pursued (Quester 1970, 34). In this case, escalation may seem the logical
response, even if events are running counter to expectations.

Although the reasons for not limiting objectives are quantitatively similar to those favoring limitation, they may seem qualitatively superior to political and military decision-makers. Reasons for not limiting objectives may include perceptions of political, military, and economic advantages; belief that time favors one's own cause; prospects of increased capabilities and support; domestic stability; and an evaluation that negotiations offer little promise (Handel 1978, 70-71).

The danger lies in the intoxicating potential of distorted perceptions concerning the panacea of escalation. Unfounded expectations assigned to unfeasible objectives may block consideration of alternatives, therefore prolonging and possibly escalating a war "long past the point where a 'rational' calculation would indicate that the war should be ended...." (Ikle 1971, 16)

Especially in a losing effort, according to Ikle, escalation becomes an irrational "mental escape" for the decision-maker (1971, 56). For such a decision-maker, notes Ikle, the "sense of reality seems to shrink as he is being pushed closer to the agonizing choice between surrender, on the one hand, and seeing his country occupied or destroyed, on the other." (1971, 56)
Similarly, Kecskemeti observed that wars tend to become more total as belligerents are faced with defeat or even stalemate; in such cases, prolongation and possibly escalation, rather than termination, may become the preferred options (1958, 18). Moreover, escalation is not necessarily the desperate response of an irrational decision-maker. Even for the rational leader, impending defeat may not be evident, thus escalation may seem reasonably promising (Mitchell 1981, 181).*

Even if the losing side resists temptations to escalate, the adversary may seek to exploit its advantage by expanding its objectives, possibly through escalation (Ikle 1971, 13). It is also possible that the belligerent winning a war may escalate the conflict to induce the adversary to surrender. In either case, a more favorable or a quicker termination is not necessarily ensured for the belligerent conducting the escalation (Holsti 1966, 278).

Although a successful escalation strategy may ensure victory or convince the adversary to seek peace, escalation may also prompt counter-escalation; may increase the military, economic, and social costs of the war; and may extend the perimeter of destruction over previously

*The Soviets may expect that by exploiting their potential ability to dominate escalation, the West could be convinced of the futility of initiating escalation, thereby precluding the mutually debilitating effects of such a process. See chapter III, section D., 2.
unaffected homeland. Moreover, rather than shortening the war, escalation might further entrench the fighting and widen the gap for settlement as the stakes accumulate for the belligerents involved. (Ikle 1971, 40-41)*

Rather than escalation, George Quester suggests that de-escalation is a prerequisite for promoting the process of war termination (186, 61). However, de-escalation would have to be a mutual process; a unilateral de-escalation might only be a perceived by the adversary as an opportunity to increase its objectives and exploit an emerging advantage (Wittman 1979, 752). Thus, as noted by Quester, de-escalation would be difficult to conduct and verify, assuming that the intent was successfully communicated and mutually accepted (1986, 61).

d. Communication

A belligerent that achieves its objectives or limits its objectives enough to seek an end to the war must still communicate, in some form, its desire to engage in the termination process. Furthermore, the adversary must agree to at least participate in the communication and eventual negotiation process in order to end the war in a manner short of total obliteration.

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*The Soviets may view escalation as a possible option in a future war; however, their desire to maintain control may preclude certain escalation strategies. See chapter II, section C., 2.; chapter III, section D., 1. and 2.
However, agreeing to communicate and to negotiate may be the essence of the problem of war termination. The limiting of objectives requires compromise but the adversaries may not be prepared to bargain in good faith toward such a compromise (Holsti 1966, 276).

As previously described, a belligerent's perception of the war may coincide with the military situation which in turn may affect the desire to negotiate a termination of the war. Because perceptions and situations will differ among the belligerents, it cannot be presumed that desires to negotiate will coincide (Pillar 1983, 54). For example, it is possible that a participant in a war will resist any move toward communication and negotiation until an advantage is secured (Craig and George 1983, 225). Should each belligerent pursue such a prerequisite, war termination will inevitably be postponed (Craig and George 1983, 225).

Moreover, a certain stigma may be attached to negotiating with the enemy. Desire to negotiate may be seen by the adversary as a sign of weakness or an admission of defeat (Carroll 1969, 309). In addition, a belligerent may perceive negotiation as cheapening its war effort, thereby hardening the desire not to compromise war objectives (Ikle 1971, 85-86). Negotiation may also inadvertently prolong the war, should one side draw the conclusion that the adversary is about to concede; assuming this, a belligerent
may forego bargaining and seek a military victory expected to yield greater results (Quester 1970, 34).

When the point in a war is reached where one or all parties are ready to negotiate, the actual communication may still be a problem. Foremost is the question of who to negotiate with. It may not be clear who is leading the adversary, given possible internal upheaval within a government during a war (Mitchell 1981, 193).*

The problem of uncertainty is exacerbated if, for example, an internal struggle within an adversary generates a split in the control of military forces (Mitchell 1981, 193).

Once the leadership is identified, it may then be realized that the means of communication are inadequate for several reasons (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 122). First, diplomatic channels are often severed at the onset of hostilities, thereby eliminating a common peacetime avenue of communication (Holsti 1966, 279). Although diplomacy may eventually be instrumental in terminating a war, the early absence of diplomatic channels to convey objectives may preclude a quicker end to the war.**

*If the Soviets destroy the leadership (see chapter III, section D., 5., a. and d.), they may not have a negotiating partner. However, if the Soviets succeed in installing favorable governments, communication and subsequent negotiation may be readily facilitated. See chapter III, section C., 2.

**Soviet wartime diplomacy might seek to avoid unnecessary prolonging of a war. See chapter III, section C. and D., 2.
Second, the signaling of intent, in the absence of direct communications, may be an ineffective substitute. As expressed by T.R. Fox, "the central question in the typical problem of war termination remains how one side can maximize the chance that its peace overtures will elicit a favorable response from the other side" (1970, 12); signaling may not be an adequate answer to this question.

Problems with signaling start with "the limits of human intellectual competence." (Quester 1970, 33). Specifically, a signal may be missed or misperceived by the recipient or signal clarity may be overrated by the sender (Quester 1970, 33).

Moreover, a signal is subject to the inherent distrust that will exist between wartime adversaries (Quester 1970, 35). It would not be unreasonable for a belligerent to send a misleading or deceptive signal in order to derive some type of advantage, thus it is not unreasonable for an adversary to disbelieve the signals of its foe (Williams 1981, 378).*

A signal consisting of a unilateral action such as a cease fire, although risky, may be required if the signal is to be effective. Otherwise, the question posed by Quester becomes rhetorical: "Even if war termination

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*Lack of Western credibility and fear of deception might be a problem for Warsaw Pact countries that might otherwise desire to rebel against Soviet domination. See chapter IV, sections C., 4., b. and d.
signals are clear, can anyone dare to terminate a war on the basis of them, if such signals do not seem to bind the signaler?" (1970, 37)

Finally, there is the problem of the technical aspects of communication. Necessary elements in a wartime communication structure include an acknowledged command authority; surviving command centers; attack warning and assessment capabilities; and intelligence information on the condition of allies, adversaries, and neutrals, as well as one's own country (Leahy [1988], 171-174). Communications, in addition to those between adversaries, must be maintained to one's own military forces, to command nodes within the government, to allies and neutrals, and to the civilian population (Leahy [1988], 172-173).*

Maintaining communications to one's own military forces is critical to the success of political signaling and the limiting of objectives. For example, the failure to coordinate political and military efforts could undermine attempts at a cease fire or intentions to de-escalate military operations (Quester 1970, 33).

Survivable communications are, of course, crucial to the war termination process. However, under the

*Communication and overall control in a nuclear war may be especially problematic. Therefore, the Soviets may prefer to contain combat to the conventional level. See chapter II, section C., 2.; chapter III, section D., 1.; chapter IV, section C., 3.
potentially severe conditions of modern warfare, it is not hard to envision difficulties in maintaining some or all of the demanding communication requirements. Thus, given a desire to limit objectives, a belligerent may be unable to communicate such intent. With the inability to communicate a desire or intention to limit objectives, the war would probably continue.

D. LIMITED OBJECTIVES

The primary question in this section is whether a state may enter a war with objectives other than the total defeat of the enemy that, once attained, define the conditions for terminating the war. To fight a war for definite, limited objectives implies forethought and rationality prior to entering a war, as well as during the fighting.* In general, such objectives aim toward obtaining specific benefits or avoiding impending costs (Pillar 1983, 38).

Although it may be questionable to assume the rationality that is implicit in a war fought for limited objectives, it may not be totally unreasonable. As Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman point out, WWII and the Vietnam War both could have been more unlimited but the threat of

*Such traits may be attributed to the Soviets. See chapter II, section C., 1.
overwhelming destruction may have induced some rational limitation (1968, 70).

Von Clausewitz may have best captured the rational argument for limited objectives:

The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need to make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. (1984, 81).*

According to Kecskemeti, unlimited war "exists only in abstract thought; practical action is always subject to limitations" that may include postwar political considerations and coalition constraints (1970, 110).** In addition, Kecskemeti recognizes that "the optimal final outcome for a belligerent may be one that falls short of the best military outcome he could achieve" because of the possibility of paying "too much for victory." (1958, 20) Therefore, recognition of the limitations in formulating termination objectives could enhance the prospects for success while eliminating the costs incurred during a quest for total victory.***

*See chapter III. It is argued that in a war with NATO, the Soviets may follow Clausewitz's advice.

**See chapter IV. Coalition constraints may limit Soviet objectives.

***This is a primary argument in this thesis for limited Soviet objectives for war termination.
1. Preserving the Spoils

Warfare is costly in military, civilian, and material terms as well as in other opportunities that are sacrificed in pursuit of war objectives (Pillar 1983, 38). Because such costs are inherent in a war, the spoils of war or the gains accumulated through the fulfillment of objectives must be enduring and must justify and minimize the sacrifices.* Limited objectives may best fulfill these intentions.

Preserving gains may be a particularly precarious process, given the nature of modern weapons. Thus, limited objectives may acquire greater urgency in a future war. For example, it is unlikely, even in the worst case, that either the U.S. or the USSR could be totally disarmed in a nuclear first strike. Therefore, each may retain substantial capability to damage the adversary.

Hence, given the devastating potential of either side to deny the other the spoils of victory, should a war occur, the incentive may exist to limit objectives and possibly the nature of the war to a conventional level (Abt 1985, 42). As noted by Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman, "the presence of nuclear weapons is likely to prove a powerful

*See chapter II, section D.; chapter III, section E. For the Soviets, it is argued that the gains of war could serve as the basis for a greater victory, thus such spoils must be preserved.
inducement to clear and/or cautious thinking" about the conduct and objectives of a war (1968, 66).

Kecskemeti concludes that nuclear weapons force states to "accustom themselves to thinking in terms of relatively small political payoffs"; otherwise, the risk is a devastating loss (1958, 257). To lose more than is initially possessed or to have gains destroyed would violate an ancient objective of war. Sun Tzu advised in 500BC that the aim of war "must be to take All-under-Heaven intact," thus ensuring that "troops are not worn out and...gains will be complete." (1971, 79) In a large-scale nuclear war, gains may not be intact or even usable.*

Conventional war may be most appropriate for the attainment of limited objectives, given the potential effects of nuclear war (Kaplan 1980, 73). If the war objectives include territorial or resource acquisition, conventional war may be more appropriate for maintaining the utility of the objectives (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 60).

Thus, gains may be lost because objectives are not limited enough. A belligerent that, rather than seeking termination upon the attainment of certain objectives,

*See chapter II, section C., 2.; chapter III, section D., 1. It is possible the Soviets recognize both productive and counterproductive effects of nuclear weapons and may adjust their military strategy accordingly.
pursues further gains may overextend its capabilities and defeat itself (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 120).*

Moreover, for a belligerent at a disadvantage in a war, failure to be bound by limited objectives, such as forcing a stalemate, could be disastrous (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 120). A firm commitment to carefully calculated objectives could avoid over-extension and self-inflicted defeat.

Perhaps the optimal way to preserve the gains of war may be to quickly secure the objectives and seek an early termination of the war (Handel 1978, 68). A rapid war would most likely imply significantly limited objectives but the minimal benefits derived from secured gains may grossly outweigh the costs of flawed ambitions.**

2. Realpolitik

Limited objectives imply not only rationality but also a realistic acceptance of the constraints upon power. Should, for example, the total defeat of an adversary be realized, the victor may still be unable to fill the sudden "vacuum of power" or to cope with the disruption

*See chapter III, section D., 1. and 5., b. In the example of Europe, it is possible the Soviets intend to exploit, rather than to destroy, Western resources.

**See chapter III, section D., 3. It is likely that the Soviets would seek the attainment of their objectives quickly and without over-extension, perhaps in the initial period of a war.
of a previous balance of power (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 60).

A limited objective, therefore, may aim to preserve some form of authority in a country or territory for several reasons (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 60). First, once the objectives are secured, the process of termination requires an authority to negotiate with (Schelling 1966, 128). Second, an authority with which to communicate the limits of the objectives may facilitate negotiation and an easier termination (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 119). Finally, maintaining an authority with the power to control domestic affairs may relieve the victor of costly administration and reconstruction of a devastated, anarchic territory (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 117).*

For example, C.R. Mitchell notes that the U.S. consciously decided to maintain a Japanese government after WWII to conduct an orderly surrender and to assist in post-war administration, thereby minimizing American difficulties and costs (1981, 178-179).

Furthermore, the maintenance of an authority and restraint in a belligerent's objectives may facilitate the

*Soviet limited objectives in Europe may aspire to either maintain present leadership to negotiate termination or, probably preferably, to install a favorable government. In either case, the merits of maintaining some form of indigenous authority may be recognized by the Soviets. See chapter III, section C.
reintegration of a losing state into the international order (Kaplan 1980, 81). This may be particularly significant in a region with a precarious balance of power. If, for example, a losing belligerent is left unduly weak, it may be open to attack or exploitation by a third party, possibly requiring rescue by the same belligerent that fostered its vulnerability (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 116).

A belligerent that is forced to carry on a losing struggle because its adversary leaves it no option other than unconditional surrender is only further weakened, thus more subject to third party exploitation (Kecskemeti 1958, 229). Moreover, in the quest for unconditional surrender, a belligerent may inadvertently create an opportunity for third party imposition upon the spoils of victory.

For example, according to Kecskemeti, the U.S. insistence on a Japanese unconditional surrender in WWII forged the opening for the Soviet Union's brief but profitable (from Moscow's perspective) involvement in the war and the subsequent settlement in Asia (1958, 229). Thus, limited objectives may be more realistically attainable as well as retainable upon terminating the war.

3. Revenge Avoidance

Ideally, the attainability of limited objectives is accompanied by a reasonable degree of palatability for the adversary. The attractiveness of termination to a
belligerent may correlate to the severity of the costs of the war; in other words, the more limited the objectives of the adversary, the more acceptable the termination may be for the loser (Coser 1961, 349).

However, objectives that are extensive and a settlement that is harsh may sow the seeds of revenge in the historical memory of the loser (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 111-112). A harsh peace imposed upon a vanquished state may perpetuate domestic unrest and deprivation which in turn may encourage sentiments for vengeance similar to those developed in Germany after WWI (Kaplan 1980, 83).

In a war between the U.S. and the USSR, the primary boundary for objectives may be that which precludes the crossing of the nuclear threshold. A nuclear war that devastates one side may still leave significant nuclear assets available for a vindictive response. As noted by Quester, "[l]eaving the other side with something to live for thus gives that side a reason for restraint." (1986, 66) In other words, limited objectives may provide a restraining incentive to the loser, therefore the winner may be left with more than just a pyrrhic victory.*

*The Soviets may use their potential for escalation dominance as well as communication of limited objectives in an attempt to convince NATO countries of the desirability of war termination on Soviet terms. Revenge avoidance may not be a prime motivation unless the USSR fears a pyrrhic nuclear use by the West. See chapter III, section D., 2.
4. Problems with Limited Objectives

If a war is fought, limited objectives may constrain the conflict within some bounds of reason. However, the assumption that restraint breeds restraint may neglect human proclivities toward escalation and revenge. According to Clark Abt, a war between the U.S. and the USSR, for example, that begins with limited objectives has the potential to run out of control (1985, 45). Regardless of the limitations on objectives, restraint in war is always problematic.

a. The Rationality Assumption

The assumption that a war is undertaken with any definite conditions formulated upon which to seek termination may overrate the rationality of the belligerents.* The people conducting the war are not inherently rational (Handel 1978, 56). Moreover, rationality may decrease as the numbers of individuals involved in the decision-making process decrease (Handel 1978, 58). A prime example is Adolf Hitler, whose prolongation of WWII exceeded most definitions of rational behavior (Handel 1978, 59).

*Soviet rationality is one of the bases for the recognition of possible limited objectives for war termination. See chapter II, C.
In addition, the forethought required to develop objectives and the corresponding conditions for termination may simply be absent (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 50). As Ikle suggests, "the grand design is often woefully incomplete." (1971, 1) The problem, according to Ikle, is that "war plans tend to cover only the first act." (1971, 8) In other words, although the course of initial hostilities may be conceived, subsequent battles and the inevitable conclusion are neglected (Ikle 1971, 8).*

Reasons that objectives may be poorly conceived include domestic constraints upon military action and conflicts between the military and political leadership (Foster and Brewer 1976, 9).** The result may be a vague plan that is designed to quell dissent and keep numerous options available but that fails to create reasonable military expectations (Foster and Brewer 1976, 9).

Furthermore, even if objectives are defined, the process of ending the war may undermine them. Pillar notes that as war termination is being negotiated, the violence of the war often escalates as each side attempts to manipulate an advantage (1983, 167). In both the Korean War and the Vietnam War, both sides intensified combat in

*Forethought and careful planning are commonly attributed to the Soviets. See chapter II, section C., 1.

**Only the latter is likely to affect Soviet decision-making.
the final stages of the war (Pillar 1983, 168). Escalation, however, could harden attitudes toward settlement.*

As Ikle points out, war may foster an intolerance for "unresolved conflicts" that were deemed acceptable during peacetime (1971, 9). Therefore, the increased obstinacy of the belligerents, such as occurred during both world wars, may create unrealistic desires to ensure a greater security and a lasting peace as conditions for ending the war, regardless of the associated costs or the original objectives (Ikle 1971, 9-10). Moreover, such desires may increase in importance as the costs of the war mount (Ikle 1971, 12). Termination is thus made, at best, more difficult (Ikle 1971, 11).

Rather than definite objectives, a Rand study on war termination suggests that wars are "more often motivated by 'negative' objectives." (Foster and Brewer 1976, 8) In other words, wars are fought to avoid certain outcomes and not to attain specific objectives; therefore, objectives are poorly defined, if delineated at all (Foster and Brewer 1976, 8).**

*Thus, the USSR may prefer to contain its potential for escalation dominance to threats, thereby limiting escalation costs. See chapter III, section D., 2.

**Possibly a problem afflicting Western strategic thought.
That a state enters a war with certain objectives and that those objectives maintain focus and definition throughout the war may assume unrealistically rational behavior. More likely, what may occur once a war is begun, is that "[t]hose with power to start a war frequently come to discover that they lack the power to stop it." (Ikle 1971, 106)

b. Intoxication with Success

Objectives that start out limited may expand should a belligerent meet with success. Rather than accepting, as Kecskemeti suggests, that limited objectives may have "far-reaching political consequences" on an adversary, a belligerent may impulsively seek to impose such political consequences during the war (1958, 256). However, the result of such action may inflate the costs of the war and possibly deny even the limited objectives originally sought.

Because a war is fought with incomplete information about the power and objectives of an enemy, a belligerent may be pleasantly surprised when its war efforts achieve unanticipated success (Handel 1978, 66). However, success may be illusory and may lead to an exaggeration of one's own ability and effectiveness (Mandel 1986, 176).

For example, a large tactical success, suggests Fox, "may open the way to inflating war objectives, and
thus postpone rather than hasten the day when terms of settlement will be offered which the enemy might reasonably be expected to accept." (1970, 6-7) Victory, as defined by the attainment of objectives, is complicated and perhaps ultimately denied by such lack of restraint.

Japan's early success in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War led to an increase in its objectives for influence in Korea and Manchuria. Although the Japanese success did lead to a more favorable settlement of the war than originally anticipated, Japan was nevertheless anxious to extricate itself from a land war in Asia, recognizing the potential for the costs of the war to quickly undermine its greater global objectives. (White 1969, 360-361)

Analyst Colin Gray writes that, based on WWI and WWII, "the experience of prolonged war tends to promote an increase in war's intensity and/or in war's geographical scope." (1986, 76) It is further suggested that as wars proceed and costs accumulate, ideological resolve intensifies and the will to compromise wanes (Holsti 1966, 277). Objectives may thus be prone to swelling the longer a war continues and as ideological fervor hardens, especially for the belligerent that is currently winning.*

*The Soviets may not be immune to such processes, given their behavior in the final years of WWII and during its aftermath.
c. Strategic Disconnect

Related to the fault of becoming intoxicated with success is the overall problem of matching strategy to the objectives. For example, objectives that are too vague and general may not readily facilitate an applicable military strategy (Dunn 1987, 178). Even in the case of specific, limited objectives, a complementary military strategy is not necessarily forthcoming. As outlined by Clausewitz, the problem for the belligerent is "to set no greater military aim than would be sufficient for the achievement of his political purpose." (1984, 585).*

However, conducting a war effort to complement the attainment of specific objectives is problematic, at best. Limits may be too constraining, resulting in an ineffective military strategy and possibly enhancing the strength and confidence of the enemy as the war endures, a process similar to that experienced by the U.S. in Vietnam (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 133). Unless the military strategy complements the political objectives, attainment of the latter may not occur (Foster and Brewer 1976, 12).

Political objectives that limit military strategy may inadvertently weaken the overall military effort (Von Clausewitz 1984, 612). Analyst Keith Dunn

*See chapter II, section C.; chapter III., B., 1. The Soviets would be expected to carefully match political objectives and military strategy.
suggests that U.S. presidents have increasingly tightened civilian control over military operations and thereby constrained the military's conduct of combat (1987, 177). Such civilian control may ultimately hinder the military's ability to secure victory. Moreover, objectives that do not change or a military strategy that remains hamstrung may incur costs far beyond the initial intentions (Pillar 1983, 174).

Misperception is a primary culprit in forging a strategic disconnect. Perhaps most costly would be a miscalculation of the enemy's military potential, including its ability to secure additional allies or assistance (Ikle 1971, 22-23).* Furthermore, it is possible to either underestimate or to exaggerate an adversary's hostility toward oneself, his commitment to the war effort, and the nature of his objectives (Mandel 1986, 176). The USSR clearly underestimated the resolve and capabilities of Finland during the 1939-1940 Winter War, and the Soviets were forced to drastically revise their objectives in the face of grave and unexpected costs (Fox 1970, 6).**

Additionally, one side's decision to fight a war for limited objectives would not ensure complementary

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*The likely wartime behavior of France, China, and Japan may offer possible opportunities for miscalculation by the USSR.

**Similarly, the Soviets may underestimate Western resolve. See chapter III, section C., 3.
behavior from the adversary, even if such intent were clearly communicated (Schelling 1966, 144). To assume reciprocal behavior by the adversary could be a fatal flaw in any political/military strategy, particularly given the presence of nuclear weapons.*

If a war between the U.S. and the USSR took place, each side would have to consider the tremendous mutual capabilities to inflict devastation, regardless of previous limits or restraints (Kecskemeti 1958, 253). Colin Gray argues that in a protracted conventional war, the possibility exists for one side to employ nuclear weapons, especially to reverse a losing effort, regardless of restraint by the adversary (1986, 85). In a limited nuclear war, some analysts suggest, a certain casualty threshold may be crossed, thereby making it "impossible for leaders...to stick to restraint and selectivity." (Sloss and Stoppa-Liebl 1986, 117)

Thus, once initiated, a nuclear war may be particularly difficult to terminate. For example, there may be an inclination during the termination process, as Quester suggests, for each side "to punish the other side a little more, in light of what has already happened, to prove its willingness to carry out threats, to make

*Thus, the potential may exist for the Soviet Union to miscalculate the credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees for the protection of Western Europe.

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deterrence become effective again in the future." (1986, 65)

Similarly, Ikle argues that even a partial defeat would be unacceptable in settling a nuclear war because of a fear that a precedent would be established that only invited further aggression (1971, 123). Ikle concludes that the need to avoid such a defeat would overshadow any limited objectives to the extent that national survival would be a forgotten strategic consideration (1971, 123-124).

Hence, assumptions of mutual adversarial restraint and overall misconceptions about the enemy may contribute to a disconnect between limited political objectives and military strategy. The extent of the disconnect may determine how severely the actual termination conditions of the war deviate from the initial objectives.

d. Alliances

The pursuit of limited objectives in a war is likely to be affected by the nature of an alliance involved in the war. The assumption is made that alliances, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, include a leader among the various members (although this does not have to be the case).

In such an alliance, by pursuing limited objectives, the coalition leader may be less likely to
alienate other alliance members and thus more likely to secure their support (Kahn, Pfaff, and Stillman 1968, 119). However, even with limited war objectives, alliance cohesion is not assured.*

Alliance cohesion may be affected by internal dynamics of several types. First, members of an alliance may disagree on objectives, strategy, and the eventual war termination process (Randle 1973, 118). Success in the latter may depend directly on alliance cohesion and strength. If some members have defected or become neutral, leverage in the war termination process is likely to be diminished (Randle 1973, 120-121).**

Second, the course and outcome of the war is not likely to produce a balanced distribution within the alliance of the costs and benefits of the war. Dissent may become evident in the members who suffered most and gained least in pursuit of war objectives, especially if the coalition leader gathers most of the spoils. (Randle 1973, 122)***

*See chapter IV for potential Soviet problems with the Warsaw Pact.

**It is argued that the USSR might attempt to encourage the neutrality of NATO countries (see chapter III, section C. and D. 2.).

***This may be a problem for the USSR. See chapter IV, section C., 4., a.
Third, a larger alliance membership may increase the variance concerning objectives and strategy. However, the magnitude of the variance will probably depend on the strength and control of the alliance leader. (Randle 1973, 122)

The key point is that even a belligerent in pursuit of limited objectives may be constrained further by the internal dynamics of its respective coalition.* Such constraints may be manifested in defections and separate peace agreements signed by former alliance members with the enemy (Foster and Brewer 1976, 15).

Kecskemeti proposes that in coalitions in which members may distrust the intentions of the alliance leader, defections or constraints of some type may be greater (1958, 21).** An alliance maintained through coercion (such as the Warsaw Pact) may be particularly prone to some degree of dissolution.

Furthermore, alliance members may perform inadequately on the battlefield or may be ineffective because of their own internal strife (Randle 1970, 84). In sum, any debilitation within an alliance may shift the correlation of forces enough to cause originally limited

*The major thesis of chapter IV.

**A possibility favoring Western interests, given potential Soviet problems with the Warsaw Pact. See chapter IV.
objectives to become unattainable (Foster and Brewer 1976, 15).

Conversely, a belligerent's actions may also be constrained by allies that demand a greater victory. Even if a coalition leader has achieved its limited objectives in a war and is ready to seek termination, its alliance partners, for better or worse, may compel the leader to continue the war for further gain. (Foster and Brewer 1976, 15)

Thus, the internal dynamics of an alliance could adversely affect the limited objectives of the coalition leader, possibly leading to an unfavorable conclusion to the war. The internal difficulties of one alliance may represent opportunities for the rival coalition.*

e. War as an End

It has been observed that wars since WWII have been limited in scope and geography. However, the process of war has the potential to erase intentions of limited objectives. Hostility flamed by the ferocity of battle may blind ambitions to no less than total victory. The violence of war may foment unyielding skepticism over possibilities for future peace, thereby foreclosing thoughts of restraint (Ikle 1971, 107). War thus becomes an end in itself and

*Such difficulties and opportunities may affect both American and Soviet strategy. See chapter III; chapter IV. 185
limits short of totally defeating the enemy may be forgotten (Foster and Brewer 1976, 6).

E. CONCLUSION

Victory, one analyst suggests, "is a highly elastic term, used to denote a wide variety of outcomes, whether military, political, or economic." (Carroll 1980, 53) Moreover, wars do not necessarily end in a discernible victory and defeat (Carroll 1969, 306-307). One way to define victory in a war may be the relationship of pre-war and intra-war objectives of the belligerents to the final outcome (Carroll 1969, 305).

Thus, the objectives of the war may define the type and the extent of the victory. The more limited the objectives, the more realistic may be the possibility of attaining victory. That is, total victory may be impossible, although even a moderate victory is not certain.

However, by seeking to terminate a war upon the achievement of calculated, limited objectives, a belligerent may secure the foundation of a greater victory through other means, such as political and economic measures. It may be beyond the scope of a meaningful victory, especially in a war between the U.S. and the USSR,
to expect to secure the "fruit" of total victory (Carroll 1980, 69).

Rather than seeking to absolutely destroy the adversary's military strength, it may be sufficient to establish in the adversary the perceptual realization that its "position is politically and strategically equivalent to defenselessness," given the futility of continued hostilities (Kecskemeti 1958, 107). The adversaries could each then limit losses by terminating the war but a fundamental change in relationships would have been forged through the outcome of the war (Kecskemeti 1958, 107).

The new relationship may leave the loser vulnerable to some degree of peacetime exploitation by the victor, thereby establishing the basis for a greater triumph (Carroll 1980, 69-70). Similarly, the victor may emerge in a position that facilitates the attainment of further gains, as did Japan after the Russo-Japanese War (White 1969, 363-364).

According to Keskemeti, "[t]he military outcome...will provide a basis for distributing political payoffs," yet "[t]he military outcome...does not determine the magnitude of these payoffs, by itself." (1970, 107) The magnitude of the payoffs will likely be expressed in the process that

*Thus, it is argued that war is only a partial means to an end for the Soviets. See chapter II, section A.; chapter III, section A. and B.
settles the war and, in the longer term, by the change in the relationship between the belligerents.

In conclusion, limited objectives for terminating a war may establish the basis for further political victory after the war has ended. For the Soviet Union, it is suggested that limited objectives in a war against NATO could be critical to Moscow's long term struggle for victory.
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