HISTORICAL LINKAGES BETWEEN DoD RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ARMY CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT WARFIGHTING CINCs

Final Report

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COMMENTS

Comments pertaining to this study are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050.
FOREWORD

This study examines developments in the last ten years that shaped and stimulated recent changes in the relationships of Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of combatant commands with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military departments. The study finds that new CINC authority in their own commands and greater access to the Department of Defense (DoD) planning process were long-standing requirements that came to fruition as logical corollaries to related reorganizations and reforms throughout the DoD.

This document was prepared at the request of the ADCSOPS, Force Development and Integration, HQDA, on 15 September 1987. It is a final report prepared by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. As such, it does not reflect official positions of the Army War College or the approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, or the Department of the Army.

The study drew valuable assistance from members of the Army War College staff and faculty, HQDA and OJCS staff, and others in the Department of Defense who reviewed drafts or responded to requests for information.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the unified, combatant commands formally entered the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1984 through channels other than, and in addition to, the Service departments. With representation at Defense Resources Board (DRB) policy and strategy formulations and Program Reviews, the CINCs now have expanded opportunities to influence strategic guidance and resource allocations which shape the plans and capabilities of the combatant commands. These changes in the CINCs' access and influence followed ten years in which changes occurred in policy and strategy guidance, DoD organization, and JCS organization and responsibilities. The purpose of this study is to show the historical context in which the roles of the CINCs changed, with emphasis on the last ten years.

The Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, ODCSOPS requested the study in a 15 September 1987 memorandum to the Director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. This request originated with a 31 August 1987 memorandum from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, Force Development and Integration. The study focuses on how policy and strategy guidance have changed; how CINCs' participation in the formulation of policy and strategy has changed; and, how campaign plans have been developed and coordinated with joint strategy and policy.

In the early 1980s, policy and strategy guidance took on a global perspective. Force development no longer used an assumption of one major and one minor war fought simultaneously. The Integrated Planning Scenario that was used to encourage the Services to develop forces from a common base implied the possibility of global war in which theater boundaries would be blurred. Moreover, our strategy was not to be dictated by the enemy's choice of where to attack; the enemy must be faced with the risk that a conflict could become wider in scope, geography, and violence than he was prepared to deal with. This view was soon amended to reflect U.S. interests and resource availability. Guidance established regional priorities for planning. U.S. forces were not available to defend everywhere against every threat at all times. War may become global, but we should first try to confine it to its theater of origin. Although this guidance carried the tone of initiative and implied the development of greater strength, the global versus regional focuses remained as they were before the revision in guidance. The CINCs must plan regionally, as their first priority. The JCS and the Services must maintain a global perspective. Logically, the different perspectives could cause conflicts in setting priorities for resource allocations. Theoretically, the CINCs' greater access to the PPBS and their continuing partnership with the Services in both the PPBS and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) would provide ample opportunities to minimize conflicts.

The Reagan Administration reviewed DoD management soon after taking office. Among the significant findings were conflicts created by changes under earlier Secretaries of Defense such as overly specific guidance to the Services from the OSD with resultant friction; unworkable Zero-Based Budgeting; insufficient execution and feedback from planning functions; and,
lack of Service participation in the DRB and insufficient participation from the JCS. Moreover, poor guidance on resource constraints led to a Joint Strategic Planning document that contained higher force levels than could be met within fiscal guidance. Secretary Weinberger centralized policymaking, decentralized operational authority and responsibility, and included the Services as full participants in the PPBS system.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 reformed the organization of the JCS. The changes were stimulated by the Chairman of the JCS and Chief of Staff, Army in 1982. Their proposals were to strengthen the role of the Chairman, limit Service involvement in the Joint process, improve training for Joint assignments, and improve feedback from the CINCs to determine better if they were receiving what they needed. Legislation expanded the authority and responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Staff, and the authority of the CINCs. It is too soon to evaluate the results.

Most CINCs do not develop campaign plans, as such; they develop Operations Plans, Contingency Plans, and Operations Orders under the Joint Operations Planning System. This latter system is linked to the Joint Strategic Planning System by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Some CINCs also plan in the context of international commands such as NATO and the Combined Forces Command in Korea. Before Integrated Priority Lists were submitted by the CINCs to the CJCS and inserted in the Service POMs, the CINCs' needs, priorities, and shortfalls in resources were serviced by the Military Departments exclusively. Examples of timely and effective response from the Services to a CINC's requirements are given in this study for CENTCOM. All three Services provided needed logistics movement facilities during 1983-84. An Army-Navy sustainment project improved considerably POL tanker discharge systems. Broadly, the Service-to-CINC relationship within the Joint war planning system has not been changed by developments over the last ten years. But the CINCs' increased access to planning and programming decisions might affect guidance for the PPBS, and the monitoring of program execution by the Services may expand beyond the CINCs and Services and include greater involvement by the Joint Staff and the OSD.

In conclusion, the main points of the study are these:

1. A need to expand CINCs' authority over the components of their commands has been recognized for decades. This authority was expanded to its current extent by legislation in 1986. The immediate genesis of the legislation and of internal reforms within the DoD was most likely the Reagan Administration's determination to improve warfighting capabilities under a global perspective of policy and strategy.

2. JCS reform received renewed impetus in 1982 from the proposals of the then Chairman of the JCS and the Chief of Staff, Army. The resulting increased authority of the Chairman and his improved access to national policymakers were logical corollaries to expansion of CINC authority and access to the planning system.

3. DoD management changes in the 1980s were the latest efforts to adjust the PPBS process to fiscal restraints and to improve the CINCs' role in the PPBS.
4. Changes in the CINCs' participation in the PPBS have not affected the JSPS in its structure and procedures. However, the CINCs' greater participation in the planning and programming phases of the PPBS provides them with better foundations for expecting that they will achieve realistic force levels within fiscal constraints.

5. Before 1984, Service-to-CINC relationships were not supplemented sufficiently by Service access to key DoD officials, especially in the planning phase of the PPBS, to provide the CINCs a formal voice in policy and strategy formulation. The recently expanded authority of the Chairman, JCS, and potential for improved analysis and review in the Joint Staff of the CINCs' joint requirements, promise to complement Service support of the CINCs.

6. The Army had anticipated the formal change in the CINCs' participation in the PPBS by including the CINCs' priority requirements in the Army POM before the DepSecDef instituted the procedure throughout the DoD. The changes are too recent to allow opinions about their success from the CINCs' points of view. A critical issue for the near future is the extent to which CINCs may wish to be involved in the details of PPBS programming and budgeting for their near-term requirements, as these details are now being managed by the Services for both near- and mid-term requirements.
HISTORICAL LINKAGES BETWEEN DoD RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ARMY CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT WARFIGHTING CINCs

INTRODUCTION

This study was commissioned to support the Chief of Staff, Army, (CSA) in fulfilling his objective of maximizing the capabilities of warfighting Commanders in Chief of Unified Commands (CINCs) through allocation of Army resources. The purpose of this study is to support this Army effort by providing a historical perspective of the planning environment within which the roles of the CINCs evolved, with emphasis on the last ten years. The focus of the study is on how strategy and policy guidance have changed; how CINC participation in the formulation of policy and strategy guidance has changed; how campaign plans have been developed and coordinated with joint strategy and policy; and how, by example, specific requested resources have been provided to the CINCs.

Expansion of the authority and influence of CINCs has long been advocated, but slow to arrive. Numerous reorganizations of the Department of Defense since 1947 have left unresolved the major issues of the chain of command from the President to the CINCs and the CINCs' authority as operational commanders. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433) is the most thorough and far-reaching of changes to the CINCs' roles and authority since 1947. (Appendix A recounts the evolution of the Department of Defense [DoD] since the 1940's and highlights changes in the JCS, Joint Staff, and the CINCs' roles.) While the principal intent of this legislation appears to be the correction of long-standing deficiencies in the CINCs' operational authority over their component commands, the corollary of this new authority is greater influence for the CINCs in the DoD resource allocation process.

Although the CINCs have always had access and influence in the planning, programming, and budgeting process, the most important formal changes in their access prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act occurred in 1984. DepSecDef William H. Taft, IV, changed Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) procedures to allow the CINCs a greater voice in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development process and the Defense Resources Board (DRB) Program Review. The procedures included:

-- CINCs' submission to the SecDef and Chairman, JCS (CJCS) of Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs);

-- tracking CINCs' concerns during POM development;

-- raising the visibility of CINC requirements in the POMs with a CINC annex;

-- increasing the participation of the CINCs in the DRB Program Review process; and,

-- improving the role of the CJCS in the review and coordination of the CINCs' concerns.1

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The CINCs have also participated in the planning phase of the PPBS since 1981 by representation in DRB formulations of policy and strategy.

The remainder of this study examines the principal arenas in which CINC participation has changed and from which changes in the roles of the CINCs have been influenced: the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS); the strategic perspectives of two U.S. Administrations; the rationale of Senate legislation to change the CINCs' authority; the CINCs in the war plans system; and recent Army initiatives for supporting the CINCs. The study concludes with observations which summarize the evolution of the CINCs' participation in the planning process over the last ten years.

REVIEW OF PPBS EVOLUTION, 1961-86

Before the PPBS was created under SecDef Robert S. McNamara in 1961, the Services prepared their budgets with little guidance. The SecDef divided the DoD budget among the Services and reduced Service budgets when they might exceed some ceiling. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) rarely reviewed or changed Service programs. In contrast, cost-benefit analysis became the basis of the new DoD resource allocation system. Under the new system, planning was to be output-oriented and, therefore, relatively unconstrained by budget ceilings; the objective was the creation of near and longer term operational capabilities. Not coincidentally, national security spending was seen as a stimulant to economic growth in the early 1960's. But the corollary to the removal of budget ceilings was detailed analysis by OSD of Service programs so that the increased spending would be put to its best cost-effective use. The PPBS and the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP), instituted at this time, were not necessarily designed to impose OSD authority, allow OSD initiation of program proposals, and second-guess the Services, but these effects resulted. The first major change in the PPBS did not occur until 1969 under SecDef Melvin R. Laird in the Nixon Administration. OSD no longer initiated detailed program proposals; it reviewed Service proposals under specific budget ceilings.

In 1976, President Carter started Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) throughout the Federal Government. One result was to give OSD more opportunity to adjust Service program proposals. Each Service developed decision packages required by the ZBB; the Army's was the Program Development Increment Package (PDIP). In 1979, SecDef Harold Brown established the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to improve management of the PPBS; the Board Chairman was the DepSecDef and the DRB consisted of under and assistant secretaries in the OSD and the Chairman, JCS.

The Reagan Administration came to office with intentions to rebuild what it saw as America's neglected military strength. The management changes that accompanied the resolve to spend more for defense were intended to make the DoD as efficient as possible while it was revitalizing military strength. The "Carlucci Initiatives," begun early in the Administration, take their name from the then DepSecDef (and Chairman of the DRB), Frank Carlucci, and include:

-- greater emphasis on long range planning;
-- greater decentralization of authority to the Services; and,

-- adjusting the DRB Program Review to consider only major issues.

The DRB now included the Service Secretaries as full members. The Board would review and approve policy and strategy in the planning phase (in the Defense Guidance, or DG), and the CINCs were now invited twice each year to brief the DRB during the planning and programming phases of the PPBS cycle (the DG and the DRB Program Review).  

In 1984, as noted earlier, the DepSecDef expanded the CINCs' participation in the PPBS through formal access to the DRB, IPLs in the Service POMs, and closer ties to the JCS for the review and coordination of CINCs' concerns. In 1986, President Reagan issued NSDD 219 to direct the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and DoD to produce a two-year budget beginning with the FY 88 and FY 89 budgets. 

THE LAST TEN YEARS

Each new administration is both a force for initiative and a victim of unpredictable events. The Carter Administration wanted to reduce tensions with the Soviets by controlling arms mutually and, in the United States, by controlling defense spending. The Soviets had caught up with, if not surpassed, the United States in strategic forces and were, therefore, expected to curb their appetites for belligerence fueled by feelings of insecurity. The invasion of Afghanistan and the American hostage crisis in Teheran caused the Administration to change direction. But these events occurred too late in the Administration to result in changes to the unified command system or in the DoD system as a whole. In 1982, Generals David C. Jones and Edward C. Meyer went public with their proposals for JCS reform. These proposals were only one of several manifestations of dissatisfaction with the character of security policy and strategy, and with the management of the system for developing and carrying out policy and strategy. Pertinent to the context of change in the roles of the CINCs were these broad developments in the last decade: the strategic perspectives of the Carter and Reagan Administrations; DoD management reforms; and JCS reform.

Strategic Perspective.

In terms of policy and strategy guidance for force development and for wartime operations, the Reagan Administration was assertive in tone and resolved to improve military capabilities. The spirit of change was caught by the CJCS in his overview to the FY 81 Military Posture Statement:

We appear to be entering the coming decade with a fresh perspective and a new maturity regarding the phenomenon of American power. The paralyzing premise that the mere existence of strength creates an inclination to use it irresponsibly or arrogantly seems to have given way to a renewed awareness that the greater our actual power . . . the less likelihood that military force will have to be used at all.
However, comparing the late 1970 guidance documents on policy and strategy with the more confident and assertive guidance of the 1980's does not yield evidence of clear and dramatic change. The changes are instead subtle but important.

The new guidance took on a global perspective as opposed to the regional perspective of the 1970's. Force development guidance no longer used an assumption of one major and one minor war fought simultaneously. Instead, to encourage all of the Services to develop forces from a common base, guidance included an illustrative planning scenario. This scenario base strongly implied the possible global scope of major wars and the blurring of theater boundaries. Planning scenarios were used in the late 1970's, but accompanying guidance left no doubt about regional priorities. The difference in how this guidance might have been seen by a planner before and after the change in strategic perspective may be shown by this hypothetical comparison:

-- Before, war with the Soviet Union was assumed as likely to become global—but we did not have the resources to fight the war globally. We must deploy and redeploy resources to the most important theater.

-- After, we continue to assume that war with the Soviets would likely become global—but we have resources, and plan to have more, to fight the war globally, which would be to our advantage if we chose to extend the fighting to other fronts where the enemy was vulnerable.

In the CJCS overview to the Military Posture Statement for FY 82, the strategy described by the JCS, true to policy guidance, was most evident in its contrast to the older regional focus.

In the event of conflict, our strategy should be to apply our strengths against the weaknesses of the adversary, not just necessarily at the point of attack . . . but across a wide array of painful vulnerabilities. The Soviets must be continually faced with the certain prospect that a military move against US or Allied interests risks a conflict that could be wider in geography, scope, or violence than they are prepared to deal with. In particular, they must be convinced that an infringement on our vital interests in Southwest Asia would trigger a confrontation with the United States that would not be confined to that region.

Later in the FY 82 Posture Statement supplement, the question of regional priorities was married to the global perspective: our priority objective was to deter Soviet attack on the United States and on Allies. The next highest priority objective was defense of European and Pacific Allies, including protection of access to Southwest Asian oil vital to those Allies' security. We also had to have the ability to deal elsewhere with lesser contingencies. "In effect, the Western Hemisphere and the three regions of greatest importance to US extrahemispheric interests—Western Europe, NEA, and SWA—comprise a system of interconnecting and inextricably
linked strategic zones." Further, "it is no longer practical to design autonomous regional strategies, for a threat in one strategic zone will almost certainly have serious impact on the security of the others." (Emphasis added)

In the FY 83 Military Posture Statement, the global perspective seems to have prompted this statement:

While the areas addressed have unique characteristics and vulnerabilities which require assessment in a regional context, the interrelationship of events among these regions demands that US security efforts in one area be designed and executed in light of potential effects on other regions. US national interests, international influences, and resource availability will often require establishment of priorities in our military strategies for these regions. (Emphasis added)

The difference between FY 82 and FY 83 is subtle but real. Regional crises overlapped other regions; Soviet vulnerabilities were to be exploited. But the relative importance of regions—possibly as a basis for planning force development and resource allocation to combatant commands—was impossible to shake off while adopting the global perspective.

By FY 84, the global perspective was amended by a qualification that remains today. U.S. forces obviously are "not available to defend everywhere against every threat at all times . . . . War must be deterred, but if conflict occurs, the United States will seek to limit the scope of that conflict and the involvement of the USSR." This unclassified statement is of course ambiguous in terms of peacetime or wartime strategy and in terms of major or minor contingencies. It also illustrates the difficulty of couching policy and strategy guidance in terms that are clear to planners and resource allocators. A global perspective demands greater coordination between and among unified commands which includes, as it now does, CINC input to the policy and strategy formulation phase of the PPBS process. What may have happened with the change in strategic perspective is that the interlocking regions of possible wartime operations left very little basis on which to assign priorities for resource allocations.

Overlapping regional crises and the possible global scope of some wars do not relieve the CINCs from planning to defend U.S. interests in their areas of responsibility as their first priority. They must plan regionally. The JCS and the Services have, and must maintain, a global perspective. Theoretically, each CINC's concerns may be in competition with other CINCs and with the JCS and the Services, given their different perspectives. Realistically, maintaining a global perspective on resource allocations must remain the focus of the JCS and the Services.

Management Reforms.

Because "the budget process was the management process," and because the Reagan Administration pledged to "revitalize military strength and to do it
in the most economical and efficient way, the Administration had to quickly assess DoD's resource allocation process and make the necessary changes.\(^{18}\) With the participation of the staffs of the OSD, the Services, and the JCS, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) conducted a 30-day review beginning in the first two weeks of the Reagan Administration in 1981. In summary, he found these problems:

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- System-wide distortions created by twenty years of different objectives and management styles. The changes made under Secretaries McNamara, Laird, and Brown left conflicts in the PPBS.

- Confusion of line and staff relationships between OSD and the Services. This caused overly-specific guidance to the Services, too much paperwork, and friction between OSD and the Services.

- Unworkable Zero Based Budgeting which caused too much paperwork and did not help the SecDef.

- Neglect of execution. Program execution functions were being neglected as were planning functions; policymakers and programmers were receiving only limited feedback.

- Mismatches between U.S. policies and current and long-term capabilities were produced by insufficient resource constraints. The Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) contained higher force levels than could be met within fiscal guidance. There was little high level dialogue; each item was handled ad hoc. The resultant plans were out of line with resources and were not relevant for the programming and budgeting phases of the PPBS.

- Programming input was inappropriate. The DRB did not include Service participation; the Services provided observers only. The JCS played a minimal role in program review.\(^{20}\)

Results of the review began with Secretary Weinberger's management principles which centralized policymaking and decentralized operational responsibility and authority, including "full participation in the system by the Services."\(^{21}\) The central OSD staff was asked to concentrate on broad policy guidance rather than detailed program guidance. Paperwork would be reduced; only major issues were to go to the DRB (a 1983-84 average of 250 issues was reduced to 40 or 50 for consideration in the DRB).\(^{22}\) The DRB was strengthened and given authority as the major governing body of the DoD resource allocation process. The Service Secretaries became full members of the DRB, joining the CJCS, the OMB Associate Director for National Security Affairs, and heads of OSD organizations. In effect, the Service Chiefs became "de facto" members and were "invited to all meetings where major policy issues are discussed."\(^{23}\)

JCS Reform.

During Congressional Hearings in 1982, the Reagan Administration, like the Carter Administration before it, did not seem to support JCS reform.
But two active members of the JCS made strong proposals to change the system. The Chairman of the JCS, General David C. Jones, said that "essentially, despite major changes in the world . . . we have had 24 years—and in many ways 35 years—without fundamental revisions of the joint system, a system which in effect represents arrangements developed in a patchwork way during World War II." In summary, General Jones' proposals were to:

--- Strengthen the role of the Chairman. "To the extent that an interservice perspective is needed on distribution issues, that perspective could be better provided by the Chairman in consultation with the Combatant Commanders." It was unreasonable to expect the Service Chiefs to take totally different positions in the joint arena than in their own Service channels.

--- Limit Service Staff involvement in the joint process. "It is unrealistic to expect truly interservice advice from a staff comprised of officers from only one Service. The Joint Staff can and should provide such advice."

--- Broaden the training, experience, and rewards for joint duty. This included influence by the Chairman in the selection and promotion of officers.

General Edward C. Meyer, then the CSA, proposed the following:

--- Create a council (a National Military Advisory Council) for, as the title suggests, providing military advice directly to the SecDef and other policymakers. The council was to consist of four, newly-created 4-star officers.

--- Give the Chairman, JCS, more influence and authority to direct planning and operations.

--- Remove the dual hat from the Service Chiefs. Have the CINCs give their views directly to the Council.

--- Design a system for more useful feedback from the CINCs; they should have a way to say if they are receiving what they need.

Several of both Generals' proposals have been acted on by the DoD and have shaped legislation. Changes are in progress, and it remains to be seen if military advice will be more direct to policymakers. General Meyer's evident wish to reduce OSD control over joint and Service programs and budgets may be realized in detail, but with DRB membership as it is and with the need to establish priorities among the CINCs' individual priorities, the power of OSD remains to be estimated. Reform, as it has evolved from these several sources—strategic perspective, management reform, and JCS reform—has, along with many other sources, been manifested in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act.
SENATE ANALYSIS OF CINC ISSUES

A 1985 Senate staff study which was the principal source of the Goldwater-Nichols Act's provisions found in its treatment of CINC issues that deficiencies in combination account for problems to be remedied by reorganization legislation. The combination of weak CINC authority over Service components, imbalance of CINC authority and responsibility and a weak ability to obtain resources needed for combatant missions, and abuse of unification below the level of the CINC and his staff led to the general conclusion that the CINCs' authority is extremely limited. To solve the problem by giving the CINCs authority was meaningless unless the CINCs could influence the resource generation and allocation process to obtain what they needed for warfighting missions. That is, reform of CINC authority must include a presumption of greater CINC participation in the PPBS process. Authority to hire and fire component commanders might look like a solution to the CINCs' dependence on Service components; but, as the staff study puts it, "the fact that the logistical chain of command runs around the unified commander greatly weakens his authority over his service component commands."29 This problem may or may not be remedied by the CINCs' improved access to policy and strategy formulation and a feedback process that allows them to report whether their needs are being met.

The staff study concluded that, as of 1985, the CINCs were "sandwiched between powerful structures above and below that encourage single-Service perspectives over a multiservice approach. As a result, unified commanders have no authority to override any strongly held, single-Service positions even if such is necessary in the interests of the multiservice, unified command mission."30 The solution proposed by the staff study was to have the operational commanders submit operational Program Objective Memoranda as formal input to Service POMs to highlight cross-service considerations and counterbalance single-Service perspectives.32 When the Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed in 1986, its statement of policy was that it was the intent of Congress to:

-- Reorganize the DoD and strengthen civilian authority in the DoD.

-- Improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the SecDef.

-- "Place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands."33

-- "Ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands."34

-- Increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning.

-- Provide for more efficient use of defense resources.
Otherwise improve the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the DoD. 35

JOINT GUIDANCE AND OPLANS

The Senate staff study and other analyses of planning system problems tend not to distinguish explicitly between the PPBS as a planning process and the CINC's war plans system. Prior to WW II, war planning was sterile, theoretical, and unrealistic. The coming of the war compelled planning to take on more immediacy and relevance. Attempts to rationalize the planning process after the war included establishing the Office of the Army Comptroller in 1948. In a time of dollar famine, the Comptroller served only to highlight the separation between civilian management practices of budgeting and military command. Before the early postwar period passed, centralized organization in the DoD, noticeable correlations between planning and programming, the dominance of the budget in planning, and the complexity of the programming and budgeting process were all well established. 36

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) was inaugurated in 1952 as an effort to formally integrate strategic planning with budget and force structure planning. The voices of the military departments remained dominant in this system, but the CINC's did have theoretical access to portions of the system. Beginning with the Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analysis (JSPDSA), Part I, the CINC's were provided strategy and force planning guidance. Using this guidance, the CINC's generated force structure requirements sufficient to provide a high degree of assurance of success. This was their first direct input to the process. The Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), which evolved from the JSPDSA, then presented the planning force (reasonable assurance of success) levels recommended by the Services and commanders of unified and specified commands as a formal step in the JSPS process. The JSPD then supported development of the DG, the first step in the PPBS.

The next opportunity for CINC input was in response to the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). In this document the CINC's were asked to comment on the overall adequacy and capabilities of the composite POM force. Theoretically, CINC views were incorporated into a JCS response, but they were commenting directly on the results of the programming process as it had evolved from their initial input to the planning phase.

One more step remained. The issuance of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to the unified and specified command commanders effectively notified them of the success or failure of their efforts to influence the process. It told them what assets they could use to develop their operational plans. Since those plans were subsequently reviewed by JCS it would have been obvious where strategy/means mismatches were occurring. What is clear is that, before the 1980's, the CINC's did have opportunities to be heard, but only through the filtering process of overlapping JSPS and PPBS procedures.
The CINCs' principal types of joint planning products are Operations Plans (OPLANS), Contingency Plans (CONPLANS), and Operations Orders (OPORDS). These products are developed under the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), a DoD-directed system for the joint planning process. Campaign plans are not a product of the JOPS and campaign planning is not included in the JOPS process. JOPS is linked to the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) via the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), but JOPS is not directly connected to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.

The JSCP starts the JOPS deliberate planning process. Based on national policy and security objectives, intelligence estimates (in the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning), and projected forces, the JSCP provides, in two volumes, "Guidance and Tasks" and "Forces." The CINC also looks to other documents in developing OPLANS. Combined guidance in Korea (directions from ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meetings and Military Committee meetings) and Military Committee guidance in NATO must be accommodated. Typically the current Defense Guidance provides additional information. Finally, some CINCs have their own theater strategy which provides direction for OPLAN development.

Until the advent of the Integrated Priority List (IPL), the CINCs formally influenced DoD resource allocation only through the good offices of their Service components. Shortfalls identified in the CINCs' OPLANS were translated into program requirements by the Service staffs. These shortfalls were then assigned a priority by the Service staffs.

The areas of identification of programming requirements were based upon shortfalls in employment (weapons, forces); deployment (strategic mobility); sustainment (Combat Service Support (CSS) structure, war stocks, industrial base); and, mobilization (Reserve Component (RC) training and availability). Today, such shortfalls are identified on the CINCs' IPL, and the CINCs participate in Defense Resource Board discussion prior to Defense Guidance and POM/Program Decision Memorandum finalization. Prior to the 1984 expansion of the CINCs' involvement in the PPBS process, the CINCs played an important advocate role even though they enjoyed less clout. They highlighted specific requirements and lent justification for new Service programs; however, Service support was requisite if a CINC's program was to survive through the PPBS to the budget year. As a clear statement of valid, priority requirements, shortfalls in OPLANS became a principal means for the CINCs to gain Service support, a method that remains unchanged.

CINC Requirements and Planning

Two examples--USEUCOM and USCENTCOM--show recent progress and problems in operations planning. Within USEUCOM, NATO's Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine required the development of deep target acquisition and deep attack technology and weapons. The Army and Air Force evidenced cooperation and a timely response in the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and Joint Tactical Missile System (JTAQMS) developments. A
related issue involving strategic missions of Special Operations Forces (SOF) required the development of new individual equipment, radios, and other equipment. The Army responded to these needs in its SOF Master Plan and continues today to work with the USAF in solving SOF transportation requirements. On its own initiative, the Army developed a Special Forces headquarters in Europe (Army Special Operations Forces, Europe) especially to enhance the wartime logistic support of SOF.

In the USCENTCOM theater, the CINCCENT campaign plan requires Third Army to employ and sustain forces. There will be continued interest in Army support for Third Army C3I capabilities to support the employment mission. Tasked to establish the theater communications zone, Third Army requires dedicated (single mission) CSS units to provide the Theater Army functions. Thus, increased emphasis on Army CSS structure can be expected from USCINCENT as well.

Further, CINCCENT is faced with critical mobility shortfalls. In the October 1983 Army "Greenbook" it was noted that 100 KC-10's and C-5B's were being procured by the Air Force to help meet airlift requirements. Eight SL-7's were to be provided by the Navy. In October 1984, General Benjamin F. Register, the CINCCENT, noted rapid progress in the acquisition of these capabilities and also of the Army contribution to the final link in the movement chain—the Logistics Over The Shore (LOTS) improvements. Two companies of LACV-30 air cushion lighters were entering the joint Army—Navy cargo delivery system.

In a related Army—Navy sustainment enterprise, the Army POL tanker discharge systems, as they existed in 1984, were limited to 25,000 DWT tankers, up to one mile offshore, with maximum discharge of 17,000 barrels per day. This system took 48 men 72 hours to install. The newly acquired single point mooring system now allows discharge of 30,000 barrels per day from tankers up to 50,000 DWT, up to four miles offshore; it can be installed by 8 men in 24 hours. Thus, the Services working together have shown themselves able to meet CINC requirements.

CINC Changes and the War Plans System.

Basically, the JSPS has not been affected by changes in the PPBS and the expanded authority of the CINCs. The PPBS must still decide on and fund the resources the CINCs need to carry out their plans. One important feature of the evolving planning system, however, is that the CINCs relationships with the Services and the major commands remains unchanged: the Services deliver to the CINCs only what has been programmed, budgeted, and actually acquired. Shortfalls must be reported back to Service departments through component commanders and through each subsequent IPL. The actual receipt of capabilities by a CINC is the responsibility of, and may be traced through, a Service department, a major command, and the staff of the CINC. At any one time, dollar figures may be available to judge the difference between CINC requests and actual allocations, but there are central offices which determine whether CINC needs which have been programmed and budgeted are being delivered in terms of specific, tangible capabilities.
ARMY INITIATIVES

On 29 July 1984, the Chief of Staff, Army, approved a proposal to develop a plan for CINC participation in the Army POM. In August, major commands were told of the procedure. In September, the CSA requested lists of priority needs from the CINCs through their Army component commanders. The latter were reminded of the new procedure at the October Commanders' Conference. An October memorandum from the Secretary of the Army to the DepSecDef described these Army initiatives. In November, after consulting with the CINCs and the DRB, the DepSecDef acted to improve the CINCs role in the DoD planning process.\textsuperscript{42}

In 1984 and 1985, the CINCs submitted IPLs to the SecDef in November. Their requirements are put in programmatic terms with the help of Army component commanders in the PARR documents which are sent to HQDA in November. The CINC requirements, given special visibility, compete before the nine Army functional panels, the Program Budget Committee, the Select Committee, and then the CSA and Secretary of the Army. The CSA and SA are kept informed of the status of CINC requests throughout this process, and the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), informs them of all unsatisfied needs.\textsuperscript{43} In addition, the Director is required to detail the impact of shortfalls to Department of the Army and to the CINCs.

An information paper of 18 August 1987, by Mr. John Nerger, PA&E, sums up the actual workings of the Army-to-CINC interrelationship since 1984:

Throughout the POM-building process and on into the budget-building process, the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, OCSA, monitored the requests and disseminated information to the Army component and CINC commands. PA&E, with the Army component command, briefs and provides feedback to CINC staff several times in the cycle. The CINCs receive briefings on the Army POM and President's Budget which highlight the status of their IPL. Briefers bring back any continuing concerns to the CSA. Publications like the CINC Annex and the Army Distribution Greenbook provide detailed analyses and data to allow CINCs to monitor the results of the decisionmaking and their effects on warfighting capabilities. The Army is the only military department which provides updates to the CINC Annex and publishes a document which projects the distribution of key items of equipment and munitions by theater for the CINCs.\textsuperscript{44}

The Army component commander has been the primary link between the CINC and the military department from the start. It was decided early that a modification to the resource allocation machinery already in place was the most practical way for CINC requirements to be introduced to and funded by the Army. OCSA has worked assiduously with the MACOMs in a team effort to build the bridges to communicate their needs and the avenues to affect program
development. Although the degree of coordination between CINC and component commanders varies, it appears that the relationship between CINC and component strongly influences the degree of potential success. CINC and component staffs are now working more closely to insure the PARR expresses the broad "word pictures" painted in the IPL in precise, programmatic terms.

OBSERVATIONS

The beginning of the PPBS in the early 1960's may seem like ancient history from the perspective of the 1980's, but the system is still young. The early years of the PPBS were, in retrospect, very much trial and error; after only a few years, U.S. involvement in Vietnam preoccupied the people and agencies in the DoD. This attention to a long crisis outside of "norms" peacetime programs, budgets, and five-year programs carried over into the 1970's and the adjustments of post-Vietnam. Service POMs and the Joint Forces Memorandum (JFM) were instituted under SecDef Laird; PA&E emerged in 1972 as a semantic improvement on the systems analysis office of OSD. In the late 1970's, the DG, then called the Consolidated Guidance (CG) to underline its attempt to bring together scattered policy and strategy statements, was subject to serious attempts to remove bland rhetoric and include guidance with implications for programs and priorities. Throughout these early and later stages of PPBS evolution, however, evidence of CINC participation is simply absent. The recollections of six former OSD civilian officials, one of whom served in both the 1961-68 period and the 1969-79 period, do not include a single reference to CINC participation in the PPBS process. The obvious inference to be drawn is that the CINCs worked through their component commanders to and with the Service staffs. Certainly the CINCs must have had access to the PPBS through the JCS, which was the same as access through component commanders to the same ultimate Service Chief of Staff and Service Secretary. They also had the ear of the CJCS, access which, before the recent changes in the Chairman's authority, may not have amounted to much influence.

Although no single event or crisis explains the changes in CINCs' roles, it is possible that the expressed need (for example, by Generals Jones and Meyer) to bring professional military advice more directly to top civilian officials prompted expanded authority to the CJCS and, for good measure, greater access to those officials for the CINCs. The evidence presented in the Senate staff report which so influenced legislation does not make a preponderant case that the CINCs were dissatisfied with their dealings with and responses from the Services. Before 1984, the CJCS did not have substantial access to the DRB, and the CINCs' ideas and requirements the Joint Chiefs did speak for could therefore not necessarily find their best route through Service channels. Moreover, except for recent years, it is doubtful whether the Services and the JCS took the full opportunity provided them to shape the planning phase of the PPBS. Six former OSD officials saw the military as alienated (often with admittedly good reason because of OSD management styles) from the OSD. Consequently, the Services did not, from those former officials' point of view, provide input of substance to the DG and its predecessor documents.
If the Services did not have sufficient access to top officials, or if they had access and refused through frustration (viewing that grant of access as hypocritical) to exercise it, the results for the CINCs were the same—if either explanation is accurate. Service influence could instead be applied and felt where it was and is strongest—in the programming and budgeting phases. But the CINCs' requirements need a joint perspective, and working through a weak Joint Staff under a weak CJCS was inefficient. The Service channels of the CINCs were representing the CINCs' interests. But the Service staffs were the only representation the CINCs had formally and predictably, and that was not enough when a joint perspective was also needed.

Changes to the CJCS's control over the Joint Staff promise improvements in how the CINCs' concerns are serviced. Currently, under the renewed system, the J-8 (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate) is tasked to provide a quantitative basis for advice to the CJCS on CINC requirements. This office, or any Service or joint facility that can sharpen CINC needs into programmatic language and define those needs at a level of generality appropriate to DRB considerations, will allow the CINCs to be heard clearly at the front end of the PPBS process and serve their priorities later in the programming and budgeting phases.

In conclusion, the main points of this paper are:

1. A need to expand CINCs' authority over the components of their commands has been recognized for decades. This authority was expanded to its current extent by legislation in 1986. The immediate genesis of the legislation and of internal reforms within the DoD was most likely the Reagan Administration's determination to improve warfighting capabilities under a global perspective of policy and strategy.

2. JCS reform received renewed impetus in 1982 from the proposals of the then CJCS and CSA. The resulting increased authority of the Chairman and his improved access to national policymakers were logical corollaries to expansion of CINC authority and access to the planning system.

3. DoD management changes in the 1980's were the latest efforts to adjust the PPBS process to fiscal restraints and to improve the CINCs' role in the PPBS.

4. Changes in the CINCs' participation in the PPBS have not affected the JSPS in its structure and procedures. However, the CINCs' greater participation in the planning and programming phases of the PPBS provides them with better foundations for expecting that they will achieve realistic force levels within fiscal constraints.

5. Before 1984, Service-to-CINC relationships were not supplemented sufficiently by Service access to key DoD officials, especially in the planning phase of the PPBS, to provide the CINCs a formal voice in policy and strategy formulation. The recently expanded authority of the Chairman, JCS, and potential for improved analysis and review in the Joint Staff of the CINCs' joint requirements, promise to complement Service support of the CINCs.
6. The Army had anticipated the formal change in the CINCs' participation in the PPBS by including the CINCs' priority requirements in the Army POM before the DepSecDef instituted the procedure throughout the DoD. The changes are too recent to allow opinions as to their success from the CINCs' points of view. A critical issue for the near future is the extent to which CINCs may wish to be involved in the details of PPBS programming and budgeting for their near-term requirements, as these details are now being managed by the Services for both near- and mid-term requirements.
ENDNOTES


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.


8. Ibid.

9. U.S. Secretary of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1983 Budget, FY 1984 Budget, FY 1984 Authorization Request and FY 1983-87 Defense Programs, February 8, 1982, on page 1-4 explained in this first budget year (FY 83) for which the new Administration was responsible, that increased defense spending was "to pay the bill for our collective failure to preserve an adequate balance of military strength during the last decade or two."


12. Ibid., p. 3.

13. Ibid., p. 6.


15. The changes in military strategy statements are most noticeable by comparing the FY 82 and FY 83 Military Posture documents with previous years.


Budgeting System (PPBS): Past, Present, and Future (cited hereafter as PPBS Conference), included the following in his remarks on p. 131:

We didn't recognize the danger of trying to force all of the services to program their forces to the same scenario hierarchy. And we made a disastrous mistake there. When I mention this, I still find people looking at me with blank faces. NATO may be the first responsibility for the Army Reserve; it is not necessarily the first responsibility for our active forces. It surely isn't the major responsibility for the Navy.... A I somehow I went through all my years in that building without understanding that each force component had to be driven to a separate option and that that would be all right because they would still be able to work together when they met on the battlefield. It is still not done today.... You simply have to tell each of the force components that it has a different force priority.


19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 7.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.


25. Ibid., p. 2-126.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 2-127.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.


37. This section is a summary of selected facts, analyses, and findings in Strategic Studies Institute, *Campaign Planning*, Final Report, 1987.

38. Ibid.


41. Ibid., p. 245.


43. Ibid., p. 2.

44. Ibid., p. 3.

45. Ibid.

46. PPBS Conference, pp. 126, 128.

47. Ibid. The former officials are, from 1961-69: John E. Keller; Russell Murray, II; Dr. K. Wayne Smith; and, from 1969-82: Murray; Philip Odum; Dr. Ivan Selin; and Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

48. On page 308, the staff study reports, for example, on the results of questioning the CINCs about whether UNAAF overly restricted their authority over Service component commanders. Four CINCs answered no and two answered with a qualified yes.

49. PPBS Conference. The former officials' comments appear in several places in this document which reviews three periods in PPBS evolution. See, for example, p. 131.
APPENDIX A

THE EVOLUTION OF DoD

A chronological development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Secretary of Defense is a logical context for understanding possible implications of changes in the role of CINCs for the planning process.

1941-42 -- The U.S. JCS was established at the ARCADIA conference in Washington in conjunction with bringing together our top military leaders with the British in a Combined Chiefs of Staff. Before this time, senior commanders of the Army and Navy "cooperated" but unity of command was absent.

1942 -- On February 9, the JCS held its first meeting. In July, Admiral William D. Leahy was appointed Chief of Staff to the President and became presiding officer of the JCS.

1947 -- The wartime JCS was established in law with the National Security Act of September 17. The Act authorized a Joint Staff of no more than 100.

1949 -- Admiral Leahy retired early in the year and the post of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief lapsed. "In February . . . the President called on General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to take a temporary assignment as 'principal military adviser and consultant to the Commander in Chief and Secretary of Defense.'"1 He presided over and moderated JCS meetings but was not a member of the JCS. In August, the National Security Act was amended to establish the Department of Defense and to strengthen the authority and control of the SecDef. The JCS were named as principal military advisors to the National Command Authority, the President, and the SecDef. The Joint Staff was increased to 200, and the position of the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) was created. He had no vote in JCS decisions; he presided and set the agenda for the Chiefs.

1952 -- The JCS established the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

1953 -- The President's Reorganization Plan No. 6 of June 30 set aside procedures carried over from WW II when the JCS designated one of their number as executive agent with communication to and supervision over a particular Unified Command. President Eisenhower declared that the JCS is "not a command body," but rather an advisory and planning group. Military Departments were designated by the SecDef as executive agents (one department for any one command) for Unified Commands. The chain of command was set as: President, SecDef, Civilian Secretary of a military department, to the CINC. The plan also strengthened the CJCS authority over the operation of the Joint Staff.

1958 -- The DoD Reorganization Act of August 6 increased the Joint Staff to 400; forbade it to operate as a general staff; eliminated the Service Secretaries from the chain of command to the CINCs; established a new chain of command from the President to the SecDef through the JCS to the Unified Commands; and gave the CJCS a vote in JCS decisions. The result was operational and planning functions for the JCS. A plan that followed on August 15 created the J-1 through J-6.
1977 -- The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy) was established in OSD by SecDef Brown.

1978 -- The Commandant, USMC, was made a full member of the JCS. A study directed by the President—the Steadman Report—concluded that "the advice provided personally (usually orally) by the Chairman and the Service Chiefs was of high quality but that the institutional products of the JCS were not found very useful."2

1981 -- The CINCs first formally appeared before the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to comment on defense guidance given to the Military Departments.

1982 -- The Chairman of the JCS, General David C. Jones, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. Meyer, published their proposals for JCS reform.

1982 -- In April, hearings on JCS reform began in a House Committee but the results did not become law.

1983 -- In June, Senators Tower and Jackson began a review of organizational relationships and decision-making procedures in the DoD. They directed the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee to prepare a study (which continued into 1984 and 1985 and became the foundation for the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986).

1984 -- The DoD authorization bill for FY 85 included some of the substance of earlier House hearings: the JCS became spokesmen for the Unified Commands on their operational requirements; the CJCS was given more authority to hire and fire and run the Joint Staff.

1984 -- On July 29, the CSA approved a plan for CINC input to the Army POM. The DepSecDef approved procedures for CINCs to submit Integrated Priority Lists to the JCS, to include these priorities in Service POMs, and to increase CINC participation in the DRB Program Review process.

1986 -- On February 28, the Packard Commission issued An Interim Report to the President, which was evaluated by the Senate Armed Services Committee and referred to frequently in the legislative history of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

1986 -- The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was passed.
ENDNOTES

1. Several items in this Appendix have been documented in the main text. Most of the remainder of the material is from U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Pub. 4: Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC: September 2, 1980. The quote is from p. I-1-2.

APPENDIX B

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

Changes in CINCs' access to DoD resource planning and expansion of CINCs' authority followed ten years in which changes occurred in policy and strategy guidance, DoD organization, and JCS reorganization and responsibilities. A need to expand CINCs' authority was recognized for decades. The Army anticipated legislative changes by including CINCs' priority needs in the Army POM. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 expanded the authority of the CINCs over their commands and expanded the authority of the Chairman, JCS. It is too soon to evaluate results.