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GRADUATED
MOBILIZATION RESPONSE:
A Key Element of National
Deterrent Strategy.

by
Paul E. Taibl

APRIL 1988

MOBILIZATION CONCEPTS DEVELOPMENT CENTER
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GRADUATED MOBILIZATION RESPONSE:
A Key Element of National Deterrent Strategy

The Mobilization Concepts Development Center (MCDC) is chartered to provide the Department of Defense (DOD) with long term conceptual planning in the area of national strategic mobilization. The concept of gradually mobilizing the nation's resources in response to external or domestic threat continues to be a fertile study area. Recent participation in a number of colloquia and exercises sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has put the Center in the rather unique position of being able to observe the development of the policy of Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) on both the DoD and Federal Government levels.

What follows is an attempt to collate the accumulated knowledge of the federal departments and agencies as they formulate the principles of GMR policy. It is by no means exhaustive—the intellectual and physical contributions of the GMR Work Group, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Security Council staff, the various interagency groups, and others, could never be satisfactorily catalogued. What emerges, however, is an overview of what is, and what could be, the central tenets of GMR policy.

MCDC has published this paper as a resource for those—in and out of government—who come across this acronym, GMR, and either need or want to know more about the policy behind the words. A cautionary note: GMR is evolutionary, somewhat dynamic, and certainly not "fixed in concrete" either procedurally or institutionally. At least, not yet. Therefore, expect change and maturation of the ideas discussed.

Finally, as with all developing notions, your insight and comments are welcomed. The MCDC IDEAS System described on the inside front cover is designed for just this. Wide dissemination and informed debate can only raise the credibility of GMR as it is suffused throughout government.

Robert L. Butterworth
Director
Mobilization Concepts Development Center
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GRADUATED MOBILIZATION RESPONSE: A Key Element of National Deterrent Strategy

Executive Summary

On 15 September 1987, the National Security Advisor to the President made development of a mobilization doctrine and system based on graduated response to early warning one of the seven priority National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) goals to be achieved by 1989.

In the classic construct, mobilization is the act of preparing for war or other emergency through assembling and organizing national resources. It is the process of marshalling industrial, economic, infrastructure, human, and government resources needed to support responses to national security threats and crises. Yet, the U.S. and other democratic nations cannot afford to maintain full preparedness for every contingency conceivable.

The purpose of Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) is to provide the National Command Authorities a range of political, economic, and military options that will assist in the management of a national security crisis. These options are designed with two goals in mind: first, to improve deterrence and avoid war; and second, to prepare for war should it come.

From the mid 1950's to the late 1970's national security policymakers probed "worst case" scenarios like a nuclear attack on the U.S., or a short warning attack on NATO Europe. Such narrow strategic thinking left no opportunity for capitalizing on America's vast economic strength. It also ignored more likely crises, including:

- Natural disasters or terrorism which could destroy substantial portions of our defense and economic infrastructure
- A sudden requirement to support an ally or client state in a conflict
- A need to respond to technological breakthrough or abrogation of arms control treaties
- Other wartime scenarios like: a small, short war; a small war of indefinite length; along, major war with early warning

GMR recognizes that options available to avoid crisis are markedly expanded by how well and how early warning is taken. Weighing the long lead time required to accomplish some actions, it focuses on moving the moment of decision to the left on the crisis spectrum, enabling decision makers to see and act on warning with a system of graduated responses that--civil or military--will allot
lead time, provide flexibility, and enhance deterrence. In short, GMR should facilitate crisis management without forcing a crisis-mode mentality.

At the national level, GMR actions are developed under the auspices of the National Security Emergency Planning Senior Interagency Group (NSEP SIG). The National Security Council (NSC) provides the management structure in which GMR is suffused throughout government. The interagency process--the NSEP SIG and the subordinate National Mobilization Interagency Group (NMIG), with FEMA in a coordinating role--ties the concept to the NSEP procedures specified in NSDD 188.

An important feature is the increasing control exercised by the executive agent:

**GMR Stage 3 - Planning and Preparation** - Exclusive Federal department and agency actions and information exchange, as appropriate.

**GMR Stage 2 - Crisis Management** - Progressively increasing Federal coordination and NSC direction.

**GMR Stage 1 - National Emergency/War** - NSC or other centralized control.

Under the system, individual department and agencies will develop response option papers identifying and describing the range of actions that could be taken within the various GMR stages. Since these papers both identify and evaluate the range of actions that each agency expects to consider during a crisis, they will greatly facilitate interagency coordination of mobilization programs.

The Department of Defense develops and executes the military response to external threat to national security. Associated with this responsibility is an implied requirement to plan for transitioning from peace to war activities. GMR implements that transition. Recent Department efforts to establish GMR (and the OSD Crisis Management System) as policy tools signal not so much a change as a codification of the process of executing its mobilization responsibilities.

Within DoD, the overriding consideration in implementation is tying GMR to existing, institutionalized processes and systems: the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System; the Joint Strategic Planning System; and, the Joint Operation Planning System. PPBS, JSPS, and JOPS are the institutional tethers for GMR policy.

GMR presents mobilization as a continuum of progressively increased activity, rather than as an “off/on” switch. As they move through the stages of the crisis spectrum, GMR actions change in focus and urgency. Logically: the link to PPBS is more intense at Stage 3; the link to JOPS, especially to time-sensitive planning, is stronger at Stages 2 and 1. Different GMR planning procedures and packages are needed to match the varying option development exigencies of the crisis spectrum. The section on DoD implementation discusses specific ways to integrate GMR into the standard DoD systems and processes.
The actions envisioned by GMR involve varying involvement in the civil sectors of the U.S. and other nations as well. At the low end of the spectrum, many GMR actions are unobtrusive--dealing with defense-oriented industry or competition in major civil markets--but, at the high end, complete reorientation of the economy could be necessary. There needs to be free and frequent coordination with industry and commerce to ensure that transit along the GMR spectrum is controllable.

GMR can become national and DoD policy by 1989. However, GMR must be marketed to broad constituency: industry and trade associations, congress, the transition team. There should be prototypes of GMR option packages and a critical assessment of how such actions enhance deterrence. A test in a major national crisis decision making exercise should be planned for FY90.
GRADUATED MOBILIZATION RESPONSE:
A Key Element of National Deterrent Strategy

Prologue

In March 1989 the last of the Soviet forces quit Afghanistan, fulfilling the timetable set by General Secretary Gorbachev some 10 months earlier. Overhead sources confirmed the withdrawal, but analysts were split on the final disposition of the forces returned to the Soviet Union. It was clear the motorized rifle brigades had returned to garrison in the Transcaucasus military district—in fact, they had de-mobilized. But there was growing evidence that the combat support for these Soviet forces—artillery and rocketry technicians, air defense missile crews, ECM equipment and crews, and transport helicopter squadrons—had not returned to the Soviet Union. Both U.S. and Israeli intelligence confirmed the increase in Soviet activity in Syria and speculation ran high that the Soviets were providing direct support to Syrian forces who were reported moving opposite the Golan Heights. Since Israel resumed operations against Hezbollah positions in Southern Lebanon and Syrian SAM sites in the Bekaa valley, the Soviets had threatened to increase naval activity in the Eastern Mediterranean and "other unspecified actions."

In Washington, the new President was confronted with the second major international problem of his administration—the first being the food riots in Poland. The INF treaty, the START reductions, the Afghanistan withdrawal—all legacies of the Reagan years—were going pretty well. He thought the Russians would be occupied with the "New Solidarity" in Gdansk and the abysmal economic problems in Bulgaria and Hungary. Instead the Israelis were demanding a speed-up delivery of military hardware, under the "Congressionally-monitored" $3 Billion credit arrangement, as a direct counter to the alleged Soviet-Syrian link. The Pentagon was warning that draw down of U.S. stocks in Europe and here at home—like during the '73 war—would put conventional defense capabilities at risk for a very long time. In light of an increased, post-INF dependence on conventional deterrence, they were probably right.

Some weeks back, after consultation with NATO, he had directed the Secretary of State to take the lead in the interagency coordination of a plan to provide essential civilian stocks to the people of Poland, if and when he deemed necessary. Faced with the current intelligence from the Mid-East, he selected two more options from the slate developed by his National Security Advisor who had, some time before, convened the National Security Emergency Planning Senior Interagency Group to monitor the situation. First, he directed that the equipment and sustaining stocks of the 49th Armored Division, Texas Army National Guard—some of the same items requested by Israel—be loaded on the super fast SL-7 supply ships and that they be put en route to Gibraltar to await further orders. And, he ordered FEMA to coordinate the interagency process to bring certain defense-related industries into production to replace consumable stocks drawn down by the Guard division load out; to buy foreign for replenishment, if necessary. Then he informed the American people—and the Soviets—of his actions.
In the Kremlin, the U.S. actions caused the "correlation of forces" generator to crank one more turn. Clearly, nothing the U.S. had done directly acknowledged the active support in Syria. Yet the long term implications were ominous: for some reason, the economic "dial" of American national power had been turned up. From the Soviet view, getting into a direct confrontation because of a client state's actions was not too likely; but now, given the perceived ability of the U.S. to produce "on demand"--and U.S. signalling of the national will to do it--getting out of a confrontation across a broader range of activities might be very difficult.

By moving through a series of pre-planned steps to respond gradually to warning, the U.S.--using the NSC interagency process--had been able to provide the President and Congress with a range of options that could signal determination, provide flexibility, and, ultimately, prevent conflict.

On 15 September 1987, the National Security Advisor to the President made development of a mobilization doctrine and system based on graduated response to early warning one of the seven priority National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) goals to be achieved by 1989.1

More recently, the President's National Security Strategy statement reinforced the importance of the U.S. capability to rapidly increase the production of supplies and equipment to "support deterrence and provide the ability for a timely and flexible response to the full range of plausible threats."2

In the classic construct, mobilization is the act of preparing for war or other emergency through assembling and organizing national resources. It is the process of marshalling military, industrial, economic, infrastructure, human, and government resources needed to support U.S. responses to national security threats and domestic crises. Yet, the United States and other democratic nations, willing or not, cannot afford to maintain full preparedness for every emergency that might conceivably threaten.3 Therein is the essence of the structure/sustainability dilemma. The NSEP priorities present a plan for a much broader concept and system for mobilizing the nation's resources to--in effect--hedge the strategy-capability mismatch. This process is Graduated Mobilization Response.

Definition

In January 1988, a government interagency conference at Emmitsburg, Maryland, adopted a formal--slightly bureaucratic--definition for Graduated Mobilization Response:

\[GMR\text{ is an interagency coordinating system and process for integrating ambiguous and specific warnings with the appropriate resources actions to: mitigate the impact of, improve responsiveness to, and/or recover from a national security emergency or other crisis.}\]

The GMR process fits within a framework that includes the following principal features:

--Emphasis on low cost preparatory actions during the early stages of a crisis to materially reduce lead times in

2
the event that the crisis were to worsen and decisions were made to significantly increase defense expenditures.

--Conception of mobilization as a continuum of progressively increased activity, rather than an "on-off" process.

--A well-defined, incremental menu of graduated, increasing readiness measures, which includes:

--Identification of courses of action and related consequences, requirements, and financial implications;

--Identification of "thresholds" required to transit along the process;

--Provision for discrete, independent action by individual departments and agencies; and,

--Identification of supporting statutory and executive authority and required emergency legislation and executive documents.

--Incorporation of mobilization as part of the overall national response to a crisis, e.g. by sending a signal of resolve.

--Appropriate interaction, responsibilities, and coordination among all Federal departments and agencies, the White House, and Congress.

--Integration, to the extent possible, into existing management information and decision-making structures.5

Concept

Graduated Mobilization Response, or GMR, recognizes an underlying strength in the resource base of the United States and its allies: that a series of pre-planned, incremental readiness measures can enhance the economic, political and military pillars of national power. As government attempts to resolve crises arising from either domestic or external sources, GMR is designed to harness and integrate actions in the resource arena.

From the purely military perspective: as long as fielding sufficiently technically superior forces to enhance deterrence demands large investment, mobilization ramp-up will remain a secondary objective; but, it is necessary to be able to transition to that second goal when warning is taken.6

How then is GMR different from the way government operates today? The answer is in the environment that necessitates GMR policy. Most planning for civil and national security emergencies assumes a crisis scenario. This reasoning implies
that dire problems have already occurred and that one must successfully manage—if that is possible at all—one's way out of the situation.

From the mid 1950's to the late 1970's national security policymakers probed "worst case" scenarios like a nuclear attack on the U.S., or a short warning attack on NATO Europe. Such narrow strategic thinking left no opportunity for capitalizing on America's vast economic strength. It ignored other wartime scenarios: a small, short war; a small war of indefinite length; a long, major war with early warning. It also ignored more likely crisis, including:

--Natural disasters or terrorism which could destroy substantial portions of our defense and economic infrastructure.

--A sudden requirement to support an ally or client state in a conflict.

--A need to provide an improved readiness/sustainability force posture in order to reinforce deterrence.

--A need to respond to technological breakthrough or abrogation of arms control treaties.7

Reality can be otherwise. Few crises are well managed; they are, more properly, resolved—and, at best, avoided. GMR recognizes that options available to avoid crisis are markedly expanded by how well and how early warning is taken. It also weighs the long lead time required to accomplish certain actions.

GMR is focused on moving the moment of decision to the left on the crisis spectrum. Its goal is to enable decision makers to see and act on warning with a system of graduated responses that—civil or military—will allot lead time, provide flexibility, and enhance deterrence. In short, GMR should facilitate crisis management without forcing a crisis-mode mentality.

At an earlier Emmitsburg meeting,8 the spectrum of crisis was portrayed in three regimes: Planning and Preparation, Crisis Management, National Emergency/War (Fig. 1). Within these broad stages occur all of the activities which are ascribed to national security emergency preparedness. It is important to focus on the thresholds which divide the stages because they depict the dilemma of national security emergency planning.

In concept, thresholds are drawn precisely; yet, in practice they are never so. Likewise, emergency plans are drawn as if there will be convincing evidence that a threshold has been crossed and a new plateau reached. Management systems are geared to respond to specific triggers: change in DEFCON, declaration of M-day, or a national emergency, or war.9 Even civil emergencies are tied to specific events: a severe weather warning, declaration of a national disaster, terrorism event, etc. Yet, with the exception of natural disasters which leave no recourse but decisive action, pre-planned responses to other forms of crisis are reluctantly selected—except in extremis. The dilemma is that extensive emergency management machinery exists, but ad hoc solutions are preferred. The reasons are not clear but it may be unverbalized reaction to choices which are perceived to be too severe.
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Fig. 1 - GMR Stages

Warning is the one continuous function across the crisis spectrum and, albeit ambiguous at first, it is the measure by which GMR can succeed. As demonstrated in the 1987 Serial Exercises, not ambiguity of warning, but the lack of the "requisite variety" of options with which to respond to warning might be the cause of decisionmaker reluctance to act.\textsuperscript{10} GMR can add variety to the process by providing adequate mobilization plans--including peacetime investment in resource preparedness measures--and a system for rapidly developing option packages for responding to incipient crisis.

To merit institutionalization in government, GMR has to have strategic advantage. In fact, the one area where GMR may be most useful is in bringing order to strategic planning at the low end of the crisis spectrum--an area largely avoided because it is so murky. In military terms, GMR is strategy in the same manner that forward defence is strategy. Forward defence is conducted by making alliances and stationing troops overseas, so to, a GMR capability is constructed by being able to respond to warning with appropriate discrete acts.

The key difference is conceptual: most strategies, like forward defence, emphasize the political and military elements of national power; GMR expands into the realm of the economic element. It is unfamiliar to visualize--the U.S. does not often consciously or purposefully exercise its economic prowess in support of national security. It is also a potential strength. Confrontation is best avoided if response is implemented early in the warning cycle when actions have the greatest effect on an adversaries' assessment of intent. It works best when supported by established policy and procedures which send intentional, and observable, signals: those which are clearly pre-defined and mutually understood.
As an element of deterrence strategy, mobilization responses complement active military response options, with additional benefits:

--They are non-confrontational, occurring mostly within national borders, far from the scene of potential conflict.

--They enhance readiness by storing up additional capability instead of consuming resources like some military options.

--They provide flexibility, giving a decisionmaker control over pace and direction.

If responses are begun at the low end of the crisis spectrum they signal national awareness of an adversary’s actions but do not necessarily unsettle domestic public opinion.

Mobilization plays to America’s strength: the ability to innovate and respond on demand. An adversary is reminded of US industrial capability in past world conflict.

To be effective, the signals sent must be clear and unmistakable to both sides.\textsuperscript{11}

GMR provides options at the low end of the crisis spectrum currently unavailable to decisionmakers. It addresses the slow response of the American resource base and the long lead time requirements of industry. And, it enhances deterrence by providing repeatable, sustainable signals of national resolve and capability.

As the nation confronts the crisis spectrum, GMR provides alternatives. For example, at Stage 3 there may be targetted investment, planned exercises, and mobilization programming. At Stage 2, surge and readiness enhancement activity or marshalling of shipping assets. At Stage 1, call-up of 200,000 reservists or return of dual-based forces to Europe. These, and other unspecified but costed and catalogued, options are integrated into a system to deter crisis and prevent conflict.

**History**

In the U.S., the conventional view that mobilization is a necessary precursor to war probably derives from a WWI model of conflict. The common WWII conception views mobilization as something done on the eve of battle. The evolution of "mobilization as deterrent" theory, traces to the Mobilization Plan of 1947 which recognized a probable transition period between peace and war.\textsuperscript{12}

The deterrent value of mobilization was consciously recognized in the Korean conflict. Policymakers feared the limited conflict might represent the opening overture of a worldwide general conflict. A substantial industrial mobilization effort was considered necessary to prepare for this worst-case eventuality, and to send a signal of U.S. resolve in order to reduce the risk of its occurrence.\textsuperscript{13} When such eventualities did not occur, active mobilization policy fell out of government consciousness. It was not a conspicuous element of the intervening post-conflict period or Vietnam era.
Rehabilitation of the “mobilization as deterrent” concept began at a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) conference in 1983. Recent work for DoD by The Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC) picked up the gauntlet for "a new planning and preparedness system that would provide a capability to harness U.S. and Canadian economic potential to respond to a wide variety of crises." The TASC concept (not yet implemented by DoD) envisions a system of Industrial Alert Conditions (INDCONS) and Personnel Alert Conditions (PERSCONS) meant to match the DEFCON system.

The INDCON system was one of the test objectives of the recent OSD decision making exercise. The Serial Exercises—properly, PROUD SCOUT-Phase 1—were conducted in the Pentagon from June to November 1987 to "permit senior executive decisionmakers to address critical issues expected to emerge early in an ambiguous situation leading to a major national security crisis." The design called for meetings of the OSD Crisis Management Council (CMC), and a final combined session with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A key feature was the interplay of the CMC with a series of "response" cells, which gave the exercise a fair measure of free play and allowed the outcome to be completely unpredetermined—a relative rarity in DoD exercises.

The Industrial Cell, comprised of senior civilian leaders from industry, commerce, and banking, noted in their after-action report: "During the period leading up to WWII...it was apparent to the political leadership that conflict was likely and that steps were needed to prepare the industrial base—yet the leadership was inhibited from major action until the threat was irrefutable. For members of the Industrial Cell, ambiguity of warning in this exercise (the Serial Exercises—ed.) was not the problem. Sufficient intelligence was, and allegedly will be, available to decisionmakers disposed to be warned. What was absent—just as before WWII—was articulation of a range of options, suitable to the threat, with which to respond to incremental thresholds of warning."

**Precedent**

In Korea, after Chinese forces entered the conflict in December 1950, President Truman declared a national emergency and ordered a mobilization effort which was far in excess of the immediate requirements of the Korean conflict. The mobilization effort had three elements:

--- Increasing production of military goods. By the third quarter of 1951, deliveries of military goods had quadrupled the rate of 1950, with further increase in the pipeline.

--- Defense facilities expansion. The goal was to provide the capability by the end of 1953 to produce 50,000 aircraft, 35,000 tanks, and corresponding amount of other military equipment annually.

--- Expansion of basic industrial capacity. Having experienced two major mobilizations in a decade, policymakers feared that the United States might face a prolonged period of high military preparedness demands. To avoid undue impact on the civilian economy, the
government established a program to expand capacity for basic industries such as electric power, petroleum, chemicals, and metals (including steel, aluminum, copper, and magnesium).19

Following Korea, the U.S. mothballed its "warm" mobilization base and embraced a policy which permanently altered the calculus of the military element of national power: for the first time in U.S. history, a large peacetime defense establishment was raised. Based initially on a large strategic nuclear structure, it has--over the last twenty years--come to contain sizeable conventional forces.

In past crises, it was necessary to raise both the force and the sustaining stocks prior to engagement; today the shell of the force is already in being--consuming daily a share of national resources at peacetime rates. The costs of fielding and modernizing this force-in-being have precluded the ability to maintain a deep support base.

Prevailing deterrent strategy--nuclear and conventional--appears based on "parade ground counting."20 Thus, de facto policy has been to rely on mobilization (in the pre-Korean conflict sense) to provide the industrial, logistical, and personnel support when the time comes.

National Policy

Management of U.S. resources in a national security emergency or other crisis is the responsibility of the Executive Branch.21 National Security Decision Directive 47 (NSDD 47), Emergency Mobilization Preparedness, dated 22 July 1982, states:

"It is the policy of the U.S. to have an emergency mobilization preparedness capability that will ensure that government at all levels, in partnership with the private sector and the American people, can respond decisively and effectively to any major national emergency with the defense of the U.S. as first priority...."

Other documents, including NSDD 188, Government Coordination for National Security Emergency Planning, and ranging from Executive Orders to Defense Mobilization Orders implement the requirement which stems from the Constitution to "provide for the defense of the nation."22

Attempts to empower a single agency--such as the Office of Defense Resources with the Defense Resources Board and the Economic Stabilization Agency--as the "czar" of mobilization activity have never achieved popularity in turf-conscious Washington. FEMA, with the approval of the NSC, coordinates for the 27 Departments and Agencies which have emergency functions. There is a Council of Economic Advisors to the President. The White House has institutionalized the Domestic Cabinet Councils, currently two, one for economic policy and the other for domestic policy. Both can operate in crisis. In addition, the White House is served by the National Security Council and certain other ad hoc crisis decision making structures. In-place staff assistance for crisis decision making is minimal. Coordination and cooperative peacetime planning on specific issues is done by Interagency Groups working under the auspices of the National Security Emergency Planning Senior Interagency Group (NSEP SIG). In a crisis, the
Director, FEMA, can constitute the Interagency Emergency Coordination Group and the Interagency Emergency Policy Board.

Certainly, on paper and in fact, there are sufficient organizational entities to conduct a national mobilization. But what they do and when they come together is crucial to GMR.

The scope of GMR extends to domestic as well as external threats to the national security of the U.S. and allied or friendly foreign governments. Like mobilization to support employment of military forces, the impact of a severe manmade or natural disaster may also warrant mobilization actions. Other potential events that could require GMR actions include: terrorism, economic crises, or replacement of allies’ war losses.

GMR actions demonstrate national will and resolve, and signal disapproval of specific international events (for instance, treaty abrogations), react to technological breakthroughs, prepare for major conventional war, or increase civil defense capability (in advance of nuclear war threat).

The ability of the U.S. to cope with such emergencies is important to both the confidence of its citizens and that of its allies. Within their purview, the individual Departments and Agencies prepare for calamity and emergency. A policy of GMR does not change those responsibilities, but superimposes a process and system that recognizes the interdependency of the separate government elements when it comes to competition for national resources and channels resources in support of national goals.

As has been noted, GMR operates across the conflict spectrum. Yet its major effect must be on the planning and preparation stage: peacetime. This argues for using a control approach at the national level which is as close to normal, day-to-day operation as possible. The GMR Working Group recommended that institutionalization take place under the auspices of the NSEP SIG.

The NSC is well positioned to provide the management structure in which GMR is suffused throughout government. The interagency process—the NSEP SIG and the subordinate National Mobilization Interagency Group (NMIG), with FEMA in a coordinating role—ties the concept to a proven mechanism for dealing with important national issues.

An important feature is the increasing control exercised by senior officials:

**GMR Stage 3** - Planning and Preparation - Exclusive Department and Agency actions and information exchange, as appropriate.

**GMR Stage 2** - Crisis Management - Progressively increasing Federal coordination and NSC direction.

**GMR Stage 1** - National Emergency/War - NSC or other centralized control.

Further definition of GMR levels may be developed. An agency may, for example, divide the crisis management stage into two or three levels that better suit its needs or the needs of its industrial, personnel, legislative, or other
null
those major actions resulting in a national mobilization. Upon receipt of warning
information, the cognizant agencies develop policy recommendations for
consideration by the NSC or one of its subordinate groups (e.g., Senior Interagency
Group, National Mobilization Interagency Group). Certain GMR actions may be
taken at the Department or subordinate level consistent with existing or
delegated authorities. Coordination of major national GMR recommendations is
effected through the National Mobilization Interagency Group chaired by the NSC,
especially its Mobilization Readiness Subgroup. Implementation of a GMR
action follows the NSC decision using the same interagency process.

As mentioned, there are 27 Departments and Agencies, all having
responsibilities under GMR policy. Executive Order 11490, set for Presidential
signature in April 1988, will update the national security emergency preparedness
responsibilities of these entities. Other documents, in preparation, will draw
together the national procedures to implement GMR. Figure 3 shows the basic set
of revisions underway. The direction to the Departments and Agencies is to
appoint a cognizant agent and to prepare detailed GMR plans and capabilities
within their areas of responsibility.

Other elements of government are not yet involved in institutionalizing
GMR. Since GMR involves, in large measure, peacetime planning and funding
through the annual budgeting process, the participation of the President’s Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) is key to successful implementation. At
present, integrating GMR into the federal budget development process is an
uncharted area.

The legislative and judicial branches are constitutionally linked to executing
the GMR policy. Only Congress can authorize full or total mobilization for the
purposes of increasing force structure, normally by declaring war or a state of
national emergency. However, a great deal of the activity pertinent to GMR occurs during the Planning and Preparation phase prior to force mobilization. Many of the preparations necessary to increase production and prepare the economy can be taken without invoking emergency authority, therefore the burden falls squarely on the executive branch to consult regularly with the other branches. Laying the groundwork for GMR actions in Stage 3, along with congressional pre-consultation and standby legislation (if required), facilitates the implementation of GMR options in a crisis.

**DoD Policy**

The Department of Defense is responsible for developing and executing the military element of national defense plans. Associated with this responsibility is an implied requirement to plan for transitioning from peace to war activities. All gradations of mobilization must be considered and planned for as part of responsible defense preparations. DoD Directive 3020.36 assigns national security emergency preparedness responsibilities to DoD components. A GMR approach to mobilization signals not so much a change in policy as it does a way of executing mobilization responsibilities in the Department.

In effort to match defense resources to the national strategy, OSD, JCS, and the Services balance the need for force structure to enforce deterrence with the certain knowledge that structure comes with an expensive logistic support penalty. In peacetime, and in competition with other agencies of government for federal dollars, the focus of the balancing act narrows quickly to hardware, programs, and personnel.

A number of current activities are being undertaken by the Department to assure balance in the strategy/resources debate. Some of the major ones are:

- The Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process, which will identify production requirements to support specific military operations.

- The Critical Items List identifies key war fighting munitions and end items, and provides a focus for prioritizing the planning effort.

- The Industrial Preparedness Planning Program, which provides a means to integrate surge/mobilization concerns into the weapons acquisition process and provides a structure for surge/mobilization planning with U.S. and Canada.

- The Industrial base enhancement programs, such as DPA Title III, Industrial Modernization Incentives, and Manufacturing Technology, which help maintain an effective industrial base and improve production capabilities.

- The North American Industrial Base Initiative, which identifies ways to coordinate joint U.S.-Canada planning more effectively.

The result provides DoD with the ability to move from peace to war. Systems and plans for accomplishing the transition are—and will continue to be—the prime mode of operation in periods of tension: the JCS implements portions of the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) Crisis Action Procedures, OSD can operate under its Crisis Management System (CMS), and so on. These procedures—or the ad hoc adaptations which are apparently preferred for their flexibility—dictate that GMR adapt itself to routine as well as intensive crisis procedures.
The process and system envisioned for GMR are designed to bring a framework to operational logistics (the act of providing support at the point of employment) at the low end of the conflict spectrum and to mesh with crisis action procedures. Execution of the mobilization responsibilities of the Services and OSD are particularly enhanced since the bulk of GMR options commence during the Planning and Preparation stage—an arena where, when deterrence works, OSD and the Services are most active.

Under a policy of GMR, the Services and OSD alter their roles to become functional advocates for resource planning, putting mobilization considerations on an equal footing with the program constituency. Probably, the most difficult task will be to establish the intelligence requirements necessary to secure convincing warning. JCS and the CINCs will be drawn into the process as it becomes necessary to "fix" on realistic requirements so that the "requisite variety" of GMR options can be established.

**DoD Implementation**

Within DoD, the over-riding consideration in implementation is tying GMR to existing, institutionalized processes and systems. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide depicts the infamous "pretzel" chart which is indelibly imprinted on every Pentagon action officer's mind, if not his or her cuff. Fig. 4 shows the confluence of the major DoD planning systems: the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System; the Joint Strategic Planning System; and, the Joint Operation Planning System. PPBS, JSPS, and JOPS are the institutional tethers for GMR policy.

GMR actions change in focus and urgency as they move through the 3 stages of the crisis spectrum (Fig. 1). Logically: the link to PPBS is more intense at Stage 3; the link to JOPS, especially to time-sensitive planning, is stronger at Stage 2. Different GMR planning procedures and packages are needed to match the varying option development exigencies of the crisis spectrum. The planned GMR links to the major DoD systems are best described in terms of their relationship to the crisis stages.

GMR Stage 3 approximates "business as usual" and GMR actions at this stage are tied to the POM submission process. In Stage 2, GMR packages are tailored to early and specific warning. They are developed within PPB guidelines under either normal or CMS auspices. (Nothing precludes the "Stage 2" GMR packages from being developed at any time, if deemed necessary by the Secretary of Defense. For instance, packages may be developed for demonstration purposes, for major Departmental exercises, or to respond to requests for assistance from other Federal agencies.)

GMR Stage 1 is aligned with severe crisis, including Presidential or Congressional declarations of national emergency or war. GMR procedures in this stage are likely to be associated with partial, full, or total mobilization; the development of Emergency Procurement Budgets; and major disruptions of the national economy. Such responsibilities are covered more thoroughly in the DoD Master Mobilization Plan, and other Federal documents like the National Emergencies Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Defense Mobilization Orders.
Procedures for DoD's conduct of GMR policy for each of the stages are described below. This does not restrict their use to a specific stage—in fact, GMR stages are unlikely to be declared decisively like Defense Readiness Conditions (DEFCONS). The stages, and associated procedures, respond to the varying information needs and decision requirements of the Secretary of Defense and can be invoked over the entire continuum from peacetime planning to war and recovery.

GMR Stage 3 - Planning and Preparation

GMR is linked to the PPBS through the Defense Guidance (DG) document and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development process. The first type of GMR package should come from a review, as programs are built to fit the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), of how the Services might transition to a mobilization-oriented program if required by ambient warning.

To facilitate such a review, the DG would be amended to include certain assumptions about investment strategy (for example, reprogramming vice supplemental appropriation) and resource base goals (for example, transition complete within "n" months).

Mobilization objectives have to be tied to requirements. In turn, requirements in this phase are derived from scenarios. At one end of the range is the DG Illustrative Planning Scenario, which—for all its controversy—is a proper start point for mobilization excursions. There are, in addition, three cases which have been advanced as alternate scenario candidates:

Case I: Soviet Union is initiating mobilization and/or engaging in aggression (e.g., Afghanistan); or
Case II: Country A is mobilizing due to the possibility of an attack by Country B. Country A is expected to request significant amounts of U.S. weapons, ammunition, and spare parts, if war breaks out; or

Case III: Insurgent activity in Country C is expected to increase sharply. U.S. military supplies and equipment are requested as the insurgency spreads and intensifies.41

GMR considerations are melded into the PPBS process by requiring the Services to include with their POM submission an annex which would specify in dollars and end product how transition to a mobilization-oriented program would be accomplished for the illustrative scenario and each of the cases. A programmatic strategy for full mobilization will be developed during each POM cycle. The strategy contains a "mobilization outline plan" for transitioning from the baseline program (in the POM) to full mobilization within the specified time frame of a decision to do so beginning sometime in the first two years of the FYDP. This outline mobilization strategy will be developed within the overall framework of the PPB system.

Results are reported in a POM annex. The annex shows the mobilization outline plan, capabilities achieved, constraints, shortfalls, risks, and estimates of projected cost. In developing their detailed POM, Services consider funding "risk reduction" measures to alleviate constraints and shortfalls highlighted by the mobilization planning process.

The mobilization annex to the POM will be reviewed by the Defense Resources Board (DRB) during normal program review in the form of a mandatory issue paper (like the "major new starts" paper in the POM document). The DRB review will focus on executability, achievement of objectives, cross-service consistency, and risk reduction current funding. The mobilization outline plan will be approved by DEPSECDEF as DoD mobilization strategy.

The next important GMR link is to the JSPS. This link is not as intrusive as it was into PPBS. Instead, it draws on the requirements determination information that the JSPS can provide. The Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) feeds DG development with requirements-type information from the Total Force Capability Assessment (TFCA). This process could be modified to include assessment of the alternate scenario cases and the result, in turn, fed back into the Services' POM development. In this phase (Planning and Preparation), operational requirements might best be stated in terms of mission area and/or specific weapons system rather than time-phased or plan specific.

The third linkage is to JOPS. Unlike the programmatic side of the Department which deals with "out years" and the assumption that war will not occur until the end of the FYDP period, JOPS and the operation planning community deal in nearer term, current capabilities actions. This is the deliberate planning phase which has as a goal the completion of Operation Plans (OPLANS) and Concept Plans (CONPLANS) to satisfy the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasks for each of the CINCs.

At present, a "base case" family of plans is being refined. It will result in a first glance assessment of the logistic supportability of a global set of plans. Some
sustainability shortfall is anticipated. Converting the additional requirement to a
time-phased GMR package should be an output of the refinement. As a follow-on,
the JSCP could require that GMR considerations be applied to future OPLANs.

Following the validation of the Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning
Process (JIMPP) requirements determination process, mobilization requirements
for all defense resources need to become part of the OPLAN development cycle. Eventually, the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) will be
accompanied by a time-phased sustainment plan which, if GMR guidelines are
followed, will start not at D-day but at D minus 6 to 18 months. The capacity of the
JOPS follow-on, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), will
extend the operational logisticians' reach into the national resource base for
planning and support.

GMR Stage 2 - Crisis Management

The tempo shifts in this stage. The first GMR link is to the OSD Crisis
Management System (CMS). This system is brought into play by JCS indicators and
warnings that an external threat to national security requires increased DoD
activity. As required, the Crisis Coordination Group (CCG) would be convened, and
the boards and committees of the CMS would be called into being by their
principals. Each CMS board and committee provides a mechanism for rapid and
effective coordination, immediate expert advice, and resolution of a high volume
of crisis issues.

This phase (but still at its low end) begins the departure from peacetime
programming and deliberate planning to crisis staffing and time-sensitive
planning. It will be the juncture where, although the threshold is not precise,
apparent warning will argue for selection of GMR options to enhance deterrence,
improve readiness, and attempt to resolve the crisis. Instead of scenarios, there
will be a measured threat to plan against. In OSD, the work plan includes both the
PPBS and consideration of specific requirements including pre-planned Emergency
Action Packages (EAPs) which have been developed for likely issues which may
confront OSD in a crisis. A primary focal point will be the Crisis Management
Council (CMC)--the crisis equivalent of the DRB.

The CMC will direct development of "costed option packages" to respond to
the specific warning. Such packages may be based on the mobilization outline
plans, revised and expanded if appropriate to the threat, or in response to JCS
requirements stemming from anticipated military options (for example, support
packages for the convoy operations in the Persian Gulf might have been a good
candidate). Or they may be purely industrial response packages meant to signal
will and determination. The costed option package has seven elements which
describe the contemplated action, rationale, risks, and costs:

--Threat Assessment. Describe potential or actual crises
that could require a U.S. response to deter or mitigate.

--Alternative Response Options. Identify alternative
political (USD(P)), military (JCS), or industrial (OASD(P&L))
responses that could be used to resolve crisis.
--Response Implications and Shortfalls. Assess resource implications of political and military responses, and identify shortfalls to be supplied by the national resource base.

--Current Industrial/Manpower Capability to Resolve Shortfall. Survey national and allied/trading partner capability to satisfy shortfall.

--Action to Improve Responsiveness. Should the resource base not be able to provide the shortfall in the time/quantity required, identify legal (legislative), procedural (directives, FARs), production (IMPs), and economic (government coordination) actions that are needed.

--Associated Costs. Describe cost for implementing each option. Costs should be apportioned to procurement or investment, and sourced to appropriation, reprogramming, or supplemental funding.

--Political Feasibility. Assess the national willingness to support each alternative.

These costed option packages become the GMR options for the SECDEF's decision brief during Crisis Management Council (CMC) meetings. Theoretically, the EAPs should provide the execution steps once the GMR option is selected.

The link to JSPS depends, at this stage, on the magnitude and duration of warning. A refinement to JSCP, Volume II (Forces), would have the CINCs construct a series of Critical Items Lists (CILs) which would order requirements (or acceptable substitutes) for their major OPLANS based on decreasing warning intervals, for example: an 18-months of warning CIL, a 1-year of warning CIL, a 6-months of warning CIL. The value in these excursions would be to provide a variety of requirements packages to fuel the time-sensitive planning aspects of GMR discussed in the next section.

The link to JOPS in the crisis management stage relates to the time-sensitive planning process and the JCS Crisis Action Procedures. In general, these procedures are not implemented until deepening of crisis where the likelihood of military action is high. At that time the JCS reviews current OPLANS/CONPLANS and may propose that the Service mobilization outline plans or a CINC CIL buy-out be executed. More likely, the threat will require that time-sensitive planning procedures be implemented.

The JIMPP capabilities currently being developed, have the potential to provide time-phased materiel requirements for time-sensitive GMR option development. The process examines the now quantifiable threat and converts it to resource demands to be met by GMR. The focus is on responding to a changed threat, rather than the relatively static threat addressed in the DG, or even in the JSCP.
The time-sensitive (Crisis Action Procedures) process follows the same developmental steps as deliberate planning but uses more finely tuned requirements taken from a CINC’s Assessment of the Situation or the JCS Warning Order. JCS input to the costed option package would be in terms of requirements to support military action, but beyond current capability.

**GMR Stage 1 - National Emergency/War**

At this stage, GMR approaches the more traditional (although inaccurate) sense of mobilization. Declaration of a national emergency or war will enable a move to partial, full, or total national mobilization. Even at this point (as envisioned by the National Emergencies Act) the declaration is not an all-or-nothing situation. The United States can temporize and send incremental signals that may de-escalate a crisis or allow certain necessary actions with a minimum of provocation. For instance, under the Act the President declared a national emergency after the hostage taking in Iran for the sole purpose of freezing Iranian assets in this country.44

In National emergency/war, the DoD CMS role expands to advocacy as one of the major claimants to resources on the national level. The NSEP interagency process intensifies and other mechanisms for resource allocation and adjudication may become operational. The economy could shift from fee-market to command.

The PPBS process would now focus on an emergency budget based on national strategy and CINC estimates of requirements. Cognizant of essential civilian demand, DoD responsibility will be to match industrial and personnel resource expansion to production targets through the NSEP interagency process. A long-range planning subset of the CMS must be looking at recovery and demobilization issues.

The JSPS, as well as JOPS, functions now point toward force expansion, sequential operations and reconstitution issues.

The mobilization outline or costed option package procedures apply equally at this stage depending on whether the national security threat—and chosen strategy—are protracted or immediate in focus.

Figure 5 shows the elements of GMR integration into PPBS, JSPS, and JOPS.

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<tr>
<th>STAGE</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Outline MOB prgrm</td>
<td>Costed Option Pkg</td>
<td>Emergency Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSPS</td>
<td>JSPD/TFCA Scenarios</td>
<td>JIMMP Reqmts</td>
<td>Force Expansion</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPS</td>
<td>Deliberate (Base Case)</td>
<td>Time-Sensitive</td>
<td>Reconstitution</td>
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**Fig. 5 - GMR Relationship to DoD Systems**
Industry Integration

None of the conscious planning and pre-planning for institutionalizing a policy of GMR in government will take hold unless the prime actors in the national resource base are brought into the process. The actions envisioned by GMR involve the civil sectors of the U.S., and other nations as well. At the low end of the spectrum, many of the actions are mundane--dealing with defense-oriented industry or competition in major civil markets--but, at the high end, major reorientation of the economy could be needed. There needs to be continuous coordination with industry and commerce to ensure that transit along the GMR spectrum is controllable.

In DoD, the Industrial Preparedness Planning Program (IPPP) will have to encourage GMR preparations, at the national level, the interagency process has to incorporate GMR considerations in its dealings with the free market--from stockpiling and export control objectives to tax policy and foreign incentives. There may have to be a series of triggering mechanisms that automatically elicit a response from the economy as GMR options are selected. Certainly such is the ladder envisioned by the INDCON concept proposed by DoD. In addition, there are new contracting stratagems needed to make GMR-related actions a consideration in all new starts within the government.

Keys to communicating GMR policy throughout industry will be the adaptation of current mechanisms to the process. Since industry responds to the order book, the GMR link should be made to existing contractual arrangements, through the acquisition advocacy process, and by pre-coordinating surge and production measures. The point men for putting GMR into the industrial lexicon have to be the program managers, government contracting officers, plant reps, and ASPROS who deal regularly with--and are familiar to--industry.

In DoD, the Secretary needs access to a broad cross-section of opinion early in a crisis to ensure that recommendations to the National Command Authority (NCA) regarding the industrial base have passed a reality check within the larger economic arena. One solution is chartering an industrial mobilization advisory panel which would come into being in advance of a national level interagency group to provide essential industry liaison on DOD's mobilization plans as they come closer to execution.

In crisis, an informed defense industry can prepare to react quickly. If confidentiality is sought, channels exist today for one-on-one contact; if a signal is intended, an advisory board provides a very visible conduit. In developing this recommendation, the Industrial Cell in the Serial Exercises was unaware of any current procedures or mechanisms to provide DoD an industrial sounding board. Some possibilities exist under an expanded charter of the Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) or a wartime mission for the Defense Science Board, but these are not fully developed for the low end of the crisis spectrum. Another possibility is one, or both, of the industrial groups created as part of the ASD(P&L) current "initiatives."
Conclusion

There are 3 potentially lethal impediments to institutionalizing a policy of GMR in government: nay-sayers, bureaucratic inertia, and interagency torpor (occasioned by near term national elections). These obstacles are formidable--and unavoidable. If GMR is to become policy by 1989, targeted planning and permanent patches to the current system are needed now.

GMR has to be marketed to a constituency broader than the denizens of the Executive branch. Industry and trade associations can be strong allies. They--alone in Washington--survive changes of administration intact. That change is important too. The presidential transition team has to be tackled as soon as it is formed. Finally, Members of Congress, and their staffs, need to be brought in early--and routinely--so that GMR requests do not come as bolts from the blue when proposed.

Proof-testing ought to be another area of emphasis. As a prototype, development of an investment strategy package to recapture the recent $33 Billion defense cut to the FY 89 budget might be a good exercise. In addition to providing a useful GMR option package, it would serve as a test bed for Service procedures for the 90-92 POM development cycle.

As was the case in 1987, a major objective of the next Serial Exercise (FY 90) should be to test the DoD implementation of GMR procedures. The test should extend to GMR option development and coordination at the national level in the REX-series of exercises by the actual interagency response cells. There is also a proposal to conduct a "live fire" test of GMR by bringing out of mothballs an ammunition production line at the Louisiana Army Ammunition Depot. GMR is a prime candidate for an inaugural test of the government's crisis management machinery under E.O. 11490.

Postscript

GMR must survive two tests. First, does it change the way business is done in government? Second--and most important--does it enhance deterrence as a key element of national strategy? Neither can be answered at the start line, but sampling and tests can be proposed that will determine whether GMR is good policy.

The way to ensure a DoD system gets put to the test is to make it part of daily activity in the Department. This is undoubtedly true in other areas of government as well. Tethering GMR to PPBS, JSPS, and JOPS is part of the answer. There is also a requirement to automate the concept. At the OSD level, a decision support subsystem attached to and operating in the Crisis Coordination Center (CCC) could be used to tie together disparate information sources (like DEARAS, DINET, etc.) with artificially intelligent GMR routines useful for training, exercising, and insuring, in crisis, that the best advice is available around-the-clock, even when the key human expert cannot be. It should be the goal of the CCC to be able to continually assess the resource base ramifications of operational military activities (those supervised from the National Military Command Center (NMCC)), and to recommend to senior Department officials where GMR actions should be considered.
An even more crucial need is a government capability to "red team" GMR. Such a test was conducted during the Serial Exercises and carried into PROUD SCOUT. The United Kingdom uses a construct--a net assessment cell--to look not only on a policy's primary effect on an adversary, but also the fall-out of such activity on the U.K.'s interests in the rest of the world. By whatever name, it is imperative that the ability to predict, measure, and assess the impact on the incident/crisis of contemplated--or executed--GMR options be developed. It is the only way, short of actually executing options, of proving the contention that GMR can deter. DoD should take the government lead in prototyping such a capability.
ENDNOTES

1. NSC memo 1063/1, Subject: National Security Emergency Preparedness Priorities, 15 September 1987. Then National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci enumerated the highest priority NSEP goals as:
   1. Revision of E.O. 11490 assigning NSEP responsibilities to Departments and Agencies.
   2. Implementation of a national security emergency plan to replace obsolete plans and update standby authority documents.
   3. Completion of continuity of government policy implementation and evaluation of program design through interagency exercises.
   4. Development of mobilization programs based on graduated response to early warning.
   5. Establishment of government-industry plans to minimize the impact of energy disruptions.
   7. Revision of E.O. 10480 assigning industrial preparedness responsibilities to Departments and Agencies.


3. FEMA memo to members of the Mobilization Readiness Subgroup of the NMIG, Subject: Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR), February 5, 1988. Originally developed by Joe Muckerman of OSD/USD(P)-EP and Jim Miskel of the NSC as a national level overview of the GMR concept, the paper has undergone numerous revisions at FEMA. It is intended to be issued over Colin Powell's signature as the national statement on GMR policy.


5. FEMA memo to members of the Mobilization readiness Subgroup of the NMIG, Subject: Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR), February 5, 1988. pp. 2-3. A recent version (11 March 1988, Page 3) of the memo reduces the explanation of key features to:
   - Conception of mobilization as a continuum of progressively increased activity, rather than an "on-off" process, to be activated on "M-day."
   - A well-defined, incremental menu of graduated readiness measures, which include:
     - courses of action and related requirements and financial implications,
     - identified "thresholds" for movement during the process,
     - recognition of independent actions available to departments and agencies during various stages of a crisis, and
     - supporting statutory and executive authority and required emergency legislation and executive documents.


8. Meeting of DoD staff agencies at Emmitsburg, MD, on 17 & 18 December 1987, significant for expanding the purview of GMR in DoD beyond industrial to manpower and logistics issues.

9. DEFCON (Defense Readiness Condition): a uniform system of progressive alert postures used by the national defense establishment to bring military forces into readiness. M-day: the day mobilization is scheduled to commence. Declaration of national emergency or war: a presidential declaration of national emergency activates certain authorities specified in public law (for example, partial mobilization); a congressional declaration of national emergency or war enables full or total mobilization to commence. Authorities are specified in Title 10, United States Code.


12. OASD(A&L) manual, Improving Intergovernmental Planning: Preliminary INDCON System, 15 March 1987. page 2-10. Although the plan called for an ambitious peacetime preparedness program, it also recognized: "...the possibility of a period marked by a rapid and serious deterioration of international relations during which important preliminary measures of mobilization could be taken although the full war powers would not be in effect." (U.S. Munitions Board, "Industrial Mobilization - Office of War Production," Annex 82 to the 1947 Mobilization Plan, p.5.)

13. Ibid., page 2-11.

14. Conversation with Leon Reed, TASC, 11 February 1988. At the FEMA conference, the challenge was put forward to develop a mobilization system to parallel the DEFCON system. Eventually, the INDCON/PERSCON system was proposed.


17. SECDEF Memorandum, Subject: OSD Decision Making Exercise. 29 April 1987.


20. Conversation with Joe Muckerman, 3 February 1988. In deep peace, strategists resist giving up force structure for sustainability unless a direct combat benefit can be demonstrated. However, a move to a more conventional-based deterrence—away from nuclear—actually supports the argument for sustainability: if the defense is essentially conventional, it would be dereliction not to make that defense credible by establishing the requisite staying power.

21. Executive emergency authority is based on U.S. Code and Public Law legislated by Congress, or upon Executive Orders, Federal regulations, etc., which implement the code or law.

22. A number of statutory authorities define the government's ability to deal with national security emergencies. Among the most often cited are: 1) The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601-1651) passed in 1976. It provides that when the president declares a national emergency he must subsequently specify the authorities he is invoking. Congress may terminate the emergency at any time by concurrent resolution and will review the declaration and situation every 6 months. The Act reinforces the concept that declaration of a national emergency is not an "all or nothing" situation. 2) The Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2061). The Korean War vintage act provides government the broad authority to intervene in the economy in the interest of national defense. In 1952 and 1953 it was amended to leave only Titles I, III, & VII. Since that time these Titles have been re-enacted, usually at two year intervals, with modest changes. Title I provides the authority to place defense production ahead of civilian requirements. Title III establishes loan and purchase mechanisms to expand capacity. Title VII provides for the mobilization of expert personnel. 3) The Selective Service Act of 1948 (50 U.S.C. App. 468). Establishes procedures for registering potential inductees into the Armed Services. Section 17(c) would have to be repealed before actual induction could occur.


26. The Working Group is an interagency group loosely affiliated with both the NSEP SIG and the National Mobilization IG.

27. FEMA memo to members of the Mobilization readiness Subgroup of the NMIG, Subject: Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR), February 5, 1988. page 5.

28. NSDD 188, Government Coordination for National Security Emergency Planning, September 16, 1985, establishes the connection between NSEP processes and the interagency concept managed by the NSC.

30. FEMA document, Major Emergency Actions, July 1985, overviews the MEA papers. The complete project covers the major functional areas of mobilization preparedness including:
   - Economics (Domestic and International)
   - Infrastructure (Food, Energy, Communications, Transportation)
   - Government Preparedness
   - Human Resources (Health, Labor Force, Social Services, Housing)
   - Industrial Production
   - Civil Defense


32. Ibid. pp 4-5.

33. Ibid. page 6.

34. Title 10, United States Code, sections 672-3.


36. DOD Directive 3020.36, Assignment of National Security Preparedness Responsibilities to Department of Defense Components, August 28, 1973, was originally prepared as a continuity of government directive. The revision incorporates the OSD Crisis Management System and mentions GMR as a USD(P) managed responsibility. An associated Instruction, same number, establishes GMR as DoD policy.


38. JOPS Vol IV, Crisis Action Procedures, and DoD Instruction 3020.36, National Security Preparedness Procedures (Graduated Mobilization Response (draft)).


40. This is the approach envisioned in the draft DoD Instruction 3020.36, National Security Preparedness Procedures (Graduated Mobilization Response). Revision 2 is dated 15 March 1988.


42. USD(P) manual, OSD Crisis Management System Functions and Membership of the Council, Boards, Committees, and Program Review Group, August 1987. The instrumentalities of the CMS are:
   - Crisis Management Council
   - Program Review Group
Health Affairs Council
Manpower Board
Production and Logistics Board
Politico-Military Board
Allied Support Committee
Civilian Manpower Committee
Energy Management Committee
Medical Mobilization and Deployment Steering Committee
Military Manpower Committee
Policy Guidance Committee
Production Management Committee
Security Assistance Committee
Transportation Management Committee

43. There are 9 categories of EAPs:

1) Manpower (10000)
   a. Military Manpower
   b. Force Expansion
   c. Civilian Manpower

2) Security Assistance/Allied Support (20000)

3) C3I (30000)

4) Acquisition and Logistics (40000)
   a. Acquisition
   b. Production
   c. Installations
   d. Transportation

5) Civil Affairs (50000)

6) Medical (60000)

7) Administrative/Budget/Legal/Congressional (70000)
   a. Administrative
   b. Budget
   c. Legal
   d. Public Affairs
   e. Congressional Affairs

8) Operations and Readiness (80000)
   a. Alert Measures
   b. Non-Combatant Evacuation
   c. OPLAN Execution

9) Political-Military Affairs (90000)


page 4.

46. Reference Dr. Costello's DoD Strategy for Bolstering Industrial Competitiveness for propositions.
