Although it lasted only 1 month, ended in a British victory, and is almost entirely forgotten today, the effects of the Third Afghan War (May 1919) were profound in terms of the post-First World War position of British India. Because the War led to the mutiny of the tribal militias (e.g., the Khyber Rifles) that policed the Northwest Frontier of India, the tribes in the unadministered border between Afghanistan and India rose in rebellion. In Waziristan, which lacked any road communications, this fighting was particularly severe, as the British failed to defeat the now heavily armed tribes. Between late 1919 and late 1921, the Indian Army, its fighting value weakened by wartime expansion and by losses, fought a series of protracted and inconclusive campaigns, each of which involved the equivalent of a division.

Not until late 1921 did the Afghans agree to normalize relations with Britain. By assisting the Wazirs and playing off the Bolsheviks against the British, the Afghans won their full independence from the British, whose client state they had been previously. The cost of tribal fighting, permanently occupying the Frontier, and building roads precipitated a fiscal crisis in the reformed Indian legislature and made the Army Budget politically contentious. This prolonged budgetary crisis prevented the British from using the Indian Army as widely in the Middle East as they had hoped, and it derived ultimately from the month-long Third Afghan War.

The Third Afghan War and the External Position of India, 1919-1924

The First World War ended with the Government of India poised on the brink of becoming a regional power. To some in London, it seemed as if New Delhi would shortly even become the eastern capital of the Empire. Such visions rested in large measure on the wartime growth and accomplishments of the Indian Army. During the war, it had expanded from fewer than 200,000 to more than a million combatants and followers, and it had fought in every theater. On Armistice Day, there were four Indian divisions based on Egypt, two at Salonika, four more in Mesopotamia, and lesser contingents in Persia, Aden, Singapore, and elsewhere. In India itself, recruiting was proceeding to produce a another half-million in 1919. These numbers suggested to those hopeful Britons accustomed to "thinking imperially" that the promise of dominion status issued in 1917 portended not eventual independence but the sort of fealty shown in the contingents sent from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even South Africa. The inaugural number of The Army Quarterly warned darkly in October 1920 that:

...the defeat of Germany merely removed the centre of danger to the British Empire from the West to the East, and it soon became evident that the safety of India was likely to be more seriously endangered than before the war. The Germans, foiled in the West, at once turned their attention to the East and by insidious methods set to work to discredit Great Britain....Accordingly, while, during the course of the war, the destinies of India were being decided on the fields of Flanders, during the period subsequent to the
Armistice the country has found itself in a detached and independent position, thrown more or less upon its own resources, and no longer able to rely upon British victories in other parts of the world to restore its equilibrium.

In the autumn of 1920, an Army in India Committee under Lord Esher produced a famous report that hinted at War Office control of the entire Army in India and its use by Whitehall as precisely that sort of eastern extension of the British Army.

By 1924, it was plain that nothing like this was going to happen. Many reasons can be cited to explain why enlistment in the Indian Army was not an accurate gauge of political acceptance of the Raj. Of more concern is the failure of the British to develop India as the eastern military capital of the Empire. The reason lay in the collapse of the British position on the Northwest Frontier in 1919—a collapse that the British were unable to repair and which effectively tied the military forces of India to tribal warfare and underlined the futility and unwisdom of using Indian regulars elsewhere in the area.

* * *

Late in 1918, the War Office queried AHQ in India as to the size of the postwar Army. In the flush of victory, the Indian Government was ready to consider a postwar Field Army of a four divisions with four cavalry brigades, and three frontier brigades permanently localized on the Northwest Frontier. In reserve would be two divisions and two cavalry brigades, which it was tacitly understood would be available for overseas as needed. The War Office itself was
known to have even grander schemes, such as maintaining 16 Indian divisions in postwar India for service abroad.

For the Indian Army, these schemes were soon overtaken by events closer to home. In April 1919, civil disturbances erupted in the Punjab, in Bombay, in Bengal, and in Delhi itself. On 4 May 1919, Afghan regulars crossed the Indian frontier in the Khyber Pass, and war followed. Most of the fighting took place in the Khyber itself, culminating in two sharp engagements near Dakka just across the Afghan frontier on 11 and 13 May. To the south, another Afghan army under the future Amir, Nadir Khan, crossed the Indian frontier at the Peiwar Kotal on 24 May and advanced on Thal, which it besieged for several days before being driven off by a relieving column on 2 June. Just 12 days after the first fighting, on 16 May, the Afghan C-in-C had indicated that he was interested in an armistice, and one was signed on 3 June.

British forces had followed prewar plans and concentrated at Peshawar. As the armistice was signed, more than 100,000 Indian Army troops were preparing a major counterstroke that would have carried them to Jalalabad. One thing that had not gone according to plan, however, were a series of mutinies by the militia units that in peacetime had held the Khyber Pass—the famous Khyber Rifles recruited from the Afridi and Orakzai tribes. The militia was disarmed after significant numbers deserted with their rifles. The effect of these desertions locally was slight due to the enormous influx of troops.
into the region. Perhaps for that reason, the potential impact of militia mutinies elsewhere did not receive enough consideration. With his forces concentrated in the Khyber, the C.O.C., North-West Frontier Force, Major-General Sir Arthur Barrett, directed that if the Afghans crossed the Waziristan frontier, then the local commander should evacuate all militia posts rather than permit them to be overrun. On 24 May, in anticipation of an Afghan move into Waziristan, the local commander abruptly ordered the militias to destroy their stores and any surplus ammunition and to evacuate their posts for those cantonments held by regulars. The evacuation, illuminated by spectacular bonfires, triggered a \textit{sauve qui peut} among the militias. The failure of these less storied militias, the North and the South Waziristan Militia, proved devastating.\textsuperscript{2}

Although the Army sometimes spoke of the militias as having been the first line of defense that permitted the Field Army to mobilize in good order, the conduct of Army commanders in May 1919 suggests that, even before the Third Afghan War, they had little confidence in the tribal militias. For example, in Waziristan, where troops were thin on the ground and unlikely to be reinforced since the bulk of the fighting (and Army transport) was in the Khyber, General Barrett ordered that if Afghan regulars proceeded as far as Wana, then the militia posts nearby and in the Gomal, Upper Tochi, and Spinwam regions were to be evacuated. When Nadir Khan's army advanced towards Wana on 26 May, these evacuations began, and the militias mutinied.
Only afterwards, did the Afghans occupy Wana. The results were devastating. The General Staff estimated that 2600 modern rifles and nearly a million rounds of ammunition had fallen into tribal hands. Between May and November 1919, the Tochi Wazirs carried out 50 raids, costing nearly 100 British casualties; the Mahsuds staged over 100 raids, killing and wounding more than 200; and the Wana Wazirs managed 32 raids, with more than 200 casualties.  

The significance of these events was complex. The political lesson was clear: Afghanistan was no longer a reliable client state but rather an enemy that might any time attack without warning or provocation. For the Indian Army itself, the Third Afghan War had been, in the caustic phrasing of the Times, "a minor Mesopotamia." In purely military terms, the fighting had shown that the Army needed to be mobilized for war at all times. For lack of warning and because the militias had not held, units had had to be rushed up to the Khyber piecemeal. Supply arrangements had broken down, and the cohesion of higher formations had been lost. To prevent a recurrence of these events, in the future the frontier would have to be held by regulars in a permanent state of readiness.

The immediate conclusion reached was that localized tribal militias had to go. They were "large enough to be dangerous if unreliable...yet neither so strong nor efficient as to be able to do without the prompt support of regular troops in cases of emergency."

In the immediate wake of the war, the Army modified its earlier
estimate as to the Army required by India. In a despatch sent to London on 24 June 1919, AHQ increased the number of regulars on the frontier from three brigades to 12, taking these units entirely from those previously earmarked for the reserve or the Field Army. This recasting of the Army, which passed almost unnoticed in the wake of the conflict, decisively re-oriented the postwar Indian Army away from the missions that the War Office had envisaged and towards, ironically enough, the purely Indian concerns that nationalist opinion accepted.

Important voices within India agreed. The veteran Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, Major-General Sir George Roos-Keppel, drawing upon two decades' frontier experience, advocated pacifying the tribal areas right up to the Durand Line. Roos-Keppel, soon to retire, wanted to deal harshly with Amanullah to quash continual Afghan intrigues with the tribes. To his mind, the policy of limiting military involvement to periodic "Burn and Scuttle" expeditions had failed just as had the tribal militias. As he put it, the Government of India had viewed "with apparent indifference a chronic state of raiding, outrage, murder, arson, and rape...the Government of India should lay down and follow a definite policy of civilising the frontier tribes up to the Durand line, first by crushing their fighting power and disarming them, and then by making roads through their countries...".

From Baluchistan, another frontier chief commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, warned against annexing Afghan territory, which would outrage
the Afghans, British tribesmen, and Muslims generally. The proper
British aim in the upcoming negotiations and in tribal policy should
be security, something best achieved not through annexations but
through improved communications within British territory. The
solution to the major danger thus lay in addressing the minor danger.  

What Dobbs and his colleagues did not yet realize was how closely
bound up the issues of tribal policy and peace with Afghanistan would
prove to be.

So much for the minor danger. For the major danger, the Army
recommended extensive frontier rectifications to make the Durand Line
more defensible and to forestall any future Afghan aggression.
Essentially, AHQ wanted to make Landi Kotal easier to defend by
pushing the Durand Line slightly forward. More drastically, AHQ
wanted to annex the Afghan province of Khost in order to secure the
Tochi and Kurram valleys. Annexing Khost would shorten the frontier
by 56 miles and improve control over the Orakzais in the Tirah region
as well.  

In the wake of the Afghan War, the Imperial government took
a consistently hard line. The India Secretary, Edwin Montagu,
lectured Chelmsford of the folly of making peace before dealing a
great military defeat to the Afghans. The Government of India had
committed the cardinal blunder when dealing with orientals, showing
"unexpected clemency [that] might be mistaken for conscious
weakness."
Peace negotiations with Afghanistan began at Rawalpindi in late July 1919. Sir Anthony Hamilton Grant, Secretary of the Foreign and Political Department, headed the British delegation. Grant recognized that the irreducible Afghan demand was for the formal freedom to conduct their own diplomacy, without having to go through the Government of India. Since the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879, the Government of India had paid the Amir of Afghanistan an annual subvention and had agreed to defend his frontiers in exchange for having control of Afghan diplomacy. After due consultation with his superiors, Grant agreed in August to a treaty that said nothing of British control over Afghan foreign policy. In a covering letter that the Afghan negotiators could take home, Grant agreed that the war had annulled the Treaty of Gandamak, and stated that, since nothing to the contrary was stated, Afghanistan now possessed full diplomatic independence. The question of a subsidy was postponed. The fourth article of the Rawalpindi peace treaty held out the possibility of a "treaty of friendship," i.e., a British subsidy, if the Afghan government behaved satisfactorily for a probationary period of six months. Orally, Grant explained what these phrases meant—that the Afghans would seek British advice in their dealings with the Bolsheviks and refrain from contact with tribes on the British side of the Durand Line. With the annulment of the Treaty of Gandamak, there could be no question of a subsidy or any British assistance in securing the frontiers of Afghanistan, Grant further explained.
Indeed, that latter point was moot in the circumstances of the autumn of 1919, as Afghan troops moved across the Oxus River to occupy the Russian Turkistan cities of Merv and Kushk.

There was little likelihood of Russian aggression against Afghanistan in 1919, either; the nearest Bolshevik center was Tashkent, and the Bolsheviks were fighting for their lives against the combined armies of Kolchak and Denikin that autumn. The British had little good intelligence on Central Asia. Like the historian, they had trouble distinguishing between Pan-Islamic, Turkish, and Bolshevik currents and the alliances struck and severed. In August, as White Armies advanced from the south and east, Montagu, informed Chelmsford that the Bolsheviks had struck an alliance with the Young Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress, and "having failed in Europe would concentrate on Asia with India as their main goal." Most British intelligence derived from their mission at Meshed under General Wilfrid Malleson—"Malmiss." Malleson had informants on the ground in Russian Turkistan in addition to access to decoded radio intercepts. But for much, he depended upon White Russians and tended to see the hand of the Bolsheviks everywhere and to conflate other articulated ideologies, such as Pan-Islam and Pan-Turanianism, with Bolshevism. The result was ill-digested intelligence filled with fantastic rumors. In the confused state of Central Asia in the autumn of 1919, Malleson reported in October that Afghan soldiers had advanced into Turkistan to take Merv and Kushk from the Bolsheviks. A month later, he
reported that both Afghanistan and the Bolsheviks were planning to invade Bokhara. He told the Indian General Staff in November that the Afghans and Bolsheviks were plotting to obtain "Bolshevik-Muhammadan solidarity throughout Asia and [to] ruin the British Empire by the destruction of its power in the near and Middle East." This movement would soon attack Persia and, simultaneously, the Afghans and allied tribes would attack India. The Turks would also foment a rising in Kurdistan to overthrow the British position in Mesopotamia. The combined anti-British forces numbered 150,000 Bolsheviks, Central Asians, Afghans, and Chinese mercenaries, according to Malleson's agent in Merv. 11

All this was a world removed from the policymaking concerns of Delhi in the winter of 1919-1920. From the perspective of the Government of India, the major problem was on ice for six precious months. In the interim, the British hoped that they could settle their minor problem of the tribes of Waziristan. It is easy to think of the North-West frontier as having been continuously at war from 1919 until 1924 or so, punctuated by such well-known events as the Third Afghan War at one end and by the spectacular kidnapping and dramatic release of Miss Molly Ellis in 1923 at the other end. Yet, it is possible to distinguish between nearly continuous raiding and the small number of major campaigns that ultimately brought the tribes to submit and enabled the British to occupy their lands. The major campaigns involved British advances into Waziristan and the formal
submissions of tribes. Following these submissions, sporadic raiding and ambushes of convoys harassed the British but did not prevent the British from establishing permanent cantonments deep in the heart of Waziristan and connecting them with motorable roads.

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Although advocated early by such as Roos-Keppel, the ultimate British policy of occupying Waziristan right up to the Durand line did not emerge finally until 1923. Initially, the British responded to developments in Waziristan with avenging raids aimed at recovering rifles. In 1919, the chief barrier to selecting a decisive frontier policy was uncertainty over Afghanistan, specifically whether there would be a fourth Afghan War and whether Britain could fight it. Secondly, because the full strength of the tribesmen did not become immediately apparent, the need for pacifying the frontier systematically, rather than simply dealing out condign punishments, was not immediately apparent, either. Because of the weak postwar Indian Army, the British proceeded cautiously to deal with the tribes of Waziristan, moving first against the rebellious tribe closest to a British railhead—the Tochi Wazirs, and then proceeding in stages to deal with the Mahsud Wazirs and, finally, with the Wana Wazirs, the tribe most remote from existing lines of communications. The terms they presented were identical: restoration of arms and ammunition and the right to construct roads, build posts, and station troops as needed, but no details or schedules were provided. The jirga of the
Tochi Wazirs accepted the British terms, and this campaign lasted only a few weeks. The campaign against the Mahsud Wazirs was something else again. Although the British deployed 30,000 combatants (and 35,000 noncombatants), the equivalent of a division, they took four months (December 1919 to March 1920) to settle accounts with the Mahsuds. The fighting showed plenty of evidence for impacts of the Great War. The Indian Army battalions present had few British officers, and many did not speak the language of their troops. The battalions themselves were second battalions, i.e., depot units that had never previously served on the frontier. Worst of all, they had only just received the new Indian Army rifle and had not yet had the time to get acquainted with it. Consequently, they felt little confidence in it, and their musketry showed as much. The tribesmen were much more heavily armed than ever before with modern rifles, and they had smokeless powder for the first time. Some had obtained hand grenades, too. Although losses in weapons and ammunition had been heavy in the Afghan War, the Near East was awash in weapons in these years. Many had come from the 13,000 British and Indian troops who had surrendered at Kut in 1916; others came from throughout the world that had lately been at war. Thus equipped, the tribesmen had grown confident. They no longer raided in small gangs but in large parties consisting of several hundred and proved capable of coordinated attacks. For example, one 1920 raid involved as many as 600 Kabul Khel Wazirs. The British estimated that the fighting strength of the
Mahsuds was 15,000, and the Wana Wazirs 6000, all plentifully supplied with modern rifles.

General Sir Andrew Skeen, who headed the Waziristan Force, advanced into the heart of Mahsudland, land seldom previously penetrated and never by such a large force. One of the most able frontier soldiers of his generation, Skeen encountered bitter opposition, and his troops came within an ace of disaster on several occasions. Despite tactical innovations, notably the creation of permanent pickets atop the defiles through which the column advanced, Skeen took four months before he could bring the Mahsud headmen to terms. The campaign against the Mahsuds witnessed very heavy losses (2300 British casualties) and nearly came to disaster on several occasions. The Mahsuds finally came to terms in May 1920. Because it proved impossible to deal with Wana Wazirs during the summer, so this campaign was postponed until the autumn of 1920. In addition, although tribal leaders of both the Mahsuds and the Tochi Wazirs accepted British terms, important sub-clans and outlaws continued to harry British lines of communication. The intractable fighting was something new to British experience. At the time, they were inclined to attribute it to Afghan assistance. Even formal agreement by the tribal jirga, as with the Tochi wazirs, did not end the fighting. Although his combatant strength totalled 30,000, fully half of them had to be relegated to guarding lines of communications and thus were strung out along lengthy lines of communication in penny packets.
On top of the stiff fighting against the tribes themselves, there occurred a new complication early in the spring of 1920 in the form of Afghan troops who entered the frontier along virtually the entire length. By March 1920, Afghans were established in Chitral, the Zhob, Baluchistan, the Kurram valley, and at Wana in south-western Waziristan. Afghans were reported to be encouraging the tribes, telling them that the peace talks would lead the British to cede Waziristan to Afghanistan. The effect of this talk and the hard fighting itself forced the British to revise their plans for the frontier. The original Army plan had been to station only two brigades in Waziristan, but the resistance of the Mahsuds convinced the Army that all the heart of Waziristan would have to be occupied. In addition, the roads would have to be more extensive. What was not so apparent was what a commitment that Waziristan would become for the Indian Army. In the past, frontier campaigns had pitched well armed regulars against skillful but much less well armed tribesmen. The armies had had staying power; the tribesmen had none. The tribal lashkars had lacked cohesion and had melted away, since they could not re-supply themselves with ammunition. As a result, tribal campaigns, even when as extensive as those of 1897, had seldom lasted long.

On 19 March 1920, the Viceroy's Council decided to occupy Makin in central Waziristan and to construct a road between the Tochi Valley and South Waziristan. To retain maximum flexibility, nothing announced to the tribes whose fate was being decided. What the
British soon discovered was that the minor problem was inextricably bound up with the major problem of permanently settling with Afghanistan. Neither could be settled without the other.

On 9 December 1919, the Amir wrote to Chelmsford proposing discussions leading to a friendship treaty—a euphemism for a subsidy. He also mentioned settling those issues that remained unresolved from Rawalpindi, a reminder that he might yet press his claims for Waziristan. Rumors reaching Delhi from Central Asia told of reports that the Afghans would demand Britain the whole of India’s trans-Indus territories. Thus, in hopes of extorting a subsidy, the Afghans would apparently continue to make trouble on the frontier. After some discussion, the Government of India agreed to begin talks that spring at the most convenient hill station—Mussoorie. But the Government expressly limited these talks to removing the obstacles and "misunderstandings" that had poisoned relations between the two nations, and said nothing to imply that a subsidy would be available. The honor of negotiating with the Afghan delegates went to the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Henry Dobbs. The weakness of the Indian Army ruled out the military option. Dobbs was expressly charged with prolonging the negotiations throughout the critical months of April and May, when, history had shown, the tribes were most liable to go on the warpath. On 14 April, he first met with the Afghan delegation at the Savoy Hotel, Mussoorie. Dobbs proved a successful negotiator, sticking to his brief in public sessions and in private tea sessions
afterwards in winning the confidence of his Afghan counterparts. By the end of July, the period of danger on the frontier had passed, and the Afghans also expressed themselves willing to sign a friendship treaty. Thinking the opportunity unlikely to recur, both Dobbs and Grant (now foreign secretary with the Government of India) wanted to sign, but the India Secretary, Edwin Montagu, refused, citing evidence of Afghan meddling on the frontier and of dealings with the Bolsheviks. The most that Dobbs could do was to give an aide-memoire to the Afghans stating on what terms a final treaty could be signed, in effect stating the terms that were on offer.

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At the same time as the Indian Army was proceeding into the tribal areas in force with its ill-trained troops, its nominal strength remained close to 200,000, thanks to the Indian Army forces that remained in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Black Sea. These units consisted of experienced soldiers, the cream of the Indian Army. The possibility that the postwar Army would remain that large and remain deployed throughout the Middle East fluctuated according to the strength of the rupee. During the war and in the immediate postwar restocking boom, the rupee actually reached two shillings, eight pence (2/8), twice its normal prewar figure of 1/4. Paradoxically, the rise in the rupee lessened the desirability of using Indian troops, since these charges fell on the Imperial government, not the Government of India. Under the Government of India Act of 1915, any portion of the
garrison of India, English or Indian, which was withdrawn to serve elsewhere than India was to be paid for by the Imperial government. During World War One, however, the Government of India had agreed to continue to pay the "normal cost" of the troops in its prewar garrison, whether they remained in India or served overseas. This generous gesture proved politically costly, as we shall see, since it suggested that India might gladly supply troops in peacetime wherever the British Army was unable or unwilling to go.

In April 1920, the Government of India discussed the first part of the Esher Committee's report, the politically contentious part with the famous recommendations that hinted at subordination of the Army in India to the C.I.G.S. in London. The Government of India did not require any prompting from the Legislative Assembly (which was not to meet for another year) to take a dim view of Esher recommendations. Chelmsford told the Esher Committee members to their face after reading the first part of their report that "He could not help feeling that they were only playing lip service to this principle [statutory control of the Governor-General in Council over the army in India], and that their proposals would hem in the Secretary of State and the Viceroy with the nominees of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and would give the latter such a say in Indian military policy as to make the statutory control of the Governor-General merely nominal."12

Certainly, the War Office inquiry of late 1918 into the shape of the postwar Indian Army had hinted at the possibility of a portion of
the Army being used outside India. In response, the Government of India staked out its position that in peacetime it could not maintain an Army in excess of her own requirements, even though in the event of an Imperial emergency, she would furnish a limited number of troops. During the First World War, however, the Government of India agreed to continue paying the regular peacetime costs, and the War Office in London paid the additional costs due to overseas service. If the War Office continued to pay this excess in time of peace, this arrangement might have continued in peacetime, as the Esher Committee thought it would. If not, such arrangements would prove a costly venture, both financially and politically, whether they went overseas or remained in India. Even in 1919, the Government of India, in replying to the War Office inquiry, stated bluntly that "we must emphasize the fact that the scale of military expenditure to which we have attained as a result of war conditions and of our contributions towards His Majesty's Government, is far beyond our normal capacity to finance."

The question that slowly emerged was who would pay and on what basis. Events in 1920 provided part of the answer just as the intractable Waziristan fighting furnished the rest. The big test case for the use of the Indian Army overseas had been Mesopotamia, the theater of war in which the Indian Army had made the greatest sacrifices and in which the Government of India's role had been the greatest. Even before 1920, it had shown itself to be an expensive liability. The War Office estimated in January 1920 that its garrison
of 14,000 British and 50,000 Indian soldiers cost 21.5 million pounds, the largest single item in the estimates that could be reduced. Not surprisingly, the Cabinet's Finance Committee directed that this sum be halved.¹⁴

In June 1920, a rebellion broke out in Mesopotamia and rapidly spread throughout the whole of the mandate. In July, a column of the Manchester Regiment was wiped out near Hillah. Rail lines were disrupted, and posts besieged. Here at last was a major test for the suitability of the Indian Army to fight small wars in the Near East. At the end of August, the Indian Army despatched three British and 17 Indian battalions to Mesopotamia. The British smothered the country with troops, and punitive columns burned villages from which the rebels came. Although Mesopotamia was a big country, population was centered in the Euphrates Valley, and traditional techniques worked in the hands of Major-General Sir Aylmer Haldane. But even this success exposed the hollowness and the costs of using the Indian Army as an Imperial fire brigade.

The Army Department in Delhi cabled Montagu on 3 September to protest reliance on the Indian Army to provide overseas garrisons. Including forces already present in Persia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Aden, as well as those reinforcements now sought, the total forces involved amounted to 40 battalions and four cavalry regiments, and associated specialists, including pioneers, sappers and miners, and signal companies. For practical purposes, 40 battalions amounted to
the Indian component of five divisions. Even the General Staff in
Whitehall conceded, "The Indian troops in that country [Mesopotamia]
are reported to be suffering from a sense of injustice on account of
their long detention overseas, and a feeling has arisen among them
that they are being exploited for the advantage of British troops."15
The main objections to such requests for troops to serve overseas were
political; Muslim opinion would not have it, neither would Hindu
political opinion. "We apprehend that this will react seriously on
the general political situation, and affect morale of the Army, and we
do not think it will be possible to maintain position that India is to
provide troops from the Indian Army for this purpose for any length of
time. Again, it is difficult to convince India at large that charges
for such troops are not borne by Indian revenues, and this adds to our
difficulties in gaining acceptance for greatly increased charges for
Military expenditures which forms part of our recent budget
arrangements."16

But the Military Budget obstinately refused to fall. Whereas Rs
20 crore had been the prewar norm, the military share of the first
budget to be presented to the reformed legislature approached Rs 70
crores. About Rs 10 stemmed from the fighting in Waziristan. An
indeterminate figure remained because the calls for troops for
Mesopotamia prevented demobilization from taking place. In 1920,
inflation was poorly understood both in India and in Britain, and it
was certainly not accepted in the way that it would become 50 years
on. Whatever the increase in prices that had stoked the rising budget figures, in political debate the issue remained at the simple level of contrasting prewar economies with postwar profligacy. In both Britain and India, the call went up for economy.

Due to the numbers required and the cost attributable to the strong rupee, all hope of an Imperial subsidy to maintain a large Indian Army had disappeared by the end of the year. The War Secretary, Winston Churchill, told a conference of ministers that he would have to seek a supplementary estimate of 34 million pounds, necessitated largely by the Mesopotamian campaign and the expense of maintaining garrisons in Palestine, Constantinople, and Egypt. As he admitted:

Compared with Mesopotamia, Ireland was a small affair, and only accounted for an additional £1,000,000. Broadly speaking, we had only lost in Ireland one-tenth of the men, and Ireland had only cost one-tenth of the money expended in Mesopotamia.  

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Mesopotamia and the Northwest Frontier were not the only worries facing the British in South Asia during 1920. Throughout the campaigning season of 1920, the British worried about the safety of their position in Persia. Halleson had some 1700 men in north-east Persia, perilously close to the Russian border. Other troops in
north-west Persia had been drawn down by the need to reinforce Mesopotamia, where the fighting continued into the autumn of 1920. That the Bolsheviks might do something in the East seemed likely with the collapse of the leading White Armies. For most of the summer, the British worried most about Persia, whose fall would inevitably imperil Afghanistan. One of the main reasons that Grant and Dobbs wanted to sign an agreement with Amanullah in July 1920 was to bind him to India in the event of a Bolshevik coup in Persia. But such worries proved groundless, as the Bolsheviks moved first to re-establish their authority within the old Tsarist Empire. The Emir of Bokhara, Said Alim, was deposed in a coup by the "Young Bokharans," a thinly veiled Bolshevik front group, at whose invitation waiting Bolshevik troops occupied Bokhara city and its nearby strategic railway junction on 2 September.

By no accident, Amanullah wrote to Chelmsford on 6 October to suggest a treaty of friendship, this time to be negotiated in Kabul. Before any reply could be formulated, the British learned "from a secret but reliable source," undoubtedly a decoded radio intercept, that the Amir had hedged his bets by signing a treaty with the Bolsheviks. The treaty permitted the Russians to establish consulates at Ghazni and at Kandahar, both too close to the Indian frontier for comfort. Still worse, the Russians were to pay the Afghans a subsidy.

Such an agreement hardly attested to the bona fides of the Amir and raised the dangerous possibility that the Amir was attempting to
play the British Empire off against Bolshevik Russia. Thus, after consultations with Montagu, Chelmsford replied that before Dobbs could go to Kabul, the British would have to know the terms of the Afghans' agreement with the Bolsheviks.

Amanullah declined to supply the text of the treaty, although he denied that the terms of the treaty had been definitively established and averred that nothing in it would be contrary to British interests. Nevertheless, Chelmsford and Dobbs wished to begin negotiations, and Montagu agreed. Dobbs believed that the Bokharan coup had decisively destroyed Amanullah's illusions of leading a Pan-Islamic movement in Central Asia and that from now on, he would recognize that his interests coincided with those of British India. Opposition to negotiating came from within the India Office and from the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, whose views carried additional weight, making him in effect a secondary India Secretary. Curzon argued that because both Bolshevik and Kemalist missions were already at Kabul, Dobbs would be subjected to daily humiliations and rebuffs, as the Afghans played the three suitors off against one another--"a humiliating position for the representatives of the Government of India, with all its great prestige in the East. The Mission would feel bound to reach an agreement, for failure would be almost tantamount to a fresh outbreak of war. Hence it would have to take what conditions it could get." Unfortunately, the best that Curzon could suggest was to play for time, continuing to demand to see the Afghan treaties with the
Bolshevik and Ankara regimes. "Above all, we must endeavour to avoid war with Afghanistan, for which we were prepared neither financially nor from the point of view of public opinion." The Cabinet in the end declined to over-rule the men on the spot and authorized the Government of India to send Dobbs to Kabul in the dead of winter 1920/1921.19

Dobbs arrived in Kabul in January 1921 and soon found that the Afghans no longer accepted his Mussoorie aide memoire. In particular, the Afghan foreign minister and negotiator, Mahmud Tarzi, insisted on tribal self-determination and again refused to divulge the terms of the rumored Afghan-Soviet treaty. Not until mid-February did Tarzi reveal his essential condition for a friendly treaty, quoting the Persian proverb, "Let us have less tact and more money." He asked bluntly under what conditions Britain would renew the prewar subsidy. The Government of India was prepared now to begin serious discussions. Neither Dobbs nor Grant feared an auction developing, thinking that Britain could always outbid the Bolsheviks. But Montagu adamantly refused to contemplate a subsidy unless Afghanistan revealed the terms of the treaty with the Bolsheviks and confirmed that no Russian consulates would be allowed in eastern Afghanistan. Yet Dobbs to insist on knowing the terms of the Russian treaty and to insist on excluding the Russians from eastern Afghanistan constituted de facto interference in Afghan foreign affairs, a blatant contradiction of Grant's pledge at Rawalpindi in 1919 and equally a repudiation of the
terms put on offer at Mussoorie six months previous. Dobbs presented Tarzi with such a draft treaty in March, and hinted at the prospect of an annual subsidy of Rs 20.5 lakhs, only to have the ground cut out from beneath him by the signature of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement on 16 March 1921.

These Kabul talks dragged on throughout the spring, summer, and autumn of 1921. Another happier result was that 1921 passed without a frontier conflagration. There were several sticking points, and Afghan-Soviet relations were only one. A key point over which Amanullah refused to concede ground was his claims for the tribes of Waziristan. In these circumstances, the Afghans were never going to accept the ideal agreement sought by Whitehall, an "exclusive treaty," one excluding Russia from Afghanistan, so no subsidy could be granted. Equally sticky were disagreements between Delhi and Whitehall over the need for Afghanistan to reveal or renounce the treaty with Russia. By mid-summer, Dobbs was negotiating on the basis of a "friendly treaty," one giving Afghanistan a subsidy if the Russian withdrew their consulates from eastern Afghanistan. By the terms of the "friendly treaty," India would defend northern Afghanistan against a Russian attack. London always took a harder line. Delhi, which would have to fight any resulting war, advocated conciliation. One result was that Dobbs and his mission lingered in Kabul humiliatingly until the end of November. Rather than come away empty-handed (something that would trigger rumors of impending war), Dobbs presented a "gentlemanly"
treaty to the Afghans, who signed it on 22 November 1921. This treaty merely provided for normal diplomatic relations between the two nations and said nothing on any of the contentious issues over which Dobbs and Tarzi had haggled for so long. Thus was Afghanistan settled.

In 1920, the Government of India had been reluctant to sign a treaty with Afghanistan, not wanting to sign an agreement without an Afghan promise to accept the frontier and the British occupation of tribal areas. While Dobbs parleyed at Mussoorie, the Army conducted two major campaigns in Waziristan. The first, in July 1920, saw the destruction of the Wansud settlements around Makin by field artillery and aircraft—a successful application of modern technology in a traditional "burn and scuttle" operation. Late in the year, it was the turn finally of the Wana Wazirs. They rejected the terms presented them in September 1920 and, encouraged by what the British believed were Afghan envoys, attacked the British. In November, a British column occupied Wana. Both these exemplary operations proved to be hollow because, as elsewhere in Waziristan, formal submission by the tribal jirga did not bring with it an end to the fighting.

Consequently, as the new C-in-C., General Lord Rawlinson, arrived in India in December 1920, voices began to be heard for the first time within the Government of India questioning the wisdom of the Army's frontier policy. The two leading voices were those of the Finance Member, Sir Malcolm Hailey, and Roos-Keppel's successor as Chief
Commissioner of the N.W.F.P., Sir (as he had become) John Maffey. As Hailey recalled the matter, the initial discussions concerning Waziristan in January 1920 had authorized only a limited occupation and roadbuilding in central Waziristan, i.e. Mahsudland, not an advance to and occupation of South Waziristan—the country of the Wana Wazirs.

Behind Hailey's opinions lay alarm at the burgeoning deficit and the extent to which it could be credited to military expenditures. During 1920, the postwar boom collapsed, and with it Indian revenues, which depended on excises, principally customs dues. As Indian exports fell, the value of the rupee plunged, which increased the burden of the "Home Effective Charges" paid to the Imperial government for training and pensioning the British garrison. The danger posed by the swollen military budget was political, including the portion spent in Waziristan (which fell on the Army vote). Excessive military spending, he wrote, "will go far to kill the growing moderate party on whose strength the future of the reformed constitution depends. They are bound to oppose the taxation; the Governor-General is bound to 'restore' it; and we go far to throw the moderate party into the camp of extremism." Within lay the internal political danger, never felt more keenly than before the first Legislative Assembly convened, posed by new taxation. Although in theory the Viceroy could certify that taxes were necessary, he could hardly do so without discrediting the very reforms that were being inaugurated. By November 1920, Hailey
had come to see the answer in terms of reducing the size of the Indian Army and adopting a frontier policy that avoided "unnecessary escapades." Hailey pointed out that the Third Afghan War, an Indian not an Imperial liability, had cost Rupees 23 crores, an unavoidable sum. What had followed, however, was not avoidable. In 1919-1920 the post-hostilities frontier campaign had cost Rs 12 crores. What exercised Hailey was not the money already spent, water under the bridge, but that the expenditure showed no signs of ending.

The immediate political solution adopted in the first session of the reformed legislature was the appointment of a committee on Indian Military Requirements chaired by Rawlinson and consisting of both British officials and Indian members of the Legislative Assembly. Rawlinson proved an effective chairman and marshalled convincing testimony from the Indian General Staff, notably his Chief of the General Staff, Lt-General Sir Claud Jacob. Jacob shrewdly linked the fighting in Waziristan with the major dangers that the Army also faced: internal unrest and Bolshevik-fostered aggression or subversion. The General Staff were acquainted with the Conference of the Peoples of the East held at Baku in February 1921 and had concluded that if Bolshevik tactics had changed from direct military assault to using local collaborators, their long term ambitions had not:

The Moscow schemers have spread their net wide,

and it now extends from the Bosphorous to the
western borders of China. It may safely be
asserted that there is hardly a single movement of
an anti-British nature in Turkey, Syria,
Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia, or
Afghanistan that they have not sought directly or
indirectly to encourage for their own ends, which
consist in the destruction of British prestige in
Asia and the consolidation of their position on
the borders of India, so that they may finally be
able to create a revolution in this country. 23

If anyone should doubt the necessity for a forward policy in
Waziristan, Jacob intoned: "There is no doubt that anti-British
propaganda under Afghan, Turkish, Khilafat and Bolshevik influences
are rife along the frontier, but the results of this are at present
chiefly manifest in Waziristan." 24 Rawlinson's committee endorsed the
size of the army and its deployment on the frontier. The only changes
advocated were increased employment of local irregular levies (a
Khassadar system already begun in the Khyber whereby tribesmen were
paid for light patrolling) and the institution of a frontier corps d'elite, such as the old Punjab Frontier Force had been. 25

In truth, the Legislative Assembly, however skeptical of military
expenditures, supported the forward policy in the tribal areas. But,
while these deliberations proceeded, so did fighting on the Ladha
Line, the southern of the two lines of communication that supported
the Indian Army presence in central Waziristan. In May 1921, the Waziristan campaign was costing half a crore monthly and was interfering with demobilization, upon whose progress the budget had counted. In addition, two brigades from the Field Army had to be transferred to the frontier to reinforce the 12 brigades of the Covering Troops. By July 1921, Rawlinson had to admit that the annualized cost of the fighting in Waziristan amounted to Rs eight crores. The cost of the "Ladha Line" had become prohibitive in terms of manpower. Even after 1 1/2 years of military occupation, the road to Ladha still had to be piqueted and was constantly exposed to heavy attack. Rawlinson attempted to answer the critics with a masterly memorandum, "Waziristan and the Lessons of the Last 60 Years," in which he summarized the General Staff's view. Rawlinson wanted to retain in Waziristan a peacetime garrison of four brigades, a division--two at Bannu and two at Ladha. For the present, even more troops would be required to guard road building.

The Army's argument was that Waziristan should be permanently occupied all the way up to the Durand line. Compliant tribal leaders would be subsidized directly to maintain tribal levies, and regulars would support them. In addition, road building would open up the country, creating jobs during construction but also subsequently by opening up the country to economic activity. Rawlinson argued that to reverse these decisions would cut the ground out from underneath potential tribal allies and would suggest that the British had lost
their nerve. To withdraw would confirm rumors spread by Afghans that Waziristan to be evacuated. These arguments carried the day, and in late 1921, the British issued proclamations that they would occupy both central Mahsud country and Wana and would begin a system of khassadars.

The Indian financial situation was serious enough at the end of 1921 for the Viceroy to agree to an Indian Retrenchment Committee modeled after the Geddes Committee on National Expenditure, whose axe had fallen so heavily on the British services. Chaired by a former member of the Geddes committee, the P&O shipping magnate, Lord Inchcape, the Indian Retrenchment Committee arrived in India late in 1921. The Chief Commissioner, Sir John Maffey, testified before it in early 1922 and advised that the Government of India should cut its losses in Waziristan. In the new budget session for fiscal year 1922/1923, Hailey forced reductions upon Rawlinson's military budget, compelling him to choose between cutting the Army or curtailing his Waziristan policy. Faced with the same political dilemma as before, the Viceroy's Council agreed to withdrawing troops from the Ladha Line and instead holding Razmak with levies, not regulars. Reading agreed and on 6 January, 1922, he issued an Order in Council drastically limiting expenditures in Waziristan during the fiscal year 1922/1923 to Rs. 1.54 crores.

To retrieve his position in Council, Rawlinson chaired an expert committee on the frontier. Besides him, the committee included every
major player in frontier policy (Dobbs, Maffey, Bray, Stuart Pears [resident in Waziristan], and General Skeen), everyone except Hailey. The committee unanimously endorsed Rawlinson's views "that the only really sound scheme is that of the permanent occupation of Waziristan by regular forces, and the domination of the country up to the Durand Line." As a result of this dissent, Montagu, overruled Reading and directed that the Indian Military Requirements Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, headed by his colleague, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, to rule. Chamberlain's committee overruled the Government of India and instructed it to adhere to its original policy of subduing Waziristan by building roads and garrisoning Razmak with a brigade of regulars, not levies. "The present situation in the Middle East, the uncertain temper of Afghanistan and the general unrest prevailing among Mahommedans in India render it an inopportune moment to initiate any scheme for partial evacuation of Waziristan which might be interpreted by the tribesmen as a first step towards withdrawal from their country."28

By August 1922, the Government of India had reached agreement with Rawlinson, and on 7 September the new India Secretary, Lord Peel, approved. Montagu had resigned in April, and Peel firmly grasped the nettle, approving the original postwar plans of occupying central Waziristan. Razmak would be "temporarily" garrisoned (until 1947), and a slightly reduced program of lateral roads running north to south would be driven through Waziristan. Peel's despatch of 5 October 1922
authorized the evacuation of Ladha and, in consequence, the occupation of Razmak and the construction of roads to the great new frontier bastion. As an additional economy move, new militias would be raised to support the Khassadars and in good time to reduce the number of regulars required. The hope was held out that ultimately scouts might replace regulars entirely at Razmak, as they did in 1947.

This ruling vindicated the Army's policy for the frontier and provoked in turn the famous "Quo Vadis" memorandum by Sir John Maffey in August 1922. Maffey distinguished between two aspects of the frontier problem, neither of which were addressed satisfactorily by the Army's policy. In his view, the major problem of the frontier, "the problem of Afghanistan, of Russia, of Bogeys, white, black, and yellow," was an Imperial problem "as distinct...from the minor tribal problem as the coast defence of India against piracy is from the Battle Fleet." Maffey had read enough blood-curdling General Staff memoranda talking of Bolsnevik, Pan-Turanian, or Pan-Islamic hordes sweeping out of Central Asia. As he wrote to Reading, "We have got ourselves involved in the minor area on some vague theory that our position there would strengthen our arm against the major and more distant danger." Against the Army's argument that the "close-border" policy advocated by himself and Hailey would entail standing on the line of the Indus, Maffey argued that the tribesmen were fiercely independent souls, who would resist any serious invader. The flaws of the pre-1919 system had lain in its implementation, not in its
concept. The Curzon militias had been over-officered with Britons, who sought too high a standard of purely military efficiency. Recruitment had focused on outsiders, Afridis in Waziristan, for example, so that the militias were regarded as foreign legions, not as a police force. In Maffey's view, shaping the militias along those lines had stemmed from the cardinal error of confusing the major with the minor danger. In the early 1920s, the danger that Maffey saw in the financial/political crisis was that the frontier pendulum would swing back once more. From having fought its way into Mahsudland in 1919 and 1920, the Army would now have to evacuate it. His was an eloquent paper, but it went into the files.29

Maffey hinted at resignation. As it was, he remained in office until 1924, quitting on the day that his pension became due--a belated but prudent protest. However, much of his policy was implemented. As Maffey had suggested, the civil government rebuilt the South Waziristan and Tochi Scouts to prewar strength but with "safer composition." And funds were budgeted to employ 3500 Khassadars. The advantage of the Khassadar system was that it did provide an earnest of British power at a time when Afghan steadfastness was suspect. Dobbs's diplomacy was not as futile as might appear. Afghan envoys had been promising but seldom delivering support for several years now, but time after time they had left the tribes in the lurch, and the Wazirs and Mahsuds lost faith in Afghanistan, and the tribal allies of Afghanistan lost standing with tribal councils.
In the same budget that approved the garrisoning of Razmak, Rawlinson had to accept further reductions of cavalry and artillery. During the time he had been C-in-C, reductions in the size of the Army had totalled 36,000, evenly split between British and Indian soldiers. In winning the battle of Waziristan, Rawlinson ensured that the Indian Army would remain focused on the frontier marches. As part of the budget compromise now reached, the Royal Air Force in India was increased by two squadrons, and thus the Fourth Division of the Field Army was cut back to a cadre formation. Not only would there be no surplus Indian Army units available for Imperial emergencies, but the Army itself would be much less than it seemed. Instead of the Indian Army being given the responsibility for maintaining order in the new Middle Eastern Empire, an alternative claimant, the R.A.F., as we know, got the assignment in Iraq, the Sudan, Somaliland, and Palestine. There was no localized frontier force, however, but, on account of the rigors of life on the frontier, the Covering Troops became a much more Indian force than either the Field Army or the troops assigned to internal security, which last became largely British or Gurkha. A further price that the Army paid in 1922 for winning in Waziristan was that the funds Rawlinson had hoped for to acquire motor transport, armored cars, and tanks had to be cut.

It was on finance, too, that the War Office's (and the Esher Committee's) project of developing the Indian Army as an Imperial force foundered. Cheap as Indian troops were compared with British,
even they cost too much in 1920 for Mesopotamia. The Great War had allowed financial issues to be ignored, but with peace they returned with a vengeance. Unless the Government of India had maintained an army to suit Imperial wishes (four to eight divisions over India's needs), India could not be the eastern military base of the Empire, since the home government had no desire to pay the bill. Not until the Second World War could India once again become an imperial bastion in the East. And there was no way that the reformed Government of India could have kept up so large an army without a stipend.

One last point deserves to be made. However easy it is to task the Indian Army for shortsightedness, we need to recall that it was the home government, not the Government of India, that at each crucial moment called for a stiffer line in dealing with Afghanistan and the frontier tribes. In June 1919, the Imperial government wanted to march to Jalalabad. The Indian Government, which would have had to fight the campaign, refused. In 1920, the Imperial government rejected a treaty with the Afghans, wanting to confront the Amir once the frontier difficulties had been settled. Throughout 1921, the Imperial government constantly urged a stiff line on Dobbs at Kabul. A year later, too, the Imperial government over-ruled the Indian Government and decided the issue of Waziristan in favor of the military.

The project of using Indian manpower for a large Imperial army foundered on many political and financial obstacles. Fundamental to
its failure was the need after May 1919 to treble the garrison kept mobilized on the Northwest Frontier as Covering Troops. Added to this standing obligation were the heavy initial costs of first pacifying a much more heavily armed Waziristan and then building the roads required merely to maintain the occupying forces. The three major campaigns for portions of Waziristan fought between 1919 and 1921 differed from previous encounters, however bloody, in their duration and in the organized tribal resistance, particularly when contrasted to the poor fighting qualities of their opponents.

Throughout the postwar years, the minor danger of the tribes proved inseparable from the major danger of Afghanistan. As long as the tribes remained in rebellion, the British could scarcely impose their own terms on Afghanistan. The Russian Civil War added new elements. Despite some anxiety, the Bolsheviks remained a secondary problem during this period compared with the immediate reality of an intractable Northwest Frontier and the possibility of a fourth Afghan war. By 1923, the Soviet Union had consolidated its position within Tsarist borders, and British policymakers in India agreed that Russian ambitions were limited to recovering the territories of the old Empire, not expanding them. The danger that Russia posed was its potential to strengthen Afghan nationalism and perhaps to excite the tribes. Certainly, Anglo-Russian enmity bolstered the diplomatic position of Afghanistan, which smoothly played off one neighbor against the other.
The after-effects of the Great War impinged most on India's external position by igniting the tribal areas, notably Waziristan, whose pacification effectively precluded the use of the Army beyond India's borders. The price that the rulers of India had to pay to resolve the frontier situation was to abandon hopes of controlling Afghanistan as a client state. In addition, due to the military commitment on the frontier, the British had to accept that they could not dominate Iraq and Iran as if they were princely states in India. Thus, the fruits of a victory so hard won in Mesopotamia proved fleeting. And India's political status evolved in the direction of independence rather than the dominion status of a Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. Unwittingly, the British had ensured that the postwar Indian Army remained India's army, not Whitehall's.

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Notes


2. This sorry episode is most recently recounted by Charles Chenevix Trench, The Frontier Scouts (London, 1985), pp. 31-49.

3. Figures from General Lord Rawlinson's, "Waziristan and the Lessons of the Last Sixty Years," 7 July 1921, p. 20, India Office Records, L/MIL/17/13/123.

4. These conclusions are contained in Despatch No. 2-Special, 24 June 1919, as described in "Summary of recent Government of India Despatches on Military Organization," Appendix I to Indian Military
Requirements [Committee of Imperial Defence Sub-] Committee, IMR 18, CAB 16/38.


6. The internal Indian debate on peace terms and relations with Afghanistan and the tribes can be followed in FO 371/3991. Dobbs's letter to A.H. Grant, Secretary, Foreign and Political Department, 28 June 1919.


10. The printed record of the Rawalpindi negotiations, along with Grant's contemporary memoranda for the Viceroy are in Chelmsford's papers, E 264/55n.

11. Two printed compilations, consisting mostly of reports from Malleson, are "Central Asia, Persia, and Afghanistan: Bolshevik and Pan-Islamic Movements and connected Information," Issues 1 and 2 (November and December 1919), India Office Records, L/MIL/17/14/19/1 and 2.


16. CP 1843, CAB 24/111.


20. An important primary source on the Kabul talks is the memorandum prepared by Major-Gen. S.F. Muspratt, "Summary of the Kabul Negotiations 1921," Oct. 1921, Rawlinson Papers, 5201-33-82, National Army Museum. Dobbs's telegrams to Delhi and his instructions can be found in PO 371/3992.


24. "The Present Situation in the Middle East and Central Asia," Memorandum by the General Staff in India, 12 May 1921, IMR 2, CAB 16/38.

25. "The Defence of India," Memorandum by the General Staff in India, 10 May 1921, IHR 1, CAB 16/38.

26. This memorandum, dated 7 July 1921, can be found at the India Office Library, L/MIL/17/13/123. The Army Quarterly printed an abridged version anonymously as "The North-West Frontier of India Problem," ix (Oct. 1924), pp. 11-25.


29. This is the "Quo Vadis Memorandum," in the form of a long letter from Maffey, then Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, to the Viceroy, the Earl of Reading, 2 Aug. 1922, India Office Records, Eur. Mss. E238/24, no. 350.
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