CAN THE UNIT MANNING SYSTEM SUSTAIN IN WAR

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN L. WOOD, III

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
In the early 1980s, the Army committed to developing a peacetime unit replacement system to change the way it manned the force. The COHORT experiment became the focus for unit replacements and supposedly pointed the path to a wartime replacement system based on units rather than individuals. The Wartime Replacement System Study (WTRSS) developed a concept for unit replacement operations and provided conclusions and recommendations for implementing a new system. However, there were numerous problems and impediments for successfully (continued)
ABSTRACT—continued.

implementing a unit manning system that could sustain and be sustained in war. This study closely examines the recommendations of the WTRSS and focuses on those issues which appear to be warstoppers and questions the feasibility and desirability of converting to a unit manning system as opposed to continuing with the individual replacement system. It reviews the descriptions and definitions of the current system as well as the proposed system. It also looks at the current COHORT sustainment model as a possible pathfinder for transition to a unit manning system in war.
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CAN THE UNIT MANNING SYSTEM SUSTAIN IN WAR
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel John I. Wood, III, AG

Colonel Franklin D. Alexander
Project Advisor

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U. S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
31 March 1988
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Manning the force is one of the key sustainment challenges for operational and tactical efforts. How to man the force during war is the primary challenge of personnel replacement operations. In the early 1980s the United States Army heralded a commitment to transition from a methodology of individual replacements to a system oriented on replacing units. The Army expended significant resources - people, money, time, systems and equipment - in developing a peacetime system which would be a model for wartime operations.

In October 1986 the Army's Chief of Staff approved a "unit manning system" and announced an expansion of the Cohesion and Readiness Training (COHORT) experiment to "align a peacetime and wartime replacement system."

There are risks associated with any sustainment system. However, due to the consequences of its failure, it is important to ask whether the system envisioned for the future can truly sustain the Army better than the one that has existed since World War I. In reviewing this subject in a global context, the scope will focus on the NATO scenario where massive combat power would be brought to bear against U.S. Army forces rapidly and relentlessly.
BACKGROUND

History and the Army's experiment with COHORT units argue persuasively in a qualitative sense for using a unit replacement system in peace and in war. Research indicates that soldiers who train together in units and develop cohesion survive longer in battle and suffer less psychological, disease and non-battle injuries than individual replacements.2

As noted above, COHORT supposedly became the model to transition from a peacetime to a wartime manning system. The Soldier Support Center's Wartime Replacement System Study (WTRSS) completed in 1987 cites the COHORT experiment findings in recommending a new "preferred" wartime replacement system. This study submits a significant change in the methodology for replacement functions - operations focusing on groups of soldiers trained together and bonded into cohesive units in the training base before being deployed and introduced into combat.

COHORT, however, is not the wartime replacement system. It is a peacetime system which has been carefully nurtured and managed from the Department of the Army down to unit level. That COHORT has succeeded in proving the value of bonding soldiers into effective units is not disputed. To accept that it is a realistic concept for mobilization planning is another matter, especially for the NATO scenario.

UNIT MANNING VS INDIVIDUAL REPLACEMENTS

Exactly what is the unit manning system and how does it differ from the individual replacement system? The answer to this question begins with a definition of the term "replacements." Generally, there are two categories of soldier replacements for mobilization and war - "fillers" and "casualty replacements." Fillers are those soldiers needed to bring peacetime structured units to their full wartime authorizations. Such requirements
generally are in the support units which operate at reduced levels of \textit{manning} in peacetime. The other requirement is for casualty replacements for all types of units but primarily for the combat skills - infantry, armor, artillery. These replacement needs are applied against losses in strength due to soldiers killed and wounded in action.\(^3\) (In peacetime, replacements are requisitioned against authorized vacancies whether due to rotation or separation losses or changes in organizational structure.)

Both fillers and casualty replacement requirements are predictable in the gross sense before hostilities begin but not to the unit level of detail. These estimates are based on known shortfalls due to reduced \textit{manning} levels as in the case of fillers and on historical data from previous conflicts and computer simulation models as in the case of casualties.\(^4\)

The individual replacement system seeks to satisfy soldier requirements in a gross sense by assigning individuals to theater armies for internal distribution as needed. Each soldier would be processed to fill a requirement without regard to associations or relationships he may have developed in training or in his former unit. On the other hand, the unit \textit{manning} system philosophy seeks to assign groups of bonded soldiers as small units ranging from buddy teams to company-size organizations. Such units then could be "plugged" in to replace units decimated in combat.

\textbf{SOURCES OF REPLACEMENTS}

We generally focus on \textit{CONUS} as the source of soldier replacements. That will be the principal focus of this paper. However, what probably is not generally recognized is that 40\% of total projected replacements will be soldiers returning to duty (RTDs) from hospitals in the theater of war.\(^5\) Other sources include soldiers in the training base, Individual Ready Reservists (IRR), retirees, soldiers released from table of distribution and allowance organizations, direct appointment civilians and soldiers in the Trainee, Transient, Holdlee, and Students (TTHS) account.\(^6\) (Other sources in the theater would be prisoners released from confinement facilities, stragglers,}
and soldiers being redistributed from units with no missions.) The TTHS account will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.

This background provides a foundation for a critical review of both systems designed to sustain the force with soldiers.

4 Ibid.
6 Ibid. p. I-1.
CHAPTER II

THE CURRENT SYSTEM -
THE INDIVIDUAL REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

If mobilization occurred today, the Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA) - formerly known as U.S. Army Military Personnel Center - would be responsible for managing replacement flow from CONUS to the theater of operations according to operation plans. This would involve expanding from relatively stable peacetime-oriented requisitions for recurring vacancies worldwide. To transition to wartime management, TAPA would activate a standby personnel request known as the “SHELF” requisition. The theater armies’ Personnel Commands (PHRSCOM) prepare a SHELF requisition every six months based on the projected Mobilization Day (M-Day) shortfall. In addition to filler requirements it includes projected casualty requirements for the first 90 days of war.¹

Using personnel resources available, TAPA begins allocating soldiers against the SHELF requests. The TTHS account will be the principal source for these replacements.² Trainees are soldiers attending initial entry training and are available for assignment within a 90 day window. Usually, 34,000 trainees are planned for OPLAN support. Transient soldiers are enroute to a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) assignment. Only those on orders to an overseas command are considered for the SHELF - about 7,000 officer and enlisted personnel. Holders are soldiers in hospitals and confinement; they are not considered for OPLAN support. Students are all PCS students (officer and enlisted professional development courses, civil schooling, and Officer Basic Courses after graduation.) About 6,000 student officers and 700 noncommissioned officers are available for planning. Total soldiers available in the TTHS account averages around 48,500.³

Soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) released from active duty within the last 12 months are considered recently trained (RT-12) and are eligible for SHELF requirements. They would be notified to report for active duty and in theory are readily available for deployment.⁴ TAPA estimates 40,000 RT-12s are available for SHELF requirements.⁵
Once these sources were identified, TAPA could start issuing orders directing movement. But first it would have to "Stop Movement" of the transient soldiers. Everyday during peacetime thousands of soldiers and their families are in travel status to new duty stations. When M-Day occurs, TAPA would have to issue the Stop Movement directive (over public radio and television) and direct soldiers to report to the nearest Army installation for processing. This directive has two purposes. One is to curtail the number of soldiers with peacetime gear and families descending upon the aerial ports of embarkation which are civil air terminals in Charleston, S.C., Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Seattle. The other reason would be for TAPA to get a handle on who is where, a process of personnel accounting which supports the critical element of strength accounting.

At the same time Conus Replacement Centers (CRC) will begin activating at selected installations. The CRC is a reserve component personnel replacement battalion (PRB) responsible for final preparation of soldiers for overseas movement. It would receive, control, billet, feed, and process soldiers bound for the theater of operations. The CRC also would manifest soldiers on Military Airlift Command (MAC) flights based on seats allocated on the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPF_DL). After arranging transportation to the aerial ports of embarkation, the CRC would report to TAPA the names of soldiers deploying. (It probably would have to support family members in the early days of mobilization for those soldiers caught in transit on M-Day though this is not stated in doctrine or concept design.)

In the warzone, the Theater Army Personnel Replacement Battalion (PRB) located at an aerial port of debarkation (APOD) would meet the MAC aircraft and take control of replacement soldiers. This battalion would be responsible not only for processing assignments, but for protection, mess support, billeting, and ground transportation coordination to move the troops to their gaining commands.

The PRB determines assignments from a prepositioned fill plan prepared by the PERSCOM. This fill plan reflects the Theater Army...
Commander-in-Chief's priorities based on the latest personnel situation reports and the PRB's own report of soldiers assigned throughout the theater.9

Corps or division replacement detachments are responsible for assigning a soldier to a unit once he arrives in the command's rear area. The unit's servicing Personnel and Administration Center (PAC) submits personnel and strength accounting data to the PERSCOM and TAPA. The soldier is integrated into his new unit.10 (He would have drawn his organizational clothing and equipment, protective clothing, and weapon in the corps or division rear.)

This individual replacement system has numerous potential war stoppers. Controlling and accounting for individual soldiers will be confusing if not chaotic in the early days of mobilization. The APOEs probably will be flooded with soldiers and family members who were involved in a peacetime move a few hours before declaration of M-Day. This situation will place a special burden on the TAPA, Military Transportation Movement Command (MTMC) and MAC liaison teams working at these public air terminals. It will be critical to military operations to get transient soldiers to a CRC for early deployment processing; yet families cannot be stranded. Because these liaison teams are small staffs working in small offices in public terminals, they would be hard pressed to handle this potential and likely situation.

Another problem may be the establishment of the Reserve Component CRC early enough to support processing of soldiers for deployment. These units must be activated immediately and operational on M-Day if the flow of replacements to the theater armies is to continue uninterrupted. It is questionable whether these units can be operational from their peacetime status in such a short period of time. In the event they are not, soldiers may be backed up until M+11 or longer before deployment.11

The current plans are not without problems with serious implications for wartime. However, the wartime system would not differ greatly from the peacetime except many "personal" considerations - career development,
schooling, promotion, and separation policies and procedures - would change drastically or diminish in importance in relation to getting large numbers of soldiers to the theater of war. Thus the personnel management experts from TAPA down to the unit Personnel and Administration Center (PAC) generally know how to adapt the peacetime procedures for personnel management to wartime.

1 U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 12-16, Replacement Operations*, p.3-0 and A-1. (hereafter known as FM 12-16.)
3 Ibid.
4 Tarbutton, p. 7.
5 Del'Omo.
6 Ibid.
7 *VMR*, pp. 4-3 - 4-4 and 6-8.
8 FM 12-16, p. 3-2 - 3-3.
9 The author has personal knowledge of this procedure based on his prior duties in USAREUR.
10 FM 12-16 p. 3-3.
11 *VMR*, p. xv.
CHAPTER III

THE "PREFERRED" SYSTEM

Can the preferred unit manning methodology resolve any of the problems complicating the personnel sustainment effort or will it add to the problems of reinforcement. Do the benefits of cohesion outweigh these problems?

The Wartime Replacement System Study does not foresee a pure unit replacement system. Rather, it concluded that there would be a mixture of units and individuals, even for combat arms units. The WTRSS concept plan identified possible replacement units at the squad, team, crew, platoon and company levels. Training and Doctrine Command proponent schools proposed replacement units determined to be feasible and desirable. The definition for units under this concept plan is as follows:

"...It includes all combinations of soldiers from squad, crew, team, and section through battalion. A buddy team consists of two or more soldiers who have completed IET (initial entry training) together, and have the same MOS and skill level. They are deployed and assigned together. Platoon, company and battalion level units are those designated in the applicable TOE."2

The Sterling and Williams study of cohesion in Army units (conducted in 1982) suggested that the optimum unit size for high cohesion is squad/crew to platoon/section; their study also concluded that cohesion tended to drop as unit size increased.3

The proposed system is similar to the current individual system except it relies heavily on peacetime planning for push packages based on specific OPLAN casualty estimates. These "push packages" are groupings predesignated for division and echelon above division size units.4

The rationale for this "Push Package Expert System" is fourfold. First is the finite limit to pretrained manpower pool; those limited resources
should be prorated based on commander's prioritized requirements. Second is the major capital expense to build a mobilization training base capacity and the long lead time from soldier induction to assignment. Third is the risk of a high intensity conflict to real-time and accurate strength accounting data. Finally, push packages with small units provide commanders with building blocks to sustain combat power. Supposedly, this reduces the workload throughout the replacement system.

**TRANSITION - A PEACETIME MODEL**

As admitted previously, COHORT has been a successful peacetime unit replacement system. The problem with these COHORT companies and batteries is their dismemberment at the end of their life cycles (24 or 36 months depending on where they are deployed.) Soldiers who came into the Army at the same time and went through training together under the COHORT enlistment option eventually come to a similar separation date. When that happens a flagbearing unit disassembles with its junior soldiers separating or reenlisting for new options. The cadre becomes available for reassignment. This event creates a "bubble" and temporary turbulence for the host command while a new unit falls in to replace the disbanding group.

U.S. Army Europe found this to be dysfunctional for peacetime training and readiness. As a result Headquarters, Department of the Army developed a package system to sustain COHORT units. Instead of refitting an entire company, the existing COHORT will be sustained with packages of individual replacements periodically. This required TAPA to project both programmed (known) losses and unprogrammed losses and requisition backfills. For the basic skill requirements, TAPA tasks the training base to form and train packages of individuals- two or more soldiers in the same military specialty. These packages are identified for assignment to a specific COHORT unit. TAPA plans their assignments so they will arrive in a specified window of assignment - a one month period which occurs for the COHORT unit every four months. The soldiers will arrive about the same time that replacements arrive for the cadre as well as the soldiers in low
density or "one of a kind" skills.\textsuperscript{7} Theoretically, this reduces turbulence and the bubble in the unit as the COHORT is sustained perpetually. (It should be noted that unprogrammed losses include early separations - deaths, medical losses, courts-martial sentences, and administrative separation cases for unsatisfactory duty performance, misconduct, improper enlistment or hardship. While not predictable to the specific unit, ODCSPER computer models are historically accurate in projecting a one percent loss per month to the Army's strength.)\textsuperscript{8}

Losses in war also are predictable but not to the unit level of detail. Thus the wartime system of predicting package needs for individual flagbearing companies committed in combat is not as simple as a peacetime system of sending packages every four months to sustain a COHORT.

The unit manning system would still rely on the CRC in deploying. It should not have the effect on the civilian air terminals since this situation would clear up within a few days of M-Day. Small units would still be processed by the PRBs in the theaters of operations but as groups, not individuals.

\textsuperscript{1} WISS. p. 6-2.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid. p. 6-3.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. p. J-18.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid. p. 6-2 and S-9.
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid. pp. 6-2 and 6-7.
\textsuperscript{6} U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, COHORT Unit Expansion Program: Package Replacement System, An Informational Guide for Personnel Managers, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p. 11-13.
\textsuperscript{8} The author has personal experience in using this information as a personnel manager in MILPERCENT. The computer model is known as ELIM-COMPLIP (Enlisted Loss Inventory Model-Computation of Manpower Program Using Linear Programming.)
CHAPTER IV

THE SUSTAINMENT CHALLENGE
FOR THE UNIT MANNING SYSTEM IN WAR

Whatever replacement system the Army employs, there will be risks and problems which challenge its ability to sustain the force. Among them are equipping soldiers, noncommissioned officer leadership shortages, training base modifications and expansion, timeliness, and peacetime funding.

Equipping soldiers so they are ready to fight upon arrival in a theater of operations would seem to be a moral imperative. Yet today there are no resources identified for issuing organizational clothing and equipment (OCIE), chemical and biological protective gear, and weapons prior to departure from CONUS. Furthermore, the replacement regulating units in theaters of operations are incapable of stocking and issuing this equipment for arriving soldiers. That burden would fall on corps and division staffs. The WTRSS recognized this deficiency and recommended that issue facilities be established with the CRCs to equip both individual and unit replacements before they deploy.

Planners in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics computed the cost of a 90 day stockage for such equipment to be $14 million dollars. While the Army personnel and logistic deputy chiefs of staff have supported this concept, OCIE and other equipment was not included for funding in the FY 90-94 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

Another critical factor in considering the best system for a high intensity conflict such as may occur in NATO is the time required to get personnel to the warzone. Computer simulation models cited in the WTRSS predict that a unit system would lag behind the current individual system by approximately two percent during the critical time period of M+10 to M+90. The models also show that this lag is relatively low because a small number of units is produced (11% of the total available resources are formed as units.) This raises the question of whether it is even worth the effort to convert the training base to produce units when in the early and critical
stages of war the qualitative benefits of unit manning would be so low quantitatively.

A corollary to this is the capacity of the training base to support a unit training system. The WTRSS stresses that unit training must not be at the expense of individual entry level training. Yet it admits that unit training strategies would require significant resources and if taken from those dedicated to individual training, the result could be fewer new soldiers available for unit training or as individual replacements.5

But training capacity remains a major detractor. The Training and Doctrine Command’s Training Base Capacity Study 1985 determined that the mobilization training base is unable to produce a sufficient number of individuals to satisfy projected requirements for wartime. A unit replacement system only exacerbates this situation.6

Units of any size need leaders and the preferred manning system for war cites the need to bond soldiers not only horizontally with one another but vertically with leaders. The primary leader would appear to be the noncommissioned officer and here the preferred system is woefully deficient. The wartime projections for NCO leadership is gloomy. Even if the training base programs for mobilization included NCOs to join with the entry-level groups of soldiers, the supply available to form replacement units is inadequate and effectively limits unit training to a small percentage of its potential.7 Shortages vary over time with large pools available immediately after M-Day. These pools, which include the IRR, would be exhausted quickly by the filler and casualty requirements. At the same time the training base is mobilizing and expanding and may be unable to take advantage of the available pool of NCOs until they have already deployed as individuals.8 The unit replacement system must have a stable source of NCO leadership and right now there does not appear to be a plan to fix this problem, if it is fixable.

The problems enumerated above pose serious questions not only of the feasibility but of the desirability to form units for replacement operations. It simply may not be cost effective, even when the benefits of
cohesion are considered. Coupled with this is the phenomenon of the "Doubting Thomases." A survey conducted for the WTRSS found that between 26 to 48 percent of combat arms officers would opt to break up small units of "green" soldiers into smaller elements or as individuals and spread them among the "bloodied" veterans of combat.9 The author conducted a similar survey of combat arms officers in the U.S. Army War College Class of 1988. More than 80 percent of these officers said they would break up small units assigned to their battalions in a NATO war. (A summation of this survey is in Appendix 1.) Scientists from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) also found that commanders preferred to fill spaces by breaking up preformed replacement packages. This suggested that the concept of maintaining cohesion has not penetrated to the small-unit level and that many leaders are oblivious to the possibilities of cross-leveling within mature companies to create places for intact packages.10 These findings indicate that while there is a desire to have a unit replacement system, the preferred system now planned will not work.

In considering the implementation of a new replacement system, one question to be asked should be "Is it affordable?" The cost may not be worth the effort if the officers who command the units and who will be the warfighting CINCs will negate the unit training and bonding process by breaking up the units.

1 Del'Omo.
2 WTRSS, p. 10-2.
4 WTRSS, pp. 5-16 and 1-4.
5 Ibid., pp. 5-16 - 5-17.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 5-16.
8 Ibid.
10 Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Evaluating the Unit Manning System: Lessons Learned to Date. p. 10. (hereafter known as WRAIR.)
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The unit manning system is desirable and perhaps even vital from a qualitative standpoint for enhancing combat power and conserving valuable manpower in war. However, the road the Army has taken will not solve the problem of getting a sufficient number of replacements to reinforce forward deployed units. The quantitative and intangible issues cited in this study will defeat the efforts to convert to a system of unit replacements in war. Even in peacetime there is no prohibition (nor should there be) against commanders breaking up sustainment packages for COHORT units. Surveys taken in 1985 for the WTRSS and observations of the WRAIR closely parallel the opinions of the current Army War College students on the propensity to break up small units and assign soldiers as individuals.

But the determining factors appear to be resource capabilities - both of the mobilization training bases and manpower. If the training base cannot produce effectively trained and led units in the early days of a conflict the war may be lost while the warfighting CINC is awaiting his bonded, cohesive units. Further if units packages do not have noncommissioned officer leaders as a minimum, then they are little more than a group of individuals. There may be limited value to training a group of entry level soldiers only to have them split up upon arrival in the warzone.

Until the Army finds ways to fix these problems, a unit manning system focusing above the squad to platoon level serves only to exacerbate personnel shortfalls in the early days of a conflict. That, however, does not imply that the Army should abandoned unit replacement options - in peace or war. It must scale back from the ambitious platoon and company level recommendations requiring long training periods with NCO leaders.

How well the COHORT peacetime package sustainment concept will work is yet to be determined. Nevertheless, it should be continued. In supporting replacement packages, the WRAIR researchers opined that
cohesion is not reduced by cross-leveling with intact replacement packets. If the Army continues to train entry level soldiers in small groups and deploys them, even without NCOs, a commander still has an option to use them as a bonded package for cross-leveling. The concept may be a bridge to a methodology wherein small units rather than lone individuals are the wartime system for sustaining combat units. If a viable system of peacetime replacement packages is successfully established, perhaps the transition to a wartime unit replacement system is feasible. If the Army already has a relatively constant flow of packages in the training base for COHORT, it may be reasonable to assume this concept could be continued and even expanded on M-Day without substantial costs. Thus those "trainee" soldiers in the TTHS account will have already started their bonding process which may well make them more effective combatants.

The Army whether by design or convenience appears to be establishing within the COHORT system a methodology to transition from peacetime packages to wartime push packages. Commanders at all levels have the option to tailor their units as they see fit and they certainly have the option to assign replacements as they think best. But if the Army as an institution is going to be committed to a unit replacement system, it must reeducate its officer corps on the need for and value of keeping together those soldiers who were bonded into cohesive groups.

My research indicates the Army is not capable of nor ready for converting to a true unit replacement system in peacetime that would work in war. In terms both of resources and attitudes, the constraints prohibit adoption of such a system. Thus the Army should continue to plan for a wartime system based on individual replacements and small sustainment packages.

\footnote{WRAIR, p. 10.}


APPENDIX I

A survey of Combat Arms officers in the Class of 1988, U.S. Army War College was conducted as part of this study. Officers with basic branches of infantry, armor, field artillery, air defense artillery, and special forces were surveyed. Sixty-five officers responded.

The survey focused on assignment in combat of groups of soldiers who had trained together. The group size ranged from team through division. The officers surveyed were instructed to consider themselves in roles ranging from battalion commander through warfighting and theater support commander-in-chief. The survey and percentage results follows on pages 19 and 20.

The survey indicated that most officers would tend to break up packages of soldiers who deployed without leaders and were not flag-bearing units. They were more likely to commit a unit intact if it were battalion size or larger. There was also reluctance to break up a flag-bearing company.
SURVEY OF COMBAT ARMS OFFICERS, CLASS OF 1988, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

SUBJECT: UNIT REPLACEMENTS IN WAR

DEMOGRAPHICS: 1. Year Group __ 2. Br: ___IN ___AR ___FA ___AD

3. Combat experience: ___RVN ___GRENADA ___Other  Rank at time________ Position, i.e. plt ldr, co cdr, S3________

4. Commanded Battalion in ___Europe, ___Korea, ___FORSCom, ___TRADOC, Other ________

FOR THE FOLLOWING, PLEASE SELECT THE RESPONSE WHICH BEST DESCRIBES WHAT YOU BELIEVE YOU WOULD DO. PLEASE ANSWER REALISTICALLY, NOT IDEALISTICALLY. Circle appropriate letter. Answers below apply to questions 1 through 5.

A. Commit the group to battle as a unit. (Ranges from squad, crew, team, platoon, or company/battery size depending on CMF)

B. Break up the group into smaller elements or as individuals and assign with "bloodied" soldiers.

1. Your battalion is committed in combat in the central region of NATO and has suffered 25% casualties overall. All companies remain committed. You receive a group of skill level 1 (SL1) soldiers (primary CMF of battalion) who have trained together since BT but to less than ARTEP standards. You direct your S1 to:

   A 19.5% or B 81.5%

2. In same situation as 1., the group arrives with a cadre of leaders (squad leader, platoon leader, etc.). You direct your S1 to:

   A 72.4% or B 27.6%

3. You command a division in which several battalions have lost up to 25 percent casualties. CONUS training base can provide nonflagbearing companies/batteries with leaders which have trained to less than ARTEP standards. There are not enough companies however to give each battalion. You direct:

   A 46.2% or B 53.8%

4. In 3. above, the units are flagbearing. You direct:

   A 75.4% or B 24.6%
5. In 3. above, you receive a flagbearing battalion. You direct:

A 92.4%  
B 7.6%

6. You are CINCUSAREUR (a nonwarfighting CINC providing U.S. Army forces and support to CENTAG, NORTHAG, and AFSOUTH). A later deploying combat brigade is in the Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) marshalling area and Transfer of Authority (TOA) to NATO has not occurred. The personnel demands of both III Corps and VII Corps are equal and the situation is critical. Assuming SACEUR has given you authority to do so, you would:

A. Chop the brigade to one region only. 77.0%

B. Assign its battalions between the two commands. 23.0%

7. You are COMCENTAG. WARSAW Pact forces attack along your entire front. Both V and VII Corps have suffered heavy losses. USAREUR has a NG division from CONUS ready for TOA. You would:

A. Assign the entire division to one of the corps. 84.7%

B. Break up the division and assign units between the two corps. 15.3%

If you desire, please add any comments below. Thanks for your support!