STUDENT REPORT

BOOK ANALYSIS OF CONTAINING THE SOVIET UNION

MAJOR MICHAEL L. MERRITT 88-1830

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TITLE BOOK ANALYSIS OF CONTAINING THE SOVIET UNION

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

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This paper is a book analysis of Containing the Soviet Union: A Critique of U.S. Policy, edited by Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis. The book is a collection of articles that offers different perspectives on the past and future of the policy of containment. The paper provides background to the policy of containment and briefly traces its evolution. The paper concludes the idea of containment will continue to be an important part of U.S. foreign policy, and proposes what the policy of containment should look like during the remainder of this decade and into the 1990s.
As World War II came to an end, the hope for a long-lasting peace was replaced by the first indications of the forthcoming Cold War. The Soviet Union had already begun its consolidation of Eastern Europe, and Churchill warned the West of the ominous "iron curtain" that was developing. With the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the United States began a policy to prevent the Soviets from reshaping the post-war international order. This policy became known as containment after George Kennan wrote his famous "X" article for Foreign Affairs in July, 1947, entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Since then, the idea of containment has been the mainstay of American foreign policy and has defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

This paper is an analysis of Containing the Soviet Union: A Critique of U.S. Policy, edited by Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis. The book is a collection of articles that offers different perspectives on the past and future of the policy of containment. Having knowledge of the evolution of containment and its possible future is important for understanding the contemporary scene of international relations.

The author wishes to thank Commander Brent L. Gravatt for his guidance and constructive comments during the preparation of this project.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part of our College mission is distribution of the students' problem solving products to DOD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

REPORT NUMBER 88-1830

AUTHOR(S) MICHAEL L. MERRITT, USAF

TITLE BOOK ANALYSIS OF CONTAINING_THE_SOVIET_UNION

PURPOSE

In 1947, George F. Kennan coined the word "containment," which denotes various post-World War II American strategies to limit the influence and expansion of the Soviet Union. The purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of containment by analyzing the book Containing_the_Soviet_Union: A Critique of U.S. Policy, edited by Terry L. Deibl and John Lewis Gaddis, and, then, to propose what containment should look like during the remainder of this decade and into the 1990s.

DISCUSSION OF ANALYSIS

Containing_the_Soviet_Union is a collection of fourteen articles originally presented at a 1985 National Defense University symposium honoring George Kennan. In the initial article of the book, "Introduction: The Evolution of Containment," Gaddis presents six principal issues that constitute the debate on the meaning of containment. As internal and external factors have interacted with the national characters of the United States and the Soviet Union, and as the leadership of the superpowers has changed, the consensus on these issues has changed also. The resultant evolution of the containment concept has been reflected in American policymakers' decisions affecting United States-Soviet relations.
The issues Gaddis presents are embodied by six questions: (1) What is containment "supposed to defend?" (2) "Who, or what, is to be contained?" (3) What are the means "to implement containment?" (4) "What should containment cost?" (5) What is the effect of domestic politics on containment? and (6) What is the "goal" or "objective" of containment?

Following the introduction and background of Chapter One, Chapter Two of this paper, "The Issues," briefly considers the evolution of containment through these questions. Beginning with Kennan's original "X" article, and with Gaddis' guidance, the issues are considered historically, to include Kennan's current thoughts from his article "Reflections on Containment."

With this background, Chapter Three, "Perspectives," reviews the remaining five articles in part one of Containing the Soviet Union. Each article is considered in light of the above issues, and for its portent to the future of containment.

Chapter Four, "The Future," proposes what containment should look like during the remainder of this decade and into the 1990s. Again using the issues as a guide, the proposals are a synthesis of ideas from Containing the Soviet Union, particularly "Part 2: Containment for the Future," other sources, and this writer.

Conclusions

During its forty-year history, containment has meant different things to different people and administrations. It has varied as policymakers have interpreted the issues surrounding the meaning of containment and reacted to changes in the domestic and international environments. Most recently, the era of détente came to an end, and the Reagan administration turned to "global containment."

Overall, changing perceptions of the issues by various administrations has created a vacillation between, what John Gaddis calls, "symmetrical" and "asymmetrical" responses. Some administrations respond symmetrically--wherever the Russians choose to challenge perceived American interests. Others respond asymmetrically--only when threatened interests are perceived to be vital, conditions favorable, and means available.

Today may be the beginning of a new era in response to Gorbachev, the Reykjavik and Washington summit conferences, and a new interpretation of the issues. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continues to be the primary threat to American interests, and, thus, the target of containment. To contain the Soviets, the United States must distinguish "vital" from "peripheral" interests and balance commitments and resources by using the proper combination of political, military, and economic power. If an interest is vital, the commitment should not be limited by
cost. On the other hand, commitments should not be made just because means are available. Domestic politics (public opinion and government) will make it difficult to have a consistent containment policy, but policymakers must limit fluctuations for the sake of stable ally and adversary relationships.

The goal of containment is "resolution" of U.S.-Soviet differences and "mutual respect for our respective positions in the world." Until this goal is achieved, containment will be a "necessary strategy."
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

In general terms, the policy of containment has been to prevent the Soviet Union from reshaping the post-World War II international order. Containment, the term that came to represent the post-war commitment against communism, was coined in July, 1947, by George F. Kennan. His famous "X" article, published in Foreign Affairs, was entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." In the article, Kennan called for "long term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Kennan's original ideas have been misinterpreted over the years, and containment has symbolized a variety of strategies and means supporting national objectives. Nevertheless, containment, in one form or another, has been the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union for the past four decades.

The purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of containment by analyzing the book Containing the Soviet Union: A Critique of U.S. Policy, and, then, to propose what containment should look like during the remainder of this decade and into the 1990s.

THE BOOK

Containing the Soviet Union: A Critique of U.S. Policy, is a collection of articles originally presented at a November, 1985, National Defense University symposium, which honored George Kennan. The editors of the book, Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, were responsible for planning the conference. As one would suspect, the book also pays homage to Kennan. The editors and other contributors acknowledge, through their various perspectives, Kennan's contributions to the field of foreign affairs. However, the authors are not hesitant to offer what they consider to be shortcomings in containment policy, and, particularly, shortcomings in the way the policy has been interpreted and implemented.

The stated purpose of the book is, first, to examine how the changing relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the changes in the international environment, have affected "the time-honored policy of containment." Secondly, the book considers the future of containment and debates many of
the issues that may affect the superpower relationship and the policy of containment in the years to come. (1:vii-viii)

THE EDITORS

Terry L. Deibel has taught at the National War College since 1978. He is currently a Professor of National Security Policy and Associate Dean of Faculty. His background includes service with the International Programs Division of the Office of Management and Budget and in the Department of State’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. Professor Deibel has been an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, a senior staff member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a Resident Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (1:249)

John Lewis Gaddis is a leading American historian of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. He is a Distinguished Professor of History at Ohio University, where he has taught since 1969. Professor Gaddis has been a Visiting Professor of Strategy at the United States Naval War College, and he recently received the Guggenheim fellowship. He won the Bancroft Prize for History with his book The United States and the Origins of the Cold War. Gaddis’ other major work is Strategies of Containment. He is currently working on a biography of George Kennan. (1:249)

Through their own articles and the organization of the book, Deibel and Gaddis set the stage for the twelve well-accredited contributors. (1:249-251) These authors offer a broad background from education and government service, not the least being George Kennan himself, who reflects on containment forty years later.

BACKGROUND

As World War II came to an end, the hope for a long-lasting peace crumbled. The first explicit declarations of the Cold War came in 1946, as the Soviet Union continued its efforts to establish a security buffer in Eastern Europe by “manipulating elections” to bring Rumania and Poland under communist control. (4:49) In a speech prior to elections for the Supreme Soviet, in February, 1946, Joseph Stalin confirmed the Marxist-Leninist idea of the inevitability of war so long as capitalism exists. (5:74-75) Winston Churchill responded in March with his famous “Iron Curtain” speech. Churchill called for “a unity in Europe” and warned of Russia’s desire for “indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines.” (4:38-39)

Finally in March, 1947, after the British could no longer support the monarchial group in the Greek civil war against the
communist-led National Liberation Front, President Truman went to Congress to request aid for Greece and Turkey. (4:52) The request for aid was not unusual; however, the rationale was. His speech became the Truman Doctrine. The President warned that nations must now "choose between alternative ways of life," and he sought a U.S. policy "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." (27:178) In effect, the Truman Doctrine was a request for "Americans to join in a global commitment against communism." (4:49) This commitment would soon acquire the "containment" label from Kennan's "X" article.

George Kennan first served at the American embassy in Moscow when the United States recognized the Soviet Union in 1933. He returned as a counselor to the ambassador in 1944. In February, 1946, the State Department asked him to draft a report analyzing American policy toward the Soviet Union and explaining the frequent anti-western statements in Soviet leaders' speeches. Kennan's 8000-word reply became known as the "Long Telegram," and it won notoriety for the author in the department. Kennan's main point was the communists needed a hostile relationship with the West to justify their internal behavior. (2:19-20)

In April, 1946, Kennan was called back to the United States to lecture as the Deputy for Foreign Affairs at the recently established National War College. Later that month, Secretary of State George C. Marshall made Kennan head of the new Policy and Planning Staff. In December, Kennan prepared an informal paper for Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal entitled "Psychological Background of Soviet Foreign Policy." Later this paper became the basis for the "X" article. (8:828) It is ironic that in the "X" article Kennan would supply the name, "containment," and rationalization for the administration's new commitment against communism, because, in early 1947, he "forcefully argued with his government colleagues against the broad thrust of the Truman Doctrine" (8:829) and supported the more passive economic measures of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe.

In 1947, Foreign Affairs asked Kennan to write an article for publication. He agreed, but, because of his State Department position, stipulated that the author was not to be identified. (8:828) After publication, the mystery surrounding the anonymity gave the article legitimacy. It caused people to speculate that an important government official had written the piece. (8:827) That is not to say it was well received by everyone. There were those like Walter Lippman, the "dean of American journalists," (4:64) who misinterpreted Kennan's intent and associated the "X" article with the "military means of the Truman Doctrine" rather than with the economically-oriented Marshall Plan. (8:829-830)

Many think Kennan's ideas precipitated the Truman administration's initial actions in the Cold War. In fact, the "X"
article and the containment concept followed the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, and became a rationalization for those actions. Kennan, says Gaddis, did more than anyone "to articulate containment as a strategy" and to show the relation between means and ends. (2:55) The "X" article was only the beginning of his efforts.

Since Kennan's "X" article and the birth of containment, the world has changed significantly. The words of the current Soviet leader contrast sharply with those of Stalin at the beginning of the Cold War. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party and leader of the Soviet Union since March, 1985, said in a speech marking the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, "the inevitability of conflict between communism and capitalism was giving way to a new era of guarded cooperation in an interrelated, interdependent world." (25:1)

The bipolar world that emerged following World War II has become multipolar. The United States and the Soviet Union no longer have the control over their respective spheres they once had. China, Japan, and other blocks of nations wield significant power and influence of their own, and often act independent of the two superpowers. The Third World, which developed following decolonialization, continues to play the superpowers off, one against the other. The war-ravaged Soviet Union, that had no nuclear and only limited force-projection capability when the Cold War began, today is a strong nation with at least nuclear parity and a blue-water navy. These factors alone, and there are certainly many others, dictate consideration be given to the future applicability of the policy of containment.

The "debate over containment and its future," (9:104) is succinctly described in Terry Deibel's article "Alliances for Containment." (9:104-105) On the one extreme, he says, are those who view the Soviet Union as a nation driven by communist ideology to conquer the world. They have no hope for settlement and believe the primary means of containment is military. On the other side are those who find the Soviets prompted by "traditional security concerns" and responsive to "positive and negative inducements." (9:104) This side of the debate believes the primary means of containment are political and economic. A third side are those who choose not to participate in this debate. They are "semi-isolationists" or "non-internationalists," (12:37) and think containment is no longer a viable policy.

During its 40-year history the policy of containment has meant different things to different people, and particularly to different administrations. (1:1-2) George Kennan has spent much of this time criticizing policies and strategies associated with the concept he says, "I so light-heartedly brought to expression, hacking away at my typewriter there in the northwest corner of the National War College building in December of 1946." (15:19)
Chapter Two

THE ISSUES

This chapter will briefly consider the evolution of contain-
ment, from the original "X" article to Kennan's current thoughts
in "Reflections on Containment," by analyzing the six principal
issues that constitute the debate on the meaning of containment.
John Lewis Gaddis presents these issues in his article " introduc-
tion: The Evolution of Containment." The issues are: the
question of interests, the target of containment, the means, the
costs, the effect of domestic politics, and the end-goal of
containment.

In his book, Strategies of Containment, Gaddis describes
five distinct periods in the history of containment: 1947 to
1949--the original containment of the Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan, 1950 to 1953--NSC-68 and the Korean War, 1953 to
1961--the Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," 1961 to 1969--the
(2:ix) During each of these periods policymakers approached
containment differently and gave the concept different meaning
by the way they interpreted one or more of the above issues.
From 1979 to the present, one could add the "new cold war" of the
Reagan administration, and, then, contemplate the possible begin-
nings of a new era in response to Gorbachev, the Reykjavik and
Washington summit conferences, and a new interpretation of the
issues.

INTERESTS

The first issue of the containment debate is the question of
interests. During the history of the concept, there have been
varying opinions as to what the strategy of containment is
supposed to defend.

Originally Kennan thought it was to defend "the fundamental
American interest...to keep key [foreign] centers of military-
industrial capability from falling under hostile control." (1:2)
In the "X" article Kennan said the United States should defend
those points where the Russians "show signs of encroaching upon
the interest of a peaceful and stable world." (29:867) In his
lectures and writings during those early years of the Cold War,
he explained there should be a "hierarchy of interests" (3:37)
because not all parts of the world were equally vital to American security. In addition to the U.S., he named four key centers that were crucial to national security: Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan (2:30). In his article "Reflections on Containment," Kennan confirms he believed if Russia were successful in taking over any of the major western countries or Japan, it would be a defeat for the U.S. and a threat to American national security, just as if Germany had succeeded in World War II. (15:16) Kennan said,

What I was trying to say, in the 'X' article, was simply this: Don't make any more unnecessary concessions to these people. Make it clear to them that they are not going to be allowed to establish any dominant influence in Western Europe and in Japan if there is anything we can do to prevent it. When we have stabilized the situation in this way, then perhaps we will be able to talk with them about some sort of general political and military disengagement in Europe and the Far East—not before. (15:17)

However, Kennan agreed Greece should be defended in 1947 and Korea in 1950 because the "psychological consequences of their loss could be devastating to areas that were critical, like Western Europe and Japan." (1:2) The issue of where to draw the containment line was becoming clouded.

In a 1950 evaluation of Cold War policies, the authors of National Security Council Paper-68 (NSC-68) expanded what containment should defend. They wrote, "...in the context of present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere." (1:3) Gaddis says President Johnson's proclamation in 1965, "if we are driven from the field in Viet Nam, then no nations can ever again have the same confidence in... American protection," indicates that credibility had become an interest to defend. (1:3) Today, the Reagan Doctrine declares the support for "freedom fighters" against "Soviet-supported aggression" to be a vital American interest. (11:40) Today, Kennan cautions not to over exaggerate security threats and to distinguish between vital and peripheral interests. (2:32)

TARGET OF CONTAINMENT

The second issue of the containment debate is what is to be contained. Kennan was very specific in his "X" article—the Soviet Union. It was not because of Russia's military strength. The Soviet Union had been ravaged by World War II. It was the "ideological-political threat" that Russia posed to the weakened and susceptible area of Western Europe. (15:16) However, the target of containment expanded rapidly after Mao's success in China and the Korean War. It soon encompassed all communists,
everywhere. The Nixon administration was the first to exploit the Sino-Soviet split and to refocus containment on the Soviet Union. However, the target remained diverse when the same administration also included the Marxist government in Chile as an object of the policy. Today the Reagan administration has attempted "to restore and revitalize a strategy of global containment of the Soviet Union. Its aim is to oppose the direct and indirect expansion of Soviet power and influence." (11:39)

In his "Reflections" article, Kennan says the circumstances regarding the Soviet Union are reversed today. The Soviet Union is now strong militarily but does not pose an ideological-political threat. Kennan believes communist ideology has lost its appeal throughout the world, and the situation in Western Europe and Japan has stabilized, as has the balance of power. (15:17)

Today Kennan takes an interdependent view. He says containment should be more concerned with the global problems confronting the world, such as the arms race, sources of instability in the Third World, and the environmental crisis. Gaddis makes the point that the issue of "what is to be contained" has been unclear throughout the history of containment. He asks, "Is it a country, an ideology, or patterns of behavior the United States does not care for?" (1:5)

MEANS

The third issue of the containment debate is what means are to be used to accomplish containment. In the "X" article Kennan's use of the term "counterforce" caused many to think in terms of military power. However, Kennan contends he was actually advocating the economic instrument of power to be used through the Marshall Plan. At that time, the means to support the "Truman Doctrine's open-ended commitment to resist Soviet expansionism" did not exist. In fact, the original containment was characterized by Secretary of State Byrnes as "patience and firmness." Kennan warned of reliance on the military as a means, and stressed the role of economics in restoring "the world balance of power." He said in the "X" article the containment policy "has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward toughness." (29:861)

For Kennan, the most effective means is a combination of deterrents and inducements applied over a prolonged period of time, which he calls "counterpressure." This includes political, military, and economic power, as well as "the force of example." Kennan said, "It may be the strength and health
of our respective systems which is decisive and which will determine the issue." (2:50–51)

COSTS

The issue of costs is closely related to means. Gaddis points out the history of containment has been characterized by fluctuations between those who think the requirements of containment should determine what one spends, and those who "first consider what one can spend and then let that determine who, or what, one should contain." (1:7)

The original containment was devised during a time of limited resources, post-war demobilization, limited military budget, and a Western Europe ravaged by war. It is not surprising Kennan emphasized economic assistance as the appropriate tool. (1:7) Nevertheless, NSC-68 proposed a tripling of the defense budget, and the Korean war became the justification for expanded military spending. (1:7) Thus began the fluctuations in containment policy caused by conflicting pressure to support containment on the one hand, and to avoid the high costs required on the other.

One of the reasons the Eisenhower administration turned to greater reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence was its concern with deficit spending. The cost of maintaining nuclear deterrence was much less than that for conventional. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations changed the emphasis and accepted the high costs associated with the military power required to support their strategy of "flexible response," and, of course, the costs of the Vietnam War. The Nixon Doctrine, the overtures to China, and detente all "reflected containment at less cost." (1:8) The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused a reassessment, and the Carter administration began an increase in military spending that continued with President Reagan. The idea that the "requirements of containment should determine what is spent on containment" (1:8) had returned.

Robert E. Osgood has drawn similar conclusions. He says, "American foreign policy since World War II has been largely shaped and driven by repeated efforts to close the gap between ever-expanding security interests and persistently inadequate power to support them." (16:5) Osgood finds various administrations have oscillated between, what he calls, "augmentation and retrenchment." (16:6) These are cycles between efforts to mobilize the means to counter the threat, and efforts to reduce the costs of involvement. (16:7)
EFFECT_OF_DOMESTIC_POLITICS

Unlike the Soviet Union, where the party elite control foreign affairs and leadership changes are relatively infrequent, the American system of government and elections causes U.S. foreign policy to be inconsistent at times. Every new administration desires to make its mark on foreign policy and "divorce itself from the discredited policies of the administration that preceded it." (1:9) This makes dealing with the United States more difficult for both our adversaries and our allies. An associated problem, Gaddis points out, is after a new administration implements its revamped foreign policy, it then goes through a "lengthy process of adjusting its own rhetorical commitments to the circumstances of the real world." (1:9)

Gaddis illustrates the effect of domestic politics on containment policy by comparing the basic motivations of administrations since the Truman presidency. He says the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" was a reaction to the Democrats' vulnerability stemming from the Korean War. In turn, Kennedy and Johnson's "flexible response" strategy resulted from the Democrats' criticism of Eisenhower's excessive reliance on nuclear weapons. The Nixon Doctrine followed in response to the Johnson administration's "overcommitment to Vietnam." Next, Carter reacted to the "perceived amorality of Henry Kissinger" and began his human rights campaign. Finally, Reagan declared he would close the "window of vulnerability" the Carter administration created. (1:9)

Certainly there are positive attributes to the American system and the changes it brings about. However, Kennan and Gaddis believe foreign policy changes are excessive and cause difficulties in dealing with other nations. Kennan has long called for an institutionalized "national security decision-making process" to cushion foreign policy from the fluctuations of domestic politics. However, given the American constitutional system of checks and balances, such a process is difficult to devise. (1:9)

GOALS

The final issue of the containment debate is the question of goals. Kennan warned containment "should be viewed as a means toward a larger end, not as an end in itself." (1:10) What is the end result of containment supposed to be? Gaddis believes the absence of an articulated goal is a basic problem in formulating containment policy. Containment has never implied the complete elimination of Soviet power or the conquering of the Soviet Union. Some have said the goal is the modification of Soviet behavior, but what the behavior should be has not been defined. (1:10-11)
In the "X" article, Kennan wrote the struggle to contain Soviet power would be a prolonged affair. However, he thought, after a period of ten to fifteen years, Soviet power might be modified by the "seeds of its own decay" he saw present even then. It seems Kennan's goal in 1947 was "to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection..., and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." (29:868)

CONCLUSION

The study of containment through the interaction of these issues and the subsequent containment eras leads Gaddis to an interesting thesis:

The history of containment suggests that when means have been perceived as expandable, conceptions of interests have tended to broaden; as conceptions of interests broaden, perceptions of threat tend to also. Conversely, perceptions of means as limited have forced differentiations between vital and peripheral interests, and, as a result, a somewhat less apocalyptic perception of threat. (1:8)

Gaddis is implying the policy of containment may be as much the result of internal forces acting on the United States, as of the actions of the Soviet Union or other actors and events in the world. (2:357)

The differing perceptions of means, interests, and subsequently, threats by the various administrations has created a vacillation between, what Gaddis calls, symmetrical and asymmetrical responses. A symmetrical response is taken wherever the Russians choose to challenge perceived American interests. An asymmetrical response is taken only when the threatened interests are perceived to be vital, the conditions favorable, and the means available. (2:101) George Kennan would prefer the latter.
Chapter Three

PERSPECTIVES

Following Gaddis' introduction of the principal containment issues and Kennan's reflections on the origins of containment, Containing the Soviet Union continues with five articles that analyze the four decades of containment from different perspectives. This chapter will review each of the articles by presenting the author's thesis, the basic development of the thesis, and its applicability to the future of containment.

"PUBLIC OPINION AND CONTAINMENT"
BY OLE R. HOLSTI

In this article Holsti presents the results of a trend analysis of survey data reflecting American public opinion toward containment over the past forty years. Holsti sought to overcome the limitations of his methodology by analyzing a large number of diverse surveys that asked questions related to the basic elements of containment. He analyzed public opinion toward major threats to national security, perceptions of Soviet intentions, support for American security commitments overseas, feelings toward the various instruments of containment (alliances, military and economic assistance), and support for specific containment actions (Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Nicaragua). Holsti's thesis is that to the extent public opinion influences foreign policy (which is subject to debate), the future of containment may be affected by public opinion trends of declining support for "important elements of containment." (12:53)

Holsti's analysis finds general public support for United States' "international activism" (active role in world affairs) has steadily declined from a high of 79% in 1965, to a low of 53% in 1982. (12:24-25) However, the data shows that leaders continue to support (97-98%) an active role in world affairs. Though the empirical evidence is limited, Holsti believes this dichotomy between leaders and the general public is greater now than at any time since World War II. (12:25) Additionally, the surveys show both the general public and leaders consider a number of challenges equal or greater in importance than containment. Such issues as arms control, energy, hunger, and third world poverty are deemed important items for American diplomacy. (12:36) On
the other hand, post-Vietnam support for American interventions in the third world has not been enthusiastic. (12:27)

From his analysis, Holsti concludes that three distinct orientations toward foreign and defense policy have developed. These three orientations reflect the positions in the on-going debate over containment. Holsti labels the three orientations "cold war internationalists, liberal internationalists, and semi-isolationists." (12:36-37)

The "cold war internationalists" believe the international system continues to be bipolar, the Soviets are the primary threat, and the use of military power may be required to confront Soviet adventurism. On the other hand, the "liberal internationalists" emphasize non-military issues such as the growing gap between rich and poor nations, the environment, resources, racial conflict, and third world debt. The third orientation, the "semi-isolationists," reject America's responsibility toward international problems and doubt its ability to do anything about them. The semi-isolationists think "the excessive global agenda" is a drain on the United States in every respect.

Holsti believes the "semi-isolationists" have acquired a measure of respectability unheard of since the beginning of World War II, (12:37) but the internationalists remain the majority by far. However, the fundamental differences between the two internationalist orientations foretell conflict in the future. (12:36)

If the declining "international activism" trends Holsti identifies in his article continue, there will likely be a gradual erosion of public support for containment. Since Vietnam, the survey data shows differing opinions on containment issues have become increasingly partisan. (12:37) Since 1980, Republican support of containment issues has been approximately double that of Democrats, and there is evidence, says Holsti, this difference is becoming an "ideological cleavage" at the leadership level. (12:44) The future of containment may be dependent on which party controls the White House and Congress. If that is the case, public opinion, in the form of national election results, could portend the future of containment.

"ECONOMIC CONTAINMENT"
BY ANGELA E. STENT

In this article Angela Stent provides a perspective on the economic element of containment policy. Despite the controversy over its effectiveness, economic containment has been a part of American foreign policy since the end of World War II. Stent's thesis is the United States has not had a "consistent long-term economic policy toward the Soviet Union," (24:67) and the economic and political effects of economic containment have been marginal, at best. (24:67-73)
Stent first describes the three major components of economic containment: (1) economic warfare—the attempt to weaken the economic performance of the Soviet Union, (2) strategic embargo—to deny goods that could be used to build up the Soviet military, and (3) economic leverage—the use of economic power to influence Soviet political behavior. (24:59-60) In varying degrees, these three components have been a part of economic containment since 1947.

George Kennan was not in favor of postwar economic aid to the Soviet Union because he thought it would be detrimental to U.S. security. (24:61) Economic containment was formalized in two pieces of legislation. The first was the Export Control Act of 1949, which gave the President power to exercise trade controls and emphasized the danger of exporting military related materials. The second was the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act), which sought the cooperation of American allies by threatening U.S. sanctions if they did not participate in economic containment. (24:61)

During the Kennedy, Johnson, and particularly the Nixon administrations, the United States began to back off from economic warfare and turned to a mix of strategic embargo and economic leverage. Domestic interests and reduction in East-West tensions became important considerations. However, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, there was a move back toward economic warfare through grain and technology embargoes. In effect acknowledging the limitations of economic containment, the Reagan administration called for a policy of "dualism," removal of the grain embargo on the one hand and a tougher stand toward technology transfer on the other. (24:61-65)

Stent finds two primary causes for the inconsistent economic policy toward the Soviet Union. The first cause is the conflicting interests of the various departments, bureaucrats, politicians, and groups who make inputs into economic policy-making. (24:67) The second cause is American allies. Since the era of detente, with the exception of limited strategic embargo, the allies have not believed in or supported economic containment. (24:68)

The effects of economic containment have been mixed. Economic warfare has had only a marginal effect on the Soviet economy and, overall, is ineffective. On the other hand, most experts agree strategic embargo has had an effect by contributing to the Soviet Union's slower rate of technological development. (24:71)

The political effects of economic containment involve linking trade to political action. Negative linkage (trade denial) uses the "stick" following a political action. It has not worked in the past. (24:72) Positive linkage (trade incentives) to gain more desirable behavior from the Soviets has had some limited
success. Stent believes "that a trade inducement strategy might produce humanitarian concessions on marginal issues." (24:73)

Stent concludes by presenting three economic containment options for the future. One is the unlikely policy of economic warfare, which would end up a unilateral effort, and subsequently ineffective policy. Another is a policy of trade inducement based on the assumption a strong Soviet economy is in the best interest of the United States— "a fat communist is less belligerent than a thin one." (24:74) The third policy option is to continue the current mixed policy of strategic embargo and economic leverage. This option, like the others, will not have a significant economic effect on the Soviet Union. However, if balanced and consistent, it could affect the American domestic economy, U.S. relations with its allies, and the political relationship between the superpowers. (24:75)

"CONTAINMENT AND THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE"

By George H. Quester

In this article George Quester attempts to analyze the complicated relationship between containment and the United States-Soviet Union strategic nuclear balance. His thesis is if the strategic nuclear balance directly affects containment, then changes or disparities in this balance should help explain why containment has expanded or limited America's role in the world and should also be related to containment's apparent failures during its forty-year history.

Following World War II the concept of containment required the United States to shun its prewar isolationism. However, Quester points out that compared to the unconditional surrender demanded of Germany and Japan, the policy of containing the Soviet Union was not very ambitious and was limited in scope considering the American monopoly of nuclear weapons. (18:78) On the other hand, after the Soviet Union established its nuclear capability in 1949, the policy of containment could be viewed as properly restrained or even overly ambitious. (18:85) Quester finds no evidence George Kennan considered the impending loss of nuclear monopoly when he wrote the "X" article. He surmises containment was constrained because Americans were tired of war and were not willing to supply the conventional forces required to support a more aggressive containment policy. (18:84)

Next, Quester takes a brief look at some apparent failures of the containment policy: Castro in Cuba; the fall of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. He finds no evidence of a relationship between the perceived U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance and failure to contain communism in these areas. (18:86) The decisions regarding these areas were not made in consideration of superiority, parity, or
inferiority in the strategic nuclear balance. The limits on containment in these instances, says Quester, were the "fundamental doubts among many Americans about the appropriateness of resisting communist forces in places like Southeast Asia, Africa, or even Central America." (18:90)

Quster concludes the nuclear threat does play a role in deterring communist expansion into areas like Western Europe and Japan, considered vital to U.S. interests. However, the strategic nuclear balance has not been the determiner of containment policy, nor has it been the cause of containment’s failures.

"ALLIANCES FOR CONTAINMENT"
BY TERRY DEIBEL

In this article Terry Deibel, an editor of Containing the Soviet Union, identifies three distinguishable periods of alliance creation since World War II: the Truman/Acheson alliances, the Eisenhower/Dulles alliances, and the Carter/Reagan alliances. Each period of alliances was motivated, in part, by the policy of containment, but each had different objectives and results. Overall, says Deibel, alliances have helped prevent the "direct expansion of the Soviet State." (9:100) However, they have not stopped the spread of Soviet influence or the spread of regimes allied to the Soviets. (9:101) Deibel’s thesis is, that with such a track record, one can expect the current proliferation of U.S. alliances and commitments to the Third World to be short in duration and of limited value to the strategy of containment.

Deibel begins his article by describing George Kennan’s skepticism of alliances. Kennan thinks the United States should not be hampered by alliances and should maintain the flexibility to meet the Soviet threat wherever vital interests are threatened. He feels alliances obligating the U.S. to worldwide commitments tend to spread American power "too thin." (9:103) Another Kennan objection to alliances is their inherent reliance on the military means of containment. Finally, Kennan thinks alliances tend to polarize the world, countering his goal of a stable, pluralistic world of independent power centers. (9:104)

The first period of alliance creation described by Deibel is the Truman/Acheson alliances. The alliances for this period were the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, and the Japan and ANZUS treaties of 1951. The objective of these treaties (satisfactory to Kennan’s concept of containment) was the "protection of non-communist centers of world industrial capacity." (9:106) The 1950 Korean War caused NATO to become a more militarized organization and was the impetus for security alliances in the Pacific. (9:107) For the most part, these alliances have been long-lasting and successful instruments of containment.
The second period, the Eisenhower/Dulles alliances, includes the Taiwan and South Korean alliances, SEATO, and CENTO. In his book, *The Cloud of Danger*, Kennan called the formation of these alliances part of "the madness of universal involvement." Kennan did not perceive the protection of any vital U.S. interest by these alliances (the exception was Japan by the U.S. alliance with South Korea). (9:111-112) The relationships created by these alliances were not "intrinsically important to the world balance of power"; however, at the time they were viewed as "perfecting the containment of the USSR at its perimeters." (9:110) Deibel contrasts the first two periods of alliance creation by saying,

The Truman/Acheson relationships, reflecting a community of interests among like-minded states and supporting key elements of the balance of power, remain and endure. But most of the Dulles alliances are gone, overturned by world events beyond the control of American power or will, or intrinsically unable to demonstrate their cost-effectiveness to the great bulk of the American people. (9:112)

The Carter/Reagan alliances, geographically centered on the Third World, make up the third period of alliance formation. In many cases, these alliances have been formed with what Deibel calls "associates or coalites," rather than with traditional U.S. allies. (9:114) The alliances are characteristically "weaker commitments" than the alliances from the other two periods, and subsequently, the freedom of action of the United States is higher. (9:114) In addition to limiting Soviet influence in the Third World, Deibel presents two other primary functions of the Carter/Reagan alliances. The first is to provide facilities and access rights for American military contingencies. The second is to provide "platforms for the supply of America's own proxy warfare" (9:115), such as the Contras in Honduras against the Nicaraguans and the Cambodian resistance against Vietnam from Thailand.

Regarding alliances and the future of containment, Deibel does not believe the Carter/Reagan-type alliances will endure. He concedes they may have been the best one could do during this period. However, he concludes Kennan may have been correct, "That until the developing world arrives at a greater degree of economic and political maturity, fixed commitments will have little further utility as instruments of containment." (9:116)
"CONTAINMENT AND THE SHAPE OF WORLD POLITICS"
BY RICHARD H. ULLMAN

This is the last article in "Part I: Perspectives on Containment." Here, Richard Ullman offers generalizations about containment and world politics in Europe and the Third World.

Ullman believes the two dominant features of international politics since the end of World War II are the division of Europe and the existence of nuclear weapons. (28:122) These features have caused NATO to face two "contradictory impulses," which are part of "NATO's nuclear dilemma." (28:123)

The first impulse comes primarily from the American side of NATO. The impulse is to raise the nuclear threshold to such a degree that the decision to use nuclear weapons is out of the question. However, this impulse requires "economic resources and the political will to field conventional forces capable of delaying a nuclear response to the outbreak of war long enough to reach a diplomatic resolution of the conflict." (28:123) On the other hand, the primarily European impulse is to doubt the utility of spending large amounts of money on more conventional forces, "since any war in Europe is likely to be nuclear from the outset." (28:123)

Regarding the Third World, Ullman says the superpowers no longer control events in this area as they once did. Nevertheless, they continue to consider the defection of any state, from one camp to the other, as detrimental to the superpower's security. Ullman calls this the "scorekeeper mentality." (28:124) He finds the United States and the Soviet Union more concerned with the "political consequences," the perceptions of gain versus loss or strength versus weakness, rather than the "practical effects" of an actual threat to vital interests or balance of power. (9:125) His observation is revolutionaries, even those supported by the Soviet Union, will eventually demand independence from the dominant influence of the larger state after they establish themselves in power. (28:127)

Unfortunately, containment in the Third World remains a problem for the United States. Ullman claims "the U.S. defines its interests--and threats to those interests--in global terms because it alone has the ability to project military power throughout the globe." (28:129) Thus, America finds it difficult to elicit support from its allies for actions in the Third World. (28:128) The primary determinants of the subsequent unilateral actions in the Third World are "domestic politics and the assessments of risk and capability." (28:129) This fact contributes to the often inconsistent and short-sighted foreign policy toward the developing nations.
Another factor that has complicated foreign policy in general, but particularly toward the Third World, is "containment is now a two-way street." (28:133) Ullman describes this concept as a "fundamental change in the structure of international relations over the last four decades." (28:133) The main theme is "reciprocity." If the United States wishes to restrict Soviet options or influence Soviet behavior, it must be prepared to accept comparable limitations or make appropriate concessions. (28:133)

CONCLUSION

The authors of Part 1 of Containing the Soviet Union have provided different perspectives on the policy of containment over the past forty years. Though the perspectives have focused on different subject areas, ranging from public opinion to alliances, there are two common themes. First, containment has been a dynamic policy that has met with varying degrees of success, but, because of its flexibility and varying forms, it has been the main idea of American foreign policy for four decades. Secondly, containment will remain a factor in the future, but the evolutionary process will continue. The policy of containment will adapt to changes in both the international and domestic political systems, and to the perceptions of the actors that make up those systems.
Chapter Four

THE FUTURE

There will be those who demand a new word to identify the next era in United States-Soviet Union relations because that is what political scientists are want to do. However, regardless of the label, the evolution of containment will continue. George Kennan's idea of containment was based on two assumptions that were controversial in 1947 and are controversial today: the "clear and present danger" of the Soviet threat, and the idea only the United States has the capability to counter that threat. (17:219)

Certainly the Soviet threat appears less vivid today, particularly in consideration of Gorbachev's rhetoric, his apparent quest for reform, and the successful summit conference with the Reagan administration in Washington. Nevertheless, the superpower rivalry will continue. (30:239) The hardline "cold war internationalists" might caution against the lesson of Munich--"That appeasement leads to war and that tardy resistance to totalitarian aggression is the road to war or defeat or both." (17:219) On the other hand, the softer, "liberal internationalists" might stress the interdependence of the international system. Neither view is completely right or completely wrong. The fact is, two great powers, regardless of ideology, have conflicting interests they consider vital to their well-being. It is true that in many respects the world has become multipolar, but "in terms of power the world is still bipolar." (23:207)

Earl Ravenal says the alternative to containment is "strategic disengagement and non-intervention." (19:197) However, the international society expects and, in many ways, demands more than that from America. This chapter will propose what containment should look like during the remainder of this decade and into the 1990s. Again using John Gaddis' six issues as a guide, the proposal will be a synthesis of ideas from Containing the Soviet Union, particularly "Part 2: Containment for the Future," other sources, and this writer.
The policy of containment has been successful in the areas Kennan and others said were vital to American interests—Western Europe and Japan. Today these areas are relatively stable, free from hostile control, and remain vital to the well-being of the United States.

Eastern Europe, on the other hand, has been part of the Soviet sphere since the end of World War II. Today these countries are dichotomized by the hope that glasnost and perestroika will revive their faltering economies and by fear that such reform will cause loss of control and Soviet intervention. The defensive nature of containment and the concept of reciprocity requires the United States to honor those areas considered vital by the Soviet Union. However, closer economic and cultural ties to the West are not out of the question. The U.S. must move cautiously, though, when pursuing contacts within the Soviet sphere to avoid "unwittingly pushing Eastern European governments further into Soviet hands or provoking Soviet interventions." (23:214)

Overall, the question of interests has become more complicated. Donald Zagoria, in "Containment in a New Era," points out the balance of power today and in the future is largely determined by regional balances. The challenge to U.S. interests, then, is in the Third World where the Soviet Union, the "scavenger of global instability," (30:235) is exploiting turbulence to "weaken the United States and expand its own interests." (30:234) Potential problem areas include the Philippines, Mexico, and the Persian Gulf.

Gaddis professes the advantage of "differentiating between vital and peripheral interests." He says, "One should be sufficiently vague about interests as to reassure allies and deter adversaries, but at the same time sufficiently precise as to retain control over how, when and where one might act to defend those interests." (1:3-4) Ravenal argues that "selective containment" is difficult because it often involves drawing a line that lacks "two interacting and mutually reinforcing characteristics: credibility and feasibility." (19:203)

Today and in the near future, the interests to be defended by containment should certainly include the traditional areas of Western Europe and Japan, but the challenge of the Third World cannot be ignored. The United States must determine the areas vital to its interests and use the instruments of containment to affect the regional balances of power there, if necessary. The determinants of vital interest must not be the means available or imagined threats. However, when an area like Central America, vital to American security, is threatened by Soviet surrogates; or an area like the Philippines, vital to the regional balance of
power in Southeast Asia, is threatened by a Soviet-supported communist insurgency; or an area like the Persian Gulf, vital to the free-flow of oil to our allies, is threatened by Soviet intervention, then the United States should respond.

**TARGET OF CONTAINMENT**

The Soviet Union should be the object of containment now and in the future, even though the circumstances today are quite different from those in 1947. The Soviet Union "no longer leads a revolution, it no longer offers ideological inspiration to the world, [and] it no longer poses as the model for economic development." (14:9) Therefore, in the Third World the United States should divorce the target of containment from ideological struggles, and distinguish Soviet surrogates from legitimate governments. The threat to the United States remains the Soviet Union’s relentless pursuit of interests (13:148) and domination in areas that threaten the interests of the U.S. With younger leadership, a very strong and growing military, and ever improving power-projection capabilities, the Soviets will continue to be an imposing threat in the future. (30:231)

Additionally, the United States should remember the close connection between Soviet domestic policy and foreign policy. (13:149) Today, Gorbachev’s domestic policies of economic development require stable foreign relations, and, perhaps, less money for the military. This connection is certainly motivation for the recent thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations. America must be cautious, though, and not surprised to see these relations grow cold again if Gorbachev begins to have domestic problems with his reforms. Once again the Western “imperialists” could be blamed for Soviet ills and the American threat used to justify repression and hardship.

**MEANS AND COSTS**

In general, the United States must balance commitments and resources to make containment more effective (19:186) and to avoid the "augmentation and retrenchment" cycle identified by Osgood (see page 8). The first step is to differentiate "vital and peripheral interests." (1:3-4) If the commitment is to a vital interest, the cost of resources should be a minor consideration. The balance, then, is to ensure a suitable combination of political, military, and economic means is used to support the commitment, and still maintain a level of effort and risk acceptable to the public and Congress. (16:13) The United States must remember it is the Soviet perception of combined American strength, unity, and will that dictates their actions relative to the U.S. (20:851)
On the political side, the United States must strengthen the Western alliance and work closely with its allies on containment matters. However, America must be cautious of spreading itself "too thin" with worldwide alliances and commitments that do not contribute to the national interest. (9:103) When possible though, the U.S. should continue to foster good relations with states, regardless of their ideological leanings, that contribute to regional balances. China is an example.

Additionally, for the political means of containment to be more effective, the United States must perfect its ability to negotiate and "deal with legitimate Soviet interests." (14:20) The political instrument must explore world issues for areas of common interest, common enemies, common causes, (13:148,7:162) and "spheres of cooperation." (10:176) Arms control should be pursued as a means to ease tensions by communicating intent.

Finally, in the Third World, the United States should encourage economic and political reform, and "promote regional integration" to limit Soviet opportunities "to exploit regional conflicts." (30:236) Where the Soviets do gain a foothold, one of America's best means of containment is to capitalize on "crude and counterproductive Soviet behavior," poor performance of centrally planned economies, and "Soviet difficulty turning influence into control." (30:232-233) The U.S. should be selective in supporting opposition to Soviet controlled governments but should not ignore opportunities in vital areas like Nicaragua.

**EFFECT OF DOMESTIC POLITICS**

Public opinion will likely become a more important factor on containment than it has been in the past. The "balanced, bipartisan, consensus of the Cold War has eroded. (22:51,12:24) While there is still support for military strength and concern for national security, there is less support for interventionism and internationalism. (21:53) The public wants "swift-decisive action, not long-term involvement." (21:42) These attitudes will make formulation of consistent and credible containment policy difficult. The Soviets understand this constraint and exploit it. The United States government should increase its efforts to keep the public informed of the Soviet threat and the American response to it. Americans will not tolerate propaganda or sensationalism, but they will consider sound reasoning and substantiated fact.

Coupled with the public opinion problem is American government itself. The turnover of administrations, the increasingly partisan support of containment, and the erosion of presidential power by the more active congressional role in foreign affairs are reasons domestic politics affects the consistency, and thus,
the credibility of containment policy. Donald Zagoria recommends a permanent bipartisan commission on the Soviet Union be attached to the National Security Council to provide direction and consensus. (30:237) Such a commission might distance the making of containment policy from the volatility of domestic politics.

Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger recognized the informal domestic constraints affecting the use of the military instrument of power. He said in a 1984 speech that the following should be the conditions for the use of military force: "that the action involve vital national interests, an intention to win, clearcut political-military objectives, continual reassessment of objectives, support by the American people, and the determination that all other means short of sending in troops had failed." (26:10) To a degree, these guidelines are an accurate representation of the domestic constraints on the policy of containment overall. In the future, containment must endure this degree of scrutiny for implementation.

GOALS

The final issue for the future of containment is what is the end result of containment supposed to be? Containment has been to prevent the Soviet Union from "reshaping" the post-World War II international order. (2:4) Many say this is also the goal of containment—containment is "an end in itself." (1:10)

However, Kennan considers containment a "means toward a larger end." (1:10) Unfortunately, he never directly says what the end is. John Gaddis, in describing Kennan’s thoughts on the "next logical step beyond containment," portrays an appropriate goal for the future of containment, "...a negotiated resolution of differences looking toward stabilization of—and mutual respect for—our respective positions in the world." (1:10) Until this goal is achieved, containment will remain a policy of the United States.

CONCLUSION

Containing the Soviet Union is an excellent collection of articles on post-World War II United States-Soviet relations. While the book pays homage to George Kennan and the policy of containment, it does so without sacrificing the quality or objectivity of the articles. Having knowledge of the policy of containment is fundamental to understanding the world today, for as Henry Kissinger wrote, Kennan "came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his [and our] era as any diplomat in our history." (3:12) Likewise, having knowledge of the policy of containment is important for understanding the future, for as Donald Zagoria wrote in his article "Containment in a New Era,"
"There is no question that the containment of Soviet expansion will remain the proper strategy for the United States in dealing with the Soviet Union, and that it will be a necessary strategy far into the future." (30:232)
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Articles and Periodicals


B. RELATED SOURCES

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