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TESTING THE MODEL INSTALLATION PROGRAM IN THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND: 1984-1986

Major Raymond A. Douthit

"insights into tomorrow"
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REPORT NUMBER 88-0775

TITLE TESTING THE MODEL INSTALLATION PROGRAM IN THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND: 1984-1986

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
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This study is a history of the Tactical Air Command's participation in the Department of Defense 3-year test of the Model Installation Program (MIP). TAC was one of five Air Force MAJCOMs to participate in the program. The purpose of MIP was to create excellent installations by returning authority to the local level. The program originators expected the test of MIP to prove that (1) base-level authorities can find better ways to operate bases, (2) counter-productive and wasteful regulations will be identified and purged; and (3) giving installation commanders authority commensurate with their responsibilities is the right way to improve installation management. This study concludes that the test of MIP in TAC was successful on all counts.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive history of the Tactical Air Command's participation in the test phase of the Department of Defense Model Installation Program (MIP). The premise behind MIP was that excellent installations could be created if the installation commanders were freed from overly restrictive regulations. The MIP concept represents a dramatically different approach to base-level management, a transition from highly centralized management to a decentralized system offering the installation commander more autonomy.

Effective 1 January 1937, MIP was implemented throughout the Department of Defense as the method for achieving more efficient and effective management of defense installations all over the world. Because of the great potential of MIP, Air Force leaders at all levels need to understand the program in order to fully exploit that potential. In order to facilitate understanding, researchers need to study all aspects of MIP implementation and testing. This paper focuses on the implementation and testing of the program in TAC, one of five Air Force major commands to test the program. This study is part of the larger body of knowledge needed to fully understand the development and implementation of MIP as an officially sanctioned DoD management policy.

The author is extremely grateful to all the personnel of the Air Force Historical Research Center for their patience and assistance during the research phase of this project. Without their knowledgeable assistance, this project could not have been completed.
Major Raymond A. Douthit enlisted in the United States Air Force in December 1960. After basic training at Lackland AFB, Texas, he was assigned to Keesler Technical Training Center, Mississippi. After graduating from the heavy ground radio maintenance course, he was assigned to a small air-to-ground radio site near Fairbanks, Alaska. His following assignment was to a Titan II missile communication squadron at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. In 1965, he was transferred to Keesler AFB where he taught missile communication maintenance for both the Titan II and Minuteman weapon systems. While at Keesler, he began attending college classes at night. In 1968, then Staff Sergeant Douthit was transferred to Nha Trang, Vietnam, and subsequently to Udorn Royal Thai Air Base, Thailand. Upon returning to the United States, he was assigned to Brooks AFB, Texas, where he resumed his off-duty education. In 1972, Technical Sergeant Douthit was selected for the Bootstrap Commissioning Program and departed Texas for a year at William Carey College, Hattiesburg, Mississippi. He graduated with honors in June 1973 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in History. In September 1973, as a distinguished military graduate of the Officer Training School, Lackland AFB, Texas, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant. After attending the Administration and Executive Support Officers course at Keesler AFB, he was assigned to Chanute Technical Training Center, Illinois, where he served as an administrative officer and then as commander of a student squadron. In 1974, he was transferred to Torrejon Air Base, Spain, where he was the squadron section commander for the communications group. In 1975 he transferred to the Aerospace Audiovisual Service, Norton AFB, California, where he served as the director of administration. In 1980, a new defense agency, the Defense Audiovisual Agency, was created at Norton and Captain Douthit was asked to head up the administration and safety directorate. In 1982, Captain Douthit was transferred back to Torrejon Air Base where he had the job of director of base administration. After being promoted to Major in 1985, he was selected for the job of executive officer for the Sixteenth Air Force, headquartered at Torrejon. He was assigned to Air Command and Staff College as a student in August 1987.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part of our College mission is distribution of the students' problem solving products to DOD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

REPORT NUMBER 38-0775
AUTHOR(S) MAJOR RAYMOND A. DOUTHIT, USAF
TITLE TESTING THE MODEL INSTALLATION PROGRAM IN THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND: 1984-1986

I. Purpose: To record the history of the Model Installation Program within the Tactical Air Command from its inception as a test program in January 1984 to its implementation as a DoD and Air Force management policy in December 1986.

II. Problem: From its inception as a management theory, through the testing phase, to its acceptance as an established Department of Defense and Air Force management program, did the Tactical Air Command (TAC) Model Installation Program (MIP) effectively test the MIP concept by accomplishing the objectives intended by its originators? The MIP concept is an attempt to reduce bureaucratic road blocks to effective base-level management by providing the installation commander a quick and easy way to obtain waivers to restrictive regulations. The philosophy of MIP encourages the installation commander to create an environment where innovative ideas can flourish and be implemented. Anything could be tried as long as it was legal and possible. This was a dramatic departure from traditional top-down management philosophy. The Model Installation program would give the installation commander a significant degree of autonomy. Therefore, the
process or evolution of the program should be thoroughly documented. This study covers one small part of the story—that of the Tactical Air Command, one of five major commands participating in the test.

iii. Data: The source documents for this historical monograph were obtained from the Air Force Historical Research Center archives and the Air Force Project Office for the Model Installation Program (AF/PRFJB). The data for this monograph were extracted from official letters and memoranda, minutes of meetings and conferences, briefings, reports, etc., obtained from the above sources.

... Conclusions: In terms of the expectations enumerated by the originators of MIP, the Tactical Air Command's test was an overwhelming success. Before the conclusion of the first year of the test, the TAC leadership was sufficiently impressed with the results that they began a systematic expansion of the program. By the end of 1965, almost every aspect of base-level management could be changed through MIP or MIP-like programs. By the conclusion of the test, all TAC bases were included in a command-sponsored program called TACMIP.

... Recommendations: First, although the Department of Defense, the Air Force, the Tactical Air Command, and this paper concluded that MIP was successful through the testing phase, it would be useful to determine if MIP lives up to this early promise over time. Therefore, the Tactical Air Command's MIP must be studied again in three to five years in order to provide a complete history of the program. Second, the source documents available for this research project raised the question of whether the MIP process at a small base with a small rural support community could be as successful as at a large base with a large industrialized support community. Unfortunately, there was insufficient documentation to answer this question. Therefore, a comparative study of MIP at two bases differing in size, support communities, missions, etc., would contribute invaluably to the understanding of the MIP process.
Chapter One

THE MIP CHALLENGE

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

This paper provides a historical review of the Tactical Air Command (TAC) implementation of the Department of Defense (DoD) Model Installation Program (MIP) from its inception as a test program to its acceptance as an operational Air Force management program. As of January 1987, MIP has been the Air Force's means of implementing the DoD-sponsored program to create excellent installations which could operate more effectively and efficiently. The Air Force initially tested the concept and philosophy of MIP in five major commands (MAJCOMs): the Tactical Air Command, the Strategic Air Command, the Military Airlift Command, the Air Training Command, and the Pacific Air Forces.

The Model Installation Program represents a dramatically different approach to management as this paper will make evident. It is important to understand how the DoD, the Air Force, and specifically TAC transitioned from a highly centralized management system to one that gives local commanders more autonomy. Since the program, on the whole, progressed smoothly from start to finish, this study may be useful to those who may be tasked in the future to implement a program as sweeping as MIP.

This study focuses on the implementation of the program at the MAJCOM level. Further, this historical monograph concentrates on implementation procedures rather than a detailed analysis of individual initiatives. Major Mark R. Johnson in his Managing Innovation in a Bureaucracy: A Case Study provides the reader a technical analysis dealing with individual initiatives.

Therefore, this paper first briefly examines the origins of the concept and philosophy underlying the program followed by a historical and chronological study of TAC's implementation of the program during the years 1984, 1985 and 1986. This study concludes with an analysis of the program's success as measured against the expectations of the originators, the TAC leadership, and the installation commanders.

Due to time constraints for conducting this study, the research has been limited primarily to source documents available
in the archives of the Air Force Historical Research Center and source documents provided by AF/PRJA. The period under study is from November 1983 to December 1986.

ORIGINS OF THE MODEL INSTALLATION PROGRAM

The Model Installation Program was the brain child of Mr. Robert A. Stone, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Logistics. Mr. Stone was influenced by two sources, In Search of Excellence by Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman Jr., and a May 1983 study by Headquarters Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources (AF/PR) on installation management. (4:1)

In Search of Excellence examines the management practices of America's best-run companies, while the AF/PR study provided the Air Force response to a 1982 memo from Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci directing an examination of the possible use of a civilian agency that would own and operate military installations world wide. (4:1) In Search of Excellence maintained that America's most successful and creative companies were those where management decision authority was decentralized to the lowest level possible. The Air Force study maintained that the installation commander must retain control of base support functions if he/she were to maintain an effective fighting force. Mr. Stone saw MIP as a means of proving the value of decentralization and providing the local commander authority commensurate with his/her responsibilities. (49:2)

INTENT OF THE MODEL INSTALLATION PROGRAM

Mr. Stone directed the implementation of a DoD-wide test of MIP in order to prove that excellent installations could be created by finding better ways to manage and operate installations. (8:8) The central feature of the program was to remove impediments to the local commander's authority. (4:4) This was based on the premise that since the local commander is charged with the responsibility to manage and operate the installation, the commander should be the most knowledgeable of the best methods to achieve that end. Therefore, under MIP, the local commander would be encouraged to identify and request waivers to higher echelon constraints which prevented efficient management of base support functions. (8:8)

In a 4 October 1983 memorandum, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer invited the military departments to participate in a three year test of MIP. The Air Force accepted this challenging opportunity and designated test commands and bases on 16 November 1983. Initially the Air Force designated three bases, one in each of three major commands, including the Tactical Air Command. Two more major commands were added, one in December 1983 and the
other in January 1984, bringing the test commands and bases to five each. (4:1) TAC's base was to be Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. (48:1)

Even though the program's intent was to remove constraints on the local commander's ability to efficiently manage his installation, MIP had several limitations built into the program at DoD level. Initiatives couldn't violate public law or the regulations of other Federal agencies. (52:--) Commanders would have to continue to comply with all existing labor agreements. Neither could MIP initiatives eliminate civilian positions. (48:2)

The new program received support from the highest DoD levels in an attempt to overcome institutional opposition to change. MIP was a direct challenge to the accepted pattern of centralized decision authority vested in higher headquarters. Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft anticipated that many local commanders would want to exercise authority over some things which were previously considered to be the prerogatives of the higher headquarters' staffs. Secretary Taft also recognized that the MAJCOM staff agencies would probably resist giving up their authority to base commanders. Secretary Taft urged the services to give MIP and local commanders a chance to succeed by letting them try new methods even though risks were involved. He argued that the risks were affordable since only a small number of installations were involved. The goal was excellence and the program assumed that the local commanders were capable and better informed on the local situation. Therefore, they should have the opportunity to show what they could do. (52:--)

Chapter Two

1984--THE BEGINNING

SETTING THE TONE

The stage was set for the Tactical Air Command's participation in MIP. General William L. Creech, Commander, Tactical Air Command, set the tone for TAC by directing his staff to "Work this hard." (9:--) Air Force (AF/PR) transmitted its 15 November 1983 program guidance directly to test bases with information copies to their major command headquarters. (48:1) Headquarters TAC followed with the TAC MIP Plan on 29 December 1983 replete with charts depicting the flow of MIP suggestions from Moody to DoD. The Operations and Maintenance Division (HQ TAC/DEM) of Engineering and Services was identified as the MAJCOM office of primary responsibility (OPR) for the program. (6:3) Moody AFB, the TAC test base, published their implementation plan on January 1984, three days later than the TAC MIP Plan. (3:--) Both plans reflected Air Force guidance with little change. The three-day separation between publication of the TAC and Moody plans indicates that both were developed simultaneously based on AF/PR guidance.

The Air Force tasking message and subsequently the TAC MIP Plan tasked the installation commander to create an excellent installation. The commander was encouraged to identify and seek relief from inhibiting and constraining policies. By so doing, the commander could create an atmosphere which encouraged innovation, and management flexibility. The goal was to turn the MIP test base into one that effectively performed its defense mission while creating a better working and living environment for Air Force members, families and DoD civilians. As an incentive for participation in the program, all savings created by MIP ideas were to be plowed back into the base to improve working and living conditions. (48:2) One can argue that the installation commander received the biggest incentive of all--the opportunity to operate the installation with a greater measure of autonomy.

An examination of Moody's implementation plan in detail provides a benchmark for measuring the evolution of TAC's MIP over the 3-year test phase. In consonance with DoD guidance, the Moody plan restricted MIP application to Base Operating Support (BOS) functions of accounting and finance, administration, budgeting, civil engineering, communication, contracting, data aut-
mation, personnel, services, supply, transportation, and morale, welfare and recreation. (3:2) All Moody base personnel were encouraged to look for new and different methods to manage base operating services more efficiently and economically. Operations and maintenance functions were specifically proscribed from MIP. (3:2) This did not preclude operations and maintenance units and personnel from submitting MIP suggestions as long as the suggestions dealt with targeted functions. (3:1-2)

In essence, Moody's MIP plan encouraged every person connected with the base to become an efficiency innovator. Expertise in a function was not a prerequisite for submitting an idea. One had only to identify an existing policy which impeded local application of more efficient or economical methods. The Moody plan developed a simplified format for the non-expert to use that required two simple statements from the submitter: a statement of their idea and how they thought it would save time, money, or otherwise be beneficial, and a statement of the anticipated savings. The MIP Project Office (347 TFW/RM) sent the suggestion to the appropriate functional agency for expert evaluation. The evaluating staff agency could prevent implementation of the MIP suggestion if the proposal did not have "potential." (3:5)

**EARLY MIP IMPLEMENTATION**

There was little documentation available in the Air Force Historical Research Center of TAC or Moody's day-to-day implementation efforts during the first part of 1984. However, the proceedings of the first Air Force MIP Commanders' Conference in August 1984 provides ample coverage of the Air Force, TAC, and Moody programs up to that time.

It is evident that Moody quickly adopted the MIP philosophy. By the August 1984 MIP Commanders' Conference, Colonel Harold G. Hermes, Commander, 347 Tactical Fighter Wing, could report that over 81 proposals had been generated by base personnel. Sixty required higher headquarters action of which 26 had been approved, 16 disapproved and 18 were still pending. Eleven of those disapproved were disapproved at DoD primarily due to legislative restrictions. (49:5) Colonel Hermes reported that Moody was using a committee system to limit bureaucracy and keep the MIP process as simple as possible. Even so, tracking, evaluating, and forwarding MIP suggestions to higher headquarters created a heavy administrative workload. The innovative use of word processing terminals linked telephonically between HQ TAC and Moody provided real time communications which reduced the administrative workload for that portion of the operation. (49:5)

While at the conference, the commanders of MIP test bases and the major command representatives received "pep" talks from DoD and Air Force leaders. General Larry D. Welch, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff set the tone of the conference: "If it's
possible and legal, try it." (47:--)

General Welch then gave his "10 Precepts Underlying the Model Installation Program":

1. Productivity is strongly enhanced by providing our people a working and living environment that meets our highest professional standards.

2. The installation commander has the direct, compelling, unavoidable responsibility for the mission of his installation and is the highest level leader/manager who directs his full, undivided attention to the special needs of that installation.

3. Nothing concentrates attention like that sole, unavoidable responsibility.

4. Decentralized decision making at the lowest level that has the needed information produces better, more motivated, more innovative operations.

5. Over the years, we have allowed bureaucratic layers of rules to grow to protect us from the risks of bad judgment.

6. The Secretary of the Air Force, Chief of Staff, and the MAJCOM commanders have great faith in the judgment of the people selected for senior leadership positions on our installations and are quite willing to take risks associated with progress.

7. No one is more likely to be better qualified to decide what is the best for an installation than the installation commander.

8. The function of higher headquarters' review of waiver requests is to decide if they are legal and possible, not if they are good ideas.

9. The function of the [headquarters] staff is to provide resources and policies that facilitate the mission carried out on and from our installations.

10. Anyone who does not understand any of the above is part of the problem. (49:1)

General Welch's "10 Precepts" let the major commands and the MIP commanders know that the Air Force was squarely behind this program and intended for it to have every chance to succeed.

The MIP Commanders' Conference also addressed other matters that seemed to be bogging the program down. For example, the conferees discussed the need for more sharing of MIP information between the MIP test bases and the test major commands. Lieu-
tenant General Charles J. Cunningham, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff Programs and Resources, stressed the need to share information and told the MIP commanders that MIP was intended to be a cooperative effort, not a contest. (49:2) Another example was the commanders' rear that quantifying savings achieved by their initiatives would be used by budget and manpower staffs as excuses to cut manpower and dollar allocations. (49:7-8) The commanders were reassured that their budgets would not reduced as a result of MIP initiatives. DoD and the Air Staff were firm in this commitment. (49:8) However, Mr. James F. Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment and Safety, told the commanders that although the Air Force measurement of success was improved operations and environment, an outsider would measure the program in dollars saved. (49:5) Major General Robert E. Messerli, Conference Chair, told the conrerees that if they didn't quantify the test program, someone else would. He also noted that documentation or reinvested savings at the installation would be very important. (49:7-8) In light of these revelations, one wonders whether the commanders left the conference with a feeling of confidence that their bases wouldn't lose resources because of MIP.

The MIP commanders were concerned over the number of MIP proposals that had been disapproved or were pending at the DoD level. Many of the most promising MIP initiatives required changes in public law in the area of contracting, procurement, and funding flexibility before they could be implemented. (49:3) DoD officials assured the commanders they were working the problem and circulated a working copy of their proposed legislative relief package. (5:1) The commanders were cautioned that there would be no quick solution to this problem. (49:9)

GROWTH OF A MIP BUREAUCRACY

The MIP Commanders' Conference also provided evidence of MIP's budding bureaucracy. Any program, especially one as complex as MIP, requires personnel to administer the program according to some system of rules. The bureaucracy was imposed on the MIP from the top. For example, the 72-hour turnaround time for MIP proposal evaluation was included in the initial DoD guidance. The 72-hour starting suspense had not been explicitly included in TAC's December 1983 plan. Nor was it in Moody's plan, although it could be argued that the suspense was not intended for the base level as they were the originators of proposals. General Welch made it clear to the Air Staff, the major command representatives, and the MIP commanders that all review levels would adhere to the 72-hour suspense. He also laid down what would become another commandment of MIP--only a directorate level general officer could disapprove a proposal. (49:2)

Shortly after the MIP Commanders' Conference, General Welch published a succinct, one page summary of current Air Force
guidance. Procedures for submitting proposals, now being called requests for waivers, were contained in three short paragraphs. Each review level would forward requests for waivers through the chain of command to the level having waiver authority. The office with waiver authority must act on the request within 72 hours by either approving the request or recommending disapproval through a directorate level general officer. (44:Atch 1) One new twist had been added to the procedures. Once a waiver had been granted for one MIP base, other MIP bases could implement the initiative with the approval of their major command. The guidelines also prescribed a semiannual report providing an assessment of savings for each initiative to include a statement of how the funds or man-hours were reinvested. (44:Atch 1)

At this juncture, HQ TAC appeared to be merely passing on Air Force guidance to Moody AFB without modification. There is no evidence in the documentation that they updated their December 1983 plan to include the new initiatives contained in the latest guidance from Air Force. This does not preclude the possibility that guidance was being passed down to Moody via the communicating word processing terminals previously mentioned.

Program Evaluation

The DoD MIP Conference, held 22-24 October 1984, revealed that the Air Force was the only military service requiring any sort of evaluation and reporting. The DoD had no plans to require evaluation or reports, but would continue to evaluate program effectiveness by conducting biennial visits to each test installation. Their position was that the installation commander was in the best position to evaluate program effectiveness. (5:2) However, the Air Force had already taken the position that if the program wasn't quantified and documented in house, someone else would do it. Even though the Air Force saw the need for measuring the program to determine effectiveness, no formal criteria for evaluation was established. Other than the guidelines discussed earlier, methods and criteria for evaluation were left in the hands of the MIP commander. However, Air Force commanders were cautioned not to overstate the benefits of savings or reinvestment. (49:3)

Resistance to MIP

A reading of General Welch's "10 Precepts Underlying the Model Installation Program" (quoted earlier) makes it apparent that he was aiming his salvo at resistance to MIP in higher headquarters staffs. Although there is no open washing of dirty linen anywhere in the record, it is quite easy to see from statements like those of General Welch that MIP installation commanders were running into road blocks put up by the staffs. (43:1) General Cunningham identified the problem as "pockets of
inertia and resistance that must be overcome." (47:1) This was a new program that struck at the heart of over centralized authority at headquarters. General Welch's program guidance was targeted to combat bureaucratic resistance. First, the limitation that only a directorate level general officer could disapprove a request for waivers prevented a low level staff functionary from killing an initiative. Secondly, the 72-hour turnaround suspense rule negated the bureaucratic tactics of stalling or stonewalling a MIP initiative. (44:Atch 1)

**THE MIP PROCESS MATURES**

As the first year of MIP drew to a close, there were definite signs that the program had progressed from a tentative test program to a program producing results which pleased the Air Staff and the major commands. The Air Force leadership had already expanded the scope of the program beyond the DoD guidelines. For example, initiatives approved for any Air Force test base could be immediately adopted for implementation at any other test bases if approved by the parent command. Now, this was taken one step further. By the end of the year, the test bases only had to notify their major command MIP offices that they intended to implement a crossfeed initiative. The major command had to do two things to stop their MIP base from implementing a crossfeed initiative. First, they had to come on line and prohibit the base from implementing the initiative. Second, they had to notify AF/PR that they were electing not to allow their test base to implement the crossfeed initiative. (44:Atch 1) Further indication that Air Force leadership was pleased with MIP can be found in the decision to spread the dividends reaped from MIP to air bases all over the world. Those initiatives which demonstrate merit would be evaluated for immediate Air Force-wide implementation without waiting for the conclusion of the 3-year test period. Likewise, it was determined that changes to regulations did not have to wait for the end of the test. (44:Atch 1)

**PROGRAM EXPANSION**

The Tactical Air Command was pleased with the results of MIP at Moody AFB. They decided to expand the program within TAC. They were only authorized one test base at this time so they employed a rather innovative tactic. Moody became the test-bed base for all of TAC. Ideas could be submitted from any TAC base through the TAC MIP office. They would be forwarded to Moody AFB. The 347 TFW would evaluate the suggestion for applicability to their situation. If they liked the initiative, Moody would submit a MIP waiver request to implement the idea. If the initiative was successful and the waiver authority was under TAC's jurisdiction, TAC could approve the initiative for command-wide implementation. (39:2)
Chapter Three

1985--The Year of Expansion

LANGLEY AFB ADDED

The Tactical Air Command was not the only organization pushing the expansion of MIP as 1984 drew to a close. The Air Force MIP oversight office was also preparing to expand the MIP test program in the coming year. On the 4th of December, the Air Force offered the test commands the opportunity to select an additional base to test MIP implementation. By the 10th of December, TAC had opted to participate in this latest round of expansion. (11:1)

The Tactical Air Command selected Langley as the newest TAC MIP base for several reasons, not the least being the feeling that it was "...only fitting that the oldest, continuously...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Langley AFB</th>
<th>Moody AFB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HQ MAJCOM + Fighter Wing</td>
<td>HQ Fighter Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-aircraft</td>
<td>Single aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Base Population</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<td>Civilian Community</td>
<td>Large Metropolitan Area</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Highly Industrialized</td>
<td>Rural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
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<td>$39,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-O&amp;M*</td>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
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<td>-MFH**</td>
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</table>

* Operational and Maintenance, FY84
** Military Family Housing, FY84

Table 1. Langley/Moody Comparison
(11:1-2)
operating base in the Air Force be used as a model to
others... " (11:2) However, Langley was also selected
because it offered many contrasts to the operating environment
at Moody. The TAC MIP office felt the diversity between Moody
and Langley should generate different types of proposals because
of their different operating environments. They supported their
selection of Langley by providing AF/PRJ the above comparative
statistics for Langley and Moody. As one can see from an exami-
nation of Table 1, the environments of Moody and Langley were
different in nearly every aspect. The two bases provided a wide
range of potential problems to solve with a variety of different
possible solutions.

**MIP IS EXPANDED COMMAND WIDE**

In a February 1985 letter citing improvements in productivity,
cost and man-hour savings, and morale, Brigadier General
Ron H. Goodwin, TAC Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineering and Ser-
vice, announced a new TAC policy to expand the benefits of MIP
throughout the Tactical Air Command. ([17:--]) The expressed
purpose of this phase of expansion was to show that other TAC
bases could also benefit from MIP. ([25:--]) He asked Moody and
the headquarters staff to review all proposals which had been
approved for implementation and to recommend those proposals
which could be employed on a wider scale. Langley was not asked
to participate because it had not been a MIP base long enough to
provide valid test results. The recommendations were to be in
three categories: first, those which could be implemented TAC
wide with only HQ TAC approval required; second, those proposals
which could be implemented TAC wide but required Air Staff or
other agency approval prior to command-wide implementation; and
finally, those proposals which could be implemented Air Force
wide but must go to Air Staff or other agency for approval.
([17:--]) General Goodwin felt that the sooner TAC could spread
the MIP concept and philosophy throughout the command, the
taster they would see results. ([16:--])

It is historically significant to note at this point that
logistics had also been brought under a MIP-like program during
February 1985. The program was called the Logistics Excellence
Program (LEP) under the auspices of HQ USAF logistics staff and
was restricted to the F-16 and C-130 weapon systems. Although
LEP is not the subject of this historical monograph, the imple-
mentation of LEP is important because it demonstrates how wide-
spread and expanding the influence of MIP had become. Not only
was LEP modeled on MIP, but the LEP implementing document cred-
ited MIP with demonstrating that people at the local level were
a valuable source of good ideas. The expressed hope of LEP was
to capitalize on the ideas of Air Force people at the working
level to improve logistic support in the same manner as MIP was
improving base operating support. ([38:1-2])
In mid March, TAC again expanded the scope of MIP. Until that time, the main focus of MIP had been restricted to base operating support areas. As of 12 March, this was changed to include the operations side of the house at Moody and Langley. For the remaining period of the DoD test period, MIP would be broadened to include most of operations. The following areas were put off limits to changes through MIP: UTE rates/flying hour program, combat readiness reporting, minimum standards for "level-A" mission readiness training, and inspection criteria. Success of the operations MIP would be measured against increased combat capability, improved training, quality of life, and aircrew retention. (2:1-2) The expansion of MIP into the operations area at Langley and Moody (and into the logistics area, even though it was a separate program from MIP) brought nearly all aspects of base-level activities under the MIP umbrella.

The expansion of MIP was in accord with the Reagan Administration's programs for increasing governmental efficiency. As TAC expanded MIP to the operations area at Langley and Moody, MIP received added impetus for expansion in the form of a memorandum from President Reagan. Citing his commitment to reducing the size, cost and inefficiency of government, he urged the heads of executive departments and agencies to increase their efforts to improve management effectiveness. (53:2) Lieutenant General Robert H. Reed, Assistant Vice Chief of the Air Force, forwarded the White House memorandum, with an endorsement from Secretary of the Air Force, to the commanders of all major commands, separate operating agencies, and direct reporting units. General Reed tasked those senior Air Force leaders to increase their efforts where the quality of performance could be improved. (50:--)

Expansion was next manifested in June 1985. Major General Michael J. Dugan, the TAC Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (TAC/DO), informally expanded MIP for the operations area from just Langley and Moody to all active duty TAC wings. While Langley and Moody remained the formal MIP bases, i.e., those under the DoD-sponsored program, all TAC active duty bases could now submit MIP proposals in the operations arena. (36:--) This command-wide expansion iteration is unlike the command-wide expansion noted at the conclusion of Chapter Two. In that first round of expansion, the TAC bases and personnel were encouraged to submit proposals which could be tried out at Moody, then the only MIP base. Under this latest expansion, each base could submit operational proposals for implementation at its base. They didn't have to be tested at the approved MIP base. This "informal" command-wide expansion of MIP in the operational area only applied to proposals over which HQ TAC had approval authority. Proposals for which HQ USAF or other higher agency approval was necessary would still have to be forwarded by one of the "formal" MIP bases. Under this operations version of MIP, any TAC command level could approve an operations MIP.
proposal if within its authority, but only the TAC vice commander could disapprove an operations MIP initiative. (37:--)

Although not supported by direct evidence in the source documents available, the informal expansion of the MIP idea command wide may have been based on good Intelligence on what would soon be coming down from the Pentagon. On 8 May 1985 a joint memorandum over the signatures of Verne Orr, Secretary of the Air Force, and General Charles A. Gabriel, Air Force Chief of Staff, encouraged the major commands and separate operating agencies to expand the MIP concept "...as a normal way of doing business." (43:--) The commander of TAC, General Robert D. Russ, challenged his subordinate commanders to implement MIP philosophy at all TAC bases in a letter dated 17 June 1985, just four days after Major General Dugan, TAC/DO, implemented the informal command-wide MIP for the operations area. (36:--)

A close reading of Secretary Orr and General Gabriel's memorandum provides evidence that the Air Force had become quite impressed with the potential benefits of MIP. They were ready to implement the concept throughout the Air Force without waiting for the completion of the "formal" DoD program test period. Secretary Orr and General Gabriel said the program had thus far proven that commanders could and would operate their bases better when relieved from restrictive regulations. Under MIP, when commanders were given the authority to run their day-to-day business, they did so efficiently and far more innovatively. The memorandum also pointed out that over 60 percent of MIP initiatives had been within the approval authority of the major commands or their subordinate commands. (43:--) Clearly, within the Air Force the ability and will existed to implement MIP regardless of the outcome of the DoD test program. Secretary Orr and General Gabriel left no doubt about where they stood on the issue:

...our greatest gains will come from instilling attitudes and mindset derived from this test [of MIP] throughout the Air Force. The former can be done by changing directives and sharing the innovative ideas, but the latter and more important task is the responsibility of every commander in the chain. Commanders are encouraged to take charge, use all the authority available to them, demand relief from stifling over regulations, and exercise the innovative spirit of the Model Installation Program. (43:--)

THE MIP BUREAUCRACY ALSO EXPANDS

The expansion of MIP was beginning to overwhelm the TAC staff's ability to keep up with the influx of new initiatives. The fact that TAC staff was not able to maintain the DoD mandated 72-hour turnaround on all staff reviews provided clear
evidence of this trend. The informal inclusion of operations area, the Logistics Excellence Program, and the requirement to review and nominate proposals for TAC-wide or Air Force-wide implementation had all combined to slow the average turnaround time for a proposal to 5.5 days during the month of June. General Russ re-emphasized the need to maintain the fast response to MIP requests. With the expansion of MIP to all TAC bases, the workload of the staff was expected to increase even more. Even so, General Russ wanted the 72-hour goal met and encouraged his staff to put more emphasis on MIP.

Beginning in July, General Russ required a monthly update on how well the staff was meeting the 72-hour goal. The magnitude of the MIP program in TAC required a better way to handle the workload. On 16 July 1985, the Model Installation Program Review Organization (MIP PRO) was established under the auspices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering and Services. Oversight of the MIP PRO remained in TAC/DEMG, with Lieutenant Colonel Walter J. Black as the chairperson. Each TAC staff agency had a representative on the MIP PRO.

The broad mandate of the working group was to coordinate and integrate all aspects of MIP management.

The MIP PRO held its first meeting on 19 July 1985. The members decided to meet weekly to act as a steering group to resolve conflicts between the formal DoD MIP and the informal TAC MIP. Their objectives were to approve more waivers and to do it faster than the staff had yet been able to do. They would also attempt to keep the approval authority lines clear and ensure that uniform guidance was provided to all non-MIP bases. Finally, all waivers which exceeded the 72-hour turnaround would require written justification which would be briefed monthly to the commander. Some of the members of newly formed MIP PRO later expressed concern over the growth of the program and the possibility that they might become part of the problem rather than the solution by forcing a 72-hour turnaround despite the complexity of the waiver request being considered.

The MIP PRO also made some administrative and procedural changes to MIP processing in the headquarters. They decided that Moody would no longer enjoy the convenience of direct communications with TAC/DEMG via the word processors linked between Moody and TAC. Moody would have to use standard message traffic file at all other bases. The MIP PRO cited simplification of the waiver process and reduction of staff workload as justification for this change but did not elaborate how these benefits were to be achieved. To cope with the increase in workload, TAC/DEMG requested two additional personnel, a management assistant and a clerk typist. In addition to personnel, they obtained a Zenith Z-100 microcomputer for tracking MIP waivers.
The 2 August 1985 meeting of the MIP PRO found them still trying to formalize procedures. The members were split over whether to require each base to establish a MIP office. Those in favor of requiring a MIP office at each base cited the need for one point of contact for the TAC staff and ease of gathering data. Those against base level MIP offices cited bureaucratic layering (an additional review level) and the fact that the installation commander should know how to coordinate the waiver message before releasing it to TAC. (19:1-2) The controversy was settled when the TAC vice commander decided not to require bases to set up a MIP office. (20:1) This decision was in the spirit of leaving decisions to the local commander rather than the mandate of the headquarters staff.

**TACMIP INTRODUCED**

The MIP PRO wrestled with the confusion created by the coexistence of the formal DoD MIP and the informal TAC MIP. By their 15 August 1985 meeting, they had decided to formalize the informal TAC MIP program and christened it the Tactical Air Command Model Installation Program, or TACMIP. The acronym MIP would be reserved for all things pertaining to the formal DoD MIP while the new term TACMIP would replace the clumsy, "informal TAC MIP." The minutes of that meeting also set down the objectives of the TACMIP:

a. To encourage TAC's wing commanders and base personnel to seek waiver relief where needed.

b. To encourage HQ TAC personnel to support TACMIP requests that have merit.

c. To confine tests of ideas that have potential Air Force-wide application to the official model bases. If the MIP bases don't want to test an idea, the request can be forwarded through lines to the Air Force.

d. TACMIP requests for waivers in affect [sic] at Moody or Langley AFBs which require HQ USAF approval should be worked through functional lines. (21:--)

On 9 September 1985, Major General James G. Jones, TAC Chief of Staff, sent a letter to all TAC installation commanders announcing advent of TACMIP. Although General Russ had encouraged the commanders to adopt the concept and philosophy of MIP in June, the MIP PRO took until September to get a program into the field. General Jones cautioned the commanders not to confuse TACMIP with the DoD MIP even though they were very similar. The letter outlined the differences between the two programs, and provided as attachments a flow chart for TACMIP waiver requests, a control number example, a sample request format, and a listing of the MIP PRO members. (10:--)

Finally, every TAC installation
commander had the tools needed to get his or her base involved in the MIP experience.

General Jones' caution to the commanders not to confuse MIP and TACMIP was prophetic. During the Air Force Model Installation Program Commanders' Conference held 5-6 November 1985, HQ USAF said the major command MIP proposals should not be linked to DoD MIP. The minutes state that the major command programs "represent specific command-sponsored initiatives that are beyond the scope of MIP." (45:2) They also imposed a further restriction on major command programs by requiring all MIP initiatives be tested at the installation making the request. (45:1) This restriction directly impacted TACMIP's third objective (see c above) to test initiatives from non-MIP bases at Moody or Langley when those initiatives required Air Force or higher approval.

MIP PRO ASSESSMENT BRIEFING

On 20 November 1985, shortly after the MIP Commanders' Conference, Lieutenant Colonel Black, MIP PRO Chairperson, presented an assessment briefing to the TAC leadership, the first comprehensive look at MIP since its beginning in January 1984. The briefing presented some very interesting comparative statistics. For instance, Air Force participation in MIP was far greater than her sister services in number of proposals submitted and the number approved for implementation. The Air Force had submitted approximately 1900 proposals since January 1984 with an approval rate for MIP initiatives at 37 percent. The Air Force's closest competitor was the Army with approximately 1000 submissions with about a 50 percent approval rate. The Marines and Navy weren't even close with about 500 and 200 respectively. (45:7) Wilkes' approval percentage at HQ TAC was 95 percent. Lieutenant Colonel Black credited Air Force and TAC's achievements to the high level emphasis from senior leadership. (45:6)

However, the briefing also identified two problems in the TAC's program. First, TACMIP suffered from low participation, only about 25 proposals from all non-MIP bases. This slow start was attributed to the delay in getting the program instructions into the field. Lieutenant Colonel Black gave credit to the operations community for getting the base-level operations units involved in MIP by June 1985, long before the MIP PRO got the TACMIP program formalized and into the field in September 1985. (45:10) The second problem concerned lack of participation by enlisted personnel. The following table contrasts the percentage of submissions versus the category of submitters. The "Others" represent "piggy-back" requests, those where a base wanted to implement a MIP initiative already approved for another base.

Table 2 clearly shows that the very population considered by many to be the backbone of the Air Force, the noncommissioned officer corps, was not submitting a representative share of the
MIF proposals. The NCOs are the people facing the day-to-day problems—the first line supervisors who must make the Air Force work. One would expect their submissions to be considerably higher. Even though young airmen lack experience and knowledge, their share of submissions was also considered to be far too low. In contrast to their numbers, TAC's civilian work force was participating in the program in numbers that far exceeded their percentage of the population.

As a result of the assessment briefing, TAC closed out 1985, the Year of Expansion, by tasking the Public Affairs office to conduct a survey to determine how well informed TAC NCOs were about the Model Installation Program. The feeling at TAC headquarters was that the enlisted force, and especially the NCO corps, was not fully aware of MIP, its goals, or procedures. (13:--) To better publicize the program, the TAC vice commander also asked the MIP PRU to come up with a slogan for TACMIP and ways to better advertise the program. (23:--)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Submissions</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airman</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. MIP Submissions Versus Submitting Population, Moody AFB (33:9)
Chapter Four

1986--THE FINAL TEST YEAR

SEEKING SUPPORT FOR TACMIP

The Tactical Air Command started off the year's efforts trying to get more support for TACMIP from both the Air Staff and the people in the field. First was an attempt to get the Air Staff to reverse its November 1985 decision that MAJCOM specific programs such as TACMIP could not generate Air Force level MIP proposals. This decision effectively prevented all TAC bases except Langley and Moody from submitting waiver requests which required Air Force approval. (46:2) On 2 January 1986, Brigadier General Goodwin, TAC/DE, sent a letter to his counterpart on the Air Staff, Major General Clifford D. Wright, Jr., Director of Engineering and Services. General Goodwin requested General Wright's assistance to get Air Staff action on TACMIP waivers. General Goodwin argued that since TACMIP was philosophically the same as the DoD MIP, it should receive the same treatment and support as the DoD MIP. (14:-) General Goodwin was not successful. As late as September 1986, the Air Staff published guidance that major command programs "...should focus on actions available at that level [major command] and below. . . ." (45:1)

The second effort was a media campaign to increase awareness of MIP in the field. One problem that surfaced was confusion between the older Air Force Suggestion Program and the newer Model Installation Program. Both programs are vehicles by which an individual could suggest better, cheaper, or more efficient ways of doing business. The Suggestion Program paid the suggestor a cash award for those proposals evaluated and implemented based on quantified savings. The MIP did not pay the suggestor a monetary award. However, the procedures established for MIP enabled a proposal to be put into effect within days, not so for a proposal submitted through the Suggestion Program. The solution to this problem was to encourage the suggestor to submit his or her proposal through both channels simultaneously. The MIP channels would get the proposal implemented faster with less chance of the proposal being disapproved. The Suggestion Program would permit the suggestor to receive a monetary award based on the actual performance of the proposal. (41:1-2)

The assumption that there was some confusion between the Suggestion Program and MIP was valid. The TAC vice commander had
tasked Public Affairs to conduct a survey at Moody and Langley to determine why the number of proposals submitted by the enlisted force was so low. The results of the survey of personnel at Moody and Langley showed that while the majority of the people responding had heard of MIP, nearly a third of them thought it was a special version of the Suggestion Program. In comments submitted with the survey, the respondents revealed that a large number were unsure how to initiate a MIP proposal and they felt more publicity was needed on what the program was intended to do and how to use it.

**THE MIP PRO THREATENS MUTINY**

Air Staff approval of TACMIP or enlisted participation were not the issues of most concern to the MIP PRO members in May of 1986. They were displeased with the 72-hour turnaround, the requirement to submit written justification for each late response, and the fact that the turnaround times and reasons for late responses were briefed to the vice commander monthly. They had asked the vice commander to discontinue the report. Failing that, they wanted extensions to the 72-hour suspense in special cases where the proposal was being disapproved or it required cross-functional staffing. At the 21 May 1986 meeting of the MIP PRO, they were informed that the late reports would not be discontinued, nor did they obtain relief from the 72-hour suspense for special cases.

Instead, the MIP PRO members received additional taskings which caused considerable consternation at the meeting. They were to identify their best (or only) MIP proposal at each monthly MIP PRO meeting. The vice commander also wanted each MIP PRO meeting to set monthly goals and to develop new ideas to improve the program. These new taskings would be included in the monthly briefing to General Goodwin. Lieutenant Colonel Black suggested that one of the goals should be to have all TACMIP bases submit at least one proposal before the next meeting. The MIP PRO objected on the grounds "...that you can't force people to submit ideas." It is clear from the minutes that the members feared the MIP PRO was in danger of becoming a "bean counting" bureaucracy. They felt the new guidelines forced them to place more emphasis on what would be briefed to General Goodwin rather than on the quality of the program.

**MIP PRO ASSESSMENT BRIEFING**

With the exception of the bureaucratic irritations troubling the MIP PRO members, the summer of 1986 saw MIP and TACMIP administration settle into the routine of a maturing program. The MIP PRO continued to publicize the program through TAC News Service releases, regular inputs for commander's calls, and articles in local newspapers. The philosophy and procedures of MIP
and TACMIP were added to the curriculum of the TAC NCO academies and NCO leadership schools. (29:28)

In August 1986, the MIP PRO gave what was to be its final assessment briefing of the test phase. The MIP PRO rated all areas of MIP and TACMIP as satisfactory or better. The troublesome area of response time was now rated outstanding, averaging less than three days since the September/October 1985 report. (30:3, 12) The "levels of submissions" rating had improved from marginal in November 1985 to satisfactory. At Moody, the participation of the NCOs had risen from 24 to 33 percent, but the airman percentage remained at two percent. (30:14) The levels of submissions at Langley were very close to those of Moody with the NCO participation rate at 35 percent and an airman participation of two percent. (30:15) The demographic distribution of officers to enlisted at Langley and Moody was very similar. This indicates the efforts to reach the enlisted forces achieved similar results at both bases. TAC considered this level of participation satisfactory. (30:3)

The growth of the program was rated satisfactory even though the number of proposals received from Moody and Langley were falling off. The number of proposal submitted had peaked at about 60 per month in July of 1985 and then declined to around 30 in December 1985. Submissions peaked again in January 1986 but had fallen off again to about 30 per month in July 1986. (30:6) This falling trend should be expected as a program of this type matures. Early in the program, participants would find it easier to identify problem areas. As the program matures, the "easy" proposals would have been used up, thus requiring more thought and research in later proposals. The satisfactory rating, despite falling submissions, recognizes that the "program meets objectives, [and] known problems are being resolved." (30:4)

MIP GRADUATES

On 17 September 1986, General Larry D. Welch, Air Force Chief of Staff, announced the formal expansion of MIP to all Air Force commands and separate operating agencies. This expansion was based on Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft's guidance to expand the MIP management approach throughout the DoD under a program entitled the Graduate Program. General Welch declared that MIP had proven that commanders would operate more efficiently and effectively when freed from overly restrictive regulation. (18:--)

On 19 September 1986, AF/PR released the tasking message establishing MIP Air Force wide effective 1 January 1987. The programs were to be major command and separate operating agency programs which were to focus on actions internal to the parent commands. Even though the new program focus was at the major command level, the Air Staff agreed to continue to work those
actions which would require approval at Air Force or higher. In fact, the Air Staff mandated procedures were similar in almost all respects to those TAC had already established to administer TACMIP. (45:1)

Since TAC already had procedures in place to administer the MIP, they were able to implement the Graduate Program one month early. (42:2) Both the DoD MIP and TACMIP were rolled into one program under the acronym TACMIP. (12:--) Basically the only adjustment they had to make to TACMIP was to change the disapproval authority for non-DoD MIP bases. Under the new TACMIP program, only the vice commander could disapprove initiatives. (42:5) Previously, only Moody and Langley had enjoyed this high level disapproval authority while all the TACMIP initiatives could be disapproved by a deputy chief of staff. (42:1) This change was consistent with MIP philosophy and was reiterated in the AF/PR tasking message: "Make it easy to approve and difficult to disapprove new ideas." (45:1)

Effective 1 December 1986, the DoD experiment came to an end in TAC with the establishment of TACMIP as a management program endorsed by DoD and HQ USAF.
Chapter Five

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

ANALYSIS OF MIP SUCCESS

What conclusion can be drawn from a study of the Tactical Air Command’s participation in the 3-year test of the DoD Model Installation Program? Obviously, the steady expansion of the program long before the conclusion of the test period indicates the TAC leadership was impressed with the results produced. However, did MIP really measure up to the early expectations for the program? Deputy Secretary Taft expected at least three benefits from the program:

[1] Better ways to operate bases will develop and spread;

[2] Counter-productive or wasteful regulations will be identified and purged;

[3] The general merit of giving commanders more authority to go along with their heavy responsibilities will be demonstrated. (52:--)

The TAC program affirmed each of these expectations. Once given the latitude, the installation commanders were able to exploit the wealth of knowledge and the genius for innovation residing in their commands’ most valuable resource—people.

The test validated Deputy Secretary Taft’s prediction that locally developed MIP ideas would spread. As of August 1985 assessment briefing, TAC had generated 297 proposals which had been approved for Air Force-wide implementation. (30:18)

Changes to regulations ranged from eliminating bureaucratic nonsense to changes resulting in large dollar savings. For example, Moody submitted a waiver to a TAC regulation which required mobility bags to be numbered and stored sequentially. The old procedure required more than 500 man-hours to sort through the bags and return them to storage following each exercise. The MIP initiative suggested the bags be color coded according to contents. The bags could then be stored based on the color code, eliminating the need for sequential sorting. The new method reduced the time required to return the bags to storage by 460
man-hours. This example also confirmed the expectation that a local commander and his people can better and more efficiently operate a base than can a higher headquarters staff. One wonders why the specific method for storing mobility bags was ever decided by a headquarters staff officer?

Another example, this one dealing with dollar savings, was the collocation of the communications center and data automation center at Moody AFB. This idea saved over $300,000 and three manpower slots by moving the new communications equipment in with data automation instead of building a new wing on the communication center. This idea also permitted upgrading the communications gear three years sooner than the original project.

However, the most significant benefit of MIP was the return of authority to local commanders commensurate with their responsibilities. Over the years, authority for base level decisions had been elevated and centralized in higher headquarters. If standardization is assumed to be the impetus for centralization, then one must ask what is standard about Moody and Langley's operational and community environments? Table 1 graphically illustrates many, but not all, of the differences between Moody and Langley. Kirtland AFB provides an example of what a commander can do when relieved from overly restrictive regulations. Kirtland needed a new electronic printing system. They received a waiver to lease, with option to buy, from a local source. The new system produced annual savings of $156,330, increased productivity, provided a better product, and consolidated all base computer hard-copy generation into a single location.

Success stories of this nature prompted the TAC leadership to begin expanding the program long before the conclusion of the DoD test phase. The continual and incremental expansion that characterized the program within TAC clearly indicated that the program met or exceeded the expectation of the TAC leadership. The program received high level support at every juncture. In fact, the rapid growth and success of the program could not have been successful without support of the TAC commander and his high level staff.

Using baseball metaphors, Colonel Robert C. Gilsson, Commander, 1st Tactical Wing, Langley AFB, summed up the program from the local commander's point of view. While the program at Langley had not yet produced a "home run" MIP by August 1986, the "singles" and "doubles" were adding up to big savings in dollars and man-hours. He was pleased with the program not only because of the tangible benefits produced, but also because MIP was allowing his people to work "...better and smarter, and gives them the feeling of being in control." (1:1)

The fact that Langley was only able to score "singles" and "doubles" is the result of the only major limitation to the program. The problem was lack of legislative relief, primarily in
the areas of procurement authority and funding flexibility. From 
the earliest days of the program, violation of public law or 
other agency regulations had been strictly prohibited. (52:1--)

As early as the October 1984 DoD Model Installation Program Con-
terence, legislative relief was seen as a major impediment to 
achieving the full potential of MIP. As late as May 1986, in a 
report to President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense  
Management the Defense Department reported that federal laws,  
Congressional direction, the appropriations structure, federal 
agency regulations, and even Defense regulations restricted the 
freedom of installation commanders to operate efficiently.  
(51:5-6) By in large, the situation was unchanged at the close 
of the test phase in December 1986.

LESSONS LEARNED

In spite of the lack of relief from federal laws and regula-
tions, MIP was a success in the Tactical Air Command. What were 
the lessons learned that so quickly and firmly committed TAC to 
expanding the program throughout the command? First and foremost 
had to be the benefits gained by freeing the local commander from 
overly restrictive regulations. When authority commensurate with 
responsibilities was returned to the local commanders, they were 
able to exploit the creativity and enthusiasm of the people in 
the work places. The MIP test validated the concept that the 
installation commander is in the best position to know the most 
efficient and effective way to operate a base. (52:3)

Another lesson learned was that the base could find better 
deals when allowed to shop for goods and services where they 
chose. The case of the electronic printing equipment purchased 
by Kirtland AFB cited above is just such a case. Additionally, 
the fact that a base could retain funds saved and reinvest those 
funds to improve base working and living conditions proved to be 
a valuable incentive measure for the program. (51:4)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

This paper records the history of the Model Installation 
Program 3-year test program in the Tactical Air Command. One can 
be forgiven for harboring the thought that approval of the 
program in TAC was a foregone conclusion even before the test 
program started. The program was rapidly expanded throughout the 
command long before the test phase was concluded. When the 
Graduate Program expanded MIP to all Air Force commands, the TAC 
program required only minor adjustments. The Tactical Air 
Command was already fully participating in MIP.

The Department of Defense, the Air Force, the Tactical Air 
Command, and this paper conclude that the test was a resounding 
success. However, it would be worthwhile to look at TACMIP again
in three to five years to determine if it lives up to its early promise.

Another area of promising research would be a comparison of MIP initiatives from two bases such as Moody and Langley. Did their divergent missions, size, and supporting communities (Table 1 above) produce radically different MIP initiatives as one would imagine?

Regardless of the final outcome, MIP represents a bold attempt to bring efficiency and excellence to a department of the federal executive branch. If it proves to be the success in the Department of Defense that it appears to be, it could very well be applied with equal success to federal, state, and local governmental institutions.
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