Passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act on 1 October 1986, brought sweeping changes to the United States military structure. A part of this reorganization act was the creation of the joint specialty occupational category. This study seeks to assess the impact upon Army officer management and development caused by the creation of the joint specialty. In addition to a search of written works, this
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

JOINT SPECIALTY: IMPACT ON OFFICER MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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I

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, enacted on October 1, 1986, contains sweeping changes throughout the Department of Defense. The purpose of this study is to analyze a portion of this act and assess its impact upon the U.S. Army. Specifically, this study analyzes the impact upon officer management and development within the U.S. Army as a result of the creation of the joint specialty occupational category. Creation of the joint specialty as a means of improving the proficiency of the Joint Staff and the ability of our armed services to conduct joint operations appears at first glance to be rather easy and a routine personnel action. However, the creation of the joint specialty is having and will continue to have a significant impact upon the management and development of the Army officer Corps. This study considers military education as a vital part of officer management and development. This research study includes the current opinions of leaders in Army personnel management and leaders in educational development as well as reference to written material. Additionally, it should be recognized that the results of this study will be a "snapshot" at the time of this study. Many actions are underway on the Army Staff and within Army service schools to implement the intent of the recent legislation. The conclusions drawn from this study will naturally be based on facts as they currently exist.
BACKGROUND

President Reagan signed into law October 1, 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (HR3622-PL99-433). This reorganization act contained the most sweeping changes to the U.S. military establishment since Congress created the Department of Defense in 1947. The approval of these sweeping changes recognized the efforts of a longtime crusade that dates back to proposals made by President Eisenhower in 1958.

Some of the most powerful political leaders were responsible for pushing these changes through Congress. As the name of the act implies, Senator Barry Goldwater, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Representative Bill Nichols, D-Ala., were key figures. Additionally, Senator Sam Nunn, D-Ga., the incumbent chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a widely accepted political leader in the defense arena, was a staunch supporter and architect of the bill. These key Congressional figures and other proponents of defense reorganization used several recent military operations to justify the need for reorganization. One incident cited in the drive to revamp Pentagon procedures and promote "joint effectiveness" was the Grenada operation of 1983. The problems in inter-service coordination were highlighted as indicators of needed changes to improve the ability to conduct joint operations. The unsuccessful attempt during 1980 to rescue hostages from Iran was used as yet another example of a military operation lacking in effective
joint coordination. Other issues such as serious budget deficits, high defense budgets, and "horror stories" about $400 hammers and $600 toilet seats were used to strengthen the case for reform.²

Some of the other objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act focused on such issues as improving the advice rendered to the Secretary of Defense and the President and to overcoming parochialism among the Services. The reorganization act significantly increased the authority and role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) by designating him as the principal advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense. It also extended the Chairman's term from 2 years to 4.³ Proponents of the reorganization act also sought to strengthen the powers of the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). The reorganization act shifted power from the Services to the CINCs and gave the CINCs full operational command over units assigned to them.

Many senior military officers and Service secretaries were adamantly opposed to the contents of the reorganization act. On February 4, 1986, the day the Senate panel began detailed work on the bill, their opposition and displeasure were plainly stated to the committee chairman, Senator Goldwater. Each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of each armed service sent a letter to Senator Goldwater that expressed his concern and opposition. A common theme of the letters was a concern that the proposed bill transferred too much power from the services to the Pentagon's "joint institutions," particularly the Joint
Chiefs chairman and the Commanders-in-Chief of the worldwide combat commands.\textsuperscript{4}

Despite opposition by the Secretary of Defense, many senior general officers and the Service secretaries, the reorganization act moved through the Senate and House of Representatives with minor resistance and few modifications. The tremendously strong voting in support of the reorganization act by members of Congress clearly showed that Congress was determined to implement significant changes to Department of Defense organization. Even President Reagan appeared to be a strong supporter of the reorganization act as evidenced by a statement issued when he signed the act into law. The President's statement is quoted as follows:

"I have today signed H.R. 3622, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This legislation is the product of a four-year effort led by the House and Senate Armed Service Committees. It is a milestone in the long evolution of defense organization since our national security establishment was created in 1947.

Our thanks go to Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, Representatives Bill Nichols, Ike Skelton, John Kasich, and Larry Hopkins, Secretary Weinberger, David Packard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many others for their patience and perseverance in this effort.

After long and intense debate, we have set a responsible course of action by taking another important step forward, building on improvements underway since 1981, and affirming the basic wisdom of those who came before us—the Forrestals, Bradleys, Radfords, and Eisenhowers—advancing their legacy in the light of our own experience."\textsuperscript{5}
In summary, passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act has created some of the most sweeping changes in the history of the U.S. military establishment. The full impact of these changes is not yet fully known nor will the full impact be completely clear for several years. Subsequent chapters of this paper will identify changes required by the reorganization act and will primarily focus on the impact upon officer management and development that have been brought about due to changes in Title IV of the act.

ENDNOTES


CHAPTER II
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 brought sweeping changes to the U.S. military structure. This paper focuses only on those changes that impact upon officer management and development.

One of the most significant requirements of the reorganization act required the Secretary of Defense to establish an occupational category for officers in joint operations. Critics had charged that officers in joint assignments who had not supported their services points of view were punished by being denied promotion. Partly for that reason, they argued the most talented officers had avoided interservice duty.1

Since the focus of this paper concerns the impact upon officer management and development as a result of the creation of the "joint specialty," a detailed listing of requirements contained in Title IV of the act is appropriate. These changes, as contained in Title IV of Public Law 99-433 are as follows:

Title IV - Joint Officer Personnel Policy

1. Establishes an occupational category, referred to as the "joint specialty," for the management of officers who are trained in and oriented toward joint matters.

2. Provides that joint specialty officers shall be selected by the Secretary of Defense from nominees submitted by the Service Secretaries.
3. Requires that an officer may not be selected for the joint specialty until he completes a joint education program and a full joint duty tour.

4. Requires that 50 percent of joint duty positions in grades above captain/Navy lieutenant be filled by officers who have been nominated for or selected from the joint specialty.

5. Directs the Secretary of Defense to designate at least 1,000 critical joint duty assignments that must always be filled by joint specialty officers.

6. Requires the Secretary of Defense to establish career guidelines for joint specialty officers.

7. Requires, subject to a waiver by the Secretary of Defense, that all officers promoted to general or flag rank must attend an education course (CAPSTONE) on working with the other armed forces.

8. Requires all joint specialty officers and a high proportion of other officers who graduate from a joint school to be assigned immediately to a joint duty position.

9. Prescribes, subject to a waiver by the Secretary of Defense, that joint duty tours shall be at least 3 years in length for general and flag officers and at least 3 1/2 years in length for other officers.

10. Requires the Secretary of Defense to exclude joint training assignments and assignments within the Military Departments from the definition of "joint duty assignments."
11. Specifies that each promotion board, subject to a waiver for the Marine Corps, that will consider officers who have served in joint duty assignments shall include at least one joint duty officer designated by the Chairman of the JCS.

12. Establishes the following promotion review process for officers who are serving, or have served, in joint duty assignments:

- Requires the Secretary of Defense to furnish to the Service Secretaries guidelines to ensure that promotion boards give appropriate consideration to joint duty performance;
- directs the Chairman of the JCS to review promotion board reports before they are submitted to the Secretary of Defense;
- authorizes the Service Secretary, if the Chairman of the JCS determines that the promotion board acted contrary to the Secretary of Defense's guidelines, to return the report to the promotion board (or a subsequent promotion board) for further proceedings, convene a special promotion board, or take other appropriate action;
- directs the Secretary of Defense to take appropriate action to resolve any remaining disagreement between the Service Secretary and the Chairman of the JCS.

13. Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments are such that the average promotion rates of their service will be achieved or exceeded.
14. Requires, subject to a waiver by the Secretary of Defense, that no officer may be promoted to general or flag rank unless he or she has served in a joint duty assignment.

15. Requires the Chairman of the JCS to evaluate the joint duty performance of officers recommended for three- and four-star rank.

16. Requires the Secretary of Defense to advise the President on the qualifications needed by officers to serve in three- and four-star positions.2

These are the primary requirements contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act pertaining to officer management. The impact of these requirements are addressed in subsequent chapters of this paper.

ENDNOTES


CHAPTER III
OFFICER EDUCATION AND JOINT CERTIFICATION

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act established the occupational category of "joint specialty." It further stipulates that an officer will not be selected for the joint specialty until he or she completes a joint education program and a full joint duty tour. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as a result of these requirements, formed an educational review board of distinguished, retired flag officers and eight active duty senior officers to aid him in evaluating current officer education programs and recommending means of improvement. This Senior Military Schools Review Board (SMSRB) completed its initial survey in May 1987. The primary focus of the SMSRB pertained to the capability of service schools to provide quality joint professional military education. This review included both intermediate and senior-level professional military education (PME), to include an examination of curriculum, student body, faculty, and lecture programs. A summary of recommendations rendered to the CJCS as a result of this review are as follows:

1. After consultation with the Service Chiefs, the CJCS should accredit the senior and intermediate Service schools, as well the schools of the National Defense University (NDU), for joint education, while maintaining the Service specificity of the Service schools.
2. The CJCS should establish a standard for joint education. This standard should identify the essential subject material necessary for adequate treatment of joint matters. Each school should address the subject material in depth and with sufficient emphasis to assure adequate focus on joint matters. The Board has proposed an initial standard for use by CJCS and the Service Chiefs.

3. In coordination with the Services, adopt an accreditation process that will validate the adequacy and currency of joint curricula. The Service schools should submit annual reports, through the Service Chiefs, to the CJCS that address the joint portion of their curricula. The NDU schools should submit their reports through the President of the NDU. The President of the NDU, as the executive agent for the CJCS for joint education, should be the reviewing authority and should recommend to the CJCS continuation or withdrawal of joint accreditation of the schools.

4. After consultation with the Service Chiefs, the CJCS should designate an appropriate Service mix of student bodies and faculties of the colleges accredited for joint education. Schools should be expected to meet the minimum Service mix before joint accreditation is granted.

5. The CJCS should create, within the Joint Staff, a division that is responsible for providing primary liaison with the colleges on matters involving joint education. The responsibility should be placed in the J-7, because of that Directorate's
responsibilities for doctrine and planning. The division should be prepared to provide primary liaison with, and policy guidance to, the colleges on matters relating to joint education.

6. The JCS should adopt a new definition of "joint matters" that is an expansion of the definition contained in Title IV of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The definition the Board proposes is: "Joint matters are those command and staff actions relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces of two or more of the Armed Services." This includes national security policy and military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, joint and combined operations, joint doctrine, and the command and control of combat forces under unified command. It also includes actions related to mobilization of forces/resources, joint logistics, communications, and intelligence, and the joint aspects of the planning, programming and budgeting process.

7. The CJCS should request, through the Service Chiefs, that all PME schools accredited for joint education submit an annual report on the joint aspects of their academic program, to include a detailed analysis of the means by which they ensure a level of academic rigor appropriate to the education of the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO).

8. The JCS should direct the establishment of joint education chairs at each of the colleges, to be occupied by highly qualified officers to assist the school commandants for all on-the-scene joint educational matters.
9. The JCS should encourage all the PME schools to include joint matters in non-resident programs for enrichment; however, we do not recommend accreditation of such non-resident programs for joint education due to the lack of a joint environment and interchange.

10. The JCS should insist that all the schools stress individual communication skills in their curricula.

11. The CJCS should establish a joint military/academic journal to enhance the creation of a body of high-quality joint literature and expanded intellectual focus on joint force development.¹

As can be seen by the positive action on the part of the CJCS to appoint the SMSRB and conduct an in-depth study of senior officer education, the issue of properly educating the "joint specialty officer" is being taken very seriously. As the recommendations of the SMSRB are implemented, it appears that the quality of senior officer education will improve.

Based on the recommendations of the SMSRB, all intermediate and senior service schools will be required to take immediate positive steps to gain joint accreditation. The language in the Goldwater-Nichols Act is very specific in that a joint education and joint experience will be prerequisites for advancement to flag rank. Since officers have little influence over where they are slated to attend intermediate and senior service schools, it seems only fair that all intermediate and senior service schools
have a means of awarding joint certification to its graduates. Otherwise, a perception of partiality or unfair competition among the officer corps could occur as a result of the slating process.

In summary, it is evident that the creation of the "joint specialty" has caused a close examination of our military education institutions. The implementation of the recommendations of the SMSRB will undoubtedly have a positive effect on the individual officer's professional development and his or her contribution to his or her individual service as well as the joint process.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER IV
DA DCSPER PERCEPTIONS

Once a political decision has been made, such as the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, the provisions of that decision must be implemented. For this reason, I interviewed Colonel Stuart B. Travis, Chief Officer Management Division, and Lieutenant Colonel Morris R. Faber, who work in DA DCSPER and are responsible for implementing Title IV provisions for the Department of the Army. COL Travis and LTC Faber have been working to implement Title IV requirements of the Reorganization Act since its passage on 1 October 1986. This interview was conducted on 20 November 1987 in the Pentagon. The primary thrust of this interview was to gain the perceptions of the DA staff personnel managers as to the impact of the creation of the Joint Specialty occupational category on Army officer management and development. Following is an analysis of the most pertinent issues developed during this interview:

1. The overall intention of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is good. However, implementation of its provisions is still confusing and requires a great deal of work and coordination.

2. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the Secretary of Defense to identify 1000 joint specialty positions coded as "critical." This means that these positions must be occupied by qualified JSO's. The Army is responsible for filling 390 of these positions. A large number of these positions are presently
occupied by officers who are not "joint specialty" qualified. Seventy-six of these positions are at the O-5 and O-6 level and the incumbents do not meet the JSO educational requirements nor do they have previous joint duty experience. Therefore, 76 of these senior officers, in order to comply with the new act, must be moved and replaced with JSO "qualified" officers. This is a delicate situation that must be managed carefully to prevent a morale problem. Compounding this problem are the constraints on PCS funds. CONUS tours are now designed to be 4 years in length so as to reduce the expenditure of PCS funds and add stability to tours of duty.

3. The new law requires that a newly promoted brigadier general must be assigned to a joint position if he or she has not already acquired joint specialty certification. In the near term this will make the management of new brigadier generals difficult, and could possibly preclude the filling of other than joint positions that are critical to combat readiness at the O-7 level.

4. The current law requires 3 1/2 years experience in a joint position in order for an officer to be "certified" as joint specialty qualified. For the Army to fill all of the critical positions for which it is responsible, some officers who have recently completed joint duty assignments will be required to return to a joint assignment. The law requires 3 1/2 years stability in joint assignments. This means that some officers will spend a total of 7 years in joint duty assignments at the
0-5 and 0-6 levels and will not have the varied experience of assignments on the DA staff, a MACOM staff, or a Division staff. Seven years in joint assignments has the potential of significantly narrowing the breadth of experience of senior officers.

5. The impact of the new law, as stated above, can be significant on selected officers unless managed carefully by the assignments offices. Additionally, during the development years of an officer, starting at the 0-4 level, there is not enough time to meet all of the new requirements. For example: If a major attends a recognized joint primary military education (JPME) school such as the Armed Forces Staff College, he or she is required to be utilized immediately to fill a critical joint duty position. Normally, this is the period when a middle grade major is acquiring essential skills and experience as a battalion S-3 or executive officer in order to prepare for possible selection for the command of a battalion.

6. The new requirement for colonels being promoted to brigadier general to be "joint specialty" qualified has the potential for creating an "elite group." This elite group could form at the rank of major when middle grade officers are graduating from schools such as the Armed Forces Staff College which is joint specialty accredited. The law now requires that graduates from a joint accredited school must be utilized in a joint assignment. Therefore, if a middle grade major graduating from a "joint JPME institute is assigned to a joint position and performs well, he or she will probably be promoted to lieutenant colonel and
selected for battalion command. Following battalion command, the most successful officers will attend a senior service college and subsequently will be selected for brigade-level command and some will progress to the general officer ranks. Therefore, there exists the very real possibility for our personnel system to attempt to identify our future general officers at the "major" grade level. Some officers possessing General Officer potential will probably not be identified at the grade of Major and provisions must be made for his or her attendance at a joint school later in his or her career. Otherwise, the Army will fail to capitalize on all of its personnel talent.

7. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also has the potential for eventually producing general officers who will not have the broad background of experience possessed by today's general officer. The assignment history of current four-star generals indicates that they have changed jobs or moved (PCS) every 16 months. New requirements such as 3 1/2 years required in a joint position and restrictions on PCS funds that have resulted in longer tours of duty in both CONUS and USAREUR will possibly produce general officers who are less general in their experience and more specialized.

8. The requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act will cause the "cream of the crop" of the officer corps to go to joint assignments. Naturally, with the requirement for joint certification in order to progress to the rank of general officer, those aspiring to be general officers must clamor for joint
assignments. This requirement has the potential for initiating a "ticket punching" syndrome.

9. The new law will also impact on the slating process for senior service college attendance. Due to the requirement to utilize an officer in a joint assignment immediately following completion of a joint accredited school, officers who are already "joint qualified" should not be slated to attend a joint certified SSC. If a joint qualified officer is slated to attend a joint certified SSC, his following joint assignment could perhaps hamper his upward mobility due to limiting his experience.

10. Currently, there is not a system for tracking "joint qualified" officers or officers with joint experience. A computerized system called joint duty assignments management system (JDAMIS) is being developed. Meanwhile, personnel managers are required to rely on a manual screening of records.

11. Due to the new requirement for joint experience to reach the flag officer rank, there is hardly enough time available to gain the necessary experience at battalion, brigade, division, DA staff, and now joint level. This condition will result in much less flexibility and a decrease in the individual officer's ability to influence his or her assignments.

12. Officers serving in joint duty positions probably will not be allowed to extend their tours of duty. Due to the necessity for joint experience to reach the general officer ranks, these positions will assume added importance and will be aggressively sought by those who aspire to become a flag officer.
It is readily apparent that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act is having a significant impact on officer management and development. COL Travis and LTC Faber work on these issues daily and their opinions are based on personal experiences as they have worked to implement the title IV changes for the U.S. Army. They readily agree that the full impact is not yet known because we are actually in the early stages of implementation.
CHAPTER V
IMPACT ON EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act has had a significant impact on officer military education. Institutions such as the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College as well as other equivalent schools have felt the impact of the new legislation. As mentioned earlier in this report, the Goldwater-Nichols Act created the officer occupational category of joint specialty and placed great emphasis on improving the capability of the services to conduct effective joint operations. The provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened by recommendations contained in the Dougherty study has caused the service schools to re-examine their mission, curriculum, faculty composition, and student ratio to determine how to best support the increased emphasis on joint education. Since education is a critical part of officer development and a vital consideration in officer management, it is appropriate to attempt, as a part of this study, to assess the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on military education. To determine the impact on service schools I interviewed MG Graves, Commandant of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Not only is MG Graves a leading authority on military education, he is also extremely knowledgeable in joint matters due to his experience in joint assignments. MG Graves' comments are summarized as follows:
1. Some recommendations contained in the Dougherty report are not a direct result of the Goldwater-Nichols requirements. Recommendations such as increasing academic rigor, improving written and oral communications, etc. are not a result of the new legislation. However, the joint arena as well as other senior command and staff positions always need officers with a high level of communicative skills.

2. Creation of the joint specialty is primarily going to affect the time available for an officer to acquire essential skills following completion of intermediate service school. Forty-two months experience plus joint education are required for awarding the joint specialty. If an officer spends 7 years in joint assignments at the major-lieutenant colonel ranks, other important experiences such as being a battalion S-3, battalion executive officer, brigade and division staff officer will suffer.

3. The quality of the Joint Staff will improve as a result of the emphasis on joint education and qualifications for joint assignments. Our system requires that high quality officers will be nominated for the joint positions, therefore the quality of the Joint Staff performance will improve.

4. Another problem facing the AWC is the ambiguity of how many JSOs the AWC will be required to graduate annually. A plan has been developed at the AWC to certify or award the joint specialty through special advanced courses. This approach leaves the content of the core curriculum, student mix, faculty content
by branch of service basically unchanged during the core curricu-
lar phase. During advanced courses a richer joint mix of stu-
dents and faculty can be achieved in order to satisfy require-
ments for JSO certification. This approach is feasible if the
AWC is expected to produce a small number (approximately 40) of
JSOs annually. If, however, the AWC is directed to produce a
large number of JSOs annually (perhaps 100+) the overall faculty
content, student mix, etc. will need modification.

5. MG Graves favors the certification of JSOs at the inter-
mediate level (CGSC). Many of the joint positions require majors
so it is quite logical that intermediate schools should develop
the capability to produce JSOs. Joint and combined operations
will then be taught at the CGSC level for at least a portion of
the students.

6. MG Graves raised another issue that certainly is
triggered or amplified by the JSO subject. That issue is:
"Should students be selected for Senior Service College based
solely on their qualifications or is there now a stronger need to
consider the needs of the services as a part of this selection
process?" I certainly hope that students will continue to be
selected for attendance at senior service schools based primarily
on their past performance and potential for continued service in
positions of great responsibility. Otherwise, a perception that
hard work and outstanding performance are not necessarily
rewarded by our selection process could be easily created.
7. The AWC has developed a plan that will enable at least a portion of the students to be certified during Academic Year (AY) 89. As mentioned earlier, this plan will support a small number of students (approx. 40).

8. MG Graves is concerned about the lack of time for an officer to gain experience in the myriad of assignments that the Army has historically expected of an officer in order to qualify for battalion, brigade, and division command. The extensive time required in joint positions by the future JSOs (± 7 years) will certainly narrow their scope of experience. MG Graves says that the Army as well as other services should study the feasibility of a promotion track for general officers that does not include division command. Stated differently, there may be merit in developing another promotion track for JSOs.

As stated in the preceding comments by MG Graves, the creation of the joint specialty is having a significant impact on the Army officer's educational development. Also, the intermediate and senior service schools are undergoing some rather extensive changes to gain accreditation for joint programs. The full extent of this impact is not yet known, but it appears that both the Army War College and the Command and General Staff College will have a capability for joint certification for a portion of other students by the beginning of SY 89.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

Based on information presented in the foregoing portions of this study, the following conclusions are drawn:

1. Creation of the joint specialty designation has had and will continue to have a significant impact on the management and development of Army officers.

2. The increased scrutiny of service schools through such actions as the SMSRB will improve the quality of military education as well as provide a means for implementing and monitoring joint certification.

3. There is not enough time for Army officers to gain experience in the traditional professional development assignment pattern and simultaneously become joint qualified. Therefore, provisions must be made for advancing JSOs who have not filled all of the traditional jobs at battalion, brigade, division, and DA staff level.

4. To retain proficiency in teaching branch related subjects, all service schools, both intermediate and senior, should quickly attain JSO accreditation for a portion of their students. This will preclude the necessity for a few universities to produce all the JSOs and will also greatly simplify the slating process for attendance at intermediate and senior service schools. Also, this will allow the continuation of quality instruction in an officer's basic branch of service.
5. The Goldwater-Nichols Act and the creation of the joint specialty designation will improve the quality of staff work at the Joint Staff level. However, only time will prove whether or not the JSO designation will help eliminate parochialism among the services.

6. Intermediate schools (CGSC level) should attain accreditation for joint specialty certification. This will allow joint education and certification for majors filling many joint positions. It will also enable experience to be gained at the level before officers are assigned to the critical positions which are coded almost entirely at the O-5 and O-6 grades.

7. A computerized system to identify and track officers in the joint specialty designation must be developed in order to properly manage joint specialty officers.
CHAPTER VII
RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the aforementioned conclusions, the following recommendations are made:

1. That the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take necessary steps in accordance with the SMSRB recommendations to accredit the senior and intermediate Service schools for joint education, while maintaining the Service specificity of the Service schools.

2. That DA DCSPER and the Total Army Personnel Agency continue to develop an automated management capability for tracking and managing joint specialty officers.

3. That the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establish a minimum annual quota of officers for each intermediate and Senior Service school to certify annually in a joint education program.

4. That DA DCSPER carefully monitor the affect of added time in joint assignments on an officer's ability to gain necessary "troop experience" in preparation for battalion and brigade level command.

5. That DA DCSPER develop an equitable system of determining which officers will receive joint instruction at the Army War College and the Command and General Staff College. This issue will become especially sensitive if only a portion of the students receive credit for joint education.
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