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TRANSITIONS FROM MILITARY RULE IN SOUTH AMERICA:
THE OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY HYPOTHESIS

by

Michael Joseph Mitchell
December

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Transitions From Military Rule In South America:
The Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis

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ABSTRACT

In recent years South America has witnessed a wave of transitions from military rule. These military regimes were different from past interventions in that the military came to power with their own agenda, not to specifically support an interest group, and they came to stay.

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It is concluded that a breakdown in obligatory legitimacy is the key factor leading to the military's decision to leave power. This perspective offers new insights for analysis of transitions, future transitions, and United States foreign policy options regarding military regimes, regimes in transition, and the new democracies of South America.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this thesis is to investigate the phenomenon of the recent transitions of the military from government in South America. This study will attempt to build a causal model explaining the transition process. The specific hypothesis of this model is, military regimes in South America choose to transition from power because of a breakdown in the military organization's common agreement of their justification to rule. There are five important underlying elements of this hypothesis. First, this investigation will only consider the "ruler-type" military regimes in South America. Although Chapter 1 will deal more specifically with this regime type, a ruler regime is characterized by a military that has visibly and/or publicly proclaimed itself to be in control of the government. The military ruling hierarchy is at the apex of control and the military institution participates substantially in the administration of the government.

Secondly, this study will highlight many of the reasons military ruler regimes have, to stay in power. These reasons vary from non moral considerations like institutional survival, tradition, underemployment and self-interests, to moral considerations such as sacred duty, commitment, and patriotism. Chapter 3 will deal
with this element and attempt to show that the forces influencing the military to remain in power do not originate and are not controlled by single actors or groups in society.

The third element of this hypothesis, that military regimes choose to leave power, can best be understood by the conclusion that causal forces external to the military cannot fully explain transition initiation. The military is not a pawn being pushed and pulled in and out of power by exogenous forces. This study will attempt to show that the key to military transition from power has its origins within the military itself. The military holds a monopoly on coercive power in society and needs only the will to use it to maintain its rule.

Chapter 4 deals with the fourth element of this hypothesis, "obligational legitimacy" (that entity from which the military derives its will to intervene and maintain power). When obligational legitimacy breaks down, the military then chooses to leave power. Obligational legitimacy is defined as the support, acquiescence, and consent for actions (up to and including coercion), motivated by subjective agreement that the military regime has a duty and obligation to rule, by those belonging to the military organization. This alleged internal justification is unique to ruler regimes and sets the
trajectory for their perceptions and actions while in power.

The fifth element of this hypothesis is that obligational legitimacy is influenced by conditions external and internal to the military organization. Chapter 5 offers nine causal variables that influence obligational legitimacy. This chapter completes the construction of a causal model in which obligational legitimacy is the dependent variable and the nine causal conditions are the independent variables. These variables will each be dealt with individually and include international influence, economic forces, external legitimacy, political capital, political culture, organizational culture, fractionalization, mission orientation, and mission success. Through a strict use of logic, outlined in Chapter 2, these variables will be categorized as necessary, sufficient, or contributing for obligational legitimacy breakdown and thus transition initiation.

Most studies of the recent transitions in South America center on the outcome of democratization. Those that do deal with the transition only look at the military from the outside. This study will discuss the transition process from the military perspective. Specifically, it will look at the underlying metaphysical assumptions (of which obligational legitimacy is a key component) of the military common identity. By looking at the transition
process from the point of view of obligational legitimacy breakdown, and building a causal model with deductive logic, we can then, in Chapter 6, inductively test case studies of transitions from the unique perspective of the military who allegedly initiates it. From the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis and its application to specific case studies, this thesis hopes to highlight the existence and key role played by obligational legitimacy, offer a new perspective to analyze transitions and their outcomes, and formulate more effective foreign policy options in dealing with military governments, military regimes in transition and the redemocratization of South America.

A. LEVELS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Since independence, Latin American history has been replete with successive waves of military intervention in national politics. The degree of intervention has varied on four broad levels. The lowest level of intervention is political influence through such avenues as bureaucratic pressure and interest group lobbying, similar to the efforts of the United States military. A more aggressive and direct form of military intervention is typified by the military as a political block actor, functioning in similar fashion to a political party, or in some cases, as a branch of the government and exercising partial de jure power
(e.g. Brazil's dentro dos limites da lei constitutional clause\(^1\)), or case by case de facto veto power over the civilian government. An example of this level of intervention is highlighted by the present situation in Guatemala. The military as a shadow government is an even more direct form of intervention. This level of intervention is an expansion of the political block actor level in that the civilian government exercises formal de jure power, but the military exercises de facto power. In other words, the civilian government is the figure head and all the important decisions are made by the military. An example of this level of intervention is Panama today. Quite often, though, military intervention in Latin America takes the extreme form of the military-as-government, and it is this level that this thesis centers on. At this level, the military has visibly and publicly proclaimed itself the leader of government, the government is controlled by the military Commander-in-Chief or a military junta made up of the separate service commanders, and there is substantial military institutional participation in government administration. This definition is sufficiently broad to include the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes of

\(^1\) The 1946 Constitution provides for the military to be obedient to the executive, but "within the limits of the law," which leaves a wide option for the organization that is constitutionally charged with maintaining law and order. Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 76-77.
Argentina (1976-1983), Brazil (1964-1985) and Uruguay (1973--1985); the personalistic dictatorships of Pinochet's Chile (1973-present) and Ongania's Argentina (1966-1970); and the "radical" regime of Peru (1968-1980).

B. MILITARY-AS-GOVERNMENT REGIME TYPES

At the military-as-government level of political intervention, two general regime types are prevalent: "arbitrator" and "ruler" regimes. Historically, the praetorian tendencies of Latin American militaries took form as "arbitrator-type" regimes. Typically, following a military coup, order was established, political disputes were settled, a new and "acceptable" regime was installed, and the military returned to the barracks. Transition from military rule was, by definition, understood and expected with arbitrator-type regimes. As Jorge Dominguez explains, this regime type "has no independent political organization or ideology; it is often content merely to supervise the leading civilian officials, ... finds nothing wrong with the social and economic status quo, and prefers a civilian government."\(^2\) Welch and Smith offer two regime subtypes,

"predatory regimes" and "reformist regimes," that further clarify the arbitrator category. Predatory regimes were characterized by their relatively small role in society, but with a large share of society's resources and capital at their disposal. They were also typically aligned with the elite oligarchy. This regime subtype was prominent between independence and the 1920s. Reformist military regimes evolved in the 1920s with the rise of political reform throughout Latin America and were prominent through the 1950s. In this reform era, the middle class became a major political actor and the military became more professionalized and separated from society, but still maintained its arbitrator role.

By the 1960s, however, "ruler-type" military regimes evolved which had no expectation of returning to the barracks after assuming power. Jorge Dominguez characterizes this regime type as having little confidence in civilian rule, rejecting the existing social order, and expecting to stay in power, to construct a new ideology and possibly create its own political organization to prolong its rule. Welch and Smith highlight two such ruler regime subtypes: radical military regimes and guardian military regimes.

---


Radical regimes were prominent in the late 1950s and early 1960s. They manifested the growing level of political consciousness within the military and required a high level of politicization with direct links to the masses. Republican dictatorships and populist regimes are examples of the radical ruler-type regime. The guardian regime further politicizes the role of the military in society and typifies the most recent ruler-type military regimes in Latin America. These regimes see themselves as "the unique custodians of the national interest.... and consider themselves to be the repositories of national honor and prestige." This study will focus on the guardian ruler-type regime, and will also consider the radical regime subtype in the case of Peru.

C. WEAKNESSES WITH CURRENT RULER REGIME STUDIES

Despite the all-encompassing political orientation of ruler-type military regimes (and a monopoly on the coercive force to achieve their goals), Latin America has, in the past few years, witnessed a wave of transitions from

5 Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations, pp.65-73.

6 The Rodriguez Lara period (1972-1976) in Ecuador is an example of this regime type.

7 Ibid.,p.67.

8 "Transition" in this study refers to the "interval between one political regime and another.... Transitions are delimited, on one side, by the launching of the process
military rule that defies a fundamental objective of these regimes: the goal to stay in power; a goal overlooked, quickly forgotten, or discarded by most transition studies. The outcomes of these transitions are moves toward democratization and most studies have centered on this phenomenon. Although most of these studies are relevant, helpful and insightful in explaining specific pieces of the transition/liberalization puzzle, key issues are circumvented or completely neglected. At the deepest level of analysis, these studies only consider the military from the outside looking in and not from the inside looking out. In other words, consideration of the military perspective is rarely entertained, or is shallow at best.9 This may be because of the interest in the positive future prospects of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative." Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p.6. "Transition," in this study, is a subset of the larger phenomenon of military withdrawal from government and is, therefore, assumed mutually exclusive from social upheaval and violent revolution.

liberalization, or because of the more readily available research opportunities available in the newly opened society (political parties, people to interview, etc.). In short, liberalization is methodologically privileged because it is easier to empirically identify and investigate. Only a handful of studies attempt to consider the military point of view, yet they too fall short of a complete analysis of the military mind. A second category of studies that attempts to explain the transition phenomena choose not to (due to limits in the scope of the paper, etc.), or simply neglect to, investigate important interrelated avenues of potential explanation. For instance, a study may discuss how a transition occurred, but not why it occurred. Arturo Valenzuela highlights four further problems of the relevant current research


11 A study in this category is: O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions From Military Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.
format. He says it is a distortion of reality to conceive of the civilian side of the transition equation in the same light as the military side. Certainly the military is a unique and difficult to compare institution. Also, civil society is not a monolithic institution, but a complex conglomeration of many institutions. Secondly, he states it is equally misleading to consider the military as a mechanical, neutral force, a symptom of another problem, in which a vacuum is created and the military simply steps in to fill it. Third, Valenzuela highlights the misconception of idealizing the military as a professional neutral force that is required to move into politics due to the irresponsibility of civilians. Finally, he points


out the incorrect assumption of certain studies that the transition process is located within the confines of national society, thus down playing the impact of international influences. Each of these six categories of theoretical shortcomings also miss two additional salient points: if it were not for the initiation of the transition in the first place, democratization could not take place with the depth or breadth it has. Secondly the military is not a neutral pawn in the initiation of transitions, but rather its immediate author. If we are to fathom transitions from military rule, we must first know something of the military mind at all levels of understanding, from its values and norms, to resultant actions. This means we cannot stop our investigation at the military's general view of reality (presented in theories of National Security Doctrine and Geopolitics), but look at the underlying metaphysical assumptions that support this view. It may well be at this less studied baseline of metaphysical assumptions that the transition process is most clearly manifested. This metaphysical level is not easily observable or obvious, but is real. Even if Latin American militaries never discussed metaphysics (though there is some evidence demonstrating they do), a certain philosophy governs all actions, whether the actor consciously

perceives it or not. What is obvious and history supports, the time in power of all military regimes is finite. The pivotal question that follows is, why does the military leave power when it does?

D. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY HYPOTHESIS

By constructing and testing the following framework, I will show that militaries choose to relinquish power because of their loss of obligational legitimacy. It is specifically argued that nine independent, or explanatory, variables (international influence, economic forces, external legitimacy, political capital, political culture, organizational culture, fractionalization, mission orientation, and mission success) play necessary, sufficient, or contributing roles in influencing obligational legitimacy and ultimately, transition from military rule. Through this causal structure, the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis offers new prisms for understanding the military transition phenomena. This model's ultimate aim is best explained in general terms by Charles A. Beard,

17 Defined as: Support, acquiescence, and consent for actions (up to and including coercion), motivated by subjective agreement that the military regime has the duty and obligation to rule, by those belonging to the military organization. Obligational legitimacy is not a process, but a common identity that forms the foundation of a military regime's internal justification for actions or beliefs, specifically in terms of maintaining power. For a detailed discussion of obligational legitimacy see Chapter 4.
No one can deny that the idea is fascinating—the idea of subduing the phenomena of politics to the laws of causation, of penetrating to the mystery of its transformations, of symbolizing the trajectory of its future; in a word, of grasping destiny by the forelock and bringing it prostrate to earth. The very idea is itself worthy of the immortal gods.... If nothing ever comes of it, its very existence will fertilize thought and enrich imagination.\(^{18}\)

Specifically, the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis offers a new way of looking at military transitions from power (as a heuristic devise designed to explain, fertilize thought, enrich imagination, and establish a perspective for further evaluation), and attempts to draw on all available evidence and remain objective. The Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis may relegate certain variables to less than pivotal importance by holding to a strict logic format, which may run counter to common assumptions or personal viewpoints. As this model does, the reader must also adhere to Gaetano Salvemini's admonition that "Impartiality is a dream and honesty a duty. We cannot be impartial, but we can be intellectually honest."\(^{19}\)

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II. ARGUMENT ANALYSIS

The object of our analysis, the ruler-type military regime has been categorized and defined. The current literature, discussing ruler regimes and their transition from power, has also been investigated and found lacking in various aspects. The Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis was presented as a new alternative in this field of study. In order to efficiently and effectively present and investigate the hypothesis, this thesis will employ a logic structure and methodology designed to circumvent the problems found with other studies on this subject.

A. LOGIC CONSTRUCTION

To avoid confusion or misinterpretation of the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis, further explanation of its structure and foundation logic will be presented. First, the variables of this study are divided into dependent and independent variables. The key variable this hypothesis attempts to explain, obligational legitimacy, is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are termed independent variables and are the hypothesized cause

of the dependent variable. In other words, the dependent variable is the expected outcome of the independent variables. Independent variables in one study, it should be noted, may be the dependent variables of another study, depending on the research objective.

The diagram in Figure 1 outlines the research objective of this study. The lines represent inferences and the numbers represent premises. Numbers 3 - 11 are the nine independent variables. They are the causal assertions of the key assertion, "2", which is the dependent variable, "obligational legitimacy." Separate lines connect the causal assertions to the key assertion not because they are not in some way interrelated; on the contrary, application of this model to real world examples highlights the high degree of interrelationship and synergism. These separate lines also do not necessarily represent sufficient conditions with respect to "2," but simply imply that each independent variable is said to support "2," which in turn supports the key conclusion "1." Therefore, we need to look at each claim separately to validate the individual inferences. This will also help to avoid errors in logic relating to necessary and sufficient conditions which will be discussed in the next section. In investigating these individual inferences, it may turn out that "4," for example, has a weak causal connection, but it should not be completely discarded because all the possible relevant
Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis Causal Model

Figure 1
evidence is not yet in. The numbers "12" and "13" are further assertions representing types of transition. For simplicity, this study only depicts liberalization "13" (which could come in substantive forms through expansion of institutional, societal and economic equality, or solely on the procedural level through increased participation and/or increased public contestation) and totalitarian outcomes "12" (which could come in fascist, socialist, and populist dictatorship forms to name a few possibilities). These further assertions are the center of most research today and may be more important in the final analysis, but "1" is the key conclusion without which "12" and "13" will not occur.

B. LOGICAL CAUSATION

With this simple construction of the variables and assertions, causal implications of the independent variables can now be considered. Using the diagram in Figure 1, to say that "3" is a sufficient condition for "2" is to say that the fact of "3" suffices to guarantee the outcome "2." In other words, if "3" is present, than "2" is present (if 3 then 2). A necessary condition, on the other hand, is a condition which "3" must obtain (is necessary) in order that "2" obtain. Therefore, if "2" is present, we know that "3" must be present. A necessary condition does not guarantee an outcome (i.e. not suffi-
cient), and is not a required precondition for sufficiency. On the other hand, with a sufficient condition, all necessary conditions will also be present by transition initiation because, by definition, the necessary conditions are required to complete the causal chain. They may come before the sufficient condition, simultaneously, or possibly as a result of the sufficient condition. It is possible to have a condition that is both sufficient and necessary and is termed an equivalent condition. Also, if all necessary conditions are met simultaneously, a sufficient and therefore equivalent, condition exists. Finally, contributing variables are those independent variables that are neither sufficient nor necessary. They may be very important intervening conditions, but do not, in a strictly logical sense, meet the special requirements defined above. Figure 2 outlines potential examples of necessary, sufficient and equivalent conditions leading to obligational legitimacy breakdown and transition. It is important to note that these models are for clarification only; the research agenda will follow the model in Figure 1. Each individual transition may not reflect the causal models offered in Figure 2 (i.e. one transition may occur from an equivalent condition, while another from a sufficient condition, etc.). For clarification, assume a necessary condition for a breakdown in obligational legitimacy is low organizational culture (which this study
Potential Causal Patterns For Obligational Legitimacy Breakdown

Figure 2
Potential Causal Patterns For Obligational Legitimacy Breakdown

Figure 2
will expand upon later). This condition does not guarantee obligational legitimacy breakdown, but it is required (i.e. necessary, but not sufficient). Further assume that fractionalization is a sufficient condition for obligational legitimacy breakdown. This condition is not required for obligational legitimacy breakdown, but if it is present, breakdown will occur. Furthermore, if fractionalization is a sufficient condition for obligational legitimacy breakdown, that means fractionalization guarantees the truth of obligational legitimacy breakdown (i.e. makes the truth of fractionalization necessary). Therefore, fractionalization can't be true unless obligational legitimacy breakdown actually happens, meaning that obligational legitimacy breakdown is a necessary condition for fractionalization. So, whenever an independent variable is a sufficient condition for the dependent variable (e.g. obligational legitimacy breakdown), the dependent variable is a necessary condition for that independent variable. This test also applies to necessary independent variables which claim a sufficient condition from the dependent variable. These concepts are complementary converse relationships and are useful to further confirm the necessity and/or sufficiency of independent variables. Although not intuitively obvious, this is one important reason why this model makes such an effort to keep each inference separate in its relationship to the
dependent variable. Prejudging variables to be sufficient or necessary could lead to spurious conclusions.

Besides the utility of the concepts "necessary" and "sufficient" in terms of causation, they also have important "control" implications. Max Black suggests that control of an unwanted effect consists of knowledge of a necessary condition of that effect. He also suggests that control of a wanted effect consists of knowledge of a sufficient condition of that effect.\textsuperscript{21} Control in this sense means we can do something about the dependent variable. In the specific context of obligational legitimacy, the implication for the future of democratization in Latin America is certainly crucial. The implication is, we could more astutely support the efficacious and efficient circumstances in countries still under military rule so that a sufficient condition for obligational legitimacy breakdown is created and thus, military transition from power. For example, assuming this study finds fractionalization as a sufficient condition for obligational legitimacy breakdown and highlights how fractionalization occurs, new influences might be brought to bear on military regimes. If we identify necessary conditions for obligational legitimacy reconstitution, first through an understanding of its breakdown, we can

help prevent the potential danger of future military rule (at least of the same type of regimes recently experienced).

C. METHODOLOGY

An obvious keystone of any causal model is the identification and categorization of the independent variables as sufficient, necessary, or contributing conditions. These variables, in the initial analysis, will be categorized using deductive inference (i.e. reasoning from the general to the specific). By continuing to keep the independent variables separate and directly connected to the dependent variable for the case study analysis, we can use John Stuart Mill's inductive "Method of Agreement, Method of Difference, and Joint Method of Agreement and Difference" to discern sufficiency and necessity. To use these methods, we must assume that the actual necessary and sufficient conditions are present in our list of independent variables. Of course we cannot be sure all the possible variables are present, nor can we decisively conclude that these variables are absolutely necessary. We can only be as sure as the evidence suggests. But this is the nature of inductive research.

In applying the Method of Agreement to this model, assume that one or more of the independent variables is suspected of being necessary for obligational legitimacy breakdown and thus military transition from power. By inductive judgment we note that one or more of these independent variables is always present when obligational legitimacy breakdown is present. Conversely, these independent variables are not found missing when obligational legitimacy breakdown is present. We can then be relatively confident that they are necessary variables.

To find a sufficient condition we must apply the Method of Differences. Assume we are able to collect all the relevant conditions that lead to obligational legitimacy breakdown (realizing there could be, of course, a multitude of irrelevant conditions, or contributing conditions in the list also). It is important to note that every sufficient condition need not (and probably will not) be present in each case of obligational legitimacy breakdown, as is required of necessary conditions. Potentially sufficient independent variables are eliminated if they are present, or could be present, and obligational legitimacy breakdown is not.

By combining the "Method of Agreement" and the "Method of Differences," termed the "Joint Method of Agreement and Differences," we can find conditions that are both necessary and sufficient. First we apply the Method of
Differences to find any sufficient conditions. We then apply the Method of Agreement to these sufficient conditions to see if they are also necessary. This joint method is also useful in confirming the equivalent condition of the complex variable of all necessary conditions, which by definition is also a sufficient condition. After applying these inductive methods to this theory's independent variables, we can test the conclusions deductively with specific case studies, hopefully adding new insights to the military transition from power phenomena.

Just as John Stuart Mill's rigorous analysis methods are applied to the independent variables of the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis, the dependent variable will undergo the scrutiny of Aristotle's four ways of understanding an entity. First, this study will look at the origins of (material cause) obligational legitimacy. Second, the "why" (formal cause) will be considered. The third and fourth categories of understanding encompassed in this hypothesis are those most studies now center on, the questions of "how" (the efficient cause), and "what" (the final cause). In short, this model will seek to answer the questions "out of what," "why," "how," and "what,"

thereby knowing as fully as possible the event of military
transitions from power in South America.24

D. MANIFESTATIONS OF APPLICATION OF LOGIC AND
METHODOLOGY IN CURRENT STUDIES

Before discussing the Obligational Legitimacy
Hypothesis, it will be useful to employ the argument
analysis constructed above to highlight the weaknesses of
the present efforts in the study of transition theory
(discussed in Chapter 1). Figure 3 presents, in causal
form, the four main attempts to explain transitions. "A"
highlights the weakness of attaching direct causal
inference between one (or more) factors external to the
military regime and transition itself. No effort is made
to look from inside the military out, especially at the

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24 The material cause concerns itself with the origin
of the entity in question. As Aristotle explained, "Oak
trees do not grow out of hazel nuts, but only from acorns.
And if they are sown in sandy soil on the ocean front... they will always remain scrub growth." (quoted in John
Herman Randall, Aristotle, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1960), p.52.) Similarly, transition from military
rule in South America has a specific environment and seed
of origin from which it springs. The formal cause is
concerned with structure. As a regime moves toward
transition from power, the regime structure will change to
manifest this movement and the "why" of the transition will
be answered specifically in the change of obligational
legitimacy. The efficient cause is concerned with process
(in this case, how the transition evolved) and is the
easiest of the four divisions of understanding to directly
observe. The final cause is concerned with what something
tends to become. In the case of transitions, the final
cause is concerned with liberalization or totalitarian
tendencies and with military reconstitution.
Overlay of Current Studies on the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis Model

Figure 3
Overlay of Current Studies on the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis Model

Figure 3
metaphysical level.25 "B" models the faulty assumption of tying factors external to the military directly to liberalization, skipping the transition phenomena all together.26 "C" manifests the easiest and most popular research agenda, assuming transition and just looking at liberalization with no concern for factors that caused the transition that may also affect liberalization.27 Finally, "D" highlights the research agenda that concerns itself only with how and little inference as to why the transition occurred.28

25 See footnotes 9 and 11 for representative studies of this causal model.

26 See footnotes 13 and 14 for representative studies that conform to this causal model.

27 See footnote 15 for representative studies that conform to this type of causal model.

28 See footnote 16 for a representative study that conforms to this causal model.
III. PERPETUATION OF MILITARY REGIMES

Before constructing the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis with the logic and methodology presented in Chapter 2, it is important to fully appreciate the natural friction inherent in military regimes moving toward transitions from power. As Chapter 1 highlights, until recently, scholars have centered their studies on the rise of civilian rule, not why (or if) military regimes choose to let transitions take place. The military regime's tendency to want to remain in power does not mean the regime is directly pushed out of power by forces external to it, although these factors may play an important role. The very fact that there are many influences supporting their stay in government highlights the need for change to take place within the military. In other words, factors external to the regime will not, by themselves, initiate transition. There are four obvious general factors that support perpetuation of military regimes in power in Latin America, historical tendencies, cultural traditions, armed might, and institutional forces.
A. HISTORICAL TENDENCIES

The historical pattern over the past two decades particularly highlights civilian rule as the exception. For example, from 1946 to 1984, Argentina saw 27 years of military rule. Bolivia has had 18 years of military rule in the same time period. Brazil recently transitioned from 21 years of military rule. Chile and Paraguay have endured (and continue to endure) military dictatorships for 14 and 33 years respectively. Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay have each had military interventions, adding up to at least ten years in each case, since the mid 1960s. Table 1 presents a further illustration of the historical tendency of military rule in South America.

B. CULTURAL TRADITION

Closely connected to the historical pattern of military intervention is the influence of culture. At the extreme end of the cultural influence theory spectrum is the cultural determinism suggested by Jeane Kirkpatrick. She asserts that Latin America is inherently authoritarian in nature; they like order.29 Although her argument is flawed (maybe there is just a dislike of disorder, as

"Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary, November 1979, pp.34-45.
TABLE 1

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RULE
IN SOUTH AMERICA 1946-1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total years of military rule</th>
<th>Total years of civilian rule</th>
<th>Military rule as a % of period 1946-1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 Table 1 information extracted from Talukder Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal From Politics, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987), pp.224-231. (Maniruzzaman classifies the first Peron era as military rule because his first entry into power was through a military coup d' etat in 1943.)
Howard Wiarda suggests\textsuperscript{31}, her point highlights a traceable cultural tendency toward centralism. Latin intellectuals, disillusioned with the failure of liberal democracy after independence, were the first to conclude that "Hispanic culture stressed strong leadership, centralized government, and an organic, hierarchical view of society...."\textsuperscript{32} From this general viewpoint, theories including praetorianism (the armed forces act as a corporate body to maintain control of government), caudillismo (rule by traditional military leaders), caesarism (rule by a single charismatic leader who is usually a military officer), and Laswell's Garrison State model (society transfers almost unlimited power to the military due to continual chaos, crisis or external threat) gained wide popularity and acceptance. Whether these theories are completely applicable or not is open to debate. What is certain, culture does play a role in supporting military intervention and maintenance as a power broker in government. Glen Dealy's "Spirit of Caudillaje" (a lifestyle oriented toward the goals and values of public leadership)\textsuperscript{33}, the Catholic Ethos and the

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\textsuperscript{33} Glen Dealy, \textit{The Public Man}, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977), p.3.
\end{flushleft}
Iberian Continuum all support the tendency of militarism in Latin America. If militarism is the tendency, then maybe the question should be, "why not more and longer military interventions?"

C. ARMS MIGHT

At first glance, the logic is very strong against transitions from military rule given Latin American military historical propensity to intervene. S.E. Finer points out,

The armed forces then are not only the most highly organized association in the state. They are a continuing corporation with an intense sentiment of solidarity, enjoying, in many case, considerable favor. This formidable corporate body is more lethally and heavily armed than any other organization in the state, and indeed, enjoys a near-monopoly of all effective weapons.\(^{34}\)

Even in the face of frustrated public opinion, as in Somoza's Nicaragua, Pinochet's Chile, Galtieri's Argentina and Bermundez' Peru, the military holds the physical power to continue ruling. Although an unpopular civilian regime may not last long, an unpopular military regime (willing to use its coercive power) can seemingly continue ruling indefinitely. Closely related to the military's coercive power, are other unique capabilities (categorized here because they depend on armed might) that dilute the potential for transition. These militaries claim a unique

mission in society, a sacred trust, including the need to govern in order to save the nation. Most South American militaries manifest the influence of Prussian training (such as in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay). The French doctrine de la guerre revolutionaire (especially influential in Peru due to the French military training mission established there in 1896) also has left its impact. Combining these two influential traditions with the United States' emphasis on internal security in the post World War Two era, most Latin American militaries add a well defined internal security perspective to their sacred trust, further entangling themselves in governmental affairs. Corporate self-interests, personal self-interests, fear of retribution for repression and social regression, and other uncertainties of liberalization also support continuance of military rule.

D. COHERENT INSTITUTION IN CHAOTIC SOCIETY

Finally, institutional steadiness, not radical change, or instability, is the descriptive characteristic of most enduring organizations, including militaries. In the face of strong external stimuli to leave government, Latin American militaries have additional institutional forces,

including commitment on the individual level, organizational culture on the corporate level, and the self-perpetuation of power phenomena and structural underemployment on the societal level, that tend to perpetuate continuance in government. On the most basic level of institutional forces is the factor of commitment. Commitment, that "state of being in which an individual becomes bound by his actions and through these actions to beliefs that sustain the activities and his own involvement,"\textsuperscript{36} is a behavioral phenomena of great influence in the context of military regimes. This concept is particularly important to a military organization that commits itself to an irrevocable action, as did Argentina's military regime during its "dirty war."\textsuperscript{37} As this individual phenomena of commitment expands to encompass an entire military organization, or even part of it, the tendency to remain in power further solidifies.


\textsuperscript{37} "Suppose an individual believes something with his whole heart, suppose further that he has a commitment to this belief and that he has taken irrevocable actions because of it. Finally suppose that he is presented with evidence, unequivocal and undeniable evidence, that his belief is wrong: what will happen? The individual will frequently emerge not only unshaken, but even more convinced of the truth of his beliefs than ever before. Indeed, he may even show new fervor for convincing and converting other people to his view." Leon Festinger, H.W. Riecken, and S. Schacter, \textit{When Prophecy Fails}, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), p.3.
Above the individual level, on the broader corporate spectrum, is a second perpetuating force of institutionalization, organizational culture. Traditions, standard operating procedures, patterns of authority, etc., after a time take on the status of objective social fact. Rules of operation, decisions and distribution of power are not questioned by the individual members. The historical tendencies and cultural traditions supporting military rule have become tightly interwoven into the fabric of Latin American military organizations, making organizational culture a key factor in the transition process. This may be a pivotal factor in Chile's current military regime.

On the societal level (of which the military organization is a key player in Latin America), the self-perpetuation of power phenomena is an important force. Simply put, power enables those who possess it to get things such as wealth, information, and opportunity that others can't obtain in order to build their strength and privilege. In Latin America, the various societal components of many countries have historically tended to define their interests in "zero-sum" terms and the perpetuation in power of the ruling group therefore became especially important for the continued realization of their self interests.

38 See Chapter 5 for an explanation of organizational culture, including its pivotal role in the military transition from power process.
This demonstrated unwillingness of societal actors to compromise and negotiate has led, at best, to exclusionary democracy and tension, such as in Brazil's Democratic Republic, 1945-1964. In other situations it has led to governmental stagnation and ensuing chaos, such as during the most recent Peronist years in Argentina, 1973-1976. In every case it has, at some point, led to a rise in military authoritarianism. As a corporate entity, they historically have had the highest organized technical abilities in most countries and were the best educated and trained in society. Today they are still qualitatively competitive with educated middle and upper class civilians and quantitatively have the largest pool of mobilized and controlled labor to harness. Also, following bureaucratic authoritarian reasoning, the military is the only corporate entity in society that can organize and control a country to achieve painful economic modernizations, or simply bring order to a chaotic political society. The exclusionary narcism of the various factions in civilian society are not the only self-interest forces supporting military rule. When the military itself, with its unique capabilities to establish its power, comes to define its interests as fundamentally incongruent with the rest of society, their willingness to perpetuate and protect their power becomes a key coagulant inhibiting the move toward a transition from rule. Add to this, the Latin American militaries'
perennial problem of "structural underemployment"\textsuperscript{39} (i.e. the armed forces do not have their major role to perform in society due to the lack of external threats and society has nothing else to offer them) when not in government, and the interest of self-perpetuation in power becomes a formidable force.

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{39} Barros and Coelho, "Military Intervention and Withdrawal," \textit{Armies and Politics in Latin America}, p.440.
IV. TRANSITION THEORY: DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The influences inhibiting military ruler regimes from transitioning from government are numerous and originate from sources outside and inside the military organization. Theories that link transition simply with external influences cannot fully explain what must be closer to the actual process. The fact that the military holds a monopoly on coercive power in society and that the regime has all these forces influencing it to stay in power, highlights the more probable situation: transition initiation begins as an event internal to the military itself. With the methodology discussed in Chapter 2, this study will present and analyze obligational legitimacy as the pivotal internal factor that leads the military to the decision of withdrawing from power.

40 The basic data of this chapter is derived from interviews and the personal writings (utilized in a strict non-attribution context) of mid and senior level Latin American military officers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Venezuela during the period 1986-1987. Very few of the terms used in this chapter were specifically used by these officers, but do summarize the issues and assumptions underlying their views.
A. WHY "OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY?"

Between historical tendencies, cultural tradition, a near-monopoly on coercive power, unique capabilities, sacred duty, corporate and self-interests and fears, commitment, institutionalization of organizational culture, self-perpetuation of power and otherwise structural underemployment, one must wonder why transitions from military governments ever occur. Causal forces external to the military certainly cannot fully explain transitions from military rule. The key to military transitions then, must have its origin within the military itself. But what is it in the military (the key assertion) that leads to a transition from military domination of government? Is that entity that brought the military to power changing? What justified the military to take over government in the first place? How can we come to terms with the common theme of these questions? Max Weber offered a way to at least start an inquiry of such regimes. He suggested,

...according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will differ fundamentally.... Hence, it is useful to classify the types of domination according to the kind of claim to legitimacy....

Following Weber's suggestion, this study looks at the type of legitimacy characterizing ruler regimes in South

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America. In fact, this hypothesis places "obligational legitimacy," and its breakdown, as the causal model's dependent variable and ultimate cause of transition from military rule. Obligational legitimacy is defined as, support, acquiescence, and consent for actions (up to and including coercion), motivated by subjective agreement that the military regime has the duty and obligation to rule, by those belonging to the military organization.

Obligational legitimacy is so named to highlight its difference from other types of legitimacy. It differs from other concepts of legitimacy, first and foremost, because it is solely internal to the military organization. It does not describe a direct feedback relationship between the regime and society. Obligational legitimacy is the pivotal factor between status quo military rule and transition because the military regime is made up of individuals with the need to understand, however correct or incorrect, the world around them. These understandings are necessary to provide enough predictability to take action as a government and enough obligational legitimacy associated with the action to make it justifiable and meaningful. To remove the nebulous and mystical shroud thus far covering this entity, its origins will first be discussed through defining its "essence"—what it is and does. Secondly, the characterizing structure of obligational legitimacy will be clarified by specific investigation of
its most basic components to understand the "why" of this unique entity. A survey of contrasting literature will also be conducted to further highlight the differing characteristics of obligational legitimacy. Next, the process of how obligational legitimacy is created, how it is sustained, and how it breaks down will be outlined. Finally, a proposal of what it becomes after transition will be put forward.

B. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY CONCEPTS

To appreciate the role of obligational legitimacy, we must first comprehend what it is and what it does. The foundation concepts of the words "legitimacy" and "obligational," which form its bipartite whole, express its essence. Legitimacy in this context connotes a different idea from more generally understood definitions of legitimacy. The commonly accepted concept of legitimacy, as a two-way relationship between the rulers and the ruled, is relegated to the role of an independent variable in this hypothesis.42 Otto von Bismark offers the best definition for legitimacy in the context of obligational legitimacy. He explained that,

Power itself, rather than any moral principles, establishes a leader's legitimate authority. Since power stops discord, keeps the rulers in office, and maintains

42 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the traditional concept of legitimacy and its role as a causal factor influencing obligational legitimacy.
order, coercive power conveys a moral value. The skillful exercise of power provides its own legitimacy.\textsuperscript{43}

This definition of legitimacy is particularly applicable because the concepts of support, acquiescence and consent attached to most definitions of legitimacy are here linked only to "the rulers in office." In other words, this legitimacy is internal to the military and does not describe the normal two-way relationship between society and the military. This concept clearly makes the point that the interests of the state transcend more abstract principles of legitimacy. Coercive power is a key element in this definition and, in fact, could be termed "coercive power legitimacy" which is operable only by, or with, the military. Bismark's definition does manifest a belief that a "skillful" evaluation of power would yield to some concern for self-limitation. This study will attempt to show about Latin American militaries what Dr. Kissinger points out about Bismark. Bismark felt that "what was at issue was not a policy but a philosophy."\textsuperscript{44}

The definition of obligational legitimacy is concerned with the military's justification of its right to rule, and this "might makes right" definition of legitimacy (with the only caveat being a skillful exercise of power) encompasses


\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p.918.
more than just the military-as-government possibility. "Obligational," therefore, becomes an important qualifying concept. "Obligational" is defined as, "a duty that compels one to follow or avoid a certain course of action." Inherent in this definition is the requirement for someone to do something. A person or group cannot simply have an obligation, they have an obligation to do a certain thing. The obligation the military has in this context is to take control of government and maintain their rule.

Explanation for the necessity of this obligation stems from both moral and nonmoral motivations. Nonmoral obligation may involve such factors as social pressures, physical compulsion, and prudential necessity. Nonmoral obligational motivation is intertwined with the more important moral motivating factors of obligation. Moral obligation springs from prima facie, "hypothetical,"


46 An example of this would be society requesting military intervention such as in Chile in 1973 and in Argentina in 1976.

47 An example of this is the desire for riches and/or power which has perhaps motivated some in almost every military regime.

48 An example of this is a perceived threat to the military organization itself (such as the fear of an armed and mobilized left in Allende's Chile), or a group within that organization (such as the concern of the officer corp in Brazil of the attempted political mobilization of the noncommissioned officer corps)
and "categorical" obligation. Prima facie obligation is used in regard to self evident duty. If a contract is agreed upon, then the parties have a prima facie obligation to uphold that contract, unless a higher prima facie duty requires a different action. An example of prima facie duties within the context of the military-as-government is the constitutional obligation of the Brazilian military to ensure a balance between the branches of government. Hypothetical obligation, on the other hand, is dependent on whether one desires the result of doing an act. In this context, motivation and obligation coincide. An example of this type of obligation is the aggressive agrarian reform program of the Velasco regime in Peru. Finally, categorical obligations can be described as unconditional. Whereas hypothetical obligations stem from doing an act because the consequences are desirable, categorical obligation requires acting upon a maxim that is thought to be for all men at all times. Obligation and motivation need not coincide. In fact, a person may not even want to fulfill the obligation, but must due to a higher law. An example of a categorical obligation is the post coup repression in Chile. It had to be done (in order to eradicate the communist threat) whether or not the act of

49 Stepan, The Military In Politics, p.75.

repression itself was desirable or not.\textsuperscript{51} It is important to note that one person's hypothetical obligation is another's categorical imperative (or physical compulsion, etc.).

C. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY STRUCTURE

The structure of obligational legitimacy must first be understood in the context of its existence in a military organization. Figure 4 represents any military, with the identifying characteristics of coercive power and an irreducible common identity of some sort.

![Conceptual Representation of a Military Organization](image)

\textsuperscript{51} This is highlighted by the actions of the Chilean military allowing newsmen and representatives of various international organizations to initially investigate what had been done, assuming they too would understand the need to use this type of force to "expatriate Marxism from Chile." Paul E. Sigmund, \textit{The Overthrow of Allende}, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p.253.
This common identity is termed irreducible because it is the basic metaphysical assumptions of the organization. It is within this irreducible common identity that obligation-al legitimacy resides. Coercive power is empirical and therefore easy to measure and understand. Common identity, let alone its "obligational" component, is much more difficult to comprehend. Cesar Caviedes admits, "Very little is known... about the way in which military-civilian relations are viewed by the military themselves and how this perception tends to influence their behavior once they are in power." 52 Common identity, in general, is the "social cement" that binds people together. It answers the basic questions, How do I define "self?" How do I fit in? How is this society different from others? Who is the enemy and who is our friend? What are "good" goals? How do we achieve "good" goals? In other words, common identity is the focal point for all civil interactions. Edward Shills defines common identity as the "central zone" of a society. He explains that this central zone,

...is a phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs. It is the center of the order of symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern society. It is the center because it is the ultimate and irreducible.... The central zone partakes of the nature of the sacred. In this sense, every society has an "official" religion, even when that society or its exponents and interpreters conceive of it,

more or less correctly, as a secular, pluralistic, and tolerant society.\textsuperscript{53}

It is relatively easy to transpose this concept to the military organization. To understand the military then, and more particularly the obligatory legitimacy of Latin American militaries, we need to look closer at their "ultimate, irreducible official religion." As already pointed out, it is difficult to pinpoint the ultimate identity of a closed organization like the military, primarily because it is protective of its inner workings and very little empirical data is available for analysis. Yet a military regime must make assumptions, either purposely or subconsciously through their actions, about what is reality, what is "good," and how is the "good" achieved. Answers to these concerns are provided at lower levels of specificity by organizational culture (the organizational memory bank)\textsuperscript{54} and mission orientation (the general view of reality)\textsuperscript{55}. In other words, when the military reacts to an issue, they are interpreting it through their mission orientation, coming up with a


\textsuperscript{54} For an explanation of organizational culture, see Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{55} For an explanation of mission orientation, see Chapter 5.
solution through theories incorporated within the bounds of mission orientation and weighing that solution in terms of organizational culture. It is tempting to explain all issues on these levels. Ultimately though, all critical issues are weighed in terms of shared values which make up the military's irreducible common identity.

Shared values characterize the irreducible metaphysical assumptions of the military's common identity and set the trajectory for the norms, expressive symbols, etc. within organizational culture and mission orientation. The shared values of the military common identity are highly general concepts of the desirable and set the criteria for deciding courses and action. The military regime may never fully realize these values in actual situations due to their abstract nature and the complex linkages that connect them to specific application. These values are also complex in themselves as they stem from numerous sources including, 1) primordial values (first order attachments---biological family), 2) sacred values (religious, ideological), 3) personal values (common attachments that are not biological), and 4) civil values (political, societal).56

This structural view of obligational legitimacy highlights four very important points. First, obligational legitimacy can only exist in the military organiza-

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56 Andrain, Political Life and Social Change, pp.59-64.
tion. This is because in contemporary Latin American society, only the military has the two main components of obligational legitimacy, (first, a zealous sense of duty and second, a unique internal view of legitimacy that relies in the final analysis on coercive power). Any ruling organization in society, except the military, must either rely on a definition of legitimacy that transcends the bounds of the organization itself and accept society's judgement, or, if deemed illegitimate by society, reject society's notion and gain the support of the military to continue rule. This form of civilian authoritarian rule in which the military has been the pawn of an elite group, or acts solely as an arbitrator, has been rejected by the southern cone militaries (manifested by the defining characteristics of military ruler-type regimes). The keys to the rejection of their old roles and acceptance of new roles are found in the common identity of the military regime.

A second point that follows from the structural context of obligational legitimacy is, it applies only to a military in power. A military out of power is out of power for one, or both, of two reasons. First, the military may not have a monopoly on coercive power to implement the

57 Examples of this include: Batista in Cuba and Somoza in Nicaragua who at one point had at least a shallow claim to some legal legitimacy, but later on maintained their rule through the support and loyalty of their respective military and national guard.
concepts inherent in obligational legitimacy.\textsuperscript{58} Second, a military out of power may also lack the obligational common identity (due to different traditions, training, social context, experience, etc.) to justify taking power and maintaining power.\textsuperscript{59} If both the coercive power and obligational legitimacy are present, it is postulated that the military will seize power. In short, obligational legitimacy applies only to a military regime in power that has first, the capability to "skillfully" exercise coercive power and secondly, a will, through obligational common identity, to exert that power to achieve and maintain their rule.

The third point we can derive from this structural understanding of obligational legitimacy is, this form of legitimacy has some common structural characteristics with other types of legitimacy. Both obligational legitimacy and the common concept of legitimacy, which this study terms external legitimacy, are claims of validity. Both types of legitimacy continue as long as a common identity

\textsuperscript{58} An example of this situation is: Mexico in the 1920s and 1930s when peasant militias who were called up by the standing government to put down a number of coup attempts by the military. See Frederick M Nunn "On the Role of the Military in Twentieth-Century Latin America: The Mexican Case," and Edwin Lieuwen, "Depoliticization of the Mexican Revolutionary Army, 1915-1940," Both in The Modern Mexican Military: A Reassment, ed. David Ronfeldt, (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1984), pp. 33-62.

\textsuperscript{59} An example of this type of military is found in the United States.
exists; external legitimacy from social agreements and related collective identities; obligational legitimacy from within the military. Therefore, if external legitimacy "validates the claim to preserve a determined social identity and justifies the establishment of mechanisms and institutions ready to employ political power for that purpose," obligational legitimacy (altering Caviedes' same thought) validates the claim to preserve a determined obligational common identity and justifies the establishment of mechanisms and institutions ready to employ coercive power for that purpose.

A final and perhaps most important discovery of this structural (formal cause) investigation of obligational legitimacy is the opportunity now open to us to answer the metaphysical questions central to South American militaries' common identities. From the previous section in this chapter and the additional insights of this section, we can complete the following query: Why does obligational legitimacy exist? To justify establishment and maintenance of rule. Why justify rule? To bind the military organization together for a task beyond the traditional bounds of a professional military. Why rule? The military perceives an obligation to do so. Why does the military have this obligation? Obligation, as we know, springs from various sources, both nonmoral and moral.

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Obligational legitimacy is characterized by an irreducible, metaphysical common identity though, which must include some type of value (moral) considerations. We can therefore conclude that the military perceives a justifiable obligation to establish and maintain power due mainly to moral necessity.

Obligational moral necessity to intervene in government is supported by both hypothetically and categorically aligned officers, both of which conclude that the military is the only organization in society able and willing to save the country from chaos, decay and almost certain destruction. The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces of Peru issued a Manifesto upon taking power in 1968 which manifests this obligational concern. After identifying the enemies of the state, the Manifesto states,

The actions of the Revolutionary Government are inspired by the necessity of transforming the structure of the state to permit efficient government action to transform social, economic and cultural structures, [and by the necessity] to maintain a definite nationalist attitude, a clearly independent position, and the defense of national sovereignty and dignity. [It is inspired in the necessity] of fully reestablishing the principles of authority, respect for and obedience to the law, the dominion of justice and morality in all areas of national life....61

Officers who see their duty to intervene as categorically imperative are usually in the minority. They must sway, or

hope for factors external to the military to influence, the majority of the officer corps to the same conclusion. Brazilian General Golbery do Couto e Silva highlights this point with the following comment:

Military activists for or against the government are always a minority. If a military group wants to overthrow a government, they need to convince the great majority of officers who are either strict legalists or simply nonactivists. Activists do not wish to risk bloodshed or military splits, so they wait until a consensus has developed. 62

General Aguirre, Secretary of Public Administration during most of the Rodriguez regime in Ecuador (1972-1979) made a similar point when he explained,

The 1963-66 experience was not a favorable one. This hardened our resolve not to intervene until the situation had become critical ... we were prepared to wait until things got out of hand .... Civilian elements had a direct influence upon members of the Armed Forces, after the second year ... especially those individuals that did not want or were never asked to participate in a military government .... Their influence was strongest ... on those members of the armed forces that did not occupy political or administrative positions .... They create a sense within the military that the armed forces should not participate in politics.... 63

The majority, who are finally swayed to common identity with the activists (those who see the military's duty as

62 Interview with General Golbery as quoted in Stepan, The Military in Politics, p.97. Stepan suggests here that the important point is the need for supportive public opinion to initiate a coup. This study suggests that public opinion is only one of numerous causal factors that influence the majority of the officer corp to the same conclusion as those military activists.

categorically obligational), cannot be considered identical to the activists. Some of this majority accept the categorical outlook, but most only acknowledge a hypothetical obligation to intervene. The rallying point of both groups, though, is the common acceptance that they, and only they, have the ability and will to save the country. If they don't do it, it won't get done.

D. CONTRASTING LITERATURE

To better understand the pivotal role obligationality legitimacy plays in transitions from military rule, a survey of potentially conflicting literature will be helpful. Adam Przeworski postulates,

The 'loss of legitimacy' theory is an 'up' theory of regime transformation in the sense that it postulates that the regime first loses its legitimacy in the civil society; [then] the ruling bloc responds.... if this theory is valid, one would expect to observe mass unrest or at least mass noncompliance before any liberalization occurs.64

Przeworski applies legitimacy to a much broader context than obligatory legitimacy allows. His application of legitimacy is only one causal condition in obligatory legitimacy theory, and (as this study hopes to show) is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. O'Donnell, Finer, and Rouquie concern themselves with the initial

illegitimacy of military regimes when they come to power. O'Donnell and Schmitter state that these regimes "will have to make use, [once in power] of some degree or some form of electoral legitimation." 65 Finer states, "They seek, in short, to exercise a right to govern; or, as the expression goes, to legitimate themselves." 66 Rouquie comments that the militaries, despite what they say, know that a superior legitimacy exists in constitutional order, and their only legitimacy exists by virtue of their future performance. 67 These scholars are also using legitimacy in a broader sense than in the context of obligational legitimacy. Not only do some military regimes have a high degree of legitimacy in civil society when coming to power—such as in Chile in 1973 and Argentina in 1976 (in both cases possibly higher than the previously elected governments)—they were also obligationally legitimate upon assuming control of the government. As in the case of Chile in 1973 and Argentina in 1976, the military hesitated before coming to power even though there was a strong feeling within civil society of their legitimate right to


66 S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p.18.

do so. Not until they were obligationally legitimate did they seize power. The same can be considered to be true at the other end of the transition spectrum: not until the military regime is obligationally illegitimate does their transition from power take place.

When individual or corporate rationalization can no longer justify the actions of a military regime, obligational legitimacy breaks down, stimulating a move toward transition. Events internal and external to the regime, and their causal explanations, affect the obligational legitimacy of the regime. These causal events, the independent variables, can hypothesize, predict and explain shifts in the dependent variable, obligational legitimacy, because they are the proximate causes of obligational legitimacy change. Obligational legitimacy, in turn, is the decisive final element in the chain of controls that

68 No study has attempted to define this dependent variable, but many studies' conclusions are valuable indicators of this fact none the less. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, pp.212-215; highlights the Chilean military, in the June 1973 aborted revolt, as not unified and still unsure in its mission orientation in this rising social chaos. Certainly this manifests an obligational legitimacy still in formation. In interviews with senior officers from Argentina, the thought was suggested that even though legitimacy within society was strong for the military to return to power in 1976, not until the senior leadership at the time felt the military was sufficiently unified in their own concept of what needed to be done once returning to power, did the military act. This was not to be like past military regimes. They were going to stay in power because they had an ideal, whereas no one else in society even had an ideal, let alone a wrong ideal.
supports military maintenance of rule or transition initiation.69

E. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY CREATION

The formation of obligational legitimacy is an evolutionary reaction, through the perceptions of the military, to the ideas and manifest interests of the various groups in Latin American society. Concerning the various societal groups, George Philip points out that the divisions in Latin American society are on the basis of class rather than religion, race, or region. These class differences may divide society, but they are likely to unite the officer corp of the military,70 due to their overwhelmingly middle class make-up. It is the officer corps that establishes the direction the military will take in almost every situation, on and off the battlefield. The military organizational culture (hierarchy, centralized

69 For example, North and Korovkin conclude in their study on the 1967-1976 Peruvian military regime, that a key factor in the regime's final decision to initiate a transition stems from the concept of obligational legitimacy (although they do not attempt to define the concept). They state, "Neither the unity of goal nor the coercive will, nor that understanding of political power existed within the Peruvian Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces." North and Korovkin, The Peruvian Revolution and the Officers in Power 1967-1976, p.100.

control, sense of duty, discipline, self-policing, etc) reinforces the pivotal influence of the officer corps in the military organization. Much of what the officer corp sees in society around them is anathema to the core values and beliefs of a professional military. Latin American societies have been described by military officers as lazy, undisciplined, untrustworthy, corrupt, ineffectual, and conflictual, but important to note, these societies are also considered misguided and teachable.71

The officer corp is not monolithic in its concept of what to do with society. As Max Weber pointed out in his study of domination systems (of which the officer corps are certainly examples), there is a ruling minority and an apparatus.72 In the context of this study, the apparatus (the military organization) obeys the ruling minority (the military regime) and the people at large obey both the ruling minority and the apparatus. This distinction within the military is important because it is the ruling elite who establish the metaphysical common identity for the

71 These descriptive terms were collected from interviews of senior and mid level Latin American officers who were asked to describe the society they are sworn to defend. Almost every officer agreed that society was not hopeless, that they were misguided and could be taught.

military as a whole. They are also generally those in the military organization who see the military obligation to rule as categorical. The apparatus, in general, only concerns itself with the general view of reality, built upon a hypothetical obligation concept.

The subset of the common identity that evolves into obligational legitimacy is a synthesis of the real interests of the hypothetical imperative developed by the apparatus, and the ideal interests of the categorical imperative of the ruling elite. Together these interests form an operable common will. Otto Hintze explains the importance of this synthesis:

All human action arises from a common source, in political as well as in religious life. Everywhere the first impulse to social action is given as a rule by real interests, i.e., by political and economic interests. But ideal interests lend wings to these real interests, give them a spiritual meaning, and serve to justify them. Man does not live by bread alone. He wants to have a good conscience as he pursues his life-interests. And in pursuing them he develops his capacities to the highest extent only if he believes that in so doing he serves a higher rather than a purely egotistic purpose. Interests without such "spiritual wings" are lame; but on the other hand, ideas can win out in history only if and insofar as they are associated with real interests .... Wherever interests are vigorously pursued, an ideology tends to be developed also to give meaning, re-enforcement and justification to these interests. And conversely;

73 Examples of this ruling minority include the well known professors of Geopolitics and architects in their own countries of National Security and Development, General Golbery of Brazil and General Pinochet of Chile.

74 The "general view of reality" would include such mind sets as National Security Doctrine and Geopolitics. Although these ideas take a specific stand, they are not generally understood or discussed at the metaphysical level.
wherever ideas are to conquer the world, they require the leverage of real interests, ...75

The real interests of this synthesis include the desire for order over chaos, a hypersensitive affinity to "La Patria," national development, and saving the nation from corruption and the threat of communism.76 The ideal interests include the philosophy of geopolitics77 (from which the guiding philosophy of National Security Doctrine evolves78), and the superiority of the military in society.79 This superiority is explained by General Pinochet as stemming from the military culture. He explains, "Culture is the real intellectual nature,


77 "Geopolitics, as General Golbery has said, can be quite appropriately considered as a type of synthesis of the organicism of Herder, the idealism of Hegel, the statism of Fichte, and the economic nationalism of List." Arzobispado de Santiago de Chile, Dos Ensayos Sobre Seguridad Nacional, trans. James Droste. (Santiago de Chile, 1979), pp.29-30.

78 The Archbishopric of Santiago suggests this by citing the authors of National Security Doctrine in Brazil, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, and Chile, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, were first geopoliticians. Arzobispado de Santiago de Chile, Dos Ensayos Sobre Seguridad Nacional, p.29. Jack Child provides evidence to support this view in Jack Child, "Geopolitical Thinking," to be published in Civil Military Relations in Latin America: The Military and Power, ed. Louis W. Goodman and Juan Rial, forthcoming.

79 Or as the military in Chile is called by Pinochet, "the chosen ones."
whereas civilization is merely mechanization.\textsuperscript{80} This culture and training brings with it certain obligations that further separates the military from the rest of society. Ortega y Gasset explains that society is made up of the "mass man" who drifts, lacking purpose, and though his possibilities are great, he constructs nothing. The excellent man (the military in this context), by way of contrast, is driven to appeal to a standard higher than himself, and therefore strives to ever improve. His nobility is defined by its demands, not by privileges gained.\textsuperscript{81}

The demands placed on the military throughout their history in South America have played a key role in the development of obligational legitimacy. Specifically, the interests of both the military ruling elite and the apparatus have evolved over a long historical process. As society in Latin America changed, so did the concepts the military maintained to operate as the protector of that society. The military as a commonweal organization\textsuperscript{82}


\textsuperscript{82} One of the characteristics of the military corporate identity as suggested by authors, such as Samuel P Huntington, "Officership as a Profession," \textit{The Political Influence of the Military}, ed. Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Bennett, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p.43., is, its interest in the common good and welfare, also known
evolved as society itself was transformed because the military was constantly placed in a position that required it to have a knowledge capable of making judgments concerning society. As the "metaphysics of experience" explains, "Intuitions without concepts are blind, concepts without intuitions are empty. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise." After independence, the reality of most Latin American countries was, state first and nation later. The military model developed to meet this reality was the personalistic caudillo leader and a loyal, but unprofessional army. By the turn of the century, foreign military missions were established, such as the Prussian Colonel Korner in Chile (1886-1910) and the French in Peru (1896-1940). Military academies, enlisted conscription, and better pay and privileges also began. The military continued its strong links with a defined group in society: first to the elite traditional leadership, and then the rising middle class as commonweal.

83 Intuition is an awareness of a particular state. Concepts are applicable models that give form to intuition. Intuitions are sensed, while concepts are mentally constructed. Together intuition and concepts create knowledge. Leslie Stevenson, The Metaphysics of Experience, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp.1-5.
(from which its own ranks were recruited). Politics continued to be zero sum and the benefits exclusively defined. The models the military established to deal with this reality can be placed generally under the category of the arbitrator role. The constant shock and evolution to the military common identity left only "La Patria" and a rallying point, not any specific institutions (such as constitutional democracy) in society. The momentum of evolution continued because of the lack of anchors within the common identity.

By the post World War Two era, the military in Latin America was beginning to develop a categorical obligation concept. Hypothetical imperatives still motivated intervention at this point (invited by a group in society, and/or to keep politics from intervening in the military). The traditional legitimacy for intervention required a relationship between society (or at least part of society) and the military that involved a limitation of power.

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(limited by time or application). The traditional limitation of power was overcome by the crucial issues the military now perceived. The synthesis of an evolutionary common identity, the traditional role as umpire, referee, and judge of the various factions in society, and dedication and perceived threats to "La Patria," culminated in the development of a categorical obligation to alter events in society, not just react to them. As Stepan, Clapham, Nordlinger, and others point out, the Higher War Colleges in these countries were a breeding ground for this ideology. In Brazil for example, of the planners of the 1964 coup, 60% had attended the Superior War College and only 15% who had not attended were active in the planning. As general views of reality were developed from this ideology, such as operational geopolitics and national security doctrine, and society continued in disarray, the hypothetical imperative came in line with the categorical imperative and a common identity was born in obligational legitimacy.

F. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY MAINTENANCE

Maintenance of obligational legitimacy is crucial for continued rule of the military ruler-type regime. Although most in the military organization are not completely aware

of the existence of obligational legitimacy, they are aware of its manifestations (such as national security doctrine) and the importance to continually nurture a firm unity. This is accomplished through continued inculcation of the present members of the military, socialization of new members to the organization, and protection from a breakdown in unity. Many programs and policies devised toward the end of these three areas of interest are already in existence when the military enters government. Any professional military has various programs established to foster unity, comradery, discipline and esprit d' corps. Maintenance of obligational legitimacy simply becomes another item on the agenda, or becomes the driving force behind the agenda in an already established program. Whatever the case, an increased awareness for the need to maintain internal unity marked the new ruler-type regimes from the more traditional arbitrator regimes.

Obligational legitimacy inculcation of the members of the military takes place within both the ruling elite and the apparatus. This is a key element as David Easton points out, The inculcation of a sense of legitimacy is probably the single most effective device for regulating

86 "For example, in the 1956 curriculum of the ECEME, there were no lectures given on counterguerrilla warfare, internal security, or Communism....By 1968, the curriculum contained 222 hours on internal security, 129 hours on irregular warfare, and only 21 hours on the classical professional topics of territorial defense." Stepan, The Military in Politics, p.181.
the flow of diffuse support in favor of both authorities and of the regime.\textsuperscript{87} Within the ruling elite an effort must be made to manage the evolution of the common identity so as to keep control of military coherence of action. Brazil, for example, attempted to partially accomplish this through active E.S.G. alumni associations and newsletters.\textsuperscript{88} Also, new ideas must be either co-opted or absorbed within the ruling elite. Sometimes this is not possible, such as in Chile where 48 generals were forced to retire for diverging views.\textsuperscript{89} Within the military apparatus obligational inculcation is exercised through such avenues as training, selective promotions, and expressive symbols (including special encampments, elite insignia, symbols of power, and social prestige).

Socialization of new members to the military apparatus or the ruling elite is another maintenance function.


\textsuperscript{88} Stepan, \textit{The Military in Politics}. pp.177-178.

\textsuperscript{89} Numerous moderate officers were retired ahead of schedule. By 1975, 11 generals, headed by Arellano Stark, Commander of the Santiago Garrison, had to go after petitioning Pinochet to end his economic policies. By 1976, 29 generals had gone into force retirement since September of 1973. In July of 1978, General Gustavo Leigh, Commander of the Air Force and junta member, was discharged for "repeatedly violating the principles which inspired the 1973 military movement." 18 Air Force were shortly thereafter retired. Hernan Rosenkranz, "The Church in Chilean Politics: The Confusing Years," In \textit{Chile After 1973: Elements for the Analysis of Military Rule}, ed., David E. Hojman, (Liverpool: Center for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 1985), p.78.
Again, training and special schools play an important role for the new recruit to the general officers. Recruitment in the officer corp is almost exclusively from the middle class and begins at a very early age.\textsuperscript{90} Communal homogeneity and exclusiveness strengthens the "melting pot" environment at the military academies and in regular units. The military bureaucracy, organizational culture and mission orientation are also important in establishing norms and acceptable behavior within the military common identity.

Inculcation and socialization are preventative measures and leave off where protection from the breakdown of military unity begins. Numerous measures are taken by a ruler regime to regulate the demands on the military. This is one reason for the more closed system of the ruler regime over past types of military rule.\textsuperscript{91} Feedback from society is kept to a minimum by keeping the available avenues for communication small and rigidly regulated, such as the news media and public gatherings. Military regime responses to the demands of society include government by decree, such as Brazil's Institutional Acts and Chile's

\textsuperscript{90} In Brazil for example, almost all cadets at the military academy attended a military high school. About 90\% of Brazilian officers thus began military education at about 12 years of age. Nordlinger, \textit{Soldiers in Politics, Military Coups and Governments}, p.61.

\textsuperscript{91} Nordlinger, \textit{Soldiers in Politics, Military Coups and Governments}. p.122.
Declaration of Principles in 1974. Postponement of benefits, partial satisfaction of demands, time lags, compromise, displays of goodwill, and of course coercion are all options open to the military to protect their own unity from the stresses of governing. Bending toward the hypothetical imperative (i.e. displaying accomplishment, mission success, and development), from where most of the officer corps perceives their obligation to rule, and not down playing the nonmoral reasons for maintaining rule (outlined in Chapter 3), also aid indirectly in supporting military unity and thus obligational legitimacy.

G. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY BREAKDOWN

Despite the best efforts of military regimes, the causal conditions influencing obligational legitimacy breakdown are too many and too complex to manage indefinitely. The threshold of support for the regime, maintained mostly by the hypothetical obligation, is not all or nothing, but a margin with room for give and take. Therefore, initiation of transition (dissolution of an authoritarian regime) is a difficult point to precisely mark. In general though, once that part of the military's irreducible common identity, termed here obligational legitimacy, breaks down, the transition of the military regime from power begins. This study postulates that there is no other way for the transition to begin. Figure 5
demonstrates this thesis. A breakdown in the monopoly of coercive power through civil war, revolution, or social upheaval is not a transition.\textsuperscript{92} With a monopoly of coercive power and a common identity to use that power if need be, nothing short of revolution can move the regime from power.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Revolution vs. Transition}
\end{figure}

This breakdown is also important because it is much easier to empirically observe than actual transition initiation. In general, two processes can lead to obligational legitimacy breakdown, inability to correctly regulate the stresses placed on the regime by society and internal cleavage of the military organization. In other words,

\textsuperscript{92} See footnote 8 for definitions of transition and revolution.
both of these processes will ultimately lead to divergence of the hypothetical and categorical contexts of the military's obligation to rule. Failure to regulate the stresses of rule include letting the demands of society permeate the military organization, or completely alienating society so as to cause a complete shutdown of the country's productive capabilities, which would after a time hamper the military's ability to run the government. The latter situation could cause a coercive response from the military, which may or may not stimulate a response from society, but in it would communicate a message to the military organization no matter how impermeable they were to any other stresses.

Internal cleavage to the point of serious fractionalization will also cause a divergence of the hypothetical and categorical views of military obligation to rule.\textsuperscript{93} Internal cleavage in the military is always present at some level, and different military organizations are able to tolerate higher levels than others, but at some level in all ruler-type military organizations, a definite break occurs. This can be observed by such events as abnormal levels of internal strife, retirements, diverging or crossed policy signals, a regime search for new missions and/or success, and succession problems within the regime. Points of divergence include such situations as inability

\textsuperscript{93} See Chapter 5, for a full discussion of fractionalization.
of the regime to accomplish the demands of the hypothetical obligation or exhaustion (failure of mission success), wrong responses on the part of the regime perceived by the military apparatus (mission orientation change), and perceived loss of professionalism by parts of the military (permeable mission orientation and organizational culture).\textsuperscript{94}

\section*{H. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY IN THE POST TRANSITION PHASE}

Even in this era of liberalization and fledgling democracies, the return of ruler-type military regimes is an important concern. In every case of transition the military maintains a monopoly of coercive power in society. The key element of concern must be the status and potential for reconstitution of obligational legitimacy. Certainly many of the same concerns the militaries had prior to coming to power before are still present or are again on the rise. Sendero Luminoso continues to be a serious internal threat in Peru. Economic development is stagnating, or groping along at best throughout the region. Political parties are still practicing exclusionary tactics. But these are influences of the hypothetical obligation for military rule. What of the categorical

\footnote{94 For a discussion of causal conditions and more specifically, necessary and sufficient conditions, that lead to obligational legitimacy breakdown, see Chapter 5.}
obligation founded in the belief of the natural superiority of the military?

After transition, some who held the categorical belief in the military obligation to rule must surely have altered their opinions, as did most who rejected the hypothetical obligation ideal. Still, it is safe to say the idea has not completely died. Nor has the perception by those who still cling to these ideals that they may have to return to government, whether they want to or not. As Ortega y Gasset suggests, The greatest danger to society is the intervention of the state. But that is where the common man leads it.95 A great deal depends on the "common man" at this point. The majority of the military in any of these renewed democracies is watching to see how this new liberalization process proceeds. In each country, critical junctures are just ahead. Brazil is nearing its first direct presidential election in over two decades and has still to produce a new constitution. Argentina also has a presidential election on the horizon that will test the democratic institution because the personally popular Alfonsin cannot constitutionally run again and the Peronistas have gained popularity. Peru is teetering on the brink of complete economic failure and President Garcia, even with the support of the military, is fal-

95 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, pp.88-95.
tering. In Uruguay, with a relatively untarnished and unrepentant military, industrialists refuse to come to terms with labor and the Colorados and Blancos have, thus far, been ineffectual in influencing a solution.

Not until after these critical junctures are crossed is there any real threat to a reconstitution of obligational legitimacy. The Augustinian cry of the ruler-type military regimes, "Oh Lord, give us democracy, but not yet!" is not acceptable to society or most of the military in these countries. Most believe they can make democracy work. Almost all know they don't want a return to military authoritarianism. History may not highlight what choices to make, but it can certainly point out what to avoid. There is the hope that the military common identity continues to evolve, but from a strict obligation to "La Patria" to an obligation to the institution of democracy. 96

In the short term, there seems to be little danger of reconstitution of obligational legitimacy. In fact, the real potential for obligational reconstitution lies not with the present senior military leadership, but with those mid level officers who embraced the categorical obligation for military rule. The time may come when they will be the ruling elite in their military organization and the context

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96 This hope was voiced by a senior Latin American officer who also suggested that most senior officers in his country would revolt rather than return to government. He said he would "pack his bags and go home," if a coup was again seriously contemplated.
ripe for the development of a new hypothetical obligation which will again create a synthesis leading toward obligational legitimacy.
V. TRANSITION THEORY: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variable of this study's hypothesis, obligational legitimacy, has been defined and analyzed from various perspectives. The environment in which it evolves, is maintained, and breaks down is made up of influential forces both outside and inside the military organization. Specifically of interest to this study are the influences which cause a breakdown in obligational legitimacy. Nine variables are presented in this chapter and are deductively inferred to be necessary, sufficient, or contributing for obligational legitimacy breakdown.

A. CONTEXT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

There are several contextual aspects, relevant to all nine independent variables in this hypothesis, that are important to understand. First, the variables together attempt to encompass the milieu of the South American military regime in power. These variables are intended to be sufficiently broad to incorporate the major factors influencing military regimes, but narrow enough to maintain causal integrity (i.e. not just become nebulous "catch-all" categories). In this attempt to include all relevant causal factors affecting obligational legitimacy, some
overlap occurs. As discussed in Chapter 2, the variables have been rigorously separated for methodological purposes. In real life, though, these variables may be intricately intertwined and interrelated, often times seemingly acting concomitantly or synergistically. Because of these realities, overlap of components within the causal conditions is unavoidable (e.g. one form of "international influence" may come in the form of trade barriers, yet this would also be relevant to the "economics" causal condition). To establish a workable level of complexity, causal components will generally be considered in the causal condition where they exerted the most influence positively or negatively on obligational legitimacy.

The second important aspect of the independent variables offered is, they are each listed as potential causal conditions in neutral form (i.e. not high, low, strong, weak, etc.). This is because each causal condition could have a positive or negative affect on obligational legitimacy. "Political capital," for example, could be high and thus supportive of obligational legitimacy, whereas if it was very low, this may aid in obligational legitimacy breakdown. In the final analysis, though, it is the positive or negative condition that moves obligational legitimacy toward breakdown that is important to this study, especially those conditions that are deemed necessary or sufficient.
A third important point embodied within these nine
independent variables is the insistence that they represent
actual causes, not symptoms. In other words, some studies
attempt to explain events by the manifested correlations
that accompany transitions. Often times these correlations
are really only side effects, indirect causes, or reasons. Simply using words like "because," "reason,"

97 A side effect is a peripheral or secondary result, not a cause itself. An example of this is the rise of political parties which is often misinterpreted as a causal factor in the move toward transition. Representative works in this category are offered by, Charles G. Gillespie, "Review Essay: From Authoritarian Crisis to Democratic Transitions," Latin American Research Review, (June 6, 1986), pp.1-30.

98 An indirect cause is an influence that is separated in the causal chain from the result by a more exact root cause. An illustrative example of an indirect cause being mistaken for a root cause is that joining the Mormon Church (which prohibits smoking) will lessen the chances of contracting lung cancer. The actual empirical cause is the act of stopping smoking. An example relevant to this topic is, transition in Uruguay took place because the military regime there chose to follow Chile's example and hold a constitutional plebescite, and had unexpected results. This theory offered by, Luis E. Gonzalez, "Uruguay, 1980-1981: An Unexpected Opening," Latin American Research Review, No. 3 1983, pp.72-73. The Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis suggests the actual causes may have had more to do with permeable organizational culture and a realization of the loss of external legitimacy.

99 According to Scriven, Reasoning, pp.65-66. reasons are misleading because they assert a causal connection, but they don't really tell you about a premise from which you can infer, or accept, a conclusion. Reasons only give an explanation for an event. An illustrative example is "I got wet because the roof is leaking." The actual cause was the rain. A relevant example to this topic is, the transition in Uruguay occurred because the regime chose to leave. Offered by, Enriquie A. Baloyra, "Democratic Transition in Comparative Perspective." In Comparing New Democracies, Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean...
"therefore," and "if...then..." does not guarantee a direct causal condition. Applicability to each unique country is not sacrificed, though, in this rigid approach to causality. This model attempts to maintain a sensitivity to local factors such as Brazil's tradition of "jeito,"\(^{100}\) or the impact of the Malvinas/Falklands War on the Argentine military regime.

The fourth and final aspect that needs to be understood before we expand each variable, is the individual environment each variable originates from and operates in. The first variable, "international influence," by definition originates outside the military regime's country and operates on both the international level and the national level within that country. "Economic forces," "external legitimacy," and "political capital" all originate and operate on both the international and national levels. Although every country has a political culture, in this model "political culture" will only deal with the country under consideration. The political cultures of other countries are indirect causal variables incorporated in "international influence." "Organizational culture," "degree of fractionalization," "mission orientation," and

\(^{100}\) Jeito is defined as a gimmick or knack for getting around problems or obstacles to get something done.
"mission success" are contained within the context of the military itself.

B. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

1. International Influence

"International influence" is defined here as direct or indirect power from a source or sources external to a given state, to sway or affect a course of action. This variable is perhaps the most complex. It includes factors such as political and military threats, actions and supports; and the phenomena of contagion. Indirect elements which are incorporated in the above affects include technology, inventions, international events, and ideas. These various forces are grouped together under the term international influence because rarely do they appear alone. Most international influences act in concert with each other, or against each other. Actors who exercise international influence include nation states, quasi governmental bodies of these states (e.g. U.S. Chamber of Commerce), international organizations (e.g. United Nations, Catholic Church, Socialist International), multinational corporations (e.g. International Telephone and Telegraph, Standard Oil), intraregional organizations (e.g. Contadora Advisory Group, RIO Treaty members), interest/pressure groups (e.g. Amnesty International, The Grange), and supranationals (e.g. International Monetary
Fund, World Bank). The superpowers and regional actors play an especially important role because they can directly affect a country due to power and/or proximity, and can indirectly influence through applying pressure to the other bodies mentioned. These actors may attempt to apply leverage in areas such as trade, finance, aid, military training, technology transfer, political recognition, and military threat. Each actor has a unique agenda it attempts to support, which defines how these elements of leverage are applied.

The United States has and continues to play a pivotally influential role in Latin America, economically, politically and in terms of regional security. Lars Schoultz correctly suggests that the general objectives of the United States in Latin America revolve around the concept of stability. Instability has been seen as a threat to security, free market capitalism, and as an exploitable opportunity to our political and ideological enemies.101 This fear of instability and the ensuing insecurity has led to contradictions (e.g. the United States, one of the most open societies in the world supporting authoritarian dictatorships, human rights, and democratization; all in the same decade), further

complicating any attempt to clarify the role of international influence.\textsuperscript{102}

Through indirect incidental factors, the United States does support the maintenance of military regimes. By way of the Monroe Doctrine and its present interpretation, Latin America is protected from the Soviet nuclear threat and foreign military intervention.\textsuperscript{103} The Malvinas War being an aberration to the rule, Latin American militaries have not had to concern themselves with armed threats from outside the hemisphere. Even within the hemisphere the threat of attack is very low. Skeptics of this idea might point to O'Donnell and Schmitter who highlight the fact that, "the most frequent [worldwide] context within which a transition from authoritarian rule has begun in recent decades has been military defeat in an armed conflict."\textsuperscript{104} Not only is this not the typical case in Latin America with only one case (Argentina) out of six cases of recent transitions, but short of complete

\textsuperscript{102} The contradiction in U.S. policy stems not from wavering human rights policy, although that should also be cause for alarm. Rather, the administration has condemned the use of repression/violations of human rights while simultaneously supporting an economic (and social) project which seemingly demands an authoritarian umbrella and is also specifically designed to disarticulate, demobilize, and otherwise ensure the total subordination of large segments of the populace to the regime.

\textsuperscript{103} Johnson, \textit{The Military and Society in Latin America}, pp.143-144.

destruction of the military, obligational legitimacy could seemingly remain in tact. Even in such cases, the regime still holds the physical (i.e. coercive) power to control. The lack of a threat leads to structural underemployment (discussed in Chapter 3, section D as supporting military regimes) and the potential alienation of the military in civil society. Without a meaningful role in society, Barros and Coelho maintain that military's reference group will shift from societal groups to professional ones across national lines. This seemingly tends to support the concept of obligational legitimacy which itself disassociates the military from society. In theory then, international actors have the potential ability to sway or affect a military regime and more specifically, the military organization's obligational legitimacy. The other international influence offered here, contagion, although not intentionally applied by an international actor, also seems to play an important role in the breakdown of obligational legitimacy. If Barros and Coelho are correct in their alienation theory, an increased sensitivity and awareness of the successes, failures, and ideas of other military regimes would be forth coming. Certainly a cursory review of the facts seems to indicate the important effect of contagion. Uruguay, for example,

TRANSITIONS FROM MILITARY RULE IN SOUTH AMERICA: THE OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY HYPOTHESIS (U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA M J MITCHELL DEC 87 F/G 5/4
followed Chile's example in presenting the opportunity of a plebescite to the country (although the results were much different). Also, it is unlikely that it is just coincidence in a five year period Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay transitioned from military rule. Of course this does not necessarily mean that contagion is the cause, but international influence of this type cannot be ignored either. In an early study (1978) of this effect on ruler regimes by Edward Constantine, the conclusion is, "the evidence is stronger for those turnovers that occurred in connection with the Great Depression and during the last half of the 1940s and 1950s; the contagion effect does not appear to have been as influential during the remaining decades."\textsuperscript{106}

The process by which international influence reaches and affects the military regime's obligational legitimacy varies with each country. For example, Enrique Baloyra points out,

United States participation in these processes has varied with geographic area and the traditional political role of the U.S. in it, with the size and external linkages of the country in question. Accordingly, the United States has been more involved in Central America and the Caribbean.... With the exception of the Argentine case, one finds nothing in South America comparable to the U.S. role in the Philippine process of transition of 1984-1986

and in orchestrating the 1986 coup against Jean Claude Duvalier in Haiti.\textsuperscript{107}

Therefore, according to each international actor's agenda, the amount of influence directed at a regime will vary. Also, each regime will vary in its resistance and resilience to specific influence. Again, as Baloyra points out, "During the 1980s, the United States adopted a more activist role in Paraguay and Chile. This was a welcome but hardly a sufficient change to determine the eventual breakdown of those regimes."\textsuperscript{108}

The preceding discussion has highlighted the importance of international influence, but key to this model are the issues of necessity and sufficiency. We find that negative international influence is often present with obligational legitimacy breakdown. Combining deductive inference with the discussion of obligational legitimacy breakdown (Chapter 4, section G), we find it could also be absent and still have obligational legitimacy breakdown, precluding it from being a necessary condition. International influence is also not a sufficient condition because it could be present in cases of no obligational legitimacy breakdown. Since this variable is postulated as neither necessary or sufficient, there is no need to apply the


\textsuperscript{108} Ibid. p.298.
Joint Method of Agreement and Differences. As with all the independent variables, this classification remains to be tested.

2. Economic Forces

"Economic forces" is defined as, inducement, or compulsion of and by a country's efforts to produce, develop and manage its material wealth in order to affect a course of action. Economic forces include issues surrounding national policies concerning trade, exchange rates, foreign investment, technology, industry, agriculture, and monetary, fiscal, and financial plans. Some of the more important issues are long term boom/bust cycles, market volatility, inflation, capital flight, national perceptions and application of economic theory (ranging from the orthodox policies of Chile's "Chicago Boys" and Argentina's Martinez de Hoz to the heterodox policies of Peru), development through import substitution industrialization, regional economic integration, capital vs. labor intensive industrialization, agricultural reform, and infrastructure improvement.

Economics, perhaps more than any other causal variable, has been pointed to as a major force in military transitions to and from power. In fact, Gordon Richards

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109 Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973); and Edward C. Epstein, "Legitimacy, Institutionalization, and Opposition in
forwards the theory that the most recent wave of military regime collapses was caused primarily by the external debt crisis that emerged in the early 1980s. He states, "The breakdown of military authoritarianism in Latin America is inextricably linked to the openness of these economies and the international shocks to which they were subjected." Related to this issue is Chalmers' and Robinson's structural change argument. They suggest important international and national actors (which presumably includes the military) have come to believe certain basic economic circumstances have altered the utility of military regimes in favor of more liberal procedures. Chalmers and Robinson, in speaking of the economic decisions facing any government explain,

Liberal regimes become rational choices when the issues facing a country are diffuse and complex, requiring procedures for identifying problems, clarifying goals, and ordering priorities. Authoritarian regimes become more likely when some process has focused the agenda on a small range of crucial, basic issues and the major task

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110 Richards, "Stabilization Crises and the Breakdown of Military Authoritarianism in Latin America," Comparative Political Studies, p.481.
concerns mobilizing energies and ensuring forceful implementation.\textsuperscript{111}

This concept assumes that a broader group (i.e. more than just the military) makes the decision to leave power. Juxtaposed against this concept is the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis which suggests that although other groups in society may make choices, the final decision to leave power belongs to the military alone.

The choices made by groups in society other than the military are important to consider though. It is within the context of the variable that society (both international and national) has a great influence. National society can intentionally send messages to a regime through strikes, work slowdowns, and low productivity. National society can also incidentally influences a regime through such avenues as capital flight and accelerating inflation. International society can also intentionally influence military regimes through tariffs, trade barriers, special trade incentives, aid, and loans. Particularly notable are incidental economic forces, such as the exogenous shocks to the world economy experienced in the 1970s and 1980s with the OPEC embargoes, the rise in interest rates, and falling prices for petroleum, which any type of government has difficulty dealing with. How a

\textsuperscript{111} Chalmers and Robinson, "Why Power Contenders Choose Liberalization," In Armies and Politics of Latin America, p.409.
military government perceives and reacts to all these forces is open to debate. Richards suggests that "military regimes were usually better able to enforce fiscal restraint, and the breakdown of dictatorships had more to do with exogenous shocks to the economy."\textsuperscript{112} On the other hand, exogenous shocks are not votes of confidence or nonconfidence in the regime, as capital flight and work slow downs could be considered. Exogenous shocks would presumably not effect obligationsal legitimacy as much because there is no control over them. As with "international influence," it seems how the military perceives and accepts or rejects these messages that become the critical criteria.

Again, as with "international influence," the pervasiveness of this variable in most military transitions makes it difficult to confirm necessity and sufficiency. Although serious negative economic forces are present in most cases of military transition, deductive inference suggests the possibility exists that transition could occur without these negative forces. Similarly, it is postulated that negative economic forces is not a sufficient condition for obligatory legitimacy breakdown because very serious economic problems could be present in a specific country,

\textsuperscript{112} Richards, "Stabilization Crises and the Breakdown of Military Authoritarianism in Latin America," \textit{Comparative Political Studies}, p.453.
but obligational legitimacy could remain intact, precluding a transition from power.

3. **External Legitimacy**

"External legitimacy" is defined as "The quality a political system has of being viewed by the people as just, and proper, and which converts political power into rightful authority."\(^{113}\) Inherent in this definition is the need for social agreement between the rulers and the ruled, and a collective identity rather than coercive power (as in obligational legitimacy) supporting the right to rule. Any type of legitimacy continues as long as a common identity exists. Just as with obligational legitimacy, the common identity has a foundation of metaphysical values, norms that define a general view of reality, and expressive symbols that mobilize the population in a general direction. The important point here is, the common identity encompasses all society, not just the military organization. Jean-Jacques Rousseau clarifies this more generally accepted concept of legitimacy and places it in direct opposition with obligational legitimacy when he explains, "The strongest--unless he transforms force into right and obedience into duty--is never strong enough to have his way

\(^{113}\) Rossi and Plano, *The Latin American Political Dictionary*, p.69.
all the time....Might does not make right....We are obligated to obey only such powers as are legitimate."114

Latin American military regimes see themselves as legitimate (through obligational legitimacy), but do not expect all of society to understand their "higher call."115 Society at worst rejects this claim to rule completely, or at best, accepts it as authority only (i.e. top down justification, not bottom up acceptance116). These authoritarian regimes must, therefore, either accept this as a variable to contend with, or transition into a totalitarian type regime (which, according to Linz' definition would, among other features, require society to mobilize behind an exclusive ideology supporting the rulers117). History demonstrates the unlikelihood and

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115 For explanation of this belief, see Chapter 4.

116 "Legitimacy differs from authority in that authority means the justified right to rule, while legitimacy refers to the nonleader's acceptance of these justifications (reasons) as meaningful and plausible. In other words, while authority involves one set of leaders justifying their rule over other persons, legitimacy proceeds not from the top downward but from the bottom upward; the nonleader's consent to the justifications proclaimed by the leaders." Andrain, Political Life and Social Change, p.150.

difficulty of such a transition,\textsuperscript{118} and so these regimes must learn to deal with "external legitimacy" as an important factor in their continued stable rule.\textsuperscript{119}

The process by which external legitimacy influences the military regime is best understood in terms of the political system components, which Andrain suggests are the "objects of legitimacy. These objects are: 1) political structures, 2) beliefs (both values and norms), 3) rule by certain individuals, and 4) particular policies.\textsuperscript{120} How the military perceives and reacts to their external legitimacy (or illegitimacy) will vary with each of these components, because each is a source of external legitimacy. For example, Brazil's military government evidently felt it important to leave the country's Congress open during their rule, while Argentina felt it prudent to close theirs. Also, as specific public opinions become public demands through one of these component conduits, the military regime seemingly attempts to maintain its course and achieve its goals through one of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} See Chapter 7, section C for an explanation of transitions from authoritarian to totalitarian regime systems.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Legitimacy stabilizes the connection between means and ends. David Easton explains, "...a system may rely on persuasion, appeals of self-interest, traditions, coercion to attain goals, rally energies--to obtain acceptance or acquiescence in outputs and structures through which they are produced." David Easton, \textit{A Systems Analysis of Political Life}, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p.279.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Ibid. p.150.
\end{itemize}
the other components of the political system. For example, the Brazilian military government's particular economic policies helped produce the Brazilian economic miracle. Success with this particular policy also, to some degree, let the regime neglect the "beliefs category" (during the Medici era of the Fifth Institutional Act, etc.) which severely impinged values and norms surrounding the concepts of liberty and equality.

As military regimes attempt to efficiently maintain stability through the use of external legitimacy, they pass through various phases of authority which are best defined in terms of external legitimacy. Guglielmo Ferrero categorizes four types of authority: prelegitimate, legitimate, illegitimate, and postlegitimate. Prelegitimate authority is characterized by rulers believing in their justification for rule, but the ruled do not. When both the rulers and the ruled accept the ruler's justifications, authority is legitimate. When neither the rulers nor the ruled accept a justification for rule, authority is illegitimate. Finally, when the ruler's old justification for rule becomes outmoded and new justifications become accepted by the ruled, authority is postlegitimate. These concepts are very helpful in tracking

the actions of a given military regime and therefore the possible influence this variable has on obligational legitimacy because not every decision made by every member of the military is made for purely machiavellian reasons.

An important conclusion of the discussion thus far is, external legitimacy is tied closely to "international influence" and "economic forces." How the military regime reacts to these other causal conditions (how they exercise power) and what they produce (performance) will affect external legitimacy. Military regimes may come to power by popular demand (though not by elections). As Linz similarly suggests for democratic regime legitimacy, at some point military regimes may claim at least a limited external legitimacy because of society's "belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established." Sometime before a transition occurs, though, they become solely a de facto government. At that point, their external legitimacy rests on how well and for whom they perform. In other words, this variable focuses on how political actions get some groups the tangible things they want from government and at the same time, weigh what these same actions mean to the mass public. When these self-imposed governments begin to become

transparent in serving a special interest group and not civil society in general, they must rely more and more on coercion, which further reduces their claim on external legitimacy.

Even though a military regime does concern itself with external legitimacy, this model postulates that it is obligational legitimacy that ultimately justifies, in the military's mind, their right (and moral obligation) to rule. Therefore, external legitimacy may decrease without seriously affecting obligational legitimacy, especially if the military doesn't have to increase coercion to continue the status quo. Through this logic external legitimacy is postulated not to be a sufficient condition. Low external legitimacy does not guarantee obligational legitimacy breakdown, but deductive inference suggests that high external legitimacy would preclude obligational legitimacy breakdown. In other words, low external legitimacy is a necessary condition for obligational legitimacy breakdown.

4. **Political Capital**

"Political capital" is defined as the material and psychosocial resources available to a government to sustain its functioning. This variable is an important determinant of power, even for a military regime with great coercive capabilities. Military regimes, like all regimes, require personnel, money, customers, and a variety of technological and material inputs in order to
continue to function. Ruler-type military regimes are especially sensitive to political capital because of the secondary emphasis placed on external legitimacy. Other types of military regimes, such as arbitrator type regimes, either place a more important emphasis on external legitimacy (in which case political capital would probably not be low while external legitimacy was high—with certain sectors of society), or they are in power for a short period of time (therefore not having to worry as much about their future capabilities to function as government). Since resources, for a large part, determine political activities, authoritarian ruler regimes must rely on societies support, or acquiescence, through means other than ideological support.

The process by which political capital is lost or increased highlights the means military regimes use to maintain a functioning capability and how obligational legitimacy is possibly affected. Loss of political capital (what Aaron Wildavsky calls political costs) refers to "loss of esteem and effectiveness with other participants in the political system, and the loss of ability to secure policies other than the one immediately under consideration." Political capital increases with gains in esteem, effectiveness, and resources that the

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regime can use in other situations. For a military regime to run a diverse and complex government, political capital is essential. The regime does have resources at its disposal to increase political capital such as money, prestige, rewards and sanctions, and expertise to deal with uncertainty. The regime also may claim the right to make important fiscal decisions as to what is produced and how much; as well as how it is distributed to whom and how much of the production will be allocated to further production, development and consumption. Yet, Wildavsky points out, "Resources like patronage are strictly limited and use in one case prohibits use in another once the appointment has been made."\textsuperscript{124} Also, the regime must in the end still rely on society to accomplish the actual production and distribution.

Loss of effective political capital, for whatever reason, severely limits the military regime's effectiveness, even with coercion. Inability to govern, due to this loss, will affect obligational legitimacy because the military does not simply have an obligation, but an obligation to \textit{do something}. Therefore, if political capital were very low or nonexistent, obligational legitimacy breakdown would follow, making this variable a sufficient causal condition. It is not a necessary condition though, because a military regime could lose

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p.159.
obligational legitimacy with manageable levels of political capital.

5. Political Culture

"Political culture" is defined as, "the system of attitudes, values, and beliefs by which a people understand, evaluate, and respond to the institutions, policies, and leaders of their society." General components of this variable include foundation metaphysical values, a general view of reality, expectations of what a government can, should and shouldn't do, appropriate reactions to a government's actions, and an on going socialization process to continue the established status quo of values, norms, etc. Specific examples (or gross generalization, depending on your outlook) within these components include, the Catholic ethos, caudiaje, machismo, acquiescence to militarism, patronism, clientelism, particularism, elitism, and personalism. It is still an open debate as to how much each of these actually applies, but a military regime's accurate perception of this variable, its applicable components and its alterations over time and the specific context it is being applied to are critical for goal achievement, political capital accumulation, and external legitimacy growth. A correct understanding of political culture by the military regime may also aid in shaping a

\[125\] Rossi and Plano, The Latin American Political Dictionary, p.75.
more effective mission orientation and establishing valid measurements of mission success.

The process by which political culture is related to the military regime must be understood in terms of the components described above. Because elements in the same society can have varying values, norms, etc. the military must carefully consider each component. Rossi and Plano offer an excellent list of considerations a military regime (or any government) should take into account when weighing the causal influence of this variable. These include, 1) whether the people of the state identify with national groups, parochial groups, social groups, etc.; 2) what is each group's belief relating to the regime's legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness; 3) do the people of these groups trust or mistrust individuals and the established political institutions; 4) do they prefer a hierarchical system or an egalitarian one; 5) which is more important to these groups, order or justice; 6) do these groups feel an obligation to participate or even have interest in government; 7) do they feel political activity is rewarding or ineffective; and 8) are these people willing to sacrifice for the good of the community, or are their interests more self or family centered.126

An important output of this independent variable that is very relevant to this model is, political culture

126 Ibid. pp.75-76.
can either amplify or dilute the perceived degree (positive or negative) of external legitimacy. If political culture is low, that is, the political culture is acquiescent or accepting of military rule and external legitimacy is negative toward the regime, negative feedback to the regime will be low. On the other hand, if political culture is low and external legitimacy is positive toward the regime, feedback is likely to be spuriously amplified to the positive. If political culture is high, that is, not at all acquiescent or accepting of military rule, and external legitimacy is negative toward the regime, feedback is likely to be spuriously amplified toward the negative. Finally, if external legitimacy is positive toward the regime and political culture is high, the positive feedback to the regime will likely be diluted. (In any case, it behooves the regime to take this variable into account).

As the foregoing paragraph alludes, political culture can help or hinder the stability of a regime. Paraguay's acquiescence to Stroessner's rule, due in part to the political culture of that country, is an example of the positive effect of political culture toward a regime. More often, though, political culture tends to inhibit obligational legitimacy, as Rouquie explains:

No matter how central their position in the political system and how great their autonomy of decision-making, the governing military are constrained by the political culture of the dominant internal or external classes,
whose self-interested liberalism constitutes a restraint on the organicist tendencies of the men in uniform.\textsuperscript{127}

Tiano's empirical findings dilute the importance of this variable though. Her studies suggest "that political culture is not a monolithic mirror of the political system...[but is rather] shaped by ongoing experiences and varying patterns of exposure to political structure and process."\textsuperscript{128} At best, political culture is only indirectly linked to political structure. High political culture can be inferred to not guarantee obligational legitimacy breakdown and therefore is not a sufficient condition. Nor is this condition necessary, because it need not be present at all to have obligational legitimacy breakdown. It is an important contributing factor, especially if misinterpreted by the military regime.

6. Organizational Culture

"Organizational culture" is defined as the institutionalized organizational memory bank of patterns of authority and standard operating procedures that has taken on the status of objective fact by those in the organization. This variable incorporates traditions, acceptable emotional responses, standard operating procedures, and trust, in a corporate understanding and corporate struc-

\textsuperscript{127} Rouquie, "Demilitarization and Military-Dominated Politics," \textit{Armies and Politics in Latin America}, p.448.

ture. Organizational culture in the context of this model acts as a boundary and buffer to the environment external to the military institution and therefore the military regime. It also filters and codes events both internal and external to the regime. This is the "complex tissue" through which the military screens all other independent variables in constructing or dismantling their obligational legitimacy. Borrowing from the concepts of David Easton, we can categorize the organizational culture of a military regime as a "gatekeeper" which protects the regime (more specifically, obligational legitimacy) from some of the stresses of the political system (i.e. keeps societal wants from becoming demands in the eyes of the regime).

Organizational culture provides a useful service to the military organization, but it also is a potential hazard because it may produce aberrations in perceptions and actions to other causal conditions the military must deal with. For this hypothesis, it is important to more fully understand this variable because of the pivotal role it plays in maintaining the regime's obligational legitimacy. One way to gain useful insights into a regime's organizational culture is to explore observable indicators of the culture such as rites, rituals, stories, and other expressive symbols of the military organization under
consideration. Rites,\textsuperscript{129} for example provide valuable tangible indications of a military's organizational culture because they are usually conducted or developed by the military elite for the military apparatus (which may provide insight into the key perceptions and decisions of the regime). Some examples of rites are rites of passage (e.g. military basic training), rites of degradation (e.g. getting many military personnel involved in interrogation of civilians), rites of enhancement (e.g. awards or medals for specific acts), rites of renewal (e.g. alumni meetings of the Superior War College), rites of conflict reduction (e.g. collective bargaining over resource distribution among the services), rites of integration (e.g. parties at the officer's club).\textsuperscript{130}

The degree of permeability and structural rigidity determines the level of organizational culture. The condition of low organizational culture is when permeability is high and structure is flexible. High organizational culture conditions are the inverse. Assuming rational actors, Weberian analysis is useful in

\textsuperscript{129} Defined as, "A relatively elaborate, dramatic, planned set of activities that combines various forms of cultural expressions and that often has both practical and expressive consequences." Janice M. Beyer and Harrison M. Trice, "How an Organization's Rites Reveal its Culture," Organizational Dynamics, Spring 1987, p.6.

\textsuperscript{130} Partially derived from a typology of rites in Beyer and Trice, "How an Organization's Rites Reveal its Culture," Organizational Dynamics, p.11.
explaining "that limits are built in in each type of regime and that the transformation of regimes beyond them is a source of their delegitimation and ultimate breakdown." If organizational culture is not permeable to events or is not "liberal" in outlook, that is, characterizes them in neutral or positive terms, these limits will not be violated and obligational legitimacy will not be damaged, thereby making this variable a necessary condition. It is not sufficient, however, because it is possible to have a permeable, liberal organizational culture and high obligational legitimacy. There is a caveat. Only in a metaphoric sense does the military regime organization interact with the environment. People interact with other people. People perform the filtering and boundary functions of the organization. The degree to which individuals are socialized into the organizational culture and interiorize the organizational goals, etc., will influence obligational legitimacy.

7. Fractionalization

"Fractionalization" is defined as the act or process of separating into various components while still maintaining some degree of military coherence. Complete destruction of military coherence would not be applicable to this model of transition, but would rather fall into the

131 Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration, p.92.
category of civil war or revolution. Fractionalization is also not to be confused with "factionalization," which connotes the forming of a contentious minority within a larger group and loss of military coherence. The perception of goal incompatibility within the military regime, due to the interaction of other independent variables, causes fractious expansion.

Some degree of fractionalization is present in any regime. At some point though, the regime may no longer be able to manage its internal cleavages. This variable can have a direct and devastating impact on obligational legitimacy. This is because the irreducible common identity central to obligational legitimacy is no longer common. Fractionalization has a synergistic impact on other independent variables such as mission orientation and external legitimacy which in turn affect obligational legitimacy. Fractionalization is of particular concern to military regimes because it multiplies the difficulty of securing compliance of the governed. Political capital is diluted and even the military's power of coercion may be fettered from within. For military regimes that lack external legitimacy and have a weak organizational culture, this variable can be especially troublesome. As Wesson and

\[132\] See footnote 8 for delineations of "transition" and "revolution."

Fleischer explain, "Arbitrary authority invites arbitrary rejection, and the necessity of making many political choices is inevitably divisive."

Fractionalization plays a key role in the breakdown of obligational legitimacy and thus military transitions from power in Latin America. It is posited that whenever a high degree of fractionalization is present, obligational legitimacy is guaranteed to breakdown. Therefore this variable is a sufficient condition. It is difficult to be any more specific as to exact levels of fractionalization required to cause obligational legitimacy breakdown because of the numerous differences in the militaries themselves and the independent variables affecting them. Fractionalization is not a necessary condition though, because it need not be present for obligational legitimacy breakdown (e.g. the military could decide in unison that they no longer had an obligation to rule the country).

8. Mission Orientation

"Mission orientation" is defined as the military's general view of reality and their role within that reality. It involves the military's perceived charter within the government and within civil society, and their commitment to that sacred charge. This variable is closely related to

organizational culture, but whereas organizational culture is concerned with internal corporate functioning, mission orientation is concerned with a specific sense of duty in relation to society on one level and actual execution of activities and decisions on another level.

Mission orientation is the military apparatus' ultimate measure of its obligational legitimacy to rule (whereas the military elite's ultimate measure stems directly from metaphysical assumptions).\textsuperscript{135} Without mission orientation, the military would lose sight of its objectives and fail in its ability, internally and externally, to rationalize continued control of government. There are many forms of mission orientation ranging from general concerns such as superior capacity and ability to govern, or a "messianic self-image as the institution ultimately interpreting and ensuring the highest interests of the nation,..."\textsuperscript{136} to specific goals such as economic modernization, internal security, or political stabilization. These concerns and goals have been absorbed into various outlooks such as Geopolitics, and various programs such as National Security Doctrine. What, if any, reference groups in national or international society the military relates to, and to what limits the regime is

\textsuperscript{135} See Chapter 4, section E for an explanation of elites and apparatus within the military organization.

\textsuperscript{136} O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions, p.31.
willing to go to accomplish its task, ties this variable indirectly to the other independent variables. In other words, like organizational culture, mission orientation is a "gatekeeper" forming a protection for the military organization and its obligational legitimacy from the stresses of the political system. It also establishes military operational boundaries to limit the arbitrary power of the military members.

Mission orientation is an obvious requirement for any military organization. This variable is an outgrowth of the military organization's irreducible common identity, of which obligational legitimacy is a key element. This is not a one way system of influence. Mission orientation can also affect obligational legitimacy. As other causal conditions, such as economic forces, attempt to reform mission orientation, obligational legitimacy may also be affected, depending on the permeability and rigidity of this variable and organizational culture. Mission orientation change (in outlook and/or commitment) is essential for obligational legitimacy breakdown and is therefore a necessary condition. It is not, however, a sufficient condition because the military could change its mission orientation, but not have obligational legitimacy breakdown.
Mission Success

"Mission success" is defined as achievement of the goals and programs established by mission orientation. The military regime must judge this variable in terms of efficacy (capacity to find solutions), effectiveness (capacity to implement solutions), and the final outcome. Mission orientation is, by definition, the key variable influencing mission success. This variable can affect the obligational legitimacy of the military regime in two ways. First, mission success is perceived as a failure (i.e. goals are not accomplished) and obligational legitimacy will begin to breakdown, as in the economic failures in Argentina and Peru. Secondly, if the military regime accomplishes mission success in certain areas, such as elimination of an internal threat, they may find it difficult to rationalize their continued stay in government.

It is also important to stress the difference between actual outcome and attitudes in mission success. Perception of success or failure is at least as important as actual outcomes because that is how the military will apply it in formulating obligational legitimacy. Actual mission success may also affect other variables which in turn affect obligational legitimacy. Finally, outcome, perceived or real, may only be loosely tied to organizational culture. Pfeffer explains that "This means that
decisions can be rationalized with little regard to the actual specifics of the decision." Although this variable is ultimately very important, it is only a contributing variable influencing obligational legitimacy. It is possible to have mission success and have obligational legitimacy breakdown therefore not a necessary condition. It is also possible to have mission failure and have no obligational legitimacy breakdown, therefore this is not a sufficient condition.

C. SUMMARY OF VARIABLES

The nine independent variables considered here have each demonstrated some causal linkage with the breakdown of obligational legitimacy and the transition process (see Figure 6). This thesis postulates that the severe loss of political capital and fractionalization are sufficient causes for obligational legitimacy breakdown. Loss of external legitimacy, low organizational culture and mission orientation change are put forward as necessary conditions. To have obligational legitimacy breakdown, all three of these necessary conditions must be present. Only when all three are present as an equivalent condition or when fractionalization or loss of political capital is present is obligational legitimacy breakdown assured. This thesis has not postulated when (in the causal chain of events) the

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necessary conditions will occur with a sufficient condition. They each may occur before or after fractionalization or loss of political capital. It is to the case studies of transitions in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru, and the non transition in Chile that we must now turn, to confirm this thesis and possibly clarify the mode of the causal chain of events leading to obligational legitimacy breakdown and transition from military rule in South America.
Causal Assertions:
3 International Influence
4 Economic Forces
5 External Legitimacy
6 Political Capital
7 Political Culture
8 Organizational Culture
9 Fractionalization
10 Mission Orientation
11 Mission Success

Key Assertion:
Obligational Legitimacy

Key Conclusion:
Transition

Further Assertions:
Totalitarian
Liberalization

Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis Causal Model

Figure 6
VI. THEORY EVALUATION

Following the logic structure presented in Chapter 2, the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis has been constructed. Obligational legitimacy is influenced by the nine independent variables discussed in the previous chapter. By applying deductive logic to these independent variables, this hypothesis has categorized them as necessary, sufficient, or contributing for obligational legitimacy breakdown. We are now ready to investigate four transitions and a case of non transition. If this hypothesis is correct, and obligational legitimacy does exist, these case studies should offer inductive assurance that the independent variables categorized as necessary and sufficient in the previous chapter are indeed so.

A. CASE STUDIES

The Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis has been constructed to study the phenomenon of South American transitions from military rule. The transitions this chapter will review are Argentina 1984, Brazil 1985, Peru 1980, and Uruguay 1985. The non transition of Chile will also be considered. This array of countries offers interesting contrasts in evaluating the obligational
legitimacy model because of size and complexity differences, disparate ideologies and regime goals, and organizational and political cultural variances. Argentina's military, for example, did not schedule its departure, while Peru's military did. Brazil's military almost made an art out of the transition process. Uruguay's "slow motion coup" regime attempted to establish long term rule in much the same way as Chile had accomplished earlier, with a constitutional plebiscite. The results varied greatly from what the regime had expected though. Applying this theory to Chile will test the efficacy in explaining why some military regimes have not yet transitioned from power. Through an analysis of these five countries (as opposed to an in depth investigation of one or two countries) the necessity and/or sufficiency of the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis's causal conditions will be tested.

B. ARGENTINA 1976-1984\textsuperscript{138}

The Peronista government elected in 1973 brought the country to complete chaos by 1976. This gave the military a second chance at bureaucratic authoritarianism. Unlike

the failed Ongania regime (1966-1970), the Videla regime had much more aggressive and detailed plans. The day after taking control of the government, the military presented to the country The Act of National Reorganization which initiated what became known as the "Proceso." The military committed themselves to an ambitious agenda which included restoration of national security (external and internal), economic efficiency, moral values, and authentic representative democracy, but with no schedule for completion. Their specific goals included stabilizing civil and political society through exclusion of the Peronistas and elimination of the Marxist People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas or Montoneros, and the other smaller leftist factions such as FAL and FAR. The regime also planned to improve the economy through revitalization and reduction of the private sector and, most importantly, control of inflation and competitive growth. Finally, the regime planned to reeducate the country to correct standards of morality and uprightness.

Mission orientation began to drift due to both success and failure in attaining the regime's goals. In 1979 President Videla claimed victory in the "dirty war" which left the regime in a quandary as to its full purpose, as Videla manifests in his statement, "We have won the war,
and now we must win the peace.\textsuperscript{139} Through a ruthless anti-terrorist campaign, the threat of leftist subversives all but disappeared, as did an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people. The economic stabilization plan, under the guidance of Jose A. Martinez de Hoz, registered a 7.3 percent growth rate by 1979 and capital flight had been reversed. However, in March of 1980, economic failure caught the country by surprise with the failure of four major banks. This failure touched off financial panic. Capital flight, bankruptcies, and the foreign debt grew at record levels as inflation topped 100\% again in 1981 (capping a 30 year rise of 24 million percent\textsuperscript{140}). The public sector continued to expand and the external OPEC and debt shocks left little stability in the economy. Confidence in the government of Videla and his successor, General Viola, disappeared. In public, the military hierarchy maintained a face of reckless confidence and unity in their ability to control the situation. As late as June of 1982, General Jose Miret, Secretary of Planning, stated, "There is no economic model in the world that we can't transplant here."\textsuperscript{141} Within the regime though,


\textsuperscript{141} Quoted in Whitehead, "Whatever Became of the Southern Cone Model?" \textit{Chile After 1973: Elements for the Analysis of Military Rule}, p.9.
serious disagreements over economic strategy existed. When Viola came to power, for example, Martinez de Hoz was forced to leave. When General Galtieri came to power, less than a year later (as Viola was forced to resign due to his "soft" stand economically and politically in the face of civilian criticism of the military government), he too announced a new economic strategy. Within the military organization, the old motivations for staying in government were waning.

Fractionalization grew within the military organization due to loss of faith over mission disorientation in internal security and the seeming inability to control the economy. The "dirty war" campaign, which initially was a source of external legitimacy, now directly influenced a growing illegitimacy because of the huge number of disappearances (later estimated to be possibly as high as 35,000) and because of the stark contrast it posed to the regime's goal to improve moral standards (as part of the Proceso). Regime fractionalization split into two main camps, the "duros" who wanted to expand repression and the "blandos" who leaned toward accommodation with acceptable political forces in the country. Once fractionalization became evident to society in general, political activation began to expand. "Yet as the parties reasserted themselves
in 1980, the concerned, control-oriented officers turned defensive once again."^{142}

With an organizational culture that isolated the regime from civil society and international realities, and with no one left to blame for failure, the regime chose a classic nonsolution--war. The Falklands/ Malvinas War pitted Argentina against the United Kingdom. The status of the South Atlantic archipelago has been contested since 1592 and was a popular aspirational national interest, but never an operational interest. Still, capability seemed to be in Argentina's favor (in the minds of the regime) at this remote corner of British power. Other factors involved in the decision were the concern over Chilean extension of power in the south, including the Beagle Channel Islands dispute, the seeming acquiescence of the United States in light of Argentina's support of the U.S. Central America policy, and the hope that Britain would be forced to "swallow this fated pill." Instead, (and even with some heroic efforts by Air Force and Naval aviation) Argentina's military was defeated. The Malvinas War defeat acted as a catalyst toward regime transition by solidifying the negative international influences against the military, completely eliminating any remaining external legitimacy.

for the regime, rupturing the boundaries of organizational culture and again unsettling mission orientation.

In the final analysis, transition was initiated in Argentina by the sufficient condition of fractionalization within the military organization (see Figure 5). A loss of mission orientation began the movement toward transition. First, the execution of the Proceso left the military without an internal security mission due to their success in eliminating the threat from the left. Their failure in all other facets of the Proceso (e.g. economic stabilization, restoration of "proper" moral values, and creation of "authentic representative democracy") left many in the military unsure as to proper strategies and goals. The synthesis of the categorical and hypothetical obligations was still intact at this point. Only when the regime failed to reestablish consensus within their own ruling elite did they loose sight of their objectives (e.g. continuing the dirty war even though in reality it was over).

Fractionalization grew within the regime and within the apparatus. The split between the duros and the blandos was not synonymous with the split of those who believed in the military's categorical obligation and those who held a hypothetical outlook, but by the time Galtieri came to power the stage was set for transition initiation. Many in the regime felt by this time that
they were erasing with one hand what they were writing with the other. On the sixth anniversary of the coup, Galtieri announced the commencement of a plan for redemocratization, one that he hoped would return him to leadership as the elected President in 1984. Galtieri's secret meetings with Peronist leaders to gain their support (anathema to many in the military), failure of economic policies, and an awakening disagreement with the continuation of the dirty war, completed the split between those who still felt the military had the duty to remain in power and those who felt the country and the military would be better served with a return to democracy.

With fractionalization rampant, organizational culture began to break down. Military traditions, standard operating procedures and trust in the corporate structure decayed to new lows. With mission orientation and now organizational culture in states of flux, external legitimacy became a pivotal issue. The insular protection from society's demands that the regime had enjoyed in previous years, was gone. Those officers who still held a hypothetical obligation for military rule were beginning to be swayed by the lack of external legitimacy. Galtieri attempted to revitalize the hypothetical/categorical synthesis by invading the Malvinas. It was hoped this action would establish a new mission orientation for the military and revitalize organizational culture. Proving
nationally popular it would establish a new external legitimacy for the regime, so as to build a new obligation-al common identity in the military. Defeat in the Malvinas only quickened a transition already in progress. The "resurrection of civil society" confirmed the end of the regime and transition culminated with the October 1983 election of President Raul Alfonsin.

C. BRAZIL 1964-1985

On 1 April, 1964 the military took control of the government for the first time in the 20th century. Eight days later the Supreme Military Command issued the First Institutional Act declaring this takeover as a revolution, not just a coup, and granted vast powers to the new military regime. The military had come to power in the wake of what the military saw as the pro-communist, but popular (even with some of the military), Goulart regime. Because of the military ruling elite's fear of possible breakdown of the fragile coup coalition, the goals and programs of the new regime were vague, talking about

control of the communists, and establishment of some political and economic reforms. Those officers who posed a "counterrevolutionary" threat to the regime were purged. Only ten days after the coup, 122 officers were expelled from the military and further expulsions continued for almost a year. Still, most officers saw the need for a military government as temporary.

Unity in the Castello Branco regime was maintained by a shared mission orientation that had been fostered in World War Two with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) and through the socialization process of the Superior War College (ESG). By 1967 and the selection of General Costa e Silva as President, only one of the five key members of the ruling staff was an FEB member and had attended the ESG, highlighting the growing cleavages in the regime.

1967-1974 marked a more militant authoritarian period, first with Costa e Silva and then, on his death, with General Medici. As the military tarried in government, leftist guerrilla activity also grew, giving the new basis for mission orientation. Opposition from the church and various demonstrations of opposition, such as the student revolt in December of 1968 only strengthened the military's belief that only they could move the country toward higher development because they were not tied to any classes or interest groups that would resist reform. By 1969,

144 Stepan, The Military in Politics, p.223.
repression was increased to meet the threat from radical groups that hoped to incite public anger against the regime. Instead, the public was more alienated by the leftist tactics than the military's tactics of suppression. Although the Medici regime established a reputation for severe tactics, the level of deaths, disappearances, and torture never reached the numbers of Argentina. The other important goal of the Brazilian military was economic development, as the Doctrine of National Security and Development highlights. Between 1968 and 1973 Brazil achieved one of the highest growth rates (e.g. the Brazilian GNP grew at an annual average of over 10.0% during this period\textsuperscript{145}) in the hemisphere and was highlighted as an example of what authoritarian modernizing strategy could accomplish.

A key factor running through every government, from 1964 on, was the military's effort to restructure politics. An important source of external legitimacy for the regime was the "support" of Congress. No government closed Congress for longer than a month, and beginning with General Castello Branco, every military president was indirectly "elected" by Congress. Because of the less defined mission orientation and fragile organizational culture, external legitimacy played a more important role in supporting the hypothetical obligation of the majority

\textsuperscript{145} Wesson and Fleischer, \textit{Brazil in Transition}, p.37.
of officers, than in such countries as Argentina or Chile. Using Congress, the military attempted, through political jeito and casuismos (gerrymandering, electoral engineering, etc.) to establish a pro military party, the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) and a loyal opposition, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). These actions by the military were generally accepted by the country because Brazilian political culture dictated that it is better to play the military's game, than not to play at all.

By 1974 the accomplishments of the military began to unravel. Economic growth began to stagnate. The first OPEC oil shock of 1973 was beginning to be felt (as Brazil imported 75% of its oil\textsuperscript{146}). The PMDB does better than ARENA in congressional elections, and from that time on, each election became a negative referendum on the military government. All serious guerrilla threats were eliminated, leaving that mission of the military hollow. Fractionalization grew between the moderates and hardliners over strategy and political purpose of the military in government. To maintain control over the deteriorating situation and to distance themselves from the more severe repression of the early 1970s, the military was forced to change its policies toward loosening their control on government.

\textsuperscript{146} Wynia, \textit{The Politics of Latin American Development}, p.223.
Transition initiation began with the selection of General Ernesto Geisel, a moderate, as president in 1974. He established a distensão (relaxation or decompression) of military rule which was subsequently termed abertura (opening). Arbitrary arrests and torture all but disappeared and censorship was eased. All manner of political jeito was attempted by the regime, as they feared losing control of the transition process. Geisel also reminded the Congress and the country who was still in charge when he shut down Congress for their refusal to pass a government sponsored judicial reform bill in April of 1977. Geisel then enacted his "April Package" of measures designed to ensure ARENA victories in the 1978 election. Although opposition grew with these setbacks to liberalization, the military remained in firm control. In 1979 the Fifth Institutional Act was repealed, a "two way" amnesty package was adopted, and the complex matter of presidential succession was overcome with the selection of General João Baptista Figueiredo. The transition from military rule continued, but with some setbacks. Political party reform was implemented in 1979, but this also split the opposition PMDB into smaller parties. Some concern over the future of abertura was created when General Golbery do Costa e Silva resigned in 1981, but the opening continued. General elections (local, state, governor, House and Senate) were held in 1982, but no split voting was allowed (same party
vote, top to bottom) and no coalitions were allowed. Due to the problematic health of General Figueiredo and the continual pressure of opposition groups, the indirect election of Brazil's first civilian president in two decades took place in 1985. President Tancredo Neves won as the opposition candidate to the military backed party. Neves' sudden illness then death just prior to his inauguration resulted in Jose Sarney (elected vice-president) becoming president.

The causal pattern of transition initiation in Brazil was much more complex and tenuous than that of Argentina. The planned lack of a well defined and rigid mission orientation (for fear of upsetting the coalition synthesis of the categorical obligation and hypothetical obligation) was always a factor that directly influenced the stability of obligational legitimacy. The regime was able to make up for this weakness by an atypical reliance (for a ruler-type military regime) on external legitimacy to help support the hypothetical obligation of a majority of the officer corps. This was a workable relationship from 1964-1967 because of the relatively light demands placed on the regime by society and because of the initial purges of opponents. Once it became clear that this was not an arbitrator type regime, but the first of the ruler regimes of South America, society became more demanding. The military regime, partly to protect its obligational
legitimacy synthesis and partly to achieve its goals, became more alienated from society and established a stronger mission orientation through the Doctrine of National Security and Development. Complete insulation from society was not possible due to the military's traditionally permeable organizational culture, but external legitimacy was bolstered with the economic miracle and the unpopular tactics of the leftist guerrillas.

Mission orientation was again changing by 1974 because the economic miracle and the guerrilla threat did not last. Neither of these issues were pivotal for the military taking power or leaving power, but they were important factors in shaping the necessary condition of a weak mission orientation. Organizational culture was relatively permeable and flexible throughout the tenure of military rule. Before 1974 this gatekeeper was not required to protect the military from the demands of society, and in fact was kept fairly permeable in the miracle years (and

Ironically, this doctrine was, in large part, developed by General Golbery of the ESG, both of which fell from favor during the Costa e Silva and Medici regimes when it was applied most intensely. Certainly there were core beliefs, like obligational legitimacy, that permeated the entire officer corps, but strategies caused cleavages that all attempted to avoid. In John Markoff and Silvio R. Duncan Baretta, "Professional Ideology and Military Activism in Brazil: A Critique of a Thesis of Alfred Stepan," Comparative Politics, Vol. 17 (January 1985), pp.183-186: the authors suggest that Costa e Silva and Medici dropped the detailed aspects of ESG thinking and used useful portions of NSD to support their more intense orientation of governmental control.
assumedly positive external legitimacy) so as to strengthen the hypothetical obligation for military rule. As external legitimacy became more negative, there were no gatekeepers in place to protect the military. In Brazil, unlike Argentina, external legitimacy had been a useful tool for maintenance of military unity. Now it became a factor in increasing fractionalization. The loss of external legitimacy was not a sufficient condition for the breakdown of obligational legitimacy (because even in Brazil other factors such as the recent proof of the miracle years showed that sometimes unpopular policies were needed to develop). Its loss has shown to be necessary (because if it had remained high, it would have been difficult to breakdown the hypothetical obligation). Fractionalization was the key outcome of a low organizational culture and loss of external legitimacy. Why, if by the end of 1974, all the causal conditions were in place for obligational legitimacy breakdown, the transition still took eleven years (and it could be argued that it will not be complete until a civilian president is directly elected)? Transition initiation does not guarantee transition completion. Brazil is the case in point that the military chooses to leave power, and if at any time during or after the process that obligational legitimacy is reconstituted the transition process could reverse itself. The importance of "societal mobilization" to reassert themselves in
government is highlighted here as an important post transition initiation condition for successful completion of a transition. Without the mobilization, the military could more easily consolidate their obligational legitimacy and reverse the transition process.

D. PERU 1968-1980

In 1968, Peru's military again took control of government, but this time with more than an arbitrator's role. This regime differed from Argentina's, or Brazil's, in that it didn't involve a coalition with any other groups in civil society. In the past, the Peruvian military had intervened in government in support of the conservative elite. The military also had a great distrust for APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria American, the major reformist party) because of its anti military stance. At first glance, the military's intervention in 1968 was seemingly in response to the probable victory of APRA the next year. In actuality though, the military acted out of their disgust for Peru's subservience to foreign capital

and because of the civilian failure to come to terms with the growing dissatisfaction and restlessness in the rural portions of the country. Although the military leaders of the various services were able to come to terms (after lengthy negotiations) to make the coup a unified action, the vast majority of the population and international interests opposed the coup. As time went on the regime did build support through inclusion of the lower class, because a key element in the Peruvian hypothetical obligation was to build a popular foundation for a reorganized Peruvian state.

The military regime, under the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, closed political parties and suppressed potential opponents, but never resorted to the serious systematic campaigns of terror found in the Southern Cone. Their goals, encompassed in the "Plan Inca," included establishing a new economic order with a nexus of development and security. Key issues of their program were agrarian reform and elimination of upper class political and economic power. The regime held a genuine sympathy for the plight of the long-oppressed peasantry, due partially to the traumatic experience of a few years earlier, when in suppressing a small guerrilla uprising they killed 8,000 peasants, left 19,000 homeless, 3,500 in
jail and destroyed 14,000 hectares of land.\textsuperscript{149} Almost immediately after the coup, the regime expropriated International Petroleum Company (IPC, a Standard Oil of New Jersey subsidiary), then ITT in 1969, Chase-Manhattan Bank in 1970, Cerro de Pascoa in 1974 and Marcona Mining in 1975. Even after some agreements were reached with the international community, the regime was not popular in international financial circles. Their domestic external legitimacy grew, however, through their efforts to integrate the marginalized sectors of civil society. By 1974 the agrarian elite had disappeared as a power elite and by 1979 almost no land remained in the hands of huge estates. The military regime also increased their external legitimacy through such programs as the Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Mobilizacion Social (SINAMOS), the Agrarian Production Cooperative (CAP), and the Agriculture Societies of Social Interest (SAIS).

The Velasco regime lasted from 1968 to 1975 and, on the surface, accomplished many of its original goals. Nationalization of industry and agrarian reform were the center pieces, but real reform was still out of grasp. The Velasco regime attempted to implement the ideas that were developed at the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) which saw reform as crucial to long term national security.

Reforms, for the most part were shallow (such as the agrarian reform effort which left over 300,000 rural families still landless because of nonavailability of land\textsuperscript{150}), or hollow, due to poor planning, inadequate administration, little thought of consequences, and not enough trained personnel to implement many of these complex reforms, (such as SINAMOS). External conditions began to crumble, adding failure to failure, with a sharp decline in export earnings with the fishmeal industry disappearing almost completely, a drop in sugar and copper prices and no new oil discoveries. The foreign debt grew and IMF forced austerity measures led to 58\% unemployment and a real income decline of 40\% between 1973 and 1978. The traditional elites were already alienated and the middle class and large sectors of the lower class began opposing military rule. With an organizational culture that was already permeable and flexible, as exhibited by their radical support of the lower class, the regime began to crumble with this external onslaught.

Uncertainty of mission orientation became apparent in 1975 with a palace revolution placing General Morales Bermudez in power. Under Velasco, the military regime had made a great effort to define their justifying ideology, which included the concepts revolutionary, nationalist,\textsuperscript{150} Wynia, The Politics of Latin American Development, p.238.

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Christian and socialist. Under Bermundez, the regime dropped socialist from its self-description and all but dropped any concern for a self-justifying ideology. Bermundez also purged most of the reformist officers from the military shortly after taking power to break from this ideological past. The major efforts of this second regime were to establish an apertura (political opening) and get the economy under control. In 1977 Morales Bermundez unveiled Plan Tupac Amaru to set up a constituent assembly in 1978 and general elections in 1980. His economic policies concentrated on austerity, privatization of industry, elimination of anti-United States rhetoric and willingness to comply with IMF measures to acquire new loans. Although the economic morass was still a serious issue, politically the transition was accomplished as planned. In 1980 Fernando Belaunde Terry was elected by a 42% majority. His election marked the final demise of a movement among some younger officers to take back power and complete the revolution.

Transition initiation in Peru occurred with the palace coup of Bermundez. Mission orientation was the first variable to influence a change in the military common identity. Prior to 1973, mission orientation had not posed a challenge to the obligational legitimacy of the Velasco regime. The radical theories born at the CAEM and assured as the majority influence through early ideologically
motivated purges of the officer corps assured a fairly solid common identity within the regime and the apparatus. By 1973 however, as North and Korovkin point out,

As the military government found itself increasingly exposed to a flow of contradictory pressures and demands from both opposition parties and the participatory organizations it had created, the two components of the government's self-definition—"revolutionary" and "military institutional"—became incompatible.151

Still, obligational legitimacy was not threatened with breakdown because the obligation to achieve the goals of development and long term security had not changed, only the strategies were coming into question. This movement in mission orientation also did not cause any serious fractionalization because, on the surface it seemed that real changes were being realized and those officers rejecting the categorical or hypothetical obligation to remain in power were in the distinct minority. Not until the threat of loss of political capital and the complete loss of external legitimacy led to serious fractionalization did obligational legitimacy breakdown. The potential loss of political capital did not get to the point of sufficiency itself to cause obligational legitimacy breakdown, but instead amplified the growing cleavages in the military organization. Because the government was being run almost entirely by the military itself, the loss of human capital was not an issue, but the economic

situation decayed to the point of potential governmental bankruptcy. The regime's alienation of international business interests (through its rhetoric and nationalization program) almost assured complacency by the rest of the world. Fractionalization was further induced by a low organizational culture that was unable to protect the military organization from the demands from all sides of society, including the lower class who was once the supporter of the regime (and indirect supporter of the hypothetical obligation of many in the military). This example, like that of Brazil, also points out the possibility of a transition reversing itself. Again it was the resurgence of an able and willing civil society that quelled the obligational legitimacy tremors in the military.
The military takeover in Uruguay has been called the "slow motion coup." The military intervened in government gradually, ultimately imposing a ruler-type regime. From 1973 until 1976, when they forced President Juan Maria Bordaberry to resign and took complete control, the military came to oversee the police, the news media, Congress, labor unions, and the economy. The military intervention was imposed as the economy continued to decay, political violence increased and government became more and more paralyzed and corrupt. All three of these factors decreased the legitimacy of the elected government and any ability of that government to get control of the ever worsening situation. On 23 June 1973, President Bordaberry established a civil-military dictatorship, "at the suggestion of the military," in an attempt to control the chaos. The National Assembly was dissolved as well as the

National Labor Congress (CNT) and all leftist political parties. The military operated through an "advisory" arm of the president called the Consejo de Seguiridad Nacional (COSENA, the national security council). The coup had very little external legitimacy associated with it. The threats perceived by the military were not shared by most of society and the ruthless and aggressive manner in which the military crushed any opposition highlighted its dangers as worse than the unpopular civilian government it had deposed.

The military regime in Uruguay lacked the common identity for obligational legitimacy and even for a clear mission orientation in 1973. This is perhaps the central reason for the "slow motion coup" process. There were three general groups of officers, the legalists (who saw their role as the traditional protectors of democracy), the hardliners (also called "Brazilianists" who advocated a strong militaristic response to the growing chaos) and the populists (also called Peruvianists, who wanted the military to intervene, but also called for a response that would correct social and economic inequality). Because of this fractionalization, about the only thing the military could agree to act in unity on was the war against the Tupamaros. Even before the military "semi-coup" in 1973, the Tupamaros had been crushed, but the military became preoccupied with its war against all leftists, labor
leaders, politicians and students who were thought to support the Tupamaro movement. By 1976, thousands of people had been arrested, tortured and imprisoned (a greater proportion of the country's population than any other nation in the world). This brought a strong response of international condemnation against the military, but had little effect. In 1978, for example, the Law of State Emergency declared that a person could be arrested and held for thinking "anti-government thoughts."

Other important reasons why the military was slow to completely take-over the government were the small size and lack of political experience of the military organization. The total size of the military at the time of the coup was 7,000 members. The officer corps came primarily from the lower middle class of the rural areas of the country. This meant their social ties in government or with the elite were almost nonexistent. Their education and training in governmental affairs was also lacking. For these reasons, the military left portions of the government, such as the technical matters of the economy, almost entirely to civilian control. Between 1973 and 1978, the

154 Ibid., p.71.
155 Ibid, p.69.
military followed an economic policy closely parallel to the orthodox policies of Argentina under Martinez de Hoz. These policies were popular with the country's industrial leaders, and some progress toward economic recovery was made, but at a very high cost. Living standards dropped by as much as 50% from 1972-1982, economic inequality rose instead of decreased, capital flight became rampant, and inflation stayed out of control (topping 80% in 1979).

The military was able to establish a weak obligational legitimacy synthesis by 1976 and take complete control of the government. The legalist faction that had tempered the drive by others for full military intervention was greatly reduced by 1976. As late as 1977 over 20 officers were arrested for urging a return to civilian rule. A follow-on decree made retirement mandatory for any officer who did not follow the regime line. Relations within the ranks of this coalition remained strained. The coalition of many variances of the hypothetical obligation (e.g. reform of economics, renovation of the corrupt political system, destruction of all subversion) made coherent rule difficult at best. As is highlighted by the naming of the hardliner and populist divisions in the military after the regime characteristics of other South American regimes, the military in Uruguay was very much aware and affected by outside influences. When the military regime in Chile successfully executed a constitutional plebescite in 1980,
which ratified the rule of Pinochet, the Uruguayan military elite saw this as a way to finally unify the military and establish a clear, but far reaching role for the military in the future.

The new constitution, drafted by the Armed Forces Committee on Political Matters (COMASPO), gave a continuingly strong role in government, banned all parties or groups of leftist orientation, established a very weak Congress, and diluted the role of political parties (especially the semi-autonomous factions which made up the political parties called sub-lemas). Even with the regime's heavy reliance on civilians in government, the military organization was almost totally unaware of the political feelings of civil society. Also, the military, by this time, was completely isolated from any communication with opposition groups. The campaign to gain support for the plebiscite was well-run and almost all tactics to skew the voting response to the military cause was taken advantage of. Still, on 30 November 1980, the plebiscite failed by a margin of 57.2% to 42.8%. With this embarrassing defeat, the military fractionalized, with those holding a categorical obligation for military rule

interpreting the results in a positive light,\textsuperscript{157} and those of the military with a hypothetical obligation viewing this as a complete rejection by society of military rule. The lack of external legitimacy had always been present, but the results of this plebiscite broke through any barriers of isolation the military had erected. When General Alvarez acceded to the presidency in 1981, the military was further fractionalized. Again, in November of 1981 with the selection of political party leadership, the votes reflected a negative referendum of the military regime. By 1983 a serious dialogue between the political parties and the military were taking place. In 1984 the Pact of the Naval Club allowed for the peaceful exit of the military from government, with a two-way amnesty allowing the leftist Frente Amplio to participate in the political process and the guarantee of no reprisals for the repressive actions of the military while in power. As with Peru, Brazil and Argentina, the civilian political society of Uruguay was able to forge a "concertacion," or consociational front (minus the Blancos who chose to maintain their free agency) to help ensure the completion of the military transition from rule.

\textsuperscript{157} Lt. General Luis Quierola, for example, suggested that the majority of "no" votes were those who were satisfied with the incumbent regime. Charles G. Gillespie, "Activists and Floating Voters: The Unheeded Lessons of Uruguay's 1982 Primaries," \textit{Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985}, p.213.
Transition initiation in Uruguay was ultimately caused by the sufficient condition of fractionalization. Mission orientation was always at a very confused state, making it difficult for those officers with a categorical obligation to establish obligational legitimacy in the military organization. The slow process of taking power highlights the lack of obligational legitimacy of this regime. Even when fully in control, beginning in 1976, fractionalization was a key concern for the regime. Every effort was made to find ways to shore up their obligational legitimacy, from a preoccupation with the perceived threat from the left, to the attempt to duplicate the ratification of military rule in Chile with their own constitutional plebiscite. It should be pointed out that this small, relatively untrained and only slightly obligationally legitimate military was able to establish their rule because the entire scenario took place in one fairly small city, Montevideo. Once the military controlled the city in 1976, they controlled the government.

External legitimacy was not a key factor in supporting the military's hypothetical obligation, until the plebiscite, because their organizational culture (built with a lower middle class, rural, already alienated officer corps) kept the military isolated from the demands of society. The results expected and later interpreted by some military officers manifests this fact. The message of the
plebiscite was undeniable and a surprising revelation to many in the military and even the isolation effect of organizational culture could no longer protect the regime from obligational legitimacy breakdown. The degree of fractionalization is what led the regime to attempt the strengthening of obligational legitimacy through external legitimacy, and the results sealed the fate of the regime.

F. CHILE 1973–PRESENT

On 11 September 1973 the Chilean military seized the government in a decisive coup that left President Salvador Allende dead (either by murder or suicide). The coup had a popular backing both within the country and internationally. The socialist government of Allende had led the country into a severe economic crisis through heavy government spending (Allende's first year in office produced a deficit that amounted to 36% of the country's

total budget), inflationary monetary policies, exhaustion of consumer and industrial inventory with no replacement, and drastic tax hikes that cut usable income over 25%. In addition, food shortages were becoming commonplace, as were the resultant women's marches, strikes, and street violence. Allende's legitimacy was tenuous at best even before these problems. He was elected with only 36.2% of the vote, less than 39,000 votes from the second place candidate, Alessandri. Also, this 36.2% represented a fragile coalition (Unidad Popular) of radical Marxists to center left factions. By the time the military came to power, all but Allende's coalition heralded the coup.

The military regime in Chile has gone through several stages of self-definition and the goals they are striving to attain. Initially the regime claimed they assumed power to restore justice, peace and normalcy to the country. By 1974, with the release of the Declaration of Principles of the Government of Chile, the regime was redefining their role. This document clearly stated that the regime had not "set timetables for their management of the government, because the task of rebuilding the country morally, institutionally, and economically requires prolonged and profound action." In ensuring this ruler regime stance, 

159 Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, p.107.

purges of the officer corps were made. By 1976, 29 generals were forced into retirement. In July of 1978, General Leigh, Commander of the Air Force and Junta member, and 11 other Air Force generals were forcibly retired. Also, within a year after the coup, the system of officer assessments and promotions were altered, giving greater power to the individual services and their commanders. This helped strengthen the already strong loyalty to immediate commanders and the military hierarchy fostered by the Prussian tradition. As a foreign diplomat remarked in 1978, "If there is any fissure in the Armed Forces, it is not between the conservatives and liberals, but between the hawks and pragmatic conservatives."161 The rigid and impermeable organizational culture of the most professional military in South America was hermetic by the 1978 purges.

The mission orientation of the regime became clearly defined by the end of 1974, taking on a counterinsurgency and geopolitical definition of national security. General Pinochet (a professor and author of geopolitics texts himself) was established as sole head of the executive and administrative organs of government in June of 1974. In 1975, the National Objective of the Government of Chile was published which placed national security and counterinsur-

gency as the military's primary function. Political repression grew, as did the main arm of this repression—the National Department of Intelligence (DINA). United Nations estimates in 1976 placed the number of Chileans "detained" since the coup at 40,000 to 95,000. International influence had little effect on the repression in Chile. Not until protests from Catholic bishops in Chile were raised, such as Cardinal Silva's episcopal statement "Reconciliation in Chile," did significant changes occur. Due to the efforts of many international organizations and the influence of the U.S., DINA was dismantled (but replaced by the Central de Informaciones, CNI), and repression became more controlled and surgical. It is important to note that by this time Pinochet's power was solidly entrenched and the once very real threat from the left was almost defeated. Repression continues even today, but is mostly wielded in the form of putting down protests, such as the mass demonstration in July of 1983 when 18,000 troops joined with police killing 27 people.

A year after the coup, the military regime presented their program for the second major concern that had lead to the chaos of the early 1970s, economic recovery through an aggressive free market monetarist orientation. The "Chicago Boys" followed an ultra orthodox set of policies based on the eradication of the protectionist system set up in the 1930s and strict state control of the money supply.
Through the late 1970s, the export sector of the economy was favored over the domestic sector. Unemployment rose, as did the foreign debt, but the fiscal deficit was eliminated, inflation was reduced to less than 30% per year, and growth was stimulated. Intertwined in this economic model was the "silent revolution" which established new structures for labor relations, education, and organization of professional associations. The hope was to establish new values and belief systems of future generations, thus overcoming the factionalized political society that still could not build any lasting consociational groups, even in the face of a military-authoritarian regime. The international oil shock of 1979 began the downfall of the Chilean monetarist system. By 1982, the Chicago Boys had led the country into the worst depression in the country's history. The government was forced to deprivatize much of the failing major industries and banks so that by the end of 1982, 34.3% of the financial sector was government owned.162 Despite the depression, inflation rose to 20.7% that year.163

During the high point of the Chilean "economic miracle," Pinochet took the advantage to further consolidate his power and highlight to the world Chilean

162 Borzutzky, "The Pinochet Regime," Authoritarians and Democrats, Regime Transitions in Latin America, p.78.
163 Ibid., p.78
society's agreement with the military's obligational legitimacy (at a time when the church and the United Nations were criticizing his tactics). In 1978 Pinochet presented a plebiscite to the people of Chile calling on them to support his administration. He later used the results to link himself directly to the people and effectively eliminating the junta from the governmental power structure. In 1980 the National Advisory Council presented Pinochet with a new draft constitution which Pinochet altered and then put forth in a short notice plebiscite. Only one opposition meeting was allowed and it proved counter productive to the opposition. The choice, as presented on the ballot, was between Pinochet and leftist chaos. The plebiscite won with 68% of the vote.

A transition seemed to be in the offing with the economic failure culminating in 1983. Sergio Onofre Jarpa, a civilian, was brought into the regime as Minister of the Interior. Censorship ended and exiles were allowed to return. Parties, although officially still illegal, were allowed to become more active. Yet, when the MIR assassinated the military governor of Santiago, the regime clamped down again (as they would later with the attempted assassination of Pinochet and the discovery of arms caches) and refused to negotiate. Whether a real transition was really about to be initiated is still open to debate. Pinochet would like to remain in power indefinitely and if
he thought he had (and could) do it through transition, it may happen. His official roles in the present regime, as President, Commander of the Army, and Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces, will keep him in power at least until 1989. His unofficial, but key roles, as personal integrator of day-to-day politics and coordinator of the civil/military governing coalition may very well spell the end of the military in government once he is gone. Although Pinochet is virtually alone in his belief that he should remain in power indefinitely, the rigid loyalty system of the military's organizational culture and the lack of any powerful, central figure to replace him will support him for the time being. The Mission orientation of the military has not changed appreciably either. Nor has the military been politicized to the point of loss of professionalism. In fact, according to Marcelo Mancilla Betti, Professor at the Academia de Guerra and Academia Nacional de Estudios Politicos y Estrategicos, the Army's self-image has been greatly strengthened and is better equipped than civilians to govern the country. In short, organizational culture, mission orientation, and the lack of any organized, consociational external demand for transition will continue to foster a strong obligational legitimacy in Chile. The lack of any serious 

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fractionalization and continued political capital for governmental operations will also not create any surprise sufficient condition for transfer of power.

G. IMPLICATIONS FOR OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY THEORY

These case studies highlight several important points. First, the information from these brief histories of transition provides the opportunity to inductively test the independent variables earlier postulated as necessary or sufficient conditions (see Table 2). Through the "Method of Agreement" (dealt with in Chapter 2) we find that low external legitimacy, low organizational culture, and a change in mission orientation are indeed present in every case of transition. Therefore, combined with this theory's original deductive reasoning, we can be reasonably certain that these variables are indeed necessary for obligational legitimacy breakdown.

**TABLE 2**
**TEST FOR NECESSARY CONDITIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Mission Orientation Change</th>
<th>Low Organizational Culture</th>
<th>Loss of External Legitimacy</th>
<th>Conditioned Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

162
Through the "Method of Differences," fractionalization is found to be a sufficient condition because it is present in every case of transition, but not present in the case of non transition (see Table 3).

**TABLE 3**
**TEST FOR SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Fractionalization</th>
<th>Loss of Political Capital</th>
<th>Conditioned Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The causal condition of loss of political capital remains untested because there were no cases considered where this variable, in its postulated sufficient condition, was present. Also, as inferred deductively, the contributing variables (international influence, economic forces, political culture, and mission success) proved not to be a causal factor in the transition histories studied. Some, like economic forces, were very important, but they were not sufficient for obligational legitimacy breakdown. These variables were also not necessary, because another cause could have taken its place in contributing to breakdown (e.g. economic forces could have been replaced by

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international influences and still have influenced transition).

These case studies highlight two further points about the independent variables. First, countervailing forces should always be considered. Even though a necessary variable (or a contributing variable) is in place, it can be negated by countervailing conditions. For example, the military regime in Uruguay did not have any external legitimacy when it came to power, or even after it established complete control of the government, but organizational culture protected the military from this condition until the plebiscite. In other words, external legitimacy didn't change, organizational culture did. This brings up the second important point highlighted by the case studies, the importance of time and space in the causal pattern of transitions. Local simultaneity (i.e. happening at the same time and not widely separated) of variables is critical for causal influence. For example, when the military regime came to power in Peru, external legitimacy was not important for the maintenance of obligational legitimacy. Later, though, after they had gained some support from the lower class, some officers began to rely on this external legitimacy for support of their own hypothetical obligation. When it was withdrawn, the hypothetical obligation of some in the military was severely affected. Also, it is important to note that it
was the lack of external legitimacy from the lower class in Peru that made the impact, not the support or non support of the poor of any other country studied here, or positive or negative international influence. In other words, no countervailing force changed to stimulate causal influence, but the right condition at the right time in the right place did happen. Countervailing forces and local simultaneity are constantly at work. Therefore, careful chronological cataloguing of events according to the independent variables is important, because, for example, a necessary condition for obligational legitimacy breakdown can also be withdrawn from the causal chain, derailing what would otherwise seem to be a propitious environment for transition.

Finally, these case studies also further clarify the roles of the categorical and hypothetical obligation components of obligational legitimacy. Categorical obligation is created by the perception of the single fundamental rule--the military is superior to any other group and therefore has the moral obligation to rule. To this minority group, actual policy, strategy and programs are secondary (but, by definition, will be better than what any alternative government could produce). For hypothetical obligation, as we know, results are what count. Who benefits from these results is also important to consider. The pattern of these case studies highlights the ruling
elite usually attempting to establish utilitarian (most good for the most people) rather than "ethical egoism" (most good just for the agent of the action) as the guiding principle of policy. When obligational legitimacy is threatened though, the guiding principle becomes ethical egoism (e.g. the decision--not the execution--to invade the Malvinas, or creation of false terrorist groups and thus continuing repression in order to maintain a mission orientation). This also usually marks the beginning of the movement toward obligational legitimacy breakdown.
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logic is used to clarify and classify the influences (independent variables) as necessary, sufficient, or contributing conditions for obligational legitimacy breakdown (the dependent variable). This thesis then tests the conclusions of the hypothesis through the case studies of the most recent transitions in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay. The non transition in Chile is also investigated. Inductive logic is then applied to the postulated necessary and sufficient conditions of the model which further confirmed the results of the original formulation.

The fourth underlying issue involves obligational legitimacy itself. There are many reasons why military regimes would choose not to leave power, including historical tendencies, cultural tradition, coercive power, self-interest, fear of civilian reprisal, self-perpetuation of power, and underemployment. This theory has argued that obligational legitimacy must be a critical factor in the transition process and warrants an in depth investigation. The components of this entity are a Bismarkian (might makes right) legitimacy and a deep sense of obligation to rule within the military organization. The military's monopoly on coercive power gives it the ability to operationalize this concept. The obligation portion of this concept is made up of a synthesis of a categorical obligation (acting upon a maxim that is thought to be for all men at all times, in this case--the military is superior to civilian
governments and therefore has a moral duty to rule) which is held by a minority of officers; and hypothetical obligations (desiring the result to the action, in this case—the end result of military rule is a positive thing), which a majority of officers must hold. Creation of obligational legitimacy basically consists of building hypothetical obligation by those holding the categorical obligation. Maintenance of the synthesis is protecting and nurturing the hypothetical obligation. Breakdown of obligational legitimacy is a breakdown of the synthesis.

The fifth, and final, underlying issue is, the nature of the independent variables. These variables attempt to encompass the milieu of the South American military regime and are: international influence, economic forces, external legitimacy, political capital, political culture, organizational culture, fractionalization, mission orientation, and mission success. Together, these independent variables influence each other and obligational legitimacy, ultimately leading to obligational legitimacy breakdown and military transition from power.

B. KEY ROLE OF OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY

This study postulates (and is sustained by case study investigation), that it is the military organization itself that removes the military regime from government. As described above, obligational legitimacy is the pivotal
factor in this entire process. Because it is part of the military common identity (of a military-as-government), and common identity (unity) is paramount to any professional military, there are certain natural "gatekeepers" that protect obligational legitimacy from the stresses inside and outside the military organization. As this study highlights, two major gatekeepers are mission orientation and organizational culture. The disruptive demands of the regime milieu are the other independent variables. Figure 7 is a conceptual representation of the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis and manifests the key importance of obligational legitimacy. This entity is placed in such a pivotal position because military regimes are made up of people who need to have an understanding of the world around them and how to react to it. Obligational legitimacy provides justification and meaning for their actions as rulers.
Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis
Conceptual Model

Figure 7
C. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

1. Other Variables

Within the study of the transition process, there seem to be five other variables that need to be considered, one prior to transition initiation and four after initiation, but prior to transition completion. First, Guillermo O'Donnell places great emphasis on unexpected events, bad information, etc. (fortuna) as often the decisive cause of transition initiation. The Malvinas War would seem to fit this description. Of course obligational legitimacy is the product of human rationality and is therefore open to great imperfections. But, circumstances only impose outcomes as they are filtered through the independent variables already offered. In the case of the Malvinas War, it was not the decisive or necessary cause of regime transition. The fact that other military regime transitions occur without defeat in war points this out. Obligational legitimacy was already in decay. The military defeat was only an important catalyst, affecting many of the independent variables, in a transition already in progress. In short, "fortuna" is an integral part of any variable in any model, but not worthy of unique categorization as an independent variable.
After transition initiation, the second variable that becomes obvious is "resurrection of civil society." This general upsurge, or mobilization, of society occurred in every successful transition studied here. When it occurred before transition initiation, it was categorized under loss of external legitimacy, but after transition initiation (after obligatory legitimacy breakdown), it takes on a more singular influence. This is suggested because in those instances when a transitioning regime, that is still held externally illegitimate, does not meet with civil mobilization the regime has a tendency to move toward reinstating full rule again (e.g. the young officers movement in Peru which wanted to complete the revolution in 1980). A third variable closely related to public mobilization, is the ability of political society to present an organized consociational front with which to take over leadership of the government. Again, all countries that successfully transitioned has done this. Chile, on the other hand, has been unable to accomplish this and it has been repeatedly highlighted by the military. Perhaps if a political consociation had been presented along with the civil mobilization in 1983, a full transition (as opposed to continued talk of one) would have continued. The fourth variable is "pacts," which also seem

165 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, pp.48-56.
to play an important role in the post initiation phase. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are many reasons inhibiting the military from leaving power. A very important one is fear of civilian reprisal. Not all pacts are explicit like the Uruguayan "Naval Club Pact." In fact, most pacts are not written, or very informal "understandings" (e.g. Brazilian military and Tancredo Neves, Belaunde's announced intention to respect the results of Velasco's reforms in Peru, Alfonsin initially letting the military control the prosecution of "dirty war" offenders). It would seem that all three of these variables are necessary (post obligational legitimacy breakdown) to successfully complete a transition.

Finally, it is important to note that after transition initiation, many of the variables offered in the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis take on new meaning and causal influence. As already highlighted, the component of external legitimacy termed here resurrection of civil society, becomes a key factor. Also, international influence becomes a more important influence after transition initiation (as demonstrated by the contagion affect the prosecution of the military in Argentina had on the creation of the Naval Club Pact in Uruguay, or the U.S. efforts in the transitions in Haiti and the Philippines). In short, this hypothesis is constructed to study and explain obligational legitimacy breakdown and transition
initiation. Although still applicable, extra caution should be applied when investigating the more complex transition completion process or consolidation.

2. Types of Transition

All the case studies investigated here resulted in a transition to liberalization. In fact, in no transition from a ruler-type military regime in South America did any other type of outcome occur. This lessens, somewhat, the challenge of democratic consolidation, but does not completely rule out the possibility of transition to totalitarian regimes. Until recently, the worldwide trend seemed to lean toward establishment of totalitarian regimes. A prime example often pointed to is the 1979 fall of the Shah of Iran to a Shi'ite fundamentalist regime that can be classified as totalitarian. Actually, though, most totalitarian regimes are the result of revolution, not transition. Examples of this type are, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Soviet backed coup in Afghanistan.

The reason the trend of transitions is toward liberalization is because they usually begin as a political opening. Remember, military ruler regimes by definition reject and distrust the civilian political structure. To establish a political closure toward totalitarianism is to require the military to mobilize society (and potentially challenge the military's monopoly on coercive power, as it did in Nazi Germany) and instill it with a powerful
ideology and party organization may be more than most concepts of obligational legitimacy could handle. Even the semi-corporatist regimes of Peron in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil did not sit well with the militaries of that time (i.e. they had not evolved to the ruler-type military yet). Of course it is possible to begin a transition by political opening and have it deteriorate into revolution, resulting in a totalitarian regime. This is highly improbable in South America, considering the democratic tradition and the military's fear of such possibilities, but it is more likely than transitioning directly to a political closure. It is more likely because after transition initiation, as we know, obligational legitimacy has broken down, weakening the military's aversion to such a possibility. Even still, it would take a revolution to accomplish a transformation to totalitarianism.

3. Foreign Policy Applications

As we begin to understand the inner workings of transition from military rule in South America, numerous opportunities for enlightened foreign policy application present themselves. Knowing the sufficiency and necessity of specific causal conditions is the first useful tool at our disposal. As the logic causation section in Chapter 2 explained, control of a wanted effect consists of knowledge of a sufficient condition. Therefore, to stimulate transition from military rule, U.S. influence should
concentrate on stimulating fractionalization of the military (but not alienation from the U.S.) and reducing the political capital available to the regime. As the latter is almost impossible to do without looking like an enemy to the entire population, and has questionable use doing it halfway (as highlighted with the complex policy toward South Africa), we should expend the most energy on the first. This can be accomplished in a non aggressive way through more opportunities for foreign officers to train and study in the U.S. and establishing more foreign exchange billets for U.S. officers in Latin America, exposing these officers to a different concept of the military institution. Just as important as providing the training billets, is the orientation of the potential training. For example, it does little good (in the context of this study) for foreign officers to attend the Inter-American Defense College at the National Defense University if they are cloistered away and do not have continual interaction with the United States officers attending National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on the same campus. Also, foreign officers attending more technically oriented schools in the United States should have an opportunity to attend some of the professional military education seminars or guest lectures. In most instances foreign officers are automatically barred from attending because of security concerns. Security
should be an important concern, but selective prior planning of topics, etc., would remove this problem. These officers would then be the seed of fractionalization in the continued maintenance of obligational legitimacy. It was also suggested in Chapter 2 that control of an unwanted effect consists of knowledge of a necessary condition. In other words, to support democratization in Latin America, we need to concern ourselves with the necessary conditions for reconstitution of obligational legitimacy (e.g. rigid and impermeable organizational culture, "national security" mission orientation, opportunity to establish hypothetical obligation, etc.). The same program described above would prove very useful. In addition, stimulation of an outward security orientation (the reverse of our successful efforts with Latin American militaries in the 1960s which stressed internal security) through broader integration and participation in military exercises and training. Of course, the United States can also reduce the potential for the creation of hypothetical obligation by aiding the fledgling democracies through financial stability and economic aid programs (not rigid austerity programs which get short term debts paid, but create long term problems of a higher caliber).

As suggested in the hypothesis and supported by the case studies, international influence is only a contributing variable in encouraging obligational legitimacy
breakdown, but becomes much more important after transition initiation has occurred. Also, as suggested by Hans Binnendijk, timing of influence is critical. "Withdrawing U.S. support too soon or maintaining it too long are equally dangerous." It is very important, therefore, to know at what juncture the transition is in. In regard to this study, U.S. foreign policy toward a ruler-type military regime should not concentrate on transition, but on stimulating obligational legitimacy breakdown. After obligational legitimacy has broken down, the U.S. should attempt to expedite the transition process. If the transition process itself breaks down, care should be taken to dilute the possibility of revolution (which not only could destroy needed infrastructure and institutions that any government would need in order to function, but this presents the highest potential in Latin America for establishment of a totalitarian regime). In the past the U.S. has successfully averted potentially debilitating revolutions by removing the autocratic leader (e.g. Marcos in the Philippines and Duvalier in Haiti). This may prove more difficult and not as successful with military ruler regimes where the focal point of unrest is not as specific.

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4. **Research Agenda**

The strength of this study relies heavily on deductive reasoning to establish the necessity and sufficiency of the independent variables. One direction of further research then is to continue inductive testing of the variables as new transitions present themselves and as new information becomes available on past transitions. Along this same avenue of interest, the applicability of this model to other parts of the world should be investigated. The recent variety of transitions in Thailand, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Turkey, and South Korea offer a wide selection of research candidates.

Secondly, further investigation of the potential reconstitution of obligational legitimacy in the militaries of South America should be considered. This topic is important because of the direct impact it might have on the democracies in South America and on present U.S. foreign policy. What have the ex ruler-type military organizations reconstituted as? Is a new evolution to a new type of military regime (as arbitrator regimes evolved into ruler regimes) in progress now? Are new justifications for ruler regimes evolving? Are ruler regimes the apex of military-as-government and is the evolutionary process now leading toward a new "low-class" (not motivated by economic class issues, as were arbitrator regimes), "low-state" (not motivated by specific statist ideals, as were ruler
regimes)? Are these militaries able to change their focus of allegiance from the state to the democratic institution? These are all questions that require attention, due to the direct impact their answers will have on the future of democracy in Latin America.

Finally, the regime transition matrix offered in the Appendix, although useful, relies on subjective, normative judgment. To assign accurate empirical weights to the independent variables would greatly enhance the descriptive value of the matrix. Applying empirical methodology to this model will not reduce the weight of the deductive and inductive logic, or the applicability of the normative case study approach, but it would offer another outlook from which to consider obligational legitimacy breakdown and the transition process. Perhaps application of empirical methodology could possibly lead to a value defining the threshold at which obligational legitimacy breakdown occurs in a given country.
# APPENDIX

## OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY HYPOTHESIS

### DECISION MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Causal Property</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Influence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Contributing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Forces</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Contributing</td>
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<tr>
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### Subjective Value Assignment

1 point for each contributing variable
5 points for each necessary variable
15 points for each sufficient variable

**Note:** relative point spread between countries does not correspond to "more or less transition."

### RULE:

Simultaneous overall value must be 15 points or higher for obligational legitimacy breakdown and transition initiation.
LIST OF REFERENCES


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


TRANSITIONS FROM MILITARY RULE IN SOUTH AMERICA: THE OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY HYPOTHESIS (U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA M J MITCHELL DEC 67 F/G 5/4 NL


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