South Atlantic Conflict of 1982:
A Case Study in Military Cohesion

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**ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)**

This research uses the South Atlantic conflict as a case study of land forces and an analysis of the issues of cohesion, bonding, and combat effectiveness.

Based on a review of the literature and pertinent research on cohesion and combat effectiveness, the author derived a short scale that measures cohesion variables affecting combat effectiveness. This 24-item scale consists (Continued)
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20. Abstract (Continued)

of four major categories: Societal Factors, Organizational Bonding, Vertical Bonding, and Horizontal (Peer) Bonding.

Based on extensive fieldwork interviews with enlisted personnel and officers of the British forces and the Argentine Army, the author uses the model as a framework for analyzing this conflict in relation to combat effectiveness.

The author found that cohesive units had more success on the battlefield and endured deprivations of climate and supply better than noncohesive units. Cohesion affects all aspects of combat effectiveness and is indeed a "force-multiplier." Implications of the 1982 South Atlantic Conflict for U.S. manpower planners are discussed.
This research deals with issues of cohesion, morale, motivation, and unit performance. Continuing in the Stouffer, Shils, Janowitz, and Moskos tradition of military psychology and sociology, Dr. Stewart analyzes the successes and failures of land forces in the 1982 South Atlantic Conflict. Her work is based on face-to-face interviews with British and Argentine officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel who fought in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict.

Dr. Stewart presents her results using a framework consisting of four dimensions: societal factors impinging on the military; horizontal (peer) bonding; organizational bonding; and vertical bonding. Although this research is a post hoc analysis of non-U.S. armies, the report has far-reaching implications for military manpower planners and analysts. The results of this research have been presented to the Department of the Army Staff.

Leadership styles, organizational climate, societal approval, defense budgets, and battlefield success are all inextricably intertwined. While most previous research indicates that there is little evidence showing that cohesion affects the outcome of battles, Dr. Stewart's research provides us with evidence that cohesive units can indeed withstand deprivations of climate and deficits of supply. Cohesion is a "force-multiplier" and in some instances determines the abilities of small units to stand and fight.

The military attaches of the Government of Great Britain and the Republic of Argentina provided Dr. Stewart with help and guidance during this project. The U.S. Army Research Institute thanks the military personnel of both governments for their cooperation, advice, and counsel. Without their help and good will, the project could not have been completed.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research used the 1982 South Atlantic Conflict as a case study in analyzing cohesion and combat effectiveness among land forces. Based on a theoretical framework derived from 40 years of sociopsychological research, this comparative approach shows the efficacy of using such a model to analyze the human dimensions of cohesion and combat effectiveness.

Background

Over a thousand young men died in May and June of 1982 on tiny, lonely islands near the tip of South America, called the "Malvinas" by the Argentines and "the Falklands" by the British. This far-away war of the South-Atlantic contains a series of lessons for military analysts interested in the human dimension of warfare.

This "human dimension" is often defined as "esprit," "will-to-fight," "morale," or "cohesion." Military analysts often focus on quantifiable factors, such as level of technology, advanced weaponry, supply capability, and sheer number of troops, rather than on the qualitative components of "soldier will" that lead to combat effectiveness.

Theory

Nonetheless, there is a large body of sociological and psychological research indicating that human factors such as cohesion, trust in peers, trust in leaders, unit climate, teamwork, and competence are extremely important factors in determining why men fight in combat or run away. Morale, esprit, or will-to-fight are often used as interchangeable terms with the word "cohesion." However, the author views the concepts of "morale," "fighting spirit," and "will-to-win" as interdependent with cohesion. Units with high cohesion have high morale.

Military cohesion is a special bonding that implies that men are willing to die for the preservation of the group, the code of honor of the group, or the valor and honor of the country.

A review of the literature shows that military cohesion consists of three major elements: (1) relationships among peers (horizontal); (2) relationships between subordinates and superiors (vertical); and (3) relationship to the military as an organization or unit (organizational).
But one cannot examine the soldier solely on the micro or small unit level and ignore the social, cultural, economic, and political heritage of the nation. Therefore, there is a fourth type of bonding: (4) relationship of the military and the individual to the society or culture at large.

Horizontal or peer bonding involves building a sense of trust among officers or NCOs and soldiers. Some elements contributing to peer bonding are the following: (a) sense of mission; (b) technical and tactical proficiency; (c) lack of personnel turbulence; (d) teamwork; and (e) trust, respect, and friendship.

Vertical bonding or the relationship between subordinate and superior (and superior to subordinate) involves the relationships between soldier, NCO, and officer. Some characteristics of vertical bonding contributing to military cohesion are the following: (a) an "open" (versus "authoritarian") organizational climate; (b) leaders' concern for the men; (c) leader example; (d) trust and respect for leaders; (e) sharing of discomfort and danger; and (f) shared training. Personnel turbulence also impinges on vertical bonding as well as horizontal bonding.

Organizational bonding or the relationship of the soldier or officer to the military as an organization or unit has the following characteristics: (a) loyalty to the nation and its values; (b) patriotism; (c) military tradition and history; (d) strong religious belief; and (e) well-defined concept of valor, heroism, and/or masculinity.

Military units with high cohesion are more combat effective than units with low cohesion. However other factors, such as factors, supply, logistics, weather, medical facilities, physical fitness of the troops, and training, all contribute to combat effectiveness. Such factors are cultural or societal.

Thus some societal factors contributing to military cohesion and effectiveness are the following: (a) culture, norms, values, and organization of the military; (b) size of the defense budget; (c) doctrine and strategy; (d) training; (e) tactics; (f) command, control, communications, and intelligence; (g) logistics, supply, and technology; and (h) medical care and facilities.

Methodology

Based on an extensive review of the literature on cohesion, morale, esprit, and combat effectiveness, the researcher developed a model containing factors that contribute to societal, organizational, vertical, and horizontal bonding. She interviewed enlisted personnel and officers of the Argentine Army (April and August 1987) and enlisted men and officers of the British Army and Royal Marines (March and July 1987). In
addition, in both Argentina and the United Kingdom, the re-
searcher met and consulted with military researchers, military
psychiatrists, professors of military history, and military
analysts. In Great Britain, she interviewed in-depth a total
of 15 officers (8 of whom were Marines) and 15 enlisted person-
nel, 5 of whom were Marines. One of the Royal Marine officers
interviewed was a Command Sergeant Major during the Falklands
Campaign. Also she met informally with 10 officers of 3 Para
and 5th Airborne Brigade. During her visits to Argentina in
April and September 1987, she interviewed 10 officers, 2
active-duty enlisted personnel, and 21 Malvinas enlisted
personnel who are now veterans, three of whom were Marines.

Results

Born of a 400-year military tradition and a long history
of overseas engagements involving long supply lines, joint
operations, and amphibious landings, British troops exhibited
high morale, esprit, and cohesion. Soldiers and NCOs were con-
fident that their British officers were well versed in battle
tactics. British NCOs are trained to accept responsibility at
all levels of command. An open organizational climate with
little regard for privileges of rank, accompanied by swift good
humor, led to continual adaptation in the fluid and ever-
changing battle and spelled swift success on the battlefield.

The most salient deficits of the Argentine Army in the
South Atlantic Conflict of 1982 were decided lacunae in verti-
cal and horizontal bonding, combined with problems associated
with societal factors such as training, intelligence, medical
care, and logistics.

In those areas of the battlefield where British regular
troops like the Welsh and Scots Guards fought professional and
well-trained Argentine groups such as the Argentine Marines and
the Third Artillery, English soldiers paid a high price.

Societal Factors

Britain was convinced that a war was necessary to defend
the Falklands against a foreign aggressor. She sent her very
best troops to the Falklands. Not all British troops were
grizzled veterans. Fully one-half of British enlisted were
young boys with an average age of 20. Few officers had par-
ticipated in pitched modern battles with naval and air bombard-
ment from the enemy. But the British lengthy military tradi-
tion and experience and the armed forces' continuing training
and preparation for NATO exercises, combined with their living
memory of World War II, Korea, Suez, and Belize, and constant
duty in Northern Ireland makes the British forces more aware of
battlefield tactics and quick response in combat.

Argentine forces were fully convinced of the historical
and political justification for their invasion of the Malvinas.
Although troops were enthusiastic about their liberation of the Malvinas and their loyalty and patriotism were bolstered by strong religious faith, many individual soldiers evinced self-doubt about their ability to fight pitched battles.

While Argentine forces have a long tradition of geopolitical strategy and political involvement, their lack of combat experience produced deficiencies in supply, logistics, communications, and intelligence. The Argentine armed forces have only recent experience in the war against subversion. The Argentine officers' schooling, based on rote memory, forced attrition in their service academies, and no living memory of modern battlefield conditions produced a rigid, intransigent attitude toward battlefield tactics and doctrine.

Although British forces suffered from confusion and supply problems, they were able to quickly set up headquarters and their 400 years of experience in overseas wars and amphibious landings served them well. British supply and logistics capabilities were well managed by their NCOs.

Organizational Bonding

Both Argentine and British are profoundly loyal and patriotic and have a proud military heritage, deep religious conviction, and an ingrained sense of valor or heroism. The Argentines did not lack for valor or loyalty but were woefully lacking in experience and unable to translate heroism into formation of cohesive units.

Horizontal (Peer) Bonding

The British were a combined arms and combined unit team. Their bonds of trust, respect, and friendship with each other were stronger by reason of history, training, and time spent together in garrison, on exercises, and on the long sea voyage from England. But at times their teamwork was faulty. Those Argentine units that had trained together or at least had had their conscripts for a whole year, as in the case of the Third Artillery, did evince such teamwork.

Argentine officers evinced a high degree of horizontal bonding due to close personal relationships developed in the service academies.

The Argentine conscript himself knew his own liabilities and strengths. The young 19-year-old conscript with only 1 month's training was well aware of his inadequate preparation. Argentine conscripts suffered from a decided lack of horizontal bonding with their fellow soldiers.
Vertical Bonding

In the case of British troops in the Falklands, an open organizational climate, combined with the officer's credo of caring for his men, serving as an example, and sharing training and discomfort, led to incredibly strong positive relationships up and down the vertical dimensions of the command structure from private to regimental commander.

Argentine forces, however, are rigid and have few relationships up and down the chain of command, particularly between conscript and officer. NCOs have little authority or responsibility and are used only for administrative duties. Conscripts are in and out of training so quickly that there is scarcely any time for vertical relationships to develop. A rigid, highly stratified officer corps ethos produces little or no bonding from soldier to commander.

On the other hand, a small number of Argentine units exhibited the same degree of vertical and horizontal bonding described for the British. Those Argentine units with conscripts who had completed a full 1 year's training, such as the Third Artillery Infantry Brigade, the Argentine Marines, or the special case of 601 and 602 Commandos, trusted their leaders, knew their weapons, and endured against frightening odds of continual bombardment; cold, wet, humid weather; lack of food; lack of sleep; and the sight of their fellow soldiers wounded and dying.

Conclusions

This case-study analysis of the South Atlantic Conflict of 1982 shows that the simple methodological framework using factors associated with four kinds of cohesion (societal, organizational, vertical, and horizontal) is an effective method of studying the human dimensions of cohesion and its relation to combat effectiveness. Further research will test its predictive reliability.

This research analyzing the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982 indicates that cohesion is a "force-multiplier" in that cohesive units, both Argentine and British, had greater battlefield success and were more able to withstand deprivations of climate and deficits of supply and logistics compared to non-cohesive units. The author discusses the implications of her findings for U.S. forces and manpower planners.
# SOUTH ATLANTIC CONFLICT OF 1982: A CASE STUDY IN MILITARY COHESION

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CHAPTER ONE

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CONFLICT 1982; A CASE IN MILITARY COHESION

Over a thousand young men died in May and June of 1982, on tiny little islands near the tip of South America. Called the" Malvinas" by the Argentines and " The Falklands" by the British, this far-away war of the South-Atlantic contains a series of lessons for military analysts interested in the human dimension of warfare.

This "human dimension" is often defined as "esprit" or "will-to-fight" or "morale" and "cohesion". Unfortunately, military analysts are inclined to focus on quantifiable factors such as level of technology, advanced weaponry, supply capability and sheer number of troops rather on the qualitative and often highly subjective components of "soldier will" which lead to combat effectiveness.

Nonetheless, there is a large body of sociological and psychological research (See Chapter Two and Cohesion Bibliography) which indicates that human factors such as cohesion, trust in peers, trust in leaders, unit climate, teamwork and competence are extremely important factors in determining why men fight in combat or run away.

Most studies dealing with cohesion and combat effectiveness have focused exclusively on one side of a war; Shils and Janowitz’s (1949) study of the German Wermacht in World War II; Stouffer. Lumsdaine, Lumsdaine, Williams, Smith, Janis, Star and Cottrell (1949) on Americans in World War II; Little (1964) on Americans in Korea; Moskos (1970,1975) Americans in Viet Nam; and a large body of literature dealing with Israeli forces (Gal,1983, 1985, 1986a, 1986b; Noy, Nardi and Solomon,1986; Shalit, 1985; Solomon, Noy, and Bar-On, 1986; Solomon, Mikulincer and Hobfall, 1986; Steiner and Neumann 1978). Henderson (1979) is one of the few comparative studies which looks at troops on both sides of a particular war. Using a traditional focus on weaponry and technology, the U.S. forces should have emerged victorious in their war against North Viet Nam. They did not. Henderson compares North Vietnamese forces with U.S. troops on the qualitative dimensions of cohesion and will. He shows conclusively that
the North Vietnamese troops were a more cohesive and more effective fighting force than the technologically superior U.S. forces.

Continuing in this comparative tradition, this particular research on the 1982 South-Atlantic conflict is a post-hoc comparative study of the landforces of two nations—Argentina and Britain. Using an analytical framework, derived from the literature on cohesion, this study shows the strengths and weaknesses of these two landforces in regard to cohesion and combat effectiveness. Based on the results of this particular case study, military analysts will have a simple, effective framework to use in their evaluation of the combat effectiveness of a particular nation. The case study is a test of the analytical framework. As such, let us turn to a broad overview of this short nasty little war.

Argentina and the United Kingdom have a long history of friendship, trade, commerce and mutual interests. Argentine liberator San Martin fought alongside of British General Wellington in the peninsular campaign of 1804-8. Five generations of Anglo-Argentines with surnames of Brown, Livingston, McDonald and Rawson have contributed to Argentina's history. In 1939, the Anglican cathedral of Buenos Aires recorded over 30,000 families on the parish register. Argentine exclusive private schools have British teachers; classes are taught in English; students take Cambridge entrance examinations and wear British style uniforms. Argentine girls in these British schools wear kilts and play field hockey. English high tea is a regular feature of the Argentine workday. There is a Harrods in downtown Buenos Aires. The British built the Argentine railways. But kilts and Harrods did not suffice to stop a war. Two nations previously bound in friendship fought a bloody bitter nasty war. And young men died.

Geopolitical questions of Argentina's claim to the Malvinas or the United Kingdom's sovereignty over these islands are not the concern of this paper. All we need to know is that both sides are and were convinced that each nation had and has territorial rights over these small islands. The pros and cons of the United Kingdom's and Argentina's respective claims are well documented (Andarcia, 1985; Cardosa et al 1983; Coll, 1985; Dubrovsky, 1982; Eddy et al, 1982; Enders, 1982; Gamba, 1982; Gamba and Ricci, 1986; Gambini, 1982(a), 1982(b); Goldblatt, 1983; Gonzalez, 1983; Horne, 1982; Iglesias, 1982; Larson, 1982; Marcella, 1983; Middlebrook, 1985; Moro, 1985; Purcell, 1982;

A plethora of articles and books appeared immediately after the Falklands campaign presenting the battle from the victorious British point of view (Arthur, 1985; Barnett, 1982; Bishop, 1982; Eddy et al, 1982; Fox, 1982; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983; McManners, 1984; Thompson, 1986; Vaux, 1986). Greenberg (1983) and Harris (1983) focus exclusively on the controversy surrounding the censorship of the British media, during the campaign. Smith (1984) provides an interesting sidebar to the war in his commentary as an island kelper in the middle of invasion, occupation and recapture. Jean Carr (1984) wrote a journalistic expose of the British military and civilian authorities' callous treatment afforded some of the Falklands widows and parents of deceased servicemen and the attendant scandals surrounding the South Atlantic veterans fund. Other personalized accounts of the "inside" story of war on the Falklands are found in more popular books such as Above All Courage (Arthur, 1985) and Don't Cry For Me Sergeant Major (McGowan, 1986) or the rush-to-press books of the Sunday Express Magazine (1982) or Underwood (1983). Much more interesting for the military historian are the personal accounts of Brigadier Julian Thompson (1986) and Major General Nick Vaux (1986).

Other authors have attempted to analyze both sides of the campaign with some success (Bowie, 1985; Coll and Ahrend, 1985; Gavoshon, 1984; Guilmartin, 1985; Marcella, 1983; Middlebrook, 1985, Perrett, 1982; Roberts, 1982; Segal, 1985; Zakheim, 1985).

The best references for military analysts are the official accounts of the United Kingdom's Secretary of State for Defence The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (1982) and the Argentine Army's Official Report in two volumes Informe Oficial Ejercito Argentino Conflicto Malvinas (1983). A devastating and suppressed critique, known as the Rattenbach Report, written by Argentine Army, Air Force Generals and Admirals, at the request of the military high command, was published by 1983 by the popular Argentine magazine Siete Dias.

Most authors have presented information obtained from the victorious British data, because, for many years, there was a dearth of information concerning the Argentine involvement. However, recently, there have appeared Argentine analyses of the campaign written by Malvinas' combatants or based on interviews with Malvinas veterans.
(Aguiar et al, 1985; Andrada, 1983; Colombo, 1984; Gambini, 1982 (c); Kanaf, 1982; Mottino, 1984; Piaggi, 1986; Ruiz-Moreno, 1986). Most of these Argentine books and diaries deal exclusively with the land war. Piaggi's (1986) account of his role as commander at Goose Green is particularly insightful. Argentine Air Force officer Moro (1985) analyzes the geo-political aspects of the Malvinas and presents a detailed account of the air war as seen by a planner and participant. Argentine books written by or about participants in the war range from detailed military accounts of dates, details, and summaries of weapons and munitions (Mottino, 1984) to emotional stories of heroism and valor (Balza, 1985; Kasanzew, 1983; Ruiz-Moreno, 1986; Turolo, 1983 and 1985) to devastating criticisms of venality and cowardice (Kon, 1982). The problem for the social scientist or historian is to sort out truth from exaggeration and fact from ephemeral fantasy.

As isolated and as tiny as the Falklands/Malvinas are, every Argentine schoolchild is taught from his first days at school, that the Malvinas are Argentine. Given the depth of Argentine nationalistic fervor regarding the Malvinas, we can understand the near hysteria amongst the Argentine population once the liberation of the Malvinas was underway. Hundred of thousands of Argentines went to the Plaza de Mayo to cheer the junta president General Galtieri. Renowned television and stage stars took part in a massive telethon to raise money for troops. During the telethon, socialites and film stars sold over 400,000 carnations in the streets of Buenos Aires. In a frenzy of xenophobia, porteños contributed religious medals, wedding rings, fur coats, persian rugs and antiques to the fund. The telethon raised over eleven million dollars. During the campaign the women of Argentina knitted scarves and socks for their soldiers. Argentine schoolgirls collected money to send candy bars to their soldiers. Children and pensioners wrote letters of encouragement to their boys at war.

While Argentines cheered and Argentine women knitted, the British were outraged. As happened with the Sepoy mutiny, the Defense of Ladysmith, the sinking of the Lusitania or the fall of Tobruk, the British lion roared. Then the lion pounced. On both sides of the aisle in Parliament, MPs railed against Argentine invasion of British soil. Longshoremen and shipyard employees worked long hours of overtime to ready the task force. Marines and Paras were called home from leave. Spence describes the British reaction.
Why then was the war ever fought? Equally important, why was it fought on a wave of patriotic hysteria and jingoism from the British people, in which the Labor Party leadership and large sections of the labor movement participated?...The war was a godsend to the Tories which they exploited quite brilliantly. Their popularity ratings soared and have stayed high ever since. The positions of the Conservative Party in the country and of Thatcher’s clique within the party have been greatly strengthened. But we cannot dismiss the war as something which was simply foisted on the British people by the militarism of the Tories, or the dithering of Labor, or the self-interest of the military establishment, important though all these undoubtedly were. The fact is that the war struck a ready chord among millions of British people: the myths, sentiments, and memories of the colonial empire are still alive, and still able to influence political events.”

(Spence, 1983:25-26)

While Argentines dispatched troops and supplies to the Malvinas and set up television satellite receivers so that Argentine troops could watch Argentina play in the World Cup soccer games, the British prepared for war. The official report of the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defense antiseptically catalogues the preparations.

The Falkland Islands lie 8,000 miles south-west of the United Kingdom and over 3,500 miles from Ascension Island; but only 400 miles from the Argentine mainland. The task force needed to be self-sufficient in food, water, fuel ammunition and all the other military equipment it might require...The ships of the RFA and the Merchant Navy and the Royal Air Force’s transport aircraft were to be the task force’s lifeline. Merchant shipping alone transported 9,000 personnel, 100,000 tons of freight and 95 aircraft to the South Atlantic. The supply chain carried 400,000 tons of fuel. RFA support ships transferred ammunition, dry cargo and fuel on some 1,200 occasions in addition to more than 300 helicopter transfers. British forces established a joint forward operating base at
Ascension Island. The Royal Air Force moved over 5,900 people and 6,600 tons of stores through Ascension Island in more than 600 sorties by Hercules and VC10 aircraft. Hercules aircraft also made some 40 supply drops to the task force, which entailed mid-air refuelling in round-trips lasting, in many cases, over 25 hours. This massive logistic effort enabled the warships and the aircraft of the task force to operate continuously without returning to distant bases for provisions.

In the space of seven weeks a task force of 28,000 men and over 100 ships had been assembled, sailed 8,000 miles, effectively neutralised the Argentine navy and fought off persistent and courageous attacks from combat aircraft which outnumbered its own by more than six to one. This in itself was no mean feat but the task force then put ashore 10,000 men on a hostile coast while under threat of heavy air attack; fought several pitched battles against an entrenched and well supplied enemy who at all times outnumbered our forces; and brought them to surrender within three and a half weeks.

(The Falklands Campaign, 1982:6).

In the space of those three and a half weeks, 746 Argentines were killed; 1,336 wounded and 11,400 Argentines taken as prisoners of war; 256 British troops were killed and 777 wounded. The Royal Navy lost 16 ships sunk or disabled and the Argentine Air Force lost approximately ninety airplanes. Estimates of the cost to Britain, excluding the reinforcement and continued garrison troops on the island, are approximately $1.6 billion dollars. Argentina expended at least $850 million dollars in the campaign and perhaps $1 billion dollars in arms purchases (Goldblatt and Millan, 1983).

While the Argentine Army and Navy suffered humiliation, the Argentine Air Force and Navy Air Force were covered in glory (Moro, 1985; Tecnologia Militar, 1985; Villarino, 1983). Argentine pilots had learned their lessons well from their German, Israeli and French tutors.
German Luftwaffe emigres who arrived in Argentina after World War II tutored the (Argentine) Fuerza Aerea. One of these emigres was Hans-Ulrich Rudel, the pilot who flew 2,530 missions in Stuka dive-bombers. His record of kills includes 519 tanks, 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, and 70 landing craft. Where Rudel’s instructions left off, the French and Israeli’s took over. They created a well-indoctrinated, well trained and well-disciplined force. The Fuerza Aerea commander, General Basilio Lami Dozo opposed the invasion; but, when the time came to fight his forces performed better than any other component of the Argentine military.

(Stickney, 1983:32)

When the Belgrano was sunk, the Argentine Navy also lost its will to fight.

Many of the 1,000 sailors on the General Belgrano had never been to sea. Lack of trained personnel probably allowed the cruiser to sink. Under normal conditions, the torpedoes fired from the HMS Conqueror should not have sunk a ship the size of the Belgrano. The Argentine Navy also suffered from lack of leadership and discipline. The flight of the two destroyers accompanying the Belgrano clearly demonstrates this point. Quality leaders do not leave the scene of a sinking ship to leave 1,000 men to the mercy of a winter storm. More than 100 Argentine Sailors probably died as a result.

(Stickney, 1983:40-41)

The Argentine military junta saw the invasion of the Malvinas as an opportunity to consolidate their political strength. The fervor and excitement which greeted the invasion proved them right. However the Argentine military were very wrong in anticipating British reaction to the invasion of the Falklands.

In war, cultural factors are ignored at peril. It is a commonplace observation that wars can start by happenstance, misunderstanding and miscalculation, with cultural misperceptions playing a starring role. Of this, the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict is a brilliant example. It is apparent in retrospect that the British government failed to take seriously Argentine claims of sovereignty, which seemed romantic, at best and irrational at worst, within a British historical and cultural context. Similarly, it is clear that the Argentine leadership found it inconceivable that Britain would really go to war over the abstract right of political self-determination of some 1,500 kelpers and shepherders who were arguably British only by a technicality.

(Guilmartin, 1985:59-60)

(The Argentine military junta) believed that the United States would not oppose an Argentine invasion of the Falklands—both as a quid pro quo for Argentina’s support of U.S. hemispheric security policy and because the United States was pro-Argentine...the generals never really thought the British would fight...This major miscalculation was partly a result of the generals' insularity. Accustomed mainly to their version of strategic military thinking, the generals decided the islands lacked strategic importance for Britain. They apparently did not take into account the role that British domestic pressures and the "End of Empire" psychology would play in determining the British response. Moreover, the generals' error in judgment also grew out of their belief that the United States, acting under principles dating from the Monroe Doctrine and reiterated in the Rio Pact (The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), would do everything in its power to prevent European ships from entering and doing battle in hemispheric waters.

(Purcell, 1982:663)

The United Nations met, the Organization of American States passed declarations; U.S. Secretary of State Haig shuttled back and forth across the Atlantic. To no avail. The task force sailed. Words like Super Etendard, Exocet, Rapier, Blowpipe, casevac and flamazine became part of everyday conversation in Argentine and British homes.
Argentina's Belgrano was sunk. Argentina's pilots came storming down bomb alley so low under the radar and so close to the sea that their windshields had salt spray from the waves. Britain's Sheffield, Conventry, Atlantic Conveyor, Antelope, Ardent and Sir Galahad were sunk. Antrim, Brilliant, Broadsword, Arrow, Avenger, Argonaut, Plymouth, Glasgow, Sir Tristan, and Sir Lancelot all suffered damage from Argentine Air Force and Naval Air bombing. And 1,000 Argentine and British young men died. Why did the British win? Why did the Argentines lose?

Much post-war analysis of the South Atlantic conflict has centered on the weaponry used, the British logistics miracle, the legality of the sinking of the Belgrano or the courage of the Argentine Air Force and Naval Air. This study uses the South Atlantic conflict as a case study of landforces and the issues of cohesion, bonding and the actions of men in war.

Many Argentine units fought bravely and well. Others broke and ran. Why? Were there discernible differences in selection, training, leadership, or experience?

The strength of the British forces was neither weapons nor technology but its men. "The most important factor in the success of the task force was the skill, stamina and resolution displayed by individual Servicemen" (The Falklands Campaign, 1982:16). As Brigadier David Chaundler of the United Kingdom 5th Airborne Brigade said in an interview,

> No matter how sophisticated the weaponry, the ultimate test is the man himself on the battlefield. It is always a soldier with a fixed bayonet and rifle who wins the war.

Using research on cohesion, morale, bonding and stress, we developed a schema of analysis for the behavior of men under battlefield stress. The methodology and development of the model is discussed in Appendixes A and B. In order to test the utility of this framework to analyze cohesion and combat effectiveness, we used the 1982 South-Atlantic conflict as a test case study. In-depth interviews with British and Argentine officers and enlisted soldiers and military analysts shows that this framework is valuable to understand why and how men fight wars.

Chapter Two reviews pertinent studies in the area of cohesion and morale and battlefield stress. Chapters Three and Four present an outline of the history and background
of the British and Argentine land forces in light of cohesion research. Chapters Five through Eight present an analysis of the various factors contributing to or deterring from cohesion in battle using the South-Atlantic conflict as a case study.
CHAPTER TWO

MILITARY COHESION

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely.

(Ardant Du Picq)

This chapter presents a broad overview of the concept of cohesion, morale, esprit or fighting spirit to show the relationship between such concepts and losing or winning battles. As we shall see in this chapter, the concept of cohesion is multi-dimensional not a single causal factor contributing to combat effectiveness.

Military historians, sociologists and psychologists have long meditated on the issue of why men stand and fight or break and run. The task of military leaders has always been to meld young men into unified troops who would bravely face the enemy’s sword, crossbow or cannon after withstanding trials of forced marches, hunger, thirst, cold, vermin, loneliness, and disillusionment. Military leaders have long sought reasons why men will fight. Is it one of or a combination of: charismatic leadership, superb tactics, adequate logistics, superior firepower, patriotism or that ephemeral quality of "esprit"?

The answer is some of the above, or all of the above, but always and most importantly that will-o-the-wisp known as "esprit", or "morale", or "will". This concept is hardly new.

After a long and arduous campaign, Greek military leader Xenophon (434-355 B.C.) wrote:

You know I am sure that not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot withstand them.
Commanders prior to and since Xenophon have pondered the problem of turning young boys into fighting men. In time of dire crisis, young children, old men and even women have been pressed into service. But most armies have consisted of young adolescent males and young men. Civilians have been dragooned into armies by press gangs. Soldiers have fought fortified by drugs or alcohol. They have rushed to their deaths inspired by belief in Holy Crusades or desire for Nirvana. Officers holding swords and lances have prodded men sick with fear into firefights. For good overviews of military history and analyses of men in battle through the ages, there are several references listed in the separate bibliography on cohesion found at the end of this paper (Keegan,1986; Holmes,1985; Keegan and Holmes,1987).

Without exception all famed military leaders -- Xenophon, Sun Tzu, Caesar, Genghis Khan, Charlemagne, Napoleon, Wellington, Washington, Lee, McArthur, Slim, Montgomery or Mao--agree that men united for a cause, trusting in each other and confident in their leaders will be an effective and victorious army. This unity or sense of belonging manifests itself in the elegant phrase esprit d’corps or a simple word like "buddy". As pointed out in the first chapter, British historians have emphasized the raison d’etre of a fighting force to be the regimental spirit or the sense of belonging.

With the advent of World War II, social psychologists worked assiduously to determine what were the elements that made men fight, fight well or break down completely. Stouffer et al’s work (1949) is still a landmark and forms an important part of the basis for military psychology and sociology.

Stouffer et al (1949) found that a majority of men in combat admitted to fear; were not overly concerned with issues of patriotism; did not hate unduly the enemy; prayed when they were frightened; and, believed in a code of masculinity. Loyalty to the group or unit was paramount to high performing units. High performing units were defined as units with low rates of nonbattle casualties. These units were those in which the men developed bonds of loyalty to the group; had favorable attitudes towards the officers; trusted in the medical care they would receive in battle and had pride in the unit’s accomplishments.

But fear was ever-present. Officers and enlisted men in the Mediterranean said that combat became more frightening the more they saw of it (Stouffer et al
1949:70). Eighty-three percent of Stouffer's sample of 1,766 combat veterans in Italy in 1944 reported that they had seen a man overcome by fear. Those who observed that extreme manifestation of fear or "crack-up" reported that they were upset as well (Stouffer, 1949:208-209). This focus on overcoming fear is a direct outcome of the emphasis placed on the diagnosis of "shell shock" of World War I vintage and the growth of psychiatry and psychology in the 1920-40 period.

Continuing in the same intellectual tradition, the founders of military sociology Shils and Janowitz (1948) interviewed German soldiers to determine why Wermacht soldiers fought against insurmountable odds; or, why units and individuals surrendered or ran away. They concluded that the following factors contributed to cohesive groups--those that stood and fought:-- small group ties, physical proximity to other groups, devotion to Hitler, fear of retribution against one's family, belief in National Socialism, paternal protectiveness of senior NCO's and junior officers, and disbelief in enemy propaganda.

Those German soldiers who surrendered did so because their primary group ties had been broken. Some of these soldiers were isolated in bunkers or cellars with no ties to the larger group and lacked food, warm clothing and supplies. Others were Poles or Slavs with no ties to the German fatherland. Of the German nationals, some knew that their families' town had already been overrun by Allied or Soviet troops and there was no sense of defending their homeland for the sake of their families. Thus, these frightened, lonely, cold and hungry troops surrendered singly or in groups or waited huddled in their sleeping bags or hidden in bunkers waiting to be captured. But American researchers found that even victorious U.S. troops did not fight in a singularly united fashion.

Military historian, S.L.A. Marshall (1947) astounded U.S. Army officials with his finding that over seventy-five percent of U.S. soldiers in the European and Central Pacific Theatres in World War II did not fire their weapons, during combat. The element of trust or of loyalty to the group that Stouffer et al (1949) had found in the high performing groups was noticeably absent in most U.S. troops whom Marshall interviewed. Thus the soldier did not fire his weapon for fear of detection by the enemy. He also did not fire his weapon because he was not sure that his fellow soldiers would cover him or help defend the perimeter against the enemy. Combat effectiveness was
degraded by this lack of trust or loyalty. Cohesion was absent.

Roger Little’s (1964) insightful work on infantry platoon in combat and in garrison, during Korea further underscored S.L.A. Marshall’s observations. Little’s title,”Buddy Relations and Combat Performance” (Little 1964) provides the essence of his results. Men were closely bonded together as buddies during combat. These bonded relationships meant that men would fight together as a unit and thus live to another day.

The primary basis for solidarity in the platoon and company was the recognition of mutual risk. A set of norms so regulated their behavior as to minimize that risk.

(Little, 1964:218).

Little (1964:213-218) also had some salient comments on the relationship between officers and soldiers. In garrison, the officers were removed from the men and were more concerned with the ceremonial aspect of army life. However, in combat, the officers lived with their men, shared their discomfort, and fears. The status differences became blurred in combat to such an extent that the officers allied themselves with their men and tended to ignore higher echelon requests.

On the line, officers were isolated from their status peers. When sharing the risks and hardships of their men they tended to develop solidarity with them and to support deviations from the norms of the larger organization, although their ultimate loyalty to the organization was effectively maintained.

(Little, 1964:219)

Over and over, research in military psychology and sociology in the U.S. and other Allied nations, reaffirms, time and time again, the interrelationship of small group ties, loyalty, bonding, esprit and combat performance. Yet, the majority of U.S. Army planners emphasize training, tactics, firepower and weapons systems and, if not ignore, at least downplay the issue of the socio-psychological effect of cohesion on high performance in battle. Fortunately, not all military analysts or members of the armed services ignore human factors in battle.
One theorist who is a noticeable exception to the emphasis on machines and weapons, Col. W.D. Henderson (1979;1985) has written two very interesting books on the issue of cohesion and battlefield performance. His 1979 book *Why the Viet Cong Fought* analyzes the reasons why the Viet Cong won in Viet Nam against a U.S. force with greater concentrated firepower and air and naval support. The U.S. inflicted five casualties for every one U.S. or Allied casualty.

One army endured, and the other did not...the North Vietnamese Army endured, maintained its cohesion, and remained on the battlefield when all others had retired.  

(Henderson, 1979:xv)

Henderson’s work refines the trailblazing participant observation research of Charles Moskos.

Moskos (1970) lived, marched, ate C-rations with and interviewed enlisted men during the Viet Nam War. Following in the footsteps of Shils, Janowitz and Little, Moskos well understood that cohesion is a key element in the soldier’s survival.

If the individual soldier is realistically to improve his survival chances, he must necessarily develop and take part in primary-group relations.  

(Moskos, 1970:145)

He points out that the one year Vietnam tour which was thought to be the best manpower solution, was in reality a disaster from the point of view of developing cohesive units who are combat effective. Even though Moskos found the individual combat soldier to have high morale, he had misgivings about the one year tour. Men were rotated in and out of units as single replacements. Thus, a lieutenant might have three weeks experience, his sergeant two months and the men varying degrees of experience ranging from a few weeks to eleven months. Thus, the group had little primary group cohesion or loyalty and even more importantly had disparate amounts of actual combat experience.

Within the combat unit itself, the rotation system has many consequences for social cohesion and individual motivation. The rapid
turnover of personnel hinders the development of primary-group ties as well as rotating out of the unit men who have attained combat experience.

(Moskos, 1970:142)

In a later paper, Moskos (1975) further developed his analysis of the deleterious affects of the one year rotation system.

Overall, the rotation system reinforced an individualistic perspective that was essentially self-concerned. The end of the war was marked by the individual’s rotation date and not by the war’s eventual outcome -- whether victory, defeat, or negotiated stalemate. Whatever incipient identification there might be with abstract comrades-in-arms was circumvented by the privatized view of the war fostered by the rotation system.

(Moskos, 1975:31).

Army psychiatrist, Peter Bourne (1970) was sure that the one year tour was a decisive factor in a lack of group cohesiveness which, in turn, led to increased rates of psychiatric casualties. Twenty years prior to Bourne, Stouffer et al (1949), had already made a clear relationship between a replacement’s integration to the group and the new soldier’s subsequent combat performance.

The replacement who joined his unit in combat had two adjustments to make simultaneously: to his new outfit and to combat itself. Lacking established ties to buddies as well as experience in teamwork with them, he would appear to be at a distinct disadvantage in his first combat experience.

(Stouffer et al, 1949:277).

Research has repeatedly shown that there is a strong relationship between cohesion, soldiers’ level of morale and combat efficiency (Ingraham and Manning, 1980,1981; Shils and Janowitz, 1949; Stouffer et al 1949). Stouffer et al (1949) provided the cornerstone for this link between cohesion and combat efficiency in their study of infantry men and bomber crews in World War II. They wrote:
(a)ffective ties binding the group together were important in keeping men in combat because, among other reasons, the group through its formal organization was inextricably committed to the fight: anything that tied the individual to the group therefore kept him in combat.

(Stouffer et al, 1949:100).

Henderson defines military cohesion as follows:

Cohesion exists in a unit when the primary day-to-day goals of the individual soldiers, of the small group with which he identifies, and of unit leaders are congruent—with each giving his primary loyalty to the group so that it trains and fights as a unit with all members willing to risk death to achieve a common objective.

(Henderson, 1985:4)

Herein lies the crux of military cohesion. Disparate men from varied socioeconomic backgrounds, of different ethnic origins and levels of education are expected to become not just a collection of individuals but a unit in which an individual will sacrifice his life and die in order to preserve the group. Because of well developed ties of friendship or camaraderie, men will fight individually as part of a unit to defend the group as a unit, its honor, or its combat efficiency. We are not referring to job efficiency, or meeting production quotas, or increasing the numbers of goals of a football team but death and dying for the good of the group. That's the essence of military cohesion. Because combat is a nasty brutish place to be.

Moskos (1975) describes the soldier's world.

In the combat situation, the soldier not only faces the imminent danger of loss of life and, more frightening for most, limb, he also witnesses combat wounds and deaths suffered by buddies. Moreover, there are the routine physical stresses of combat existence: the weight of the pack, tasteless food, diarrhea, lack of water, leeches, mosquitoes, rain, torrid heat, mud and loss of sleep. In an actual fire-fight with the enemy, the scene is generally one of utmost chaos and confusion.
Deadening fear intermingles with acts of bravery and, strangely enough, even moments of exhilaration and comedy.

(Moskos, 1975:28)

Moskos (1975) repeated the contention of Stouffer et al (1949) that men fight as individuals as part of a fighting group so that the individual may survive and live. While friendship and the bonds of cohesion tie the men to each other, during a firefight with imminent death a possibility men fight and kill so that each one may live.

This bonding to the group and the individual’s bonding to the goals of the society as a whole are intrinsic elements of military cohesion. Because there is a dark side to cohesion. Highly cohesive groups may have standards at polar opposite to the organization, the military or the society. Fraggings, a drug subculture and even mutiny are cohesive groups with little or no allegiance to the mores, norms, folkways and culture of society at large. Thus our definition of military cohesion implicitly defines the group and individual as being in consonance with the norms of the larger culture. Thus, we view cohesion as an ameliorating factor in group relations.

And, in peacetime, strong military cohesion has salubrious effects. Motowildo and Borman (1978) studied 614 U.S. soldiers from 47 platoons and 16 companies stationed in a foreign location. Their results indicated that units with high morale (as defined by a combination of scales) had less AWOL, drug abuse, numbers of serious accidents, sick calls, congressional inquiries and nonjudicial punishment than units with low morale. Motowildo and Borman’s concept of "morale" is based on a series of surveys and interviews that tap the dimension of cohesion defined as "high morale".

Thus, we see that, for some researchers and theorists, morale is an element of cohesion or is the measurement of will. Cohesion is a combination of many factors. Cohesion is linked to the sense of belonging to the primary group, to the hierarchy of rank structure and to the society as a whole.

Military psychiatry has shown that the more cohesive the group, the less psychiatric casualties there are in peacetime or in wartime (Bourne 1970; Gal,1983, 1986a, 1986b; Ingraham and Manning, 1980; Marlow unpublished ms. n.d.; Milgram and Hobfall,1986; Noy, Nardi, and Solomon,
1986; Price, 1984; Shaw, 1983; Solomon, Noy and Bar-On, 1986; Tiffany, 1967; Yager, 1975). In his study of U.S. Eighth Army pilots in World War II, Bond (1952) found that anxiety reactions and fatigue were directly correlated to danger of combat. Price (1984) states that psychiatric casualties for the U.S. were 23% for World War II, 6% in Korea and 5% in the early stages of Viet Nam and reaching a high of 60% during the drug epidemic of 1972 (Price, 1984:109). He also states that the extremely low rate (i.e. 2%) of psychiatric casualties among British troops in the Falklands War...

was due to a number of positive factors. The use of elite units, short duration of combat, little exposure to indirect fire, an unopposed landing, and a consistently successful posture, all of which influenced the rate of psychiatric casualties in past American Wars.

(Price, 1984:112)

The Price quote illustrates that cohesion is only one element of winning a war. Supply, logistics, tactics, air superiority and medical care are all necessary elements of a victorious force. Cohesive patriotic groups with inadequate weapons and supply cannot win a war any more than well supplied troops with no will to win. But in all wars at all times it is the man on the ground who trusts his buddies and who believes in his officer's competency who wins the war. But the individual soldier does not win the war -- the unit or group does. And the more cohesive the group, the less the nonbattle casualties.

Israeli research has built on and refined the U.S. findings on the link between cohesion and psychiatric casualties. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is well aware of the value of cohesion, morale or esprit in reducing psychiatric casualties.

Israelis know that manpower is the most important resource of their fighting force because their small nation cannot field an effective army with a high rate of battle and nonbattle casualties. Col. (R) Reuven Gal, former Chief Psychologist of the Israeli Defense Force has written extensively on this subject (Gal, 1986a;1986b). Gal feels that morale is not a criterion (or predictor) variable but one of eight unit climate factors which comprise a broader construct which he calls "unit climate". The eight factors that he developed were related to confidence in leaders, peers, weapons and oneself, relationships with one's
leaders and peers and fear variables such as worries about combat aftermath and concern about the enemy (Gal, 1986b:563). Gal’s research on Israeli heroes shows that the more cohesive is the group the more the group and individuals will perform heroic acts in battle.

Gal (1983) studied those soldiers in the 1973 Yom Kippur War who received Israel’s Medal of Honor. He states: "Israeli heroes, then, are not a distinct species. Apparently, they are not born heroes, they become heroes" (Gal, 1983:88). Gal feels that results of the study indicate that men who are bonded to their unit will perform acts of heroism.

A more careful examination of the characteristics of the Israeli cases reveals the predominance of the "social" element in the behavior of these heroes. In three out of four situational categories the awarded acts were carried out not while the hero was alone, but in the presence of others, most frequently his unit members. Almost half of the cases involved the risk of one’s life for the sake of the survival of others...group morale and cohesiveness, as well as the sense of commitment to one’s unit and friends, play a major role in instances of combat gallantry in general...and in the Israeli instance in particular... (Gal, 1983:89-90)

Again, we see that men who know each other, respect each other, have confidence in their leaders and believe in their cause are better braver combat soldiers.

Steiner and Neumann’s (1978) study on (IDF) tank crews showed a conclusive link between the concept of unit cohesion and combat efficiency. They studied two different types of tank crews: those who fought as distinct units and those tank crews comprised of individuals who came willy-nilly to the staging area and were sent hastily to the front. This action was contrary to Israeli training and doctrine and had dire manpower consequences.

IDF tank crews train and fight as units. But the 1973 Yom Kippur War caught the Israelis by surprise. Several of the IDF reserve armor units were sent precipitously to the front lines before forming their normal combat teams. Hence, many tank crews found themselves fighting battles
with men whom they had met scarcely a few hours previously. Steiner and Neumann found that the tank crews of strangers compared to intact crews had a higher incidence of battlefield stress casualties and post-traumatic combat reactions. This result is all the more astonishing given that the control group of intact crews experienced more intense battles, were under heavier fire, were short in equipment and had heavy losses.

Israeli military researchers are interested not only in battle stress casualties but also in post-traumatic stress casualties. Because Israel has a severely limited manpower pool which is called on again and again to deploy rapidly, the nation cannot afford to have trained soldiers incapacitated by post-traumatic stress (PTSD).

Solomon et al (1986) studied combat stress reactions (CSR) among a group of 382 Israeli soldiers during the 1982 Lebanon-Israel War. This group was compared with carefully matched controls who did not develop CSR. They studied the effect of feeling of loneliness or isolation in battle and CSR. They concluded that lack of social support from officers and/or buddies contributed to greater feelings of loneliness and higher likelihood of CSR. Intensity of battle also led to increased loneliness and increased incidence of CSR. However the lack of social support also may lead to a perception of a more intensive battle than there was in actuality (Steiner et al 1986:1269).

Solomon, Noy and Bar-On (1986) found that men in the IDF reserve forces were more likely to have psychiatric or nonbattle casualties than active army troops. They concluded that there were five reasons for the difference between the casualty rate between reservists and regulars: reservists are older and are not physically as fit as younger regular troops; have been in several wars and have weakened resilience to stress reactions; are forced to make a more dramatic transition from peacetime to wartime; have a greater sense of responsibility to their wives and children; and, have less cohesion among their groups. Because IDF reservists come from different geographical areas of Israel and from varied socioeconomic backgrounds, the groups are disparate in a demographic sense. Thus reservists fight with "strangers" and active troops with the same men with whom they live during peacetime.

Building on their previous research, Noy, Nardi and Solomon (1986) analyzed the performance of four Israeli battalions. They state that group cohesion and leadership are buffering variables that can lessen the number of
psychiatric casualties. Furthermore, they feel that their work shows that it is feasible to predict a unit’s susceptibility to psychiatric casualties knowing the unit’s cohesiveness, leadership styles and the anticipated battle conditions. Group cohesion and leadership will explain the covariance between direct casualties and nonbattle casualties.

Unfortunately most of the psychiatric and psychological literature dealing with combat stress or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has serious methodological flaws. Stewart and Weaver (1987) discuss the lack of replication, the use of small numbers of subjects, little use of control groups and variation in definition of terms to illustrate the severe statistical and methodological defects of this body of research. A review of this literature, inadequate as these studies may be, indicates that some of the factors leading to combat stress or post-traumatic stress are the following: lack of confidence in leaders, pre-existing personality disorders, adverse life events, fear of loss of one’s own life, grief and loss of comrades, lack of group cohesion, lack of morale, lack of motivation, guilt of survival, guilt over killing people, being a new member of a unit, lack of self esteem, lack of self confidence, sense of helplessness, lack of social support, alcohol or drug use and abuse, severity and intensity of combat exposure, exhaustion and fatigue, hostile climate (jungle or arctic), unfamiliarity with mission or terrain, no forward psychiatric treatment, inability to return fire, isolation, loneliness, defensive military posture, lack of belief in legitimacy of the war, physical discomfort, pain, one year rotation schedule, low level of education and enlisted rank (Weaver and Stewart, 1987).

The task of leaders in training, garrison, field exercises and finally in combat is to recognize that these are elements that will cause stress and psychiatric breakdown in troops. The job of the trainer and the combat leader is to meet these problems before they occur. Many researchers and military officers agree that any man over a long period of time will definitely suffer combat stress, particularly if the conditions of climate, combat, exhaustion, lack of food and sleep are continual. Major General Vaux commenting on the state of his troops, in the South Atlantic Conflict of 1982, before the assault on Mt. Harriet, wrote,

By now there was evidence of real suffering among the troops in the rifle company
positions. I could see that if we endured too long in these mountains, we might not be capable of a major attack at the end of that time. Moreover, our patrols were now going to have to fight for the intelligence we needed to plan the main assault. That would require leadership, initiative, aggression and stamina, from increasingly weary and weakened junior leaders and marines. The self-confidence and determination with which we had landed were now being eroded ominously. Morale and fitness are like bank accounts—incessant withdrawals must be compensated for eventually.

(Vaux, 1986:139)

Vaux wrote that high morale and "determination" were important factors in the cohesive spirit of his troops. In the preceding discussion on Israeli and U.S. research, there is an implicit assumption on both the Israeli data and the U.S. findings that the soldiers who withstand stress must be committed to a principle of patriotism, just war, ideology, or, belief in the nation's principles. Researchers refer to this kind of integration as "integral" or "organizational" cohesion.

Quite the opposite may be true. There is a dark side to cohesion, as the U.S. discovered in Viet Nam. Cohesive units may oppose a war, or be united in opposition to leaders or the conduct of the war. Cohesive units may have an active drug sub-culture; engage in anti-war activities and attempt to kill officers or NCO's; and, have high rates of AWOL, or desertion. But these activities run counter to the aims of the nation, the army or the purpose of the war. Such behavior detracts from combat effectiveness. By definition this kind of bonding of the group or intellectual doubts of the individual soldier in the rightness of his cause run counter to the definition of "military cohesion".

Shalit (1985) discusses the psychological problems of loss of structure, confusion, alienation, fear, poor cohesion and leadership problems attendant on Israel's 1982 War with Lebanon. Shalit states that the fact that compared to a 1969 social status ranking of occupations the military rank lower today illustrates that the military have lost a great deal of their previously high prestige (Shalit, 1985:10). He states that in 1967 and 1973 the percent of psychological injuries was 5-8% of the total
force. During the Lebanon war, the incidence of psychological casualties was 23-25% Shalit (1985:12). He concludes from anecdotal discussions with troops and civilians that the Lebanon War of the 1980’s covered Israel with shame and that the soldiers’ confusion about their role and behavior in Lebanon contributed to the high rate of psychiatric casualties, loss of social status, loss of cohesion amongst troops and leadership problems.

Gal does not agree with Shalit that morale was low. In a very perceptive paper on commitment and obedience in the Israeli Army, he states that IDF combat troops continued to maintain high morale, despite the increasing criticism directed to the legitimacy of the Israeli presence in Lebanon, as long as they perceived their commanders as trustworthy and competent.

(Gal, 1985:560)

Therein may lie the key to Gal’s disagreement with Shalit in the respondents’ perception of the commander as "trustworthy and competent". It may be that those soldiers interviewed by Shalit were precisely those who did not trust their commanders. However the Gal paper is interesting because it discusses the concept of mutinies, and the dilemma of a commander to obey or disobey orders which he may consider to be militarily unsound or politically stupid.

Nevertheless, Shalit’s statements about the problems inherent in the incursion into Lebanon and Gal’s 1985 case study on the ethical, political, and tactical disagreements of one high ranking Israeli officer do point out the varying tugs and pulls an enlisted man or officer must resolve in war. These Israeli ethical dilemmas sound remarkably familiar to Americans who lived through the emotional roller-coaster of the Viet Nam War. Bourne (1970) discusses some of the issues surrounding soldiers’ views of the Viet Nam War against the backdrop of protest and anti-war activity in the United States and among American troops in Viet Nam.

Stouffer et al (1949) found that American soldiers said that patriotism had little to do with fighting or defending a perimeter or foxhole. They fought to live to another day. Or so they said. But when Stouffer and his researchers continued to probe and seek reasons for the soldiers’ combat performance patriotism was indeed an
important factor in determining the will to endure and the will to fight. Stouffer's research indicated that those nationalistic or patriotic values were difficult for the soldier to articulate but nonetheless were a salient factor in his ability to withstand the rigors of war.

Thus we see that the soldier (or NCO or officer) is bonded to his peers, to his subordinates and superior officers and to the principles of the nation as well. Cohesion, therefore, is a multi-dimensional concept. We need some precision in our definition of what is military cohesion.

That methodological precision is supplied by work done at the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Holz, 1986; Oliver, 1987; Siebold, 1987a, 1987b; Siebold and Kelly, 1987a; 1987b). Siebold and his associates have delineated three types of cohesion: vertical, horizontal and organizational. The U.S. Army Research Institute research shows that an open organizational climate and nurturing (caring) commanders leads to high levels of morale, cohesion and competence. Siebold and Kelly (1987b) found a direct correlation between cohesion measures and unit performance. Other U.S. Army researchers have found similar results (Furukawa et al, 1987; Griffith 1986a, 1986b, 1986c; Griffith and Chopper, 1986a, 1986b; Hoover and Griffith, n.d.; Ingraham and Manning, 1980, 1981; Marlow et al, 1985; Van Straten and Kaufman; Wesbrook, 1980; Wray, 1987).

In a Walter Reed Army Institute of Research monograph, Furukawa et al 1987 delineated the issues of military cohesion.

Military unit cohesion is a complex concept. It is the product of (a) bonding of equals (soldiers with each other), (b) bonding of superiors and subordinates, (c) bonding and affirmation of the special properties of a group (a team, a crew, a platoon), and (d) a set of perceptions of the skills and abilities of oneself and others.

Cohesion processes are both emotion-laden (affective) and task-oriented (instrumental). The metaphors that combat personnel use in describing their relationships are those of love, kinship, and fraternal bonding. These metaphors are rooted in perceptions of the degree to which the skills, competencies, and
interpersonal linkages of oneself with others ensure survival of both oneself and the group. We group these perceptions under the term "psychological readiness for combat."

Psychological readiness for combat comprises five dimensions, including horizontal cohesion, vertical cohesion, individual morale, confidence in group combat capability, and confidence in leaders. These dimensions of psychological readiness provide the soldier with supportive relationships that mediate the effects of stress. They provide the soldier with a psychological "armor" of strength and competence, through the instrumental and affective bonds that increase his odds for safety and survival in a hostile environment.

(Furukawa et al. 1987:2)

In sum, this review of the literature shows that military cohesion consists of three major elements:

1. relationships between peers (horizontal)
2. relationships between subordinates and superiors (vertical).
3. relationship to the military as an organization or unit (organizational).

But we cannot examine the soldier solely on the micro or small unit level and ignore the social, cultural, economic and political heritage of his nation. Therefore, we include a fourth type of bonding:

4. relationship of the military and the individual to the society or culture at large.

Horizontal or peer bonding involves building a sense of trust between officers or between NCO's and between soldiers. Some elements contributing to peer bonding are the following:

(a) Sense of mission.
(b) technical and tactical proficiency
(c) Lack of personnel turbulence
(d) teamwork
(e) trust, respect and friendship
Vertical bonding or the relationship between subordinate and superior (and superior to subordinate) involves the relationships between soldier, NCO, and officer. Some characteristics of vertical bonding contributing to military cohesion are the following:

(a) An "open" (versus "authoritarian") organizational climate.
(b) Leader's concern for the men.
(c) Leader example.
(d) Trust and respect for leaders
(e) Sharing of discomfort and danger.
(f) Shared training.

Organizational bonding or the relationship of the soldier or officer to the military as an organization or unit has the following characteristics:

(a) Loyalty to the nation and its values.
(b) Patriotism.
(c) Military tradition and history, high status
(d) Strong religious belief.
(e) Well defined concept of valor, heroism, masculinity

Morale, or esprit or will-to-fight are are often used as interchangeable terms with the word "cohesion". However, we view the concepts of "morale," "fighting spirit" "will-to-win" as interdependent with cohesion. Units with high cohesion have high morale. Morale is a factor associated with and intrinsic to cohesion. Unfortunately, military historians and most social scientists use varying, imprecise and fuzzy definitions of cohesion, military cohesion, morale and command or unit climate. The best attempt at precise definition is the quoted section from Furukawa et al (1987).

The literature review also indicated that the higher the military cohesion:

- the less nonbattlefield casualties in combat
- the more soldiers will fire their weapons in combat
- the less desertion in time of war
- the more valiantly soldiers will fight
- the less AWOL, drug addiction, alcoholism and sick calls in peacetime.
Military cohesion is a special bonding which implies that men are willing to die for the preservation of the group or the code of honor of the group or the valor and honor of the country.

Military units with high cohesion are more combat effective than units with low cohesion. However other factors such as tactics, supply, logistics, weather, medical facilities, physical fitness of the troops and training all contribute to combat effectiveness. We call such factors cultural or societal.

Societal factors which impinge on military cohesion are those of society’s attitudes towards the military, in general, or, towards a particular war in the sense that an adequate defense budget exists for training of men, purchase of supplies and armament and staffing of military hospitals and training of officers and men. All the high level of morale and all the will to win combined with officers and men who trust each other will come to nought if the men have no weapons or no food. If the political will is absent or political strategy is incorrect, the military strategy will also suffer. Or if the level of technology of the war has an imbalance, the troops are doomed. World War II Polish officers using cavalry charges against German tanks may illustrate cohesion amongst Polish officers but was to no avail.

Thus some societal factors contributing to military cohesion and effectiveness are the following:

(a) Culture, norms, values and organization of the military
(b) Size of Defense Budget
(c) Doctrine and Strategy
(d) Training
(e) Tactics
(f) Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
(g) Logistics and Supply and Technology
(h) Medical care and facilities.
Military cohesion is part of and embedded in the society's norms, values, mores and cultural ethos. Fig. 1 illustrates the interrelationship between the three major facets of military cohesion (vertical, horizontal and organizational), how these three elements are embedded in and dependent on the societal and cultural ethos and the ultimate effect of these interrelationships upon individual and unit combat effectiveness.
Using this review of literature dealing with military cohesion, we found four major dimensions of military cohesion (vertical, horizontal, organizational and societal). Within each one of these four parts of military cohesion, we found references specific to their effect on that type of cohesion.

Using the South Atlantic Conflict of 1982 as a case study we used these elements taken from literature dealing with military cohesion, morale, stress, unit climate and combat effectiveness as an analytical framework. In order to better understand the issues of cohesion within the British and Argentine armies, Chapter Three presents a brief outline of the history and tradition of the British Army and Chapter Four the Argentine Army.
CHAPTER THREE

BRITISH MILITARY HISTORY, TRADITION, AND TRAINING

In Oxford in the Chapel of Christ Church founded by Henry VIII in 1546, there is a plaque which reads:

Dedicated to the
memory of all ranks of
the Oxfordshire
and Buckinghamshire
Light Infantry
who have given their
lives for their country
and in the service of
the regiment since its
foundation in 1741

That plaque is the essence of the British military tradition. Every town, every city, every church has a statue, a plaque, a list of war dead for all the wars in all the countries around the world in which British soldiers have fought. This chapter presents a brief outline of the British land forces to illustrate those cultural, societal and military factors which contribute to cohesion through societal, organizational, vertical and horizontal bonding.

Overseas wars, long supply lines, amphibious landings, entrenched warfare and guerilla encounters have been commonplace fare for the British soldier from the beginning of the British Empire which began with the ascendance of Queen Elizabeth I in 1558 to its sunset with the partition of India in 1947. British schoolboys recite the names of the Kings and Queens of England and learn the proud heritage and tradition of the British Navy, Army and, since World War I, the Royal Air Force. Folly, bravery and stupidity are all intertwined in the litany of Charge of the Light Brigade, Crimea, Khyber Pass, Waterloo, Trafalgar, The Somme, Ypres, Flanders Field, Dunkirk, The Battle of Britain, Burma, Arnhem, Borneo, Aden, Belfast and The Falklands

Pitched battles, charges, skirmishes and guerilla patrols were fought by the British soldier who joined a
local regiment with his friends and schoolboy companions. His officers and NCOs are sons of his father’s officers and NCOs. This lengthy military tradition strengthens both societal and organizational bonding.

British regimental history began with Charles II in 1661, when Parliament handed to the Crown control over the standing army and militia. In 1868, Edward Cardwell reorganized the regimental system and set the stage for the organization of Britain’s modern standard army. For a more complete outline of the British regimental system’s history and organization, see Stamp (1984).

With valor born from strength of local ties, local recruiting and local pride of the regiment, men fought doggedly in numerous wars and countless colonial exploits. Valour had a terrible toll. Thousands upon thousands of young men, the flower of English youth, died in the trenches of the Great War, leaving bereft empty villages and dales of Yorkshire, Lancashire, the Highlands and Ireland. World War II was not as costly in manpower but still staggering losses occurred in Europe, Burma and North Africa.

Huge death tolls combined with astoundingly high economic costs of two World Wars weakened the once-powerful British Empire. Due to budgetary constraints and the loss of Empire, Britain’s large standing army was dramatically reduced in size. But decreased numbers do not diminish ties of history, culture or tradition which contribute to the pride of particular regiments or the individual soldier’s sense of bonding to his group.

The total British Army consists of the Regular Army, The Territorial Army and the Regular Reserves. The focus of this paper is on the active army which consists of 165,600 persons: 71,000 troops of the United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF) stationed in Great Britain; 55,000 troops in Germany known as the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR); and, six smaller commands stationed in Hong Kong, Gibraltar, Falkland Islands, Cyprus, Brunei and Belize (USA Training Board, 1987:4).

The British Army Regimental System consists of the Cavalry and the Infantry. The Cavalry comprises the Household Cavalry (Life Guards, the Blues and Royals). The Royal Armoured Corps has thirteen Cavalry Regiments of the Line and the Royal Tank Regiment. The Infantry consists of thirty-eight British Infantry Regiments: five regiments of Foot Guards, twenty eight regiments of the Infantry of the
Line, the Parachute Regiment and four regiments of the Gurkha Rifles (Stamp, 1984).

Interestingly enough, the Royal Marines, although a part of the Royal Navy, are considered the twenty-fifth infantry regiment in organizational terms and for war planning.

Within the Army there are specialized elites such as the SAS (Special Air Squadron) and the 7th Gurkhas. Within the Marines, are the Commando Brigades and the SBS (Special Boat Squadron). Exigent selection, training and specialized mission contribute to a sense of bonding on the organizational, horizontal (peer) and vertical level. Elite units foster a sense of uniqueness and constantly imbue their officers and men with a deep seated loyalty to the organization.

But organizational tables, manuals and listings of units do not present the essence of regimental loyalty. Military historians and officer’s memoirs provide some insight into the existential meaning of morale. In this instance, the British use of the term "morale" is equivalent to the U.S. military analysts’ use of the word "cohesion".

John Baynes (1967) analyzed the 2nd Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle March 9 to 15, 1915. (The 2nd Scottish Rifles) started the battle about nine hundred strong on 9 March. Six days later it came out of action. By this time, the hundred and fifty men left were commanded by the sole surviving officer, a 2/Lieutenant. Throughout the battle, the battalion gave not only a wonderful example of courage but also of the other human qualities, such as loyalty, generosity, unselfishness, and endurance which are only found in a unit in which morale is at its peak.

(Baynes, 1967:7)

Baynes is adamant in his explanation for the valor of the 2nd Scottish Rifles.

...if anyone wants to know what was the quintessence of the morale of the pre-1914 Army--what was the rock of its foundation--then the answer is the regiment.
Everything else was important, but if the actions of the soldiers of the Scottish Rifles at Neuve Chapelle are to be explained in a few words one can only say that they did it for the Regiment.

(Baynes, 1967:163)

The Baynes quote illustrates the strength of cultural and historical ties to bind a soldier or officer to his unit and strengthen the sense of belonging a man has to his unit. Thus the cohesion of the unit and its combat effectiveness is correspondingly strengthened. Men know each other through their fathers’ and grandfathers’ ties to the regiment. Individual soldiers have trained and worked together for years. Officers leave the regiment for other assignments but return always to their same regiment or at least (as in the case of the Marines) to a sister unit. Thus we see that a particularly salient factor in the regimental system and the British Army as a whole is a lack of personnel turbulence. Men train, work and fight together for years and years.

We shall return to a more detailed focus on the issues of the regimental system, when we discuss the issues of cohesion and the British troops in the Falklands. However it is worth noting that Guilmartin (1985) enthusiastically praises the concept of the British system and stated that it was a primary factor if not the most salient factor in the British victory in the Falklands.

The Regimental system works. The excellent performance of British ground forces in the South Atlantic conflict came as no surprise to the historically well informed...the British regimental system has...in modern times...produce(d) troops who would stand and fight, generally with considerable competence and often with uncommon valor. This is generally attributed to the system’s ability to develop and maintain unit cohesion through effective socialization of the primary military group....The soldier is bound to his regiment and to his primary military group because the regiment supports, nurtures, and protects him in real and concrete ways.

(Guilmartin, 1985:62-63)
The British Army of the 1980's is characterized by a tough well trained, experienced professional volunteer force. The officers must face difficult selection process and arduous physical and mental training as an officer candidate. In bygone years, the aristocratic elites supplied most of the officers for the British Army. Even today, as Macdonald (1980) shows, certain regiments have higher status than others and boys from public (i.e. U.S. private) schools enter these prestigious units.

...the products of high-status schools will get their commissions in high-status regiments, and those from state schools will lead the humble ranks of the Royal Pioneer Corps and the Royal Army Ordinance Corps.

(Macdonald, 1980:635)

Macdonald sees a salubrious effect in the fact that the upper-class regiments such as the Guards and Royal Armoured Corps recruit members from the elite schools. Peer or horizontal cohesion and loyalty to the group and each other is undoubtedly increased, when officers have known each other since grade school years. Macdonald almost serendipitously links homogeneity and cohesion.

But given that a certain minimum of academic attainment is required to become an officer, does it matter that existing officers want to recruit people like themselves? In situations of danger, uncertainty and confusion it may be much more important to have a person alongside you on whom you feel you can depend, rather than someone whom you know has three 'A' levels.

(Macdonald, 1980:636)

For an extensive analysis of the British Army, see the U.S. Army Training Board pamphlet entitled, Allied Army Training Study of the United Kingdom (1987). The next sections on officer and NCO education quotes extensively from this document. This outline presents the Infantry model for the U.K. Army and there are other models for Marines and Paras as well. The following outline of selection and training of officers illustrates the kinds of selection and training which strengthen peer (horizontal) bonding.
There are several ways a person may become an officer. Candidates may enter, at age 15 to 17, through the military boarding school at Welbeck; or enter directly from high school; enroll in a university cadetship program while pursuing a university degree; be commissioned directly from a civilian career; enter after university graduation; or upon recommendation from their commander be selected from the ranks. Officers obtain one of four types of commissions: (1) a Permanent Regular Commission (PRC) which allows the officer to stay in the Army until age 55 if he has obtained the rank of major; (2) Special Regular Commission (SRC) which allows the officer to stay on duty for 16 years; (3) Short Service Commission (SSC) which allows the officer to stay on duty for three to eight years; and, (4) a Short Service Limited Commission (SSLC) a probationary commission which allows a person to attend university.

Regardless of type of commission or method of entering the Army, all officers attend the basic six month standard Military Course at Sandhurst. Thus all officers have a basic allegiance to and deep relationship to the military college of Sandhurst. After Sandhurst all officers attend a branch young officer’s school. During the first two to four years in the service, officers holding the Permanent Regular Commission must return to Sandhurst to attend the fourteen week academically oriented Regular Commission Course.

Lieutenants must pass an examination as well as fulfill other qualifications in order to be promoted to captain. All captains attend the Junior Division of the Staff College at Warminster. The course covers instruction in combined arms tactics, staff procedures, logistics and worldwide operations.

After serving with his unit at brigade or regiment and after completing requirements for promotion to major, the officer attends the All Arms Tactics Course at Warminster. This five week course emphasizes mechanized, air assault and infantry operations. "Top quality" majors attend the Army Staff College. This course lasts for more than a year and prepares officers for division and higher level staff work.

Above the rank of major, promotion boards determine selection to higher ranks. Selected lieutenant colonels may attend the National Defense College at Latimer for a joint services/civil services course lasting six months to prepare him for joint command at Ministry of Defense level.
Those officers designated for regimental command attend a one-week Command Designee course at Larkhill for fundamentals of administrative requirements of command and a two week Commanding Officer Tactics Course (COTC) at Warminster which focuses on tactics of the regiment. Selected brigadiers attend the year long course on national defense at the Royal College of Defense Studies in London.

Officers attend exchange programs and training with NATO allies and are officer students at the Command and General Staff College and Senior War Colleges of the U.S. Army and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. British officers serve in embassies throughout the world and maintain liaison with their army counterparts in these countries. Thus the selection, training and education of the British officers is an rigorous process. As such, those officers who complete the various examinations and schools in their career are bound to their fellow officers by dint of shared experience. The procedure is equally as arduous for non-commissioned officers.

Known as the "backbone of the British Army", non-commissioned officers are seasoned men who efficiently run and manage the army or marines. British NCO's manage, train and perform dreary daily administrative tasks. NCOs are an essential, if not crucial, element in contributing to and maintaining vertical cohesion. NCOs come from the ranks.

The British Army is a volunteer army and recruits join at age seventeen and a half and serve on an average for six years. The minimum enlistment is three years and the maximum is nine. After the young recruit has moved up to Lance Corporal and after serving as a section 2 I/C (Second in Command) and with the recommendation of his commander and having passed a standardized set of training, the Lance Corporal attends the Section Commander's Battle Course (SCBC) at Brecon. This twelve week course teaches potential NCOs how to command, train and maintain a rifle section in the field in a war setting. Graduates return to their units and after having served for four years and having been a section commander, the Corporal attends the Platoon Sergeant's Battle Course (PSBC). This eleven week course continues where the basic course terminated. After additional tests, ten years of service, passing special educational requirements, Corporals may be promoted to Staff Sergeant and Sergeant Major. Additional schooling consists of the Advanced Course for Education for Promotion Certificate. British Senior NCO's have administrative duties and perform tasks which are considered in the U.S.
to be the purview of officers. (U.S. Army Training Board, 1987:7-9). The British NCO and his officer are well aware of their leadership roles and their task of imbuing the enlisted ranks with a sense of honor. Indeed, the well understand the concept of vertical cohesion, free and open climate and the need to develop trust, teamwork and respect up and down the chain of command.

Regimental tradition and organizational cohesion are maintained in the officer and NCO messes, where the young officer or NCO is trained in the socio-cultural and historical lore of his group.

Although a younger organization, Commandos of the Royal Marines exhibit the same characteristics of the older Army Regiments. Like the Army, Marines are encouraged in the pursuit of adventure training. Thus, paid for by the individual and by his mess or regiment, officers and enlisted engage in climbing Mount Everest, downhill skiing in Norway, international yacht races or a host of other activities designed for the physical fitness of the individual or group and to enhance the reputation of the unit. The accomplishments of men who engage in "adventure training" enhances the reputation of the individual officer and increases the individual soldier’s or NCO’s pride of regiment or unit. The men gain respect for those officers and NCO’s who perform outstandingly well in international competition. Thus teamwork, trust, respect, unit pride are enhanced. In terms of our model, vertical, organizational and peer bonding is enhanced and cohesion strengthened. Special missions and high levels of training contribute to peer(horizontal) and vertical bonding.

Most British units have some experience in combat especially in urban guerrilla warfare and jungle warfare. The BAOR (British Army of the Rhine) trains rigorously for its NATO mission. Marine Commandos regularly train in Norway as part of their mission to defend NATO’s northern flank. Other units transfer in and out of Northern Ireland. Over the past few years, the PARAs, the SAS, SBS and Gurkhas have gained experience in far off areas of the world. Such areas include: Cyprus, Borneo, Hong Kong and, of course, the Falklands. Such experience in combat, counter-insurgency or peace-keeping contribute to the high level of readiness of the British forces (societal bonding); their technical and tactical proficiency (horizontal bonding); their concept of heroism (organizational bonding); and teamwork, trust and respect (vertical bonding).
In accord with their constant high level of training and physical fitness, British troops have had long experience in joint land-air-sea operations. Joint exercises are nothing new to the British who as an island nation have long depended on the Navy for transport, supply, and naval warfare. Well planned and well executed joint operations have been a feature of British warfare since before Wellington and Nelson. Thus cohesion involves not only a small group phenomenon but the trust and experience of working between military groups.

And all of the units and all of the commanders have a sense of history and military tradition imbued in their essence of what it means to be an officer. Lieutenant Colonel (now Major General) Nick Vaux wrote of his feelings, when he spoke to 42 Commando before they disembarked in the Falklands.

The time had also come for me to speak to ‘Four-Two’ before we went to war. A spacious passenger lounge is no doubt easier for the purpose than an olive grove in Tuscany, a plain in Russia, or a creek in Virginia. But across the centuries it can never have been easy for commanders to look down upon young, resolute, faces that soon may be frozen in death, or contorted with agony. The British are an undemonstrative race, and nowhere more so than in Her Majesty’s Forces, where affection and trust are often concealed behind regimental loyalty and military discipline.

(Vaux, 1986:79)

In the Falklands, after the sinking of Atlantic Conveyor Lieutenant Colonel (now Colonel) Andrew Whitehead turned to the men of 45 Commando and said, "In The Second World War, we marched from Normandy to Berlin. We can bloody well march twelve miles across this island."

And they marched bloody well.
The motto of the Argentine Army is, "Nacio con el pais en 1810" (Born with the nation in 1810). And the army is indeed the backbone of the nation. Undefeated in any campaign, until the ill-fated Malvinas expedition, the Argentine Army has been the supporter of traditional conservative values and a contributor to and a detractor from political stability in Argentina. The political role of the Argentine armed forces, the Army in particular, is a salient factor in accounting for horizontal (peer) bonding among officers.

While the Argentine armed forces, and Army in particular, have always fulfilled the role of defense of the nation, the Army has also been the principal element of internal order. From the mid 1880’s, the Army has actively participated in a series of coups, counter-coups, juntas, cabals, political involvement and power-brokering.

Given an U.S. anti-militaristic ethos and a strict constitutional prohibition of military involvement in politics, North Americans often are unable to understand Argentine armed forces intervention in the economic and political life of Argentina. It is difficult for North Americans to accept the Latin American armed forces' propensity to engage in active political activity to the extent of overthrowing governments or themselves forming juntas or governing the nation. Yet, such political activism is a fact of life of all Latin American nations and Argentina in particular.

The military coup of 1930 marked the first time that the Argentine Army actively overthrew a civilian government. From that time to today, Argentina’s Army, Navy and Air Force have engaged in a series of political machinations. Argentina’s history is a roller-coaster of more or less democratically elected governments interspersed with coups and juntas. The chaotic state of Argentina’s body politic implies that no government can stay in power without the support of the military.

For example, in the 1930-83 period, there were nineteen governments in Argentina, ten of which were
military. In reality, military leaders had true governing power in at least four of the nine "civilian" governments. To understand Argentina, Argentina’s politics or the Argentine Army, one must always keep in mind the Argentine Army’s political role is inextricably intertwined with its military function.

For more in-depth analyses of the Argentine armed forces involvement in politics see Beltran (1987), Moneta (1984), Potash (1970), Tulchin (1984), and Turner (1983). In essence, the officer corps sees itself as the guardian of democracy and the defender of the nation in all aspects. Given such a worldview, it is not surprising to note strong emotional bonds between brother officers.

An interesting series of articles in Gamba and Ricchi’s (1986) analyzes possible roles of the Argentine Army given no involvement in future wars and a withdrawal from the political scene. In spite of armchair theorizing on alternative roles for the Argentine military, every characteristic of the Argentine Army has some political implication including the size of the Army and even dates of training cycles.

The size of the armed forces "has fluctuated over the years partly for policy reasons but largely because of budgetary considerations" (Potash, 1970:90). In the 1950’s Peron regime, there were approximately 145,000 men in the Army. In 1964, the Army had 85,000 men (Potash, 1970:90). Since the Malvinas War, the Army budget has been severely cut by the elected Congress. The Army now varies between 50,000 and 60,000 persons of whom approximately 4,500 are officers.

The size of the Army varies between years and within each particular year depending on the numbers of conscripts who enter and who remain in the army at any given point in the year.

Argentina has universal military service for all males. Until 1976, Argentine men were eligible for military service at age twenty. After 1976, eighteen year olds were inducted into the service. The law was changed because officials felt that there was less job and career or educational disruption for an eighteen year old who probably had just finished high school. Of the total available pool, some receive exemptions on the basis of being unable to meet physical requirements, or having dependency considerations or those who agree to participate in reserve programs. The total number of conscripts is then
determined by the current training budget. All males in
the total pool are assigned by lottery to the Army, or
Navy, or Air Force. Conscripts serve for one year only.

The fluctuating numbers for the army depend on the
number of conscripts inducted each year and on what date in
any one of three training cycles one measures the army
size. Conscripts are inducted in March; the training cycle
closes in October; a portion of the class is released
successively in November, and others in December and January
and a final group released after the induction of the new
class in March. Therefore, some conscripts serve as few as
eight months and others their full twelve month commitment.

Thus the lowest number of men in the Army exist in the
months between January and March (Summer). Since the army
has its highest number of conscripts during the cycle of
June to September, this fact is the reason, "perhaps, apart
from the summer heat, why in the past military takeovers or
attempted takeovers occurred at" this time of the year
(Potash, 1970:91).

One year training is sufficient to form horizontal
bonds on the enlisted level. However the extreme social
distance between officer, NCO and enlisted contributes
nothing to vertical cohesion.

Education and selection for officer school and
noncommissioned officer training is markedly different from
a conscript's life.

Potash (1970) has produced the most complete
historical and sociological analysis of the Argentine army.
Potash has the only reliable data on social class and
ethnic background of Argentine army officers (Potash,
1970:95-97). He shows that the young men who attend the
Colegio Militar (Military Academy) come mainly from the
Buenos Aires area, are from urban middle class families and
over one-third of the students are from military families.
Since Argentina is ninety percent nominal Roman Catholic
it is not surprising that there are few non-Roman Catholics
amongst the military cadets. Given the strong Roman
Catholic traditions of the armed forces with ceremonies
venerating the Virgin of Lujan, the Rosary and the ideals
of a militant anti-Marxist church, it is well understood by
non-Catholics (Jews, Protestants, and Muslims, agnostic and
atheist) that military officers are expected to take an
active part in Roman Catholic ceremonies.
Militant Catholicism is an important element for understanding the psychology of the Argentine military officer. While there are few Protestants in Argentina, Buenos Aires has the highest proportion of Jews in the Western Hemisphere. Over twenty-five percent of the graduates of the University of Buenos Aires are from Jewish backgrounds—even if they are non-practising Jews. However, Jewish men do not choose the military as a viable career. With the understandable exception of Israel, there are few Jewish officers in the U.S. or other Western European armies.

Over the past fifty years, there has been a large influx of Lebanese and Syrian immigrants to Argentina. The political and economic importance of this relatively small group of immigrants is best illustrated by the fact that in 1987, nine of the eighteen governors of the provinces of Argentina are from this ethnic group. The fact that there are few non-Roman Catholic military cadets who are Jewish, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Maronite Christian or Muslim indicates that the officer corps as a whole does not reflect the ethnic and religious diversity of the urban middle class.

On the other hand, classes from the post 1940 cadet corps do reflect traditional Argentine immigration patterns (Spanish, Italian and British). Since the Argentine constitution prohibits non-Argentine-born persons from entering the cadet academies, and because there were successive waves of immigration pre and post the two World Wars, it has taken until well into the 1960’s for cadets to reflect the heritage of second generation Argentines of Lebanese, Syrian, Turkish, German, and Eastern European backgrounds.

Academy cadets are primarily from urban middle class backgrounds with professional or army officer fathers and who are Roman Catholic. Cadets (and officers) are remarkably homogeneous in ethnic, social class and religious background. Such homogeneity contributes to horizontal (peer) bonding for these cadets and officers are alike in values and social psychological attitudes. We now turn to an examination of cadet and officer education to further examine the process of bonding.

After attending the Military Academy and forging life-long bonds with their classmates, and after several years in the field, selected Argentine military officers continue their education at one or more of the advanced professional military schools. Such schools are: Escuela
Superior de Guerra (Senior Level War School); Escuela Superior Tecnica (Senior Level Technical School); Centro de Instruccion de Inteligencia (Center for Intelligence Instruction) and Centro de Altos Estudios (The Center for Higher Studies) (Potash, 1970:98-100).

Lieutenants with five years of service, high efficiency ratings and who can pass a stringent examination may enter the Escuela Superior Tecnica (Senior Level Technical School) founded in 1930. After four years of instruction, officers graduate with a degree in military engineering. The Senior Level Technical School supplied many officers who planned, developed, built or oversaw Argentina’s huge military munitions, armament and steel factories of the 1930 through 1980 period (Potash 1970:100).

While the Senior Level Technical School provides specialized engineering and mechanical instruction, there are other army schools for high ranking officers. All Argentine officers are afforded the opportunity to attend the Senior War School. Those who pass the difficult entrance examinations may decline admission or may apply to the Senior Level Technical School. Those officers who fail the entrance examination or decline admission to the Senior War School may remain in the army for a twenty year career.

Entering as captains and graduating as majors, Argentine officers spend a grueling three years at the Senior War School. The three year curriculum of the Senior War School consists in the first year of staff procedures for battalion and below tactics; the second year Brigade and Battalion tactics and procedures and the third year corps and national defense strategy. Teaching methods and examinations emphasize rote memorization of such minute details as, for example, rate of fire of automatic weapons or rates of march of men under various climactic conditions. Free wheeling discussion and active debate, such as found in the U.S. counterpart, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, are relatively absent from the classroom. As will be shown later, this method of teaching and emphasis on rote memory impinges on flexibility and quick response in a battlefield situation.

Until 1979-80, there was ruthless competition within the school. Less than one-third of the incoming class graduated. Automatically, fifty percent of the officers were asked to leave the academy at the end of the first year and another twenty percent at the end of the second year. Since the seventy percent attrition rate was mandated by tradition, the difference in grade point average between those who were deleted from the rolls and
those who remained were a scant tenth or hundredth of a
decimal point. Those men who survived this ruthless
competition were destined for higher commands and were
definitely candidates for general officer rank. Realizing
how demoralizing was this forced attrition, the Argentine
military revised their exigent selection. Today, all
incoming candidates are chosen on the basis of rigorous
examinations. Well over ninety percent of the incoming
class graduate at the end of three years. All those men
who attend these higher level schools show horizontal
bonding based on the experience of having endured an
arduous education.

Unlike the United States Army, which recruits students
from civilian universities through the Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC) and encourages its officers to obtain
civilian graduate degrees, the Argentine Army makes no
provision for its officer to pursue civilian university
education. Those Argentine officers who do obtain degrees
from civilian universities do so at their own expense and
during off-duty time. Since the curricula of all the
military schools emphasizes rote memorization and focuses
on tactics and logistics, most Argentine officers have not
experienced the ameliorating effect of studying literature
or social sciences or jurisprudence with civilian students
in the hurly-burly of a college or university. Argentine
military schools emphasize military subjects and those few
civilian lecturers who teach at military schools teach
military-related subjects such as international security
strategy or international economics. To obtain higher
rank, the Argentine officer must follow a specified route
of appropriate schools and assignments.

Those colonels, who graduated from the Superior War
School and who show potential for attaining general officer
rank, attend the National War College. This school is a
joint service academy including top ranking civilian
officials of the Ministry of Defense.

In addition, selected officers attend the
Interamerican Defense College in Washington, D. C. Under
the aegis of the Interamerican Defense Board, the
Interamerican Defense College has the distinction of being
an institution of higher learning which has graduated more
high level cabinet officials (Ministers of War, etc.) and
Presidents of Heads of State, than any college or
university in the U.S. For example, the President of
Argentina, during the military junta in 1970, General
Levingston, was a graduate of the Interamerican Defense
University.
There are other links with non-Argentine armies. Reflecting the fact that the Superior War school was founded in 1900 and its courses modeled on the German *Kriegsakademie* (War College), many Argentine officers often attend courses and spend lengthy time as staff liaison with the West German Army. Argentine staff officers attend senior war colleges in France and until 1982 were regular exchange students in war colleges in the United Kingdom.

Argentine officers are military attaches in embassies throughout the world, are staff liaison with other armies and take part in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Middle East. In 1987, there were four authorized and four assigned Argentine officers in the Middle East (Israel).

With increasing U.S. involvement in Latin America, since the 1960's, there has been strong emphasis on forging links between the U.S. and Argentine armies. Many Argentine officers attend short courses with their counterparts in the United States Army. There was one important hiatus.

During U.S. President Jimmy Carter's tenure (1976-80), the United States deemed Argentine one of several nations guilty of human rights violations. As a result, Argentine military officers were not allowed to attend courses or training in the United States. Nor did the United States ship any arms nor engage in any military exchanges with Argentina. The Kennedy-Humphrey legislation regarding the Presidential Certification Act which excluded Argentina from military assistance was in effect until 1985. As a result, many Argentine officers were unable to continue their training in the United States and make those personal and professional contacts necessary for international military cooperation.

Regardless of foreign travel, liaison with other nations and residence abroad, there is one feature of Argentine officer corps which distinguished the Argentine army from other Western European or U.S. armies—the logia (lodge).

Founder of the nation and father of Argentina's army, Jose de San Martin, brought the concept of the secret lodge (logia) with Masonic overtones to Argentina in 1808. The logia was a secret military organization within the army which existed for the purpose of effecting political change within the nation or reform within the military or both. Retired and active duty officers belonged and there were often competing lodges within the military. The number of members and the power of the lodge waxed and waned given
the exigency of a particular political situation or the degree of civilian control exerted over the Army.

Logias were a peculiarly Argentine military institution serving the worldview of those Argentine officers who saw themselves as guardians of tradition. While the logia was a singular Argentine military institution which promoted peer bonding, the existence of a logia is a matter of conjecture today. The Argentine Army of 1988 is bound to uphold the constitution and serves under civilian control. There is also a unique Argentine twist to inter-service rivalry which detracts from bonding between groups and bonding between officers of different services.

While inter-service rivalry is endemic to most nations, Argentine conflicts between and amongst services, at times, reached a height unimagined in Pentagon conference rooms.

...the Argentine Army, Navy and Air Force engaged in a brief but active shooting war with one another in a confused series of coups and countercoups in the political chaos following the ouster of the Frondizi government in 1962. (There was) a news photograph showing a long line of burned-out Grumman F-9F fighters of the Argentine Naval Air Arm, victims of an Argentine Air Force raid. This sort of thing is not easily forgotten. The junior officers of 1962 presently occupy key middle-to upper-level staff and command posts.

(Guilmartin, 1985:60)

Like his U. S. military counterpart, the Argentine Army officer mirrors the cultural ethos of his society. Argentine military officers reflect the high level of culture of Argentine society. Most middle class Argentines are remarkably well read and au courant regarding plays, films, art and literary trends. The average Argentine military officer is literate, cosmopolitan and imbued with nationalistic fervor and patriotism. Relationships between subordinate and superior officers are very formal. Reflecting the Prussian influence of the 1930’s armed forces’ college, junior officers often click heels; bow to superiors; ask permission to sit at mess tables and address superiors by their title as "My General" or "My Colonel". Strictly defined social barriers exist also between officer and enlisted ranks.
As with most armies of the world, there is a social, educational and cultural gap between the worlds of the Argentine officer, his noncommissioned officers and his troops.

The Argentine army actively recruits for potential noncommissioned officers from secondary schools through its recruiting stations throughout the nation. Also conscripts who show leadership qualities are encouraged to stay in the army and attend the noncommissioned officer school. But Argentine noncommissioned officers are not given the kind of training nor the kind of responsibility found in most Western European armies. Noncommissioned officers train for two to three years at Campo de Mayo. Since many of the NCO candidates have not completed high school, part of their military education involved obtaining a high school degree. Noncommissioned officers have little responsibility within the Argentine Army excluding administrative duties. They do not train recruits or soldiers. Their duties focus solely on the physical care of the soldier such as ensuring soldiers are adequately clothed and fed.

In addition, there is an enormous social gap between the officer and the noncommissioned officer. This extreme social distance detracts from vertical bonding and cohesion between officer and noncommissioned officer. This social distance and lack of vertical bonding produces a rigid hierarchically organized army which de facto is incapable of flexibility and creativity under stress.

Let us now turn to an analysis of the South Atlantic Conflict of 1982 to examine the British and Argentine forces using the factors discussed in Chapter Two (Cohesion) and the model developed in the Methodology Section (Appendixes A and B).
In this chapter, we shall analyze the societal factors affecting cohesion and combat effectiveness in the South Atlantic Conflict of 1982. These factors are the basic social milieu which are the fabric, background and ethos in which the military operates. For example, if a society is opposed to war or despises its military forces, the populace will not support a large defense budget. As a result, the military itself will be hard pressed to man, equip, train or field an adequate military force. On the other hand, a society which constantly faces invasion, such as Israel for example, will bear a high tax burden and a high death rate of its populace in order to maintain a well equipped and well trained military force.

I-Societal, Cultural and Structural Factors.

We begin with an analysis of the cultural ethos of the United Kingdom and Argentina to analyze those factors in which the military context is embedded. This section is brief in scope by intent. We are well aware that numerous books discuss these concepts in depth and mid and senior level military schools devote whole semesters to analysis of strategy, doctrine or tactics. Chapter Two discusses British military tradition, education and training and Chapter Three the Argentine Army’s history, training and education.

(a) Culture, norms, values of the military

The United Kingdom has a long tradition of fighting bloody wars. World War I, World War II, Korea, are the major wars of this century. However since Korea (1952), Britain has engaged in landings, skirmishes and peacekeeping in the Suez (1956), the Persian Gulf (1958), the Brunei Revolt (1962) and its mission in Northern Ireland to this day. Britain has sacrificed men and endured financial hardship to support its destiny.

Retired and active duty British officers have high social status and respect. Goldthorpe and Hope (1974) rank British officers in the upper middle class and "other
ranks” in the upper working class. As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, Mcdonald (1980) has found that officer candidates from upper class schools enter the Guards and Green Jackets, while middle class officer candidates enter other regiments. Thus we see that officers of the British Army come from a solid upper and middle class background which indicates a fairly high social status given to the military as a whole and the military as an occupation.

Cenotaphs, plaques, statues, tattered battle flags in cathedrals, poppy sales on Remembrance Day, the Queen’s role as Colonel of the Regiment, the skirl of bagpipes are all constant reminders of England’s military tradition and the honor the country pays to its military men and women.

Argentina, on the other hand, has not fought a large-scale war since the War of the Triple Alliance 1865-1870. Prior to the Malvinas surrender of 1982, all Argentine schoolchildren would proudly recount that Argentina’s army had never been defeated. Although Argentina’s armed forces have trained and prepared for war, the Malvinas War of 1982 was their first experience in over a hundred years with the emotional and financial costs of a large-scale war. Argentina has had a recent long war against insurgents and guerrillas.

During the decade 1972-82, the Argentine Army had experienced the vicissitudes of a war against terrorism with its corresponding emotional toll on the civilian populace and the military. Prior to the war against subversion, the military were firmly in the middle class status rankings, although Potash (1970:109) stated that the military was losing prestige in the decade of the sixties. Given the revelations of excesses of the war against subversion and the loss of the Malvinas, today (1987) the army and navy have suffered a loss in prestige. Also salaries of officers and NCO’s are abysmal, even by Argentine standards. For example, an Argentine general earns $500.00 per month. The Argentine military’s constant intervention in politics alternately contributes to or detracts from their social status. One moment the populace calls on the military to come and run the country and make order out of chaos. The next moment, people are in the streets clamoring for the resignation of generals or a junta who have been unable to perform those economic miracles the populace sought. Not only could they not perform economic legerdemain, they lost a war.

Argentina and its military had no idea what war entailed. The social, emotional, familial, political and
financial debilitating costs of a war with artillery barrages, bombings and naval maneuvers were absent from the Argentine psyche. In the Yorkshire television documentary, Jean Kirkpatrick, who was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 1982, termed the Argentine attitude towards the eventuality of a war as "a sense of frivolousness". War was a romantic notion found in novels. After the surrender, one Argentine officer commented to Lieutenant Colonel (now Major General) Vaux:

We thought we knew about war, but you have shown us that we only knew about exercises.

(Vaux, 1986:209)

Britain knew about war all too well. Living memory served them well. In World War I, the flower of English youth died in Flanders Field and hundreds of thousands of Englishmen died at The Somme. In World War II, London was bombed and Coventry destroyed. The English people and its tommies know that war is a serious business indeed. To prepare for war, soldiers must train for war. And to train for war, you need money to train, man and equip your force.

(b) Defense Budget

Since the traumatic austerity program of post-World War II years, Britain has reduced the size of her force and monies expended on armament and training. Beginning with the Thatcher Conservative government of 1980 salaries of the force were increased and more attention paid to manning and equipping the force. Yet, in 1982, plans were almost complete for the sale of aircraft carrier HMS Hermes to Australia. Plans were in preparation for a drastic reduction in the British surface fleet. The Falklands War was for the British what the Americans like to call, "A Come As You Are War". Major General Vaux wrote about the cost of the weapons:

..each Milan missile cost the same as a
Renault 17 TL estate car. Cheap at the
price--although most of 'Four-Two' couldn't
afford to buy a new car themselves!

(Vaux, 1986:176)

The British Parliament was willing in 1982 to support the cost of the Falklands Task Force and continues to bear
a burden of taxes for the soldiers stationed on the Falklands. The Thatcher government policies may be questioned by backbenchers and the opposition but the fact remains that support for the military and for the Falklands forces was and is supported by Parliament and the British populace.

Argentine military expenditures were probably per capita much higher than the British. Grindle (1987:259) writes that military spending in Argentina from 1974-1976 was the highest expenditure of any Latin American country and represents 20% of the Gross National Product of Argentina. These figures are misleading because much of this expenditure was used in developing large armament plants, steel factories and industries, associated with the military’s governing of Argentina.

Over centuries, British forces had long learned to "muddle through". Even though the British had high level technology and new weapons, their real weapon was the ingenuity of their Tommies. Argentines had advanced technology but their men were not adequately trained to use it.

(c) Training

Training is the means by which soldiers and officers reach a peak of physical fitness and practice and rehearse their battlefield tactics.

The Rattenbach Report succinctly describes the Argentines' lack of training for the young twenty year old conscripts of the 1981 and 1982 year groups known by their birthdates as "classes of 1962 and 1963".

The majority of the class of 1962 had already been sent home, while the class of 1963 had scarcely completed its initial inscription, but not even basic instruction.

(Siete Dias, 1983:8)

Moreover the majority of these young untrained conscripts of the class of 1963 came from the tropical (Northern) Argentine provinces.

...(These) troops were neither adapted to nor equipped to withstand the climate and conditions of life in this theater of operations where it was necessary to confront
dreadful conditions and a well trained and well equipped enemy.

(Siete Dias, 1983:8)

The Rattenbach Report does point out that those well trained groups of the Argentine Army did perform well under battle conditions. These units were:

- Field artillery and air defense artillery, commando companies, cavalry reconnaissance squadron, helicopter units of army aviation, some combat support units and especially groups of 25th Infantry Regiment who showed a high degree of training and professionalism and a high level of leadership.

(Siete Dias, 1983:8)

The 25th Infantry Regiment was located in and had trained extensively in Patagonia. As such, they were used to the South Atlantic’s brutal cold weather and had appropriate winter gear for the Malvinas weather.

Also in regard to training, Argentine Commandos, who are composed solely of officers and non-commissioned officers, are proud of their brutal training. Ruiz-Moreno describes their training in his book (Ruiz-Moreno, 1986:37-42) and in a 1987 interview in La Semana. He relates how the commandos, eat snakes, endure live fire exercises, endure harassment as supposed prisoners of war and suffer lack of sleep and food.

Captain Rod Boswell, in a BBC tape on the Raid at Top Malo, commented on the caliber of the Argentine commando unit he fought.

Their professionalism left something to be desired. They made up for their lack of professionalism by their courage. They certainly didn’t lack for courage. I know when I got back that the hysteria of the press left something to be desired. In terms of saying that all the Argentines were cowards that they ran away. That’s simply not true. Every (Argentine) man got out of the house... and they all fought with their weapons.

Royal Marine forces won the raid at Top Malo because of luck, ingenuity and superior training. Training over
and over again, the Royal Marines, on the boggy marshes of Dartmouth Moors, and the Paras, on the cold plains of Salisbury, the British forces were ready for battle. In April 1982, Royal Marines had come off annual manoeuvres in cold and arctic conditions in Norway. 2 Para had just returned from duty in Northern Ireland. Paras and Marines are proud of their physical prowess and their agonizing training. One of the Para enlisted said:

I could never figure out why the hell we were training in the muck and goo at Salisbury when we were going to fight in Northern Europe. Then when we were in the Falklands, I said to my mates, 'Bloody Hell! This place is just like home.'

Paras have thirty weeks of basic training. They are convinced that their grueling training builds spirit and bonding between men and pride in unit. One para said:

I started out in a class with 83 men and only 11 of us finished. You know that you're the best in the world when you finish that training.

British officers state that they believe in subjecting their men in training conditions to expect the unexpected. Sometimes meals don't arrive. Sometimes ammunition runs out. Officers continually test their men and push them beyond what the trainee or soldier thinks is his limit. Royal Marine officers are held to a higher level of training standard than are the enlisted men. The officers and the men train at the same depot. Thus the enlisted and noncommissioned officers can watch their future officers going through exhausting physical fitness tests and having to meet those higher standards.

English officers engage in sport activities paid for by themselves or the officers mess. Some of these activities include the first ever traverse of the Himalayas on skis (Major Sheridan), scaling Mt. Everest (Colonel Helberg), international yacht racing (Major Southby-Tailyor) and other mundane activities like competitive down-hill skiing, polo competitions, and Olympic biathlons and triathlons.

British officers emphasize not only physical but mental qualities as well.
David Cooper, Chaplain of 2 Para said:

The greater the integrity of the individual, the greater his ability to withstand battlefield stress. The job of training is to develop that integrity. You have to examine your equipment, training and the character of your men. Look for the strengths of these three but remember that war exploits the weaknesses in all three.

While the trip to the Falklands was relatively pleasant for most men, lengthy wine lists and elegant cuisine of cruise ships, like the Canberra, provided most pleasant surroundings for troops underway to a war. But British troops did not laze their way to the Falklands. Onboard ship, Marines and Paras continued their relentless training. They began marathon runs around and around the ship. They had continual physical fitness drills.

...on Canberra, the fitness program continued unabated from dawn till dusk, even though the promenade deck was now beginning to resemble a crumbling motorway...The companies or platoons, laden with weapons and equipment, tramped and doubled in the same direction for mile after mile. When I wasn’t punishing my own aging frame, I would stand on the sidelines with the RSM and watch the snake of sweating marines and paras, flanked by their offices and NCOs, stamping endlessly by, as if in some bizarre ceremonial...below decks...bulkheads shivered...Not surprisingly, the five weeks of undiluted training had produced a lean, mean-looking band of warriors with feet like leather. Equipment now seemed moulded to the body, and men carried their weapons as extensions of themselves.

(Vaux, 1986:63)

Vaux wrote of his own Marines and the Paras. There is fairly good evidence that Welsh Guards and Scots Guards were simply not as physically fit as the Marines or Paras (Hastings and Jenkins, 1983:269;274). As a consequence, Guards had difficulties during long marches in the Falklands cold humid climate.

Onboard ship, British medics taught basic first aid to the troops: how to administer a saline drip, how to inject
morphine and how to deal with various kinds of wounds and burns. Helicopter pilots practiced landings and take-offs. Troops practiced firing their weapons from prow and stern of the ships. While the task force repacked its ships during its two week stopover at Ascension Island, The Sunday Express Magazine Team (1982) reports that British troops used 37 1/2 years of training allowance of ammunition in their two week practice sessions.

With few exceptions, the Argentine Army did not train its men nor prepare them for the battle ahead. Young conscripts had to be shown how to handle and fire their weapons and to dig their foxholes. Their training was confused at best. But there was no sense of urgency because Argentines were still convinced that the British would not come, would not land and all would be well.

Training is derived from doctrine and tactics. Doctrine determines the "why" of a battle and the tactics the "how".

(d) Doctrine

Doctrine is a general collection of wisdom and experience of both strategy and tactics which results in general instructions to military units for the operation of forces.

British doctrine has always involved combined arms training and joint exercises with sister services.

The British military is one of a handful of national establishments today with a living staff tradition of planning and mounting invasion operations involving transoceanic distances, the others being the United States and India.

The British were more or less constantly involved in amphibious operations far from home waters since the sixteenth century and learned the hard way in the Crimean War the cost of letting planning and operational skills atrophy. They employed these techniques during World Wars I and II—not always successfully, witness Gallipoli—and from these experiences institutionalized the mechanics of joint logistics and operational planning.

(Guilmartin, 1985:61)
Argentines with no experience in conventional warfare for over a hundred and twenty years could not match Britain's experience in joint exercises combining and coordinating the activities of land, sea and air forces. As we discussed in Chapter One, inter-service rivalry reaches extreme proportion in Argentina. The most salient example is the 1962 bombing of the Argentine Naval Air Arm by the Argentine Air Force. The Argentine Navy went to port, after the sinking of the Belgrano and the Naval Air Force had command, control and tactical problems with the Argentine Air Force.

There were also dramatic differences in tactical capability and experience of British and Argentines.

(e) Tactics

Tactics involves the actual employment of troops on the battlefield.

The Rattenbach Report succinctly states that the Argentine Military Command didn't prepare any alternative plans for the new operational and tactical circumstances, and for this reason was unable to fulfill its mission.

(Siete Dias, 1983:13)

The report further emphasizes that the Military Command showed a "generalized lack of knowledge of the real tactical situation" (Siete Dias, 1983:14). The most glaring example of tactical and intelligence failure is the massing of troops around Port Stanley.

Since Argentine Marines had been trained by U.S. Marines, who land in shallow water, Argentines assumed that all amphibious landings are in shallow water. However, British Royal Marines invariably seek deep water for their landings. So while the Argentines massed their forces at Port Stanley and fixed their artillery for the invasion they assumed would come to Stanley Harbor, the British landed at San Carlos and Ajax Bay. The eastern traverse across the island coupled with the landings in the south-east completely confounded the Argentines. One of the young ex-enlisted Malvinas veterans commented,
I don’t know anything about strategy. I don’t know anything about war. But I could figure out that all these troops massed in one place was nonsense. This was a great big island and the English could come from anywhere. Why were there thousands of troops all in one place?

British troops are trained to attack at night, to work in dispersed groups, to assume command when a leader falls and to exercise independent judgment and flexibility. Argentines were unable to cope with an enemy who didn’t fight by Argentine textbook rules. The official account of the Argentine Army, Informe Oficial Ejercito Argentino, states:

(We were) fighting against an adversary for whom night was his best ally.

(Informe Oficial Ejercito Argentino, 1983, Tomo I:105)

(During the retreat, the troops were) pressured strongly by vastly superior enemy who not only attacked on the front but also advanced on the flank.

(Informe Oficial Ejercito Argentino, 1983, Tomo I:107)

The lines of the (Argentine) minefields which were only partially effective after the disposition of troops the 27th of May, also impeded the movements of our own forces.

(Informe Oficial Ejercito Argentino, 1983, Tomo I:79)

Turner analyzed the tactics of the Argentines and shows how they did not seize their advantage against the outnumbered British troops who were themselves often in dangerous positions.

Most mistakes were made in the army campaign on the ground. The field commanders neglected three classic tenets of strategy: the Argentines did not launch a ground attack against the beachhead landing force of the British, where it was most vulnerable; the Argentines did not fight hard to maintain the hills overlooking Port Stanley; instead, by
losing the high ground, they made defense of the capital nearly impossible; and, instead of using the best-trained, professional troops as a spearhead against the British, General Mario Menendez dispersed them in an unsuccessful attempt to bolster units made of of recent conscripts.

(Turner, 1983:60)

The Argentines faced a tough, smart, well trained and relentless force. But in spite of their training for war on the Northern Plains of Germany, British Paras, Marines and Guards had to drastically revise and rethink their tactics.

..moving and fighting over the rough, open terrain was a slow business, involving a high expenditure of ammunition...The mountain-top objectives were very restricting, allowing only enough elbow-room for, at most, one commando or battalion at a time. The battle was not being fought on the plains of North Germany by armored units, so talk of narrow thrusts and swift follow-up to maintain momentum was academic.

(Thompson, 1985:134)

Yet many of the tactical problems of both forces were confounded and compounded by serious problems in command, control, communications and, most of all, intelligence.

(f) Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

The most important factor in understanding the South-Atlantic Conflict of 1982 is simply that the Argentines did not think that Britain would actually attack in force. The lack in political and military intelligence and misunderstanding on both sides was incredible.

Thus Argentine optimism about both Britain’s unwillingness to fight and about United States neutrality proved unfounded. The Argentines had believed what they wanted to believe. More effective strategic planning and better foreign intelligence could have pointed to the errors and danger implicit in these assumptions. But because Argentina had not fought a war for over a century, its capacity
to provide this sort of intelligence had not been developed.

(Turner, 1983:59)

Several good references dissect intelligence failures on both sides (Cardosa et al 1983; Guilmartin, 1985; Hopple, 1984; Lebow, 1983). Freedman’s (1986) article is noteworthy for its incisive commentary.

Indeed many of the British forces could not believe that they were actually going to war. Numerous officers and men recounted that they were convinced they would never embark and then once underway thought that the Task Force would never actual see battle. Once the Task Force left Ascension, officers and men knew that battle was imminent.

Argentina waited for a diplomatic solution. Citizens and soldiers were convinced that the United States would mediate a solution and that either or both the Organization of American States or the United Nations would condemn Britain and there would be no war. In part this explains the use of conscripts on the island and the faulty or negligible planning. The Rattenbach report noted that the lack of planning for defense, not establishing logistics support, not organizing joint command and control actions, and not installing adequate communications produced a spirit of indolence.

It induced in the units and the troops the preconceived idea that there wasn’t going to be any battle confrontation and that the situation would be resolved in the diplomatic sphere all of which affected the spiritual outlook of the troops and their disposition towards combat.

(Siete Dias, 1983:14)

Argentine Colonel (now General) Balza, at a meeting in Buenos Aires, told how he dealt with his troops questions about diplomatic solutions.

My soldiers kept asking me, 'My Colonel don’t you think that the United Nations will solve everything? My Colonel, we won’t have to fight will we?’ And I kept telling them that we didn’t have very much to do with politicians and that we couldn’t worry about international diplomatic solutions. Our job
was to fix the guns and sight our weapons. We had to be ready to fight.

The Argentine military never thought they would go to war with England. However they were so worried that Chile would exploit the political situation that crack well trained Argentine Army units were stationed around Commodoro Rivadavia and near the Chilean border to prevent a Chilean attack in the Southern tip of Argentina (Aguiar et al, 1983:26).

Both sides lacked a critical element so necessary to invasion or defense—maps. Argentines used British maps and the British supplemented their knowledge by using yachtsman and Marine Major Ewen Southby-Tailoyor’s personal knowledge of the Falklands.

Argentines forgot their history lessons. They were lulled into thinking that the English were tea drinking dilettantes with a lost Empire. Had the Argentines only known their history lessons they would have been beware of the true bellicose nature of the British. They would never have invaded the Falklands. In a television interview after the surrender, a Buenos Aires taxi-cabdriver commented," We only meant to twist the lion’s tail. But the lion came and bit our head off."

Yet the British knew next to nothing about their enemy.

Following the example of Montgomery during the Second World War campaign in North Africa, (General Jeremy Moore) had obtained not only a full briefing on General Menendez but a picture of him which he studied while traveling to the South Atlantic. This was a paratrooper who could be expected to attempt an aggressive battle, rather than the reactive, defensive battle that was actually fought. It was only after he had met the real General Menendez at the surrender negotiations that it became apparent that he had been given information on the wrong General Menendez (there were five to choose from in all!). The overall state of intelligence on the senior Argentine officers was scanty.

(Freedman, 1986:327)
Moore also wonders what might have happened if he had been given the picture of the mild mannered Menendez to look at during his long sea voyage and the tough paratrooper Menendez had been the actual enemy.

The Argentines, once they saw the British fleet in San Carlos Bay, and once they heard the rumble of naval bombardment and felt field artillery rounds kicking up around them, knew that their enemy was the ferocious British. The British of the Empire. The British of bulldog tenacity. Not the mythical effete tea-drinking British.

To prevent their men from surrendering to the British, Argentine officers told their soldiers horror stories about the fierce Nepalese mercenaries -- the Ghurka. After the surrender, the British capitalized on the Argentines’ fear of the little men from Nepal. When given the task of one man guarding hundreds of Argentine prisoners, a tom would invariably find a Gurkha to stand guard. Then the tom would find an English speaking Argentine to deliver a message to his fellow Argentine prisoners.

The prisoners were by this time getting unsettled and showing the first signs of causing trouble. 2 Para had a simple but effective ploy. Before they left, 2 Para had told the prisoners that the Gurkhas were cannibals and ate people they did not like. The Argentinian conscripts believed what they were told without question, as rumours about the Gurkhas were already rife.

The Gurkhas had no trouble. They had been told to smile at the prisoners every time they looked like getting out of hand. A gurkha’s smile is a terrifying thing. It looks as though he is about to do something dastardly. The prisoners behaved themselves immaculately every time a Gurkha bared his teeth, believing that one false move, and he would leap forward and eat them.

(McGowan and Hands, 1986: 181)

Major General Vaux commented on the stories bandied about regarding the Gurkhas’ ferocity.

After the war an emotional book was published in Argentina. Los Chicos de la Guerra alleges fearful carnage amongst survivors as they
attempted to surrender to the 1/7th Gurkhas. But after all the self-delusion and propaganda perpetuated amongst Argentines previously, that allegation seems pathetic, as well as ungrateful. Fortunately for their conscripts, the cheerful little men from the mountains of Nepal never closed with any enemy; let alone drew their lethal kukris in anger for the Queen. After years of patient loyalty in peace and war, they were frustratingly deprived of the chance to display their legendary valor on this occasion.

(Vaux, 1986:201)

While rumors and horror stories proliferate after any war, some actual day to day problems of great import gnawed at both British and Argentine landforces. Both the English and the Argentines had problems with command and control. High speed communications with not only higher level headquarters but with capital cities compounded the problems of organizing and fighting a battle. General Menendez continually received instructions from Buenos Aires as did Brigadier Thompson and later General Moore from Northwood Command. Just like the U.S. Task Force on the raid to Iran recounted how President Jimmy Carter gave instructions to men on the ground, so Buenos Aires gave commands to Menendez and Piaggi; London to Moore and Thompson. Just as the U.S. War in Viet Nam was muddled by continual orders and changes in strategy and tactics from Washington D.C to Saigon, so also did London and Buenos Aires dictate instructions to their far-removed commanders.

Brigadier Julian Thompson, in the Yorkshire television documentary, remembered his frustrations.

...Although you don’t mind really dying for your Queen and country, you certainly don’t want to die for politicians...I was summoned quite often to speak to superior headquarters at Northwood...(and) on one particular occasion after one particularly irritating telephone conversation I remember walking out of the tent and saying to myself...'I shall win this war for those buggers and then I shall leave.'
Both Argentine and British commands had problems in delineating definite lines of authority. Cohesion and combat effectiveness are hardly enhanced while leaders quarrel amongst themselves.

Here is how two British authors delicately alluded to the British problem.

When difficulties began to develop in the South Atlantic and relations between Admiral Woodward and Brigadier Thompson were clearly less than smooth, the chiefs of staff were eager to get Moore on to the scene as rapidly as possible.

(Hastings and Jenkins, 1983:270)

General Moore had arrived late in the Falklands on Queen Elizabeth II and due to communications problems had been out of touch with the Task Force for ten days (Thompson, 1985:107). But British command problems were minimal and were sorted out after Moore’s arrival. Indeed, the British troops have always paid particular attention to chain of command, command control and the setting up of headquarters. World War II lore recounts acerbic discussions between British General Montgomery of the 21st Army group and U.S. General Bradley and the 12th Army group. Field Marshal Slim in his book Defeat Into Victory (1972) emphasized the importance of setting up an efficient headquarters with clear lines of command and communication. Field Marshal Slim often refers to problems between and among British officers in the South Asia campaign of World War II and the numerous times he had to smooth U.S. General Joe Stilwell’s annoyance at decisions made by British High Command (Slim, 1972).

If the Argentines had read Slim, they would have perhaps been better prepared to straighten out the internal squabbles of the landforces on the Falklands. The Rattenbach Report devotes an extraordinary amount of space to chastise Argentine Generals Menendez, Daher, Parada and Jofre who seemed unable to coordinate their tasks. The Rattenbach report states that after the chain of command was established by Buenos Aires, "there was an evident psychological subordination to the Landforce Commander, General Jofre" (Siete Dias, 1983:13).

When generals squabble and bicker over control and command, younger officers take sides and soon the troops know that there is confusion amongst their leaders. Hardly
a situation to foster cohesion or give inspiration for combat. The British had clear indication of the toll paid by strict adherence to rank combined with lack of information.

Communications and command problems contributed to the appalling loss of life at Fitzroy. When the Ship Sir Galahad landed at Fitzroy Bay, Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour tried to persuade a colonel of the Welsh Guards to disembark. The colonel refused. The Welsh Guard colonel had no experience with the deadly devastation wrought by the Argentine pilots. The Welsh Guard colonel also said he would not subject his men to being "mucked about" (Hastings and Jenkins 277-280). The Galahad was bombed and fifty-one men died and others horribly wounded.

As great gusts of flame and black smoke spewed into the sky from the bowels of the landing ship, the men of 2 Para dashed to the shore, and began pulling survivors from the rafts and helping casualties to medical aid. All that afternoon and evening, a tragic procession of blackened, dazed, terribly wounded men was brought aboard the assault ships in San Carlos Bay...

(Hastings and Jenkins, 1983:280)

In the Yorkshire TV Documentary, Major Southby-Tailyor mused on the reasons why the Welsh Guards' colonel refused to listen to him. Southby-Tailyor went over the reasons pro and con as to had he been forceful enough, had he given the colonel enough information or was it simply that he (Southby-Tailyor) was only a major? Whatever the problem men died unnecessarily for lack of information or command problems. The British were lucky that they didn’t have more deaths.

The British also failed to estimate the correct Argentine strength on South Georgia and at Goose Green. Only the superior leadership and training of the 2nd Para Regiment prevented disaster at Goose Green. The intelligence gap probably resulted from British withdrawal of SAS teams five days prior to the San Carlos invasion. Even at San Carlos, the British stumbled on new Argentine positions. If these positions had not been silenced, the Argentines could have inflicted severe losses on the invasion force.
Both sides had constant intelligence difficulties. The British had few Spanish speaking officers. Yet, while the Argentines were surprised at the anti-Argentine attitude of the "kelpers", they still did not adequately monitor the islanders' telephone lines or radio sets of the "kelpers". The Argentines had no adequate count of the kelpers, except where the population was held prisoner in one hall at Goose Green. Thus British commandos mixed in freely with the population and provided important intelligence information.

Communications were difficult for the Argentines and the British. Roads in the Falklands were few and boggy. Logistics and supply were a constant problem.

(g) Logistics and Supply

All the grand plans and all the grand strategy and all the training mean nothing if an Army has no food and no munitions. British hustled about and found ships in their Merchant Marine and commandeered four roll-on-roll-off channel ferries. The Queen Elizabeth II cruised elegantly alongside rolling ugly Channel ferries.

The SS Canberra was converted from a merchant cruiser carrying school parties to a hospital ship complete with intensive care units, casualty department, operating theatre, laboratory, ex-ray department and desalination plant within 60 hours.

(Richards, 1983:790)

Queen Elizabeth II, or aircraft carrier, or channel ferry, or cruise ship, they all moved men, food, helicopters, airplanes, trucks, jeeps, medical supplies, ammunition and artillery to the battle zone.

Argentines did not prepare warplans containing mundane boring details of logistics support for their landforces. Argentines were completely unprepared for war. The British had several hundred years of long-range experience in supplying its troops in Africa, India, Pakistan, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, China, Malaysia, Burma and Central America. She has sent her men and
supplied her troops since the seventeenth century. We should not wonder at Britain’s logistics "miracle" because it is really only Britain’s everyday manner of fighting a war.

...amateurs talk about strategy while professionals talk about logistics. Of all aspects of military activity, logistics is the least appreciated, the least well quantified, and the most poorly funded. Yet on the day of battle, as the South Atlantic conflict proved, logistics was a necessary condition for success.

The contrast between British and Argentine logistics management was striking. Capitalizing upon its geographic proximity, Argentina built up a large stockpile of weapons and munitions on the islands; it then failed to manage the distribution system properly. As a result, some units were short of equipment that was, in fact, available in supply dumps on the islands. In addition, Argentine resupply efforts became sporadic once the British fleet imposed an exclusion zone around the islands. Although their resupply lines were never severed, the Argentines were limited to night flights into Port Stanley. This sharply reduced their ability to sustain their forces.

The British faced an entirely different logistics problem. Their supply line ran 8,000 miles from their homeland. Limited logistical support existed on Ascension Island, whose airfield was operated jointly with the United States. Moreover, upon arrival in the battle theater, the British had to organize their logistics system on a ship-to-shore basis. This continued until they secured beachheads. In effect, the British conducted a classic ‘World War II’-style amphibious operation at a distance that matched any operations undertaken during the earlier conflict.

(Zakheim, 1985:41)
One of the Argentine ex-enlisted commented:

After the surrender, we got to Porto Argentino and we saw the tons and tons of food. Senora you wouldn't believe the warehouses of food. We walked on floors of pasta and found boxes and boxes of marmalade and cookies and beef. All the while we had been starving out in the hills.

The Official Report of the Argentine Army (Informe Oficial Ejercito Argentino, 1983:15) admits to decided lacks in logistics planning and also to cases of malnutrition. The Rattenbach Report (Siete Dias, 1983:8) refers to lack of logistical support in weapons, materiel and food. While the Argentine Army admits to its own problems, and there were many cases of starvation and malnutrition, logistical problems plagued the British as well.

After the sinking of Atlantic Conveyor, with all but one of 42 Commando’s Chinooks all its tents and most of its food lost, the unit was forced to make its long twelve mile march across the island with men carrying hundred pound packs. High technology served them nought. Although they were in top physical condition, they suffered from lack of food and water. Food and water was a problem for the British, throughout the campaign.

Not only had we been short of rations for some time, but we had lacked many other essentials as well. Drinking-water had become virtually unobtainable. Cooking fuel was so scarce that marines were no longer able to boil the liquid they got from the brackish puddles. As a result, increasing numbers of them were suffering from diarrhoea, or 'Galtieri’s Revenge' as they called it. Everyone had given up shaving many days before.

(Vaux, 1986:158)

These reports of privation and hunger are from the victorious British forces who landed in San Carlos 21 May 1982 and were in battle until the surrender 14 June 1982. Imagine the state of the Argentine forces on the island from March and April of 1982 and subject to a naval blockade, offshore naval bombardment, aerial attacks, field artillery barrages and advancing English troops.
During one interview with ex-enlisted Argentine young men, the group recounted the true sorry state of Argentina’s lack of preparation. Here is an excerpt from the researcher’s fieldnotes.

One of the young men turned to me and asked, "Senora have you ever seen an Argentine dogtag?" He then produced from his pocket a little round disk of aluminum with a piece of paper taped with Scotch tape. He then asked me to read the dogtag. I was completely unable to decipher the figures.

He turned to his friends and said, "See she doesn’t even know what she’s looking at. She can’t even read the tag."

He then explained that after wearing the dogtag for only a few days the heat and sweat of a person’s body would make the ink run and the dogtag was useless. Apparently I looked stunned and another young man spoke up.

"Well he was lucky. We didn’t have any identification tags. I got up every morning in the Malvinas and wrote my name and address on my arm in ballpoint ink. Of course, you can imagine that the ink ran and in a few hours there was nothing but a smudge on my arm. And then after a few days, my pen ran out. Senora do you know the terror that it means to a person to think that they will die and no one will know where you are buried? Your mother will never know. Your body will never go back home and no one will ever visit your grave."

Then a third entered the conversation.

"I know how you feel. I worried and worried about my family and about being thrown in a hole with no one knowing where I was buried. I didn’t have any dogtags either. I had a lot of letters from my family. So I found a piece of plastic and wrapped the letters up in the plastic. I wanted to wrap them up in plastic because I thought that if I got hit and bled a lot the plastic would protect my letters. Then whoever found me would look in my pockets and would know that this body had to belong to this return address with all these letters".

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Dogtags are a relatively new phenomenon ranging from makeshift punched tags of World War I to the more sophisticated variety of World War II and beyond. During the U.S. Civil War, soldiers would pause before battle and write their names and addresses on a piece of paper which each would pin to the back of his coat so that his family might be informed of his death (Porter, 1906:174). That was the eve of the battle of Cold Harbor, June 1864. Argentine boys in 1982 were no better off that the Union soldiers of over a century past.

Argentines were fighting a high tech war with nineteenth century manoeuvres and logistics. The mere fact that there were no dogtags is an encapsulated story of all the mistakes of Argentine logistical and strategic planners. Also, there was little attention paid to the issue of medical care and facilities.

(h) Medical Care and Facilities

Stouffer et al (1949) found that men who were bonded to their unit were confident in the fact that each wounded man would be rescued and cared for.

One element in the men’s reluctance to be transferred from the unit they knew intimately was probably the minimum security they felt in the knowledge that they would be cared for if they were wounded. Where strong mutual ties had developed, a man could feel sure that the other men would take the extra trouble and risk to care for him if he were hit...

...The presence of medical aid men with each combat company was a universal source of reassurance, and these medics were highly respected and admired. The men could and did expect that if they were wounded everything possible would be done for them, even at the cost of personal hazard to medical personnel...

(Stouffer et al, 1949:144)

Commander Rick Jolly’s account of the surgical hospital at Ajax Bay entitled, The Red and Green Life Machine (London: Century Publishing, 1983) is probably the best first-hand account of the British soldier, his surgeons, the medics and the wounded. Other references
include London (1983); Marsh, (1983); Richards, (1983); Sherman, (1986); Williams, (1983). Although the Sherman (1986) article tells of cooperation between Argentine and British medical doctors onboard the Uganda and the Bahia de Buen Suceso, her stories about Argentine medical incompetence are simply not true. Argentine army medical teams worked under dreadful conditions and given those conditions performed extremely well.

First-hand Argentine accounts are found in Buroni and Ceballos (1986) and Ceballos and Buroni (1986b). The Buroni and Ceballos (1986) and the (1986a) Ceballos and Buroni articles are particularly interesting for they present meticulous analyses of British preparations for combat medicine from helicopters to basic instruments and bandages. Dr. Enrique Ceballos was the Director of the Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley) Argentine Army Hospital during the Malvinas campaign. Without mentioning the Argentine lack of preparation, he presents a veiled criticism of the Argentine Army’s lack of preparation for medical care during combat. Ceballos and Buroni (1986b) are more open in their criticism in their article dealing with experiences in the Malvinas.

There was no planning on the highest level of the medical corps which manifested itself fundamentally in: lack of planning for hospitalization, lack of planning for medical evacuation, absence of a system of treatment and complete lack of basic necessities... (and) a lack of hospital ships... all from the very beginning of the conflict.

(Ceballos and Buroni, 1986b:28)

British soldiers were given continuous training onboard the ships on first aid and treatment of wounds. Thus every soldier was a medic himself. Every soldier carried morphine attached to his dogtags. The video tapes on Raid at Top Malo and the Yorkshire television documentary all contain interviews of soldiers wounded in battle who told of treating their friends, or themselves or Argentine prisoners.

At Ajax Bay, on the Uganda or the Canberra, the finest possible care was given to Argentine and British wounded. Ceballos and Buroni (1986a) indicate that 40 percent of the patients onboard the Uganda were Argentine. It is a strange war indeed when invading forces care for a high percentage of the enemy’s wounded.
There were numerous heroic instances of Argentine officers, noncommissioned officers and fellow soldiers rescuing Argentines from the field of battle. Individual Argentine soldier did not lack for courage in rescuing their fellow soldiers. However the level of first aid knowledge and technological level of hospital and evacuation facilities was much better for the British compared to the Argentines. Not all wounds are physical.

Price (1984) wrote that British troops in the Falklands had a low psychiatric casualty rate because of the following: short duration of the war, use of elite troops, little exposure to indirect fire, an unopposed landing and psychiatric care. O'Connell (1986) has also written about the stresses on men and psychiatrist in the Falklands war and indicates that approximately 4 to 5% of the casualties were neuropsychiatric in nature. Orts (1986) and Collazo (1985) also found an identical rate of psychiatric casualties among the Falklands veterans. Orts, in particular, recommended that Argentine forces have mental health teams close to the line or with the field hospital. During a 1987 visit to Argentina with six U.S. Army psychiatrists, the researcher noted that the Argentine Army is now interested in the issue of mental health teams and psychiatrists with the division and with field hospitals.

Nonetheless, the conclusion we reach is that, during the 1982 South-Atlantic Conflict, Argentine medical care was inadequate and British medical facilities were excellent. A British soldier had much more confidence in his fellow soldiers' first aid and the medical facilities of his forces than did the Argentine conscript which is probably one very good reason why the soldier fought harder.

The British soldier is bound to his unit, his regiment, to his service and to his nation because of the cultural context of the military, military traditions and history, high esteem accorded to the military, financial support given to the military, advanced and realistic levels of training, experience of officers, and dedication of men. While the Argentines have a proud heritage, it is a nineteenth century tradition with no experience in war and no knowledge of the consequences of war. Argentine officers are fiercely proud of their nation but neither these officers nor their individual conscript had any recent living memory of a modern war to bolster them in the chaotic battlefield of the twentieth century Falklands/Malvinas war.
Placing Argentine and British armies in this cultural framework, we now turn to an analysis of those factors which bind the individual soldier or officer to his special military unit.
In this chapter, we shall discuss variables which contribute to the bonding of the soldier or officer to his military organization. As we noted in Chapter Four, these are the characteristics which military sociologists and psychologists have found most difficult for the military man to put into words.

(a) Loyalty to the Nation and its Values

Both Argentine and British military soldiers and officers indicated that of course they were loyal to the values of the nation and upheld the war in the South Atlantic. Argentine officers were much more vociferous in their statements that loyalty to the nation was essential for an officer and then they expanded on the officer's role as leader and role model. Loyalty, patriotism and an ingrained sense of being the nation's conscience is inculcated in Argentine officers. Such a sense of exalted mission is absent from the British officer.

Royal Marine, Lieutenant Colonel (now Major General) Vaux wrote:

We were all professionals in Commando Forces. Willing recipients of the Queen's shilling, content with the conditions of service. Stimulated by the challenge, variety and comradeship. Free to retire at minimal notice. But each man was aware that he could be called to account at any time.

(b) Patriotism

In 1949, Stouffer et al wrote:

Officers and enlisted men alike attached little importance to idealistic motives--patriotism and concern about war aims...An intermediate proportion of both officers and enlisted men mentioned
self-preservation as a motive; that combat was, as they put it, a matter of kill or be killed.

(Stouffer et al, 1949:111)

While both British and Argentine officers expounded on political reasons for invading or defending the Malvinas/Falklands, like Stouffer's World War II respondents, British enlisted men were hard pressed to express their reasons for joining the army or marines or fighting the South Atlantic War. One of the Paras said:

When you're in a foxhole and there are tracers and grenades going off over your head, you don't really think about the Queen. You just worry about getting out alive and fighting for another day.

Several Argentine ex enlisted were much more specific. One said:

I knew what we were doing. I was proud to be part of the invasion. As an Argentine, I knew that this liberation of the islands was right and I was proud to be part of the war.

Both nations were firmly behind the war. Public opinion supported both Prime Minister Thatcher and General Galtieri. That meant that the fighting man on the ground had the emotional support of his family and neighbors in this war. There were no demonstrations such as the U.S. anti-war rallies of Viet Nam nor the negative attitude of the French people towards the wars in Indo-China or Algeria. The South-Atlantic conflict was a short war and no one knows how or where the tide of public opinion would have turned had the war continued for much longer.

Deceased British naval officer, David Tinker's diary (1982) provides a glimpse of what have might been an increasingly vociferous anti-war sentiment in Britain had the war dragged on and loss of life continued to mount.

When Argentines learned of the surrender on 14 June 1982, having been told through the mass media that the Argentines were winning, the people were enraged. Crowds gathered in the Plaza de Mayo and chanted, "Son of a bitch. Son of a bitch" to General Galtieri. That was after the war.
Generally, the British were particularly pleased to see their military recoup its honor and tradition once again. Argentines were delighted to have their military come face to face with the second most powerful NATO nation. Turner wrote:

Even in defeat, Argentines are proud that they stood up to Britain. As one journalist put it in a sober article in La Prensa, 'Argentina has already proved that it can wage war with dignity' and 'can also put the world's number three military power in a tight spot, not to mention the fact that the latter is being helped by the world's number one military power.'

(Turner, 1983:60)

These are the comments of a nation with little military tradition or history seeking a revindication of their defeat.

(c) Military Tradition and History

The Argentine army reveres San Martin as the founder of the nation and the founder of the Argentine Army. Argentine schoolchildren can rattle off the names of the famous generals and admirals of Argentine history but noticeably all these heroes are from the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Argentine officers only knew battle tactics in the abstract. They had little money for thorough field exercises. Their training was inadequate at best. They knew modern warfare from textbooks. But they did not and do not lack for loyalty or the sense of an officer's proper role.

Colonel (now General) Martin Balza, when he was asked in a public meeting (April 1987), why he went to the Malvinas knowing that the English forces were far superior in preparation and technology, answered:

I am a soldier. I obey orders. I go where my government tells me to go.
I am a professional soldier and that is the way a professional soldier behaves.

Balza's Third Artillery were from the Province of Corrientes. When the Third Artillery Correntinos manned their twentieth century artillery pieces, they screamed battlecries in their five hundred year old Guarani
language. These Correntinos added a new page to Argentine field artillery history.

The English were spoiling for a fight and screaming their battle cries.

We could hear them calling out, 'Commandos, Royal Marine Commandos!'; that was to let the Argies know who was going to go in and kill them. If they chose to mix with the best in the world, they were going to get burned.

A Royal Marine on the BBC Tape Raid at Top Malo voiced his feelings which were echoed by many of the respondents.

Be you a Marine with no war...until you can get one of these little wars and you can prove that you are a blooming good soldier... it's a waste of time. It's like being a concert pianist and having no place to play your violin (sic).

The British with their long tradition of battles and heroes were well aware of who they were and what their proud tradition meant to the regiment and to the unit.

Royal Marine and British Army recruiting posters and pamphlets emphasize the long proud tradition of the British forces. One Marine poster recounts memorable dates from the birth of the corps in 1654 (Bunker Hill, 1775; Gibraltar, 1705; Belle Isle, 1761; Trafalgar, 1805; Gallipoli, 1915; Zeebrugge, 1918; Normandy, 1944; Walcheren, 1944; and, The Recapture of the Falklands, 1982). When Lieutenant Colonel (now Colonel) Andrew Whitehead turned to the men of 42 Commando, after the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor and said, "We marched from Normandy to Berlin. We can bloody well march twelve miles to Stanley". His men knew that the tradition of the Royal Marines was at stake. They marched. They slogged. They yomped. They were Marines.

David Cooper of 2 Para commented:

Every Para knows that 2 Para fought at Arnhem. Everyone felt pride in his regiment. In the Falklands, one soldier said to me 'I'll be damned, if I'm going to let down those chaps who fought at Arnhem'.

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One Marine said,

You know that old saying about "Tommy this and Tommy that?" Well we have a saying in England that "If you take the Queen’s shilling you go where she sends you".

British military tradition includes awful debacles like The Charge of the Light Brigade, Gallipoli and Dunkirk. Yet the British have learned from their terrible mistakes. Their military history is of grandeur and heroism interspersed with incredible stupidity.

Argentines prided themselves on never having lost a war and the Argentine Army made the phrase "never having lost a war" their motto and raison d'être. All of which makes their loss even more devastating. But during the Falklands campaign both sides, winner and loser, were helped by religious faith and the work of their chaplains.

(d) Strong Religious Belief

Just as the Stouffer et al (1949) research found religion to be a consolation to men and a means to relieve anxiety, so also were British and Argentine forces comforted by their religious faith. David Cooper, Chaplain of 2 Para, remembered that church attendance increased on the ships the closer the fleet approached the Falklands and decreased onboard ship the closer the fleet neared England. He said:

As a Chaplain, I cared for them when they were most at risk and most in fear...We can cope without equipment but we have a need to meet a man’s emotional needs with ceremonies, bands and religious services.

We had a religious service after the battle, where men stood with tears streaming down their face. I spoke of the belief in an ultimate being who cared and loved for the Argentines and for the English.

Major John Crosland wrote of David Cooper:

David Cooper, the Padre of 2 Para, was extremely good with the toms while we were on the Norland. ...his sermons on the boat...had a tremendous amount to do with uniting an already very close battalion, because he
wouldn’t avoid issues. He has an inbuilt ability to talk to soldiers and gain their trust, which is not as easy as one might think. Because he’s got a tremendous depth of wisdom, he doesn’t talk down to a soldier—he talks at his level. He is very realistic, but he can be very abrupt and down to earth...He’s not just a very practical Christian, he’s also a very fine soldier so he knows what he’s talking about. The blokes have a tremendous respect for him.

(Arthur, 1985:199)

The British had Padre Cooper and the Argentines Padre Piccinalli. Fr. Jorge Picinalli’s sermons dedicated the Malvinas to the Virgin of Luján and the whole war and all the soldiers to the Virgin of the Rosary. Many Argentines are convinced that the airport at Stanley remained open until the last day of the war and was never destroyed was because Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Ali Seneldin buried his rosary beside the airstrip.

Nearly every man in the Malvinas wore a rosary, had a scapular and took part in some religious service during his stay in the islands. Argentine Air Force and Naval pilots hung rosaries on their instrument panels as they came streaking down Bomb Alley in San Carlos Bay. Picinalli’s sermons and the firm conviction of all the chaplains in the Malvinas that the war and the Argentine forces were dedicated to the Virgin of the Rosary, the Virgin of Luján, and to the holy cause of liberating the islands provided comfort to combatant and anxious family members alike (Kasanzew, 1983:159-163; Burns, 1987:68-73).

Nonetheless, having visited England, Pope John Paul II came to Argentina on the 9th of June 1982 and he made no secret about his attitude towards the Malvinas War. Immediately on arriving at the Buenos Aires airport, he intoned:

At this moment, humanity should question itself once again about the absurd and always unjust phenomenon of war, on whose stage of death and pain still stands the negotiating table, which could and should have prevented it...I shall pray that the governments of both sides and the international community will find ways of avoiding further damage, heal the
wounds of war, and find the necessary solution for peace.

(Burns, 1987:97)

But religious faith in war is intertwined with the concepts of valor or heroism or a cult of masculinity.

(e) Concept of Valor, Heroism or a Cult of Masculinity

A survey of a division that had fought in North Africa and Sicily in April of 1944, showed that combat effectiveness or a fighting spirit was intertwined with the concept of manhood, masculinity, valor or heroism (Stouffer et al 1949:131-135; 150-151; 308-309). A man’s sense of self and his idea of masculinity are tied up in his courage and aggressive behavior in battle. World War II combatants used words like, “fearless, brave, cool, had guts, disregarded personal safety” to describe this idealized behavior.

Argentines did not lack for valor or heroism and indeed with the Latin culture the concept of machismo is ingrained. But what does this machismo entail? British officers spoke admiringly of the Naval and Air Force pilots. They felt that the Argentine pilots epitomized the Latin concept of machismo. But troops did break and run so that cult of masculinity or heroism must have been rather a thin veneer. Turner wrote:

...while some officers fought with dedication (with medals for bravery going to officers at the rank of Major and below), many field commanders left their men for the safety of the rear echelons. In many cases, it was the heroism of new recruits, fighting alone, that held off the British as long as possible.

(Turner, 1983:60)

A majority of Argentine men were not prepared to fight and die. As one of the ex-enlisted soldiers said:

Hey man. I was cold and hungry. No one had taught me how to shoot. I was wearing mittens and they kept telling me to shoot my weapon still wearing my mittens. I knew that the English were coming. I knew they were coming down the pass and that we were in the wrong place if we were to stop them. No way I was
going to get killed for this kind of stupidity. If I had had real officers who were real men, maybe I would have stayed. No way! I’m Argentine and we aren’t made for killing people. We like to eat, go to the movies, drink and dance. We aren’t like the English. They are professional soldiers war is their business.

British officers and enlisted were insistent that the second battle is the test of a man’s mettle. One officer commented:

It’s the second battle that’s the most difficult. When you’re on the start line for the first battle, it’s just like the movies and you’re John Wayne. Especially if you have young troops. They are just ready and anxious to dash off and do some killing. Then when the blood and the guts and the gore come home. Then you know what battle is all about. Not only if you get hit but it’s when you hear the dreadful noise of those incoming shells. No one can tell you what battle is like. You simply have to be there. And it’s not a movie.

Then when you have to get the men moving again for the second battle. That’s your test of leadership and that’s when you find out who is a man or not.

Paras and Marines link their military heritage and their sense of masculinity all together. Customs of the mess and green berets and red berets signify a membership in an elite and special outfit. After every firefight and at the close of battle, helmets were tossed aside and the red or green berets were placed on top of dirty and weary heads. Units of macho men. One Para NCO said it all:

We are the best. That’s simply put. We are the very best in all the world. We wear our cherry berets with pride because we are good soldiers and we are men who walk the face of the world and are afraid of no one.

In September of 1987, on a visit to Campo de Mayo the researcher saw several Argentine Commandos wearing stained,
faded and pale blue-green berets. These were noncommissioned officers and their caps were in strange contrast to the natty new velvet green berets of their officers. These NCOs were Malvinas veterans and they were proud of their service in the Malvinas. Like their compatriots across the sea, their berets were a symbol of membership in an elite and special brotherhood banded together and born of battle.

Both Argentine and British are profoundly loyal, patriotic, have a proud military heritage, deep religious conviction and an ingrained sense of valor or heroism. But the British long history of wars and battles over four hundred years and the armed forces’ continuing training and preparation for NATO exercises combined with their living memory of World War II, Korea, Suez, Belize and constant duty in Northern Ireland makes the British forces more aware of battlefield tactics and quick response in combat. The Argentines did not lack for valor or loyalty but were woefully lacking in experience.

We see then that within the cultural ethos of a nation the military gains a certain amount of prestige and respect. When individuals belong to that military group, they are bonded to the organization. But they are not bonded to an abstract concept but to buddies, or fellow officers, or fellow noncommissioned officers. We now turn to the discussion of bonding on a horizontal level or peer bonding.
This chapter discusses horizontal or peer bonding, which is the trust built up between soldier to soldier, NCO to NCO and officer to officer. These relationships are "buddy relationships" or ties of friendship. This concept of peer bonding was reviewed at length in Chapter Two.

(a) Sense of Mission

Societal, organizational and peer bonding are related to the concept of sense of mission. Do individuals know why they are fighting and for what reason? Is there dissension between and among ranks as to the raison d'etre of the war? As discussed in Chapter Two (Cohesion), patriotism, love of country and other abstract concepts are seemingly far from the soldier's thoughts. However, when pressed a soldier will speak of his reasons for fighting in terms of loyalty to the nation, patriotism or defending a way of life. The sociological and psychological literature on the Vietnam war clearly indicate that the reasons for fighting a war or society's attitudes pro and con a particular war impact on the attitudes, values and performance of the soldier.

As we discussed in Chapter One, both nations were firmly convinced that each was fighting a just war. Argentines saw the invasion of the Malvinas as recuperating Argentine territory which had been stolen from them in 1833. Argentina's President Galtieri saw the invasion of the Malvinas as a way to consolidate public opinion behind a faltering military junta. Overwhelming support given to the war by crowds in Plaza de Mayo and jingoistic media accounts proved his point. The English, obviously, did not agree.

Britain saw the invasion of the Falklands as an aggressive action by a hostile nation (Argentina) who had invaded British soil and was threatening life, liberty and a way of life of British citizens. Many of Britain's troops were blooded veterans with experienced officers and noncommissioned officers who had seen death and dying in Northern Ireland. Even those without combat experience
viewed themselves as professional soldiers who accepted their role as obeying orders to go wherever they were sent. Few British soldiers worried about the geopolitical and grand strategy reasons for the Task Force.

One British Para said:

I didn’t even know where the Falklands were. I thought they were some place around Scotland.

To a man, every Argentine officer interviewed stated that the war was just and right because they were liberating the Malvinas which was Argentine territory. With few exceptions all the Argentine ex-enlisted soldiers stated that they felt that the Malvinas were rightfully Argentine territory. One stated emphatically,

I would go back tomorrow to free the islands. They are ours. They belong to us. The English can stay as long as they want. We will return.

In downtown Buenos Aires, a shop sells ashtrays with the motto:

"For our motherland.  
For our heroes.  
For our dead.  
We will return."

Be that as it may, British soldiers, NCO’s and officers didn’t and don’t agree that the Falklands were or are Argentine. Officer and enlisted alike stated that the invasion by the Argentines "just wasn’t fair". The toms might not know their geography but they were clear that their mission was to get rid of the Argentines and have the Union Jack fly over the Falklands once more. Major Chris Keeble of 2 Para summed up the essence of a sense of mission, when he said, "It’s two-thirds morale and one-third combat power" (Eddy, 1982: 219).

Interestingly enough, hatred of the enemy was not a salient issue in the South Atlantic Conflict or even in World War II, as Stouffer et al found

...hatred of the enemy, personal and impersonal, was not a major element in combat motivation...hatred of the enemy does not seem to have had much to do with encouraging the
The South-Atlantic Conflict of 1982 was a strange little war given the strong ties between Argentina and Great Britain as we discussed in Chapter One. Argentine officers told the researcher time and time again that they didn't hate the English. British officers looked up their former Argentine officer classmates after the surrender at Stanley. Welsh Guardsmen wept, when they captured young Argentine soldiers who had come from Patagonia who spoke perfect Welsh. A British soldier, in the Yorkshire television documentary, wept when he told how a young Argentine officer, who spoke perfect English, died in his arms. Argentine officer prisoners-of-war invited their English captors to a makeshift dinner two days after the surrender (Vaux, 1986:208-210). As officers will, after a war, they dissected the pros and cons of the battle, as we continue to do in the context of cohesion.

(b) Technical and Tactical Proficiency

Words like "ingenuity" and "flexibility" have become catchwords in military jargon. But such concepts have far-reaching consequences to battle outcomes and to the soldiers’ and officers’ attitudes. When personnel see that their leaders are committed to outmoded or inadequate plans and tactics, they begin to lose confidence in their leaders and themselves. When men have not been taught how and when to take charge, when circumstances necessitate such action, the battle is lost. Technical and tactical proficiency impinges on both horizontal and vertical cohesion. And an open organizational climate fosters attitudes leading to flexibility in crisis situations.

The Rattenbach Report minces no words in analyzing the intransigent attitude of the Argentine military leadership.

..during the hostilities we observe..a clinging to preconceived ideas without adequate flexibility to permit possible changes (in plans)...

(Siete Dias 1983:14)

Such inflexibility is the product of years of learning by rote memory and training and working in a rigidly
hierarchical system. Argentine landforces were simply unable to adapt rapidly to an ever-changing and fluid battle.

The British have a long tradition of going to battle with whatever is at hand. A nation that could mobilize every yacht, coal barge and fishing vessels to rescue over three hundred thousand of its troops from Dunkirk has a demonstrated capacity for spontaneous ingenuity.

In the Falklands War equipment failed because of the damp cold and high humidity. British servicemen had to make immediate on-the-spot innovations. British sailors dried out Harrier black-boxes in warm galley ovens. They sealed electrical connections with artificial plastic skin "taken" from the sick bay. Air maintenance crews used plastic food wrap to keep instruments and cockpits dry. Because of the bitter cold, British artillery men had to use pipe wrenches to screw in artillery shell fuses. Gun detachment commanders slept with artillery firing boxes in their sleeping bags to keep fuses dry in the 100% humidity. Milan wire-guided anti-tank missiles were used against fortifications, anti-aircraft emplacements and fired against aircraft. British soldiers fired at aircraft with their Scimitar reconnaissance vehicle’s 30 mm cannon and set off Schermuly rocket flares to simulate surface-to-air missiles. When the British found that the Rapier missile system interfered with naval identification friend or foe (IFF) system, they turned off the -adar system and used the Rapier’s optical sighting. Rapier crews had to adapt to shooting targets flying below the level of the batteries. There were countless other instances where soldier, sailor and air maintenance crews worked together to make immediate swift spur of the moment adaptations to a constantly changing war situation (Bowie,1985:6-7).

War inevitably yields the unexpected and military professionals must always prepare for the unknown. Coping with the unexpected creates great strains—standard procedures must be abandoned, doctrine changed on the spot, equipment modified, and so on—but it is precisely this ability to adapt to the unexpected that provides united Western democracies with hidden strength.

..in their military establishments, the democracies place a great deal of stress on the role of education and the ability to think independently. This stress is expensive given
the costs of tuition and the associated 'opportunity costs'. However, possessing educated officers and enlisted men assists the ability of our fighting forces to adapt rapidly to new tactical, operational, and political realities.

(Bowie, 1985:20)

For the most part, British enlisted men made quick responses and modifications of weapons systems and adaptations to the special climactic conditions of the South-Atlantic. Soldier, sailor and airman made rapid decisions and their commanders gave them freedom of action. This technical and tactical proficiency of the men which bonds them to each other and to their officers is related to the concept of a free and open organizational climate which we will discuss in Chapter Eight.

Argentines did adjust to various situations. Field artillery units quickly learned how to maneuver and dig their artillery pieces out of the boggy ground into which they sank with every firing. The Argentine Navy and Army made a brilliant change in missile delivery.

The Argentine Navy's success in converting a shipborne Exocet missile for delivery from an improvised truck mount—the conversion was responsible for hitting the Country-class guided missile destroyer HMS Glamorgan—is impressive.

(Guilmartin, 1985:62)

Argentine officers who demonstrated intransigent, rigid and unyielding attitudes did not allow their men freedom of action and did not promote bonding between men nor their officers. Intransigence was not a characteristic solely of the Argentines. The colonel of the Welsh Guards who refused to have his men disembark from the Sir Galahad in spite of repeated warnings is an example of British inflexibility.

However an open climate and bonds of friendship which produce a well honed team take time to develop.

(c) Personnel turbulence

The longer a person is a member of a group the more he or she knows whom to trust or not to trust. As we
discussed in Chapter Two, the one year rotation of the Vietnam era degraded small unit cohesion. Stouffer et al (1949:277) wrote that the new recruit in World War II had to make two adjustments: to the group itself and to combat. Under conditions of combat, a man learns quickly or he and the unit pay serious consequences. Guilmartin underscored the strength of personnel stability inherent in the regimental system.

...unit cohesion... is commonly considered a product of the personnel stability of a system in which a soldier is enlisted into a particular regiment and pursues his career within it. In terms of the defense debate within the United States, the presumed stability of the regimental system is frequently contrasted with instability and high personnel turnover in U.S. Army combat arms units in particular.

(Guilmartin, 1985:62)

While Argentines often explain their loss to the fact that their enemy, the English, were all older experienced veterans, such is not the case as General Vaux pointed out.

In 'Four-Two', the average age of marines was less than twenty. They were 'teenagers'. By all modern criteria their youth and inexperience should have been highly susceptible to insecurity or depression... Many of them had realized the risks of this venture long before the air attacks in San Carlos. Afterwards they had never faltered once.

(Vaux, 1986:232)

British officers and men serve for long periods. The officers and NCOs serve for usually a minimum of nine years and most officers serve for thirty year terms. Soldiers serve a minimum of four and usually nine years. Thus ties to the regiment, ties to the group, development of teamwork and ties of friendship are all strengthened by the fact that officers, NCOs and soldiers know each other. Training is constant and takes place over years and not months.

How long does it take to adequately train a soldier? Both British and Argentine officers agreed that a six months period was sufficient to train a soldier to fight in battle.
A major problem with the Argentine forces was that the majority of the conscripts were from the class of 1963 and had only a month’s training. One needs not be a military genius to know that one month is hardly time to learn to be a soldier. However those Argentine units which had their conscripts in place for at least one year, such as the Third Artillery of the Argentine Army, or the Argentine Marines or the 25th Infantry Regiment performed extremely well. Therefore the issue is not conscript force (Argentine) versus professional-volunteer (British) but rather the bonding between officers and men and between soldiers that determines a unit fighting or running away.

Also, personnel turnover affects the issue of vertical cohesion i.e. the relationship of superior and subordinate. When there is a constant in and out pattern for officers and NCO’s, soldiers are forced to adjust to varying leadership styles and personalities of their officers. Therefore, the less the personnel turnover, the more the individual soldiers or officers know each other and meld hopefully into an efficient team.

(d) Teamwork

As discussed in Chapter Two, military cohesion is defined as bonds between men that indicate that a man will die to preserve the group or individuals within the group. Teamwork, in the military sense, means that the men in the unit trust each other enough to go out on patrol, to fire weapons, to advance through minefields and to make the second, third or fortieth advance.

Teamwork involves knowing and trusting leaders, learning through advanced and realistic training, being sure of the mission, having a sense of patriotism and all the other variables we have previously discussed. In Chapter Six, we analyzed the importance of medical care and medical facilities in allaying the fear of the soldier that he wouldn’t be have proper medical care. But teamwork, trust and bonding mean that a wounded soldier must rely on his buddies for aid in the battle.

British soldiers recounted how they had been carried out of the line of fire by their buddies. One para’s story was told with typical British sardonic humor.

We had been told that if we were hit. That the other men would go on. We all knew that
we would be left. But you can't be a para and
leave a buddy on the battlefield.

But my mates only got me because they were
greedy. I love porridge and I'd been stealing
every package of porridge I could get my hands
on. So there I was lying on the battlefield,
bleeding with a sucking wound and these
bastards come after me. Well they pulled me
out and took care of my wounds. But they then
stole all my porridge.

His mates agreed that they had only wanted his porridge.
That is why they went out in a battlefield, crawling on all
fours under raking machine gun fire to rescue their fellow
Para. Porridge indeed.

Para and Marine officers agreed that they had to
drastically revise their command decisions to leave wounded
behind. During a discussion with a group of Para officers,
the majority agreed that you could not develop trust,
comradeship and bonds of friendship amongst men and then
tell the men to ignore their buddies during battle.

One British officer stated that it is every man's
nightmare to be left on the field wounded and alone. In
battle, in the Falklands, Marines and Paras decided than
one man would stay with four wounded. The battle was of
paramount importance but wounded men had to have care and
comfort too. There were instances of units that had a
one-on-one care of wounded and were obviously unprepared
for further firefights given the lack of manpower because
of wounded soldiers and those who stayed to care for them.

During fire fights men would shout that they were down
and might be left. In the video, Raid at Top Malo, several
Marines recounted their reactions on being hit. One man
stayed propped up against a tree because he had a sucking
chest wound. His fellow Marines shouted wisecracks at him,
while they rushed forward to fight the Argentines. One
shouted, "You silly sod, didn’t you know that bayonet
charges went out in 1914?".

Argentine officers and NCO’s and soldiers themselves
helped and aided their fellow soldiers. The battle was
severe and the inexperienced and untrained Argentine troops
were frightened. The British conquered their fear.

Colonel Whitehead of the British Royal Marines
discussed the issue of morale in the context of teamwork.
Morale is the state of mind in an organization whereby those in it operate right up to their level of skill and experience. They are not easily disturbed by the unexpected and have a strong corporate loyalty.

Ruiz-Moreno's book *Comandos En Accion* (1986) captured the regimental loyalty and spirit of the Argentine 601 and 602 commandos. Remember that Argentine commandos have no enlisted only officers and NCO's. General Vaux wrote about the contrast of the well turned out smart Argentine Marines and their teamwork and cohesion evident even after the surrender.

All along the muddy road to the airport columns of dejected Argentines tramped....(we caught) up with an orderly group amongst the rabble. These troops were marching briskly along with their regimental colours in the centre of a battle-stained column. Visions of those (flags) hanging in the officers' or sergeants' messes occurred simultaneously to CO and RSM...just as someone was briefing me that these were the Argentine marines from Mount Tumbledown, they halted. To our surprise and chagrin the flags were swiftly burnt in petrol before we could intervene...we conceded that it was what we would have done ourselves....

(Vaux, 1986:206-207)

Vaux acknowledges that the Argentine Marines fought very well. They were a team. Argentine General Menendez had committed a serious tactical error in dispersing the majority of his professional officers among the conscripts. The inexperience of these officers combined with the lack of training of one-month conscripts led to ultimate disaster. The United States Army learned this lesson at the Battle of the Bulge in 1944.

The U.S. 28th Infantry Division was a unit comprised of experienced battle-scarred veterans who experienced continual fighting in the Battle of the Bulge and never surrendered fighting until they were completely overrun. By contrast, the U.S. Army 106th Infantry Division consisted of new troops fresh from the United States on line only 7 to 10 days. The 106th fell completely apart
with two regiments surrendering (MacDonald, 1985). The Battle of the Bulge shows that placing inexperienced troops with no horizontal or vertical cohesion against a well trained ferocious enemy guarantees failure.

In the Falklands, the British had their own problems as well. All was not completely a well organized all-star team flawlessly executing a school exercise. The British forces, like the U.S. forces, had to face a difficult doctrinal and political question—military women in a combat zone.

Navy medical surgical teams consist of doctors, women nurses and technicians who work and train together as a team. The U.K. Chief of Naval Operations decided that no women nurses were to be in the field hospital on the Falklands and substituted, at the last moment, male nurses for the already trained and integrated women nurses. While the male nurses performed extremely well under great stress, some navy doctors felt that the smooth-running team of doctors and women nurses who had trained together over years would, perhaps, have been more efficient. Needless to say the women nurses were hardly pleased to be left behind. There were women nurses onboard the Canberra and the Uganda. Since the Canberra carried supplies and munitions, it was not marked with a Red Cross. Both the military women and the civilian women employees of the cruise ship Canberra were at risk because the Canberra, known as the "Great White Whale" because of its shiny white hull was a prime target.

The United States Army, during the Grenada Invasion (1983), had women nurses and women army officers who were shuttled back and forth from their U.S. bases and Grenada. Known as the "ping-pong nurses", because they bounced back and forth from Grenada to Ft. Bragg, the women nurses and women Army personnel were finally allowed to land and continue with their duties. The British case and the U.S. example from Grenada indicate that the issue of women will continue to be of strategic and tactical importance for those armies which include women in other than medical or clerical roles. Teamwork is not only within small groups but between groups as well.

Not only do men in battle have to learn to trust each other and know each others strengths and weaknesses, they must develop teamwork between disparate units. The British Marines describe the varying patterns of battlefield tactics of units by a catchy phrase.
Guards March.
Paras Charge.
And Marines get there by guile.

In the Falklands, one could observe different patterns of battlefield strategy and readiness between units of the British Army.

Both Guards battalions joined 5 Brigade from prolonged tours of ceremonial duties, during which their infantry training was obviously less intensive than that of a marine or parachute battalion. The Welsh Guards had completed an exercise in Kenya the previous winter. Like all Guards units, these two could be accounted among the finest in the army. But however enthusiastic and efficient their officers and men, they could scarcely be as mentally and physically attuned to a campaign in the Falklands as 3 Commando Brigade. They were trained to fight from armoured personnel carriers. 'We are not bergen (backpack) soldiers,' as one of their officers said.

(Hastings and Jenkins, 1983:269)

On the afternoon of 3 June, the Welsh Guards began an attempt to march to Goose Green. They walked for twelve hours before 5 Brigade agreed with their CO that the exercise should be abandoned. The Guardsmen were far too heavily laden. Their handful of Sno-tracs were breaking down every few miles. It was evidently uneconomic to exhaust the battalion merely to get them to Goose Green. Back the Guards marched over Sussex Mountain. The news of their misfortunes aroused exasperation, even contempt, among 3 Commando Brigade...

(Hastings and Jenkins, 1983:274)

At the battle for Tumbledown Mountain, Lieutenant Anthony Fraser recounted how the honor of the Scots Guards was at stake.
The morale of my platoon had been very low. The cold was unbelievable - and we had been there nearly four hours and it was taking all our time to keep in touch with our bodies. Most of the men had nothing to do. I felt that the combination of cold, uncertainty and the general awareness that we were stuck led to the group ego shrinking and shrinking and shrinking. At that stage, I though we had blown it - holding up the whole brigade attack - and that those people who had said we would be no good, coming off public duties to this job were right.

(Middlebrook, 1985:363)

The crisis passed. Tumbledown was taken. Nine Scots Guards had died and forty-three were wounded.

Thus we see that teamwork is not only the small group of platoon and company but also must operate between companies and between units. The British were a combined arms and combined unit team. Their bonds of trust, respect and friendship to each other were stronger by reason of history, training, and time spent together in garrison, on exercises and on the long sea voyage from England. But at times their teamwork was faulty. Those Argentine units that had trained together or at least had had their conscripts for a whole year, as in the case of the Third Artillery, did evince such teamwork.

Many Argentines acquitted themselves valiantly in battle as the long list of medals for bravery in the Official Report of the Argentine Army (Informe Oficial del Ejercito Argentino) indicates. But the fact remains that the majority of Argentine conscripts were untrained and unready for a second battle. Not all groups and not all Argentines were untrained and unprepared. Those units who evinced high degrees of horizontal and vertical bonding fought well. Argentine units who fought with distinction were: the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion, the 25th Regiment, 601 and 602 Commandos, and 7th Regiment of X Brigade as well as the Third Artillery. After the battle at Mt Longdon, Colour-Sergeant Brian Faulkner said,

Some of the Argie wounded had been injured by phosphorus grenades - severe, deep burn wounds, very painful. They screamed, were very upset. One or two had bayonet wounds - very unusual in a modern battle - and some
were even physically mauled, literally from hand-to-hand fighting with rifle butts or anything that had come to hand.

The Argies had fought very well.

(Middlebrook, 1985:352)

Such teamwork (Argentine or British) came from training constantly, working together and strong bonds of trust.

(e) Trust, Respect, and Friendship

Since all Argentine officers attend the Colegio Militar close personal bonds of friendship are cemented in those school years. Because the total officer corps is quite small (5,000 men) most officers know each other. Thus over a ten or fifteen year period most Argentine officers have worked or trained with each other. Close ties of friendship and the 1982 Malvinas experience have melded the Malvinas officer veteran into a tough committed group. Witness the young officer uprising of April 1987.

On comparing Argentine and British military officer corps in regard to their bonding and ties of friendship and intermarriage, what is most striking are their similarities and not their differences. Argentine and British officers are often sons and grandsons of military officers. Ties of friendship are further strengthened by officers’ being related to each other or having known each other from childhood. Senior officers have watched their friends’ sons grow up and enter the service. Two notable examples follow.

In 1982, Major (now Colonel) Dair Farrar-Hockley’s father was Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe. Queen Elizabeth’s son, Prince Andrew, was a helicopter pilot with the Task Force. During an interview for this project, in London, Brigadier Julian Thompson talked about those ties of friendship and marriage.

We are very much a family. In the broadest sense the smallness of the British Services induces a family feeling even across the ‘tribal boundaries’ of the regimental system. Within the Regiment, we train together and are bonded by belonging to the Regimental family, be it Marines, Paras, Guards and so forth. We know each other and, for example, there are many sons of former marines serving, as there
are marines married to daughters and sisters of serving or former marines. For instance, we had three members of the Nunn family in the South Atlantic—two brothers and one brother-in-law.

Brigadier David Chaundler said in an interview:

There is a level of continuity in the Army. We have coherent groups of people. A commander leaves his regiment or the Paras and then returns to command the same group of people. We are not strangers. These men are my friends.

But Brigadier Chaundler pointed out that being close with ties of friendship, marriage and family might be a problem for the commander.

There is a weakness in the system, however. It is difficult to send a friend to his death. There is a danger in a commander thinking too much about casualties. I feel if you think too much about casualties, you get lots of casualties.

Therein lies the burden of command. An officer must make decisions to send men perhaps to die. The men hope that their officers and their generals will so manage the battlefield that troops will emerge relatively unscathed and victorious. Every soldier hopes he will serve a general like Patton who said on the eve of the Normandy invasion,

Don’t think that this is the day that you will give your life for your country. Today is the day that you will make some other son of a bitch die for his country.

The responsibility and burden of command leads us to a discussion of bonding between subordinate and superior or vertical cohesion.
This chapter analyzes the relationship between subordinate and superior and superior to subordinate. This bonding is called vertical bonding and looks at relationships between soldier, NCO and officer.

(a) Open Organizational Climate

Research dealing with organizational climate generally indicates that open climates are those where superior and subordinate can freely discuss the aims, goals, values and structure and organization of the workplace. There is a body of literature dealing with the concept of Japanese Management, Humanistic Management or even the touted Theory Z concept. Generally, the major characteristics of an open climate are: trust, camaraderie, a casual as opposed to rigidly hierarchically organized chain of authority and no fear of retribution.

In Chapter Four, we presented an outline of the history, education and social class backgrounds of the Argentine military officer. The Argentine Army is a rigidly stratified and hierarchically organized army patterned after the Prussian model. Heel-clicking and miniscule attention paid to protocol are appropriate behavior. Classmates from the same classes in the Colegio Militar are good friends, call each other by their first names and are free and easy in their social behavior. But this casual relationship does not extend up or down the chain. We should not expect any other pattern of behavior. The Argentine Army is the product of its Latin cultural heritage based on rigid highly stratified social strata and the Army itself has its roots with training and education based on the inflexible Prussian model.

Attention to dress, form, the appropriate way of behaving, fear of social faux pas and rigid social class patterns are part of the cultural background of all Latin countries including Spain and Italy. As such, one would not expect the Argentine army to be as open and casual as the U.S. or Israeli armies.
There are notable exceptions to this portrait of the Argentine officer as a stern martinet. One officer, in particular, readily embraces his NCOs and his ex-soldiers. In the stern and formal atmosphere of the Estado Mayor he gives bearhugs to his Malvinas compatriots. He is not alone. The researcher saw warm friendly cross-class and cross-rank relationship that were obviously based on trust and companionship. On the whole, however there is a vast social distance between the ranks of the Argentine army. Since Britain has a tradition rank based on birth and inherited titles and a stereotypical image of stuffy caste-conscious military officers, one might expect the same rigid attitude to prevail amongst the British forces.

What is surprising is the studied casualness of the British forces. Their open and free relationships between ranks is unexpected. That is not to say that there is not a definite unspoken distinction between NCO, officer and soldier. While British officers and NCOs have their own messes and engage in social activities, officers, on invitation, often engage in ritual drinking rites at the NCO mess. Accounts of the Falklands indicate that distinction between officer, NCO and soldier disappears in battle. Wherever possible and whenever rum was mysteriously found in a medic’s chest or some Argentine wine was "liberated", officers, NCOs and soldiers enjoyed a mild libation. Also Marines and Paras make a special point to call each other by their first names. Officers, except when addressing a general, do not use titles of rank. Marine NCOs and enlisted call each other by their first names. This pattern of behavior seems to be endemic to the Marines and the Paras, as one Marine enlisted soldier explained,

We have an exchange chap here from one of the Guards units. He can’t stand the thought of going back to his unit after he has served with us. We all call each other by our first names, officer and Marine alike. We don’t stand on ceremony when there’s a job to be done. We behave ourselves if there’s an Admiral around. But we know a lot of them too from when they were wearing short pants.

But use of a first name is not sufficient to measure the open climate of a military organization. The reader is referred to the section on technical and tactical proficiency in Chapter Eight as an example of the results of this open organizational climate. The numerous and continual adaptations and changes that the British
accomplished throughout the campaign could only be done within the context of an open organizational climate that pays attention to, encourages and rewards initiative and creativity. Donnelly wrote about training which is a product of an open climate and produces a free and easy attitude among British soldiers and officers.

We (British) pride ourselves in inculcating initiative in our officers and soldiers, on the level of independence of action allowed to commanders at all levels

(Donnelly, 1982:128)

The independent, creative and flexible reactions and adaptations of the Falklands Task Force were due in no small part to the special role of the NCO in the British forces. With excellent training, dedication to task and with an inordinate amount of responsibility, the British NCO exercises his profession in the highest manner. He is secure in his social status and proud of his tradition and his heritage. A former Marine CSM who is now a lieutenant joked,

My buddies keep coming up to me and telling me how sorry they are that I’ve been demoted to an officer. They ask me what I did wrong.

That wry comment is a further example of the dry witty humor which so distinguishes the British soldier and officer from his compatriots throughout the world with the possible exception of the wise-cracking American G.I. Throughout the interviews, British enlisted men and officers would make off-hand comments which made the interviews sound like a soundtrack from a Noel Coward play. This rough and ready biting humor is evident in McGowan and Hands book, Don’t Cry For Me Sergeant Major (1986) which is a collection of wry and wonderful vignettes of the soldier in the Falklands.

British enlisted men through their Sergeants Major and other NCO’s perform the day to day tasks of running the unit. British officers rarely engage in petty micro-managing. Social class and rank differences are present but mutual trust and respect blur those lines. Contributing to an open organizational climate is the leader’s concern for his men.
(b) Leader's Concern For His Men

The Rattenback report denounced those officers who did not fight with their troops or who ran away. Not all professional Argentine officers behaved in this manner. In interviews, Argentine officers stated that officers should care and nurture their men. Argentine officers were most explicit in outlining the fact that the leader should set an example to his men and should care and nurture his men. One officer told how he looked after his men in the cold and damp of the Malvinas.

My men were never forced to stay in their wet foxholes except when there was an air raid or when the battle came closer. But before the English landed, I made sure that my troops were warm, safe and well fed. I saw no reason to have them in their wet holes, when there was not immediate danger. I knew that the time would soon come, when they would be cold and hungry.

Another Argentine officer recounted celebrating his birthday on the 13th of June 1982.

My wife had sent me some marmalade and a bottle of whiskey. I don't drink but I took the jam and the whiskey out to my men and told them that it was my birthday. I found a few men who also had the 13th of June as their birthday. You know in Spanish Tuesday the 13th is an unlucky day. Well it was unlucky for us because the surrender was the next day.

He then continued.

For the past five years my men call me long distance from all over Argentina. They remember my birthday. I stay at home and know that they will call me. And I know how much trouble it is for them to even place a long distance call and how much of their hard-earned money it costs them.

Here is an Argentine leader who was and still is concerned for his men. His unit stood and fought until they were surrounded. His concern for his men translated into their unit cohesion and combat effectiveness.
British officers, to a man, used the phrase, "One must love one’s men". Colonel Ivar Helberg of the Royal Marines said:

You have to show the men that you care for them. You have to show a man that you have his interests at heart.

Royal Marine Colonel Andrew Whitehead stated,

You have to love your men. You must care for them in a paternal way just as a father cares for his children.

Royal Marine Commando Major General Nick Vaux said,

The key to leadership is to care for your men. You have to talk to them. You have to work with them and show them that you care.

Colonel Whitehead made a perceptive comment on the fact that troops are able to discern incompetence or duplicity in a commander.

Marines are the most perceptive animals I know. Marines can pick out a dud officer at a thousand yards upwind.

In the final analysis in the final terrible moments of the war, Argentine officers made decisions to spare their men. In spite of thousands of frightened troops running away and in spite of orders from Buenos Aires to continue the battle and in spite of the sure humiliation and criticism to follow after returning home, General Menendez refused to commit his forces to any more battles (Turolo, 1985). Tcnl. (Lieutenant Colonel) Italo A. Piaggi, knowing that he would be excoriated by military and civilians for surrendering Goose Green, made a personally painful and professionally difficult decision to surrender rather than send any more boys to their death (Piaggi, 1986). These Argentine officers are in good company for the agony of surrender has seared the soul of officers in all wars and from all nations: British General Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781; U.S. Confederate General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox in 1865 and U.S. General Wainwright at Corregidor in 1942.
In spite of their surrender and their personal humiliation, these generals of bygone years were known for their bravery in battle, their concern for their men and their personal example. Perhaps Argentine officers will learn from their defeat.

(c) Leader’s Example

Stouffer et al (1949:126) found that men who had favorable attitudes towards their officer were more likely to show themselves to be ready for further combat than were those who gave consistently unfavorable answers. They analyzed the personality and leadership styles of a successful officer.

The officer who commanded the personal respect and loyalty of his men could mobilize the full support of a willing followership; he therefore had at his disposal the resources of both the formal coercive system and the system of informal group controls. If, however, the officer had alienated his men and had to rely primarily on coercion, the informal sanctions of the group might cease to bear primarily on the combat mission.

(Stouffer et al 1949:118)

The motto of Sandhurst is "Serve To Lead". The concept of devoting one’s life to a military career and to serve one’s men is ingrained in the British military officer. Major Ian Gardiner of the Royal Marines said,

If you are a leader (an officer or an NCO) you have to be prepared to sacrifice your time, your social status and even your life for your men.

A sense of vocation; of serving towards common ideals is shared by many good soldiers; and as with those who are committed to religious order, they know this may demand sacrifices.

In a rigid stratified society, officers will behave with extreme social distance between the ranks and between offices and enlisted. Leader example and leader bravery come to nought if the men have had little or no personal relationship with their immediate superiors. There is one account from the South Atlantic which illustrates the extreme social class differences which exist between
Argentine officers and men.

Commander Rick Jolly wrote that after the surrender he worked closely with Argentine medical officers. One evening he asked one of the Argentine medical officers to accompany him to the mess tent. The Argentine officer was apparently quite perplexed at standing in line and allowing enlisted men to proceed first.

I tried to explain to him that no British officer would ever eat until he was sure that his men had eaten too, but that is a concept of operations quite beyond his understanding.

Even a Prince of the Realm knew not to abuse rank or privilege.

In the radio room of Sir Bedivere, (Prince) Andrew waited while a pressman finished a call to his office in London.

'Would it be OK if I used a credit card?' he asked pleasantly.

'I can’t see that you’ll need it,' came the reply. 'In your case there’s a fair chance they’ll accept a reverse charge call.'

Andrew and the others present laughed, and the Prince was able to call London, in a conversation later described by a radio officer as being 'just like any son would talk to his mum after three months in a dodgy place.'

(McGowan and Hands, 1986:282)

Sometimes leader example may be misinterpreted, particularly by the victors. To a man, British officers commented on the smart and well turned out appearance of the Argentines at the surrender. All the British accounts of the surrender at Darwin, at Goose Green and at Port Stanley refer to the neat well-dressed Argentine officers. The British interpreted this smart appearance as an indication that most Argentine officers never fought at the side of their men. British spoke with pride about General Moore's disheveled appearance at the surrender and that of all their fellow officers who had been days without a bath or shave. While some of the Argentine officers did not leave their barracks, appearances were not all they might
Piaggi (1986:129) and Menendez (Turolo, 1983:312) recount how they made a special effort to appear clean shaven and with a neat uniform on meeting the English. Dress is extremely important to the Argentine, man or woman. Dress signifies social class, knowledge of proper deportment and a host of other subliminal messages. It is not surprising that Argentine officers would, at the time of the surrender and ever afterwards as prisoners-of-war, be clean and well shaven. But the question of special dress and correct attire are often associated with defeated armies. The vanquished salve some of their honor by smart appearance. When U.S. Confederate General, Robert E. Lee, surrendered to Grant at Appomattox in 1865, Lee astounded his staff with his appearance.

...(Lee) joined his staff around the campfire that morning...dressed in a splendid new gray uniform. His linen was snowy, his boots highly polished, and over a deep red silken sash, gathered about his waist, he had buckled on a sword with an ornate hilt and scabbard...(he said) ‘I have to probably be General Grant’s prisoner, and thought I must make my best appearance.’

General Grant, like General Jeremy Moore, was mud-spattered, rumpled, dusty and very dirty.

The example of Lee and Grant in 1865 is used to show that the Argentine officers special care in their dress and their well burnished boots was an effort to maintain personal dignity in the face of an ignominious defeat. To infer that all Argentine officers did not fight alongside their troops would be a canard distorting Argentine officers’ dignity.

It is a basic principle of military leadership that a leader leads by example but he also leads by enduring privations with his troops. The leader may think he is setting an example to his troops by visiting them once in a while on the front line, but the soldier’s ideal is the man who stays with his troops, eats with them, marches with them and endures with them.
(e) Sharing of Discomfort


The combat situation itself fostered a closer solidarity between officers and enlisted men than was usual in the rest of the Army. The makeshift character of front-line living arrangements meant that the contrast between provisions for officers and enlisted men was at a minimum. Formalities were largely abandoned in combat. Also, combat exigencies undoubtedly led a larger proportion of officers to try to exercise leadership rather than mere command....officer-enlisted solidarity was greater on the whole in combat units.

(Stouffer et al 1949:119)

While many soldiers fight with seeming insouciance, as we reviewed in Chapter Two, an ever-present ambience hangs over combat soldiers. Fear. Fear of being maimed. Fear of dying. Fear of being captured. It is this underlying psychological state --fear-- that commanders have to combat so that their troops will fight and will not panic and run.

But the open climate is important to discuss a man’s fear. If combat and combat motivation are wrapped up in the cult of masculinity, machismo means that a real man can’t be afraid. Or if he is afraid, he will not or cannot admit or discuss it. All the British officers interviewed said that they were afraid sometime in the Falklands. David Cooper, Chaplain of 2 Para said,

Fear is infectious but so also is courage.

All British officers interviewed stated that they were afraid prior to battle. They all emphasized that they went and talked to their men about this fear and worry. These British officers felt no need for bravadura but were willing to share their feelings and help salve their troop’s anxieties. To combat those inner fears and to discuss them requires a man secure in his own sense of self and his leadership capabilities. Even in the face of casualties, morale remained high, as Brigadier Thompson said in an interview.
Casualties didn’t seem to lessen morale, as a matter of fact, they produce a type of bonding. But of course everybody could see that we were winning and there was no feeling that vast numbers of lives were being expended uselessly. Some officers, and particularly the chaplain of the 2nd Battalion Parachute Regiment, encouraged people to talk about death. We all need to talk about fear and to explain that everyone will feel frightened and this it is normal to do so. Thus every man realizes that he is not alone or odd. The lonely or oddball character can be the most vulnerable when the pressure is on.

Lives were lost. Commander Rick Jolly wrote in his diary,

Eleven of the seventeen being buried today are officers or NCO’s, showing exactly what the British forces mean by leadership.

(Jolly, 1983:10)

British officers and men are prepared to die in battle. They come from a tough little island nation whose men have fought and died through the centuries throughout the world. Except for internal guerilla warfare of the 1970’s, the Argentine Army had no experience in modern conventional warfare.

In spite of journalistic accounts of cowardice and even though the Rattenbach report (1983:14) chastises some Argentine officers for not being with their troops in battle, Brigadier Julian Thompson observed that it is a canard to state that most Argentine officers ran away.

On Mount Harriet 42 Commando found themselves with over 300 prisoners, including the Commanding Officer of the Argentine 4th Infantry Regiment and several officers. This gave the lie to later Press reports that all the officers ran off leaving their conscript soldiers to be slaughtered or surrender like sheep. On Mount Harriet, as elsewhere, the Argentine officers and senior NCOs fought hard and on several occasions towards the end of the battle tried to prevent their men from surrendering by firing at them. The only solution was to kill the officers or senior
NCOs in question before accepting the surrender of the remainder.

(Thompson, 1986:168)

Officers and men who endure noise and confusion of battle are forever bonded into a special brotherhood.

'K' Company was a moving sight. Weatherbeaten, grimy and disheveled, the marines formed a ferocious semi-circle around us. Swathed in bandoliers of bullets, festooned with grenades, they leaned lightly on their weapons, inhaling wearily on captured cigarettes. Some had minor injuries covered with khaki field dressings. Others were cloaked against the cold in the heavy Argentine blankets they had captured. Inevitably, one's concern was focused on two overwhelming impressions. The first was their pathetically sodden feet, shifting ceaselessly in the slush. The other those red-rimmed hollowed eyes that glowed from blackened faces....I do remember that I envied them their now-exclusive brotherhood. That belongs only, but always, to those who fight at close quarters alongside one another. Each rifle company would retain that special bond forever. But, if you hadn't been there with them, you could never be a part of it.

(Vaux, 1986:188)

That bonding of combat and that special brotherhood begins with officers and men engaging in rote, sometimes brutal and more often than not boring training.

(f) Shared Training

On the wet plains of Salisbury and the boggy marshes of Dartmoor, Marines and Paras practise over and over again their tactics. They run and jump and engage in all sorts of exercises of keep physically fit. On the ships to the Falklands, they ran and ran and jumped and marched round and round the ships. In all their training, Marine officers are held to a higher standard than Marine enlisted. Paras are convinced that both officers and men are superior to any group in the British forces.

Strategy and doctrine are linked to tactics. Training
of men and officers rehearses the inevitable battle.

For generations, British military staff instruction has leaned heavily on the 'Tactical Exercise Without Troops' (TEWT). In these, aspiring commanders have to resolve tactical and logistic problems based upon marked maps of ground actually before them. The crucial preliminary is the 'Appreciation', in which 'Factors' are identified and then analyzed to deduce the 'Courses Open'; the best of these is then identified. Now I would have to do this once more; not for practice, or qualification, or promotion, but to maneuver within a brigade attack at night against a real enemy.

(Vaux, 1986:145)

Training, tactics, repetition, military history all come together in a team.

Once again superior training, aggressive soldiering, the ability to think fast and, it must be said, calling for a getting artillery fire quickly, had won the day. The value of a worked up and practised team was proving itself in this campaign as it had before.

(Thompson, 1986:131)

Argentine officers study hard at their military academy and at their mid level and senior courses. They share training and endure brutal grading which ensures a two-thirds loss before graduation in the senior level college. They know theory but their practical experience is scanty, at best. But neither officers nor NCOs nor enlisted can be expected to have levels of tactical efficiency when there is little or no budget support for the armed forces. Purchases of equipment and arms eat up the small defense budget and very little monies are available for training. Defense budgets, training, horizontal bonding and logistics are all interrelated, as the U.S. found out, when the North Koreans attacked on June 25, 1950.

The U.S. Army in Korea, at that time, consisted of overweight and out-of-shape officers with untrained soldiers. Units were cannabalized for occupation duty so that there were only 2 battalions per regiment only 2
battalions per artillery battalion. In the first thirty days, the U.S. forces were unable to stop the North Korean advance so that the U.S. forces were pushed back down Highway 1 short of the Naktong River—more than half the distance of the Pusan perimeter (Hoyt, 1984). The U.S. forces quickly mobilized and was able to include officers and men with World War II experience to move the battle perimeter to the 38th parallel. The American experience in Korea showed the need for physically fit well trained men and experienced officer in order to win a war against an equally well trained enemy. British troops have fostered horizontal and vertical bonding through the regimental system.

Thus we see, in the case of British troops in the Falklands, that an open organizational climate, the officer’s credo of caring for his men and serving as an example and sharing training and discomfort leads to an incredibly strong positive relationships up and down the vertical dimensions of the command structure from private to regimental commander.

Argentine forces however are rigid and have little relationships up and down the chain of command particularly between conscript and officer. NCOs have little authority or responsibility. Conscripts are in and out of training so quickly that there is scarcely any time for vertical relationships to develop. On the other hand, a small number of Argentine units exhibited the same degree of vertical bonding described for the British case. The results of this was that those Argentine units with strong vertical bonding were able to fight as equals with the British.

Cohesion impinges on every aspect of a military operation’s success or failure. Let us now make a final evaluation of the South Atlantic campaign.
CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

It doesn't matter who starts the war, it's always the soldier who has to fight them.

We have dissected and analyzed military cohesion and combat effectiveness in the South Atlantic Conflict of 1982 using a framework utilizing the concepts of societal factors, organizational bonding, horizontal (peer) bonding and vertical bonding. This analytical framework has provided an effective method of analyzing human factors on the social, psychological and sociological dimensions of cohesion. This research is a post-hoc comparative analysis of a combined arms conflict of short duration between two technologically well equipped forces. The focus of this chapter is to indicate the "lessons learned" for the study of cohesion in a cross-cultural comparative analysis in general and for U.S. forces in particular.

Military analysts need to account for the qualitative and often subjective factors of esprit, cohesion and morale to determine the outcome of a battle or war. The analytical framework used in this case study, reported in Appendices A and B, shows its efficacy for military analysts. As a further validation of the model, eight country experts used this brief questionnaire based on the analytical framework and results indicate that this rating scale shows significant differences between countries. The advantage of this framework is that it is simple to calculate and can be readily incorporated in qualitative reviews of weaponry, manpower and technology.

However, the military analyst himself or herself must be thoroughly familiar with the societal, cultural and military ethos of the nation under study in order to use this shorthand framework. For example, when analyzing a third-world army composed of illiterate peasants, the analyst must not make assumptions on cohesion or bonding or even competence based on the lack of education or sophistication of the force. Yet such was not the case for Argentina or the United Kingdom. Let us see how this framework of analysis leads us to make conclusions about
cohesion and combat effectiveness in our case study of the 1982 South Atlantic conflict.

A brief summary of our findings follow.

Britain was convinced that a war was necessary to defend the Falklands against a foreign aggressor. She sent her very best troops to the Falklands. Contrary to Argentine evaluations of the war, not all British troops were battle-experienced veterans. Fully one half of British enlisted were young boys with an average age of twenty. Few officers had participated in pitched modern battles with naval and air bombardment from the enemy. Nonetheless, British officers and NCOs had living memory of recent wars (World War I, World War II, Korea) and many first-hand experiences in Cyprus, Belize, and Northern Ireland and even the 1956 Suez incident.

Born of a four-hundred year tradition of overseas engagements involving long supply lines, joint operations and amphibious landings, British troops exhibited high morale, esprit and cohesion. Soldiers and NCOs were confident that their British officers were well versed in battle tactics. British NCOs are trained to accept responsibility at all levels of command. An open organizational climate with little regard for privileges of rank and accompanied by swift good humor led to continual adaptation in the fluid and ever-changing battle and spelled swift success on the battlefield. In those areas of the battlefield, where British regular troops like the Welsh and Scots Guards fought professional and well trained Argentine groups such as the Argentine Marines and the Third Artillery, English soldiers paid a high price.

The price might have been much worse. If the Argentine Navy had not gone to port; if the seven unexploded Exocets which hit their targets had gone off; if Argentina had not left her professional troops on the mainland, if Argentina had waited until the English had dismantled their surface fleet; if the Argentine Air Force and Naval Air Arm had not squabbled over tactics and command; if Argentina had only prepared adequate logistical plans; if Argentina’s medical services had been better prepared, then perhaps and only perhaps the outcome would have been different. "What if" is an interesting exercise appropriate only to armchair historians. We must deal with the facts at hand.

The most salient deficits of the Argentine army in the South Atlantic Conflict of 1982 were decided lacks in vertical and horizontal bonding combined with lacunae in
societal factors such as training, doctrine, intelligence, medical care and logistics.

Argentine forces were fully convinced of the historical and political justification for their invasion of the Malvinas. Although troops were enthusiastic about their liberation of the Malvinas and their loyalty and patriotism bolstered by strong religious faith, many individual soldiers evinced self-doubt about their ability to fight pitched battles. The Argentine conscript himself knew his own liabilities and strengths. The young nineteen year-old conscript with only one month’s training was well aware of his inadequate preparation. Argentine conscripts suffered from a decided lack of horizontal bonding with their fellow soldiers and non-existent vertical bonding with their officers.

Yet those Argentine units with conscripts who had completed a full one year's training, such as the Third Artillery Infantry Brigade, the Argentine Marines or the special case of 601 and 602 Commandos trusted their leaders, knew their weapons and endured against frightening odds of continual bombardment, cold, wet humid weather, lack of food, lack of sleep and the sight of their fellow soldiers being wounded and dying.

Argentine officers evinced a high degree of horizontal bonding due to close personal relationships developed in the service academies. But their schooling based on rote memory, forced attrition in their service academies and no living memory of modern battlefield conditions produced a rigid intransigent attitude towards battlefield tactics and doctrine. Lack of combat experience produced deficiencies in logistics, supply, communications and intelligence. Argentine NCOs have little training in battlefield tactics and are used mainly for administrative duties. A rigid highly stratified officer corps ethos produces little or no bonding from conscript to commander. The Argentine loss is a repetition of errors made by other peacetime armies in other wars and other battles. What is most interesting is that most, if not all, the mistakes made by Argentine officers and men in the Malvinas were repetitions of the initial months of the Brazilian Army in the Italian campaign of 1944 (Williams, 1986).

British officers said that for them the Falklands was not a question of new lessons learned but rather old mistakes repeated. If that is the case, what significance does the South Atlantic conflict of 1982 have for the forces in question and for the U.S. Army?
Interrelationship of Factors

While we have discussed each one of these forms of bonding separately, all these factors are interrelated. For example, personnel turbulence impacts on vertical and horizontal cohesion. Budgetary constraints impact on training, education and purchase of medical supplies and armaments. Attitudes of the society and the cultural attitudes towards the military as an organization or individuals as members of a particular service relate to the self-concept of those individuals, their dedication, loyalty and patriotism.

Societal Attitudes

If a particular war is a political anathema to the population as a whole, bonding may mean nothing in the battlefield situation. Men may either refuse to fight or fight in such a desultory fashion that the enemy will win. Also public disapproval may be expressed in cuts in military budgets which curtail purchase of armaments and training. Military units may have high degrees of vertical and horizontal cohesion but without adequate training and weapons they cannot fight a conflict. Or third world nations may spend an inordinately large percentage of their budget on high technology weapons but not have soldiers sophisticated enough to use or repair the weapons.

Regardless of small armed forces and cuts in military budgets, British and Argentine citizens were strongly in favor of the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982. Had the war lasted for much longer and casualties rates mounted, there is evidence that the British population might have had second thoughts about continuing to support their Task Force. Conversely, we see how public opinion dramatically changed within Argentina after the surrender. The Argentine nation's anger against its loss in the Malvinas resulted in toppling the military junta and the return of democracy to Argentina (Beltran, 1987).

The United States learned that a prolonged war such as Viet Nam may lead to public disapproval. The 1983 invasion of Grenada met with high levels of public approval. But the short duration of this conflict should not lead military leaders or politicians to the conclusions that public opinion is now and constantly in favor of military actions regardless of their strategic implications. This need to account for public opinion is a characteristic of a democratic nation with its open and free organizational climate.
Open Organizational Climate

An open organizational climate generally grows out of a democratic society with little regard for hierarchy. This open climate, in turn, produces and fosters cooperation and flexibility. Teamwork, trust, respect and friendship are associated with an open organizational climate and also are strengthened by leaders and subordinates sharing of discomfort and sharing of training.

In combat, distinctions based on rank are blurred. Survival and victory depend on the intense cooperation of all ranks during combat. We must not make the fallacious assumption that an open climate is endemic exclusively to democratic societies. Even organizations which appear, at first glance, to be rigid and inflexible, such as the Wermacht in World War II (Shils and Janowitz, 1949) and the North Vietnamese Army (Henderson, 1979), showed that in battlefield situation and in the small unit level criticisms and suggestions were a part of an open climate on the small unit level.

Even though British society is still somewhat stratified, British forces exhibited such an open climate. Argentine forces, with few exceptions, did not.

Recent U.S. Army Research Institute research indicates that an open command climate leads to high level of morale, cohesion and competence (Holz, 1986; Siebold, 1987a, 1987b; Siebold and Kelly, 1987a, 1987b). However morale and competence are intertwined. High performing groups have high morale and thus perform well (Oliver, 1987). U.S. Army training should emphasize developing open command climates that produces free-wheeling criticism and, of course, good humor. Such an ambience requires patience and time.

Time

Time is an important factor for the development of cohesion. Military tradition grows out of years and years, if not centuries of military heritage, lore and myth. British soldiers and Argentine officers recount with pride their military traditions. Perhaps more than any army in the world, British soldiers and NCOs readily speak of their forebears and long-ago battles.
While the U.S. Army teaches military history to its officer cadets, there seems to be little emphasis on military history within the training cycles of the average soldier. There are recent attempts to resurrect traditions and historical lore, as for example with the 10th Mountain Division of the U.S. Army (Holz, 1986). The U.S. Army might model its training of history and military tradition by examining how British forces inculcate soldiers with a sense of military history. One factor in teaching soldiers their military tradition is time of service. British troops serve long tours and their personnel turbulence is reduced.

Close personal (horizontal and vertical) bonds and learning whom one can and cannot trust take months and probably years to come to full fruition. High levels of personnel turbulence affects adversely officer and soldier competence. High morale, dedication, loyalty, patriotism, devotion to duty and sincerity are fine words for Boy Scouts but they have little import to a lonely soldier on a battlefield who is unsure of himself and his officers.

Current U.S. Army policy of developing units with strong cohesive bonds as in the COHORT system is an excellent method to counter personnel turbulence and promote organizational, horizontal and vertical bonding. Time also is a compelling factor on the immediate outcome of a modern war.

Warning time for preparation for immediate mobilization and deployment is shorter and shorter. Wars themselves are of brief duration. The Argentines called their war "Una Guerra Improvisada" (An Improvised War) and the British their war one of "muddling through". As the time factor becomes more compressed for mobilization and deployment and duration of battle shorter and shorter, the few days or months for the chaos of war to shake out the basic irrationality of the training system, the logistics plans or the battle tactics may simply not be there.

If we (U.S. and NATO) plan for a Six Day War, then it will be an improvised and muddling through war. If we cannot rely on the industrial might of a war machine, as for example in World War II, then we ought to look carefully at British military and civilian ingenuity in quick adaptation to ships, airplanes and equipment at hand. The modern battlefield with increased lethality and short duration requires competent officers and NCOs who are capable of adapting quickly to a fluid situation.
Competence

Constant arduous and appropriate training, requires months and years. Soldiers and officers train in peacetime for war. Soldiers and officers hope that their training, doctrine and tactics are sufficient, appropriate and ensure development of organizational vertical and horizontal bonding to ensure success in combat.

While Argentine forces have a long tradition of geopolitical strategy and political involvement, they have little experience in mundane activities such as supply and logistics. Argentine troops were sent to the Malvinas with summer uniforms and no rational supply or logistics system was set up. While British forces suffered from confusion and supply problems, they were able to quickly set up headquarters and their four-hundred years experience in overseas wars and amphibious landings served them well. British supply and logistics capabilities were well managed by their NCOs.

A decided strength of the British and weakness of the Argentine landforces were their respective NCOs. British officers rely heavily on their NCOs for direct leadership of troops in garrison, in training and on the battlefield. British NCO training is rigorous and thorough. More importantly, British NCOs have a well defined sphere of command and influence which their officers respect. U.S. forces might well look to the British model in order to relieve U.S. officers of administrative responsibilities which lie within the purview of the British NCO.

Elite Units

Although there is a U.S. cultural bias against elite units with their peculiar customs, regimental insignia and strange looking berets, the British show over and over again that elite units produce, maintain and foster high levels of morale, esprit, organizational, horizontal and vertical cohesion. And the success of Argentine elite units underscores the combat effectiveness of such cohesive units.

Finis

Finally, as British Para Brigadier Chaundler says, wars are always and finally a question of a lonely soldier on a battlefield fighting his war.
This soldier on the battlefield of today or tomorrow wins or loses the battle based on supply, weaponry and cohesion. His training, his confidence in his weapons, his reliance on the experience of his officers and his belief in the battle at hand will win or lose the battle and perhaps the war. The single most important element in developing bonds between and among ranks are caring nurturing officers and NCOs. The hallmark of a competent officer is, as both Argentine and British said,

You must love your men.
APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY

On choosing the South-Atlantic conflict as a case study for cohesion, the principal scientist conferred with military and governmental officials at the following agencies: Department of the Army Political Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Library of Congress, Inter-American Defense Board, Inter-American Foundation, Johns Hopkins School of Area and International Studies, Smithsonian Institution, Defense Intelligence College, U.S. Veterans Administration, and Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. In addition, she consulted with scholars in the area of military sociology or Latin America area experts. Also advice and guidance was given by the Office of Military Attaches of the Embassies of Great Britain and The Republic of Argentina.

She conducted extensive library research in popular and professional and military literature utilizing computer searches. While conducting fieldwork, she obtained books and articles published in the United Kingdom or from Argentina books and articles published in Spanish. At the end of this paper there is an extensive bibliography under the heading Falklands/Malvinas Bibliography.

Subjects were contacted in the United Kingdom through the Army Research Office in London and the Ministry of Defense with prior clearance through the Office of the Military Attaché of the Embassy of Great Britain.

The Office of the Military Attaché of the Republic of Argentina provided a list of names of officers who fought in the Malvinas. Through the Argentine Military Attaché and with the assistance of the United States Army Military Attaché in Argentina contact was made with officers and enlisted soldiers through the Argentine Army High Command (Estado Mayor). Interviews were held with persons who were either on active duty in the Buenos Aires region or recently retired officers still resident in Buenos Aires.

Both in the United Kingdom and Britain, the subjects were told beforehand and at the beginning of the interview
the purpose of the case study. The investigator explained that this study was not a geo-political analysis of the South-Atlantic conflict nor a military evaluation of tactics or logistics. The reason for the study was to use the South-Atlantic conflict as a sociological study of the reactions of men at war in a modern conflict on the battlefield. In addition in both Argentina and the United Kingdom, the researcher met and consulted with military researchers, military psychiatrists, professors of military history and military analysts. In Great Britain, she interviewed in-depth a total of 15 officers (8 of whom were Marines) and 15 enlisted personnel, 5 of whom were Marines. One of the Royal Marine officers interviewed was a Command Sergeant Major during the Falklands Campaign. Also she met informally with ten officers of 3 Para and 5 Airborne Brigade. During two visits to Argentina in April and September 1987, she interviewed 10 officers, 2 active duty enlisted personnel and 21 Malvinas enlisted personnel who are now veterans, three of whom were Marines.

During March and July 1987, interviews were conducted in London in the offices of the Army Research Institute and various offices within the Ministry of Defense; in Plymouth at HQ Commando Forces, Hamoaze House and the 539 Assault Squadron offices in Prince William Yard; at Haslar Hospital, Gosport; and, Aldershot Barracks the home of the 5th Airborne. Interviews with British officers were face-to-face individual interviews but she met the enlisted men of the Royal Marines and 3 Para in groups for lively and free wheeling discussions.

In Argentina, April 1987 all individual interviews with officers were held in the Army High Command (Estado Mayor) conference room of Colonel (now General) Isidro Caceres. The Argentine High Command Estado Mayor appointed a retired Army Colonel, Colonel Rodolfo Agostini, as staff liaison to assist the researcher in contacting respondents, arranging for interviews and obtaining research data. The Argentine Army granted her every request for interviews and were cordial and attentive.

In the 1st week of September 1987, she met with three groups of Malvinas veterans. In the Estado Mayor, she interviewed 4 former enlisted soldiers-veterans members of a veterans organization Comision de Enlace de Veteranos de Guerra. She met in a private home with 8 Malvinas veterans members of a veteran's organization Voluntarios de la Patria. At the Argentine Military Hospital at Campo de Mayo, she met with 9 Malvinas veteran patients. In addition, as member of the U.S. delegation to the World
Congress of Psychiatry (Subsection on Military Psychiatry) she visited Army and Navy military hospitals in Buenos Aires.

While the interviews were semi-structured and allowed the respondent freedom to talk on any subject related to the issues of morale, leadership or espirit, all British and Argentine respondents were asked the following questions:

How do you achieve cohesion amongst your troops?

What are the qualities of command and leadership that generate closeness between officers and soldiers and between soldiers?

What are the elements of peacetime training that produce soldiers prepared to fight a war?

How would you improve training of soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers?

Can you define the meaning of the word cohesion?

Is there anything that you would like to add regarding your experiences in the Malvinas/Falklands War?

In Argentina, military officials requested that a copy of the questions be given (in Spanish) to respondents before the interview. The request was granted. There was another interesting aspect to the Argentine interview situation of April 1987.

During this period, officers and retirees who were veterans of the Malvinas engaged in a young officer coup within the Argentine Army. From Holy Thursday of April 16 to Easter Sunday April 19, Argentina was in turmoil. Over four hundred thousand people came to keep vigil in the main square in front of the Congress in Plaza de Mayo. Dissident officers hunkered in the Infantry School thirty miles outside of Buenos Aires in the Campo de Mayo. Officers dressed in battle camouflage fatigues, with their faces painted with camouflage paint and wearing their red commando berets stood guard with loaded weapons at the front gate of the Infantry School. Private and state-owned television and radio covered minute by minute the progress of troops coming under President Alfonsin’s command to disband this officer rebellion, or perhaps, to join it. On Easter Sunday, Alfonsin met with the dissident officers at the Campo de Mayo and on returning by helicopter to the
Plaza de Mayo, he announced to the waiting four hundred thousand people, "Happy Easter. Argentina’s house is in order. Go to your homes."

The military’s house was still in disorder; the leaders of the internal rebellion were under arrest, and, the country still had to deal with the issue of military obedience, just laws, and the extent of civilian control over the military. A new Army Chief of Staff was chosen, General Dante Caridi, which meant that fifteen generals senior to Caridi were, by custom, forced to resign.

With the country in turmoil and the military in disarray, during the April trip to Argentina, the principal researcher held interviews exclusively in Argentine Army Offices.

British military officers and enlisted understood the theoretical concepts of the research project. Most, if not all, of these officers had taught at staff schools and Sandhurst. Several were authors of books on military history and/or the Falklands war. All had a depth and breadth of vision surrounding the issues of leadership, cohesion and morale. All the officers had taught classes dealing with the issues of morale, cohesion and military manpower. These British officers were thoroughly familiar with U.S. research on morale and cohesion. They were all completely at ease and interviews were conducted in an atmosphere of relaxed good humor.

During the September 1987 visit to Argentina, she held interviews with groups of ex-enlisted Malvinas veterans. As in the April visit, the Argentine High Command Staff were extremely helpful in arranging interviews with former enlisted personnel. The 21 ex-Malvinas veterans talked openly about their war experiences. They wanted to know more about post-traumatic stress and the study focus on men in battle. During these group discussions, there was an atmosphere of good humor, joking, camaraderie and forthright honesty.

But recollections and points of view change five years after a battle. Argentine and British respondents admitted that they had meditated on the conduct of the war; had discussed and presented after-action briefings; and, had given interviews to the press on the South-Atlantic Conflict. Several of the British officers commented that they had appeared together with their fellow British officers on panels both in the U.K. and in the U.S. As such, they admitted that perhaps their comments were
beginning to sound identical because they had begun to use the same phrases and insights of their brother officers. Such is the problem of retrospective research. And indeed many times their replies were remarkably similar. Not by design. Not by plan. But simply the same because they had over the past five years, both Argentine and British, talked to each other, read each others' books and now were repeating each others words.

There is an interesting byzantine twist to the Argentine analysis of the war. Since the surrender in 1982, widely circulated Argentine magazines such as Somos, Gente, or, La Semana have published interviews with British General Jeremy Moore, Admiral "Sandy" Woodward and Brigadier General Julian Thompson. Spanish language editions of books on the Falklands (Malvinas) War were best sellers in Buenos Aires. Brigadier General Julian Thompson’s book No Picnic (1985) was translated into Spanish under the title No Fue un Paseo (It Wasn’t a Stroll). General Thompson’s book appeared in April 1987, five years after the initial invasion of the Malvinas by the Argentines. The Argentine publishers took the occasion to have a publicity blitz with published interviews with Thompson about his view of the Argentines’ conduct of the campaign. Thus, Argentine military officers in public and private discussions felt compelled to answer any of Thompson’s implied or actual critiques of the Falklands/Malvinas campaign.

Today, five years after the war in Argentina, there is extreme political sensitivity regarding the Malvinas War. Immediately after the surrender and for several years afterward, military officers stood trial and were jailed for the role in the Malvinas. As we recounted earlier, officers who served in the Malvinas were leaders in the Easter Week 1987 young officer uprising. There still remains the possibility of new trials regarding the military’s role in the Malvinas. For this reason, we have not included any quotes attributed to any officer or veteran who was interviewed in Argentina. What might appear to be an innocuous comment might be misconstrued in the press or in any evaluation of the Malvinas War. The basic principle of research ethics makes it incumbent on any researcher to protect the privacy of all respondents. In our data analysis chapters, we quote British officers with their permission, use anonymous quotes from Argentine respondents and rely heavily on published first-hand accounts from both the U.K. and Argentina.
Argentine civilian and military who read English have a large library of books, articles and magazines dealing with the Malvinas/Falklands. Some Argentine officers still correspond regularly with their English counterparts with whom they studied (prior to the war) or those British officers with whom they dealt while prisoners-of-war in the Falklands. Argentine officers eagerly seize on comments by British officers, such as Captain Rod Boswell, who speak highly of Argentine valor on the battlefield. Argentine video stores have a large stock of video tapes made by ITV and BBC during the Falklands campaigns. Some of these tapes run up to two hours. Ordinary citizens, teenagers, military officers and whoever else is interested rent these tapes and watch the battle as filmed by BBC and ITV.

The British have no such access to the Argentine Weltanschauung. While there is a plethora of books and articles written by British officers and read in English or Spanish by the Argentines, there is only one book in English available which shows the "Argentine point of view". That book is Los Chicos de la Guerra (Kids at War), a runaway best seller in Argentina now in its thirteenth printing in paperback, which was also a popular Argentine movie. The English translation uses the Spanish untranslated title. Many British officers have read Los Chicos de la Guerra. We use this example of Los Chicos de la Guerra as an example of the difficult methodological problem confronting a military analyst or researcher to determine what is after-the-war hyperbole and actual fact.

Although Los Chicos de la Guerra was touted as the true untrammeled version of Argentine infamy during the Malvinas war, there are enough strange incidents in the book to cast doubt on its veracity. For example, there are lengthy passages dealing with the murderous and barbaric Nepalese mercenaries, The Gurkha, who wandered through minefields in a drug induced state with Walkmans on their ears and, all the while, and lopping off innocent little Argentine boys' heads (Kon:36-37, 45). Nicolas Kasanew's book (1983:181-182) also contributes to the myth of Gurkha dope-maddened bestiality.

While this scenario strikes terror to the heart of every Argentine and helps explain the bloodthirsty character of the British--at least to the Argentines--it has little basis in fact. Gurkhas were radio men who carried radio sets; hence the vision of Walkman transistor radios on their ears. They saw little action. There is no recorded instance of their lopping off Argentine heads. Albeit there reputation is warranted. There are
blood-curdling stories of Gurkhas in action in World War I and II (Farwell, 1985). Thus if the story of the Gurkha is without merit so also may be the other accounts of Argentine Army infamy found in Los Chicos de la Guerra.

The analysis presented in this analysis relies on the 1987 interviews supported by first-hand accounts of British and Argentine officers with references to professional military historians and analysts. Given the high-tech aspect of the 1982 war, the researcher had an additional source of information—video tapes. She viewed over twenty hours of BBC and ITV tapes on the South Atlantic war. Two tapes, in particular, were useful. One tape is a BBC program which was a re-evaluation of the Royal Marine’s attack on Top Malo House. The other is a two hour documentary by Yorkshire Television on The Falklands War which included interviews with Argentine and British participants in the 1982 South Atlantic Conflict.

Using interview data and quotes from analyses of the South Atlantic Conflict, this research focuses almost exclusively on the land forces and the issue of cohesion. These chapters or based on the four types of bonding found in the literature review in Chapter Two: societal (Chapter Five), organizational (Chapter Six), horizontal (Chapter Seven) and vertical (Chapter Eight). Each of these four types of cohesion has a subset of variables used as an organizational framework in each of these chapters.

To confirm that these variables were appropriate items to use in this analysis, we asked U.S. Army officers who are students in the 1987-88 class of the U.S. Army War College to rank these variables as to how much each one contributed to a unit’s combat effectiveness. The results of this study are found in Appendix B. All but one of the items were used in the analytical framework.
In order to confirm that items taken from a survey of literature on military cohesion were salient concerns to U.S. Army officers and appropriate items to use as a methodological framework for our analysis of the South Atlantic War of 1982 a short survey was administered to a random sample of 100 U.S. Army officers at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania in September 1987.

The questionnaire consisted of 25 items taken from the survey of literature on military cohesion. These items are found at the end of Chapter Four. The respondents rated variables on how important they considered each item's contributing to combat effectiveness. The scale was a seven-point scale (0 to 6) ranging from "not at all important" to "extremely important". Ninety of the 100 respondents returned the sample.

Ninety-five percent of the respondents were Lieutenant Colonels and 5% were Colonels. Ninety-four percent indicated that they had served in a combat zone and only 6% had not.

The results of the survey are found in Table B.1.

With only two exceptions, all the items are at the mid-point of the scale (3.0) or above. Sense of mission (5.6), technical and tactical proficiency (5.3), teamwork (5.2), leader's concern for men (5.5), leader example (5.4), trust and respect for leaders (5.3), command, control and intelligence (5.0) and logistics and supply (5.0) received the highest rankings.
Table B-1: Results of Army War College Survey on Variables Affecting High Combat Effectiveness (n=90 U.S. Army Officers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Peer Bonding</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) sense of mission</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) technical and tactical proficiency</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) lack of personnel turbulence</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) teamwork</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) trust, respect, and friendship</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Organizational Bonding</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) loyalty to the nation and its values</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) patriotism</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) military tradition and history</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) strong religious belief</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) concept of valor or heroism</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Vertical Bonding</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) open organizational climate</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) leader’s concern for the men</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) leader example</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) trust and respect for leaders</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) sharing of discomfort</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) shared training</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) appropriate level of social distance</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Structural/Societal Factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) culture, norms, values and organization of the military</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) defense budget</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) training</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) doctrine</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) tactics</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) command, control, communications, and intelligence</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) logistics and supply</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) medical care and facilities</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The low ranking of 2.3 for religious belief is consonant with Stoufer et al (1949) who found that the average soldier or officer was hard pressed to articulate his religious faith. Yet, that religious faith was a comfort to men in foxholes during direct and indirect fire. The Stouffer (1949) research is further confirmation of the commonsense adage "no atheists in foxholes". As we saw in the discussion of the South Atlantic conflict, both Argentine and British troops evinced great religious faith and attendance at religious ceremonies during battle. As David Cooper, Chaplain of the British 2 Para, observed, "attendance at religious services increased the closer we got to the Falklands; was highest after the surrender and decreased the closer we got back to home".

The second low ranking of 2.7 for the item "appropriate level of social distance" is in keeping with the egalitarian aspect of the United States Army. U.S. society, as a whole, is not predicated on status rankings. Since the United States has an open and upwardly social mobile ethos, it is quite understandable that Army officers would rank social distance on a low priority for combat effectiveness and cohesion. Little's (1964) research on U.S. soldiers in the Korean war shows that social distance is rarely maintained in combat situations. Rank distinctions blur in face of danger. Also since it is extremely difficult to determine "appropriate" we deleted this variable as an item in our analytical framework.

What is most interesting is the mid-point ratings of the cluster of items relating to organizational bonding. With the exception of loyalty to the nation (4.0) and patriotism (3.7), the other items hover around the mid-point of our scale.

Once again we see a re-affirmation of the Stoufer et al (1949) research that the average American soldier in World War II rarely spoke of loyalty or patriotism as reasons for fighting the war. However, when asked more questions about their basic reasons for fighting a war, these same combatants in the Central European and Pacific theaters were able to voice their innermost feelings about defending democracy. The AWC sample's mid-point ratings only indicate that, like Stoufer's World War II sample, these officers at the U.S. War College simply accept the concept of organizational bonding as an intrinsic part of their psychology and concentrate more on specific items relating to combat effectiveness.
The sample was given an opportunity to write any additional comments regarding the issue of combat effectiveness and cohesion. Some of these comments follow:

I would add public support—the nation fully behind whatever action the Armed Forces is engaged in.

(Add) the cohesion established by stability, common training, trust, confidence and knowledge of other members of the unit as gained only in units who have been together for extended periods. One of the most important factors!

I believe that another factor is extremely important—I call "it"—but what "it" amounts to is a shared conception that the unit is the best, that it will win—"as it always has". Frequently, all of this is myth but that’s irrelevant. The point is that everyone believes in the unit’s winning destiny. This is more than high morale, more than a positive leadership climate, it is sort of egotism at the unit level. High performing units frequently sustain "it"—Rommel’s Afrika Corps..our Ranger Battalions, a couple of battalions in my old division and so on.

The unit must have a strong sense of internal cohesion/trust at all levels. How they feel is much more important than their technical competency. Leaders must understand and support why soldiers fight rather than how to fight.

Other comments included items such as: camaraderie, high standards, integrity of leader, pride in unit, fear of dying, fear of failure, respect for dissent, sense of belonging, sense of cohesion and trust at all levels, total commitment of the people and the government, a will to win and winning spirit.

Thus we see from the written comments and ratings given by this sample of U.S. Army officers that these variables are important in analyzing the concept of cohesion and its relation to combat effectiveness.

Even more important and more heartening is the fact that these officers some of whom are future generals of the U.S. Army show such a sensitivity and awareness of the need for men to be integrated into units with high morale and the will to win.


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**VIDEO TAPES**
