THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: A GUIDE TO THE RENAISSANCE OF U.S. NAVAL STRATEGIC THINKING IN THE 1980s

by

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**Abstract:** An annotated bibliography of open-source literature pertaining to the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy. This report integrates and expands upon materials published previously by the U.S. Naval Institute in January 1986, February 1987, and April 1987. It is compiled to assist military strategic planners, analysts, and academics in their professional/educational duties. This version is issued to allow a wider distribution than that done by OPNAV and to serve as the initial draft of an annual update to be performed by the Naval Postgraduate School.
THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: A GUIDE TO THE RENAISSANCE OF U.S. NAVAL STRATEGIC THINKING IN THE 1980S

by

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U. S. NAVY
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INTRODUCTION

This is a bibliography with a point of view. It takes as a departure point the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, as enunciated by the civilian and military leaders of the U.S. Government, especially the Department of the Navy. It includes criticisms of and commentaries on that strategy, as well as items relating the Maritime Strategy to overall national and allied military strategy, and to historical precedents. In addition, it covers both how the Strategy was developed and who developed it, and the important role of wargaming.

The Maritime Strategy has generated enormous debate. All sides and aspects of the debate are presented here. The focus, however, is on that Strategy. Absent are discussions of naval affairs which do not have as their points of departure—explicitly or implicitly—the contemporary Maritime Strategy debate.

In order to trace the ebb and flow of ideas and events over time, items are listed chronologically, by occurrence or publication date, rather than merely alphabetically. Authoritative official statements of the Maritime Strategy are indicated by an asterisk (*). Explicit direct commentaries on the Maritime Strategy are indicated by a double asterisk (**). The other items listed deal implicitly with various issues or aspects of the Maritime Strategy or with its immediate antecedents.

Publications on Sister Service and Allied contributions to the Maritime Strategy are listed separately, to aid the reader/researcher. (Admittedly, this and other artificial typological devices run against a central theme of the Maritime Strategy: its global, "seamless web" character). Also, only cursory attention is paid to pre-1981 Navy strategic thinking on global war, a structural shortcoming that cannot legitimately be cited as evidence that such thinking was lacking.
I. MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: 1979-1985

American military strategy and its maritime component have been debated since the foundation of the republic. Following World War II, maritime strategy concerns centered around peacetime presence, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and the Navy's role in nuclear strike warfare against the Soviet Union. During the late 1950s and 1960s the focus shifted to limited war and deterrence through nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) operations. In the early 1970s, the debate centered on then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt's formulation of the "Four Missions of the Navy"—strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and peacetime presence. (A major body of literature began to be created then on presence). In the mid-1970s, sea control seemed to dominate discussions.

In 1978, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward became Chief of Naval Operations. His views on strategy had been heavily influenced by his experience as Seventh Fleet Commander and Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief in the post-Vietnam environment. Admiral Hayward's focus was on flexible offensive forward power projection, conducted globally and in conjunction with allies and sister services, especially against the Soviet Union and its attacking forces. Much of this was a return to concepts familiar to U.S. naval officers of the first post-World War II decade. That era's focus on nuclear strikes, however, now broadened to encompass a much wider range of options, primarily conventional.

Admiral Hayward outlined his views publicly in his initial 1979 testimony before Congress, and subsequently in the pages of the Proceedings. The naval strategic renaissance and the resultant debate he and others sparked continues to this day, fueled by the statements and policies of the Reagan Administration, especially its first Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., who served from February 1981 to April 1987.

The initial public Maritime Strategy discussion of the early 1980s had largely taken the form of a debate on the pages of American public and foreign affairs and national security periodicals. This debate had focused on two themes: the general forward strategic principles (and certain highly publicized Norwegian Sea examples) enunciated repeatedly by Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. and a perceived "Maritime Strategy versus Coalition Warfare" dichotomy incessantly alleged by former Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer and others.

At the same time, however, the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps -- in conjunction with officers of their sister services and allies -- had been tasked to develop for internal use a detailed description of the Maritime Strategy component of U.S. national military strategy. This Maritime Strategy rigorously integrated into one clear, consistent document a number of long held views of Navy and Marine Corps senior officers, certain newly refined concepts developed in the fleet and at the Naval War College, agreed national intelligence estimates, the strategic principles articulated by Secretary Lehman and other Reagan Administration officials, and a thoughtful discussion of the variety and range of uncertainties inherent in the strategy.
Concepts developed by the Navy's warfare communities and fleets, as well as by Army, Air Force, joint, and allied commanders, were examined and incorporated as appropriate. Where inconsistencies appeared, hard choices were made. Uncertainties and limitations were identified. Properly, the job was spearheaded by the Strategic Concepts Group on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-603).

The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy was codified initially in 1982 to focus Navy program development efforts more tightly. Its basic premises already had been underlying Navy planning, gaming, and exercises. Subsequently, congressional testimony in 1983 released an initial edition of the Maritime Strategy to the public. A classified revision to the strategy statement was approved by the Navy's Program Review Committee (chaired by then Vice Admiral Carlisle Trost) in October 1983 and signed and distributed Navy-wide by Admiral James D. Watkins, then Chief of Naval Operations, in 1984.

Various unclassified elements of the strategy began to find their way into naval affairs journals, especially the Proceedings. Writings on naval strategy that did not take the Maritime Strategy as a starting point began to fade. By 1985, enough authoritative congressional testimony, speeches, op-ed pieces, journal articles, and letters-to-the-editor—penned by senior naval officers and well-placed civilian commentators—had appeared for the essential elements of the Maritime Strategy to be accessible to the public. Public commentary gradually shifted from exegeses on the press conferences, speeches, and articles of Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Komer to discussions on aspects of the actual Maritime Strategy developed largely by military officers from national and alliance guidance and approved by civilian leadership.

Promulgation of the Maritime Strategy fostered increasing public and government discourse. Within the Navy, the interplay among the Maritime Strategy, force-level planning, fleet plans and operations, and professional education and training became a governing dynamic. In the open literature, the number of writings on the strategy rose from a handful of newspaper and journal articles in 1981 to an avalanche of government documents, books, and articles in 1986, including over 145,000 copies distributed of the Proceedings' watershed "The Maritime Strategy" January 1986 supplement alone. This quantitative leap was accompanied by qualitative changes in both the background of the commentators and the sophistication of their arguments.

Contrary to much uninformed external criticism of the early 1980s, the Maritime Strategy was presented by the Navy as only one—albeit a vital—component of the national military strategy. It was not presented as a recommended dominant theme of that national strategy. Also contrary to earlier uninformed criticism, the strategy embodied the views of unified and fleet commanders as well as Washington military and civilian planners and Newport thinkers. The Navy Department and the fleet were now speaking with one sophisticated voice to—and increasingly for—the nation and its allies.

Moorer, ADM Thomas H. USN (Ret.) and Cottrell, Alvin J., "Sea Power and NATO Strategy", in Myers, Kenneth A., NATO: The Next Thirty Years, Boulder CO: Westview, 1980, pp 223-236. (Detailed arguments on the necessarily global nature of any major future war with the Soviets and the need for forward carrier operations off the Kola, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk, by the 1970-1974 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 1967-1970 Chief of Naval Operations. Arguments against a "swing" strategy from the Pacific are also echoed in "For Want of a Nail: the Logistics of the Alliance" by ADM Isaac Kidd USN (Ret.), former U.S. Navy and NATO commander in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in the same volume, pp 189-205).


U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, Nomination of John F. Lehman, Jr., to be Secretary of the Navy, January 28, 1981, Washington: USGPO, 1981. ("I think the major need of the Navy today is the establishment by the President and the Congress of a clearly articulated naval strategy, first and foremost").


1-3

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy," Strategic Review, Summer 1981, pp. 9-15. (For more than two years, the basic Navy public statement on Maritime Strategy. See also Lehman "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1981-1987, especially regarding linkages among operations, strategy, and programs.)


Caldwell, Hamlin, "The Empty Silo--Strategic ASW, "Naval War College Review, September-October 1981, pp. 4-14. (Call for anti-SSBN operations in Soviet home water bastions.)


Ikle, Fred Charles, "The Reagan Defense Program: A Focus on the Strategic Imperatives", Strategic Review, Spring 1982, pp 11-18. (By the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Especially good on administration requirements for naval forces to provide options to fight on a variety of fronts).


Record, Jeffrey, and Hanks, RADM Robert J., USN (Ret.). U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads, Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, July 1982. (Two different arguments for a shift to a national maritime strategy, including one by a prominent U.S. Navy strategist of the mid-1970s.)


Vlahos, Michael, "Maritime Strategy versus Continental Commitment," Orbis, Fall 1982, pp. 583-589. (Argues that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.)

Posen, Barry A., "Inadvertent Nuclear War?: Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank," International Security, Fall 1982, pp. 28-54. (Claims forward U.S. Navy operations in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere are a bad thing.)


Lehman, John, "Support for Defense is Still Strong", Washington Post, December 16, 1982, p 23. ("The Navy is working to do its part in a team effort of forward-based air, land, and naval power. Navy strategy is part and parcel of the national strategy of deterrence, not a substitute for it").


Posen, Barry, and Van Evera, Stephen, "Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment", in Oye, Kenneth A., Lieber, Robert J. and Rothchild, Donald (eds.), Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, Boston: Little Brown, 1983, pp 67-104. (Critical of all aspects of Reagan defense policy and strategy, including offensive conventional warfighting, especially with naval forces. "Overall, a counteroffensive strategy is a bottomless pit, since it generates very demanding missions that cannot be achieved without huge expenses, if they can be achieved at all... a counteroffensive strategy defeats the basic purpose of American conventional forces--the control of escalation." Advocates a 10-carrier force).


Staudenmaier, COL William, USA, "One if by Land - Two if by Sea: The Continental - Maritime Debate", Army, January 1983, pp 30-37. (Opening salvo of the "Carlisle School". A leading Army War College faculty member contributes to the misperceptions that the central U.S. naval strategy debate is about Maritime Strategy vs Continental Strategy, and that it is driven solely by budgetary considerations).


Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective", Proceedings, October 1983, pp 66-81. (By a former Under Secretary of the Navy and the first Director of the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies. See especially pp 70 & 74 on the maritime strategy and the role of the Naval War College. "You have to discard the term 'naval strategy', and even the slightly more modern variant, 'maritime strategy' and talk instead about the naval contribution to national strategy... Newport is not, of course, the planning center for the Navy. It is, however, one place where naval officers get together and try to produce better ideas").


1-7

Ullman, CDR Harlan, USN (Ret.), *Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime Industries and National Security*, Washington: Georgetown CSIS, 1984. (Pp 4-7 give a good quick summary of the basic opposing viewpoints on U.S. naval strategy, eschewing the extraneous elements usually dragged in by unknowledgeable would-be analysts).


Turner, ADM Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "A Strategy for the 90s." New York Times Magazine, 6 May 1984, pp. 30-40, etc. (Argues for focus on USN Third World intervention role, amphibious warfare, and more/smaller ships.)

Hamm, Manfred, "Ten Steps to Counter Moscow's Threat to Northern Europe", Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation), No. 1356, May 30, 1984. (Calls for rather modest U.S. and allied maritime counters to a greatly increased Soviet threat).


Brooks, CAPT Linton F., "Escalation and Naval Strategy," Proceedings, August 1984, pp. 33-37. Also "Comment and Discussion:" October 1984, pp. 28-29; November 1984, pp. 18, 24; December 1984, p. 174. (On Maritime Strategy and nuclear weapons by an important and articulate contributor to development of the Strategy. Focus of public debate begins to shift to the Strategy as it actually is, rather than the Strategy as it is alleged to be.)


Klare, Michael T., "Securing the Fire Break," World Policy Journal, Spring 1985, pp. 229-247. (Sees forward offensive operations of ships with both nuclear and conventional capabilities as eroding the firebreak between nuclear and non-nuclear combat and raising the likelihood of nuclear war).


"The Defense Budget: A Conservative Debate", Policy Review, Summer 1985, pp. 12-27, especially pp. 20-21 (Prominent conservatives line up, pro or con, on the 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy, as they understand it.)


* Lehman, John F., Jr., "Talking Surface with SECNAV," Surface Warfare, September-October 1985, pp. 2-10. (SECNAV ties the strategy, surface warfare, and procurement issues together.)


** Harris, CDR R. Robinson, and Benkert, LCDR Joseph, "Is That All There Is?" Proceedings, October 1985, pp. 32-37. (Surface combatants and the Maritime Strategy.)

** Powers, CAPT Robert Carney, "Commanding the Offense," Proceedings, October 1985, especially pp. 62-63. (Central strike warfare theme of the Strategy is criticized, along with the tactical organization evolved thus far for its implementation.)


Watkins, ADM James D., "Reforming the Navy From Within", Defense 85, November 1985, pp. 18-20. (The CNO on the role of the Maritime Strategy within the Navy, and its basic characteristics. "We lean heavily on our unified commanders-in-chief and Navy fleet commanders to help strengthen, modernize, and then put into practice our naval strategy. This plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust dynamic strategy that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strategic issues as viewed by all key U.S. military leaders worldwide, not as viewed by a parochial naval bureaucracy in Washington").


Martin, Ben L., "Has There Been a Reagan Revolution in Defense Policy?", World Affairs, Winter 1985-86, pp 173-182 (especially 175-6). (Sees Maritime Strategy as the basis for horizontal escalation doctrine, and both important only as U.S. Navy budget rationales. "The idea of horizontal escalation itself is too inherently implausible to find an enduring place in American strategic doctrine").
II. THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATE: 1986: THE WATERSHED YEAR

In late 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley -- having ensured that the Maritime Strategy met their requirements and represented both their thinking and that of their superiors -- submitted manuscripts containing the strategy's basic tenets -- less its uncertainties and limitations -- to the Naval Institute. Following the publication of "The Maritime Strategy," a special supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings, public discussion of the strategy took on a new, sophisticated tone, more relevant to the actual requirements of U.S. national security decision making. Subsequent statements by President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and others confirmed for the public that the strategy was consistent with higher civilian and military defense guidance.

In the United States and abroad, discussions ranging from global warfare with the Soviets to naval history, fleet balance, and peacetime and crisis operations became suffused with the vocabulary and concepts of the Maritime Strategy. Much of the writing was now done by senior military officers. Most notably, a spate of broad-gauged articles by naval aviation, surface, and submarine warfare specialists appeared, transcending narrow "unionism." Knowledgeable civilian strategic thinkers and historians also offered their cogent commentary on the Strategy.

Proceedings now served as the primary forum, along with the Naval War College Review, Sea Power, and Naval Forces. The arena, however, also broadened to include more newspapers and popular magazines. The public affairs and national security journals rediscovered the Maritime Strategy, but now in a manner that brought together not only academics, pundits, and military retirees, but also serving naval professionals. By 1987, the uniformed naval officer corps once again -- as in the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan or of the pre-World War II War Plan Orange -- had captured the high ground and catalyzed thinking about the Navy's role in national and alliance strategy.


2-1


Hughes, CAPT Wayne P., Jr., USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. (By a Naval Postgraduate School faculty member. Shot through with important insights on naval strategy and its relationship to tactics. See especially Chapter 1 on the relationship between war at sea and war ashore, and Chapter 9 on the relationship between peacetime and wartime naval missions).

Connell, John, The New Maginot Line, New York: Arbor House, 1986, pp 71-81. (Another journalist--this time British--for whom the strategy debate is largely between Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Komer, and solely driven by budgetary considerations. Arguments totally derivative from other journalists. It would have been news four years earlier).


Clancy, Tom, Red Storm Rising, New York: Putnam, 1986. (Fiction. Wartime Maritime Strategy implemented under drastically changed assumptions, some plausible and some fanciful, to suit the storyteller's needs. Soviet fear of global forward pressure leads to pre-emptive seizure of Iceland, SSN surge to the Atlantic, but operations are somehow limited to Central and Northern Europe only. Inherent flexibility and lethality enables NATO navies to adapt rapidly and successfully, but with heavy losses). In this vein, see reviews by CAPT David G. Clark in Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 139-141, and ADM Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.) in Proceedings, March 1987, p 164. Cf Hackett and McGeoch et al., The Third World War: The Untold Story, cited in Section V below; and Hayes et al., American Lake, Below, Chapter 19, which addresses the Pacific in a hypothetical global war, although probably not in a manner in which CAPT Clark or ADM Hayward would agree).

Hayes, Peter, Zarsky, Lyuba, and Bello, Walden, American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific, New York: Penguin, 1986. (Thorough and extensive analysis of the Maritime Strategy and much else, but in a shrill, leftist, Australian context. See especially Chapters 8 and 16, and Chapter 19, a fictional scenario. They understand that "What appeared a mere budget battle was in fact a conflict over military strategy").

Daniel, Donald C., Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability, Champagne IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986. (An excellent survey by a Naval War College faculty member. Concludes that "It seems implausible the U.S. could so reduce the number of Soviet SSBNs that the U.S.S.R. might be pushed into using the remainder". See especially pp 151-157).

West, Francis J., Jr. et al., Naval Forces and Western Security, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986. (Contains two essays: "U.S. Naval Forces and NATO Planning" by West, pp 1-9; and "NATO's Maritime Defenses" by Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E. Dougherty, RADM Robert J. Hanks USN (Ret.) and Charles M. Perry, pp 10-53. West restates his 1985 Proceedings article assertion that there is a profound divergence between U.S. and West European perspective, on the purpose and potential contribution of naval forces in NATO contingency planning, although it is sometimes difficult to understand which Americans and Europeans he is talking about. The other essay offers an overview of current issues regarding the role of naval forces in NATO strategy).

Cohen, Eliot A., "Do We Still Need Europe?", Commentary, January 1986, pp 28-35. (A Naval War College faculty member views NATO flanks and the Far East as of increasing importance. Sees little utility in discussions of stark strategic alternatives, e.g. "Europe vs. the Pacific, going it alone vs. having allies, keeping resolutely to the sea vs. preparing to engage the Red Army on the continent").

"Ocean Safari '85: Meeting the Threat in the North Atlantic", All Hands, January 1986, pp 20-29. (Publicizes close-in convoy defense, coastal defense, and mine countermeasures aspects of the strategy, as well as strike warfare and tactical innovations).


Landersman, CAPT S. D., USN (Ret.), "Naval Protection of Shipping: A Lost Art?" Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 23-34. (By a member of the initial U.S. Navy Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Excellent critique of U.S. Navy attitudes and practices regarding Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) as well as Naval Protection of Shipping (NPS), essential but too-little-discussed aspects of the Maritime Strategy which are often overshadowed by discussion of concomitant forward operations. See also his "I am a...Convoy Commodore", Proceedings, June 1986, pp 56-63).


Liska, George, "From Containment to Concert", Foreign Policy, Spring 1986, pp 3-23, and "Concert Through Decompression", Summer 1986, pp 108-129. (U.S.-Soviet rivalry seen as "fed primarily by its own momentum and, at bottom, by the timeless asymmetry between land and sea powers". Argues, however, for a "land-sea power concert" by the two. "The salience of sea-over land-based power has diminished as the principal maritime power finds it increasingly difficult to maintain clear naval superiority").


** Hart, Senator Gary, with Lind, William S., America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform, Bethesda MD: Adler & Adler, 1986, pp 77-81. (Criticizes the Maritime Strategy for its linkages to the land war in Europe, its early forward focus, and its relationship to current force structure. Major concern, however, seems to be with the semantics of the term "Maritime Strategy").


* Hughes, VADM Thomas J., Jr., "Logistics Became Legitimate", Sea Power, May 1986, pp 17-24, especially p 22. (By the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics. "The logistics of the Navy are matched to our maritime strategy").

** Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Precept for Tomorrow: A Busy Agenda Awaits the Next CNO", Sea Power, May 1986, pp 48-51. (Sees a need for the new Chief of Naval Operations to examine the future maritime environment as well as the reactions of U.S. and foreign political and military leaders to the Maritime Strategy).


"Sailing the Cold Seas", Surface Warfare, May-June 1986, pp 6-8. (On the steps being examined and taken to increase U.S. Navy ability to operate in northern latitudes as required by the Maritime Strategy).

Williams, CDR E. Cameron, USNR, "The Four 'Iron Laws' of Naval Protection of Merchant Shipping", Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 35-42. (An argument for convoys. Sees the SLOC protection debate as between convoying and "sanitized lanes". Oblivious, however, to the debate between either or both of these options and forward defense, the more topical issue.) See also "In My View," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1986, pp. 108-109, and Spring 1987, pp. 91-92.

Pendley, RADM William, "Comment and Discussion: The Maritime Strategy", Proceedings, June 1986, pp 84-89. (This ostensible response to an earlier "Comment and Discussion" item is actually an important official amplification of the Maritime Strategy by the 1985-86 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist).


** Polmar, Norman, "The Soviet Navy: Nuclear War at Sea", *Proceedings*, July 1986, pp 111-113. See also "Comment and Discussion", *Proceedings*, September 1986, p 90. ("The Maritime Strategy must be challenged for its lack of definition in how we are to deter nuclear war at sea").

** Defense Choices: Greater Security with Fewer Dollars, Washington: Committee for National Security, 1986. (The Committee's annual attack on the Maritime Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy. "There is no need to ask the U.S. Fleet to take on high risk missions close to Soviet shores". Advocates a "return to a more sensible naval strategy". Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document. This study achieved a certain notoriety due to its endorsement by Dr. Larry Korb, a former Reagan Administration defense official and earlier advocate of a 600-ship Navy).

** Stefanick, Tom, "Attacking the Soviet Sea Based Deterrent: Clever Feint or Foolhardy Maneuver?", *F.A.S. Public Interest Report*, June-July 1986, pp 1-10. (The author seems to lean more to the "foolhardy maneuver" persuasion. "The U.S. must reduce the current emphasis on submarine operations in waters heavily defended by the Soviet Union." But cf his December article, below).


** Winkler, Philippa, "A Dangerous Shift in Naval Strategy", Oakland Tribune, 7 July 1986. (Decrees the Navy's "forward offensive strategy" for going "beyond legitimate defense purposes").


** Polmar, Norman, "600 Ships-Plus or Minus?", Proceedings, August 1986, pp 107-108. The author's views on the relationship between the Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy force level goals. "While some would argue with specific components of both the strategy and the ships that Lehman seeks, it is a coherent and long-term plan...one that Congress has long demanded from the Navy and the other services").


** Hinge, LT A., RAN, "The Strategic Balance in the Asia-Pacific Region: Naval Aspects", Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, August 1986, pp 31-50. (Poses important questions regarding USN force posture requirements in each oceanic theater, and potential naval roles of Pacific allies, China, and ASEAN. Very sanguine regarding Western maritime superiority in the Pacific).

Isherwood, Julien, "Russia Warns Oslo on U.S. Base", Daily Telegraph, August 13, 1986. (Cites major Soviet propaganda offensive against forward battle group operations in the Norwegian Sea, "the so-called Lehman Doctrine").


** Drury, F., "Naval Strike Warfare and the Outer Air Battle", Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 46-52. (Sees the Maritime Strategy as merging the two concepts, which he feels had grown apart, into one coherent plan to defeat the Soviet air threat).

** Tellis, Ashley J., "The Soviet Navy, Central America and the Atlantic Alliance", Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 54-60. (Endorses the Maritime Strategy for its geopolitical logic, especially regarding forward operations).


* Lehman, Hon. John F., Jr., Maritime Strategy in the Defense of NATO, Washington: SIS, September 25, 1986. (His 1986 views: "No maritime strategy can be a successful strategy without an effective land deterrent on the continent of Europe". "The forward strategy, articulated by the Reagan administration, is in fact orthodoxy of the oldest sort, conforming precisely to NATO alliance doctrine". "In summary we have a maritime strategy in the defense of NATO that is universally accepted by the maritime forces of Europe and the United States").


** Mearsheimer, John, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe", International Security, Fall 1986, pp 3-57. (Despite its biases, distortions, and misleading discussions of the development of the Maritime Strategy over time, probably the most important piece of writing critical of the Strategy to date. Faults the Maritime Strategy for its "elastic quality", actually regarded by U.S. naval officers as one of its great deterrent and warfighting strengths. This West Point graduate and former U.S. Air Force officer's bottom line: "The key to deterrence is not the Navy, but the forces that will be fighting on the Central Front. Those forces should be given first priority when deciding how to allocate defense budgets").

2-11


Winnefeld, LT James A., Jr., "Topgun: Getting It Right", Proceedings, October 1986, pp. 141-146. (The Navy Fighter Weapons School seen as a key contributor to the Maritime Strategy's execution, by the School's training officer, one of the new generation of naval officers for whom the Maritime Strategy is truly the cornerstone of his profession).


O'Neil, Captain W. D., USNR, "Executing the Maritime Strategy", *Proceedings*, December 1986, pp 39-41. (Recommends measures that the U.S. Navy must take to ensure the continued executability of the Maritime Strategy, by keeping the Soviets on the defensive and improving defense penetration and strike effectiveness).

Stefanick, Tom A., "America's Maritime Strategy -- The Arms Control Implications", *Arms Control Today*, December 1986, pp 10-17. (Appears to favor the Maritime Strategy more than he did in July. "The implicit threat to Soviet ballistic missile submarines during a conventional naval conflict would be likely to yield an advantage to the U.S. Navy in the conventional balance at sea... The likelihood of widespread escalation of the use of nuclear weapons as a direct result of threats or even attacks on Soviet SSBNs in their home waters appears to be low.")


Matthews, William, "Marines Would Storm by Air, Not Sea if NATO Attacked", *Navy Times*, December 1, 1986. (Despite the misleading headline, an otherwise generally accurate rendering of the views of the principal USMC global strategist, BGEN Michael Sheridan, on the role of the Marines in North Norway, as part of the Maritime Strategy).


* U.S. Navy Appears to Expand Operations in Pacific Ocean*, Jane's Defense Weekly, 27 December 1986, pp 1474-1475. (Interview with VADM Hernandez on new peacetime measures to more successfully deter war or -- should deterrence fail -- conduct wartime operations in the North Pacific in accordance with the Maritime Strategy).
III. THE DEBATE CONTINUES: 1987 AND BEYOND

The first half of 1987 saw the Maritime Strategy firmly in place as an acknowledged vital element of U.S. and allied military strategy. President Reagan, Defense Secretary Weinberger, Deputy Defense Secretary Taft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Crowe, all publicly cited its importance and utility. Likewise, James H. Webb, Jr. (John Lehman’s successor as SECNAV), Admiral Carlisle Trost (Admiral Watkins’ successor as CNO), and a number of other top flag officers provided numerous examples of the extent to which it had become the common strategic framework of the naval leadership. Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon was, however, the July 1987 issue of the Proceedings. Therein, the Maritime Strategy formed the baseline for a wide range of discussions of specific U.S. and allied peacekeeping and warfighting issues: by active duty U.S. Navy junior officers, senior officers, and admirals; by naval aviators, surface warfare officers, submariners and a Marine; and by officers concerned with inter-allied relations, regional strategic objectives, fleet operations, and weapons system employment and development.

The second half of 1987 and 1988 promise to add yet another dimension to the discussion: a number of book-length treatments of the Maritime Strategy and related subjects are scheduled for publication. That the 1980s saw a long-needed burgeoning of naval strategic thought, both in the United States and abroad, has become indisputable. What remains to be seen is what use future generations of planners, policymakers, and thinkers will make of this outpouring.

* Reagan, President Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington: the White House, January 1987. (The framework within which the Maritime Strategy operates. Clear focus on global, forward, coalition approach, especially vs. the Soviets. See especially p 19: "U.S. military forces must possess the capability, should deterrence fail, to expand the scope and intensity of combat operations, as necessary"; and pp 27-30: "maritime superiority is vital. (It) enables us to capitalize on Soviet geographic vulnerabilities and to pose a global threat to the Soviet’s interests. It plays a key role in plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It also permits the United States to tie down Soviet naval forces in a defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic missile submarines and the seaward approaches to the Soviet homeland...").

Crowe, ADM William J., "Statement on National Security Strategy", U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security Strategy, January 21, 1987, Washington: USGPO, 1987 (forthcoming). (Solid concurrence in the Maritime Strategy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "In recent years we have benefited from some excellent conceptual thinking by the Navy about global maritime strategy--how to phase operations in a transition from peace to war, clear the way of submarines opposing military resupply or reinforcement shipping, and use our carrier battle groups for either offensive strikes or in direct support of such allies as Japan, Norway, Greece, and Turkey. It is imperative, of course, to fold these concepts into our larger military strategy and that is exactly what we are doing").


Hendrickson, David C., The Future of American Strategy, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987. (A new and different perspective. Advocates a scaled-back mix of continental and maritime strategies and forces. Sees some U.S. naval forces particularly useful in Third World contingencies, especially carriers, but would cut back on naval--and air and ground--forces he sees as only useful for highly unlikely forward global operations against the Soviets. Wrongly believes this includes Aegis cruisers and destroyers).


** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The Implications for NATO", Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 8-19. (A thoughtful, wide-ranging, and often provocative article examining linkages, especially between continental and maritime power, between the European and Pacific theaters, and between strategic and conventional deterrence. The article is notable also for the contributions of CAPT Roger W. Barnett, USN (Ret.), one of the foremost original architects of the Maritime Strategy).

"From the Editor", Submarine Review, January 1987, pp 3-5. (Challenges some of the basic strategic concepts of the Maritime Strategy regarding the employment of SSNs).

Connors, LCDR Tracy, "Northern Wedding '86", All Hands, January 1987, pp 18-26. See also "Cape Wrath Feels Iowa's Fury", "Nimitz and Northern Wedding", and "Alaska", in same issue. (VADM Charles R. Larson, Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic: "We went north to test tactics designed to support NATO's maritime strategy of forward defense. I am proud to report those tactics worked").


Keller, LT Kenneth C., "The Surface Ship in ASW", Surface Warfare, Jan/Feb 1987, pp 2-3. ("Any future ASW conflict, by necessity, will be fought in accordance with the maritime strategy". Another of the new generation of naval officers gets--and passes--the word).


Tritten, CDR James J., "(Non) Nuclear Warfare", Proceedings, February 1987, pp 64-70. (By the Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. On the symbiotic nature of nonnuclear and nuclear warfare, at sea and ashore, under conditions of crisis response, intra-war deterrence, and warfighting).

Best, Richard, "Will JCS Reform Endanger The Maritime Strategy?", National Defense: February 1987, pp 26-30. ("The passage of JCS reform will provide a future administration with a handle on defense policy that will allow it to override previous strategic conceptions, including the Navy's maritime strategy, (which) will come under heavy criticism by those using arguments derived from the approach of the systems analysts." Best decries this since "only the Navy has thought through the implications of the continuum of operations in a way which will not cause civilian populations to shrink in horror").


Wood, Robert, "The Conceptual Framework for Strategic Development at the Naval War College", Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, pp 4-16. (Further development of the views of this Naval War College strategist/faculty member. His focus is now on integrated national military strategy and its teaching and gaming. See also commentary by RADM J. A. Baldwin, President of the Naval War College, pp. 2-3).

"Analysis: U.S. Carriers", RUSI, March 1987, pp 1+. (Drags out yet again the false choice between a Continental or Maritime Strategy as an issue. Claims West Germany "would object strongly" if moves were made to convert the Maritime Strategy into the U.S.'s general war strategy. It is, in part, and they haven't, at all. Cf Bonn's actual White Paper 1985, cited in Section V below).


Dunn, VADM Robert F., "NAVviews Interview", Naval Aviation News, March-April 1987, p 4. (The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare comments on "today's maritime strategy in terms of its effects on Naval Aviation": "Tactical commanders must deal with the strategy on a day to day basis. From that derives a new tactical awareness").


Wilson, George C., "600-Ship Navy is Sailing Toward Rough Fiscal Seas", Washington Post, March 16, 1987, pp A1 & A6. (Sees forward anti-SSBN operations as a "Watkins" "scenario" and forward carrier battle group operations as a "Lehman" "scenario", with little backing in the officer corps. Cites a "number of (nameless) Navy officers" as predicting that the latter "aspect of the forward strategy will start fading as soon as Lehman leaves the Navy Department". This seems doubtful, given the primary role of the officer corps in drafting the Maritime Strategy; time will tell. See also retort by Bennett, Rep Charles E., "A 600 Ship Fleet is What's Needed", Washington Post, April 22, 1987, p 19.

Cushman, John H., Jr., "Navy Warns of Crisis in Anti-Submarine Warfare", New York Times, March 19, 1987, p 19. (Outgoing Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering and Systems Melvyn Paisley on need for increased Navy ASW research: "We are faced with a crisis in our anti-submarine warfare capability which undermines our ability to execute maritime strategy". For context, however, see actual Paisley statements before congressional committees, 1987).


Dorsey, Jack, "NATO Navy Called 'A Constant Source of Pride'", Virginian Pilot, March 28, 1987, p 133. (Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV: It is "naive and dangerous" to believe that strong naval forces are merely expensive competitors to ground forces in Europe, an argument that has become fashionable in recent years for critics of naval programs and maritime strategy).


Lessner, Richard, "Quick Strike: Navy Secretary's Wartime Strategy Is Contested Legacy", Arizona Republic, March 29, 1987 pp C1+. (Comprehensive discussion of the issues, including a lengthy interview with Secretary Lehman on the eve of his departure from office, on his Maritime Strategy opinions. Contributes, however, to the erroneous view—running throughout America journalism—that the Strategy was solely his creation).
Goodman, Glenn W. Jr. and Schemmer, Benjamin F., "An Exclusive AFJ Interview with Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost", Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, pp 76-84, especially p 79. (The Chief of Naval Operations discusses his views on the Maritime Strategy, including forward pressure, anti-SSBN operations, and relations with the NATO allies. "Our intent is to hold Soviet maritime forces at risk in the event of war. That includes anything that is out there").


Bliss, Elsie, "Fleet Hardening: Responding to the Nuclear Threat", All Hands, April 1987, pp 30-31. (On USN efforts to "harden" its ships, aircraft, and equipment against nuclear attack).


Sea-War Plan All Wet?", Columbus Dispatch, April 7, 1987, p 10A. (A call for a "vigorous review" by the Pentagon of "Lehman's plan", including "aircraft carrier battle groups...sent to the...Barents, (a plan) never...formally approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, or NATO." As has often been the case with public journalistic commentary on the Maritime Strategy, no mention was made of the extent to which the Strategy reflects longstanding JCS, SECEDEF, or NATO policy and strategy, or of its roots in the naval officer corps).

** Beatty, Jack, "In Harm's Way", The Atlantic, May 1987, pp. 37-53. (Having listened to naval leaders and to college professors, Beatty sides with the college professors. His criticisms, however, pale beside Theo Rudnak's sensationalist artwork). See also August 1987, pp 6-10, for retorts by Norman Friedman, Richard Best, Mark Jordan, Bing West and Colin Grag, and a final rejoinder by Beatty, who apparently believes the Maritime Strategy calls for carrier operations in the Black Sea.


** Korb, Lawrence J., "A Blueprint for Defense Spending", Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1987, p 34. ("The Navy's proper wartime job is...to secure the sea lanes necessary to support a ground campaign and to take the Soviet Navy out of the war, not primarily by seeking it out and destroying it, but by bottling it up. For this, a 12-carrier Navy should suffice").


** Barnett, CAPT Roger W., USN (Ret), "The Maritime Continental Debate Isn't Over", Proceedings, June 1987, pp 28-34. (Still more on the two famous alleged "mindsets", by one of the most prominent crafters of the Maritime Strategy). Also, see "Comment and Discussion", August 1987, p 30).


* "Lehman on Sea Power", U.S. News and World Report, June 15, 1987, p 28 ("The maritime strategy I've promoted is not new; it is NATO strategy that was never taken seriously -- a formula for holding Norway and the Eastern Mediterranean, two high-threat areas"). See also related articles, pp 36-43.


Rostow, Eugene V., "For the Record", Washington Post, June 30, 1987, p A18. (Extract from a Naval War College lecture by a former high Reagan Administration Arms Control official: "I can imagine no better antidote for the frustration and irritability which now characterize allied relationships than allied cooperation in mounting successful applications of counter-force at outposts of the Soviet empire and shifting geographical points around its periphery. The Soviet empire is extremely vulnerable to such a peninsular strategy").


** Winnefeld, LT James A., Jr., "Fresh Claws for the Tomcat", Proceedings, July 1987, pp 103-107. (On the relationship between the Maritime Strategy, CVBG operations, and hardware requirements. "The F-14D is not just another nice fighter; it offers a significant enhancement of the CVBG's ability to execute the maritime strategy. The aircraft's true worth is apparent only in this light").
** Newell, LTC Clayton R., USA, "Structuring Our Forces for the Big Battle", Armed Forces Journal International, July 1987, p 6. (Takes on both the U.S. Navy's "vaunted maritime strategy" and the U.S. Army's "large complex corps designed to fight the Soviets in Western Europe." Prefers force structures and strategies enabling the United States to "apply its military power sparingly in small well-focused engagements in unexpected parts of the world.").

** Prisley, Jack, "Submarine Aggressor Squadron -- Its Time has Come", Submarine Review, July 1987, pp 83-86. (A call for a "Top Fish" program to enable submariners to better practice what they must do to implement the Maritime Strategy).

** Wilson, George, "Soviets Score Silent Success in Undersea Race with U.S.", Washington Post, July 17, 1987, p A20. (Claims ADM Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "has never been enamored of the forward strategy" and that "other Defense Department officials said the forward strategy started to sink as soon as Lehman left the Pentagon." On the former, see Crowe testimony earlier in 1987, cited above. On the latter, see Mark Twain's cable from London to the Associated Press, 1897).

** Truver, Scott, "Phibstrike 95 - Fact or Fiction?", Armed Forces Journal International, August 1987, pp 102-108. (A case study of how the Maritime Strategy has been used as a framework by the Marine Corps to develop an amphibious warfare concept of future operations).

** Kalb, CDR Richard, "The Maritime Strategy and our European Allies: Cold Feet on the Northern Flank?", Proceedings (forthcoming). (By a former member of the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) and contributor to the development of the Maritime Strategy).


** Glaser, Charles L. and Miller, Steven E. (eds.), *The Navy, the Maritime Strategy, and Nuclear War* (forthcoming in 1988). (Examines whether the strategy might cause escalation and the results if it did).


IV. SISTER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY

The Maritime Strategy fully incorporates U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force and Army contributions to the global maritime campaign. In fact, the case can be made that more thought has been given to actual joint combat operations (as opposed to problems of command relationships or lift) by the Navy and Marine Corps in codifying the Maritime Strategy than by either the Air Force or the Army in developing their own “cornerstone” publications. The open literature on potential Army contributions to maritime warfare -- such as air defense batteries based in islands and littoral areas -- is particularly weak.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub. 2), Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1986. (Reflecting the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Title 10 and Title 32 U.S. Code, as amended, and DOD Directive 5100.1 (The “Functions Paper”), JCS Pub. 2. governs the joint activities of the U.S. armed forces. See especially Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2-3, charging each Military Department, including the Navy, to “prepare forces ... for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war”. This responsibility (and not --as some critics charge--a desire to somehow usurp the authority of the JCS or the Unified and Specified Commanders) was the primary impetus and justification for Navy and Marine Corps development, promulgation, and discussion of the Maritime Strategy. It is the Navy Department’s framework for discharging its responsibilities to “organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea”).

U.S. Army, Operations (FM 100-5), Washington: Department of the Army, 20 August 1982. (The Army’s “keystone warfighting manual” and therefore a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Almost no discussion of Army-Navy mutual support, however, e.g.: air defence and island/littoral reinforcement. Included on p 17-7 a useful discussion of the importance and essentially maritime nature of the NATO northern and southern European regions. Superseded in May 1986; distribution now restricted to U.S. government agencies).
U.S. Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (AFM 1-1), Washington: Department of the Air Force, 16 March 1984. (The "cornerstone" Air Force doctrinal manual and therefore a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Takes a somewhat narrower view of potential areas of mutual support than does the Navy. See especially the discussion of objectives of naval forces on p 1-3, neglecting projection operations, e.g. strike or amphibious warfare; and pp 2-15, 3-1, and 3-5/3-6, covering possible Air Force actions to enhance naval operations, virtually all of which are incorporated in the Maritime Strategy. Note, however, the lack of mention of any concomitant naval role in enhancing "aerospace" operations, and the lack of discussion of USAF AAW contributions to maritime warfare, a key element of the Maritime Strategy).


Lewis, Kevin N., Combined Operations in Modern Naval Warfare: Maritime Strategy and Interservice Cooperation (Rand Paper #6999), Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, April 1984. (See especially for arguments on alleged unique "Navy Planning Style", many of which are belied by the Maritime Strategy).

Killebrew, LTC Robert B., USA, Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options, Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986. (Unique among studies of NATO defense in its attempt at an integrated discussion of U.S. and allied land, sea, and air forces. Argues NATO conventional defense is possible. Advocates early employment of naval forces as a defensive barrier "guarding" force. Sees a potential role for carrier air on the Central Front in a protracted war).

Atkeson, MG Edward, USA (Ret.), "Arctic Could Be a Hot Spot in Future Conflicts", Army, January 1986, pp 13-14. (Fanciful proposal for expanded U.S. Army role in helping implement the Maritime Strategy: "An Army air cavalry force, properly tailored for the mission, should be able to locate submarine activity under the ice as well as, if not better than, another submarine").


Yost, ADM Paul, USCG, "The Bright Slash of Liberty: Today's Coast Guard: Buffeted But Unbowed", Sea Power, August 1986, pp 8-24. (See especially pp 11-12 and 21-22, on the Maritime Defense Zones, an important Navy-Coast Guard element of the Maritime Strategy, by the Commandant of the Coast Guard).


Chipman, Dr. Donald D., "Rethinking Forward Strategy and the Distant Blockade", Armed Forces Journal International, August 1987, pp 82-88. (Argues for joint integrated USN-USAF wartime operations in NATO's Northern Region, the GUK gap, and the Norwegian Sea. Well in keeping with the Maritime Strategy).

V. ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY

The Maritime Strategy as developed by the U.S. Navy of the 1980s is heavily oriented toward combined (and joint) operations, and this was reflected in the Proceedings January 1986 Supplement, "The Maritime Strategy". The postwar U.S. Navy had never been "unilateralist". Allied contributions to the global campaign were worked out years ago and then had been continually updated in the drafting of allied war plans, Memoranda of Agreement, and other documents. They have been routinely discussed at annual Navy-to-Navy staff policy talks and CNO-to-CNO visits, held between the U.S. Navy and each of its most important allied associates. Thus most of the hard bargaining and tradeoffs had already been done, and integrating allied efforts with the U.S. Navy component of the Maritime Strategy was not particularly difficult. Once the Maritime Strategy was drafted, it was briefed to key allied CNOs and planning staffs and to NATO commanders. Allied feedback was considered and utilized in updating revisions to the Strategy, and the process continues today.

Allied naval strategy -- and its relationship to the Maritime Strategy -- is well documented. The NATO Information Service is prolific, and NATO commanders author relevant articles frequently. Most allied defense ministries publish occasional or annual "Defense Reports" and/or "White Papers" which sometimes touch on naval strategy as well as policy and procurement issues. As is evident from these and other writings, U.S. Navy and allied military thought is generally congruent.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (10th and subsequent editions), Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1981 and subsequently. (The basic official public document on NATO policy and strategy. See especially latest (1984) edition, pp 108-111, 143-144 and 380. "The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic would be to ensure security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding the sea lanes and denying their use to an enemy, to conduct conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and airfields and to support operations carried out by SACEUR." "NATO's forces (have) roles of neutralizing Soviet strategic nuclear submarines, safeguarding transatlantic sea lines, and in general preventing the Warsaw Pact from gaining maritime supremacy in the North Atlantic").


The North Atlantic Assembly, NATO Anti Submarine Warfare: Strategy, Requirements and the Need for Cooperation, Brussels: 1982. (Good survey of the issues, with a call for resolution of the debate over mission priorities).


Tonge, David, "Exposure Troubles NATO's Northern Commanders", Financial Times, October 27, 1982, p 3. (Reports NATO Northern Region ground commanders' concerns that carrier battle groups may not arrive in the Norwegian Sea early enough).


King-Harman, COL Anthony, BA, "NATO Strategy--A New Look", RUSI, March 1984, pp 26-29. (By a former long-time member of the International NATO Staff. Alleges and decries a NATO "lack of political direction in the maritime sphere". "It has been largely left to SACLANT himself to develop and implement a maritime strategy for deterrence... There is also a Tri-MNC concept of operations again carrying no political endorsement." Calls for a new NATO "strategic review", one result of which, he anticipates would be a finding that "reinforcements...would only need the minimum of maritime protection").


Federal Minister of Defence (Federal Republic of Germany), White Paper 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces. (Includes latest official West German defense policy and strategy views. See especially pp 27-29, 76-77, 111, and 211-216. Declares unequivocal German support for "forward defense at sea" in accordance with the NATO commanders' maritime concept of operations, which "calls for countering the threat far from friendly sea routes and shores. Interdiction of enemy naval forces should be effected immediately in front of their own bases". Differentiates clearly, however, between such use of naval (and air) forces and "aggressive forward defense by ground operations in the opponent's territory", which "NATO strategy rules out").


Caufriez, Chaplain G., "Comment and Discussion: Plan Orange Revisited", Proceedings, March 1985, pp 73 & 79. (From Home Forces Headquarters, Belgium, a plea for Norwegian Sea vice GIUK Gap defense, lest "at one go, the northern flank would have crumbled").


Cole, Paul M. and Hart, Douglas M. (eds.), Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s, Boulder CO: Westview, 1986. (See especially COL Jonathan Alford, BA (Ret.), "The Soviet Naval Challenge", pp 43-56, and LTGEN Heinz von zur Gathen, FRGA (Ret.), "The Federal Republic of Germany's Contribution to the Defense of Northern Europe", pp 57-82. The former sees forward U.S. operations in the Norwegian Sea as unlikely, and argues that the Royal Navy should therefore concentrate on the Channel, the North Sea, and the Norwegian Sea, rather than either "unspecific flexibility" or "keeping open the sea lines of communication to the United States", options that parallel those discussed in the concurrent U.S. Maritime Strategy debates. The latter discusses the increasing West German role in Baltic, North, and Norwegian Sea defense. Both authors base their arguments for enhanced European naval power on the premise that the U.S. Navy will not be available, at least not in strength, in the Norwegian Sea early in a war).
Dibb, Paul, Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. (Against Australian involvement with United States and other allied contingency planning for global war. Claims that Radford-Collins Agreement "convoying and escort connotations which extend more than 2000 nautical miles west of Australia to the mid-Indian Ocean suggest a disproportionate commitment of scarce resources to activities which may be only marginally related to our national interest and capabilities". An input to the March 1987 government White Paper on defense).

Riste, Olav and Tamnes, Rolf, The Soviet Naval Threat and Norway, Oslo: Research Center for Defense History (FHFS), National Defense College Norway, 1986. (See especially pp 18-22. Two Norwegian defense specialists see recent U.S. naval and other efforts as providing "from the Norwegian point of view... a considerably improved probability that the supply lines to Norway will be kept open"). See also Tamnes' "Integration and Screening", (also FHFS 1986), on Norwegian attitudes in the 1970s and 1980s.


Bjarnason, Bjorn, "Iceland and NATO", NATO Review, February 1986, pp 7-12. (By one of Iceland's leading journalists. "It is crucial that in any defence of sea routes between North America and Western Europe, ...the Soviet fleet is confined as far north towards its home base at the Kola Peninsula as possible...the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap...is not an adequate barrier; instead, NATO envisages a forward defence in the Norwegian Sea." Includes update on the defense debate in Iceland).
Stryker, Russell F., "Civil Shipping Support for NATO", NATO Review, February 1986, pp 29-33. (By a U.S. Maritime Administration official and member of the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. On the shipping that is to use the North Atlantic SLOC).


Leenhardt, ADM Yves, FN, "France--The Need For a Balanced Navy", NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1986, pp 41-46. (Rowing to the beat of a different drum. Authoritative statement by the French CNO. Heavy emphasis on nuclear deterrence, crisis prevention and control, and allied cooperation. Minimal discussion relating to global or regional forward conventional operations against the Soviets, however, in contrast to U.S. Maritime Strategy and other allied writers).


Kampe, VADM Helmut, FGN, "Defending the Baltic Approaches", Proceedings, March 1986, pp 88-93. (By the NATO Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Baltic Approaches. Complementary German and Danish naval strategies: "In the Baltic Sea, forward defense begins at the Warsaw Pact ports").


Grimstvedt, RADM Bjarne, RNN, "Norwegian Maritime Operations", Proceedings, March 1986, pp 144-149. (By the Norwegian CNO. Stresses Norwegian Navy intent and capabilities to defend North Norway, including same Vestfjorden area that focused COMSECONDFLT/COMSTRIKFLTLANT's attention in 1985 and 1986).
Secretary of State for Defence (UK), Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986: 1, London: HMSO, 1986. (See especially pp 29, 34, and 60-61. ("...enemy attack submarines are successfully to be held at arm's length from the critical Atlantic routes. Defence against these submarines would begin when they sailed"; "the availability of U.S. ships in the Eastern Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities cannot be assumed"; "U.S. and European navies are continuing...to ensure the preservation of an essential margin of allied maritime superiority in key ocean areas").


Greenwood, David, "Towards Role Specialization in NATO", NATO's Sixteen Nations, July 1986, pp 44-49. (Argues against a significant Eastern Atlantic naval role for Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Denmark. This translates out as largely an attack on the existence of the Dutch Navy, one of the world's best).


** Eberle, ADM Sir James, RN, "Editorial", Naval Forces, IV/1986, p 7. (By a former top Royal Navy and NATO Commander-in-Chief. "The New Maritime Strategy is to be welcomed as a brave effort to bring some much needed clarity into the field of maritime strategic thinking. But it is more likely to be welcomed in Europe by naval officers than it is by political leaders").


** Huitfeldt, LTGEN Tonne, RNA, NATO's Northern Security, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, September 1976. (By the retired Director of the NATO International Military Staff. "United States maritime strategy is in harmony with the agreed NATO strategy". Good coverage of the 1981 NATO Concept of Maritime Operations, a major building block of the Maritime Strategy).

** Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy", Bulletin of the Council for Arms Control (UK), September 1986, pp 5-6. (Regards the Strategy as "self-consciously offensive" and "self-consciously coalition-minded", "yet another example of the growing difference in mood between the two sides of the Atlantic". Challenges fellow Europeans to inject amendments reflecting their own "interests and fears". The "difference in mood" he sees, however, may well be more between military leaders and some political writers on both sides of the ocean than between Americans and Europeans).


** Huitfeldt, LTGEN Tonne, RNA, "The Threat From the North -- Defense of Scandinavia", NATO's Sixteen Nations, October 1986, pp 26-32. (The former NATO International Military Staff Director's endorsement of the Maritime Strategy as "making a more effective contribution to deterring the Soviet Northern Fleet from any adventurism in the Norwegian Sea, and Soviet aggression in general", with the caution that it "not go beyond what is essential for deterrence and defense").

** Boerresen, CAPT Jacob, RNN, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 14-15. (By the military secretary to the Norwegian Minister of Defence. ("During the 1970s, NATO and the USA expressly limited their carrier operations...to the waters in and south of the GIUK gap, Norway...found this situation rather uncomfortable... The official Norwegian reaction to (forward deployment of CVBGs) has been positive, (but) Norway is...sensitive to all developments that it fears may threaten the low level of tension").


Gann, L.H. (ed.), The Defense of Western Europe, London: Croom Helm, 1987. (Surveys all the defense forces of all the Western European nations. Particularly useful is Nigel de Lee's "The Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces", pp 58-94, which examines in some detail their wartime sea and air concepts of operations in the Norwegian Sea, the Baltic approaches, the Baltic itself and inshore waters. These concepts are well integrated into the Maritime Strategy. As regards Denmark, de Lee notes: "Plans for naval action are based on aggressive tactics in depth, and this entails a forward defence". Particularly useless is the highly parochial chapter by COL Harry Summers USA (Ret.), allegedly on "United States Armed Forces in Europe", which should have been styled "The U.S. Army in Germany").

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Department of Defence (Australia), *The Defence of Australia: 1987*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 19, 1987. (The first official Australian Defense "White Paper" since 1976 ensures continued RAN cooperation within the Maritime Strategy. "In the remote contingency of global conflict...our responsibilities would include those associated with the Radford-Collins Agreement for the protection and control of shipping. Subject to priority requirement in our own area the Australian Government would then consider contributions further afield...for example, our FFGs...are capable of effective participation in a U.S. carrier battle group well distant from Australia's shores").


** Mackay, CDR S.V., RN, "An Allied Reaction" *Proceedings*, April 1987, pp 82-89. (Concludes that a peacetime USN Norwegian Sea CVBG presence is required with concomitant "greater commitment from Norway", and "a firm and agreed-upon line...on ROEs". "There are clear indications from recent exercises that this Maritime Strategy is the way ahead for U.S. maritime forces and not solely to support the cause for a 600-ship Navy...the supporting maritime nations in NATO must follow the lead. (But) We in Europe must be sure that the Maritime Strategy is a genuine US. policy for the future and not just a product of the current administration"). See also "Comment and Discussion", July 1987. pp 19-20.


** Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987. (June 1987 official Canadian Ministry of Defense "White Paper", the first since 1971. Current Canadian contributions to allied Maritime Strategy and future plans. See especially maps pp 13, 52, 64 and discussion of proposed changes in Canadian policy, which will increase the requirements for USN and USMC forces in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere, but which should help improve other elements needed to carry out the Strategy).**

Nishihara, Masashi, "Maritime Cooperation in the Pacific: The United States and its Partners", *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1987, pp 37-41. ("The U.S. strategy of horizontal escalation by which the United States would open up armed tensions in different parts of the world, in order to force the Soviets to disperse their forces, may not meet Japanese interests").
VI. SOVIET STRATEGY AND VIEWS

U.S. and allied Maritime Strategy is not a game of solitaire. The Soviet threat -- along with U.S. national and allied interests and geo-political realities -- is one of the fundamental ingredients of that strategy. No attempt can be made here, however, to recount the considerable literature that exists on Soviet naval affairs. The focus in the relatively few works listed below is how the Soviets view their own maritime strategy as well as ours, and how correctly we have divined their views. A critical issue is which missions they see as primary and which they see as secondary, for their navy and for those of the west, and whether these priorities will change soon. Much material on the Soviets also can be found in other entries in this bibliography.

Gorshkov, RADM Serge G., The Sea Power of the State, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. See especially pp 290 and 329. ("The employment of naval forces against the sea-based strategic systems of the enemy has become most important in order to disrupt or blunt to the maximum degree their strikes against targets ashore...").

Yashin, RADM B., "The Navy in U.S. Military-Political Strategy", International Affairs (Moscow), #2, 1982. (Sees "new U.S. Naval Strategy" of Secretary Lehman as deriving from the "ocean strategy" of Admirals Zumwalt and Turner).


Strelkov, Captain First Rank V., "Naval Forces in U.S. 'Direct Confrontation' Strategy", Morskoy Sbornik, No. 5, 1983, pp 78-82. (Highlights maritime roles of allies and sister services as well as USN).


Sturua, G., "Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare", USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology, February 1985. (Strategic ASW viewed as a primary USN mission.)


** George, James L., (ed.), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. (An outstanding collection of papers from a 1985 CNA-sponsored conference of top experts in the field, including several references to the Maritime Strategy. See especially Brad Dismukes' discussion of the contending views on Soviet Navy missions; the authoritative judgments of RADM William Studeman, RADM Thomas Brooks, and Mr. Richard Haver, the nation's top naval intelligence professionals; and the contrasting views of ADM Sylvester Foley and ADM Harry Train, two former "operators". Wayne Wright's "Soviet Operations in the Mediterranean" is especially good on the interplay of Soviet and U.S. Maritime Strategy. The excellent paper by Alvin Bernstein of the Naval War College and and the paper by Anthony Wells have also been reprinted elsewhere: the former in National Interest, Spring 1986, pp 17-29; the latter in National Defense, February 1986, pp 38-44).


** Palin, Valentin, "Back to the Stone Age", Izvestia, January 23/24, 1986, pp 5/5. (A top Kremlin spokesman takes the Maritime Strategy to task as being "remarkably odious": "It is hardly possible to imagine anything worse". Highlights opposing arguments by Barry Posen). See also commentary by Manthorpe, CAPT William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: The Soviet Union Reacts", Proceedings, April 1986, p 111.

Petersen, Charles C., "Strategic Lessons of the Recent Soviet Naval Exercise", National Defense, February 1986, pp 32-36. (A leading strategy analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses sees Soviets' strategy threatening U.S. ports and SLOCs in addition to defending SSBNs close to their homeland. Urges USN strategic homeporting, mine warfare, and shallow-water ASW initiatives, in addition to "carrying the fight to the enemy").

** Friedman, Norman, "Soviet Naval Aviation", Naval Forces. No. 1/1986, pp 92-97. (Sees Soviet Naval Aviation as perhaps the greatest threat to NATO navies).


Schandler, Herbert Y., "Arms Control in Northeast Asia", The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1987, pp 69-79. (Wide-ranging article which gives the context within which the Maritime Strategy operates in the Pacific. Highlights "the ever-looming nightmare of a two-front war" as gaining in credibility for the Soviet Union. "This two-front threat is enormously important to Soviet psychology and provides the United States with a major pressure point on Soviet leaders").
** Mozgovoy, Aleksandr, "For Security on Sea Routes", International Affairs (Moscow), 1/1987, pp 77-84, 103. (See especially p 83, on the Maritime Strategy as "an unprecedentedly impudent document, even given the militaristic hysteria reigning in Washington today").


** Daniel, Donald C.F., "The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at Sea", Survival, July/August 1987, pp 138+. (The Director of the Naval War College's Strategy and Campaign Department concludes, inter alia, that Soviet decision makers will use nuclear weapons at sea only if they have already been used ashore, or if NATO uses them at sea first).
VII. PEACETIME, CRISSES, AND THIRD WORLD CONTINGENCIES

Most of the above works deal principally with use of the Navy in general war. What follows are books and articles of the 1970s and 1980s discussing the uses of the U.S. Navy in peacetime, crises, and "small wars" (the "Violent Peace" of the Maritime Strategy). Many of these derive from the increased discussion of peacetime presence as a naval mission engendered by Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and Stansfield Turner in the early 1970s. Thus, the contemporary era of U.S. Navy thought on peacetime presence operations began about five years prior to that on forward global wartime operational concepts. Both bodies of thought, however, have build on the earlier literature of the late 1950s and 1960s on the role of the U.S. Navy in limited war.

While most of the items listed below focus on the U.S. Navy, there is a significant literature on the peacetime/crisis/"small war" activities of the Royal Navy and the Soviet Navy as well, some of the most important elements of which have been included here. In addition, certain of the "White Papers" and "Defense Reports" published by various defense ministries around the world routinely highlight the peacetime operations of their naval forces. Especially notable in this regard are the annual British "Defense Estimates" and Canadian "Annual Reports."


Bull, Hedley, "Sea Power and Political Influence", in Power at Sea: I. The New Environment, Adelphi Paper Number 122, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974, pp 1-9. ("The period we are now entering will be one in which opportunities for the diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, will be severely circumscribed").

McGruther, LCDR Kenneth. "The Role of Perception in Naval
Diplomacy," Naval War College Review, September-October 1974, pp
3-20. (Part of the initial Zumwalt-Turner new look at USN
"Naval Presence" mission. Includes Indian Ocean case study and
a "cookbook". By a future OP-603 staffer).

McNulty, CDR James, "Naval Presence - The Misunderstood
Mission." Naval War College Review, September-October 1974, pp
21-31. (Another reflection of the initial Zumwalt-Turner focus
on presence. See also Turner, VADM Stansfield, "Challenge," pp
1-2, in the same issue.

Luttwak, Edward N., The Political Uses of Sea Power, Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. (Short treatment
sponsored by VADM Turner. Typology and analysis based on
concept of "suasion." Focus on the U.S. Navy in the
Mediterranean.)

Young, Elizabeth, "New Laws for Old Navies: Military
Implications of the Law of the Sea," Survival, November-December
1974, pp 262-267. (Forecasts the demise of naval diplomacy.)

Survival, Mar/Apr 1975, pp 69-72. (Takes issue with Young's
article. Suggests that, "in the turbulent future, maritime
forces are likely to be more rather than less in demand both at
home and away").

McCwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.), "Changing Naval Operations and
Military Intervention", in Stern, Ellen P., The Limits of
Military Intervention, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977, pp 151-178,
and reprinted in Naval War College Review, Spring 1977, pp
3-25. (Sees numerous constraints now in place on the "almost
casual use of force which used to be the norm" in military
intervention by sea).

McCwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.) and McDonnell, John (eds.),
Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, New
York: Praeger, 1977. (See especially chapters by McCwire,
Booth, Dismukes, and Kelly).

Booth, Ken, Navies and Foreign Policy, London: Croon Helm,
1977. (Magisterial treatment.)

Mahoney, Robert B., Jr., "U.S. Navy Responses to International
Analyses, 1977. (Survey of USN crisis operations and summaries
of incidents and responses.

Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K., "The Evolution of
International Order and the Future of the American Naval
Presence Mission", Naval War College Review, Fall 1977, pp
37-59. (Sees political and technological changes as
necessitating revision to contemporary thinking on naval
presence, just when that thinking had begun to solidify).
Eldredge, CAPT Howard S., "Nonsuperpower Sea Denial Capability: The Implications for Superpower Navies Engaged in Presence Operations", in Ra'anan, Uri et al. (eds.), Arms Transfers to the Third World, Boulder CO: Westview, 1978, pp 21-64. (Argues that growing sea denial arsenals of littoral nations are complicating the risk calculations of the superpowers in using naval forces to further their interests. Focus on anti-ship missiles and submarine torpedoes).


Allen, CAPT Charles D., Jr., USN (Ret.), The Uses of Navies in Peacetime, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Excellent short analysis, with typology. (Focus on postwar U.S. Navy, and on escalation.)


Cohen, Raymond, International Politics: The Rules of the Game, London, Longman, 1981, pp. 41-48. (One of the few general works on international relations by an academic political scientist to deal in any depth with the peacetime and crisis uses of navies. Navy force movements seen as part of the "vocabulary of international politics.")
Truver, Scott C., "New International Constraints on Military Power: Navies in the Political Role", Naval War College Review, July-August 1981, pp 99-104. (Sees regular employment of major naval combatants and large-deck carriers as becoming less tenable in Third World areas for the remainder of the century, for a variety of reasons).

Neutze, CDR Dennis R., JAGC, "Bluejacket Diplomacy: A Juridical Examination of the Use of Naval Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy", JAG Journal, Summer 1982, pp 81-158. (By the legal advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations. Very comprehensive examination of the lawfulness of the political uses of U.S. naval power in terms of domestic and international law, going back to the framers of the Constitution. Sees such political uses as expanding in the future).


Hickman, LCDR William J., "Did it Really Matter?" Naval War College Review, March-April 1983, pp. 17-30. (By a future OP-603 staffer. On limitations and misuses of USN naval presence operations. Indian Ocean case study is useful counterpoint to McGruther article a decade earlier, above.)

Barnett, CAPT Roger W., "The U.S. Navy's Role in Countering Maritime Terrorism", Terrorism, Vol 6, No 3, 1983, pp 469-480. (A primary architect of the Maritime Strategy argues that while the U.S. Navy is well prepared against attacks on its own ships and installations, its role in deterring terrorist attacks on U.S. merchant ships or overseas facilities "cannot be suggested to be a large one").

Zelikow, Philip D., "Force Without War, 19/5-82," Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1984, pp. 29-54. (Updates Blechman and Kaplan book. Also provides listing of incidents when USN was used.)

Cable, Sir James, "Showing the Flag," Proceedings, April 1984, pp. 59-63. (The utility of ship visits.)


Arnott, CDR Ralph E. and Gaffney, CDR William A., "Naval Presence: Sizing the Force", Naval War College Review, March-April 1985, pp 18-30. (Seeks to develop a rational structured approach to choosing a force tailored to respond to a particular crisis, so as to achieve the desired outcome with minimum effect on scheduled fleet operations).


Levine, Daniel B., Planning for Underway Replenishment of Naval Forces in Peacetime (CRM 85-77), Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1985. (Much more than underway replenishment. Examines U.S. Navy fleet exercises, crisis response and surveillance operations. Analyses them by ocean area, frequency, and number/types of combatants used).
Harris, CDR R. Robinson, and Benkert, LCDR Joseph, "Is That All There Is?", Proceedings, October 1985, pp. 32-37. (Contrasts peacetime-and global war strategy requirements, with focus on surface combatants.)


Mandel, Robert, "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy", International Studies Quarterly, March 1986, pp 59-76. ("The most effective gunboat diplomacy involves a definitive, deterrent display of force undertaken by an assailant who has engaged in war in the victim's region and who is militarily prepared and politically stable compared to the victim").


Vlahos, Michael, "The Third World in U.S. Navy Planning", Orbis, Spring 1986, pp 133-148. (By a former Naval War College faculty member. Argues the U.S. Navy has recently refocused its attention on its contributions to a global allied campaign against the Soviets, to the detriment of planning for more likely and qualitatively different Third World contingencies).

Cable, Sir James, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Futu-e", Proceedings, August 1986, pp 36-41. (Forcefully argues that the days of gunboat diplomacy are by no means over. Denigrates those who have said otherwise).

Coutau-Begarie, Herve, "The Role of the Navy in French Foreign Policy", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 36-43. (By probably the most important contemporary French writer on naval strategy. The recent French global experience, one not often discussed in an English-language literature dominated by U.S., British, and Soviet examples).

James, Lawrence, "Old Problems and Old Answers: Gunboat Diplomacy Today", Defense Analysis, December 1986, pp 324-327. (On its limitations, past and present).


Jordan, COL Amos A., USA (Ret), "A National Strategy for the 1990s", The Washington Quarterly: Summer 1987, p 15. (The president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies sees Third World peoples as increasingly uncowed by "gunboat diplomacy and other similar kinds of hollow threats").
VIII. FLEET BALANCE: ATLANTIC VS. PACIFIC VS. MEDITERRANEAN

Geographic flexibility is one of the great strengths of naval power. Yet the U. S. Navy's global posture since World War II has often looked like a series of hard-and-fast theater commitments, more appropriate to less flexible land-based types of forces. The articles and letters below illustrate current problems of implementing a balanced global Maritime Strategy with limited naval forces in the face of competing regional demands. They were selected because of their focus on the need for hard choices by the Navy regarding fleet balance; articles merely trumpeting the importance of an area or discussing regional priorities solely at the geopolitical level are omitted.


Ortlieb, CDR E. V., "Forward Deployments: Deterrent or Temptation." Proceedings, December 1983, pp. 36-40. Also "Comment and Discussion:" February 1984, p. 22. (On reducing the Sixth and Seventh Fleets while increasing the Second and Third).
Maiorano, LT Alan, "A Fresh Look at the Sixth Fleet," Proceedings, February 1984, pp. 52-58. Also "Comment and Discussion:" July 1984, pp. 28-33. (On reducing the USN Mediterranean commitment, with USAF and allied forces filling any gaps).


IX. WAR GAMING

As is well discussed in previous sections, U.S. and allied navies, other services, and joint and allied commands have a variety of means at their disposal in peacetime to test the wartime validity of aspects of the Maritime Strategy, besides debate and discussion. They actually participate in fleet exercises, advanced tactical training, and "real world" peacetime and crisis operations, and they conduct extensive operations analyses and war games. Most of these avenues are generally inaccessible to the public, however, save one: gaming. There are over a half-dozen commercial board and computer games now available that can provide players with insights into modern maritime strategic, operational, and tactical problems and potential solutions, and thereby further enhance players' understanding of the Maritime Strategy. Like all simulations, however, they each have their limitations, and even built-in inaccuracies (as the various reviews point out). Thus they cannot by themselves legitimately be used to "prove" validities or demonstrate "outcomes". Nevertheless, playing them is the nearest many students and theorists of Maritime Strategy can ever come to actually "being there", and therefore is an activity that can only be encouraged.

A. Commentary

** Perla, Peter C., "Wargaming and the U.S. Navy", National Defense, February 1987, pp 49-53. (By a leading Center for Naval Analyses war gamer. "The Navy is continuing a process of using wargaming, exercises, and analysis to address the aspects of major issues for which they are best suited... a classic example of this process can be seen at work in the 2nd Fleet. Taking the promulgated maritime strategy as his starting point, the commander, 2nd Fleet, proposed a concept for operating the NATO Striking Fleet in the Norwegian Sea. A wargame was held at the Naval War College to explore this concept, and analysis was undertaken to quantify some of the issues raised by the game. Then an exercise was held in the area of interest, which confirmed some assumptions and raised new questions. A new series of games and analysis was capped by a second major exercise, as the process continues"). See also his "What Wargaming is and is Not", co-authored by LCDR Raymond T. Barrett, Naval War College Review, September-October 1985, pp 70-78 (and "In My View..." commentary, Naval War College Review, Autumn 1986, pp. 105-108); and "War Games, Analyses, and Exercises", Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, pp. 44-52 (and endorsement by former CNO ADM Thomas Hayward, USN (Ret), in August 1987 Proceedings).

B. Games


** Balkoski, Joseph, *Second Fleet*, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. Palmer, *Proceedings*, March 1987, pp 160-162. ("Those of us without access to the War College's computers can test the waters north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and gain insight into the problems and opportunities inherent in the application of the Maritime Strategy". Can be played simultaneously with Sixth Fleet, with forces shifted from one set of maps to the other, in a simulation of war in both Northern and Southern European waters and adjacent areas).


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X. ANTECEDENTS

The general and historical literature on naval strategy is admittedly vast. What is presented here are only books that describe earlier strategies -- conceptualized, planned and/or implemented -- which are analogous to key aspects of the U. S. Navy's Maritime Strategy today. The materials are generally listed chronologically, by historical period covered.

Till, Geoffrey, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, (Second Edition), New York: St. Martin's, 1984. (Basic one-volume historical and topical survey.)


Mahan, CAPT Alfred Thayer, "The Problem of Asia", in his The Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Politics, Cambridge MA: University Press, 1900, pp 1-146. (Mahan on "restraining Russia", the central problem of the Maritime Strategy: "The Russian centre cannot be broken. It is upon, and from, the flanks... that restraint, if needed, must come" (p 26); "hence ensues solidarity of interest between Germany, Great Britain, Japan and the United States" (p 63)). See also Trofimenko, in Section VI above, and Crowl, Philip A., "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian", in Paret, Peter (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp 444-477, especially p 477. (A Naval War College professor emeritus asserts the Maritime Strategy is antithetical to Mahan's teaching, especially as regards the role of other services, in a book which otherwise--and to its detriment--pays scant attention to makers of modern maritime strategy. Trofimenko gets the linkage between Mahan and the Maritime Strategy right. Crowl gets it wrong).

Schilling, Warner R., "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," PhD. Dissertation, Yale University, 1954. ("Maritime Strategy" of the 1980s was not first time this century U.S. Navy developed a coherent preferred strategy.)


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** Vlahos, Michael, "Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism: 1919-1942", Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 7--22. (By a former Naval War College faculty member. How wargaming prepared the U.S. Navy for war in 1941, and how it is doing so again today, including linkage between gaming and planning).


Spykman, Nicholas John, The Geography of the Peace, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944. (Basic geopolitical reference. See especially maps, pp. 50-54.)


Nimitz, FADM Chester, "Future Employment of Naval Forces," Vital Speeches, Jan. 15, 1948, pp. 214-217. (Also, in Brassey's Naval Annual: 1948, and Shipmate, February 1948, pp. 5-6+, as "Our Navy. It's Future.") (Argues for a projection strategy and a Navy capable of land attack early in a war.)


Rosenberg, David, Arleigh Burke and the United States Navy, Vol I: War and Cold War, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, (forthcoming in 1988). (By a Naval War College faculty member. "Maybe it would help us sell the Navy's case if we could make a presentation on how the Navy could function in the first 90 days of a war, and keep that presentation up to date "--RADM Burke in 1952 after relieving as OP-30, now OP-60).

Marolda, Edward J., "The Influence of Burke's Boys on Limited War", *Proceedings*, August 1981, pp 36-41. (By a prominent Navy Department historian on the influence of the Navy officer corps on national strategy a generation ago. "Between 1956 and 1960, the Navy added its considerable influence to the intellectual campaign within the national defense community for a reorientation in strategic policy").

Wylie, CAPT J.C., "Why A Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor", *Proceedings*, August 1957, pp 811-817. (By the Navy's leading public strategist of the 1950s and 60s. Remarkably similar to the views expressed in the Maritime Strategy a generation later).


U.S. Navy, *Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study (Unclassified Executive Summary)*, Washington, DC: 28 March 1978. (A progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Whereas the latter stresses the role of the Navy in a global conventional war with the Soviets, however, the former tended more toward emphasizing the extent of the range of potential uses of naval power).

XI. MAKING MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: INFLUENCES


Sagan, Scott D., "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability", International Security, Fall 1986, pp 151-175. (An excellent piece. Takes issue with literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the Offensive". "Offensive military doctrines are needed not only by states with expansionist war aims, but also by states that have a strong interest in protecting an exposed ally". See also Snyder, Jack and Sagan, Scott D., "Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Counterforce", Winter 1986-87, pp 187-198).

Bartlett, Henry C., "Approaches to Force Planning", Naval War College Review, May-June 1985, pp 37-48. (By a Naval War College faculty member. Provides eight approaches to Force Planning, but each such "approach" can—and does—apply to the drafting of Strategy as well. They are presented by the author as pure types, stark alternatives, but in actual practice (for example, in the development of the Maritime Strategy) their influence on the strategist is often simultaneous, to a greater or lesser degree. His list of approaches: "top-down", "bottom-up", "scenario", "threat", "mission", "hedging", "technology", and "fiscal". The first four were probably the most important influences on the Maritime Strategy of the late 1940s-early 1950s and the 1980's; "Mission" and "hedging" were relatively more important from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s. "Threat" influences tended to be driven more by perceived capabilities in the 1940s through the 1970s and more by perceived intentions in the 1980s. Critics tend to focus on "technology" and "budget" influences. There is actually also a ninth approach, "historical/academic" approach, which tends to focus the strategist on "lessons of history" and/or the great classics of military thought. All these approaches coexist with the organizational and psychological influences on war planning identified by Jack Snyder. The remaining citations in this section give examples, drawn primarily from the Maritime Strategy debates).
Johnson, CAPT W. Spencer, "Comment and Discussion" "Strategy: Ours vs Theirs", Proceedings, September 1984, p 107. (One of the initial drafters of the Maritime Strategy elaborates on the necessity, utility and existence of a national military strategy from which the Maritime Strategy is derived. The "top-down" view of strategy-building written in response to McGruther's "threat-based" approach, cited below. See also "Comment and Discussion", Proceedings, April 1984, p 31).

Hughes, CAPT Wayne P., USN (Ret.), "Naval Tactics and Their Influence on Strategy", Naval War College Review, January-February 1986, pp 2-17. (The strategy-tactics interface. The "bottom-up" view of strategy-building. See also his Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, cited in Section II above; and Hill, RADM C. A. "Mark", Jr., USN (Ret.), "Congress and the Carriers", Wings of Gold Spring 1987, pp 6-8. But cf "In My View...: Tactical Skills", Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, p 91: "The best plans are not those developed through top-down or bottom-up approaches. Strategists and tacticians need to keep in mind that the road to sound planning is a two-way, not one-way thoroughfare").

Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? ... to Support the Land Battle", Naval War College Review, November-December 1984. (By a member of the 1983-84 Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Argument is distilled from a "scenario" approach. See also fictional treatments by Clancy, Hackett and McGeoch et al., and Hayes et al, cited in Sections I and II, above.).


Moodie, Michael, and Cottrell, Alvin J., Geopolitics and Maritime Power, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981. (A good example of a "hedging" focus. Regards Lehman's "major change" as not enough. Also wants greater naval activity in the Caribbean, periodic visits to the South Atlantic, an enhanced fleet in the Western Pacific, and continuing large-scale activity in the Indian Ocean. See also Sea Plan 2000, cited in Section X above).

** Froggett, CDR S.J., "The Maritime Strategy: Tomahawk's Role", Proceedings, February 1987, PP 51-54; Williams, RADM J.W., Jr., "In My view ... Cross Training", Naval War College Review, March-April 1985, pp 96-97; and Chipman, Dr. Donald D., and Lay, MAJ David, USAF, "Sea Power and the B-52 Stratofortress", Air University Review, January-February 1986, pp 45-50. (Good examples of the "technology" approach to strategy. Focus is on one system—in these cases the cruise missile, the nuclear submarine, and the land-based heavy bomber—and arguments on strategy are built around it. But cf Taylor, Philip A., "Technologies and Strategies: Trends in Naval Strategies and Tactics", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 44-55. ("The consensus among senior military officers is that ... technology ... has not, nor is it likely to determine military strategy").


Neustadt, Richard E. and May, Ernest R., Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, New York: The Free Press, 1986. (Seeks to focus decision-makers/users of the "historical" approach. Has direct relevance for strategists, a sub-category of "decision-makers". For example, the "cases" highlighted in Section VIII of this addendum and in its predecessor -- The Crimea, Salonika, the Russian Intervention, World War II, etc. -- can all be profitably examined using the Neustadt-May methodology).
The Maritime Strategy was originally drafted primarily--although certainly not exclusively--by U.S. naval officers for U.S. naval officers. Not only were agreed national, joint, and allied intelligence estimates and concepts of operations utilized as fundamental "building blocks", but great importance was also attached to long-held views of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps leadership, to the concepts of operations of the fleet commanders-in-chief, and to the views of thinkers in uniform (active duty and reserve) at the Naval War College and the Center for Naval Analyses.

Much of what is in the Maritime Strategy is hardly new, and would be especially recognizable to naval officers who developed U.S. and allied naval warfighting concepts in the late 1940s and 1950s. Likewise, elements from key strategy products of naval officers and civilian thinkers of the late 1970s--e.g. the 1976 National Security Council Maritime Strategy study, naval reservist John Lehman's 1978 Aircraft Carriers, and the Navy's 1978 Sea Plan 2000 and Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (NWP 1 (Rev.A))--are also evident in the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.

Much of what is new in the Maritime Strategy is the linked, coherent discussion of (a) global warfare--rather than separate service and theater operations; (b) warfare tasks--e.g. anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface, strike, amphibious, mine and special warfare--rather than traditional "platforms" or "unions"; (c) the specific geopolitical problems facing the U.S. Navy--and other maritime elements--of the 1980s; and (d) the current conventional wisdom regarding Soviet Navy capabilities and intentions. This approach was largely driven by the primacy of the need for the Strategy to satisfy current global operational requirements of fleet and other force commanders, over the future requirements of competing bureaucracies in Washington. Its effect in fostering common reference points for all portions of the contemporary officer corps, especially junior officers, is already being felt.

While much of the robustness of the Maritime Strategy derives from its roots throughout the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and elsewhere, both over space and over time, it owes a high degree of its current utility to its initial approval and promulgation by successive Chiefs of Naval Operations in Washington and to its codification by their staffs (OPNAV). These include especially the successive Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), Directors of the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-60), Heads of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and staff officers in that branch. OPNAV is the one organization tasked to focus on maritime strategy, and to view it not only in a balanced global manner but also within the bounds of actual current national military planning parameters.
OPNAV's capabilities in this endeavor are due in part to the existence of the Navy Politico-Military/Strategic Planning subspecialty, education, screening, and utilization system. This personnel system, while somewhat imperfect, has been identifying, training, and using naval officers in a network of strategists--in Washington, Newport, the Fleet, and elsewhere--for over a decade and a half.

Nevertheless, despite the clear postwar historical roots of the Maritime Strategy and its codification in and dissemination from Washington by some of the best minds in the national security affairs community today, a number of publications appeared in the last decade decrying a lack of strategic training and thinking in the Navy, past and present, and ignoring or misunderstanding the critical role in strategy development of naval officers in staff positions. This literature, as well as some counters to it, is briefly outlined below.
A. The Public Debate: Criticisms and Kudos

Brooks, Captain Linton F., "An Examination of Professional Concerns of Naval Officers as Reflected in their Professional Journal", Naval War College Review, Jan-Feb 1980, pp 46-56. (A future primary contributor to the development and articulation of the Maritime Strategy decries the paucity of articles on strategy in the Navy professional literature of the late 1960s. This era was admittedly dominated by Vietnam and an internal professional view of the navy as primarily an infinitely flexible limited war fire brigade, but it did, however, also see the publication of RADM J. C. Wylie's Military Strategy, RADM Henry Eccles's Military Concepts and Philosophy, and ADM Joseph J. Clark's coauthored Sea Power and its Meaning).


Woolsey, R. James, "Mapping 'U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980's'", International Security, Fall 1981, pp 202-207. (By the 1977-1980 Under Secretary of the Navy. "The other side of the coin". A call to bring the "American academic intellectual establishment" and the military establishment more in touch with each other by focusing the efforts of the former on the actual "defense policy" problems of the latter, vice exclusively on "(a) the politico-military situation in the four corners of the globe and (b) nuclear and arms control theology"). For similar disconnects that have occurred even within the field of "nuclear theology" itself, see Rosenberg, David, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Theory vs. Practice", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1987, pp 20+. ("Theorists and consultants have had little impact on the development of nuclear weapons policies. Rather, strategic planning should be seen as a governmental process, carried out largely by military officers and civilian bureaucrats").
Bruins, Berend D., "Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?", Proceedings, January 1982, pp 52-56. Also "Comment and Discussion": March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20; May 1982, p 17. (The Proceedings throws three more retirees and an active-duty non-strategist into the public fray. Meanwhile, fleet plans staffs, the Strategic Studies Group at Newport, and the one intelligence officer and nine line officers--six with PhDs--assigned to OP-603 were at the time actively laying the groundwork for the Maritime Strategy. Illustrative of the limited public visibility of actual naval strategic thinkers before 1982-83.)

Hanks, RADM Robert J., USN (Ret.), "Whither U.S. Naval Strategy?", Strategic Review, Summer 1982, pp 16-22. (An outstanding OP-60 of the 1970s challenges the U.S. Navy to develop a coherent strategy, an activity being vigorously pursued even as the article was published).

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Thinking About Strategy," Shipmate, April 1982, pp. 18-20. (SECNAV's charge to the officer corps.)

Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "Naval Strategy for the Next Century: Resurgence of the Naval War College as the Center of Strategic Naval Thought", National Defense, April 1983, pp 27-30. (Covers the resurgence of the Naval War College, although without describing the linkages between that institution and the strategic planners in Washington, through which Naval War College thinking is actually translated into Maritime Strategy elements). Also see 1983 Murray article cited in Section I above.


Hattendorf, John, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U. S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984. (Chronicles the important supporting role of the Naval War College in the development and dissemination of U. S. Navy strategic thought. See especially pp. 201-202, 237, 312-319.)
Crackel, LTCOL Theodore J., USA (Ret.), "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels", Public Interest, Summer 1984, pp 18-30. ("The services have produced no strategic thinkers at all." He is especially hard on War College faculties, including the Naval War College: "None of the war college faculties is in the forefront of development in any of the military disciplines they teach." Actually, no group has been more in the "forefront of development" in the "discipline" of Maritime Strategy (SECNAV, the CNO, the OP-06 organization, and the Strategic Studies Group aside) than the Naval War College faculty, as is evidenced by their prominence in this bibliography. Crackel is a military historian by training with little apparent experience in actual strategy- or policy-making, and with an almost exclusively U.S. Army-oriented academic and operational record. Unlike most practicing U.S. naval strategists, he has apparently self-fulfilled his prophecy and "discovered that the think-tanks in and around Washington are a more congenial environment").

"413 Named as Proven Subspecialists", Navy Times, September 9, 1985, p 58. (The Navy system for identifying the "pool" of naval strategists. Results of the seventh biennial U.S. Navy selection board that identifies "proven" subspecialists for further mid- and high-level assignments in the eight fields of naval Political-Military/Strategic Planning. Earlier lists appeared in Navy Times back into the 1970s. Includes many of the builders of the Maritime Strategy. Note that these names constitute not only the "Corps of Naval Strategists", but also the Navy's Politico-Military and Regional Affairs experts).

** Stavridis, LCDR Jim, "An Ocean Away: Outreach from the Naval War College", Shipmate, November 1985, p 8. (On the role of the Naval War College in contributing to OP-603's codification of the Maritime Strategy, and in "getting the word out" to mid-grade naval officers. By a former OP-603 member).


Davis, CAPT Vincent, USNR (Ret.), "Decision Making, Decision Makers, and Some of the Results", in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed.), The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment, Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986, pp 23-62. (A somewhat anachronistic characterization of the contemporary Navy as one with "too few thinkers", riven by acrimonious debates among factions of naval officers. "Rancorous disputes simmer among its 'big three unions'--the carrier, submarine, and surface-warfare admirals". Thus the seminal thinker and writer on naval strategy and bureaucratic politics of the 40s, 50s, and 60s sees no essential change in the Navy of the mid-80s, -- despite conscious Navy efforts to take his earlier counsel to heart in its development of a transcendent Maritime Strategy. Cf articles by VADM Demars, Schoultz, and Dunn--leaders of the submarine and air warfare communities--and by LTs Winnefeld, Peppe and Keller--the rising generation--cited in Sections II and III above).

** Bush, Ted, "Libyan Exercise Exemplifies New Navy Strategy", Navy Times, February 10, 1986, pp 45-46. (OPNAV strategists illuminate a variety of aspects of the Maritime Strategy and its origins. Note that, unlike open-literature authors, actual practicing strategists usually remain nameless to the general public. This hardly means, however, that they are somehow less important).

** Leibstone, Marvin, "US Report", Naval Forces, II/1986, p 94. Allege "an unusually large number of naval officers do not recognize fully the switch from 'defense' to 'offense' that the Navy's high command believes is necessary". But of "The United States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave", The Economist, April 19, 1986, p 49 cited above: "What is certain is that an entire generation of junior and middle-grade naval officers now believes that the first wartime job of the navy would be to sail north and fight the Russians close to their bases".

** Burdick, CAPT Howard, "Sons of the Prophet: A View of the Naval War College Faculty", Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 81-89. (On the Naval War College, its faculty, and the Maritime Strategy, by the Dean of Academics at the Naval War College).


Murray, Williamson, "Grading the War Colleges", National Interest, Winter 1986/7, pp 12-19. (Antidote to Crackel. "The best of the war colleges, the Naval War College at Newport, sets the standard by which the other war colleges should be measured." "The strategy and policy curriculum has justifiably acquired a reputation as the premier course in the United States, if not the Western world, for the examination of strategy. So high is the Naval War College's reputation, that over the course of the past few years it has attracted a number of the best young military historians and political scientists in national security affairs to Newport.").

** Clark, Charles S., "In Person: Fred H. Rainbow: Charting a Course for the Navy's Debates", National Journal, February 21, 1987, p 435. (On the role of the Proceedings in orchestrating "some heated forensics over the Navy's trumpeted Maritime Strategy (while) similar Air Force and Army journals often reflect the blandness of official restraints". The Institute has come a long way in just a few short years. Like the Naval War College and the Naval War College Review, the Naval Institute and the Proceedings are clearly at the cutting edge of maritime strategy debate today).

** Tritten, CDR James, "New Directions," Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, p. 94. (By the Chairman of the Naval Postgraduate School National Security Affairs Department and a former OP-60 staffer. On the revitalization of naval history and strategy studies at the "PG School").

** Hearding, LCDR David, "A Requiem for the Silent Service", Submarine Review, July 1987, pp 73-78. (An important article, stressing the need for broader integration of U.S. Navy submarine officers into the Navy as a whole, in part as a result of the advent of the Maritime Strategy).
B. The Public Record: OP-603

From 1982 to the present, the primary U.S. Navy organization charged with codifying, refining, and articulating the consensus in the Navy regarding the Maritime Strategy has been the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Organized by VADM William J. Crowe (then OP-06) and RADM Robert Hilton (then OP-60) in 1978, OP-603 evolved into an office of about a dozen post-graduate educated, trained, professional operator-strategists, including U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Central Intelligence Agency officers.

Almost invisible to the general and national security affairs academic publics—especially when contrasted to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-06 and OP-60, the operational commanders, the Strategic Studies Group and the Naval War College—these officers have nevertheless been those principally responsible for the development of the Maritime Strategy as a unified, coherent, global framework and common U.S. and allied naval vision.

As with war planners, but unlike war college faculties, their output is largely classified. Nevertheless, they—and their superiors, OP-60 and OP-60B—have often also achieved respectable open publication records. Typically, their writings prior to assignment to OP-60/603 reflect their diverse operational and academic interests and achievements; their publications during and after their assignment as strategists usually reflect their work on the Maritime Strategy. (For the latter, see the entries cited earlier in this bibliography by RADMs Hanks, Marryott, and Pendley; CAPTs Barnett, Brooks, Johnson, McGruther, and Swartz; CDRs Hickman, Kalb, and Milsted; and LCDRs Pocalyko and Stavridis. For the former, see the entries below. They represent, admittedly, only a portion of the record, limited only to the products of those officers who were specifically and principally assigned to codify the Maritime Strategy, generally the OP-603 "Branch Heads" and "Maritime Strategy Action Officers" serving from 1982 through 1986. They are provided only to illustrate the breadth of experience and depth of thought members of the U.S. Navy's current, functioning "Corps of Naval Strategists" bring with them when they report for duty).


Daly, CAPT Thomas M. and Myers, CDR Albert C., "The Art of ASW", Proceedings, October 1985, pp 164-165. (Operators and warfare specialists as strategists. The 1985-86 OP-603 Branch Head and his primary Maritime Strategy Action Officer discuss their primary warfare specialty. See also Daly Proceedings articles on the Iran-Iraq War, July 1984 and May and July 1985, and on the Bikini A-Bomb tests, July 1986).
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